NARRATING THE WAR EXPERIENCE. THE POLITICS OF WAR MEMORY AND COMMEMORATION WITHIN THE FRAMED PEACE PROCESS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Abstract

The proliferation of memory of war and commemorative practices within interconnected local and global contexts, are in the focus of global public and academic debate both of which are initiated in the onset of cultural globalisation. The last three decades have seen a growing research interest in a ‘memory boom’ and a recent ‘crisis in history’ in the history and memory debate in Western scholarship. Memory of war is more performed than theorised within the highly contrasting post-war Bosnian-Herzegovinian (BiH) memory landscape, framed through the global transitional justice model.

This research study aims to bridge the gap between theory and practice, and to contribute to recently growing critical approaches to the study of memory of war in politically and culturally isolated post-war BiH. The study aims to develop a sensitised theoretical and methodological framework to the analysis of the construction of recent commemorative language in the BiH, and the ways in which this is challenged.

The understanding of the complex notions of experience, memory, history and culture, which are necessary for grasping the experience of violent changes, is developed through three different stages of the analysis. These concepts are first identified through the examination of the interrelated post-Yugoslav and the post-war BIH contexts, and further considered through the nexus between global, transnational, regional and local contexts in the light of the ideological changes after 1989. The ambiguous and ideologically loaded concepts of memory, history and culture, which inform both the dominant interpretative framework, and the ongoing peace process in the post-war BiH, are demystified in the light of the recent memory and history debate. The conceptual and analytical framework for the study of the commemorative practice in BiH developed in this thesis draws on some of the main concepts which are discussed in this critical debate.

The analysis of the recent politics of war memory and commemoration examines the approaches to memory of war in BiH, through a closer insight into four disparate commemorative events. Bearing in mind the lack of academic debate and the scarcity of critical approaches to history and culture in BiH, the analysis includes the reconstruction of the commemorated events. This analysis highlights the importance of the wider picture needed for understanding the limitation of the predominant and frequently criticised ‘one-fits-all model of transitional justice,’ and more importantly, the ways in which these approaches are challenged in the existing and in emerging arenas of articulation of memory of war, which signalled the shift from the ‘culture of memory’ to the ‘politics of memory’ in BiH.
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<tr>
<td>ARBiH</td>
<td>Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>Central Register of Monuments in BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOS</td>
<td>Democratic Opposition of Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Dayton Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUTCHBAT</td>
<td>Dutch Battalion of the United Nation Protection Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECMM</td>
<td>European Community Monitoring Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICFY</td>
<td>International Conference of Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICMP</td>
<td>International Commission for Missing Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC Sarajevo</td>
<td>Research Documentation Centre Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIMES</td>
<td>International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCY</td>
<td>League of Communists of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières /Doctors Without Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUP KS</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Canton Sarajevo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUP FBiH</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Federation of BiH</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIOD</td>
<td>The Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (from 2010, NIOD, Institute for War Holocaust and Genocide Studies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBiH</td>
<td>Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>RTVSA</td>
<td>Radio and Television of Sarajevo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Office for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Socialist Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SENSE</td>
<td>South East News Service Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRBiH</td>
<td>Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Municipal Territorial Defence Staff the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>TO RBiH</td>
<td>of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations/ Teritorijalna Odbrana/</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nation Protection Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>VRS</td>
<td>Army of Republic of Srpska</td>
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<td>YUTEL</td>
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This thesis is written in memory to my little brother Elin and my father Enes. The vivid memories of their remarkable and beautiful souls and powerful love they left behind continuously illuminates many dark places and keep my heart and eyes open for everything meaningful and beautiful that remained.
Declaration

I declare that the research contained in this thesis, unless otherwise formally indicated within the text, is the original work of the author. The thesis has not been previously submitted to this or any other university for a degree, and does not incorporate any material submitted for a degree.

Signed: Melina Sadiković

[Signature]

Date: 7 February, 2019
CHAPTER 1
Introduction

that is my river
in war, a line of the demarcation of two worlds
the Berlin Wall of a million drops
which we built during Babylonian night watches
yearning with all our might to break it down

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to je moja rijeka
u ratu, crta razgraničenja dvije strane svijeta
berlinski zid sa milijardu kapljica
kojeg smo sagradili u babilonskim stražarskim noćima
iz sve snage žudeći da ga razbijemo

‘Una,’ Faruk Šehić, 2007

My research study explores the experiences of the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) through an analysis of the endeavours of Bosnian-Herzegovinian people to construct the memory of war within the peace process framed by the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (also referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement). The 1992-1996 war in BiH was the most destructive and bloody conflict of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession. Throughout my research study I explore the ways in which the interpretation and representation of multifaceted violent changes enforced by the dissolution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the subsequent 1992-1996 war in BiH, one of Yugoslavs’ six successive republics, shape the post-war culture in the country.

The scale of destruction and brutality performed through the strategies of ethnic cleansing executed during the Wars of Yugoslav Succession (Ramet, 2005) utterly transformed the shared landscapes and social experiences of the peoples once gathered around the idea of Yugoslavism and the concept of worker’s self-management. The ‘legacies of damage’ (Ashplant, Dawson, Roper, 2004) of the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina fragmented

political and cultural space, and reorganised everyday life in the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Similarly, like in other warzones throughout modern history, the peace that was negotiated and mediated by international actors, was finally concluded between the representatives of the opposing warring parties. Accordingly, the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter The Dayton Peace Agreement, DPA) was the outcome of the long-term process of negotiations, which the envoys of the international community first initiated at the very beginning of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession. The signatories of the peace agreement were the representatives of the three succeeding Yugoslav republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who were also perceived as representatives of the three major ethno-national collectives involved in the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While the DPA, initialled in November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, and signed in December, 1995 in Paris, confirmed the legal continuation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and ‘Daytonian’ Bosnia and Herzegovina, it also modified its internal structure. The division of the once unified country into two entities, namely the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), and District Brčko confirmed the political units formed during the wartime, and established an expensive, complex and uncoordinated political organisation of the country. The DPA also comprises the country’s highly criticised constitution that guarantees special rights to constituent dominant ‘ethnic categories’ over the other, ‘national minority’ and civic constitutional categories, which merged with the endorsed territorialisation of the constituent peoples.

The problems related to the practical implementation of the DPA and its Annexes along with the countless practical issues related to contested constitutional provisions, gave rise to the long-running reform debates and affect all aspects of life in the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Nowadays, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a politically divided country faced with the transition from war to peace, from communism to democracy, and parallel to that, the country is in the process of preparing for European Union membership. These transitions are generally supervised by the international community, and conditioned by the successful implementation
of the DPA. In accordance to the general definition of the term provided by Jonathan Tonge, a peace process is defined as an ‘often protracted period of ceasefires, negotiations, settlements and implementation of deals designed to achieve peace.’ Accordingly, Tonga assesses the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, outlined by the DPA whose implementation is supervised by the representatives of the international community, as one of the most successful peace processes in the world, in terms of reduction of violence. On the other side, twenty-seven years after the war, some activists describe the ethnically framed post-war peace process as war by other means.

The most prominent approach to peace and stability in the post-war Bosnian-Herzegovinian society is the transitional justice mechanism. The principal process for establishing the truth about war crimes is proceeding through seeking justice within the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) created in 1993 by the United Nations and closed in 2017. Founded during the wartime, in response to mass atrocities then took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia the ICTY aimed to contribute to the broad peace process in the region of the former Yugoslavia. Through the work which was focused on the prosecution of perpetrators, and specifically of those individuals ‘most responsible for appalling acts such as murder, torture, rape, enslavement, destruction of property and other crimes listed in the Tribunal's Statute’ the ICTY aimed to prevent future crimes and, as stated, to ‘render justice to thousands of victims and their families, thus contributing to a lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia.’ Some of the principles specified by the ICTY Statute are foundation for widely accepted ‘norm for conflict-resolution and post-conflict development across the globe.’ Through its work, as stated, the ICTY contributes to the development of the ‘indisputable historical record, combating denial and helping communities come to terms with their recent histories’ in the wider post-Yugoslav space, including BiH.

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3 Ibid.
4 The ICTY prosecution addresses war crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia, during the periods 1991 – 2001.
6 Ibid.
The application of the universal norms of post-conflict development, along with the vague designations of ‘communities’ and ‘histories’ signal some of the main methodological, theoretical and practical challenges in my search for an adequate theoretical and methodological device for an exploration of the ways in which people construct memories of the 1992-1996 war in BiH, through the analysis of the memory practices and commemorations within the context of the peace process.

Some of the challenges are the framing of the peace process around the perpetrator-victim model, which has recently been challenged in academic debates about memory and history, and by scholars and activists from the post-Yugoslav space. This includes the problems related to the framing of ethnically defined mnemonic communities, and their histories, which first suggests that these notions are rather fixed categories, and second, it largely impedes recognition of the manner of the socio-political and cultural changes which resulted with ethnic divisions.

The changes that affected the social, political and cultural landscape of the region I am focusing on include the vast ideological transformations that took place within the post-Yugoslav space as well as the wider global context at the end of the Cold War. These changes also affected the intellectual paradigm that came to hold sway in the late 1980s and that strongly influenced how history, politics and culture were interpreted after the Fall of Communism.

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Some of the grounds for ambiguous designations of the political, social and cultural categories can be traced to earlier periods of the Yugoslav state(s), but also to the historical turn of 1989-1990 symbolised by the chain of democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe. While the countries of Eastern Europe abolished Soviet domination and communism, in this period in BiH, as Asim Mujkić argues, one form of collectivism was replaced by another, while ‘the rights and fundamental freedoms were transferred from the “proletariat” to a new, re-described
“base” – three ethnic identities.” In the same line, Xavier Bougarel claims that ‘[s]ome of these categories have been carried over from the socialist era, albeit transformed by the war.  

Together with the war-related groups, which were created through the sheer brutality of the war, the spectrum of collective identities in the post-war period demonstrate significant transformations of social structure and relationships. These general categories also (re)shaped individual experiences in relation to the various intersecting senses of belonging including gender, social, class, professional, cultural, religious, and other associated aspects. On the grounds of their multidisciplinary and comprehensive analyses of the post-war society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bougarel and others describe how, although ‘after war and ethnic cleansing, ethno-national categories have become more pervasive and rigid, as well as more closely linked with religious markers and institutions’, at the same time ‘ethno-national identifications are still relative, changing and contested and that some forms of interethnic cooperation have survived the war.’ Accordingly, the war memory of various groups are mainly closely related around their often contrasting war experiences. Their identities, as Xavier Bougarel and others suggest, are in some cases ‘less related to ethnicity as such than to place – such as, for example, the side of the frontline on which people were trapped during the war.’ They are also related to social status, which in some cases antedates the war or, they emerged along with the war while, in some cases are related to personal experiences of interethnic violence or cooperation. Accordingly, the authors emphasise that

colors of memory not only pit ethno-national groups against each other, but also reflect other divides such as those between war participants and returning refugees (…), believers and secularists (…), and supporters of nationalist parties and their opponents.  

Different concepts of political pluralism demonstrated in the opposition between civic identity and emerging ethno-national identity also conveyed different ideas of culture and society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, pre-war forms of alternative politics,

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7 Asim, Mujkić, We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis (Sarajevo: Centar za ljudska prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu, 2008), p.30.  
9 Ibid., 2007, p.27.  
12 Maček, Kolind, Delpla in Bougarel and others, The New Bosnian Mosaic.  
persisted during wartime. The examples are countless, from the regular protests against the war in BiH organised in Serbia, and beyond by artists, intellectuals, activists, and members of the wider public to the acts of solidarity by individuals who saved the lives of threatened ‘ethnic others.’

The negotiation process of the general framework for peace involved exclusively the ethno-national elite and recognized ethno-national affiliations as the primary identities in political and cultural life in Daytonian Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, various civil society actors and those politicians who had resisted the war and ethno-mobilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although completely excluded from the negotiation processes, have played a prominent role in the peace process in the post-war period.

The complex notion of the ‘postwar moment’ integrates some of the main dilemmas of various researchers concerned with the study of memory of war. This foremost methodological problem, as Cockburn and Zarkov explain, refers to the difficulty in defining clearly a moment when a particular conflict started, and the moment when it ends. The authors examine the impact of peacekeeping and post-war reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and suggest that instead of aiming to define these specific moments, we should rather perceive them as a part of continuum.14 The latter, is, according to Cockburn and Zarkov ‘expressed now in armed force, now in economic sanctions or political pressure. A time of supposed peace may later come to be ‘the pre-war period.'15 In order to underline the often blurred and overlapping relation between war and peace, the authors further assert that [d]uring the fighting of war, unseen by the foot soldiers under fire, peace processes are often already at work. A time of post-war reconstruction, later, maybe re-designated as an inter-bellum - a mere pause between wars.’ 16

On the premises of their gender analyses of war violence, which generally indicate the prevalence of male sexualized violence against women and children, in both war and peace, the authors argue that cycles of war and peace should not be broken up into discrete, labelled chunks, emphasizing that

14 Tonge, Comparative Peace Processes, p.1.
15 Cockburn and Zarkov, The Postwar Moment.
16 Ibid., p. 10.
a continuum of violence runs through the social sphere, and the economic and political spheres. To focus on outbreaks of armed conflict could thus have the effect of diminishing the significance of structural violence, long-term oppression and impoverishment.17

This argument sheds light on both the overlapping periods of war and peace in Yugoslavia, its constituent republics and autonomous provinces in the twentieth century, and on the deeply-rooted political, economic and social problems that were fashioning complex relationships within the larger society through time.

The resultant Yugoslav wars, which also symbolised the end of the Yugoslav federation, framed in this way imply that the War of Yugoslav Secession turned the post-Second World War period of peace into the pre-war period for different generations. Overlapping and divergent experiences of war and peace of the people of Yugoslavia, and particularly experiences of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are the focus of this thesis, thus require development of a comprehensive framework and a sensitised approach to the context after the 1992-1996 war, in which my analysis is situated.

As Cockburn and Zarkov explain, the post-war moment also refers to a moment, which comes after the war that is dominated by military strategy, when policy can be diversified. Specifically, the authors describe how these changes occur simultaneously and that they include several aspects, such as reconstruction of the economy, rebuilding of social structures, and new conceptions of the state in general. On the other hand, these processes also confront numerous challenges, where supposed changes in the processes of ‘rebuilding of social structures, the renewal of democracy and the reworking of cultures’, as the authors emphasize, could turn in the wrong direction due to lack of understanding of the context, and can reproduce old exclusions and oppressions.18 Cockburn and Zarkov, who are primarily concerned with gender power relations in the context of peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina, describe ‘the post-war moment’ as a crucial moment, but also as an opportunity for inclusion of gender equality, in their terms, as a prerequisite for the peace and equal society in the overall peace process. In this manner, when reflecting on the policy-making process and the policy-makers, the authors are concern with the following questions:

17 Cockburn and Zarkov, The Postwar Moment, p.10.
18 Ibid., p. 11.
'[w]ill they understand with hindsight, a certain causal implication of gender relations and gendered cultures in the mobilisation of national sentiments and the requirement of armies? Is it thinkable that the postwar moment be used as an opportunity to turn a society towards gender equality, diminution of “difference” and the valorisation of women and the feminine? Could policymakers recognize such a transformation of the gender order as a necessary component of every lasting peace process, as itself an underpinning of peace?'\textsuperscript{19}

The concept of ‘the post-war moment’ and the questions that are raised concerning gender power relations,\textsuperscript{20} signpost a valuable perspective, and draw attention to the overlapping experiences of war and peace. This view discloses relevant aspects of the relations of power in narration of war and the in the processes of construction of war memory, which is not always situated within the local context, but rather brings into relation local and global contexts.

The aspects involved in the complex political and cultural process in the aftermath of the war require closer insight into the change of the structure, the ramifications of these changes for the people on the ground, and their endeavours to construct shared narratives and to gain recognition within the political arena.

1.2. The organization of the research

The analysis of the processes of narration of the experience of the 1992-1996 war focuses on the cultural and political aspects of war memory and commemoration of the events in order to understand the relations between politics from below and the ongoing peace process in BiH. This thesis aims to provide the contextual framework within which I situate the political and historical aspects of the interrelated Yugoslav and Bosnian-Herzegovinian context(s) in order to explore how the existing narratives were constructed and to analyse the shifts they have undergone over time. It also aims to identify the horizon of representation used in the recent commemorative practices. This is in accordance with Ashplant, Dawson and Roper’s suggestion that ‘responses to the war are formed in relation both to personal experience and to

\textsuperscript{19} Cockburn and Zarkov, \textit{The Postwar Moment}.

\textsuperscript{20} Bob Connell uses the term ‘gender order’ to designate a particular structuring of gender relations on the large historical and spatial plan, while institutionally, gender relations manifest themselves in differing ‘gender regimes.’ (Connell, 1987 in Cockburn and Zarkov, \textit{The Postwar Moment}). Here, as Cockburn and Zarkov point out ‘[i]t is a regime that exaggerates gender difference and inequality, and dictates complementary worlds for men and women during and after the wars. In war, militarist discourses (like the nationalist discourses with which they often elide) elevate men to the world of arms and glory; women they relegate to the world of birthing and mourning. (...) After war, the traditional militarized gender regime endows men with power in politics and locates women’s importance within the family.’ Cockburn and Zarkov, \textit{The Postwar Moment}, p.13.
pre-existing narratives.’ Accordingly, individual memory draws upon key ‘re-memories’ or ‘templates’, and as they further explain

These templates, consisting of cultural narratives, myths and tropes, are the frames trough which further conflicts are understood. (...) Thus individuals expressing their direct personal memories of the war may invoke elements drawn from experiences and representations which originate before the lifetime of current living population. Even the ‘eyewitness’ memory of the war then, is constructed both from personal experience and in relation to pre-existing cultural templates. The templates provide horizons of representation through which later conflicts are understood.21

The conceptual framework developed in this thesis incorporate both Western and (post) Yugoslav multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary accounts including cultural studies and political theory.

My analysis is focused on the identification of social actors who experienced the war differently, and who have been involved in the commemoration of events from the 1992-1996 war within the vastly transformed post-war society. Specifically, I will consider their discourses and the interplay between them. One of the analytical concepts I will use in my analysis is the ‘politics of memory and commemoration’ approach suggested by Ashplant, Dawson and Roper. I draw on this work in order to indicate the, ‘importance of retaining a live connection between the intellectual debates developing within the academic world and the wider contexts and constituencies where these issues are salient.’22 They go on to argue that, ‘[a] distinguishable feature of the most compelling “academic” research on the cultures of war memory has always been its willingness to step outside the academy so as to engage critical theory and analysis in a more self-conscious dialogue with ‘living memory.”23 The analysis in this thesis aims to contribute to the scholarly debate by using this critical analytical approach to the social practices of war memory and commemoration to understand different aspects that constitute this process in the post-war context in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taking into consideration Ashplant and others’ emphasis on the importance of the nation state to the politics of memory and commemoration, which, as they suggest, produces the central dominant national narrative24 the analysis of the dominant and oppositional narratives in political and

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p.16.
cultural process of constructing the past are of great importance in understanding the process within the divided post-war society.

Ashplant and others’ analytical model of the politics of memory and commemoration embraces both, top-down and bottom-up approaches and various actors struggling to voice their responses to the violence, injustice and destruction of war. Also, within this broad cultural and political process, the authors distinguish several aspects of ‘the struggle to articulate war memories: its narratives, its arenas and its agencies.’ As such, the politics of war memory and commemoration are helpful in reflecting on the multi-scale destruction of the country and social and political divisions, which are, as Bougarel and others underscored, often beyond ethno-national belonging. But, they are also reflecting the dearth in legal, social, cultural, psychological and physical reconstruction framed by the widely criticised General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The analysis presented here seeks to grasp the ‘post-war moment’ through an examination of (re)framing the peace process, particularly through exploring the ways in which people affected by the war are responding to the vast changes caused by the violence of war, human rights violations, overall destruction of the country’s socio-economic infrastructure and its cultural symbols and heritage; and their endeavours to rebuild their lives and society.

In order to provide deeper insight into the post-war context, the study will incorporate an overview of the context in the three chronological stages, within which particular historical, political and cultural experiences are reflected in the war memory and articulated through the processes of commemoration. The first stage depicts a political and economic crisis in Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the shift from socialist self-management to ethnopolitics, which occurred in the pre-war period. The second stage refers to the war period, characterised by the politics of disintegration and the physical and symbolic destruction of common spaces (political, historical and cultural) that occurred after the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia. And finally, the third stage is the period after the signing of the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The analysis is structured around seven chapters that include the second chapter on contextualisation. The subsequent chapters broaden understandings of some of the main

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ideological changes on the global level that took place at the same time as the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The analysis in the fourth chapter ponders some of the main concepts that are developed in recent debates about memory and history, and which inform the theoretical and analytical framework for my analysis of case studies of commemoration. Chapter five analyses the process of construction of the narrative of the Srebrenica genocide. This include different stages from the first stage of silence, through the public activism and resultant legal framing, to the establishment of the memorial in Potočari. This chapter is complementary to the subsequent chapter six, which examines the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide on 11 of July, 2010, and the counter-commemoration in the nearby village Kravica on 12 July 2010. Chapter seven explores commemorative practices at the parallel commemorations in Dobrovoljačka street in Sarajevo, structured around two contrasting narratives. And finally, the eighth chapter provides an overview of the first post-war debate on ‘national’ culture, and various alternative approaches and platforms of solidarity, which were initiated in response to the crisis of national cultural institutions. In the second part of the analysis I focus on commemorations in Sarajevo and in Prijedor. The latter provoked some emergent memory practices which challenged dominant commemorative practices.

The four selected case studies commemorate events that occurred during the 1992-1996 war in four different geographical locations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This includes two commemorations in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dobrovoljačka Street Gathering in Sarajevo, specifically the first gathering organised on the 3 May, 2010; and Sarajevo Red Line, the memorial event organised on the 6 April, 2012); and two commemorations in the Republic of Srpska (Srebrenica Memorial Day, 15th Anniversary of the Genocide in Srebrenica organised on the 11 July, 2010; and The Worldwide Armband Day Campaign initiated on the 31 May, 2012 to commemorate victims of the ethnic cleansing of non-Serb citizens in the municipality of Prijedor during 1992.

The second chapter on contextualisation includes a political and historical analysis of the (post) Yugoslav context in order to: establish and examine the relationship between interrelated contexts of socialist Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; analyse the legal framework(s), which delineated the political and cultural society of socialist Yugoslavia and subsequently of its succeeding republics; outline some of the main historical, political, cultural and social changes that occurred in the last three decades in Yugoslavia, with particular focus on the effects of these major watershed moments on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus constructed
analysis is necessary for thinking about complex notions of culture, society, identity, and memory after the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also brings historical aspects of the violent dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia into view and underlines similarities and differences between Bosnia and Herzegovina and other Yugoslav succeeding republics, and particularly between Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia. The historical-political analysis sheds light on the conditions under which the new politics of time and space were developed. It also depicts different stages of the radical alteration of the social experience and thus, the ways in which new cultural forms and practices were introduced and exercised. Gradually, these changes led to the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and transformed the meanings (as well as experiences) of ‘culture’, ‘identities’ and ‘memory’ in the (post)Yugoslav space. The effects of these changes on the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the focus of the analysis of post-war culture in these places.

Within the political and historical analysis of the interconnected pre-war socialist Yugoslavian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian contexts, I also examine the relationship between ‘deep-rooted’ problems from the earlier historical periods, and ‘ethnic identity.’ The latter was the main postulate of the ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ thesis prevalent in a number of scholarly and non-scholarly publications about the interrelated contexts that were written chronologically closer to the conflict. However, this thesis has subsequently been frequently criticised in the scholarly debates within (post-)Yugoslav studies. The overview of the historical-political and cultural background of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the pre-war era, and from the war period that is provided in this part of the analysis shall allow me to develop a wider and contextually sensitive conceptual framework within the subsequent chapter. Such contextual and conceptual frameworks are necessary in order to thoroughly analyse the outcomes of the multifaceted changes. The second chapter accentuates the multiple interconnections between the countries that once shared a common culture and history; and particularly between the countries involved in the Wars of Yugoslav Succession; which (apart from Slovenia) were involved in the peace negotiation process that resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement. A review of the country’s recent history will shed light on particular events that are seen as watersheds in the development of the recent politics, and recognised as an integral part of the (post-)war memory politics, while some other relevant events are absent, or they are only recently gradually (re)emerging in public memory narratives and in the scholarly debate. Importantly, the overview will also outline the scholarly debates about the 1992-1996 war, its causes and consequences. This overview is essential for rethinking some of the main concepts, relationships and dynamics
involved in the process of construction of senses of belonging in relation to war memory within the peace process as it has been framed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The third chapter broadens the debate about (war) memory, history and justice in relation to the shift of paradigms after the turn of 1989-1990, and it explores some of the ramifications of this shift on the political relations between the interrelated global, transnational, wider post-communist and post-Yugoslav contexts. Some of the main issues considered in the third chapter are examined in the history and memory debate in the fourth chapter, which informs the development of the sensitive conceptual and analytical framework for the analysis of the politics of war memory and commemoration in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The fifth and sixth chapters analyse the narration of war experience through the politics of memory and commemorations and it encompasses legal, political and cultural framing of the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide, which is the central case study of my dissertation.

In the seventh chapter I further explore some of the main arguments from the analysis of the politics of memory and commemoration that I developed in relation to the case of the Srebrenica genocide, through the analysis of the commemoration of the JNA soldiers killed in Dobrovoljačka Street in May 1992 in Sarajevo.

I link my analysis of the politics of war memory and commemoration to the wider post-war context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the eighth chapter, I integrate and discuss the findings of the analysis of the two case studies in relation to two commemorative events from 2012, namely, the commemoration of the beginning of the 1992-1996 Siege of Sarajevo, and the commemorative protest in Prijedor held in 2012.

Finally, in the conclusion I summarise the main conclusions of the analysis of the politics of war memory and commemoration in the country, and the (post-war) culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina and discuss them in relation to the theoretical and analytical framework.
The selected case studies are examined through the analytical concept of the politics of memory and commemoration developed by Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, within which the authors have developed an extended notion of the concept of ‘the politics of memory’. Within this framework, the authors differentiate several aspects of the struggle to articulate war memories - the narratives of articulation, arenas of articulation and the agencies of articulation. The four case studies exemplify some of the main challenges facing post-war society in BiH as they seek to commemorate experiences of war and also reveal how the politics of memory is structured in the country.

Thus, the selected concept for critical analysis offers insight into the processes as well as the ways in which individuals and groups articulate their war experiences in the narratives, the arenas within which articulated narratives seek recognition and finally, the agencies through which they act. The analysis provides closer insight into the structure of cultural and political spaces within the fragmented country, the actors involved in the construction of war memory and commemoration, but also the role of the memory of war and commemoration in the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.
CHAPTER 2  
Historical and Political Analysis: The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia Between Reformation and the Violent Dissolution

2.1. Introduction

The Yugoslav economic and political crisis, and the subsequent 1991-1996 Wars of Yugoslav Succession (hereafter the Wars of Yugoslav Succession) have coincided with some of the major shifts in political, economic, technological and cultural developments on a wider, global scale that occurred in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Generally characterised by the shift from future-oriented modernism to present-oriented postmodernism, these changes on the global scale instigated shifts in dominant intellectual paradigms developed throughout the turbulent twentieth century.¹ Throughout the twentieth century, historical events such as the Great Depression, two World Wars, and the end of the Cold War, have had a ripple effect on the wider political order and thus, they have significantly redefined the world’s political map.

The immensely changed post-Second World War (WWII hereafter) world order was symbolised with the beginning of the nuclear age and rushed building of nuclear deterents in a world divided between capitalist and communist power blocks. Specifically, the long-term global crisis, denoted as the Cold War, was demonstrated in an ideological opposition between state-market Communism in the East and free-market capitalism in the West. The economic models were controlled by superpowers, namely the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA) incorporated a number of countries into their opposing ideological and military blocs, namely NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The end of the turbulent and violent twentieth century was marked by the end of the Cold War, which ended suddenly, with the collapse of both the Soviet and

Yugoslav respective models of communism. The dramatic, and to some extent, violent chain of events in the Soviet bloc countries, also termed ‘democratic revolutions,’ initiated in 1989, led to the collapse of the Bloc, and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Thus, in the period from 1989 to 1991, murky images from the far communist East, which depicted hundreds of thousands of unarmed people gathered in pro-independence rallies held in the cities across eastern Europe were broadcast to the world. These media-transmitted political transformations across Europe resulted in: the German (re)unification in 1990; the violent dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter SFRY) in June 1991; the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991; and, the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 (popularly called the Velvet Divorce).

The ripple effect of the wider ideological, political and geographical transformations that followed the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’ in 1989 has resonated strongly in socialist Yugoslavia. However, the scale and extent of the violence that followed the dissolution of the USSR was not as extreme as the violence that followed the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, which occurred in the same year. Under the influence of the political turmoil and manner of the changes in surrounding countries, the long-term Yugoslav economic crisis which led to the paralysing political crisis in the late 1980s, culminated in the Wars of Yugoslav Succession that brought the (post)Yugoslav space into the focus of the ever-changing world.

The political-historical analysis I develop in this chapter, primarily aims to rebut the popular scholarly and non-scholarly claims that the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), as one of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, was caused by the ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ among the ‘ethnic collectives’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This common perception of the rise of nationalism in the late eighties as the main cause of the horrendous conflicts that followed Yugoslav dissolution, is, as Allcock describes, conveyed within journalistic debate in particular through the often-used metaphor that ‘President Tito “kept the lid on the boiling pot”’. On the other hand, the scholarly

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debate, as Allcock further explains, commonly sees the communist system and its inability to resolve the long-term crisis, which reached its peak in the late 1980s, as some of the key causes since, in his terms ‘disintegration was a process driven from the top, not the bottom.’ These opposing accounts are discussed through a comprehensive and retrospective scrutiny of some of the main events that preceded the war.

Generally, many approaches to the study of the Yugoslav wars accentuate the importance of the different historical periods of the post-Yugoslav space. While some researchers trace the roots of the modern problems to the earlier historical periods, the other camp of researchers focuses on the modern history of Yugoslavia. Accordingly, historian Jasmina Soso-Dragović notes that the longue durée approach was first introduced after the outbreak of the war in the 1991. The ‘ancient hatreds thesis’, as one of the longue durée explanations, as she explains, traces the origins of the wars of Yugoslav Succession, back to the fourteenth century, when the Battle of Kosovo, in which the Army of the Kingdom of Serbia, was defeated by the Army of Ottoman Empire. Recently, on the ground, most of the dominant ideological constructions incorporate some of the myths from earlier historical periods, together with the reinterpreted events from the Second World War period, something I explore in more detail within the cultural analysis in the subsequent chapter. The shifting focus which produces the basis for different re-interpretations and meanings in the post-Yugoslav space, is most evident in the memory of the wars from the 1990s.

Thus, the aim of my analysis in this chapter is twofold. First, it aims to identify divergent and complex historical frameworks for the interpretation of social, cultural and political relationships of (post-) Yugoslav space, through the exploration of some of the main approaches to the conflicts that followed the violent dissolution of the SFRY. These dominant frameworks today provide the foundations for the ongoing peace process, and the recent politics of identity and memory in BiH as well as in the wider post-Yugoslav space.

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3 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, p.418.
Second, this analysis examines some of the key events from the twentieth century. This includes a consideration of transformative events from the earlier period, in order to identify actors and relations between different politics and to contribute to the understanding of the recent and growing revivalism of some of the movements and associated ideologies from the country’s earlier history.

Within this chapter I also consider some of the main transformative events which occurred in the last three decades of the twentieth within the (post-)Yugoslav space in general, and the post-war BiH context, in particular. Considering the internationalization of the Yugoslav wars and particularly of the war in BiH, I examine these and other associated events in relation to wider European and global contexts.

Chronologically, this chapter incorporates a brief political-historical overview that encompasses the period from the foundation of the First Yugoslavia in 1918, through its modern history, to the violent dissolution of the country, and the aftermath of the wars. The overview outlines some of the perspectives that are important for the context and for the envisaged analysis of the politics of war and memory in the post-war period in BiH.

Methodologically, the political-historical overview operates on three levels of framing of the (post-war) BiH context, which is the focus of my thesis. Firstly, by focusing on the historical-political overview of the Yugoslav modern history, it identifies some of the key events that preceded the war, and it establishes the relationship between the then Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the SFRY. Secondly, framed in this way, the overview enables an examination of the relationship between the wars from the early nineties, and it limits the analysis to the conflicts that occurred in the period from 1991 to 1996. Thus, the scope of the analysis encompasses the wars that occurred in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. These conflicts, which I frame as the 1991-1996 Wars of Yugoslav Succession in accordance with Ramet’s suggestion, are part of the wider framework of the Yugoslav wars (1991-2001). Thirdly, the framework, which also outlines some of the main events from the 1992-1996 war in BiH, incorporates some of the main events, agencies as well as the processes that led to the signing of the peace
treaty in 1995 as well as the mode of the change which is continuously reproduced and contested in the post-war period.

2.2. Historical-Political Overview: The Long Yugoslav Revolution

In the first paragraphs of her well-known accounts on violence and on revolution Hannah Arendt recalls the prediction of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin that the twentieth century has become ‘a century of wars and revolutions, hence a century of that violence which is currently believed to be their common denominator.’ The rational goal of a ‘new apocalyptic chess game between superpowers’ which marked the twentieth century, as Arendt describes is deterrence, not victory, and the arms race, no longer a preparation for war, can now be justified only on the ground that more and more deterrence is the best guarantee for peace.

The space of today’s ‘former Yugoslavia’, can be seen as a precedent of the fulfilment of Lenin’s prophecy, considering that the country experienced three devastating wars and the communist revolution during the twentieth century. Throughout the twentieth century, the long and disputed history of the idea of Yugoslavia passed through different political-historical periods that generally correspond to the three wars, of which two were World Wars. Although different in their characters as in their impact on the broader geo-political European and global contexts, these wars played an immense role in shaping the political and cultural history and identity of the (post-)Yugoslav space. The political dynamics of ‘a new chess game between superpowers’, the way in which Arendt designates the new political hegemony, are an integrative part of both Yugoslav history and the respective histories of its succeeding republics.

2.2.1. The First World War and the ‘birth’ of the First Yugoslavia

The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and his wife, Sophia Duchess of Hohenberg in Sarajevo in 1914 by Gavrilo Prinicip, a member of the pro-Yugoslav youth organisation ‘Young Bosnia’ [Mlada Bosna] was recorded in historical scholarship as the event that triggered the First World War (1914-1918). Today, many historians will agree that it was not the event itself that was decisive for the outbreak of the war, but the complex relations between the greatest European powers at that time. At the same time, in the context of the (post) Yugoslav space, the assassination of the Archduke resonated with the long struggle of South Slavs against the empire’s governance. As some scholar commentators suggest, the overall dissatisfaction of the majority of the South Slavs was mainly related to the lack of land reform, which has been seen as the only solution for the reduction of poverty among the local population. In general, as Denitch explains, although the dual Monarchy largely granted cultural autonomy to South Slavs, they were treated as ‘at best as backward provincials.’

The end of the First World War saw the creation of new nations, which seceded after the collapse of the defeated Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, and the Ottoman Empire in 1920, and after the diminishment of the German and the Russian empires. Thus, the Treaty of Versailles, in Mark Mazower’s terms, ‘had given sixty million people a state of their own, but it turned another twenty-five million into minorities.’

One of the states that emerged from the dissolved Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the

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7 Growing resentment against Austro-Hungarian Monarchy instigated the struggles for independence within Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, and it intensified cooperation with Serbia in establishing the common South Slav’s state.

8 In total, seven members of the ‘Young Bosnia’ were involved in the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sofia, while the complicity of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević called Apis, chief of Serbian army intelligence and one of the leading members of a secret society named Union of Death (also known as the Black Hand) is still the subject of debate. Moreover, in the period from the 1907-1910, as Malcolm describes, The Young Bosnia was one of the organizations of students and schoolboys that adopted pro-Yugoslav campaign and which articulated the common political aspirations of Bosnian Orthodox Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The nationalist sentiment of that time is illustrated in a statement at Gavrilo Princip’s trial in 1914 ‘I am Yugoslav nationalist aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria.’ in Vladimir Dedijer, Road to Sarajevo (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1967); also in Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, (London: Pan Books, 1996), p. 153.


Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Moreover, the emergence of this new multinational Kingdom was also an outcome of both the long struggle of the former Austro-Hungarian provinces against the empires,\textsuperscript{11} and the accomplishment of long aspirations for the political unity of the South Slavs.\textsuperscript{12} The new state which was formed by the unification of the former Austro-Hungarian provinces\textsuperscript{13} and the Kingdoms of Montenegro and the Kingdom of Serbia, was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. It is also referred to as the First Yugoslavia.

The newly formed Kingdom established as ‘the constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy under the Karadordević dynasty’ confronted numerous challenges in nearly twenty-five years of its existence. Some of the main disputes in the interwar period were concerned with the problem of a highly centralised constitution led by the king, which incited strong opposition from the federalists’ parties. Denitch suggests that some of the grounds of the opposing centralist and federalist conceptions of the state can be found in the legacy of the previous wars. As he explains, the centralist concept was upheld by Serbia which, after the victory in Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and after the end of First World War (1913-1914), perceived its role in the new Kingdom as a liberator of other South Slavs from foreign rule.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, in Denitch’s terms, Serbia saw the multinational Kingdom as ‘an extension of Serbia.’ On the other side were Croats, Slovenes and Bosnian Muslims who endorsed the federalist conception and considered the new state as ’a voluntary federation of equal people who will jointly construct a new state with a new constitution, laws and civil service.’\textsuperscript{15} However, the principal disagreements culminated in the political crisis in the 1920s, manifested through intensive quarrels between the parties of the constituent assembly of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Dramatic turns of the political crisis after the assassination of three members of the Croatian Peasant Party in the Parliament, finally led to the collapse of government in 1928. One year later, the King Aleksandar I Karadordević of Yugoslavia had abolished the constitution of 1921 and pronounced the

\textsuperscript{11} Some provinces, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina were earlier under the rule of the Ottaman Empire.
\textsuperscript{12} The Yugoslav (land of South Slavs) movement emerged in the nineteenth century with literary movements in Croatia, Slovenia and the Kingdom of Serbia and Kingdom of Montenegro and echoed in other provinces of South Slavs under the Austro-Hungarian occupation. The word ‘jug’ designates ‘south’ in Bosnian, Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian and Slovenian languages.
\textsuperscript{13} Fred Singleton, \textit{Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia} (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1976)
\textsuperscript{14} Denitch, \textit{Ethnic Nationalism}, p.25.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
royal dictatorship. In this period the Communist party that led strikes of the trade unions in BiH and in Slovenia earlier in 1920, was banned, while a number of the members of the party and unions were imprisoned. Also, the extreme nationalist views were repressed, which drove some of the most radical nationalist leaders such as radical Croatian politician Ante Pavelić and his nationalist organisation called ‘Ustaše’ (Ustashe) into exile.

2.2.2. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia on the eve of the Second World War

The politics in Yugoslavia radically turned since 1934, when the king Aleksandar was assassinated in Marseilles during his state visit to France, and the Prince Paul was appointed regent as the successor to the throne of King Peter. The concurrent rise of fascism and the rapid progress of the Axis powers in Europe had a strong impact on the general situation in the country, which found itself under the increased pressure of the Axis pact. The country’s geo-political position was of high significance for both the Allies and the Axis powers during the war. The latter, eager to establish domination over the country from inside, initiated negotiation processes with the Yugoslav government, but also with the opposing radical nationalists in the country and in exile.

This was followed by the decision of the Yugoslav government to join the Tripartite pact in March 1941, which confronted strong resistance and incited protests across the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Only two days after the signing of the Vienna Protocol of March 27, 1941, a few opponent ministers organised a coup d’état in the name of King Peter. However, soon after the coup, the deposed Prince Paul fled to Greece, while the new government, formed by a few ministers from the previous government, and King Petar Karadordević (who was sworn in after the coup), emigrated to London after the invasion of the Axis pact. These unforeseen political turns in the country impedied the strategy of the Axis powers to gain control over the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as they had lost the support they expected from the overthrown Yugoslav government.

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16 Also known as ‘the 6th January Dictatorship.’
17 A few days after he fled the country, regent Prince Paul was captured by the British troops in Greece.
Only four days after the German, Italian, Bulgarian and Hungarian forces invaded Yugoslavia on April 6 1941, the Axis powers proclaimed the state they named Independent State of Croatia, which soon, in Malcolm’s terms, became ‘an instrument of terror and genocide.’ Germans nominated radical Croatian politician Ante Pavelić, who came back from the exile in Italy, to govern the Nazi-puppet state that included and occupied the whole of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were also divided between Germany and Italy. Pavelić’s ‘Ustaša’ organisation became a mass-movement only after the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia, and was one of main actors in the execution of anti-Jewish, racist and genocidal policies of the state. These policies were executed through appropriation and through the torture and mass murder of civilians of Bosnia BiH and Croatia who belonged to various ethnic and religious groups (mainly Serbs, Jews, Roma) and to political parties (members of communist and other left-wing parties, regardless of their ethnic-religious belonging) across the Independent Croatian State. The largest number of these people were tortured and murdered in the death camp Jasenovac located on the border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and run by Ustaša.

In 1941, another quisling government was installed in Serbia, and it was headed by a former member of the royal Yugoslav Government, General Milan Nedić. Specifically, it was established after part of the Royal Government went into exile, when the Royal Army broke down into guerrilla bands commonly named Četnik (Chetniks). Nedić’s Četnik forces executed anti-Semitic policies in Serbia. Together with General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović’s Četnik’s units, these forces were involved in the arrests of the Jews, Roma people and supporters of partisans across Serbia and Montenegro, who were later executed by the occupying German forces. Moreover, both Nedić’s and Mihailović’s Četnik forces were involved in massacres against local

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18 Malcolm, Bosnia. A Short History, p.175.
20 Mihailović was the colonel of the Army of Kingdom of Yugoslavia who was upgraded to general by the Yugoslav-royal-government in-exile. Forces under his command were also known as Četnik, which, as Malcolm argues, became confusing name, considering that there were many Četnik groups active across the territory of the occupied Yugoslavia. According to some historian’s accounts, Mihailović’s Četnik organisation began resistance to the Axis forces in May 1941. However, during the wartime they were collaborating with the Nedić’s quisling regime and the Axis against the Yugoslav partisans.
population across Yugoslavia, mostly against Muslim civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia and Montenegro.

Hence, the Second World War in Yugoslavia, as Malcolm describes, was ‘the story of many wars piled one on top of another.’\textsuperscript{\ref{21}} Here, Malcolm refers to the war of the Axis occupiers against Yugoslav’s resistance movement(s), which he also describes as ‘subsidiary to the wider aims of Axis strategy against the Allies’, and to ‘at least two civil wars.’\textsuperscript{\ref{22}}

The Communist party that organised the all-Yugoslav armed resistance in the National Liberation Struggle thus fought against the Axis power and quisling governments, which included the Independent State of Croatia and Nedić’s Serbian quisling regime, and various Četnik groups (Mihailović’s as all other groups called Četniks) for the most part in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and in Croatia. Accordingly, in his analysis of the role of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Partisan war, Denitch asserts that the Communist Party was re-created during the wartime and underlines that

[d]espite the occupation and partition of Yugoslavia by Germany, Italy, and their allies, the partisans carried out this struggle not only against the Axis occupiers, but also for power and a new social order. This is what differentiated the Yugoslav resistance from all others in Europe during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{\ref{23}}

The so-called Second Yugoslavia was initiated during the war with the formation of the provisional government – the Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (hereinafter AVNOJ), which, as Woodward describes, projected the idea of Yugoslav partisans to ‘replace the monarchy with the republic and to create a federation based on the territorial organization of the partisan, antifascist resistance.’\textsuperscript{\ref{24}} Additionally, BiH became one of six socialist republics that constituted the new socialist Yugoslavia established in 1943 at the Second Session of the AVNOJ, which

\textsuperscript{\ref{21}} Malcolm, \textit{Bosnia}, p.174.
\textsuperscript{\ref{22}} First, Malcolm refers to a war of Croatian extremists against the Serb population of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and second, a war between ‘two resistance organisations’ – where Malcolm counts the Mihailović’s Četniks on one side and the Communist Partisans on the other, against the Croatian extremist.
\textsuperscript{\ref{23}} Denitch, \textit{Ethnic Nationalism}, p.34.
\textsuperscript{\ref{24}} Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, p. 30.
confirmed the unity and integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a ‘free and brotherly country in which full equality of Serbs, Muslims and Croats will be guaranteed.’

The death toll in the Second World War in Yugoslavia, according to Denitch, was around one million out of sixteen million Yugoslavs registered in the Census of 1941, where all nationalities were killed in the massacres that took place throughout Yugoslavia. Denitch provides a complex picture of the crimes committed in Yugoslavia during the Second World War in his account of the wartime massacres. He first asserts that Ustaše committed the worst massacres against the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jews, Roma people, left-wing Croats and Bosnian-Herzegovinians, and other political opponents. Unlike Ustaše, who held state power under the Nazis, Denitch claims that the Serbian Četniks ‘of all varieties’, committed brutal massacres against Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia and against Croatian villagers.’ In his analysis, Denitch also mentions the Hungarian massacres of Serbs in Vojvodina; Albanian and Bulgarian brutality against the Serbs; and the burning of villages by Italians. Germans massacred tens of thousands of civilians, mostly in Serbia, in reprisal for the resistance and deported large numbers to forced labour camps. Most Jews in Yugoslavia were exterminated.

Moreover, as Woodward states, within five years another 51,000 people were arrested or disappeared, and many members of the political elite were excluded from further participation in public life. On the other side, Josip Broz Tito (Tito hereinafter), the leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and of the Yugoslav partisan’s resistance movement during the wartime, tried to balance numerous conflicts between the people of the new Yugoslavia. Tito’s efforts were demonstrated through his policy of amnesty for various soldiers who were fighting against partisans and their supporters, but were overshadowed by the crimes committed by partisans in the end of the war. One of the ‘best-known instances,’ as Malcolm describes the massacre committed in Bleiburg in Austria, was

the treatment meted out to the remnants of various anti-Partisan forces (and associated civilians) who had taken refuge in Allied-controlled Austria in April and May 1945; Slovene “home-guards,” Ustaše soldiers, and Serb and Muslim

26 Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism, p.31.
27 Ibid.
28 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 25.
Četniks, Bosnian Croats, Serbs and Muslims were present in this great mass of defeated soldiers. More than 18,000 were sent back to Yugoslavia by the British at Tito’s insistence; most were massacred within hours on their arrival on Yugoslav soil.  

Once the Yugoslav partisans, led by Tito with the support of the Allied powers and the Soviet Union, defeated the German and Italian occupying forces and the local collaborators, they established the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. Tito became what Mitja Velikonja describes as the ‘trinity ruler’ in the state that was later renamed the Socialist Federative Republic Yugoslavia. Specifically, Tito was the head of state, the Marshal of the Yugoslav People’s Army, and the leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia until his death in 1980. During his nearly forty-year long year leadership of the country, Tito placed Yugoslavia at the particular political position within the bipolar world then, divided between the West and the Eastern Block. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Yugoslav regime that was also described as ‘national communism’, was greatly dependant on the foreign aid of the United States, and on economic assistance.

2.2.3. The Cold War period

The watershed in post-war Yugoslav history occurred after the Information Bureau of the Communist and Worker’s Parties’ (hereinafter Cominform) resolution of 1948, which expelled Yugoslavia from the membership. Some of the main consequences of the expulsion were strict economic and political measures against socialist Yugoslavia. Thus, the economic blockage and anti-Yugoslav campaign propagated by the Soviet Union among the other socialist Eastern European countries led to a deterioration in political and economic affairs between Yugoslavia and rest of the socialist Eastern European countries. At the same time, it produced an internal crisis within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, where tens of thousands of people who were suspected of supporting Stalin and international communism were arrested, interrogated and often sent to the labour camp Goli Otok (barren island) located in the federal republic Croatia.

29 Malcolm, Bosnia, p.193.
30 Britain transferred logistical and strategic support to Yugoslav partisans in 1944, after finding about Dragoljub Mihailovic’s Četniks collaboration with Nazis, Fascists and Nedic’s quisling government.
However, after the dramatic events that followed the crisis in Cominform, also known as the ‘Stalin-Tito Split,’ socialist Yugoslavia, combined, as Doder describes ‘complex and seemingly contradictory policies’ in order to preserve its independence.\(^\text{32}\) Specifically, after the Tito-Stalin split, socialist Yugoslavia negotiated loans from the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter IMF) in 1949 and initiated its economic liberalisation and political decentralisation, while its citizens enjoyed the freedom to travel and work abroad. Its hybrid economic system combined ‘market and socialist elements emphasizing increasing autonomy for the firms and territorial decentralisation.’\(^\text{33}\) Consequently, as Woodward stresses

\[\text{[t]he economies of different localities and regions tended to become identified with certain specializations, including foreign trade. […] But the economic differences among republics, given their shared dependence for production and employment on imports and their preference for Western technology to improve international competitiveness and productivity, made federal policy on foreign trade and foreign exchange particularly contentious.}\(^\text{34}\)

Additionally, during the Cold War bipolar division of the world, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) adopted alternative nonalignment foreign policy and took a prominent role in the movement’s leadership by initiating the establishment of the Nonaligned Movement in 1961.\(^\text{35}\) Besides playing an active role in helping the Third World through the Nonaligned Movement, socialist Yugoslavia also participated in numerous United Nation programmes such as peacekeeping efforts and provided technical assistance and aid to developing countries.\(^\text{36}\) Bearing in mind that Tito managed to ensure a neutral and independent position for Yugoslavia within the division between superpower blocks, many scholars concerned with (post)Yugoslav studies commonly describe Tito as one of the most charismatic leaders of the twentieth century, and refer to the country as his revolutionist, socialist Yugoslavia. This relationship, together with the uniqueness of Yugoslav experience of socialist self-management led to the perception of Yugoslavia’s essential otherness, what Allcock

\[^{33}\text{Woodward, p.28.}\]
\[^{34}\text{Ibid. p.29.}\]
\[^{35}\text{The first founding conference of the Non-Alignment Movement was held in Belgrade in 1961.}\]
\[^{36}\text{Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 26.}\]
describes as ‘[s]o distinctive a historic creation is this configuration that a new term enters the lexicon to denote it - “Titoism.”’37

The last decade of the turbulent twentieth century was marked by political and ideological shifts which significantly reshaped the part of the world once commonly designated as the Eastern Europe. On the wider scale, a series of abrupt events instigated radical political changes on a broader political scale. This included the end of the Cold War after the collapse of the Eastern Block in 1989, symbolised by the Fall of the Berlin Wall, and the subsequent re-unification of Germany in 1990 after more than forty-years of division. Moreover, the Fall of Communism and the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe led to the disintegration of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in 1991. In the same year, the political crisis in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia led to the violent dissolution of the country that was followed by the wars in its seceding republics in the period from 1991 to 2003.

Accordingly, Slovenian scholar Mitja Velikonja stresses the specificity of the complex political and ideological changes that occurred in the post-socialist societies, and their influence upon collective remembering. Velikonja recapitulates the ‘various disruptive transition processes’ in the following manner:

- a change from the socialist political system to the parliamentary system,
- from the state-planned economy to the neoliberal-turbo-capitalist one,
- from communist (inter)nationalism to, in most cases, new ethnocentrisms, Eurocentrisms and Occidentalisms, and, in the case of Yugoslavia (and also the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia), from a multi-national federation to small nation-states and various pseudo-state formations.38

He further argues that the impact of these changes on collective remembrance is mainly reflected through ‘reckless revisions of modern history’ due to the ‘new exclusivist ideologies and deliberate amnesia’.39 This relationship between post-socialist transition and collective remembrance is even more complex in the case of post-socialist and post-conflict societies that seceded from the socialist Yugoslav federation, something I explore throughout the cultural analysis in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

37 Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia*, p.3.
39 Ibid.
In relation to the post-socialist transition, these societies are today at different levels of transition to liberal democracy and neoliberal economy, which Horvat and Štiks also describes as a ‘twenty-year-old experiment in political, social and economic engineering.’ During the long-term transition, only two former Yugoslav republics, namely Slovenia and Croatia fulfilled the requirements for European Union membership, while the other republics, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia are at different stages of the process of accession to the European Union.

Unlike in other post-communist countries, the long process of transition in the post-Yugoslav societies is engulfed by the legacy of the recent wars that significantly transformed the symbolic spaces between, and within the societies of the post-Yugoslav countries. Though, with significant variety in the scope and amount of changes, the 1991-2001 wars generally caused great demographic changes in the whole region and change of the identity and composition of many places across the former country. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo in which wars occurred, are today faced with the task of estimating the casualties of war, the documentation of war atrocities, the prosecution of those responsible for war crimes and with establishing the truth about the wars in the 1990s. On the other side, countries such as Serbia are also involved in these processes, but mainly through their complicity in the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and in Kosovo, after the latter gained independence in 1999 from Serbia. Thus, the divergent relationships enforced during the wars in the 1990s endured in the post-war period with particular modifications.

The post-war transition in the former Yugoslavia also includes the ongoing process of the construction of war memories of the late wars. This process occurs parallel to the post-socialist transition that is, like in the other post-communist countries, generally characterised by the reckless revision of the modern history of socialist Yugoslavia. Consequently, on the ground, convoluted and disputed narratives of the wars from the 1990s are often blended with the intensified process of revision of modern Yugoslav history and particularly the Yugoslav history of the Second World

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War. It is important to emphasise that both processes are occurring within the post-Yugoslav context, characterised by a lack of factual history due to the lack of historical writing about the late wars. Moreover, the intellectual history and the memory culture of socialist Yugoslavia are largely devalued in recent political debates. This problematic relationship towards the past which dominates recent constructions of collective memory generally corresponds to Velikonja’s concept of ‘deliberate amnesia.’ Specifically, the events and actors from the Second World War that were sufficiently explored in post-1945 Yugoslav history and established in relation to the post-1945 European historiography, are today subjects of the continuous, provisional revisionism, revivalism and reinterpretations and are often misinterpreted.

The beginning of the reckless revisionism of modern Yugoslav history can be traced to the mid-eighties when the official historical narrative of the War of People’s Liberation was challenged by the controversial thesis that there were two anti-fascist movements in Yugoslavia. According to this counter-thesis, besides the Yugoslav partisans, the pro-royalist and Nazi-collaborators Četniks units, were another anti-fascist movement that organised resistance against the Axis pact. One of the examples of this revisionist approach is a book published in 1985 by Serbian historian Veselin Djuretić, in which he presented the controversial thesis about the rehabilitation of Draža Mihailović, the leader of one of the main Četnik units, which were generally banned in post-war Yugoslavia. In his then controversial thesis, Djuretić claims that

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\text{[t]here was not just one resistance movement in Yugoslavia, there were two: Tito’s partisans and that of the Serbian royalist, led by Draža Mihailović. The latter were usually lumped together with the Croatian fascists (Ustasha), who in their ideology, their methods and indeed their wartime allegiance were totally subservient to the Nazis.}^{42}
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Djuretić’s proposition refers to the trial that took place from June to July 1946, at which the post-war Yugoslav regime found Mihailović and other accused members of the Četnik movement guilty of the following crimes: collaboration with both the Nazi’s and Fascist’s occupation forces and other collaborators, for the war they fought against

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41 Denitch states that there is a large bibliography on the Yugoslav war and revolution and on collaboration and massacres, while Allcock argues that some subjects such as the Independent State of Croatia and the Nedić’s regime in Serbia were not studied objectively and systematically. (Allcock, 237).
the Yugoslav Partisans, and for brutal crimes committed during the war. All the accused, including Mihailović were sentenced to death, and executed on July 17, 1946 by firing squad.

These, and other conflicting memory narratives of the Second World War that first emerged in the late-1980s, were viciously used in the early-1990s with the emergence of the ethno-nationalism and particularly in the outbreak of the wars. Another example of revisionism that occurred in the early nineties period was the instigation of new debates about the population losses in the Second World War, which Denitch criticised in his analysis of ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia, arguing that ‘in the poisoned nationalist polemics of the present all sides try to exaggerate their own losses.’

The increasing normalisation of fascist collaborator regimes, which were previously condemned, first penetrated into political and public spaces short before the war in the 1990s, also percolated through the political and social space during and particularly after the wartime. Specifically, during the wars of Yugoslav Succession, some paramilitary forces that fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia embraced Četnik’s dogma and used its insignia, whereas some of the Croatian forces that have fought in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina praised the Ustaša’s doctrine. These and other associated myths are still echoing today, in the fragmented post-Yugoslav political space through offensive public actions, reckless revisionism of a once shared history, as well as through the never-ending scholarly and non-scholarly debates about the Second World War victims of the Ustaša and Četniks’ forces, and suppressed crimes that were committed by Yugoslav Partisans (Partizani). These debates often merge with debates about the victims from the war(s) of the 1990s.

The rifts in the (post-)Yugoslavia together with the broader alterations in collective remembrance in the post-socialist European countries indicate the complexity of the social and cultural experiences after the turn of 1989, where myriad aspects of the transformation in these apparently distant contexts, denote the interconnectedness between interrelated post-war Bosnian and Herzegovinian and

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43 Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism, p.32.
(post-)Yugoslav contexts with post-communist European, as well as the wider global contexts.

2.3. Framing the War of Yugoslav Succession

Besides numerous challenges that researchers encounter in examinations of the post-war societies and memory of war in general, most of the challenges are related to the complexity of the (post-war) Bosnian-Herzegovinian context. The debates about the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina are often included into broader debates about the armed conflicts, which followed the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. The conflicts in federal republics that made up the socialist Yugoslavia - namely, the Socialist Republics Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia - with two Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina; and Slovenia, are analysed within the same framework and subsumed under a common name. However, authors in their respective analytical frameworks name the violent break-up of Yugoslavia differently. Some of the prevalent designations are: ‘War in the Balkans’, or even ‘the Third Balkan war’, ‘the Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia’, ‘the Yugoslav War’, ‘Yugoslav conflict’, and, using a more explanatory phrase ‘the War of Yugoslav Succession’ of 1991-1995,’ and also ‘the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession’. It is worth noting that in some cases authors are not consistent in using the particular designations in their respective analyses. Throughout my analysis, I am using the designation ‘the Yugoslav Wars,’ to refer to all conflicts that occurred on the territory of former Yugoslavia since 1992 to 2001. Within this broader term, I distinguish conflicts that followed the violent dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1996, and to which I refer in accordance with

44 Misha Glenny, 1992, 1995; Andreas Riedlemayer, 2007
45 Misha Glenny, 1996
47 Miroslav Hadžić, 2004; Maria Todorova, 2009; Sabrina P. Ramet, 2005.

One of the causes for this discrepancy in designation and interpretation of the causes of conflict(s) is possibly related to the fact that these analyses were written at different stages of the conflict(s). Some of the studies considered in my research were written during the conflict, while some of them were written shortly after the conflict, and in some cases, they were written one or two decades after the conflict. Generally, different approaches, naming and interpretations of the conflict in the scholarly debate reflect how the focus of analyses of the conflicts(s) has been altered under the influence of dramatic dynamics of the events in the region of the former Yugoslavia. Some of the exceptions are critical accounts of Bogdan Denitch (1994) and Susan L. Woodward (1995) produced during the last years of the War of Yugoslav Succession, which provide critical analyses of the (post-)Yugoslav context and the war of Yugoslav Succession. These comprehensive accounts have approached the ancient hatred thesis critically and have analysed the political crisis and the conflicts in socialist Yugoslavia in relation to events that occurred on the global political scene.

Generally, the scholarly debate about the war(s) in the former Yugoslavia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects the altering relationship between the approach of scholars and responses of the international community to the conflicts that were largely influenced by numerous disputes over the causes and the nature of conflict, particularly in the case of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The extensive debates incorporate often contested accounts of scholars concerned with the field of (post)Yugoslav studies. These debates, as Ramet points out

cover a wide range of subjects, riveting on the best methodology to study East-Central Europe, the nature of the collapse of the communist organizational monopoly (a collapse completely denied by one “imaginative” scholar), the nature of the ‘Bosnian War’ and the appropriate Western response, the nature of the war in Kosovo and the appropriate Western response, and the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.  

51 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p.6.
As Ramet’s argument about scholarly debates implies, the war in the former Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina are analysed in relation to three major political and socio-economic transitions in global and in European contexts, specifically, in relation to globalisation, to the fall of Communism in Europe in 1989, but also in relation to the post-communism paradigm. The relevance of all three perspective as aspects of their impact on the (post-) Yugoslav space and particularly on the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is examined in the analyses within this as well as the subsequent chapters.

Within the multifaceted process of globalisation, scholars take into consideration different aspects in relation to the study of the wars in former Yugoslavia. For instance, some authors explore this relation through analysis of the internationalisation of the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and new identity politics and growing ‘cultural dissonances/differentiation.’ And, in relation to the generally negative impact of changes in the international post-Cold War order to internal crisis in Yugoslavia on one side, and an inadequate response of the world powers to the fall of communism that created disputed political agendas that hugely affected western intervention in the former Yugoslavia, on the other.

The conceptually confusing term of globalisation is widely reflected in structural and organisational changes in modern society that have profoundly affected social structures. The process that was intensified after the Cold War mainly by technological innovation, also brought a set of economic and political transformations mainly manifested in the growth of international organisations, regimes and regulatory agencies that was followed by the development of non-governmental transnational networks, such as non-governmental organisations. Accordingly, on the example of the besieged Sarajevo during the wartime, Mary Kaldor argues that besides the descriptions of divisions in territorial terms, the divisions of the city can also be described in non-territorial terms. Within the latter Kaldor differentiates inhabitants of the city who were living under the siege for the duration of the war on one side, and a group of people that

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55 Woodward, 1995
56 Sarajevo was territorially divided during the war and parts of the city and its surroundings were controlled by the Serb Army and parts were controlled by the Bosnian Army.
Kaldor named the globalists and which, as she explains, include ‘UN peacekeepers, humanitarian agencies, journalists and those locals who spoke English and were employed as assistants, interpreters and drivers.’

Also, Kaldor accentuates that the political goals and obfuscated politics of identity executed during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she designates as the ‘archetypal example, the paradigm of the new type of warfare in the 1990s,’ cannot be understood in traditional terms. Thus, Kaldor’s approach to analysis of the 1992-1996 war is structured in relation to the new forms of identity politics that emerged due to the new methods of warfare and change in its political goals. She argues that whilst the political goals of the previous war were focused on geo-political interests, the goals of the new wars are mainly related to particularistic identity politics. These changes, as Kaldor describes, were instigated by the changing nature of government through the establishment of transnational networks of government and through decentralisation and horizontal forms of organization of Nongovernmental (NGO) and other transnational organisations. The transformation of political patterns and ‘global dislocations’ produce new growing cultural differences that arose with globalisation, which as Kaldor describes:

conceals a complex process which actually involves both globalisation and localisation, integration and fragmentation, homogenisation and differentiation, etc. On the one hand, the process creates inclusive transnational networks of people. On the other hand it excludes and atomizes large number of people – indeed the vast majority.

However, this growing cultural dissonance between those who participate in transnational networks and those who are excluded from the global processes and ‘tied to localities’ cannot be simplified. The political changes after 1989 on one side and global organizations on the other, as she suggests, resulted in new cultural classifications. Within these Kaldor differentiates cosmopolitan politicisation, which is based on principles of universalism and diversity and advocates equality and respect for human dignity and exclusive identity which is based on ethnic politics, which can

58 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p.33.
59 Ibid., p. 74.
60 Ibid., p. 73.
be related to nationalism that arose after the collapse of communism and also with insecurity associated with globalisation.

These different features of globalisations can be traced in the context of former Yugoslavia in relation to the political mobilisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and particularly to (post-war) Bosnia and Herzegovina. In line with the argument of scholars who stress the importance of the process of globalisation in the analysis of the war in former Yugoslavia, part of my analysis is focused on social, political and cultural transformations and the new politics of identity since 1989 in the former Yugoslavia and (the post-war) Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to political transformation in global context.

Furthermore, the variety of perspectives of the accounts incorporated in broader debates can be provisionally divided into two main perspectives, those of insiders’ or local perspectives, on one side, and of outsiders’ or international perspectives, on the other. The first, local perspectives, comprise regional accounts considered with the area of the former Yugoslavia and narrower, local, Bosnian-Herzegovinian accounts, while the international perspective comprises western accounts about the Yugoslav War and the 1992-1996 war. These two perspectives are occasionally intersecting, mainly through occasional collaborative research.

Discord in approaches to analyses of the wars in the former Yugoslavia are accompanied by discord in interpretations of the particular wars, as well as causes that led to the violent dissolution of the country. Hence, in relation to the question why did war happened, some of the researchers focus their analysis on the events that occurred in the early history of the region. On the other side are scholars who, as a point of departure, take events from modern Yugoslav history. The latter are mainly concerned with the mounting economic and political crisis in socialist Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Also, a significant number of these studies focus their analyses on the events in socialist Yugoslavia in relation to changing dynamics within the bipolar world once the Cold War was over, and in relation to the historical turn of 1989-1990 and the Collapse of

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61 Glenny, 1996
62 Woodward, 1995; Ramet, 2002; Andjelic, 2005; Malcolm, 2002
63 Woodward, 1995; Allcock, 1999; 2004; Kaldor, 2006
Communism in Europe. These different approaches and perspectives, which Sabrina Ramet describes as a 'potentially confusing avalanche of work', are encompassed in scholarly and non-scholarly debates about the Yugoslav wars as well as in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and these inform my analysis throughout the thesis.

2.4. Internationalisation of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The interconnectedness of the context of the former Yugoslavia and the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina requires particular consideration. As Bougarel argues ‘[t]he beginning of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992 cannot be explained outside the larger context of the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia.’ Later, after the conflict from Slovenia and Croatia expanded to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, the brutality and scale of the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina led to immense internationalization of the 1992-1996 war. This internationalization was also a response to the humanitarian disaster and dreadful crimes that occurred in the first year of the war. This includes ethnic cleansing, organized systematic rape and forced impregnation of women detained in ‘rape camps’ located in eastern Bosnia (i.e. in Višegrad and Foča); detention camps Keraterm, Omarska and Trnopolje in the northwest of the country in Prijedor municipality; the siege of the cities of Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, Bihać and Goražde. As Bougarel argues, the war crimes have ‘hastened the redefinition of the role of the various regional and international organizations in Europe and prompted some major changes in international law.’

Thus, already on 13 August, 1992 United Nation Security Council passed Resolution 771, which among other aspects, has ‘underlined mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonments and abuse of civilians in detention population, and wanton devastation and destruction of property.’

Some of the following major transformations in international law include the establishment of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible

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65 Ramet, Thinking About Yugoslavia, p. ix.
67 Woodward, 1995; Bougarel and others, 2007; Cockburn and Zarkov, 2002; Kaldor 2005
68 Bougarel and others, The New Bosnian Mosaic, p.5.
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereinafter the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) [ICTY]. This first war crimes court established by the United Nation after the Security Council passed Resolution 827 on the 25 May 1993, is also the first international war crimes tribunal that was established after the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. The jurisdiction and organizational structure of the ICTY that is defined in Article 1 of the Statute drafted to the Resolution declares that ‘the International Criminal Tribunal should have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.’

Also, the ICTY situated in the Hague in the Netherlands, has had a significant role in establishing facts and qualifying the crimes committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After more than twenty years since its establishment, the Tribunal’s legacy includes its judicial mandate and mandate of contributing to peace and security in the region. As stated on the official website of the ICTY ‘[t]he Tribunal contributed to an indisputable historical record, combating denial and helping communities come to terms with their recent history. Crimes across the region can no longer be denied.’

The framework of ‘the Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia’ developed by the ICTY provides a chronology and brief descriptions of the armed conflicts, which occurred on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. This comprehensive framework includes all conflicts that arose in the area - the conflicts that resulted from unresolved political and economic crisis in socialist Yugoslavia, which marked the official dissolution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991; to the

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conflicts that broke out after the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, in 1999 in Kosovo, and in 2001 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Thus, the ICTY framework includes the following conflicts: Slovenia (The Ten-Day War in 1991); Croatia (1991-1995); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995); Kosovo (1998-1999), and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001).

Although my research is primarily focused on the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I also consider the conflicts in Slovenia and in Croatia that occurred in the first half of the 1990s in order to grasp the actors, dynamics and political environment that also stirred up the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This interconnectedness is implied in the designation ‘the 1991-1995 Wars of Yugoslav Succession’ used by some scholars who perceive the conflicts that occurred in Slovenia in June 1991 as the beginning of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, while they perceive the signing of the Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 as the end of both, the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, and of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Throughout my dissertation, I use the designation ‘the Wars of Yugoslav Succession’ in order to frame the conflicts that followed the dissolution of the country, which include the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This approach enables the analysis of some of the circumstances that led to violent dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, with an important distinction in the timeframe of widely accepted timeline of conflicts. Specifically, while I see the conflict in Slovenia as the event that marked the beginning of the war, in my understanding, the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession is signified by the end of blockade of the city of Sarajevo in March 1996, and with the final territorial rearrangements and changes in demography that followed the signing of the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (DPA). The designation used for two decades of wars that occurred in the (post)Yugoslav space from 1991-2001 is ‘Yugoslav War.’

It is important to note that the turmoil at the end of the twentieth century when the war in former Yugoslavia occurred was also marked by a profound alteration of the intellectual paradigm. The implications of the turns in academic discourse (cultural turn, memory turn, narrative turn) are numerous and they significantly influenced
political and social discourses as well. Altogether, the repercussions of these changes strongly affected (re)construction of (mis)understandings of socialist Yugoslavia, the country which ‘on the eve of the 1989 revolutions in eastern and central Europe’, as Susan Woodward describes it, ‘was better posed than any other socialist country to make a successful transition to a market economy and to the West.’\textsuperscript{74} Woodward’s suggestion differs greatly from the essentialist interpretations of the re-emerged concept of the Balkans that is mainly constructed around the thesis of ‘ancient hatred between Balkan’s people,’ and that signifies their general backwardness. The latter dominates academic, political and media discourse in the 1990s and it endured in the post-war period. However, a significant number of scholars and non-scholars have recently challenged this problematic thesis. Some of these debates that reveal several of the main disputes between these two opposing concepts in the production of knowledge about the (post)Yugoslav space, are discussed throughout this dissertation.

2.5. The Dissolution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991: The beginning of the Wars of Yugoslav Successions

Once the common socialist framework was abandoned, together with the transnational idea of Yugoslavia, the political crisis in each of the Yugoslav republics turn in separate directions. Scholars concerned with the analysis of the causes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 identified different events as the main watersheds in Yugoslav political affairs, which led the Yugoslav federation, once founded on the principles of ‘brotherhood and unity’\textsuperscript{75} to disintegration followed by the so-called ‘fratricidal war(s)’.

The large-scale conflict in the former Yugoslavia escalated after numerous attempts to solve the ongoing economic and political crisis in socialist Yugoslavia had failed. Despite the efforts of the Yugoslav League of Communists,\textsuperscript{76} which were

\textsuperscript{74} Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, p.1.
\textsuperscript{75} The Yugoslav partisans had fought under the slogan ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ (Bratstvo i jedinstvo in Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian language[s]).
\textsuperscript{76} The League of Communists of Yugoslavia consisted of the eight regional party organizations of Yugoslavia’s eight federal units, namely six socialist republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia, and two Socialist Autonomous Provinces - Vojvodina and Kosovo, which enjoyed a legal status founded not merely on Serbian law, but also on federal law. Their status guaranteed by the 1974 Constitution, was changed in 1989 after Serbian controversial amendments were accepted to its constitution. The amendments that aimed to recentralize the Republic of Serbia were
assisted by the international community, the economic crisis that had shaken the
country throughout the 1980s was gradually culminating into a political crisis. In this
process, as Slovenian scholar Renata Salecl describes, the West was ‘an impassive
observer,’ who failed to recognize that Yugoslavia ‘died several times before it
officially disintegrated.’ In her analysis of the events that preceded the disintegration
of Yugoslavia, Salecl argues that the symbolic death of the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia came before its dissolution in 1991, and that the moment of
this symbolic death arrived at different times for different Yugoslav nations

[f]or the Serbs, this event occurred in 1974, when the constitution gave
full autonomy to the Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo; for the
Albanians, the symbolic death of Yugoslavia came in 1989, when they
lost their autonomy; for Slovenes and the Croats it came with the
disintegration of communism [in] when half of Yugoslavia formed a
multi-party system but the other half remained communist.

And finally, the definitive symbolic death of Yugoslavia, as Salecl argues, occurred
shortly after the conflict in Slovenia in June 1991 when the Yugoslav People’s Army
‘which was perceived as the principal guarantee of the transnational character of the
Yugoslav federation openly took the side of the Serbs.’ Also, Salecl provides the
chronology, and outlines some of the key events that occurred in the modern period of
the country’s history that led to the country’s dissolution. This includes a decade long
economic crisis, snowballing political crisis and the constitutional reforms, which
altogether resulted in the victory of newly established ‘democratic’ parties, the collapse
of federal government, and with the violent dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia.

drafted in 1988 were strongly opposed by the party leaders of the other Yugoslav republics, and
particularly by the leaders of two Autonomous Provinces. Once they were irregularly adopted in February
1989 they assured Milošević de jure authority in two provinces. As Ramet argues, this was only possible
after the series of political actions of the Serbian government mainly manifested through the organized
public mass gathering – protest demonstrations in order to put pressure on the parliaments of Vojvodina
and Kosovo as well as in other Yugoslav republics and to set up Milošević’s supporters in their
governments. However, as the closing act of Milošević’s ‘second coup’ after the overthrow of Stambolić
and other high positioned politicians within the Serbian League of Communists (Ramet, 2002, p.31) in
1990 the Serbian government declared the dissolution of the provincial parliaments and threaten its
deputies with prosecution because of their belated resistance to Serbian actions. (Ramet, 2002).

77 Renata Salecl, The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and Feminism after the Full of
79 Ibid.
Most of the scholars concerned with the Yugoslav wars argue that the political and economic affairs in socialist Yugoslavia cannot be isolated from the political and economic affairs of the bipolar political world during the Cold-War period (Woodward, 1999; Kaldor, 2006; Allcock, 1999). Their arguments mainly underline the specific political position of socialist Yugoslavia during the Cold War period, which was balancing between East and West. Generally, as Mary Kaldor writes, the ‘political identity of the Yugoslav regime’ at that time was derived, in part, from the struggle of the partisans during the World War II; in part, from its capacity to provide reasonable living standards for its population; and, in part from its special international position as a bridge between East and West, with its own indigenous brand of socialism, and its role as leader of the non-aligned movement.\(^{80}\)

Similarly, Susan Woodward explains the complex economic and political interrelations between Yugoslavia and the bipolar world in the following manner

\[\text{[a]s is characteristic of small states, the domestic order of socialist Yugoslavia} \]
\[\text{was strongly influenced by its place in the international order: its geopolitical} \]
\[\text{location, its pattern of trade and foreign alliances, and the requirements of} \]
\[\text{participation in the international economy and its various organizations. The} \]
\[\text{viability of the Yugoslav regime, in fact, depended on its foreign position and a} \]
\[\text{policy of national independence and nonalignment tied to the organization of the} \]
\[\text{cold war world.}^{81}\]

However, this position was dramatically changed under the influence of numerous external and internal factors. In the last two decades of socialist Yugoslavia’s history, the economic crisis was worsening mainly due the unsuccessful restructuring of the central economy and growing foreign debt,\(^{82}\) which by the time of the world debt crisis in 1981, reached enormous proportions.\(^{83}\) The changes in the foreign economic and political environment also altered economic policy towards Yugoslavia and together with the rising internal political and economic crisis, threatened the Yugoslav complex system. Thus, the demands of foreign creditors and Western governments for trade liberalization and greater economic integration to the western market placed the state in

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\(^{80}\) Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 38.

\(^{81}\) Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, p.16.

\(^{82}\) Malcolm states that by the end of 1988 Yugoslavia’s total foreign debt came to $33 billion (Malcolm, *Bosnia*, p.210.).

\(^{83}\) Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*. 
an impossible position. Woodward describes these demands as asking for what she terms ‘political suicide’

they require governments to reduce their own power. They also do at the same time that the demands on governments, particularly the necessity to protect civil order and to provide stability in the midst of rapid change, are ever greater.\(^{84}\)

Moreover, the program of economic reform and stabilization followed by the political reform undertaken in the period from 1979 to 1989 had, as Woodward notes, ‘a drastic effect in most citizens’ welfare, and led to major political quarrels between the republics and the federal government over the federal budget, taxation, and jurisdiction over foreign trade and investment.’\(^{85}\) Some of the austerity measures introduced in this period, as Malcolm argues, only contributed to the general unpopularity of the government and the federal system,\(^{86}\) while the main effect of an International Monetary Fund Recovery Plan\(^{87}\) agreed on in 1982 was, as Kaldor claims, ‘to intensify the competition for resources at the level of the republics and to contribute to the growing criminalization of the economy.’\(^{88}\)

2.5.1. The First Democratic Multiparty Elections in the Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990

The development of the events that followed the end of the LCY at the federal level inevitably deepened the political crisis of the state. It also imperilled any possibility for the democratisation of Yugoslavia as whole, whose central government, faced with the economic crisis and demands for democratic reform reduced to the level of federal republics, was even more challenged in this period. The challenges include both external and internal changes such as ongoing ‘democratic revolutions’ and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, while within socialist Yugoslavia various opportunists from the major Yugoslav republics sought (more) political power. The opportunism of republics’ politicians and intellectuals here refer to ‘a new hybrid’ that Denitch describes

\(^{84}\) Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, p.17.  
\(^{85}\) Ibid., 51.  
\(^{86}\) Malcolm, *Bosnia*.  
\(^{87}\) Besides the IMF’s financial assistance and support to Yugoslav economy, this plan refers to the set of recommendations of the Kraigher Commission applied in 1982 by the federal government. The blue ribbon panel, known as the Kraigher Commission, was founded in 1981 in order to develop a strategy for addressing the financial crisis in the country.  
\(^{88}\) Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 39.
as an informal ‘symbiosis of Communist and local nationalists’ that was developed after Tito’s death and, which was first applied in Milošević’s strategy of nationalist populism. Accordingly, they gained popular support by focusing on the interests of their own republics over the interests of the Yugoslav Federation, and often against it, through an open appeal by a significant part of the local/republican Communist leaders to nationalism. As Denitch explains, their nationalism was mainly based, on ‘claim that the Communists, most effectively represented national interests and demands, particularly as against competing national demands and against the federal centre.’ Accordingly, they gained popular support by focusing on the interests of their own republics over the interests of the Yugoslav Federation, and often against it, through an open appeal by a significant part of the local/republican Communist leaders to nationalism. As Denitch explains, their nationalism was mainly based, on ‘claim that the Communists, most effectively represented national interests and demands, particularly as against competing national demands and against the federal centre.’

Also, in this period that was loaded with nationalist rhetoric that enjoyed great media support on one side, and support by nationalist intellectuals and their historical revisionism on the other, the vague notion of democratic multiparty elections was introduced in socialist Yugoslavia.

The League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself between the opposed nationalist doctrines, which were growing in surrounding Serbia and Croatia. After the multi-party elections in socialist republics that constituted Yugoslavia, as Abazović et al, point out: “ethnic polarizations within the borders of the Republic [Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia] began largely on the principle ‘one state-one nation.’ The only republic that did not fit into this pattern due its specific demographic structure was BiH.” Thus, the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina was resolute to maintain the Communist party policy focused at the ethnic equality in the multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rule of prohibition of political organization (The Law on Association of Citizens) on an ethno-national or religious basis was still on power until the first half of the 1990, mainly because the Communist party leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina were concerned that ethno-nationalist political discourses could incite divisions in the society. However, the Communist party leaders permitted multi-party elections under conditions that new parties should not be based on national or religious grounds, and that these parties recognize the territorial

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89 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 60.
90 Ibid.
integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides the uttered requirements the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Andjelic claims

did not prepare its own trap by trying to impose a common Bosnian or Herzegovinian nation over the three, clearly distinctive, ethnic groups. Thus, ethnic self-expression was allowed and even encouraged, although very often ethnic organizations were banned. This shows the regime did not see danger in individual ethno-national expression but in organized groups; even ethnic cultural [programs] were seen as dangerous.

As Abazović and others emphasize, the complex question of national identity in socialist Yugoslavia that was a subject of ongoing debate and, was even more complex in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was mainly because of its complex national, religious and cultural background. Although the six-federal republics and the two autonomous provinces were all multinational and multi-religious societies to a certain degree, this heterogeneity was most prevalent in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accordingly, Abazović et al argue that ‘being Bosnian was never a Constitutional option for the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ which is comprised of Serbs, Croats and Muslims and other nations (narodi) and nationalities (narodnosti).

Many authors concerned with study of the (post)Yugoslav space agree that throughout the history of socialist Yugoslavia, the differentiation of the various Yugoslavia groups significantly vary. According to Singleton’s comparative analyses of the census returns of the pre- and post-Second World War years, different groups were recognized in earlier periods, while some other groups appeared at different times, such as ‘undifferentiated Yugoslavs’ in 1953, and ‘M[u]sl[i]ms in the ethnic sense’ in 1961 and

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94 Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 47.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Different authors use different terminology (nation, nationalities, ethno-national groups) when referring to the complex national identities within the multinational SFRY and BiH. According to Bougarel et al, the socialist Yugoslavia comprised the six South-Slavic constituent peoples narodi – Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs and Slovenes; and the national minorities narodnosti. Moreover, in 1993 the name ‘Muslim’, which designated the Slavic-speaking Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1974, when it was included in the new Yugoslav Constitution for the first time, has been changed to the new national name ‘Bosniak’ (some authors who write in English also use the term ‘Bosniac’). This is different from the term Bosnian, which applies to all members of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Bougarel and others, The New Bosnian Mosaic, p.1). Throughout this dissertation I use the term Bosnian Herzegovinian, the designation that is commonly used in BiH.
99 As Singleton describes it: in 1921, there were Serbo-Croats, Slovenes and the non-Yugoslav peoples. In 1948 and subsequent five years, the five Yugoslav nations-Montenegrins, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians and Slovenes were recognized. (Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, p.219.).
The complex relationship between nationalities, as Singleton underscores, have penetrated into every aspect of Yugoslav life.

The ongoing debate on political identities and the related question of culture, that shaped the notion of national and ethnic identities through the nearly hundred-year long Yugoslav confederation, also strongly influenced the dispute over the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the Yugoslav political community during the socialist era. Under the influence of the pressure of some of the politicians who actively impeded the country’s equal status in relation to other socialist Yugoslav republics, in terms of the prominent Yugoslav intellectual Miroslav Krleža ‘the whole nation and her culture were silenced.’

Moreover, in relation to the disputed question of Muslim and Yugoslav political categories, Abazović and others argue that ‘[s]ince the very creation of Yugoslavia, Muslim people in Bosnia and Herzegovina could only declare themselves as either Serb, Croat or stay undecided, which actually meant that they had not decided yet whether to call themselves Serbs or Croats.’ Although the constitutional changes of 1971 and 1974 did recognised respective Muslim and Yugoslav political categories, the population, as the authors explain, was further set apart by the fact that Muslims denoted a religious group, while Serbs and Croats denoted the ethnic groups. In effect, as Abazović and others argue, the ‘Bosnian (nation) has consequently been mistaken for, (and misinterpreted by), the three dominant ethnicities, very often referred to as “nations.”’

However, some of the most prominent members of the League of Communists BiH articulated their concerns about the emergence of the nationalist’s parties in the following manner

I do not see any particular problem in emerging purely Croat, Muslim or Serb parties provided that they agree on democratic values on which BiH and SFRY are based. However, this certainly is not the case with the parties that think of BiH as artificial and octroyed creation and that threaten its sovereignty by flirting with their ‘spare’ homelands.

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101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
Accordingly, some authors agree that ethno-nationalism only suddenly emerged in 1990 as a possible option for mass political mobilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{104} In accordance with the results of the Croatian political weekly Danas’ survey that was conducted in April and May 1990, Andjelic describes that the majority of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian population ‘was not in favour of national parties, considering them as a threat.’\textsuperscript{105} However, the first stage of the process of ethno-nationalist indoctrination was successfully concluded with the euphoric victory of the new democratic political options throughout the Yugoslav federation.

Similarly, in Slovenia and Croatia, the victory of the ethno-nationalist coalition over the reformed communists in 1990 initiated a violent political restructuring of the society. This political pluralisation of the country, as Abazović and others describe, expanded the political space of the country, but it also led to a populist rising, where ‘[a] peak of negative democracy was achieved in BiH by the legislative institutionalization of ethnicity through the constitution of political parties on a solely ethnic base.’\textsuperscript{106} The political transformations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in combination with political changes in surrounding republics brought the country to a difficult position. Although, Bosnia and Herzegovina were still rather peaceful when the fierce disintegration of Yugoslavia began in the early nineties, as Andjelic points out

Bosnia-Herzegovina was confronted with two kinds of chaos because of the developments in Croatia and Serbia, and because of the misrule within the republic. Fragmented administration in local councils was replicated at the level of republican government.\textsuperscript{107}

Additionally, the territorial aspirations of two key ethno-nationalist leaders Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudman were uttered in March 1991 when they met secretly in Karadorđevo\textsuperscript{108} and agreed to partition the Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory between Serbia and Croatia.\textsuperscript{109} These and other ethno-political projections of the newly democratically elected governments became clearer once they were executed in the war

\textsuperscript{105} Andjelic, \textit{Bosnia-Herzegovina}, p.135.
\textsuperscript{106} Abazović and others, ‘Ethno-Mobilization’, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{107} Andjelic, \textit{Bosnia-Herzegovina}, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{108} Karadorđevo is a small town in Serbia
\textsuperscript{109} Ramet, 2002; Andjelic, 2005; Abazović and others, 2007; Bougarel and others, 2007
in the former Yugoslavia, and particularly in the 1992-1996 war against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The future events were only entrenching the delineated differences, which, as Andjelic argues at that time were still ‘linked more to national interests than to ideological options’. ¹¹⁰ Hence, at the first democratic multiparty elections in April 1990, which were held at the republic level, in Slovenia the reform Communists who renamed themselves as the Party of Democratic Renewal were defeated by the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia coalition (DEMOS). Also, the Croatian Democratic Union¹¹¹ (HDZ) defeated the reformed Communists in Croatia and won more than 60 per cent of the seats in the newly elected government.¹¹² The newly elected multiparty nationalist governments in Croatia and Slovenia launched democratic reforms and made moves towards the declared intention to establish independent states due to the political, economic and intellectual crisis in socialist Yugoslav federation. Particularly Slovenia, which Malcolm describes as ‘the most westernized and independent-minded of the republics, was making arrangements to protect itself from the next stages of ‘Milošević’s slow-moving constitutional coup.’¹¹³ These arrangements, as Malcolm explains, started in September and October 1989 when Slovenia: ‘drafted and passed a new Slovenian constitution, giving itself legislative sovereignty – in other words, saying that its own laws would take precedence over those of the federal state - and explicitly declaring its right to secede.’¹¹⁴

As an immediate response to these political changes, already in May 1990, the authorities of the Yugoslav People’s Army commanded the complete disarmament and disbanding of the Territorial Defence Units¹¹⁵ in both republics.¹¹⁶ However, the

¹¹⁰ Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, p.115.
¹¹¹ The name of the party is translated differently in the English language. In her analysis, Sabrina P. Ramet translates the party’s name as the ‘Croatian Democratic Community.’ I will use the translation suggested by Malcolm, Andjelic and, Abazović and others, who are translating the name of the party as ‘Croatian Democratic Union.’
¹¹² Ramet, Balkan Babel, p.55.
¹¹³ Malcolm, Bosnia, p.214.
¹¹⁴ Ibid.
¹¹⁵ Generally, within the organization of the armed force of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia the Territorial Defence Units (TOs) acted as an auxiliary force of the Yugoslav People’s Army. These Units were established in 1970 in all republics of socialist Yugoslavia Federation, as a result of a new ‘Generalized Popular Defense System’ after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Yugoslav Army utterly failed in this attempt, which Slovenia and Croatia resisted by declaring that their forces are not paramilitary groups but legal defence forces. Additionally, parallel confiscations of weapons were carried in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an exception of ‘Serb-inhabited districts, where local Territorial defence arms were used to provide the basis for the future Serb militias.’

2.5.2. The beginning of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession

One year later, the intensive confrontations between the newly elected republican parliaments and the federal government continued without political will to achieve an agreement about the political (re)arrangement of the Yugoslav federation. Also, in that period the federal Prime Minister Ante Marković introduced the so-called ‘shock programme’ for reforming the malfunctioning state’s economic system in order to control the country’s mounting inflation. However, some encouraging developments in the state’s economy that were achieved through the implementation of the relatively successful reform programme were downplayed by the contention between antagonistic ethno-nationalists in the state’s major republics. Denitch argues that despite this negative impact, the majority of the political leaders within the LCY in individual republics ‘had no intention of actually destroying Yugoslavia. They just wanted more power and were willing to use nationalist real or imagined grievances to achieve that power. The stakes were continually raised until it became impossible to back down.’

Dramatic developments that include frequent and endless sessions and both public and secret meetings between the newly elected republican representatives, were conveyed to the public by sensational media reporting. However, this political chaos soon changed direction from political negotiation to ‘politics by other means’ and culminated in the armed conflict which occurred immediately after Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally declared independence on the 25 of June 1991. Accordingly, already on 26 June 1991, The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) column of tanks entered...
Slovenia.\textsuperscript{121} With this attack, the JNA, which was designated as ‘the bastion of Yugoslavism’\textsuperscript{122} openly chose Serbian side in this, and in the conflicts that were to follow in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

However, Andjelic claims that the Yugoslav People’s Army were not openly one-sided during 1990. Confrontations between the political leaders of Yugoslav republics, and particularly between Tuđman and Milošević, had a strong influence on the Army’s politics. Tuđman’s open criticism of the Yugoslav People’s Army, as Andjelic further explains, enabled Milošević to gain the trust of the Army authorities and to impose his control over the Army. Generally, Andjelic describes the transformation of the JNA in the following way: ‘the federal army passed through several phases: from a revolutionary partisan army to a communist controlled military force and, finally, to a force serving the interests of a single ethnic party— Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia—in a multi-ethnic federation, with multiparty systems in the federal units.’\textsuperscript{123}

In addition, Malcolm claims that the ‘Serb-dominated federal army leadership’ (at that time) broadly shared Milošević’s aim, mostly because ‘it depended on a continuing Yugoslavia for its privileges, its finances - more than 55 percent of the federal budget – and its whole system of military industries.’\textsuperscript{124} Further, he explains that the attack on Slovenia led by the Yugoslav People’s Army was

\[ \text{encouraged both by the EEC, which had stated in April that it was committed to the “unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia,” and by America’s Secretary of State James Baker, who had made same pledge in Belgrade on 20 June, Milošević felt that he could quickly make an example of Slovenia pour encourager les autres.}\textsuperscript{125}

During the Ten-Day War in Slovenia the Yugoslav People’s Army relentlessly bombed civilian objects and took control over the airport in Ljubljana and over all major access roads. The Slovenian Territorial Defence forces\textsuperscript{126} resisted attack, which finally

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{121} Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 225.
    \item \textsuperscript{122} James Gow quoted in Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p.41.
    \item \textsuperscript{123} Andjelic Bosnia-Herzegovina, p.134.
    \item \textsuperscript{124} Malcolm, Bosnia, p.225
    \item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
    \item \textsuperscript{126} Slovenian Territorial Defense (TO) is the Slovenian Army force. It was restructured in October 1990, shortly after the incident with the Yugoslav People’s Army, which occupied its Headquarters in
\end{itemize}
ended in the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People’s Army. The intervention in Slovenia was also the official beginning of the War of Yugoslav Succession. The shortest of all Yugoslav Wars, the Ten-Day War in Slovenia preceded the larger-scale wars in Croatia, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were, as Lukić describes them, ‘each more devastating than the previous’.

Accordingly, the war in Croatia escalated in the autumn 1991. The dramatic political events of 1990 and 1991 were followed by numerous incidents and clashes between the Croatian police on one side, and rebellious Croatian Serbs groups fully supported by the Yugoslav People’s Army, on the other. The existing conflicts were additionally stirred by declarations of independence, which caused uprisings of local Serbs and the occupation of the territories where Croatian Serbs lived in the majority. The armed incidents were also described as ‘undeclared war,’ and secessionist politics propagated among the Croatian Serbs loyal to the ‘Serbian Democratic Party’ (the SDS) formed in 1990 (the Knin SDS was taken over in the summer of 1990 by a new leader who seemed to have a close contact with Milošević), caused the three-month postponement of the constitutional decision.

After the localized conflicts escalated during the summer 1991, the Decision on Secession of the Republic of Croatia from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was finally adopted in October 1991. However, ‘a stateless’ Yugoslav People’s Army was still located in military barracks in various locations across Croatia and its personnel provided military support to the rebellious Croatian Serbs groups and the Serbian and Montenegrins militia.

Ljubljana, and after the unsuccessful operation of disarmament conducted by the Army earlier that year. Moreover, as Kaldor argues, after the Yugoslav People’s Army openly took side of Slobodan Milošević’s centralist politics ‘Slovenes and Croats were secretly organizing and arming their own independent forces based on the TOs and the police through the growing black market for surplus arms that was emerging in Eastern Europe.’ (Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p.41.).


128 The Croatian Police ‘make up was a core of their future army.’ Similarly, like Kaldor, Andjelic states that during the autumn of 1990 the leading party in the country-Croatian Democratic Community led by Tudman organized secret arming of the police forces in Croatia. (Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, p.192.; Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 41.).

129 Laura Silber and Allan Little, quoted in Ramet, Balkan Babel, p. 67.
In the autumn of 1991, these forces forcibly displaced Croatian Catholics from occupied parts of the territory and created self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Regions. Later in December 1991 they created the Republic of Serbian Krajina and formed a military force known as the Serbian Army of Krajina. The devastating war in Croatia ended in 1995, when the Croatian forces launched the military ‘Operation Storm.’ During this military operation the vast majority of the Croatian Serb population fled to the occupied territories under the control of the Bosnian Serbs in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to Serbia. It is estimated that approximately two hundred thousand Croatian Serbs fled the Croatian territory during the Operation Storm.

2.5.3. The Democratic Multiparty Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990

However, after the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia in 1991, Bosnia Herzegovina's inclusive cultural and political legacy became the main target of the exclusivists’ ethno-national politics within the country that were, as many authors argue, mainly controlled and supported by the ethno-national power centres from the surrounding countries. The election victory of the coalition composed of three nationalist parties in 1990 marked the end of the legacy of socialist Yugoslavia and at the same time it saw the beginning of the ethnopolitics in the country. Andjelic designates the electoral campaign of the victorious coalition as ‘several months of bitter campaigning to underline all possible differences of ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and describes it in the following manner.

Second World War atrocities were recalled and revived by all three ethnic parties. The Serbs often added fire to their speeches by reminding people about the victims of massacres and the genocidal Ustahas’ policy in the early 1940s. The Croats reminded their supporters of the victims of the partisan revenge operations in 1945, against members of the Ustasha regime and, in some cases, civilians. Therefore, everybody claimed the title of the greatest sufferer and the most endangered species. Ethnic leaders were there to offer protection, but only if they got all the votes from their ethnic group.130

130 Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, p.169.
Through the legitimization of the politics of ethnic division, and the emerging discourse of victimisation, the unique cultural and historical experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina was soon reduced to narrow essentialist, ethno-nationalist perspectives and the aspirations of the newly elected political leaders.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina as in the other Yugoslav republics, at the first multiparty elections held in 1990, the newly-formed ethno-nationalist parties won the majority of the seats at all levels. The largest ethno-nationalist parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the Muslim (Bosniak) Party of Democratic Action (SDA - Stranka Demokratske Akcije); The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS – Srpska Demokratska Stranka); and The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica). However, as Abazović and others, argue there are several reasons that contributed to the victory of the nationalist parties at the first multiparty election in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They describe the election campaign as ‘more than dirty’ and argued that the following factors contributed to the nationalists’ victory

1. Firstly, the religious dignitaries of all three confessions, who had been laying dormant for a long time when it came to political issues, became involved. There were cases of burning ballot boxes, adding votes, dead men voting, etc. The election victory of the right-oriented parties in the region also affected the electorate. Inter-partisan division between the SK BiH (The League of Communists of BiH], SDP[Social Democratic Party] and DSS [Democratic Union of Socialists], and SK BiH SDP and Union of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for BiH also contributed generally to the defeat of the left.  

2. The election’s three ethno-nationalist winning parties created the ‘nationalists’ partnership in power’ as they describe it, which very soon resulted in the fragmentation of power. The impossibility of this partnership was evident soon after the election victory, when the representatives of the parties displayed their lack of willingness to share the power, and began to confront each other loudly over the political fate of the country.

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132 Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, p.183.
133 Andjelic, 2005; Bougarel and others, 2007.
The situation on the ground after the elections in 1990 is described by Andjelic in the following manner:

[...] the leaderships of the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina simply followed their mainstream leaders in Belgrade and Zagreb, while Muslims [Bosniaks] tried to underline the issue of Bosnian sovereignty, just as the communists had attempted earlier. The communists, in their attempts, might have been acceptable to all ethnic groups, but Muslims [Bosniaks] nationalists mistakenly hoped to attract all Muslims [Bosniaks] and non-nationalist Serbs and Croats.”  

Consequently, the lack of any political option interested in ruling the whole country and openly expressed oppositions between the new rulers was ‘the centrepiece of the Tudman-Milošević negotiations in Karadordevo.’ Under these circumstances, as Andjelic underlines, the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina seemed inevitably connected with the bleak future of Yugoslavia.

2.5.4. Different Perspectives of the Political Pluralism in the SFRY in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s: (Post)Yugoslav civic engagement

Whatever will be the result of today’s armed confrontations, people will have to live together in these districts. We all need peace, we all need to work on the development of democracy and achievement of the [economic], social and ecological welfare. Citizens of all republics and members of all nations, regardless of actual difficulties, must maintain and develop mutual communication and cooperation on projects useful for all sides included. We are part of modern Europe in which state borders are becoming point of connecting, rather than separating individuals and nations. Our governments and other state institutions have limited functions and range. They [cannot] be exclusive representatives of our interests if they are pushing us to fight with each other. We, citizens of our republics, citizens of Europe and the World, resolutely reject violence and war. We will communicate and cooperate regardless of differences in political views and regardless of future relations between the republics. Everybody for himself and all together. We will confront those who are imposing war as the “only left” solution for our problems.

Charter of Anti-War Campaign, 1991, ARKZIN

134 Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina*, p.188.
136 Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina*, p.188.
The period of ethno-mobilization in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and in its constitutive republics and autonomous provinces that started in the late eighties snowballed by the early nineties. The ethno-mobilization, as Abazović et al suggest, can broadly be interpreted as a process, which is bringing members of one ethnic group in a state of readiness, mobility, which should be a prerequisite for the performance of other actions and/or an obstacle and barrier to the sudden or unannounced “attack” by another, “opposing,” ethnic group or groups.138

The authors differentiate between two types of the process of ethno-mobilization, specifically, as ‘latent’ and as ‘manifest’, in relation to the ways in which the ethno-mobilization is conducted. In the first type designated as ‘latent’, a requirement for homogenization of a particular ethnic group is formed upon widespread values among the members. A ‘manifest’ ethno-mobilization may directly and openly agitate, and set a necessity for homogenization as its political and ideological goal. Furthermore, Abazović et al suggest that the ethno-mobilization can be commissioned by various stakeholders, either internal to a particular nation/state or ethnic group; or external, who act from outside the territory of that state, or ethnic group. Also, a wide-range of actors can be involved in both types of ethno-mobilization ranging from politicians, members of a military force, intellectuals, to ‘ordinary’ people.139

Nevertheless, in the wider context of socialist Yugoslavia, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the process of ethno-mobilization initiated in the late 1980s was legitimized after the one-party rule of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was replaced by the multi-party political system in federal republics. In the same manner, the multi-party system was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the victory of the collation composed of the three nationalist parties in 1990 that were presenting three dominant nations in the country. This political shift from the one-party communist system to ‘mono-ethnic multi-party democracy,’140 which occurred after the first multi-party elections, was also described as ‘a definite breakdown of the political structure of BiH along ethno-national lines.’141 Accordingly, as Abazović et al

138 Abazović et al, Ethno-Mobilization’, p.3.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid., p12.
141 Ibid., p.10.
emphasize. ‘democracy made a wrong turn and it can be concluded that postulating mono-ethnic multi-party democracy was among the important conditions that constituted what we may call a ‘promised land of war in BiH’.142

This newly established multi-party political system, which the authors designate as ‘national(istic) political pluralism’143 was, as they argue:

understood in BiH not as a conglomerate of various political programs and ideas but as a national-political pluralism where one party automatically meant one religion, one nation, and political and territorial exclusivity and hegemony on at least one part of BiH. As such, it inevitably finalized ethnic divisions in a society as fragile as BiH’s was before the war.144

In this period in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as in other constitutive republics of the former Yugoslavia, one form of collectivism was replaced by another, while ‘the rights and fundamental freedoms were transferred from the ‘proletariat’ to a new, re-described ‘base – three ethnic identities’ as Mujkić describes.145

The unforeseen turn of the existing political and economic crisis in socialist Yugoslavia, that occurred once the discourse of growing social division had been altered to a new, exclusivist nationalist discourses consisting of ethno-national mythology and victimisation, rapidly produced anxiety among the people of socialist Yugoslavia. Concurrently, the long-term economic crisis produced the political crisis in the late 1980s, and both increasingly led to the deterioration of the standard of living of Yugoslav citizens and thus increased the economic and social uncertainty in the state. In this period, as Woodward describes ‘[w]arnings of civil war or an impending military coup had been made so often that they were losing much of their currency’.146 Accordingly, the results of different scholars’ surveys conducted in the federal republics and autonomous provinces in the period from 1989 and 1990 show that the majority of the citizens of socialist Yugoslavia, including some of the leading scholars

143 Ibid., p.10.
144 Ibid., p.10
145 Mujkić, We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis, p. 30.
from a range of different fields such as sociology, political sciences and economy did not expect the (violent) dissolution of the state.

However, after the attempts of the federal government to recover the state’s economy failed, a vast number of the disenfranchised-working people in Yugoslavia responded differently to emerging ethno-nationalist doctrines. Focused on political and cultural divisions, these exclusivist discourses were aiming to generate ethno-national, or rather ethno-religious, homogenisation of the people of the multinational Yugoslav federation to the detriment of democracy, civic rights and the supranational framed Yugoslav identity. While on one side, a significant number of people demonstrated their support for the nationalist populism, that was exercised first by the Serbian party leadership and soon widely exercised by the prominent ethno-nationalist leaders of other federal republics, a significant number criticised these ethno-nationalist discourses and decisively opposed the rising politics of fear and division, on the other side. Thus, parallel to the escalating ethno-mobilization numerous civil initiatives, including both personal and group initiatives, were mushrooming across the country in response to the growing political crisis, nationalist opposition and the intensive ethno-mobilisation. The latter will be in the focus of this section of the chapter, considering its importance for the creation of alternative political discourses, the establishment of activist circles that remained active during the war, and in the post-war period, and thus being an inevitable part of the post-war environment in former Yugoslavia, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

One of the main challenges for the study of the phenomenon of the anti-war activism that occurred within the armed conflicts in socialist Yugoslavia is its marginalised position both within media reporting and in the international and the local (post-)Yugoslav scholarship. However, there are significant changes in the recent state of the research, and this is indicated by the increasing number of researchers and anti-war activists working on this subject.

Recent research by scholars concerned with the anti-war mobilisation in the 1990s has shed light on the scope and the importance of the anti-war activism of

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147 Dević, 1997; Jansen, 2005; Spasovska, 2012; Sejdija 2008; Bilić, 2011.
formal and informal groups, as well as of individuals, which marked both the period before and during the War of Yugoslav Succession. The growing body of work on anti-war activism also provides deeper insight into the development of various initiatives across the Yugoslav state, the main shifts in their approaches, and it also reveals some of the methodological challenges involved in an exploration of these, including the significance of interdisciplinary approaches and alternative politics.

The consideration of anti-war and peace activism is a valuable contribution to the main argument of this section and the first chapter in general, about the actuality and importance of ideological pluralism within the Yugoslav model of socialism, which is commonly simplified and described as a mono-political system. This political pluralism was also notable in the last years of socialist Yugoslavia and was mainly manifested through the response of the anti-nationalist, ‘trans-republic, pan-Yugoslav or supra-national peace oriented civic engagement’\(^{148}\) to the lack of political will for consensual decision at the federal level demonstrated by the newly elected political leaders of the federal republics, which thus offered the conflict as the only alternative.

As such, engaging with anti-war and peace activism is required for both understanding of the complex historical, political and cultural dynamics within the (post)Yugoslav space, and for grasping the shifts which occurred with the ethno-mobilisation and subsequent wars. Additionally, civic engagement also illustrates the often overlooked but considerable contribution of the civil society of Yugoslavia and its federal republics, the principles of anti-nationalism, resistance to divisive exclusivist politics, intellectual critical tradition, and creative practices that are altogether accrued in the anti-war activism.

The approaches of scholars has contributed to historicising anti-nationalist and democratic civic platforms that were initiated the late 1980s. Bojan Bilić describes some of the challenges that researchers concerned with histories of anti-war and peace civic initiatives that have been significantly marginalised in (post-)Yugoslav scholarship and in popular media discourse. Bilić writes of the difficulties for

researchers in ‘finding his/her way through a dense forest of scattered, misnamed, empty or overstretched conceptual labels which are sometimes eagerly sticking to social phenomena and political orientations to which they do not normally belong.’

Hence, Bilić suggests differentiating between anti-war and peace activism which, as he notes, are related and overlapping terms that are in some cases used in an interchangeable manner. Further, in his research that is concerned with theorising these practises within the appropriate theoretical framework(s) of social movements theories that have been developed within Western political sociology, Bilić differentiates between two types of anti-war activism. He describes the first type as referring to general principles of resistance to an armed conflict, whilst the second type of anti-war activism, which he designates as ‘civic engagement’, refers to local dimensions of activist’s experiences. Accordingly, Bilić clarifies that ‘civic engagement’ can be articulated from a nationalist perspective, since the activists ‘need not to be against war as such, but might reject a particular war out of ideological convictions or personal grievances.’ On the other hand, the associated concept of peace-activism, Bilić designates as a ‘broader, globally-oriented set of beliefs and values according to which war or any other kind of military means must not be used for conflict resolution.’

This and other valuable insights into civic engagement and peace-activism in (post)Yugoslav space is necessary for the consideration of interrelated Yugoslav (regional) and Bosnian Herzegovinian civic engagement and anti-war initiatives that emerged across Yugoslavia in the midst of the War of Yugoslav Succession. Although still fragmented, accounts concerned with a wider crumbling Yugoslav space provide an overview of developmental trajectories of the anti-war and peace engagement in the turmoil of the decline of the self-management system and the historical and cultural experiences of Yugoslav people. Whilst in the wider Eastern European and global context this historical turn was marked with so-called democratic revolutions and inevitable loss of political experience of the activists of civil society who defeated the Soviet-dominating model of communism and thus ended the Cold War. On the global level, this was followed by the political and economic world reordering, the shifts from

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149 Bojan Bilić, ‘(Post-)Yugoslav Anti-war Engagement’, p. 90-91.
150 Ibid., p. 84-85.
151 Ibid. p. 85.
early forms of formal and informal civic activism on a national level to increasingly growing transnational NGO networks.

However, the pan-Yugoslav civic engagement was significantly transformed in response to the destruction of the Yugoslav communication space due to the breakdown of telecommunication and mail services between, and within, the federal republics and autonomous provinces. The sudden shift from demos to ethnos along with the growing isolation of the once shared Yugoslav space and an incomprehensible scale and brutality of violence which was executed during the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, tremendously changed the form of (post)Yugoslav civic engagement and affected the experiences of activists. At that time, some of the main efforts of considerably well-organised activists were directed to the enhancement of connections with international, regional and local networks in order to raise awareness about the violence, crimes and perpetrators and to assist and protect the continuously increasing number of victims of ethnic cleansing, and to challenge the manufacture of hatred and uncontrollable murders and criminality generated and reproduced by the ideological war machine.

Consequently, since then the activists of Yugoslav civil society who resisted violence and exclusivist ethnopolitics as well as the trivialization of shared socialist experience were routinely exposed to threats and persecution. For instance, a number of the most prominent intellectuals who maintained dialogue during the wartime within the (post)Yugoslav space and with the ever-changing world were forced to emigrate. Croatian feminist and intellectual Rada Iveković in 1993 described this public ‘witch hunting’ as ‘ideological and cultural cleansing’ and this has continued in the post-war period across the (post)Yugoslav space, with physical threats being made to intellectuals. Iveković, was one of five women writers who were publicly abused by the influential Croatian nationalist weekly ‘Globus’ in December 1992, which represented the five women intellectuals as ‘witches’, and, in Meredith Tax’s terms accused them of suppressing information about Serbian war camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and attacked them for ‘being published too much abroad, reading foreign

literature, complaining a lot and having a bad attitude.” Contrary to published accusations, Iveković, and other accused writers, namely, Slavenka Drakulić, Dubravka Ugrešić, Jelena Lovrić and Vesna Kesić, covered the rapes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and criticised wartime press censorship in Croatia in 1992. Since the witch hunt that was initiated in December 1992, the list of those who ‘betrayed the country’ was rapidly growing and as Tax explains, it included intellectuals, artists actors, writers and film directors, who were described as ‘traitors’ and ‘communists,’ since as Tax describes ‘in nationalist papers “Yugoslav has become a synonym for Communist or traitor” Iveković describes that in this period, which she termed a period of cultural autism “[m]any people, not only we five, are treated like this all the time. They want us and any critical intellectuals. Possibly any intellectuals, to go away. The result for culture is disastrous, and journalism has never been so low, not even during socialism.” In this period the ‘five witches’ and many of intellectuals who found themselves on one of the numerous lists of the national weekly Globus, which many critics describe as ‘revolverblatt’ as ‘it spends so many words shooting at enemies’, left the country.

The same practices that were deployed earlier in neighbouring Serbia, are illustrated through one of the most prominent examples of public accusation, the case of Bogdan Bogdanović. This well-known intellectual, and architect who designed some of the most beautiful modernist monuments across Yugoslavia, that commemorate victims of the Second World War, and the former city mayor of Belgrade, was forced to emigrate to Vienna, where he died in 2010. Similar practices continued during the wartime, and in the post-war period.

Today, the intellectual tradition as other aspects of (post)Yugoslav civil society are largely devalued and, they seem temporally and cognitively very distant, not only to new generations, but also to people who lived through the socialist period. Some of the factors that contributed to this active process of distancing, or to be more precise, the factors that fortify long-term politics of distancing from the socialist experience are: the violent changes in the 1990s, and the radical shifts in politics: (post-)war politics of

154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
fragmentation and isolation within, and between the republics that once made socialist Yugoslavia, where the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrate the depth and extent of range of possible divisive politics; and a reckless historical revisionism that is continuously exercised in the former Yugoslavia since the mid-1980s. Some of the features of the existing problems in scholarly approaches to the (post-)Yugoslav space along with numerous incongruities are explored in depth in the second chapter.

The ongoing process of naturalisation of the Yugoslav wars, which is largely underpinned through the dominant ancient hatred thesis, has recently been challenged with different approaches to the analysis of the (post)Yugoslav space. The failure of the vast majority of scholars to develop a comprehensive, critical, and contextually sensitive approach in their analysis of the war in former Yugoslavia, is elucidated in Bilić’s argument that ‘a specifically social scientific “partitioning” of the Yugoslav space in which it has now become more “natural” to focus only on one of the newly created nation-states represents in itself a consequence of the war.’ However, one of the largest resultant problems of this ideological practice of ‘naturalisation’ was identified in the 1990s by (post)Yugoslav feminist, anthropologist and writer, Svetlana Slabšak. She claims that even the activists who advocated democratisation of the country and stood up against war-mongering ethno-mobilisation have ‘discovered that they lacked even the language to describe their own identities’ and this remains a challenge today in general in social and cultural (post) Yugoslav space. Thus, the documented civic engagement and alternative political approaches provide valuable material for critical engagement with (post)Yugoslav culture, and the understanding of the ways in which once shared feelings and principles have been transformed and naturalised in the last three decades.

156 Bilić, ‘(Post)Yugoslav Anti-war Engagement’, p.86.
157 Slabšak’s comment presented here is paraphrased in Ana Dević, ‘Anti-War Initiatives’, p. 148.
2.5.5. The Anti-War and Peace Activism in the SFRY

In the period from 1989 to 1992 various formal and informal anti-war, democratic initiatives were formed across socialist Yugoslavia. They named themselves in different ways – campaigns, forums, centres, movements, associations, circles – whilst the adjectives used in labelling the initiatives such as Yugoslav, ‘democratic’, anti-war and women’s, often imply their ideological concepts and focus of their work. Thus, the naming used by initiatives, particularly pan-Yugoslav democratic initiatives, was generally opposite to the trend in naming used by the emerging political parties in constituent Yugoslav republics, which frequently used ethno-national adjectives in their names. Although, some of the parties preferred to keep the adjective ‘socialist’ in the name of the party, such as was the case with the majority party of Serbia led by Slobodan Milošević. On the other hand, the term ‘democratic’ which was commonly used by both anti-nationalists and ethno-nationalists, was thus loaded with different and opposite meanings. The meaning suggested by political opposition is briefly introduced in the following section focused on some of the most influential anti-war and peace initiatives at that time, while some of the main causes of their failure after the ‘death of socialist Yugoslavia’ are discussed within this section as well as in the subsequent chapter.

2.5.6. The Association for a Yugoslav Initiative (UJDI)

One of the first civic initiatives was the Association for Yugoslav Initiative (UJDI Association hereinafter) formed in 1989 by a group of prominent Yugoslav intellectuals.158 Branko Horvat, one of the founders and the president of the Association, explains that some of the main reasons for its establishment were lack of democratic institutions and pan-Yugoslav political initiatives. After the founding meeting in Zagreb on 10 January 1989, the founders were not allowed to register the Association as political association, since the new emerging political elite - ‘the

communist-turned nationalists’ first prevented the registration of the UJDI, which was finally registered in (then) Titograd, the capital of Montenegro, and was based in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. Aiming to create a movement for a democratic transformation of Yugoslavia, and to include individuals and organizations across the country, the Association established its branches in all the Yugoslav republics. The UJDI’s Manifesto reads ‘Yugoslavia did not have any other solution but radical democratization’ in response to the increasing ethno-mobilisation that followed the political and economic crisis.

The founders preferred to describe the UJDI Association as a civic initiative of intellectuals. Many of the intellectuals associated with the UJDI were prominent members of the critical school of thought gathered around the Praxis School, while some of the UJDI associates were actively involved in earlier civic platforms, such the 1987 campaign ‘Call to the Yugoslav Public for Different Constitutional Amendments.’

The UJDI’s strong criticism of threatening ethno-nationalist populism that was emerging in the major constituent Yugoslav republics, also included concerns related to historical revisionism and the dangers of the simplification of Yugoslav experience, and the perception of Yugoslavia exclusively through the perspective of national divisions. In accordance with their aims that were mainly focused on building a representative, democratic federal Yugoslav community for all its citizens, the UJDI’s

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160 Nowadays Podgorica.


162 The Praxis journal was founded in 1963 in Zagreb by a group of philosophers, political scientists, sociologists and economists, which stimulated debates on fundamental questions of socialist theory and practice. The work of Praxis group particularly influenced young Marxist intellectuals both inside Yugoslavia and in the West. On the other side, it did not directly influence the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LYC), whose officials made no attempt to engage in debate with the Praxis group. However, the LYC officials who were often harassed by the Marxist humanist critics gathered around Praxis silenced the journal in February 1975 and removed from public office or expelled from the LYC those authors who contributed critical articles to the Praxis journal. (Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, p.297.).

associates organized numerous activities across the country in order to advocate for democratic and public action.

The core activities of the UJDI Association included cooperation with numerous political parties and anti-war initiatives as the establishment of the Yugoslav Pre-Parliament that was active in the period from January 1989 until February 1992. The Pre-Parliament was initiated in response to the ongoing constitutional amendments. It took place at the peak of the debate about the reorganisation of the federal level of government and the LCY in 1989. The Pre-Parliament was envisaged as a ‘potential mechanism for the adoption of a new federal constitution which would set the country on a new legal and political basis.’

Through the emphasis on political citizenship that will go beyond belonging to constituent nations and nationalities preferred by the majority of the leaders of the Yugoslav constituent republics, UJDI associates advocated the idea of Yugoslavia as the country of its citizens and proposed the strengthening of federal government.

In the period from July 1991 to February 1992, which marked the beginning of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, the UJDI organized a series of meetings of the government and the opposition across the country. Some of the last discussions were organised in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the UJDI Association had the largest membership. Earlier in 1990 and particularly in the late summer of 1991 when the war spread, ‘UJDI became an anachronism’ after, as Denitch writes, most of the UJDI members ‘turned to organizing parties in their respective republics.’ Hence, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian branches of UJDI along with the democratic socialists, namely, the Social-democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, SSO-Democratic Union and the Democratic Party formed the Democratic Forum of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990.

Although the UJDI’s programme of political action enjoyed considerable support among both politicians and citizens across Yugoslavia, they failed in their

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164 Horvat in Djokic, *Yugoslavism*.
165 Sejdija, 2008; Spasovska, 2012.
166 Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism*, p. 179.
attempt to encourage the wider Yugoslav civic community to join their initiative for radical democracy. One of the main reasons, as Spasovska writes, was ‘their initial decision to stay out of the political arena which led the Association to assume an elitist and detached outlook that could not resonate with wider Yugoslav public.’

However, part of the arguments for the failed attempt of UJDI and other alternative platforms such as Marković’s Reformist party and social-democratic unions formed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia that emerged in 1989 can be related to their late response to the immense and dramatic development of the political crisis. Thus, their rational and planned approach to the mounting crisis in the country was silenced in the cacophony of radical changes in society, which were mainly manifested through the war-mongering campaigns conveyed by media; the reckless revisionism of history which underpinned the dominant politics of fear employed by the ethno-national elites; numerous ‘traditional’ cultural rituals that were reproduced by the newly formed ethnopolitical elite, and led by the religious authorities and institutions in respective republics, who thus largely contributed to ethno-nationalism in the process of forging ethno-national cultural borders within what was once socialist space.

On the other hand, media space was almost completely controlled by ethno-nationalists. The ethno-mobilisation and war mongering media campaign called for various kinds of social action that also included many young intellectuals who were, as Denitch describes profoundly suspicious of politics and political organisation. They ‘preferred to work with social movements, which in practice meant ecological, women’s and peace’ movements. The retrospective analysis of some of the social organising and social actions undertaken in the early 1990s additionally illuminates alternative discourses as the main ideas articulated in various campaigns. It also illustrates some of the main challenges that activists involved in social actions experienced in their retrospective republics, in the period when the majority of Yugoslavs, including activists and some politicians, faced the shock that followed the sudden awakening from their long dream of a better Yugoslavia.

167 Spasovska, Landscape of Resistance, Hope and Loss, p.53.
The statements presented in the Charter of war-activists Anti-War Campaign from Zagreb in 1991, quoted in the beginning of this section, had initiated collaboration between different NGOs as well as individuals committed to building peace and cooperation between ‘citizens of all republics and members of all nations’. Bearing in mind that at that time the war in Croatia began along with the conflict in Slovenia, the explicit articulation of principles of distancing from the already executed war violence which, as stated in the charter, was promoted by ‘governments’ also anticipated the position of a number of NGOs and initiatives that became active in the later period across the (post)Yugoslav space.

The anti-war campaign which concentrated mainly on the integration of experience, and work of various initiatives and individuals involved in the campaign, thus provided relevant experience of deliberate work on integration during the violent and imposed disintegration of the political and cultural space(s) across Yugoslavia. However, the borders which might be perceived as the ‘meeting points’ rather than points of division through the lenses of alternative politics suggested by the anti-war platform, had been radically changed since 1991 when the Charter was declared. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the war-divisions endured through the post-war reorganisation of the country in accordance to the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (also referred to as Dayton Peace Agreement).

2.6. The War against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992

The beginning of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was marked by a series of dramatic events that hastened a decision about a referendum on independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the then rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia proclaimed their independence earlier in 1991, only Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina were left within the Yugoslav Federation. The political discussion about possible restructuring

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169 The Republic of Serbia at that time consisted of Serbia and two autonomous provinces namely, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

170 The socialist Republics Macedonia and BiH also declared their intention to establish independent states in the same period when Croatia and Slovenia declared their intentions for secessions.
of the rump Federal Yugoslavia failed due to the impossibility of reaching agreement about the political fate and position of BiH. Thus, the country found itself in a difficult position, where the political situation in the country was under the strong influence of the opposing ethno-national politics from surrounding Croatia and Serbia and dynamics of the armed conflict that occurred in 1991. On the ground, as in the case of Croatia, numerous localised incidents occurred in 1991. Already in autumn 1991 the creation of the self-proclaimed Serb autonomous districts and regions in BiH started, creating the territorial foundation on which the Serb Republic was to later be established. In the same period the Yugoslav People’s Army began to withdraw its forces from Croatia and re-deploy them into Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.6.1. Referendum for Independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

At the two-day independence referendum held on February 29 and March 1, 1992, more than sixty percent of the citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted for the independence of the country. On the other side, a majority of Bosnian Serbs loyal to the Assembly of Bosnian Serbs, boycotted the referendum in accordance to the demand of the Assembly, whilst the Yugoslav People’s Army air force assisted the boycott “by dropping leaflets urging Serbs to stay home.” In response to the referendum, political representatives of Serbs of BiH formed the Bosnian Serb Assembly, dominated by the Serbs Democratic Party. The Assembly that was founded on 24 October 1991 was described as ‘the highest representative and legislative organ of the Serbs in BiH.’

Moreover, in this period, the Bosnian Serb forces backed by the Yugoslav People’s Army and by militia from the Federal Republic

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571 Also, Malcolm states that Radovan Karadžić, a president of the Serbian Party forbade Serbs to vote in the referendum, and that the party organized different activities in order to disrupt the referendum – they erected road-blocks to prevent ballot-boxes entering the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina under their control; also, the planes of the JNA dropped leaflets supporting the boycotts. Malcolm, Bosnia, p.230).

572 Ramet, Thinking About Yugoslavia, p. 206.

of Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{174} executed the same strategy as in Croatia. In autumn 1991, they proclaimed four ‘autonomous districts’ in BiH, that would later become the territorial foundation on which the Serb Republic was established, and demanded their secession from BiH. (Malcolm, 2002). Initially, the Serb Democratic Party ‘wanted Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain a part of Yugoslavia.’\textsuperscript{175} Later, on 21 November 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a decision to endorse these ‘Serb autonomous regions,’ which was soon followed by the proclamation of the creation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina already on 21 December 1991. In this period, these forces had encircled Sarajevo, Mostar, Bihać and Tuzla with heavy artillery. (Malcolm, 2002, Ramet, 2005). Soon after the United Nations failed to respond to the appeal of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian legitimate president Alija Izetbegović to deploy a peacekeeping force along the borders of BiH ‘due the unending and persistent aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina,’\textsuperscript{176} the Serbian Assembly proclaimed the independence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 January 1992, with headquarters in Pale, a small industrial town near Sarajevo.

The Constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, later called Republika Srpska was adopted on 28 February 1992. Article 2 of the Constitution states that: “the territory of the Republic consists of Serb autonomous regions, municipalities and other Serbian entities, including the regions in which genocide was committed against the Serb people in the Second World War.” Also, such territories were declared to be part of the Federal Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{177}

The dramatic overture to the horrors of the war that followed included strategies focused on the isolation of the country from the outside world and on the isolation of

\textsuperscript{174} Already in April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro declared the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was reconstituted in 2003 and renamed as a State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The Union was ended in 2006, after both countries formally declared independence.

\textsuperscript{175} The ICTY Indictment against Biljana Plavšić, one of the leaders of Serb Democratic Party, ‘The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Biljana Plavšić’ (2000) Case No.IT-00-40-I, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/id/en/pla-ii000407e.pdf> [accessed on 12 May 2016].


\textsuperscript{177} Article 2 to the Constitution of the Serb Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina quoted in ‘Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić’ (2011).
municipalities and villages within the country. This strategy was accomplished at first through the establishment of military control over the ‘Serb autonomous regions’ created in autumn 1991. Also, the Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces backed by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and other paramilitary forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cut the road network within the country and occupied the important communication centres. In the first few months from September 1991 to May 1992 joint (para)military forces also took control over the airports and encircled the major Bosnian-Herzegovinian cities. These military actions were followed by strategies of ethnic cleansing of the ‘non-Serb’ population\(^\text{178}\), which inhabited towns and villages within the occupied territories, but also of those Serbs who were resisting the secessionist politics of the Serb Democratic Party and the Bosnian Serb Assembly, and strategies of ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population. These policies were based mostly on ethno-religious, gender and social principles, and they were outlined within political agendas created by the Bosnian Serb Assembly, such as ‘six strategic objectives of Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.\(^\text{179}\) The scope of the violent changes in the country’s demography executed through ethnicization, initiated in this period, can be illustrated through data of the census of April 1991. The census data reflects a complex picture of the country where in only 32 of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 109 districts did one of the three ‘ethnic groups’ constitute 70 per cent or more of the local population.\(^\text{180}\) However, by the end of 1992 the Bosnian Serb forces backed by the Yugoslav People’s Army (until its withdrawal from the country in May, 1992) and numerous paramilitary forces from the Federal Yugoslavia conquered close to 70

\(^{178}\) A significant number of Bosnian Serbs rejected the secessionist politics of the Serb Democratic Party and the Bosnian Serb Assembly, firstly by voting for the independence of the country at later by staying in the encircled municipalities. The majority of the citizens of BiH in that period, regardless of their religious or ethnic belongings, or political and ideological beliefs, in various ways resisted the secessionist politics and protested against the division of the country.

\(^{179}\) Adopted on 12 May 1992 at the 16\(^{\text{th}}\) session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, which outlines the following objectives: 1. establishment of State borders separating the Serbian people from the other two ethnic communities; 2. Set up corridor between Semberija and Krajina; 3. establishment of a corridor in Drina valley, that is, eliminate Drina [river] as a border separating Serbian states (Drina is ‘a natural border’ between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia); establishment of border on Una [a river in the western part of Bosnia] and Neretva [a river in the southern part - in Herzegovina] Rivers; 5. Division of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts and establish effective state authorities in both parts; and finally the 6th - Ensure access to sea for Republika Srpska; ‘Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić’ (2011).

\(^{180}\) As Sabrina Ramet underlines ‘the ‘census of April 1991 recorded that 43.77 per cent of the residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina were “ethnic Muslims,” 31.46 per cent were Serbs, and 17.34 were Croats. There were especially large concentrations of Serbs in western Bosnia - far from Republic of Serbia - and of Muslims in eastern Bosnia along the Serbian border.” (Ramet, Balkan Babel, p.204.).
percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, during the first months of this undeclared war marked by intimidation, mass expulsion of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the occupied territories, (organized) internal migration of Serb populations from the blockaded cities, nonstop poisonous propaganda followed by numerous incidents across the country, the Yugoslav People’s Army was still located in military campuses in the besieged cities as well as in other locations across Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The conflicts in the country culminated when the Bosnian-Herzegovinian negotiation team, led by the country’s president Alija Izetbegović (the leader of the SDA party) was captured by the Yugoslav People’s Army at the Sarajevo Airport on 2 May, 1992. The three members of the BH team which had just returned from failed peace negotiations in Lisbon, organized by the European Community were transferred to the Lukavica military base nearby Sarajevo. They were held there until the next day, as a guarantee for a safe withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army soldiers and its personnel out of the city, after their failed attempt to take control over the central part of Sarajevo on 2 May, 1992. The dramatic political crisis that was mediated by the envoys of the international community, resulted in the agreement between the BH Presidency and the JNA Commander, that enabled the safe withdrawal of the JNA soldiers and its personnel out of the city, which was guaranteed by the presence of the United Nation Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) and the seized BH negotiation team who headed the JNA column. However, the peaceful withdrawal out of the city was disturbed when the column was cut and self-organized units of defenders of Sarajevo attacked the convoy, soon after the convoy left the JNA Military Headquarters.

This incident that occurred in Dobrovoljačka Street (today Hamdije Kreševljakovića Street) in 1992 became a subject of highly political quarrels between representatives of Republic of Serbia and Republic of Srpska on one side, and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other. In the long-term dispute, this highly politicized incident incorporates contested interpretations of the attack on the convoy and drastically different estimations of casualties, just as in the ‘Tuzla Column case’ of 15 May 1992.

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182 See section 5.3.
Both the ‘Dobrovoljačka Street’ and ‘Tuzla Column’ cases have served as the foundation for the construction of contested discourses of the war and for recent political vortexes in the relationships between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbia. However, after the JNA left the territory of the internationally recognized Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the agreement mediated by the European Community, the JNA shifted their armaments to the newly formed so-called army of Serb Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Earlier in 1992 the Bosnian Serb forces with support of militia from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia occupied some parts of Sarajevo. Most of the ‘non-Serb’ inhabitants of these parts of the city as well as a significant number of Bosnian Serbs, who did not support the violent secessionists’ politics propagated by the Serb Assembly, were forced to leave their homes. Many people who lived in the occupied areas of the city were tortured, detained and in most of the cases, brutally killed and their property was looted or completely destroyed. Most of the people who managed to save themselves and who escaped to the parts of the city under control of the Bosnian Army forces, shared the destiny of their fellow-citizens and spent nearly four years under the siege, which started already in April 1992. 183

The scale and brutality of the war crimes committed against the civilians during the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina demanded urgent responses of the international community and various humanitarian agencies. After the Serb Republic was proclaimed in January 1992, in the second year of the war, precisely in May 1993, the leaders of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, created a self-proclaimed ‘Croatian Republic of Herceg Bosna’. A one-year conflict between Bosnian Army forces and Croat forces resulted with the horrendous war crimes against civilians that included mass murders (i.e. massacre over the Bosniak civilians in a village Ahmići in central Bosnia); torture and rapes in concentration camps (the camp Dretelj and the camp Vojno nearby Mostar); eviction of Muslim/Bosniak populations from the territories on which the Bosnian Croat leadership wanted to establish Croat domination; and the siege of the city of Mostar, 183

Additionally, it is estimated that nearly seventeen-thousand refugees from various part of Bosnia and Herzegovina settled in the city until May 1992.
which is also marked by the complete destruction of the Old Bridge (Stari Most, the UNESCO World Heritage site) in November 1993. Under strong pressure from the United States of America, this conflict was ended in 1994 by the signing of the Washington Agreement.\textsuperscript{184}

2.6.2. Framing the Peace Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The demographic consequences of the war in BiH are the subject of a broader framework of demography of conflict and violence. On the basis of various methods employed in the analysis of the war in BiH, it is estimated that ‘ethnic cleansing, the violent expulsion of certain populations in order to create ethnically homogenous territories, was used systematically by Serb and Croat forces’ resulted in displacement of about half of the pre-war Bosnian-Herzegovinian population and killing of over one hundred thousand people.\textsuperscript{185}

Many authors concerned with the analysis of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the war in the former Yugoslavia emphasize not only the brutality of the war, commonly described as ‘the most deadly conflict in Europe since the Second World War’, but also that the post-Cold War order generated the increased internationalisation of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{186} This internationalisation, Bougarel describes, occurred on various levels

Thus, the long process of resolving the economic crisis in the former Yugoslavia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which involved the international community and which had been initiated earlier in the 1980s, had been completely transformed in the early 1990s, when the political crisis in the country culminated in the violent conflict.

The shift in approaches to crisis resolution occurred after the social unrest manifested in mass protests in response to the economic crisis and austerity gradually altered to the rallies for support to contested demands for the restructuring of the Yugoslav federation. These demands articulated by the newly elected representatives of the governments of Yugoslav republics, brought into the open public confrontations of the politicians both, at the federal level of governments and at the levels of each Yugoslav republics. Most of the politicians involved in disputes over the political organization of the Yugoslav federation were coming from the newly elected ethno-nationalist parties, and the majority of them were former members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Their rivalry and opposing political campaigns led to the rise of nationalism and ethnic rivalries throughout socialist Yugoslavia. In this way, the crisis of the system was ‘developed into a crisis of identity,’ as Andjelic points out, when ‘[c]lass identity, or any other social identity, was replaced by ethnic identity.’ 188

Accordingly, in the early stage of international interventions into Yugoslav political crisis, the responses to the worsening situation in the country were focused on efforts to keep Yugoslavia together and to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in the country. This includes the Conference on Yugoslavia, held on 18 October 1991 in the Hague in the Netherlands. The conference resulted in a proposal for the European Community to reorganize Yugoslavia into a community of sovereign states. The plan titled ‘The Agreement on an Overall Settlement of Yugoslav Crisis’ also known as the Carrington Plan 189 was accepted by the representatives of all republics of the former Yugoslav Republics except by the representatives of the Republic of Serbia. 190 However, after the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia in 1991, the international intervention into political affairs in the region was mainly concerned with the growing violence, war crimes, human rights violations and humanitarian disasters in the conflicts that occurred shortly

188 Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, p.21.
189 The then European Community envoy Peter Lord Carrington chaired the Conference on Yugoslavia held in 1991 in The Hague, the Netherlands.
190 Ramet, Balkan Babel.
after the proclamation of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992.

In relation to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a broad term ‘international responses’ refers to the shifting politics of the European Union and its member states in that period, the United Nations and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the governments of the following countries: the United States of America; Western European countries - mainly The United Kingdom, France and Germany; Russia; and the Middle Eastern countries - mainly Saudi Arabia, and Iran.\textsuperscript{191} Dynamics of relationships between these international actors, as well as the progression of the conflict were shifting politics towards war. They also fashioned relationships towards the war-sides involved in the conflict. Thus, during the war-period some of the main disputes between the international actors were related to the demands for international military intervention in BiH, and with demands for lifting the general and complete weapon embargo on the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, adopted by the United Nations Security Council in September 1991.\textsuperscript{192} Considering the situation on the ground, repercussions of the United Nations embargo were particularly hard for defence forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were renamed The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After the Yugoslav People’s Army openly took the side of Serbia and provided fully military support to Serbian hegemonic centrist politics towards the other republics of socialist Yugoslavia, Croatian and Slovenian forces managed to reorganize their defence units, while the embargo left Bosnian defence forces almost completely under-armed. Initial demands of the ethno-nationalists for ‘cantonization’ and for the partition of BiH that was presented already in the early 1990s,\textsuperscript{193} were discussed and further modified throughout the war. After the years of unsuccessful attempts of a diplomatic initiative of the Western governments to end the conflict in the country, and after the numerous ceasefire agreements failed, further developments of the conflict demanded

\textsuperscript{191} Ramet, Balkan Babel.
\textsuperscript{193} I.e. at the Lisbon peace negotiations in May, 1992.
urgent changes in the international response to the conflict. The deterioration of the situation was marked by increased violations of human rights and war crimes against civilians that occurred in the period from 1993 to 1995 and includes the increasing humanitarian crisis in the country, specifically in the occupied areas; continuation of armed hostilities by the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against besieged towns (which resulted with the proclamation of the UN ‘safe areas,’ which were to be free from any armed attack or any hostile act in the following municipalities and their surroundings – Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde and Bihač), and the massacre that happened in July 1995 in Srebrenica, a small town in the eastern part of the country, one of the ‘safe areas’ under protection of the UNPROFOR. The massacre was committed by the Bosnian paramilitary Serb forces backed by the paramilitaries from Serbia, which, in the period between the 12th to 20th July 1995 summarily executed over 8000 Bosnian Muslims, mostly men, and forcibly transferred women, children and elderly to areas outside the ‘safe zone Srebrenica.’ A significant number of men managed to flee towards the territories under control of the Bosnian Government forces and escape the massacre, which the ICTY recognised as genocide in 2004.

In August 1995 NATO launched aerial strikes against selected Bosnian Serb military targets. Soon, a new round of negotiation was organized when the American-led diplomatic initiative held a series of the meetings with representatives of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Once the previous proposals of a division of the country were generally accepted, a general agreement was attained at a US Air Force base in Dayton Ohio in October 1995. The process of negotiation was finally concluded on 14 December 1995 after the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and The Federal Republic

194 This particular discourse of the war requires detailed analysis and it should consider numerous illegal channels of deliveries of weapons to particular war-sides.
197 In accordance to the agreement of August 29, 1995, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was authorized to sign, on behalf of the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), the parts of the peace plan concerning it, with the obligation to implement the agreement that is reached strictly and consequently. Office of High Representative (OHR), General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1252&lang=en> [Accessed on 22 May, 2014].
198 At the meetings in Geneva on 8 September 1995, and in New York on 26 September 1995.
of Yugoslavia signed the General Framework for Peace (Dayton Peace Agreement) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Paris. The Agreement often referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the fighting, but it also entrenched the divisions generated during the wartime, through endorsement of the ‘territorialization of the “constituent peoples” of Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore also the main result of war and ethnic cleansing.’ Additionally, it has established a complex administrative and political organization of the country, which has subsequently been criticized and characterized as an inappropriate and ineffective system of government.

2.7. The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia as well as in BiH were framed as ‘ethnic conflicts’ within the dominant international approaches, which as a consequence, privileged ethno-nationalists as political representatives. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) is often criticized as the main obstacle in the process of dealing with the legacy of the war. It established the complex territorial-political organization of the country, which greatly affects everyday life through various forms of discrimination and domestication of enforced divisions within the country. In this way, the constitutional arrangements of the DPA, as Malcolm claims, created doubts about ‘the future of Bosnia as a united country.’ Malcolm’s observation refers to complex political and administrative country’s division agreed by the DPA. Firstly, by dividing country into two Entities each with its own constitution, namely, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska. Secondly, the Federation of BiH is divided

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200 The principal mediators in the negotiation process were American envoy Richard Holbrooke and the then European Union special negotiator Carl Bildt, while the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement was witnessed by the representatives of the European Union, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
203 The ways in which political organization and political practices in the post-war BiH affects everyday life and the reconstruction of life and society in the post-war period are the subject of strong criticism. For instance, some of the prominent Bosnian-Herzegovinian scholars Asim Mujkic, Nerzuk Curak and Zdravko Grebo describe the DPA a ‘straitjacket for the citizens of BiH.’
204 Malcolm, Noel, Bosnia, p. 269.
further into ten federal units - Cantons, each with its own administrative government. The territorial and political-administrative organization of the country was finally concluded on 5 March 1999, when the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina *(hereinafter the Brčko District)* was created as a single administrative unit of local self-government, which exists under the sovereignty of the state.

The institutional design of the internationally agreed Bosnian-Herzegovinian Constitution, which is included as Annex 4 to the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a minimal common institutional framework. The Constitution stipulates the governments at three different levels, where the first - State level refers to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole and it includes a tripartite rotating Presidency, a Council of Ministries and a bicameral Parliamentary Assembly. Importantly, as Vehabović and Fetahagić point out ‘[t]he Constitution stipulates that that the political positions in the Institutions of BiH can be filled only by those who identify themselves as belonging to one of the “constituent peoples” (parity distribution between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs).’ The second, the Entity level, which, as they further explain, clutches ‘a substantial part of governmental powers.’ includes two distinct Entities, namely, Serb dominated Republic of Srpska, defined as ‘the State of Serb people and of all its citizens,’ and, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consists of ‘Bosniacs and Croats as constituent peoples, along with Others and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the territories of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ And finally, the third level of government is the District

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205 Since the DPA left unresolved the Inter-Entity Boundary Line in the Brčko area, the parties agreed to a binding arbitration (Article V of Annex 2 to the Dayton Agreement).

206 See Appendix 1.

207 A bicameral Parliamentary Assembly consists of a House of Representatives (lower chamber) and a House of Peoples (upper chamber). Moreover, as stated at the official website of the United Nation Development Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina "Thirteen prime ministers, fourteen legislatures, nearly 150 ministers, five presidents, and three constitutional courts govern this small nation." The United Nation Development Program.


209 Ibid., p.4.


211 The Office of High Representative, Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/laws-of-
level, which includes the ‘neutral’ District Brčko of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its own institutions, laws and regulation. As its Statute reads, the residents of the District Brčko may be: “citizens of an Entity, and of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the entities.”

Thus, while the Dayton Constitution confirmed legal existence and continuation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and ‘Daytonian’ Bosnia and Herzegovina it also modified its internal structure. Specifically, two political units – the Republic of Srpska Bosnia and Herzegovina, proclaimed in 1992, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina established in 1994 by the Washington Agreement, were confirmed as Entities. The complex political structure created by the DPA and particularly the power-sharing arrangements at the state level, the House of Peoples and the tripartite Presidency, are characterised with an overall prioritisation of the ethnic values over the civic values, and as such reinforces discrimination. Some of the recent prominent legal cases are related to discrimination against those citizens who declare themselves as ‘the Others’, and as ‘citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, and who are thus not affiliated with the ‘constituent peoples’, three politically dominating ethno-national collectives in power, are discussed within the subsequent sections of this chapter.

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214 The category of ‘Others’ encompasses members of ethnic minorities. The prominent case of discrimination of the ‘Others’ in political participation in the institutions on the state level is elaborated in the European Court of Human Rights judgement in the case of ‘Sejdijć and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’ from 22 December, 2009. These two applicants hold prominent public positions, but both are ineligible to stand for election to the House of People and Collective Presidency because they declare themselves to be of Roma and Jewish origin respectively.

215 In accordance with the constitutional provisions (Articles IV and V), only persons declaring affiliation with a constitutional category ‘constituent peoples’ are entitled to stand for elections to the House of Peoples and the tripartite Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, European High Court for Human Rights’ Judgement in the Case ‘Zornić vs Bosnia and Herzegovina’ from the 15th of July, 2014.
Accordingly, Rees emphasizes, the process of structuring the country into two entities and an overall ‘cumbersome governmental and administrative machinery’ with fourteen legal systems created by Dayton Agreement altogether did not reverse but rather reinforced ethnic identification by establishing ethnic criteria of citizenship in the entities.\footnote{217}

The high-scale internationalization of the war in BiH, according to Rees, can hardly compare to an ‘influx of internationals once a peace deal was signed.’ In her terms, this massive involvement of international actors cannot be simply perceived as a peacekeeping operation, but rather as ‘a peace-making exercise in which international bodies have acquired a quasi-colonial role, running what is widely acknowledged to be a protectorate or trustee-ship.’\footnote{218}

Hence, the political organization responsible for guidance of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) which consists of governments of the states that attended the London Peace Implementation Conference in 1995. Accordingly, the PIC’s Steering Board comprises representatives from the following countries: Canada, Italy, Japan, The European Union, France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, United Kingdom, and of the United States of America. The PIC’s ‘man on the spot’, is the High Representative, the position which was created under the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\footnote{219} Specifically, Article II of Annex 10 to the DPA on Civilian Implementation guides the High Representative to monitor the implementation of civilian aspects of the peace settlement. Also, the High Representative, positioned in the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo claims extensive powers which ‘allow him to remove or replace officials perceived as opposed to the Agreement’s provisions, or hindering their implementation.’\footnote{220}

\footnote{218} Rees ‘International Intervention, p. 53.
\footnote{219} Ibid.
\footnote{220} Ibid.
The DPA which comprises eleven annexes, contains provisions for: military aspects of the peace settlements (Annex 1); regional stabilization (Annex 1-B); inter-entity boundary line (Annex 2); elections (Annex 3); constitution (Annex 4); arbitration (Annex 5); respect for human rights and the establishment of a human rights commission comprising a chamber and an ombudsman (Annex 6); protection of refugees and displaced persons and voluntary return and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons (Annex 7); preservation of national monuments (Annex 8); public corporations (Annex 9); civilian implementation (Annex 10) and, the deployment of the International Police Task Force (Annex 11). In this fashion, the DPA contains, as Rees argues

more than an agreement between the belligerents to end the fighting. The accords were going to be influential for the lives of Bosnian people far beyond the immediate postwar moment. (..) Dayton was clearly intended to lay the ground for a new state and a new society.\(^{221}\)

The repercussions of the DPA’s so-called ‘founding paradoxes’ are numerous, and the provisions of the Dayton Constitution have been echoing far beyond the postwar moment.\(^{222}\) Many critics address different ‘founding paradoxes’ and related lapses in implementation of the DPA, which continue to shape the everyday lives of the citizens in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. For instance, one of the significant lapses which Rees specifies, was the absence of women during the negotiation processes, which, as she argues, has had a strong impact on the position of women in the post-war reconstruction. She further argues that although the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war that ‘itself has been highly gendered affair’,\(^{223}\) it is not a gender inclusive peace agreement. During the war, which affected ‘the nature of relationship between the nation, its military and the men and women that constitute them’ women were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual torture and humiliation.\(^{224}\) The majority of women experienced evictions and life in refugee centres within the country and throughout the world.

\(^{221}\) Rees ‘International Intervention,’ p.52.
\(^{222}\) Bougarel et al, 2007; Cockburn and Zarkov, 2002.
\(^{223}\) Rees, 2002, p.56.
However, during, and after the ‘militarized nationalism’ of the war ended with the signing of the ceasefire agreement, a high proportion of women took responsibility for their families, and a large number of women found themselves single parents. While some women managed to re-establish their home-lives, a significant number of women still live in the temporary centres for refugees and internally displaced people. Consequently, today, as Rees argues the ‘highly masculinized and militarized society, characterized by a significant growth in organized criminal activity, increased the marginalization of women.’ Although all the major international human rights convention have been adopted (Annex 6 to the Dayton Peace Agreement), including the Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations against Women (CEDAW) in this way, as Rees asserts, it provides a legal framework ‘through which women could theoretically assert their rights’, but it was insufficiently articulated. Similarly, Bougarel, Helms and Dujizing’s commentaries regarding the so-called DPA’s ‘founding paradoxes’ address the issues related to human rights provisions. They point out that the Dayton Constitution

prioritized the implementation of human rights, beginning with the right to return for all displaced persons (DPs) and refugees. These founding paradoxes of Dayton, with the diverging implications of its military and civilian aspects, the gap between its institutional mechanisms (based on ethnically defined territorial units) and its demographic aims (return of DPs and refugees), have made it the object of never-ending polemics at both the local and international levels.

Thus, the structural and consociational models introduced by the DPA reflects Malcolm’s statements that ‘the negotiators were thinking in terms of potentially separate statelets rather than mere administrative divisions within a single state.’

The Dayton Constitution institutionalized the process of ethnicization of the country. Through its complex political structure and territorial division, as Vehabović and Fetahagić point out, it ‘combines the “minimalist” approach to the power of the

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225 Ibid.
226 Rees ‘International Intervention,’ p.56.
227 The CEDAW Convention (UN 1979) had been ratified earlier by the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.
228 Rees ‘International Intervention,’ p.57.
230 Malcolm, Bosnia, p.269.
central government and “maximalist” approach to the balance and distribution of power between the “constituent peoples” and territorial entities that retain a high degree of autonomy.\(^{231}\) Moreover, the Preamble to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina mention three constitutional categories, namely, ‘constituent peoples,’ Others and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The last line of the preambular paragraph notes:

Recalling the basic principles agreed in Geneva, 8 September 1995 and 26 September 1995 in New York, Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows.\(^{232}\)

Considering the existing territorial organization and the institutional design of the country the framework for equal political participation of all constitutional categories is minimal. On the ground, there are numerous social and political effects caused by special rights of ‘the constituent people,’ over the other constitutive categories of ‘Others’ and the ‘citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ which merged with the endorsed territorialisation of the constituent peoples. Hence, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian philosopher Asim Mujkić who designates the recent political practices in the country as ethnopolitics, argues that

the political practice in Bosnia can be rightly described as the democracy of ethnic oligarchies, not as [the] democracy of citizens. Furthermore, such a formally democratic procedure without explicit, constitutional political legitimation of citizenship remains only a mechanism for legitimation of non-democratic government (political parties, or better put movements who pretend to represent one of the three constituent people). The ethnically-centred Dayton Agreement has become [the] main obstacle to the establishment of civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\(^{233}\)

In their joint study from 2013, Vehabović and Fetahagić discuss the constitutional category of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The authors accentuate the ambiguity of this constitutional category, since it is not clear whether this constitutional category includes all citizens regardless of their ethnic, religious or territorial belonging, or whether it is a separate constitutional category for those who

\(^{231}\) Vehabović and Fetahagić, ‘Democracy Without Citizens,’ p.4.
\(^{233}\) Mujkić, *We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis*, p.18.
are refusing to identify themselves as a member of one of the ‘constituent peoples’ or ‘Others.’\textsuperscript{234} Unfortunately, their attempt to initiate the crucial discussion about this insufficiently explored and discussed question on the eve of the first post-war census, has failed. So far, however, there has been little discussion about the subject, and Vehabović and Fetahagić’s study is the only analysis which is primarily concerned with the question of the constitutional category of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Today, the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is a divided country in a transition from the war to peace and parallel to that, on the long run to the European integration process. Thus, the process of transition is spanning experience of war and disintegration of the country on one side, and a projected, shared European future on the other. The transition is fraught with various oppositions that are originating from the war and, which are primarily considered with the vision (or a lack of the vision) of the united country. The radical political, cultural and social turmoil caused by war were additionally aggravated with the Dayton Peace Agreement, which as Malcolm accentuates:

\begin{quote}
pointed strongly in the direction of de facto partition, leading eventually to the secession of the Serb Republic – a secession which, if contested by the Federation, would lead once again to the war.\textsuperscript{235}
\end{quote}

The dynamics between the dominating oppositions are generally protracting the designated processes of reintegration and reconciliation through the obstruction of the peace process. Though, differentiation between dominant, allegedly opposed perspectives, which are shaping the complex post-war reality, is not clear and easily perceptible. Although these political principles were recognized as the only explicable frameworks during the 1990s, they do not reflect the complete picture of the post-war BiH society. This was demonstrated first through the political opposition and alternatives that were presented through the 1991-1992 protests. The opposing political utopias also characterise the post-war period, through the various forms of protests of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens against discriminatory and dreadful ethnopolitics and the political deadlock and divisions which they are re-producing.

\textsuperscript{234} Vehabović and Fetahagić, ‘Democracy Without Citizens.’
\textsuperscript{235} Malcolm, \textit{Bosnia}, p.270.
2.8. Conclusion

Most of the accounts from the fields of political, international and globalisation studies and history presented here challenge the widely accepted ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ thesis. They approach critically the dynamics and the course of events that first led to the Yugoslav crisis and later to the Yugoslav Wars and the post-war peace arrangement in BiH in relation to transformative events that occurred within the interconnected wider (post-)Yugoslav, and more narrow BiH political and cultural contexts, on the one side, and the wider global contexts, on the other.

Some of the main findings of the analysis from the first chapter are the recent emergence of the ethnic animosities. At the same time, they signpost the formation and interconnectedness between different discursive practices, as some of the main strategies used in the manufacture of differences in the multiple transition from one-party communist system to democracy, from war to peace, and from violent disintegration to envisioned peaceful integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some of the authors whose accounts are presented and discussed throughout the first chapter, point out that until recently little critical research had been done on the particularities of the Yugoslav self-management model, the causes and consequences of the disintegration of the country, and about the Yugoslav wars in general. The political and historical analysis thus outlines some of the main interpretative frameworks as the problems in critical approaches to the analysis of the politics of memory of the interconnected (post-) Yugoslav and (post-war) Bosnian and Herzegovinian contexts.

These accounts also point to the emergence of both ethnopoltics and the revisionist history wave as contemporary phenomena, and identify and discuss the limitations and some of the main issues in both the pre-war and post-war political frameworks, as the extent and consequences of the devastating war in BiH. Thus, they provide sufficient contextualisation of and valuable insights into some of the key events and agencies relevant for the analysis in the subsequent chapter.

However, most of these accounts, drawn on classical concepts of history, are largely explanatory. Also, with some exceptions, most of the analyses do not engage critically with the postmodern condition. Thus, they are insufficient for the cultural
analysis of post-war memory practices and the politics of war memory and commemoration in BiH, which requires more critical engagement with memory, in relation to ideas about history and justice in postmodernity. These and other associated concepts are developed in the second chapter which focuses on the development of a theoretical and analytical framework in relation to the politics of war memory and commemoration in the post-war BiH.
CHAPTER 3
History, Memory and Justice after the turn of 1989-1990

This chapter considers the shift of paradigm and its ramifications on the interrelated global; post-communist, including post-Yugoslav space; transnational (European Union); and the post-conflict Bosnian-Herzegovinian context. The chapter is organised in four main sections. The first section introduces some of the most influential interpretative frameworks, which maintained the post-Cold War political reordering, through naturalisation of highly complex concepts of culture, civilisation and history. The second section examines some of the main ramifications of this production of knowledge and presents alternative approaches to the analysis of the world after the fall of communism in Europe structured around the concept of globalisation and civil society. The third section deepens the analysis of the de-politicisation of the post-communist East through the examination of the mode in which ideological antagonism was replaced with cultural difference. Finally, the fourth section examines the way in which, thus crafted, cultural difference is arrayed in the European Union narrative about dealing with the legacy of the totalitarian system in Europe as well as the ways in which the so-called double-legacy is decoded through the dominant revisionist narratives in the new member-states.

3.1. Introduction

The turn of 1989, which is also designated as the ‘end of metanarratives’, or the ‘end of grand narratives’ symbolises the collapse of Communism in Europe and the end of the bipolar ideological division of the world. While the majority of the dominant interpretations of the ‘historical turn of 1989-1990’\(^1\) at that time, have signalled both the shift in the intellectual debate caused by the change of the paradigm, and the establishment of the new world order, some of the most influential notions underpinned the new political world reordering through engendering new meanings of culture and history. The dominant theses in both scholarly and non-scholarly debates that were introduced on the eve of the collapse of Communism in Europe

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\(^1\) Throughout this thesis I use the full designation ‘the historical turn of 1989-1990’ suggested by Boris Buden, 2009, 2010; and a shorter version ‘turn of 1989’
and after 1989, were saturated with ‘Declinism and Endism’ as Callinicos describes. The prominent examples of the latter are Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’, and the notion of the ‘End of History’ suggested by his student Francis Fukuyama.

The rapidly changing picture of the economically and politically concurrently re-connecting and disconnecting post-Cold War world, was followed by the rapid development of information technology. At the same time the intense geopolitical and cultural transformations challenged some of the main intellectual concepts within which the experience of two World Wars, the Holocaust, and the ideological post-Second World War world’s division were framed.

However, despite these immense ideological transformations, as some scholars argue, politics continue to be redefined within the existing West-East dichotomy, while the spatial and temporal aspects of the ‘East’ pertained. The ruptures generally create space for both the critical engagement with the ever-changing world as well as for non-critical deployment of dominant concepts. The former encourages debates focused on questioning the adequacy of dominant concepts in thinking about the new power relationships in politically and culturally changed contexts. While the non-critical accounts aim to produce overreaching principles which interprets new changes into discourses of dominant ideologies and reproduces the sense of historical continuity. This illuminates the value of critical approaches, which are necessary for the examination of mythologizing knowledge which limits, and in some cases, terminates, the intellectual debate required in the ever-changing world-picture.


Some of the prevalent arguments that dominated the new post-Cold War scholarly debate are briefly presented here, considering their influence on both scholarly and non-scholarly debates, and particularly on the USA policy debate. Accordingly, some of the central

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arguments at that time were that the ‘definite triumph of the Western liberal capitalism’, which was followed by the ‘third way of democratisation’ (Huntington, 1991), has also signified the ‘end of history, (Fukuyama, 1989), and heralded a series of cultural clashes in the allegedly post-ideological world. The latter refers to Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis introduced in 1993 which suggests that conflict occurs at two main levels that resemble the old hierarchies of political power, and which fashion the post-Cold War world. Accordingly, at the first, lower level which Huntington designates as the micro-level, the ‘adjacent groups’, struggle along the ‘fault lines between civilisations’, which in his terms replaced ‘the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War.’ While at the second, macro-level, as he further explains, the ‘states from different civilisations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their political and religious values.’

The new suggested post-Cold War world division between Fukuyama’s ‘posthistorical’ West and the ‘historical’ Rest, creates new civilizational, cultural, or national boundaries. Huntington structures his thesis around the ambiguous concept of civilisation, which he anticipates as a new divisor in the post-ideological world. He defines the notion of civilisation as ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity’, which is expressed ‘both by common objective elements such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people.’ Additionally, Huntington perceives civilizational differences as basic categories, which are, he argues, products of centuries, and thus ‘more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes.’ Accordingly, the cultural line of division, which he understands in accordance to Wallace’s suggestion, and terms the ‘fault line’, divides ‘Western Christianity on one side, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other’ and in this way it delineates the frontlines of the future conflicts. Furthermore, within this world division, both European and North American civilisations make the ‘Western civilisation,’ while the ‘non-Western civilisation’

5 Ibid. p.7.
6 Ibid.2-3.
7 Huntington and others, Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilisation? The Debate, p., 4-5.
8 Appendix 1, The Fault Line of Civilisations
9 Huntington and others, Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilisations? The Debate, p.9.
encompasses Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American and ‘possibly African’ civilisations, as he suggests.\textsuperscript{10}

In his analysis of the contemporary ‘era of democratic transitions’ from 1991, Huntington perceives culture as one of the key aspects in successful democratic transitions, along with specific country’s political and economic aspects.\textsuperscript{11} Throughout the analysis, Huntington outlines both chronologically and politically the process of the democratization as well as some of the main features and challenges of contemporary transitions. Accordingly, he argues that this global process first started with a nearly century-long ‘first wave of democratisation’ in the USA and Western Europe, which in the period from the 1820s to the 1920s brought some 29 democracies. However, this ‘first wave of democratisation, as Huntington terms it, was soon followed by the first ‘reverse wave’ that culminated with the authoritarian regimes in countries like Italy, Germany and Spain.\textsuperscript{12}

The defeat of the fascist regimes in Europe marked the beginning of the ‘second wave, which encompasses the period from 1960 to 1975. Huntington describes that in this period, as in the first wave, the number of established democracies was significantly reduced due to the overlapping ‘second reverse wave.’\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, the subsequent end of the second ‘reverse wave’ Huntington sees as the beginning of the recent ‘third wave’ of democratisation.

Accordingly, this long-term, global wave was first initiated in 1974 with the democratisation of the post-dictatorship and post-authoritarian countries from the south of Europe, namely Greece, Portugal and Spain. These shifts were followed by the democratisation of a group of post-dictatorship and post-authoritarian countries in Latin America in the 1980s. However, at the end of the decade, the third wave of democratisation returned to Eastern Europe in 1989 with the so-called democratic revolutions, which according to Huntington, have had a ‘snowball’ effect for democratisation in some countries in the Arab world in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{14} In his analysis, Huntington considers the outcomes of recent democratisation in relation to the previous two waves and the associated two ‘reverse waves’ of democratisation.

\textsuperscript{10} Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilisations? The Debate, p.8.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p.12.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p.16.
Huntington’s account of the new pattern of conflict in the global world from 1993 exposes a significant change in his understanding of the notion of culture from his analysis of 1991. For instance, in the latter Huntington questions and diminishes both ‘cultural theses.’ This includes the ‘more restrictive view’ of culture suggested by George Kennan, who, in Huntington’s terms argues that democracy is appropriate ‘only for north-western and perhaps central European countries and their settler-colony offshoots.’ While the second, ‘less restrictive’ thesis holds that some cultures are ‘peculiarly hostile to democracy.’ Huntington disproves both suggestions and understands the notion of culture as historically dynamic, rather than as stagnant systems of beliefs and attitudes and argues that certain cultures, which are designated as anti-democratic and undemocratic in the abovementioned restrictive views, are still compatible with Western-democracy. Yet, in his article from 1993, Huntington highlights the importance of ‘civilisation identity’ in the future and underlines the global civilizational and cultural delineations suggested by Wallace and Kennan.16

Accordingly, in his analysis of 1993, Huntington ponders some of the main changes in Europe and in the political concept of the ‘Balkans’ that had re-emerged at that time. He argues that in Europe ‘the Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology’ and marks out the ‘centuries-old boundary’ outlined earlier in 1990 by William Wallace.17 In the Balkans, the fault line, as Huntington further explains, ‘coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires’, whereas in the case of Yugoslavia, this ‘line of bloody conflict’ separates Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia.18 Huntington’s influential proposal that drew a line between western and non-Western civilisations, also announced the re-emergence of nations of the Balkans and balkanisation that were to become some of the most dominant interpretative frameworks for the violent dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia.

16 Huntington and others, Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilisations? p.3.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p.163.
3.3. The Re-emergence of the ‘Balkans’ Metaphor

The wars of Yugoslav Succession were also called the ‘Balkan Wars.’\textsuperscript{19} This vague designation, which re-emerged with the war in the 1990s, has complex and rather misleading implications for comprehension of the 1991-2003 wars in the former Yugoslavia, and it also revived some earlier disputes. The renewed interest for the area as well as the meanings produced in Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ along the cultural lines of divisions in the Balkans, associated metaphors that dominated media presentation of the conflicts, scholarly debate and policy analyses, are only some of the examples of the persistence of a ‘frozen image of the Balkan.’\textsuperscript{20}

In her seminal work that is concerned with ‘a spectre of the Balkans’ which is haunting Western culture, Todorova aims to contribute to the ‘awareness of the danger and the freedom of the boundary situation.’\textsuperscript{21} She examines various descriptions of the area in the long-term process of defining of the Balkans, during which the notion has transformed from earlier geographical appellations to ‘one of the most powerful pejorative designations in history, international relations, political sciences, and, nowadays, general intellectual discourse’.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, the process of defining the Balkans, as she claims, has generally followed a ‘set of geographic, political, historical, cultural, ethnic, religious, and economic criteria, and most often the combination of criteria.’\textsuperscript{23}

Todorova describes that the polysemic term Balkans have been ‘compared to a bridge between the East and the West, between Europe and Asia. (…) The Balkans are also bridges between stages of growth, and this invokes labels such as semideveloped, semicolonial, semicivilized, semioriental.’\textsuperscript{24} Additionally, the wider space of the Balkans also bridges different political legacies specifically, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman and communist, where, in Todorova’s terms, ‘some periods and legacies overlap and other are completely segregated.’\textsuperscript{25}

\vspace{1em}

\textsuperscript{19} See section 1.3. \\
\textsuperscript{20} Maria Todorova, \textit{Imagining the Balkans} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.7. \\
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p.30. \\
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p.16. \\
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 199.
Todorova’s terms, in the ‘complete dissociation of the designation [Balkans] from its object, and the subsequent reverse and retroactive ascription of the ideologically loaded designation to the region.’

The latter can be exemplified in relation to the (post)Yugoslav space, precisely through the labelling of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession as the ‘Balkans War’, and through the emergence of the term Western Balkans to denote those former Yugoslav countries, which are currently in the process of accession to the European Union. This includes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Thus, the new designation separates current European Union members, Slovenia, which has been a member-state since 2004, and Croatia which joined recently, from the rest of the former Yugoslavia, now designated as the Western Balkans, which Todorova describes as a ‘politically correct designation’ that is frequently used in the jargon of the international community in the process of the European integration.

This new division within the (post)Yugoslav space, which culturally and politically separates the new EU member states from the Western Balkan states that are on different levels of accession to the EU process, underlines Huntington’s cultural line of division. This new cultural difference is articulated in some of the commentaries which followed the Slovenian accession to the European Union in 2004, and which Mitja Velikonja summarises in the following manner:

Slovenia has come “one step closer to this European centre” (...) At the same time all things bad, backwards, obsolete, and all that is out, stand for the other side-the Balkans, the East, socialist past and so on. By joining the EU, Slovenia escaped the Balkan curse, said a journalist in the Spanish daily El Pais.

Regarding the associated process of ‘balkanization’, Todorova explains that the notion was coined after the disintegration of great powers, namely the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russian Empire, to signify the emergence of small states. Accordingly, the concurrent creation of Yugoslavia, was in Todorova’s terms ‘technically speaking the reverse of balkanization.’

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26 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p. 7.
27 Albania is also included in the Western Balkan countries.
28 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p.192.
29 See section 3.1. of this chapter.
31 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p.33.
Moreover, this peculiar position of Yugoslavia in relation to the Balkans and in the second half of the twentieth century, Todorova describes in the following manner:

[w]hile, during the Cold war Yugoslavia was neatly exempt from any connection to the Balkans, its civil war in the 1990s was generalized as a Balkan War, although none of the other Balkan countries - Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, even Albania - were in danger of entering it. Now with the changed political conjuncture, one speaks only about the Western Balkans as a problematic zone, and the rest of the Balkans are exempt from the designation.32

In the ongoing European Union enlargement process, most of the countries from the Balkans33 have already joined the European Union, while a significant number of the countries will be formally admitted in due time.34 Todorova sees this shift as an opportunity ‘to reflect more calmly on the scholarly project of making sense of the Balkans.’35

3.4. Alternative approaches to the post-Cold War dominant interpretative framework: The Notion of the Global Civil Society

The ‘End of History’ thesis is associated with the collapse of Communism which, according to Fukuyama, along with Fascism was one of the two major modern challenges to Western liberal democracy. It is worth mentioning here that both somewhat incongruent theses suggested by Fukuyama and Huntington, as the authors themselves admit, are not original, but draw on proposals suggested earlier. While Huntington in his ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis, uses Keenan and William’s proposals, Fukuyama discards Marx’s interpretations of Hegel, and draws his concept from Alexandre Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel and his original idea that ‘history culminated in an absolute moment – a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious.’36 In Fukuyama’s terms, Kojève who perceived the post-war

32 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p.192.
33 Specifically, among member states are Greece that joined the EU in 1981; Slovenia, together with seven eastern European countries joined in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007; while Croatia joined to the EU in 2013.
34 The recent accession negotiation processes were formally opened with the following ‘Western Balkans’ candidate countries which are thus granted EU candidate status: Albania (in 2010), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (in 2009), Montenegro (in 2012), Serbia (in 2014), and Turkey (in 2010), while Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 2003) and Kosovo (since 2008) are holding status of the potential candidate countries. In ‘Briefing on Progress of Western Balkans Countries’ (2016) The European Commission <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/589791/EPRS_BRI%282016%29589791_EN.pdf> [accessed on 23 March, 2017].
35 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p. 192.
Western European countries as the embodiment of the so-called ‘universal homogenous state’ which resolved all prior contradictions, and satisfied all human needs, has assumed that ‘there was no more work for philosophers as well, since Hegel (correctly understood) had already achieved absolute knowledge, (…) left teaching after the war and spent the remainder of his life working as a bureaucrat in the European Economic Community’.

Finally, Huntington describes his influential ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis as an ‘effort to lay out elements of a post-Cold War paradigm’ and which, as he argues, although it fails to explain and predict some important events, these ‘anomalous events’ in his terms ‘do not falsify a paradigm’, which can be disproved ‘only by the creation of an alternative paradigm that accounts for more crucial facts in equally simple or simpler terms.’ From this perspective, Huntington disqualifies Fukuyama’s thesis, which he describes as the ‘one-world paradigm that a universal civilisation now exists or is likely to exist in the following year’ as an ‘unreal alternative.’ Among other arguments, Huntington disproves Fukuyama’s presumption that liberal democracy is the only opposing political model to communism, which consequently leads to the deduction that ‘the demise of the first produces universality of the other.’ He challenges what he terms this ‘Single Alternative Fallacy’ with the existence of many other forms of ‘authoritarianism, nationalism, corporatism and market communism (as in China)’, and particularly emphasises the role of religion in the modern world, arguing that ‘religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people’.

He also challenges the argument that increased interaction in the globalised world produces a common culture, and claims that commonly wars occur ‘between societies with high levels of interaction, and interaction frequently reinforces existing identities and produces resistance, reaction and confrontation.’

In the light of recent politics, some critics argue that these dominant interpretative frameworks that commonly naturalise and thus articulate cultural and civilizational differences through hegemonic ideologies, in certain circumstances functioned as ‘ideological manuals’

39 Ibid. p.63
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
for destructive hegemonic politics. As Ó Tuathail argues 'to reduce the war in Bosnia to an ancient fault line civilizational struggle is to read it in the same terrain as those who wish to produce it as essential civilizational war of the Orthodox Slavic Serbs against Islam.' In the realm of theory, both approaches significantly hinder the manner and consequences of the historical change through focusing exclusively on official politics, essentialist understandings of culture and civilisation, and through the non-critical understanding of the debated concept of history.

Yet, Andreas Huyssen in his cultural analysis moves the interpretation of ‘endism’ beyond the dominant so-called ‘Cold Warriors’ perspective, and designates some of its earlier notions in history, and in cultural and postcolonial theory. Huyssen clarifies that new memory discourses in the West first occurred with the social turn after 1960s ‘in the wake of decolonisation and the new social movements and their search for alternative and revisionist histories’, and argues further that the search for other traditions and the tradition of “others” was accompanied by multiple statements about endings: end of history, the death of the subject, the end of the work of art, the end of metanarratives. Such claims were frequently understood all too literally, but in their polemical thrust and replication of the ethos of avant-gardism, they pointed directly to the ongoing recodification of the past after modernism.

Accordingly, Huyssen examines ‘today’s turn against history’ in relation to the proliferation of memory at the end of the twentieth century’, which as he claims, ‘has added significantly to the ways we understand history and deal with the temporal dimensions of social and cultural life’ at a time which is, he argues, characterised by the ‘threat of socially produced amnesia’.

In the following sections of this chapter, some of alternative approaches are considered in order to explore more theoretically and analytically sensitised approaches that shed light on the manner and scope of the change of the structure that occurred with the historical turn of 1989-1990 and the end of the Cold War. This includes the respective analyses of Mary Kaldor and Boris Buden, which are both concerned with the context of post-communist Europe, in which the authors from different perspectives tackle the issues of de-historicising of the turn of 1989-1990 and the consequent devaluation of the critical intellectual tradition, and the civil society of communist countries. Although Kaldor in her political analysis considers the context

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of ‘central Europe,’ while Buden’s cultural analysis is focused on the wider post-communist Europe, including the post-Yugoslav space, both authors contribute to understandings of some of the main modes of the political reordering, the transformation of civil societies that existed prior to the turn of 1989 as the new challenges they confront in the post-Cold War.

3.4.1. The Notion of Civil Society

The largely problematic and at the same time widely accepted Fukuyama and Huntington’s theses have significantly influenced both the scholarly debate and Western policies at the time of the transition of both the USA and the countries from the communist East, and more widely in Latin America and the Middle East. However, these and other similar theories that foreground essentialist and simplistic explanations of both the Cold War and the post-Cold War world, faced criticism from both scholars and activists. One of the examples of the earliest criticism of the simplistic, black and white presentations of the Cold War era is Jürgen Tampke’s political-economic analysis of the countries in Communist East from 1983.\textsuperscript{46} Tampke signals the problem of the predominance of Western interpretations of Eastern Europe and claims that the ‘publications on this topic continue to be written almost exclusively from a Western point of view and therefore lack understanding of the Eastern European perspective.’\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, in her work, Mary Kaldor the political scholar and activist, addresses the issue of predominance of the western point of view in interpretations of the Cold War and the post-Cold War world.

Specifically, throughout her comprehensive analysis, Kaldor tackles the arguments promulgated by many western scholars, that the chain of so-called democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 were spontaneous uprisings without history and without new ideas through the concept of global civil society.

Accordingly, Kaldor exemplifies these interpretations through comments propounded by two prominent European intellectuals. The first is the comment of the French historian

\textsuperscript{46} Jürgen Tampke, \textit{The People’s Republics of Eastern Europe} (Kent: Croom Helm London & Canberra, 1983) p. 7.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
Fançois Furet, who, in Kaldor’s terms, has argued that ‘[w]ith all that fuss and noise (…) not a single idea has come out of Eastern Europe in 1989’.  

48 The second refers to Jürgen Habermas’ commentary that a ‘peculiar characteristic of this revolution, namely its total lack of ideas that are either innovative or oriented towards the future’, which underpins Habermas’ definition of the 1989-revolutions as ‘nachholende Revolution’.  

49 The latter Kaldor translates in English as ‘rectifying revolutions’, in accordance with Kumar’s suggestion.  

50 Moreover, in her earlier work from 1995, Kaldor problematizes some of the dominant Western theses stipulated by Francis Fukuyama, Ralf Dahrendorf and other observers. Accordingly, she claims that this interpretative framework has numerous consequences for understanding the causes, actors, the outcomes of the revolutions, as well as the post-1989 world in general.  

51 Her argument for the pervasiveness of these interpretations is twofold. First, she argues that Fukuyama and other commentators who share the same point of view were not sufficiently engaged with political and cultural affairs in Eastern Europe before 1989. And second, she claims that despite this lack of expertise, their interpretations prevailed mainly because the “experts” on Eastern Europe were shunned when they failed to predict the revolutions, while those who took part in the revolutions were too busy constructing new democracies to write about their experiences.  

52 In relation to these views, Kaldor addresses the problem of a number of studies that focus solely on the economic aspect on one side, and the lack of focus on agency, on the other. In relation to the former, Kaldor recognises the significance of this aspect, but at the same time she argues that the focus on the ‘economic and moral bankruptcy of the communist regimes and the coming to power of Gorbachev’ is not sufficient for comprehension of the change that occurred after 1989, since, in her terms ‘it explains the context but not why the revolution happened.’  

53 Also, she problematizes the related focus on the role of important individuals, and claims that ‘no single individual can bear the weight of the 1989 revolutions.’  

48 Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Polity: Cambridge, Malden, 2004), pg. 50.  

49 Ibid.  

50 I use the term ‘catch-up revolutions’ suggested by Boris Buden.  


<https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VQwAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA57&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage &q&f=false> [Accessed 22 January 2018]  

52 Ibid., p. 57.  

53 Ibid.  

54 Kaldor, ‘Who Killed the Cold War’, p.57.
Accordingly, Kaldor claims that most scholars overlooked the role of agency, which she understands as the ‘action and behaviour and thinking of the actors who actually carried out the revolutions in the period immediately preceding 1989’.55

In response, Kaldor provides an overview of the growing cooperation between the peace movements in Eastern and Western Europe during the Cold War. Her central argument is that the process of the re-discovery of the term civil society in Eastern Europe in this period, which simultaneously occurred in Latin America, has collapsed the territorial boundaries of the nation-states and commenced the development of the global civil society.56

Moreover, within their temporally distant accounts both Kaldor and Tampke emphasise the importance of the dialogue between the Eastern and Western Europe during the Cold War era, in the rapprochement between the two antagonistic ideological blocks in Europe. The dialogue that was initiated in the first decades of the Cold War, was subsequently developed throughout the official politics during the 1960s such as the Ostpolitik57 of Brandt’s Government. While, as both Kaldor and Tampke agree, cooperation and rapprochement were greatly encouraged by the Helsinki Declaration (Declaration) from 1975. Socialist Yugoslavia was among 35 European countries which signed the Declaration. Developed on the principles of solidarity and the common history of the participating states, it outlines and promotes the common European strategy of disarmament as well as the economic, scientific and cultural, and other relevant aspects of cooperation among signatories. Accordingly, as stated in its preliminary text, the Declaration was encouraged by ‘political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and cooperation as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States of the world’, and determined to ‘exert efforts to make détente both a continuing and the increasingly viable and comprehensive process.’58

This new shared European policy enhanced the cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe, eliminated some of the barriers between the ideologically divided European East and West and importantly, it enabled the movement of citizens, mainly from Western to

55 Kaldor, Global Civil Society, p. 52.
57 Politics towards the ‘East’
Eastern Europe. This turn, as Kaldor further argues, encouraged the development of the peace movement in the Europe that was characterised by ‘the explicit link between peace and democracy and human rights.’ Accordingly, as she further explains, the cooperation between the growing number of different peace movements across Europe was significantly increased in the 1980s when both the Western and the Eastern peace movements, activists groups as well as individuals established the common political platform symbolically named ‘The European Nuclear Disarmament’ (END). The END was formed in response to the deterioration of the agreed rapprochement due to NATO’s deployment of the new generation of nuclear weapons in Europe in 1983, and the ‘Soviet invasion of Afghanistan three years later. This regression was described as the ‘new Cold War.’

Yet, despite their shared vision of the world without nuclear weapons, Western and Eastern European civil societies have faced different challenges in their continuous opposition to the ruling political elites in their respective countries. While the work of the Western peace movements was mainly focused on anti-war activism and protests against the new nuclear threat, the peace activism in the Eastern European countries was also directed against the ruling communist one-party systems in their respective countries. Through their non-violent activism carried out by a diversity of groups and movements, the peace activists in Eastern Europe searched for new ways of thinking politics. Accordingly, their activism which was focused, in Kaldor’s terms, on the changing ‘relationship between state and society’ encompasses the spectre of political actions such as the refusal of compulsory military service in the case of members of the Polish ‘Freedom and Peace’ movement, and the concept of ‘anti-politics’ developed by Vaclav Havel and George Konrad, who suggested the creation of ‘non-political space in which public affairs could be discussed honestly and openly without self-interested concerns about power.’

3.5. The Emergence of Global Civil Society

Kaldor, who sees these and other related examples as the reinvented concept of civil society, argues that the latter has signalled its global character through, in her terms, the ‘social,
political and economic transformations that were taking place in different parts of the world and that came to the surface after 1989.’

On the premises of this argument, Kaldor problematizes the nullification of the legacy of Eastern European peace activism which, as she argues further, has built the basis for globalization through the creation of the global interconnectedness, and the collapse of the territorial boundaries of the nation-state, which are two most important features of globalisation. The second feature that has occurred after 1989, as Kaldor argues, opens up ‘new possibilities for political emancipation as well as risk and greater insecurity’ that both resonated in the dual role of global civil society which, as she further explains, is on the one hand

in the process of helping to constitute and being constituted by a global system of rules, underpinned by over-lapping inter-governmental, governmental and global authorities (...) and in the other hand, new forms of violence, which restrict suppress and assault civil society also spill over borders so that is no longer possible to contain war or lawlessness territorially.

Thus, in relation to the turn of the 1989-1990, Kaldor suggests that the notion of civil society has to be understood in terms of ‘deepening and widening, a move away from state-centred approaches, combining more concern with individual empowerment and person autonomy, as well as territorial restructuring of social and political relations in different realms’. Moreover, she attempts to bridge different definitions of the term global civil society, and outlines five interwoven concepts of civil society, specifically, two past and three contemporary versions. Some of the main aspects of the suggested meanings, which are of great importance for grasping some of the main political and cultural developments after the 1989 in both scholarly and non-scholarly debates, as well as the memory history debate and cultural practices, are briefly presented here.

3.5.1. Five Versions of Civil Society

The first concept of civil society, which emerged in the pre-capitalist period, Kaldor designates as societas civilis. She perceives this version as the original meaning of civil society, and describes it as a ‘state of affairs where violence has been minimalised as a way of organising social relations’ within the state. Kaldor further argues that the subsequent new

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63 Kaldor, Global Civil Society, p.1.
64 Ibid. p.2.
65 Ibid. p. 6.
66 Kaldor, Global Civil Society, p. 7.
meaning, which she terms *bourgeois society*, was associated with modernism, the emergence of capitalism and a market society, and exemplifies this version in relation to Marx’s definition of civil society. Accordingly, Kaldor argues that Marx’s notion of the ‘theatre of history’ which encompasses ‘[m]arkets, social classes, civil law and welfare organisations’ for the first time has positioned civil society both in contrast to the state, and transposed to a global level, the process which, as she suggests, might be equated with ‘globalisation from below.’  

Subsequently, with the emergence of the activism of the 1970s and 1980s in Eastern Europe, this meaning was shifted to the *activist version* of civil society, which, in Kaldor’s terms, emphasises ‘active citizenship’ and ‘growing self-organisation outside formal political circles.’  

While the activist version at the level of the state opposes unconstrained state power, its form at a transnational level is demonstrated through the work of transnational advocacy networks such as Amnesty International, and global social movements. One of Kaldor’s central arguments is that the activist version has empowered the development of the global civil society.

However, in the aftermath of the turn of 1989-1990 the activist version was replaced with the neoliberal one, which, in Kaldor’s terms ‘consists of associational life - a non-profit, voluntary “third sector” - that not only restrains state power, but also actually provides a substitute for many of the functions provided by the state.’  

Unlike the previous three versions that were mainly bounded within the state boundaries, the latter is seen as ‘the political and social counterpart of the process of globalisation’ whereas in the absence of the global state, as Kaldor further describes

an army of NGOs (…) perform the functions necessary to smooth the path of economic globalisation. Humanitarian NGOs provide the safety net to deal with the casualties of liberation and privatisation strategies in the economic field. Funding for democracy-building and human rights NGOs is somehow supposed to establish a rule of law and respect for human rights.  

Finally, Kaldor designates the *postmodern version* as the latest version of civil society. While, in relation to the earlier two versions, namely the activist and the neoliberal, the postmodern version shares the principle of tolerance, at the same time, it departs from the cosmopolitan

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68 Ibid., p. 8.
69 Ibid., p. 9.
70 Ibid.
principle and, as Kaldor explains, sees ‘national and religious identities as well as multiple identities’ as preconditions for civil society.\(^{71}\) Thus, the postmodern civil society is, in Kaldor’s terms, seen as the ‘arena of pluralism and contestation’, which compromises plurality of global society that ranges from ‘Islam, nationalist Diaspora, networks, as well as human right networks.’\(^{72}\) Additionally, on premises of the overview of contemporary definitions of civil society, Kaldor suggests that every version of the concept relates to different categories of actors. For instance, in her terms ‘the neoliberal version of global society, where the civil society is seen as substitute for the state (…) corresponds to the idea of a civil society composed of a market of NGOs. The very term NGO seems to imply “not” or “instead of” the state. The activist model of civil society corresponds to civil society composed of social movements and civic networks, while the postmodern version would include the nationalist and fundamentalists as well.’\(^{73}\)

3.6. The Global Civil Society: Some Critical Remarks

The criticism of civil society as an Eurocentric concept has recently been raised by many left and the post-colonial scholars. In her analysis of the discourse of the concept of civil society, Kaldor examines some of the main grounds for the perception of the concept as Eurocentric, and incompatible to other political and cultural contexts. She first discloses that the main ambiguities, and some of the main negative associations with the concept, stem from its perception within Europe as ‘national and contrasted with war in international arena’, while at the same time, civil society was also contrasted to: “Eastern Europe and beyond”; the ’Eastern Empires that ruled on basis of fear’; and ‘societies of the North America and Africa, that were ‘characterised as “rude”, “savage”, or “barbarian.”’\(^{74}\) Accordingly, this complexity and antagonism both denoted by the concept resulted in its vagueness, since, as Kaldor remarks, ‘if civil society was national within Europe, it was conceived as European outside Europe.’\(^{75}\) This issue of the ambiguity of the utterly European aspect of the concept of civil society is followed by negative perceptions towards the other non-European societies. These interpretations were promulgated by civil society theorists of which the majority had, in Kaldor’s terms, a ‘teleological view of history’ and who ‘understood these “uncivil” societies

\(^{71}\) Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.9.
\(^{72}\) Ibid., p. 9, 10.
\(^{73}\) Ibid. p. 106.
\(^{74}\) Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p. 38.
\(^{75}\) Ibid.
as backward, less advanced in stages of history, which would inevitably lead to civil society—the highest stage mankind had experienced so far.\textsuperscript{76} This dominant perception, which also reverberates with some of the Eurocentric contradictory ideals from earlier historical periods that are discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter, persist today, as Kaldor suggests when she argues that this view ‘pervades the thinking of the Western donors – the idea that through support for NGOs, the West can help the rest of the world “catch up.”’\textsuperscript{77}

Kaldor accentuates the complexity of the notion through contrasting the existing European version and the opposing argument of many ‘third world and left’ theorists, which suggests that so-called ‘“uncivil” societies are not simply an alternative route to modernity; rather they are a reaction to European civil society, a consequence of the often violent encounter between European civil society and the rest of the world.’\textsuperscript{78} Furthermore, Kaldor exemplifies one type of the mediated Eurocentric argument through Ernest Gellner’s idea, and the criticism of Eurocentric model, which she exemplifies through Mahmood Mamdami’s argument, which discloses its contradictory function in the post-colonial African contexts and sees it thus, as incompatible for African societies.

Gellner perceives different forms of collectivist ideologies such as nationalism, within which he underlines its negative types that can lead to collectivism, populism and social cohesion, Islam and Marxism as the main obstacles in the development of civil society, and terms them as ‘rivals of civil society.’ As Kaldor further explains, although Gellner, unlike the majority of Eurocentric civil society theorists, argues that these forms are all compatible with some of the aspects of civil society, he does not think that ‘civil society will necessarily win out against its rivals.’\textsuperscript{79} This view, as Kaldor argues, is illustrated in Gellner’s observation of the revival of civil society which followed the turn of 1989-1990 in Eastern Europe, as an ‘aspiration to gain what has already been achieved in the West, although this may not be achieved.’\textsuperscript{80}

Kaldor contrasts Gellner’s Eurocentric perception with Mahmood Mamdani’s remark. Mamdami frames the concept historically and, according to Kaldor, he sees the domain of civil

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{76} Kaldor, \textit{Global Civil Society}. p. 38.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{79} Kaldor, \textit{Global Civil Society}, p.40-41.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p.41.
\end{footnotesize}
society, particularly citizenship, rights and contractual relations, as politics ‘reserved for whites in the colonial period’ since the ‘Europeans, in the tradition of stadial history, tended to describe Africans as “children.”’ In relation to the current Africanist discourse on civil society, which is the focus of his comprehensive analysis, Mamdami describes this discourse as ‘more programmatic than analytical, more ideological than historical’ and identifies two central claims around which is constructed. The first, in Mamdami’s terms, suggests that ‘civil society exists as a fully formed construct in Africa as in Europe’ while in accordance to the second the ‘driving force of democratisation everywhere is the contention between civil society and the state.’ Yet, Mamdani understands the primarily Eurocentric concept of civil society as an ‘embryonic and marginal construct in Africa’ since it hinges on the experience of the 1989 uprising in the East Europe. Accordingly, Mamdani identifies the problem of the prominence of the notion of civil society, which, in his terms became the new prismatic lens through which to gauge the significance of events in Africa. Even though the shift from armed struggle to popular civil protest had occurred in South Africa a decade earlier, in the course of the Durban strike of 1973 and the Soweto uprising of 1976, the same observers who tended to exceptionalize the significance of these events eagerly generalized the import of later events in Eastern Europe!

Kaldor accepts Mamdami’s criticism that the concept, which was developed in Europe, is mainly associated with the conquest, domination and exploitation of colonial states, that in effect deepened the gap between West and the Rest. This gap, as she further argues, was increasingly included in the discourse of civil society through notions like ‘orientalism’ that were, as she argues ‘invented to explain the “backwardness” of other society.’ Similar practices are also evident in relation to the reinvented notion of the ‘Balkans’ in the 1990s, as Todorova demonstrates in her critical account, through the practices deployed after 1989 in the wider Eastern European and post-Yugoslav contexts, which are analysed in more detail in the subsequent sections and chapters.

81 Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.41.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., p. 3.
86 Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, p. 44.
87 See section 2.2.1.
In response to both criticisms, Kaldor reiterates the complexity of the concept, and highlights the emancipatory potential of civil society, which, as she argues, should not be denied by these and other negative associations with the concept. Specifically, she sees this emancipatory potential in the new meanings of ‘concepts of individual autonomy and self-organisation’ endorsed with the reinvented concept of civil society in the Eastern Europe and Latin America. Accordingly, Kaldor claims that this reinvented concept has offered a new liberating language through changing ideas, and bringing new meanings, and in this way, it has challenged some earlier practices, and bridged divisions between and within different political contexts. In relation to this, Kaldor clarifies the relationship between the actual practice of civil society and coercive power elsewhere, which Mamdani problematizes in his criticism, in the following manner ‘[c]ivil society was linked to the war-making colonial state, which constituted a limitation on civil society itself. Indeed, the new meaning of civil society, which breaks through the territorial boundedness of the concept, has relevance for the West and the South.’ Finally, in her reflection to complexity and contradictory meanings associated with the concept, Kaldor clarifies that her own understanding of civil society incorporates many of the changing meanings of civil society, which are briefly presented here.

The brief insight into Kaldor’s analysis of the concept of global civil society delineates the re-framing of the concept in relation to historical and ideological shifts that were intensified in the aftermath of the turn of 1989-1990, with the process of globalisation. Some of the aspects of these changes are revealed in the three contemporary meanings of the concept of civil society. They are discussed further in the subsequent sections, which focus on the repercussions of these political transformations in the wider context of Eastern Europe, where the denial of the legitimacy and the accomplishments of civil society of Eastern Europe that characterises dominant Western interpretations of the turn of 1989-1990, in Kaldor’s terms, consequently led to ‘their inability to come to grips with the post-Cold War world.’

The following sections are concerned with some important questions which Kaldor pinpoints in her comparative analysis, specifically, the problematic interpretations of the Eastern European ‘democratic revolutions’ as spontaneous uprisings without history, without new ideas, which as she argues, led to the nullification of the civil societies of Eastern Europe. The analysis first debunks some of the aspects of political science approaches informed by

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88 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 43.
89 Ibid.
90 Kaldor, ‘Who Killed the Cold War’, p. 58.
Huntington’s concept in relation to hegemonic power established after the turn of 1989-1990. Then, it shifts the focus from the orthodoxy of political science approaches to ‘eclectic’ and ‘critical and deconstructive’\(^{91}\) cultural studies, which through their focus on the ‘relations within a cultural process’\(^{92}\) provide a sufficient theoretical and analytical device for studying memory in the post-war and post-socialist context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3.7. The Replacement of ‘The Iron Curtain of Ideology’ with ‘The Velvet Curtain of Culture’

Some of the important questions which Kaldor implicitly signposts in her analysis, the (post)Yugoslav philosopher and cultural theorist Boris Buden explicitly addresses in his cultural analysis. While Kaldor’s outline of the shifting notion of civil society stipulates a necessary insight into some of the main political changes within the concept of society on both state and global levels, Buden’s lucid cultural analysis scrutinises some of the grounds and the modes of hegemony that were established in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of 1989.

These questions which are commonly related to the re-articulation of political antagonism through cultural difference, are primarily conceptual and methodological problems that are crucial for grasping some of the main conceptual issues disclosed in the political-historical analysis from the previous chapter of this dissertation.

The resultant political shift that occurred after the protests of respective civil societies in Eastern Europe went in different directions for the newly re-established democracies. Thus, in some countries, prominent members of civil society swiftly moved from their ‘anti-political spaces’ to the centres of the political power, after the West proclaimed the death of communist rule and the re-birth of democracy in this rediscovered part of the world. Among prominent dissidents and peace activists that won the presidential democratic elections held in 1990 were Lech Walesa in Poland, and Vaclav Havel in what was then Czechoslovakia.

Yet, in the first wave of the political changes that are characterised by democratic elections, the course of the development of the long-term crisis in the (post)Yugoslav space shifted in the reverse direction for both the peace movement activists in particular, and civil


society in general. In contrast to the victory of political opponents across Eastern Europe, Yugoslav alternative platforms along with their protagonists were swamped by the emergent ethno-nationalist parties which won the multiparty elections in Yugoslav republics in 1990.

However, regardless of these diametrically different political outcomes of the turn of 1989-1990, the political legacy of respective civil societies of Eastern Europe was completely discredited in the aftermath of the historical turn of 1989-1990. The probability as well as the mode of this political shift are some of the main research problems which Buden examines in his perceptive and exhaustive analysis of the ‘post-communist condition’.

Specifically, throughout his comprehensive comparative analysis of post-communist societies, Buden examines the mode of the changes within, and towards the post-communist context after 1989, and pinpoints some general features of this shift. First, he addresses the post-modernist shift in the intellectual debate, primarily in the field of the largely simplistic, reductionist and explanatory political science, which he perceives primarily as the conceptual device of post-communist ideology. Second, in a similar way to Kaldor, Buden criticises Habermas’ concept of the ‘Nachholende Revolutions’, which he translates as ‘catch-up revolutions’ and examines them in relation to the cultural and political transformations of the post-communist space. Here, Buden’s main argument, which he frames as the ‘infantilization’ of the agency of political change in Eastern Europe in 1989, somewhat reverberates with Mamdani’s argument about the Western perception of Africans as children.

Buden dismantles similar issues in his analysis of the mode of change in the relationship between the ‘victorious’ West and the ‘loser’ Eastern Europe, the ways in which this change wrought the dynamics in the politically and culturally disempowered ‘East’ and, the ways in which the gaze of the triumphant West re-shapes perception of past, present and future in post-communist Eastern Europe. Some of Buden’s insightful arguments, which disclose this complex political turn and elucidate the realm of political and cultural transformation in the general post-communist context, are briefly presented in subsequent sections.

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93 Boris Buden, Zona prelaska: O Kraju Postkomunizma [Zone of Transition: Of the End of Postcommunism] (Beograd: Edicija Reč, 2012); translated from the original in German ‘Zone des Übengangs: Vom Ende des Postkommunismus’ [2009] by Hana Ćopić) p. 73.
3.8. The Post-Communist Condition: Transition to Democracy

In relation to the largely problematic dominant Western interpretations of the ‘historical turn of 1989-1990,’ in general, and to the problem of the nullification of the role of civil society agency in the political change, in particular, Buden first reminds us that

[s]urprisingly, nobody at the time asked the question: who, if not civil societies of Eastern Europe brought the ancient regimes to collapse? What was Solidarity in Poland if not the paradigmatic institution of – a resisting, struggling and radically world-changing – civil society par excellence? How has it suddenly become so weak if yesterday it had been able to overthrow communism? By posing the questions which were barely tackled in dominant and critical accounts, Buden highlights the change of the intellectual paradigm, through shifting the focus of his analysis to the dominant interpretations of the turn of 1989, which redefined the cultural contexts in their aftermath, and created the ground for a new political rule. Buden perceives these transformations as changes in the ideological hegemony which, as he argues, are generally characterised by the de-historicisation of both political and historical practices and of political subjects in the re-emerged notion of the ‘East’.

Attempting to deconstruct the aims, methods and implications of this new ideological hegemony, Buden first reveals the paradox that the actors of the ‘so-called democratic revolution’ in Eastern Europe that gained political power after they overthrew Communism ‘with their bare hands’, have suddenly vanished in the ‘oblivious dark’ of the ‘post-communist transition.’ Furthermore, he first depicts the scope and the significance of the political and historical change generated by the political subjects, precisely civil societies of Eastern Europe, and then questions the grounds for, and modes of, the mysterious disappearance of these civil societies from the political and cultural horizon of the post-Cold War world. In his terms, the civil societies of eastern Europe, have succeeded in toppling totalitarian regimes in whose persistency and steadfastness the whole so-called “free” and “democratic” world had firmly believed, until the very last moment, and whose power it had feared as an other-worldly monster. In the struggle against the communist threat, that world had mobilised all its political, ideological and military forces, its great statesmen and generals, philosophers and scientists, propagandists and spies, without ever really frightening the totalitarian beast.


95 Buden, Zona prelaska.

96 Buden, Zona prelaska, p.18.
Accordingly, Buden suggests that some of the main methods which enabled this nullification were the ‘repressive infantilization’ of the societies that have recently liberated themselves from communism. 97 In his understanding, this process ‘comes to light in the ideology of the post-communist transition, a peculiar theory addresses itself to the task of understanding and explaining the post-communist transition to democracy.’ 98 By highlighting the three interconnected political and cultural procedures embodied into the new ideological hegemony, Buden provides a substantive analysis of the mode of the changes in the aftermath of 1989. Each of the proposed aspects of the changes is briefly presented here, in order to reconsider the apparent unintelligibility of the politics in the ‘East’, and particularly in the ‘Balkans’, after the 1989-1990 turn, which was demonstrated in most of the theses discussed within the political and historical analysis in the first chapter of this dissertation.

Also, Buden’s suggestion illuminates both the practical politics and foremost conceptual dilemma in analysing the concept of the ‘loser East’ after the supposed ‘end of history.’ Importantly, in disclosing the construction of the dominant Western interpretations of the turn of 1989-1990, Buden navigates the focus of his analysis from the wider Eastern European context to the (post) Yugoslav space, and thus depicts the kaleidoscopic overview of the immense political and cultural implications of the new political order to the considered contexts. His suggestion provides a framework for thinking politics and culture after the ‘Fall of the Iron Curtain’ and it enables me to scrutinise some of the modes of politics of war memory and commemoration deployed in the postcommunist and postwar BiH.

3.9. The Concept of ‘Repressive Infantilization’ of the Political Subject in Eastern Europe in 1989 in Relation to the Post-Colonial Africa Experience

In his analysis Buden first critically ponders the conceptual device of the notion of ‘transition’, and then he points out some of the main causes for the absence of the notion of civil societies of Eastern Europe in the new vocabulary of political science. 99 In this endeavour, Buden discloses some of the main difficulties for the critical analysis of the post-communist context.

98 Ibid.
99 Buden, Zona prelaska, p. 72. (My translation).
Buden suggests that in this ‘post-communist turn’ the political Cold War antagonism between the West and the East was rearticulated into the realm of the cultural. He distinguishes within a few interwoven modes of the establishment this new power relation. Accordingly, among some of the main features of the ‘post-communist condition’, which depicts politics towards and within all former communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe, Buden first identifies the process of the ‘repressive infantilization of the societies that have liberated themselves from communism.’ This process Buden perceives as the ‘key feature of the so-called post-communist condition’, which is expressed through the language of post-communism. The latter is symbolised with a set of metaphors such as ‘school of democracy’, ‘education for democracy’, ‘first steps in democracy’ and ‘democracy suffering from children’s illnesses’. In this way, the political actors from Eastern Europe who changed the course of history and who, in Buden’s terms have ‘proved their political maturity in the so-called “democratic revolutions” of 1989-1990, in the post-communist era have become children’ that today ‘must assert themselves before their new self-declared masters as their obedient pupils.’

Furthermore, Buden’s observations on the ‘repressive infantilization’ of actors of the 1989 revolutions, resonates with some of Mamdani’s arguments in relation to the long-term impasse in African politics, which are briefly presented in Kaldor’s account of global civil society. Some of the similarities and discrepancies between Buden and Mamdani’s arguments are presented here, in order to expand the understanding of the thesis on the infantilization of political subjects. Both theorists apply this thesis within the different and rather contradictory contexts of Africa and Eastern Europe as well as in different historical periods. While Mamdani focuses his analysis of the concept of ‘political children’ as well as associated practices that were deployed in Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century, Buden explores the concept in relation to the historical turn of 1989-1990. Additionally, although both Buden and Mamdani take the Enlightenment’s ideal of maturity as a point of departure in their respective analyses, they draw their arguments from different theoretical premises. Specifically, Mamdani works with thesis suggested by Hegel, who describes Africa as the ‘land of children,’ while Buden

100 Buden, ‘Children of Post-Communism,’ p.19.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., p.18.
103 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p.3.
builds his argument around Kant’s self-reflective notion of transition to maturity.\textsuperscript{104} The brief
discussion of the practices in Africa informed by Mamdani’s account, is complemented with
Miyang Cho’s arguments about Eurocentric practices.

Mamdani argues that the notion of civil society, which he considers as a primary
Eurocentric concept, is insufficient as the single conceptual framework for the analysis of the
organisation of power in Africa. Accordingly, he suggests that the core legacy ‘was forged
through the colonial experience’ and structures his analysis around, in his terms ‘the language
of rights and that of culture in their historical and institutional context.’\textsuperscript{105}

Specifically, Mamdani scrutinises the colonial discourse of the Western tradition,
which he represents through two examples. The first is the public speech about the ‘native
question’, which the South African General Jan Smuts delivered in 1929 at the University of
Oxford. Smuts in his speech, according to Mamdani, describes the Africans as a ‘special human
“type” […] It has largely remained a child type, with a child psychology and outlook.’\textsuperscript{106}
Likewise, the second example Mamdani illustrates through Albert Schweitzer’s paper
published in 1928, in which he claims that ‘the negro is a child, and with children nothing can
be done without the use of authority.’\textsuperscript{108} In the same line, Miyang Cho examines Schweitzer’s
conservative and Eurocentric practices in Africa which, as she argues, were articulated in his
ideal relationship between Europeans and Africans. Regarding this ideal relationship, as
Miyang Cho explains, Schweitzer considers Europeans as the party which have ‘reached the
manhood’ and proclaims that ‘[i]t is on the development of manhood in the native craftsman
and cultivator that a new social order can be built, and it is manhood in the administrator and
educator from the West that we can alone find means of helping the native to re-create a new
civilisation on his own soil.’\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{104} Buden, Children of Post-Communism’, p. 20-21.
\textsuperscript{105} Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{107} Albert Schweitzer was a philosopher and the most prominent medical missionary who in 1952 won the
Nobel Prize for his nearly five decades-long humanitarian mission in French Equatorial Africa (today the
Gabonese Republic).
\textsuperscript{108} Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 4; Also, in Joanne Miyang Cho, ‘Provincializing Albert Schweitzer’s
\textsuperscript{109} Joanne Miyang Cho, ‘Provincializing Albert Schweitzer’s Ethical Colonialism in Africa.’
In relation to Schweitzer’s ideal ‘nurturing but at the same time strictly hierarchical’\(^{110}\) relationship, as Miyang Cho describes it, she further pinpoints the controversy that stem from Schweitzer’s conservative and Eurocentric practices and argues that he pointed the necessity of “civilizing” Africans under Western authority. Arguing that untimely independence of colonies would lead to further dependence on other countries, he rejected decolonisation. Secondly, in contrast to his emphasis on higher education for Europe’s educated middle class, he rejected advanced learning for Africans, dismissing the class of African intellectuals as frivolous. He instead recommended low-level education to fit Africa’s low developmental stage.\(^{111}\)

In her interpretation of these and other contradictory practices, Miyang Cho uses Dipesh Chakrabarty’s thesis about the ‘provincialization of Europe’ which ponders the contradictory liberalist-conservative practices of the European nineteenth-century liberalism. Accordingly, Miyang Cho sees Schweitzer’s approach as paradigmatic, since he ‘advocated liberal principles for the Europeans but denied them to the colonized’ and thus Schweitzer positioned Africans in the “waiting room” of politics, labelled “not yet.”\(^{112}\) Both Mamdani and Miyang Cho reflect on and expose the ways in which some of the Eurocentric practices were articulated at the beginning of the twentieth century as well as the ways in which they were deployed in colonised Africa.

Yet, in his analysis, Buden points to how some similar practices were deployed in Eastern Europe at the end of the century through conceptual and practical procedure. The latter includes ‘repressive infantilization’ in the post-communist transition which is, as Buden argues, articulated through the new theory of ‘transitology.’ Both proposals are discussed in the subsequent sections that are concerned with the ‘post-communist turn.’

Buden refutes the dominant language uttered through the latest proclamations of the ‘End of History’ and of the continuation of the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ after the turn of 1989-1990. Instead, he denotes it as the ‘post-communist turn’ according to the suggestion of Jean-Luc Nancy, who, as Buden explains, criticises Fukuyama’s ‘belief that history is now finally finished with Marxism and Communism.’\(^{113}\)

\(^{110}\) Joanne Miyang Cho, ‘Provincializing Albert Schweitzer’s Ethical Colonialism in Africa.’

\(^{111}\) Ibid.

\(^{112}\) Ibid.

\(^{113}\) Buden, ‘Children of Communism,’ p. 23.
Furthermore, Buden remarks that Nancy, in an indignant tone, asserts that these and other comparable dominant interpretations engender the ideas

[a]s if history, our history, could be inconsistent, so phantasmic, so flaky (floconneuse) to have carried us along for one hundred and fifty years on clouds that dissipate in a moment. As if error, pure, simple, and stupid error could be thus corrected, regulated, mobilised. As if thousands of so-called intellectuals were simply fools, and especially as if millions of others were even more stupid as to have been caught in the delirium of the first.  

This infuriated criticism of the post-communist turn implies the problematic conceptualisation of history after the collapse of communism, but at the same time it discloses that similar practices were applied in the post-communist context as in Africa, following Mamdani and particularly Miyang Cho’s arguments about the discredited African intellectuals in the Eurocentric practices deployed in Africa. Also, Nancy’s argument, as Buden shows, addresses the ‘suppression of communism as a historical fact, the erasure of the communist past with all its intellectual and political complexity from the historical consciousness of post-communism.’ Accordingly, Buden first pinpoints and then considers in detail some of the main concepts and practices entangled in this complex process as well as their repercussions for the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe.

The first concept, which he designates as ‘repressive infantilization’, Buden defines as a complex process that creates ‘a political child [which] offers itself as the almost perfect subject of a democratic restart’ since, a ‘child is dependent; it must be guided and patronised by the adults’. This notion of ‘children of post-communism’, Buden does not perceive simply as a metaphor, but, rather, in his terms it ‘denotes the figure of submission to the new form of “historical necessity” that initiates and controls the process of the post-communist transition’ and argues that ‘on these premises, the transition to democracy starts as a radical reconstruction out of nothing.’

Accordingly, in relation to the second notion, which conceptualises the process of ‘repressive infantilization’ and other associated practices, Buden argues that precisely this

\[^{114}\] Jean-Luc Nancy in Buden, ‘Children of Communism,’ p. 23.
\[^{115}\] Ibid. p.23.
\[^{116}\] Buden, ‘Children of Communism,’ p. 23.
\[^{117}\] Ibid., p. 22.
deviant shift of the complex relationship between East and West, is in the core of a ‘peculiar
tohy theory’ which he terms the ‘ideology of the post-communist transition’. The latter, in his terms
addresses itself to the task of understanding and explaining the postcommunist
transition to democracy. Here cynicism becomes (political) science. From the
perspective of this political science, postcommunism is understood above all as a phase of transition- that is a process of transformation of an “actually socialist”
(realsozialistisch) society into a capitalist democratic one.  

Since the practices of repressive infantilization enabled the democratic restart, Buden
further argues that this political science now ‘finds no reason to understand this transition in
terms of a specific historical epoch’ as it ‘lacks basic identity features: a specific
postcommunist political subject, or system, for instance, a specific postcommunist mode of
production, or form of property.’

3.10. The Concept of ‘Catch-up Revolutions’

Through this political science, as Buden argues, Western spectators have firstly
delegitimised the subject of the change and then have articulated the ‘revolutionary dream’ of
the protagonists of the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe as ‘nothing but their own
reality.’ Furthermore, by arguing that the turn of 1989-1990 did not bring any new ideas, the
Western spectators thus denied its revolutionary character and designated it as ahistorical. In
effect, the series of uprising in Eastern Europe are denoted as backward revolutions in
accordance with Habermas’ abovementioned thesis on ‘Nachholende Revolution’, which
Kaldor translates in English as ‘rectifying revolutions’, while Buden suggests the term ‘catch-
up revolutions’, which I use within my thesis.

Buden argues that Habermas’ concept of ‘Catch-up Revolutions’ articulates the new
hegemonic concept of democracy. Accordingly, Buden elucidates that this concept
distinguishes between the ‘subject of the 1989 democratic revolutions’, and the ‘subject of
catch-up revolution’, where the former was disregarded on behalf of the latter, as if the
revolutionary people were a sort of democratically illegitimate early stage of the
constituencies/voters, and thus the form which has to be discarded in order to achieve the

118 Buden, ‘Children of Communism,’ p. 22.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
supposed goal of the catch-up revolutions, which is determined as ‘national unity.’ ¹²¹ Specifically, within the concept of catch-up revolutions which Habermas discusses in relation to the events in Germany after 1989, Buden sees the ‘principle of sovereign’ as the ultimate goal of the subjects of catch-up revolution. This principle, as he describes further, is expressed through the political will of those people, whom Habermas now designates as the protagonists of catch-up revolutions, and who thus, have decided to link with the brighter side of history embodied in the Federal German Republic. In this way, as Buden remarks, within the ‘quasi-transcendental perspective of the unchanged political horizon’ which determines the peoples as the pivotal subject of sovereign power, the catch-up revolutionaries also choose a particular continuity with the past, that of ‘people’s democracy.’ ¹²²

Contrary to the example of the catching up with ‘brighter side of history’ and with the ‘democratic past’ in Germany, Buden expands the concept of supposed historical catching-up, and through examination of its detrimental effect, which is evident in the case of (post)Yugoslav space. As he argues, through the authorisation and affirmation of the hegemonic status of national sovereignty in today’s world, this idea has supressed its dark, dystopian side from the (post) Yugoslav historical horizon. Here Buden takes the democratic multiparty elections from the 1990s in socialist Yugoslavia to illustrate the adverse implications of the idea of catch-up revolution and particularly, of its core principle of national sovereignty whose democratic legitimisation at the 1990 election has marked the beginning of the horrendous tyranny that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. Accordingly, Buden explains that through the concept of the catch-up revolution, the post-communist societies which emerged from socialist Yugoslavia, have caught up to the worse, sadder side of history and thus catch up with their development through tragic violence. Consequently, Buden remarks that in retrospect, the Yugoslav communist past after 1990 seems politically brighter and economically wealthier from the perspective of people on the ground. Whereas, the spectator, who is now nominated as the guardian through the idea of the historical catch up, sees the tragic wars in (post)Yugoslav space simply as ‘children’s illnesses of democracy, that would be healed in the process of education and healing which he supervises.’ ¹²³

¹²¹ Buden, Zona prelaska, p. 61. [My translation].
¹²² Ibid., p. 63. [My translation].
¹²³ Buden, Zona Prelaska, p. 64-65. [My translation].
Furthermore, Buden elucidates the ways in which the term ‘(post)communism’ vanished from scientific, political and cultural vocabulary within the new hegemony, and identifies some of the main academic and legal and cultural methods through which the change of vocabulary and thus related cultural practices, was realised. Firstly, he claims that on the premises of the dominant ideology of post-communist transition as well as of the concept of catch up revolution ‘political science does not need the concept of postcommunism’. Instead, as Buden argues

it prefers (...) the concept of ‘transition to democracy’ and it even develops within this framework a special discipline with the task of studying this process: ‘transitology’. It is based on the cynical idea that people who won freedom through their own struggle must now learn how to enjoy it properly.\textsuperscript{124}

At this point of his analysis, Buden provides one of the most exhaustive criticisms of the mode and practical implications of the dominant Western theses, which are introduced in the previous section of this chapter. In his approach, he does not focus on the most dominant theses of the ‘end of history’ and the ‘clash of civilisations’, but instead concentrates his analysis on the transformation of the field of political science in the light of the new ideological hegemony. Specifically, Buden dissects the political transformation in relation to the recent re-definition of the notion of transition, which, as he explains, was first introduced ‘by orthodox political scientists in the late 1960s and early 1970s to explain various cases of regime change, principally in South America and Southern Europe.’\textsuperscript{125}

According to the first meaning, which was developed to articulate political shifts that occurred in the period to which Huntington refers to as the beginning of the ‘third wave of democratization’, transition was understood as ‘an interval between two different political regimes.’\textsuperscript{126} This ambiguous definition, as Buden clarifies, was still sufficient in the world characterised with the prevalent ideological and military division between the First and the Second world, and with a ‘series of anti-colonial movements in the “Third World”’ when it ‘still seemed as though there was a choice, as though history had an opened end.’\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{124} Buden, ‘Children of Communism,’ p. 19.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
3.11. Transitology

At the end of the 1980s, political scientists recognized the need to change the central term ‘transition’, which is now redefined as the process of political transformation whose development and aim, contrary to its previous meaning, are now determined in advance. Thus, in Buden’s terms

[i]ts goal is always already known - incorporation into the global capitalist system of Western liberal democracy. From that point the concept of transition has been almost exclusively applied to the so-called postcommunist societies and denotes the transition to democracy that begun with the historical turn of 1989-1990.\(^\text{128}\)

The new definition wrought myriad interpretations of transition as well as methods of evaluation of its successful implementation, and it uttered the new dominant language. Through the lenses of this ‘new ideology of transition’, Eastern Europe after 1989, in Buden’s terms, ‘resembles a landscape of historical ruins that is inhabited only by children, immature people unable to recognize their lives democratically without guidance from another.’\(^\text{129}\)

Moreover, this new ideology, as Buden elucidates, instructs the ‘children of postcommunism’ that ‘there are no major obstacles on the way to democracy, so long as one strictly adjust to the objective, external factors – economic, cultural, institutional and so on. Sometimes a geographical position will suffice.’\(^\text{130}\) Therefore, the process of transition, in his terms ‘appears as an educational process following the ideal of education for maturity and responsibility.’\(^\text{131}\) Understanding recent transitions to democracy, and thus to political maturity in accordance to the old Enlightenment concept which, as Buden reminds us, has invented the ‘analogy between the historical development of humanity and the growing up of a child’, also exposes all of its contradictions, as he argues.\(^\text{132}\) While some of the contradictions were briefly discussed through Chakrabarty, Miyang Cho and Mamdani’s respective accounts in relation to the context of colonised Africa, Buden in his analysis of post-communism, focuses on the contradictions that occurred throughout the historical development of the concept itself. He signposts two different notions of this transition to maturity.

\(^\text{128}\) Buden, ‘Children of Communism,’ p. 20.
\(^\text{129}\) Ibid., p. 22.
\(^\text{130}\) Ibid., p. 20.
\(^\text{131}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{132}\) Ibid.
As a point of departure in his analysis, he takes Kant’s idea of ‘self-imposed maturity’ according to which the idea of transition to maturity is understood as self-emancipation but which, as Buden highlights, ‘should never be mistaken for a revolution’. Furthermore, in historical development, as Buden explains, Kant’s concept of Enlightenment that implies emancipation of a ‘reform in the manner of thinking’ and perceives emancipation as a ‘long-term process with an open end’ was replaced by the idea of emancipation as an ‘act of liberation from an unjustly imposed domination’. The change of the meaning has also shifted the aim of transition from, in Buden’s terms, a ‘more mature man to society free of domination’, which also resulted in the disassociation between the concept of maturity and the ‘emphatic meaning of emancipation’.

However, Buden develops his argument further, and argues that this relation has been re-established in post-war Europe after 1945. Specifically, emancipation was linked again to the notion of maturity, which became the core concept in the historic transition from fascist dictatorship to democracy. The influential viewpoint of maturity as the precondition for democracy, which in the ‘post-fascist transition’, as Buden describes it, ‘envisioned the ideal of mature and responsible citizens as the final cause of the construction of a new, democratic society’, as he underlines, also became the central ideal in the post-communist transition that occurred forty-five years later. The peculiar connection between two antagonistic ideologies was possible, since, in Buden’s terms ‘the new condition understands itself as post-totalitarian - liberating itself ideologically and historically from both “totalitarianisms”, fascist and communist: the so-called “double occupation” – a retroactive equalization of two ideologies and political movements that in historical reality fought each other mercilessly.’

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133 Buden, ‘Children of Communism,’ p. 21
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
3.12. The European Union’s Measures and Practices for dealing with the Legacy of the Totalitarian Regimes

Some of the main directions of the ‘new condition’ as Buden terms it, which is articulated through the post-communist transition to democracy, have been developed during the last twenty years through the number of interconnected legal acts, reports and decisions that have been adopted at different levels of the European Union’s government. The beginning of this long-term process can be traced to 1996 when the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1096 titled ‘Measures to Dismantle the Heritage of Former Communist Totalitarian Systems.’ The Council of Europe by this resolution recognises that the re-establishment of a ‘civilised, liberal state under the rule of law, on a basis of the ‘former communist totalitarian systems’ cannot be achieved until ‘the old structures and thought patterns’ are dismantled and overcome.\(^{137}\) Accordingly, the resolution envisaged the creation of pluralist democracies ‘based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and diversity’ as one of the main outcomes of transition which, as stated, should be constructed on the following values

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\text{[t]he principles of subsidiary, freedom of choice, equality of chances, economic pluralism and transparency of the decision-making process (...) [t]he separation of powers, freedom of the media, protection of private property, and the development of a civil society (...) and the ‘decentralisation, demilitarisation, demonopolisation and debureaucratisation].}^{138}
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Alongside the suggested legal and institutional transformations, the resolution focused on the crimes committed by the totalitarian communist regimes which ruled in central and eastern Europe, and also highlights the importance of a ‘transformation of mentalities (a transformation of hearts and minds)’ in order to eliminate the heritage of the old regimes, and precisely ‘the disrespect for diversity, extreme nationalism, intolerance, racism and xenophobia.’\(^{139}\) The resolution, which prohibits passing and applying retroactive criminal laws, recommends the prosecution and punishment of those individuals that are suspected for committing crimes during the communist totalitarian regime. This legal measure, as recommended, should be followed by the ‘rehabilitation of people convicted of “crimes “which in civilised society today

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\(^{139}\) Paragraph 6 of the Resolution 1096 (1996).
do not constitute criminal acts and of those who were unjustly sentenced.\textsuperscript{140} Finally, with this resolution, the Council of Europe provides guidance through the successful implementation of some legal procedures such as lustration which, among other proposed measures, should ensure the transition to democracy. Accordingly, the Council holds that the key to peaceful assistance and a successful transition process lies in building the democratic state under the rule of law that will ensure the balance of providing justice without seeking revenge, and it provides guidance through pinpointing some of the main criteria without which some of the administrative measures such as ‘lustration’ and ‘decommunisation’ laws cannot be accomplished.\textsuperscript{141}

In the subsequent period, following the process of the enlargement of the European Union, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (the Assembly) adopted a number of resolutions, legal frameworks, organised public debates and commissioned studies, in order to address the issue of the legacy of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe. Among the array of measures is the resolution 1481 of 2006 titled ‘Need for International Condemnation of Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes’, which identifies some of the main issues of the current political situation in those member states that experienced communism.\textsuperscript{142} The resolution of 2006 acknowledges the clear position of the ‘international community’ towards the massive violations of human rights that, as stated, were committed by the ‘totalitarian communist regimes that ruled in central and eastern Europe’, and which were ‘justified in the name of the class struggle theory and the principle of dictatorship of proletariat’.\textsuperscript{143}

In relation to existing problems in the post-communist member states the lack of recognition of the committed crimes is emphasized as one of the main issues, throughout the text of the resolution. According to members of the European Council’s Parliamentary Assembly (Council) who drafted the resolution, the committed crimes are not acknowledged after the collapse of Communism, as it was the case after the defeat of National Socialism (Nazism) and thus, in effect, as the paragraph 6 of the resolution reads ‘public awareness of

\textsuperscript{140} Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Resolution 1096 (1996).
\textsuperscript{141} Paragraph 12 of the Resolution 1096 (1996).
\textsuperscript{143} Paragraph 2. and 14. of the Resolution 1481(2006).
the crimes committed by the totalitarian communist regimes is very poor. Communist parties are legal and active in some countries, even if in some cases they have not distanced themselves from the crimes committed by them. In relation to this, although the Council by the resolution of 2006 recognises the contribution of some of the European communist parties in the accomplishment of democracy, it generally ‘strongly condemns the massive human rights violations committed by the totalitarian communist regimes and expresses sympathy, understanding and recognition to the victims of these crimes.’ Accordingly, the Council emphasises the ‘awareness of history as one of the preconditions for avoiding similar crimes in the future’, and acknowledges the role of the Council of Europe as crucial in fostering debate at international level. Both resolutions of 1996 and 2006 have identified some of the main issues that dominate two parallel political processes, transition to democracy, and the required institutional changes that encompass dealing with the legacy of the totalitarian (communist) past. The resolutions have also outlined the set of measures focused on dismantling the heritage of the former communist totalitarian systems, which were debated further and uttered through decisions, declarations and framework programmes that were adopted in the subsequent period.

I review a few legal acts here which frame the European Union approach to history and memory of ‘totalitarian communist regimes’ in post-communist member-states, that also encompass the potential candidate states category, which includes Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Accordingly, the Berlin Declaration of 2007, highlights the history and lessons from the tragic past as European shared experience, the topics that were discussed at the seminar titled ‘How to deal with the totalitarian memory of Europe: Victims and reconciliation’, which the European Commission organised in the same year in Brussels. The seminar formed part of the preparatory activities for the organisation of the public hearing that was jointly organised by the Slovenian Presidency of European Union and the European Commission in 2008. As stated, the hearing titled ‘Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes’ addressed recognition and reconciliation as the core issues with the aim to contribute to raising awareness about

totalitarian crimes, and to ‘enable exchange of views between independent experts, representatives of national institutes, and NGO’s dealing with these issues.’

During the adoption of the European Framework ‘Decision on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia’ by means of criminal law, in November 2008, the Council of Europe appended a statement to the minutes of the meeting. By this statement, which addresses some of the main conclusions from the seminar and the public hearing of 2008, the Council acknowledges that the adopted Framework Decision that ‘covers crimes committed on ground of race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin’ does not provide legislation for dealing with the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes. Also, the statement requested that the Commission scrutinise and report to the Council of Europe within the two-year period, whether an additional instrument is needed to assure that the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the past will not be publicly denied and trivialized.

The statement instigated a number of diverse activities on both the European and the member states levels, that were concerned with the issues related to the development of a common approach towards the preservation of memories of the past, the search for the best ways to establish the truth about the committed crimes, and to record history in order to pass on the knowledge about the tragic past to future generations.

3.13. Towards a Shared European Memory of Crimes Committed by the Totalitarian Regimes

Among the important legal acts adopted in 2009 are European Parliament resolutions on Srebrenica of 2009, and the resolution of 2009 on ‘European consciousness and


150 Ibid.
totalitarianism'\textsuperscript{151} as well as the European Council’s ‘Stockholm Programme’.\textsuperscript{152} While I discuss the resolution of 2009 and the other resolutions on the Srebrenica Genocide adopted in 2005 and 2010 in more detail in the subsequent chapter, in this section I provide a brief overview of the resolution on ‘European consciousness’ of April 2009, as well as the European Commission’s report of 2010 that provides deeper insight into the European framework for dealing with the double legacy of the totalitarian regimes in Europe.

In both acts adopted on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the collapse of Communism, the European Parliament’s resolution of April 2009 and the European Council’s ‘Stockholm programme’, the role of the European Union is highlighted as pivotal and designated as a ‘facilitator’ in the process of European integration, which is described as a ‘model of peace and reconciliation.’\textsuperscript{153}

As stipulated in the resolution of April 2009, European unity cannot be achieved without construction of a common view of its history, or precisely, until it ‘recognises Nazism, Stalinism and fascist and communist regimes as common legacy and brings about an honest and thorough debate about their crimes in the past century.’\textsuperscript{154} Accordingly, one of the measures in encouraging reconciliation through sharing and promoting the collective memory of the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes is the proclamation of 23 August as the Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.\textsuperscript{155}

The resolution of April 2009, also described as the ‘epoch-making’ resolution,\textsuperscript{156} underlines different European historical experiences, which encompass dominant historical experiences of Western Europe on one side, and of Central and Eastern European countries, on

\textsuperscript{156} In the letter of the group of the members of the European Parliament (European People’s Party members) who requested the ban of symbols of totalitarian regimes in January, 2005 \texttt{< https://eureconciliation.eu > [accessed on January 18, 2018].}
the other. While the former experienced Nazism, the latter, as one of the paragraphs of the resolution reads, have experience ‘both Communism and Nazism: whereas understanding has to be promoted in relation to the double legacy of dictatorships borne by those countries.’\textsuperscript{157} Moreover, alongside the crimes committed during the totalitarian regimes in the earlier decades of the twentieth century, the resolution mentions the genocide committed in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian town Srebrenica during the 1992-1996 war, and it ‘[r]ecalls that the most recent crimes against humanity and acts of genocide in Europe were still taking place in July 1995 and that constant vigilance is needed to fight undemocratic, xenophobic, authoritarian and totalitarian ideas and tendencies.’\textsuperscript{158}

In relation to this war crime as well as other crimes committed in Europe, the resolution reiterates that the main preconditions for reconciliation are truth and remembrance of the atrocities committed by the totalitarian regimes, and it also highlights the importance of the impartial research of the past. As its first article reads ‘whereas historians agree that fully objective interpretations of historical past are not possible and objective historical narratives do not exist: whereas, nevertheless, professional historians use scientific tools to study the past, and try to be as partial as possible’.\textsuperscript{159} Finally, the non-governmental organisation and independent researchers, and particularly historians have a prominent role in the envisaged processes of ‘a comprehensive reassessment of European history’ and ‘appropriate preservation of historical memory, envisaged by this resolution’.\textsuperscript{160}

On the premises of this resolution and of the other related acts and initiatives, the European Commission has financed an independent research study titled ‘How the memory of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe is dealt with in the Member States’, which was submitted in January, 2010.\textsuperscript{161} Some of the study’s main findings are presented in the extensive ‘Report to the European Parliament and to the Council of the European Union’ of 2010, together with the information gathered through the questionnaire which the European Commission sent to the member states in 2010. Specifically, the concise report, which


\textsuperscript{159} Paragraph A. of ‘The European Parliament Resolution on European Consciousness and Totalitarianism’ (2009).

\textsuperscript{160} ‘The European Parliament Resolution on European Consciousness and Totalitarianism’ (2009).

\textsuperscript{161} Closa Montero, ‘Study How the Memory of Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes in Europe.’
incorporates some of the outcomes of both the study and the questionnaire, provides a brief overview of the transitional justice mechanisms deployed in the twenty-seven member states in order to deal with the legacy of the totalitarian regimes. This includes the following measures that are revised in the scope of the study: memorialization, criminal investigation and prosecutions, different truth-seeking mechanisms, reparation for victims, and ‘guarantees of non-repetition and institutional reform.’ Some of these findings that provide closer insight into the terminology, the existing legislation, different practices and methods, and approaches to history at both the European and member states levels, are briefly discussed here in relation to the post-communist turn thesis.

3.14. The Comparative Study of the Memory of the Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes in Europe

The political scientist Carlos Closa Montero cooperated with twenty-seven national experts in order to gather data from respective member-states for his study, which examines existing legal and cultural aspects of the ongoing process of dealing with crimes committed by the totalitarian regimes in Europe. The scope of the study encompasses both the countries in the transition to democracy as well as those member states that are considered as ‘paradigmatic cases of democratic continuity’, and which adopted measures that are dealing with the crimes of the totalitarian regimes that were committed elsewhere in Europe.

The transitional justice mechanisms used in the former, in order to support the ‘successful transition from totalitarianism to democracy’ are mainly structured around the victim-perpetrator relationship. Generally, these models include the following, in some cases converging, measures: legislation on the legacy of totalitarian regimes, including the legal framework on the denial of the crime; justice for victims; justice for perpetrators; fact finding and truth-seeking mechanisms; a plethora of approaches and initiatives focused on the preservation of memory and awareness initiatives, which include prevention of revision of the past through education, research work, remembrance days, removal of the symbols of totalitarianism in public space (through changes of street names, removal of monuments and

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163 Ibid.
other symbols), erection of new monuments, new approaches to history education, and curation of the past in museums.\textsuperscript{164}

Regarding the inconsistent terminology used throughout the study to denote the past non-democratic regimes, Closa Montero clarifies that in the study, the broad term ‘repressive regimes’ refers to ‘all forms of non [-] democratic regimes that have produced abuses of human rights’. Whereas, the term ‘totalitarian’ which signifies different forms of regimes, is throughout the study understood in accordance to scholarly interpretations, as a systematic use of repressive means, regardless of different ideologies of regimes encompassed by this broad label, namely, National-Socialism (Nazism), Fascism and Communism.\textsuperscript{165}

Accordingly, the research study uncovers a myriad of different approaches to the legacy of totalitarian regimes, which significantly differ even among those states that experienced the same type of totalitarian regime. The results of the study, as stated, show that ‘there is no one-size-fits-all model, and that the mix of instruments and methods used in each Member-State (justice for victims, truth-seeking, preservation of memory, awareness-raising initiative, etc) is country-specific’, and thus, member states considered in the study adopted approaches in relation to ‘their history, specific circumstances, culture and legal system.’\textsuperscript{166} The aspect of justice for victims, which is assessed as one of the important measures for transition to democracy, in different states concerned, according to the report, includes ‘trials of perpetrators, truth-seeking mechanisms, the opening of archives, lustration procedures, rehabilitation and restitution of confiscated properties’.\textsuperscript{167} According to the report, the role of the NGO is of great importance in the process of transitional justice as well as in the education for active citizenship that fosters ‘young people’s civic competence and democratic values’.\textsuperscript{168} Also, the reports revises two main approaches, the official and that of NGO, to the associated measures framed as education, research work and in other memory and awareness initiatives that are assessed as essential in tackling the knowledge gaps concerning the crimes committed by the totalitarian past of member states.

\textsuperscript{164} Closa Montero, ‘Study How the Memory of Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes in Europe,’ p. 10.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid. p.12.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., p.4.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
Both approaches are seen as crucial in the realization of various research projects, reassessment and curation of the totalitarian pasts, and raising awareness about the crimes they committed. This includes the establishment of new research institutes, formation of specialised and non-specialized official bodies which are established by some of the member states, and whose scope of work on specific policies vary from wider to more specific mandates. Within the NGO sectors in considered countries, there are a huge number of organisations and associations whose work is concerned with different aspects of transitional justice.\(^\text{169}\)

The prevention of revision of the past is in the report represented through two dominant measures which are effected in most of the member-states, specifically, the relation towards the symbols of totalitarianism, and the legislation on publicly condoning and denying crimes. In relation to the former, the report reveals that most of the states have swiftly removed the symbols of ‘their repressive past’, which among different activities includes change of street names and removal of symbols from public spaces, while Hungary, Lithuania and Poland prohibited the use of symbols associated with their former communist totalitarian regimes by means of law.\(^\text{170}\)

The majority of the member states adopted law, other legal instruments and policies condemning the former repressive regime(s), which are implemented through a number of official bodies that encompass both specialised and non-specialised governmental and regional organisations, and agencies, NGOs, and other types of institutions such as research institutes and museums.\(^\text{171}\) The overview demonstrates complexity and discrepancy between the existing criminal legislation, which Closa explores in relation to international law as well as to the Council Framework Decision with statement of 2008 and the resolution of April 2009.

Additionally, the European Commission report outlines the set of activities that are focused on assistance and support in promoting the memory of the crimes committed by ‘the totalitarian communist regimes’ in Europe. Thus, in line with its responsibilities, the Commission provides support and promotes these activities, and implies its contribution to this process in which the Commission ‘can facilitate the exchange of experiences and practices in

\(^{169}\) Closa Montero, ‘Study How the Memory of Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes in Europe,’ p. 40-49.

\(^{170}\) Ibid., p.5.

\(^{171}\) Ibid., p. 22-49.
this area. This will also confirm the importance of the values of respect for human dignity, freedom and democracy on which the European Union is founded.\textsuperscript{172}

Some examples of a number of substantially different acts that were agreed to in this period, as well as initiatives and educational measures which were instigated and implemented through governmental and NGO organisations, are the Prague Declaration of 2008 on ‘European Consciousness of Communism’; the informal group of European Parliament members called ‘Reconciliation of European Histories’;\textsuperscript{173} as well as the Platform of European Memory and Consciousness.\textsuperscript{174}

The new guidance for the preservation of the memory of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes, which was significantly changed after the turn of 1989, was outlined in the resolution of 2009. The latter resulted in a plethora of initiatives, including international and bilateral education and research platforms. One of the examples of the educational initiatives is the European Association of History Teachers (EUROCLIO), the umbrella organisation that the European Council founded in 1992, which today coordinates work of more than seventy EUROCLIO associations of historians and educators in history that are established across the world. The Association’s work encompasses history teaching, different educational initiatives which approach ‘nation-centric’ approaches to history critically, and promote a common history approach and the development of common history textbooks. The majority of the associations are based in Europe, including the Bosnian-Herzegovinian EUROCLIO HIP\textsuperscript{175} association.

This example of the promotion of the European projects and cross-border cooperation as well as the promotion of the memory of crimes committed by the totalitarian regimes reflects some of the main criteria for financial assistance provided by the EU. Some of the examples of specially conceptualised programmes that provides EU funding for various projects focused on the promotion of the memory of the totalitarian past are the ‘Europe or Citizens Programme’,

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item[174] The Platform of European Memory and Consciousness was established in 2011 <https://www.memoryandconscience.eu/about-the-platform/about-the-platform/> [accessed 22 January 2018].
\item[175] The European Association of History Teachers (EUROCLIO) <https://euroclio.eu> [accessed 23 January 2018]; in the BH Association, the acronym HIP stands for Historija, Istorija, Povijest, the problematic and under-analysed reduction of the different and complex concepts History and Geschichte, which are subject of the larger intellectual debate to merely ‘linguistic difference’ between ‘BiH official language[s].
\end{thebibliography}
the ‘Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development’ and ‘Media 2007’.\textsuperscript{176} Participation in the EU research programmes is marginal, mainly due to the long-term issues in the complex educational system on the national level, which are mainly demonstrated through the lack of harmonisation in the field of education, and particularly higher education in BiH. However, according to the European Commission progress report from 2014, some small progress has been made in the field of culture, which is exemplified with the full participation of BiH in the ‘Media 2007’ Programme, partial participation in the FP7 programme, with the support of the Austrian Development Agency, and preparation in the EU funded research and innovation programme ‘Horizon 2020’.\textsuperscript{177}

Finally, the subsequent conclusions of the meeting that was jointly organized by the Council of the European Union and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2013\textsuperscript{178} reiterated the importance of guidelines outlined in the Report of the European Commission. Thus, one of the conclusions recognises the importance of the establishment of the ‘Europe-wide Day of Remembrance (23 August) of the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes’ in awareness-raising approaches to, and in promoting the shared European memory of the crimes of totalitarian regimes, which are, as stated, crucial in ‘preventing the rehabilitation or rebirth of totalitarian ideologies’.\textsuperscript{179} According to the findings of the study from 2010, the Europe-wide day was commemorated only in five member-states.

3.15. Debates and Controversies in Relation to the EU Legislation on Dealing with the Legacy of Totalitarian Regimes in Europe

Closa’s study also reviews legislation and some of the practices that were employed by 2010 in Slovenia, the only former Yugoslav republic which joined the EU in that period. Some of the findings reveal the Slovenian legal and cultural aspects of dealing with the country’s totalitarian past as well as some of the main controversies that emerge in dealing with the


legacy of socialist Yugoslavia. The latter do not solely typify the Slovenian context, but rather reflect some of the main controversies and the course of debates within the EU, in general, and within the post-Yugoslav space, in particular. Generally, the practices deployed in Slovenia reveal somewhat divergent and often opposing understandings of the interrelated processes of the reassessment of history and the unbiased examination of injustice and wrongdoings committed by the former totalitarian regimes in accordance with the EU framework. Additionally, in the context of the post-Yugoslav space, the Slovenian case outlines some of the dominant perception(s) of the common Yugoslav legacy and correlated dynamics in the process of transition to democracy, which can be found in comparable forms in all Yugoslav successive republics that are today at different stages of both integration and accession to the EU. It also encompasses different cultural practices which are common for most of the countries of the post-Yugoslav space.

According to the Study Centre for National Reconciliation that was established by the Slovenian Government in 2008, the country’s historical experience is similar to that of central and eastern European countries, such as Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania. Slovenia, which has ratified the resolutions of 1996, of 2006, and of 2009, as Closa describes in his study, has publicly condemned the crimes committed by fascist and Nazi regimes. The Slovenian communist past is a subject of debate and opposing views, which Closa examines through some of the practices related to the removal of symbols of the totalitarian past. Specifically, he describes that

almost all street names, monuments and other symbols from the period of the Fascist and the National Socialist totalitarian regimes have been removed and their traces and relics erased. In contrast, several symbols of the Communist totalitarian regimes have not been removed or replaced with other symbols. Moreover, as stated, the City Council of Ljubljana decided in April 2009 (…) to name a street in the capital after the former Yugoslav communist leader Josip Broz Tito. The cities of Koper and Velenje maintain a street with the name of the former communist dictator.

In a similar way to Closa, Slovenian historian and the director of the research centre ‘Study centre for national reconciliation’, Andreja Valič Zver, criticises the preservation of symbols of communist past. Thus, in her public statement Zver reflects on the city authority’s

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180 Precisely, the Slovenian Ministry of Justice in formed this research and educational institution.
182 Ibid.
184 Ibid., p. 296-297.
decision to name a main street in Ljubljana, in her terms, ‘after the bloody dictator Tito’, and sees this practice as one of many examples of ‘reaffirmation of totalitarian symbols, names, actors, monuments, positive evaluation in curricula and textbooks.’ Additionally, in relation to these practices and thoughts which she labels, ‘damaged mentalities’, Zver mentions the media attack against the ‘historians that served before 1990 as Marxists scientists in the Central Bureau of the Communist Party’ on the work of the ‘Study centre’ which she leads.

In response to this criticism of the reassessment of history, Zver discredits the intellectuals whom she represents as servants of the totalitarian system which was led by Tito whose political role she mentions in relation to Stalin, Ceausescu, and Hitler. She further highlights the importance of historical consciousness for the development of ‘democratic spirit’ and for reconciliation in Europe, the union, which is in her terms based on ‘cultural diversity, which creates plurality of views, including historical views.’ In this envisaged path to democracy, Zver highlights the crucial role of education in achieving these objectives.

However, Zver’s interpretation of the EU legal framework and values in simplistic and absolute terms, does not reflect the complexity and multiplicity of different approaches across the EU that were exposed in Closa’s study, as well as the controversy between these approaches in relation to the EU legislation. The latter refers to the debate from 2010 that was instigated by the request for the so-called ‘double genocide law.’ Precisely, in their letter to the European Commission’s justice department from December 2010, the foreign ministers from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, who called for the resolution of 2009, have argued that required legal measure should ensure treatment of communist crimes in the same manner as those of Nazi regimes, particularly in those countries with Holocaust denial laws.

In response, the European Commission rejected the request, which also faced strong criticism from some of the officials of western countries. The Commission’s decision was informed by the study of 2010, as the EU justice spokesman reported to media, and followed

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186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
the argument that ‘neither legal instrument mentions totalitarianism.’ Moreover, in their criticism, seven representatives of western countries describe the request as a ‘thinly-veiled attempt at rehabilitation of domestic collaborators while antisemitism remains a live issue on the streets and in the media in the east’, referring here to some earlier incidents such as the designation of the Holocaust as a “legend” in the article published in the newspapers in November 2010 by the Lithuanian interior ministry historian. Additionally, the opinions of some of the members of the European Parliament political groups as well as the officials of six countries that were presented in media in this period, also showed opposing views on the communist legacy in their respective countries.

The Slovenian official politics of memory partly reflects some of the practical issues related to the European legislation of memory of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes, and particularly in relation to the communist past. This mainly refers to the discord in interpretations of the EU legislation in most of the post-communist countries. In relation to the post-Yugoslav context, the Slovenian case reveals some of the conflicting processes in dealing with the Yugoslav past resonate with political and cultural processes across the post-Yugoslav space.

3.16. The Post-Communist Transition Apora

This section draws on some of Buden’s remarks on the aporia of the post-communist transition, which provide a diagnostic tool for understanding some of the main challenges in the process of dealing with past, in the post-Yugoslav space, which is structured around the transitional justice paradigm. Buden clarifies that the manner of the ideological change enables the ‘unconditional reproducibility’ of the liberal democratic capitalist society in the era of globalisation. He argues that the infantilization of political subjects is the core principle of the newly established hegemony, which de-historicised eastern and central European political subjects. The resultant creation of ‘infantile innocence’, which holds political children uncountable for post-communist crimes, as Buden argues ‘has a constitutive effect’ for juridical ideology.

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189 Phillips, ‘EU rejects Eastern States’ Call.’
190 Ibid.
In his reflection on the ways in which the estrangement of political subjectivity from the civil society actors of central and eastern Europe has affected their experiences of the past, present and future, Buden first claims that these actors have experienced the ‘strange form of social life we call “transition.”’ This, as he clarifies, refers to socialism which was ideologically conceptualised as a type of ‘transition–society from capitalism to communism.’ However, in the current transition to democracy, Buden explains that the new hegemony ‘made true winners out of the Western spectators, not only over communism but at the same time also over the protagonists of the revolution that brought down communism.’ Today, the dispossessed actors of the revolution of 1989, as he further argues ‘see themselves neither as subjects nor as authors of a democracy that they actually won through struggle and created by themselves.’ Due to this complex political reversal, democracy in Buden’s terms, returns ‘from outside as a foreign object’ which the infantilized actors must regain, and it thus ‘appears at once as the goal to be reached and a lost object.’ Regarding the relation to the envisaged future, which is already answered, Buden argues that the ‘question of the past does not make sense,’ since, in his terms ‘one does not expect the children of communism to have a critically reflected memory of the communist past,’ because ‘as children, they don’t have one.’ This resultant amnesia of the children of communism who are now educated for democracy was, in Buden’s understanding, the main grounds for their infantilization.

Moreover, Buden ponders the relation between the assumed ‘innocence’ of the ‘ideological child’ in relation to ‘individualistic (juridical) ideology’. He argues that the ideological figure of the child, who is the ‘leading political figure of postcommunism’, and an ‘instrument of the new hegemony’ around which the vision of a new social beginning is structured, is also the core of juridical ideology. Here, his argument is twofold. First, Buden claims that in the new ideology, the post-communist child is unaccountable for all crimes from the communist past as well as the crimes of post-communism. Additionally, in his reference to

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192 Buden, ‘Children of Postcommunism,’ p. 23.
193 Ibid., p. 22.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid., p.23.
197 Ibid., p.24.
the crimes of post-communism, Buden depicts some of the main economic, political, cultural and social detrimental effects of the post-communist transition, including

the criminal privatisation, in which the wealth of whole nation has become the property of the few, almost overnight: for the new postcommunist pauperization of the masses with all its social and individual consequences; for historical regression that in some places have thrown postcommunist societies, economically, culturally and morally, back below the levels that had already been reached under communism; and, finally, for all the nationalisms, racisms, bloody civil wars and even genocides. All these phenomena appear today as unavoidable childhood illnesses.¹⁹⁸

Second, the ‘infantile innocence’ as Buden concludes, enables both a number of individualistic (juridical) ideologies, and the reduction of the antagonistic ‘political truth of human history to a relation that is structured according to juridical pattern, the relation between perpetrators and innocent victims. One looks into history with a sort of forensic interest, as into a corpse that can provide useful information for the court proceedings.”¹⁹⁹

Some of Buden’s arguments about ‘juridical ideology’ resonate with recent critical approaches to the management of memory and affect in post-genocide BiH culture, engendered by theorists and artists from BiH and Serbia. In their analysis, Damir Arsenijević and Emin Eminagić challenge the long-standing ‘alliance between the Scientists, the Bureaucrat and the Priest’ which they describe as a ‘strategic collaboration of forensic science; multiculturalist post-conflict management with its politics of reconciliation; and religious ritual.’ ²⁰⁰ Arsenijević and Eminagić argue that this predominant approach constructs public commemorations in which survivors can only mourn their loved ones ‘as ethnic dead victims,’ whereas the triad the Scientists, the Bureaucrat and the Priest, in their terms ‘assume the perspective of the perpetrator of the crime.’²⁰¹ For it is in the fantasy of the perpetrator that the executed person is ethnic other.’ In response to this stalemate, artists and theorists created a collaborative platform and initiated various innovative practices in order to create public space for debate, and generate emancipatory politics in BiH. Some of their projects are discussed in the second part of the thesis.

¹⁹⁸ Buden, ‘Children of Postcommunism,’ p.24
¹⁹⁹ Ibid.
²⁰¹ Ibid.
3.17. Conclusion

This chapter provides a wider picture of the vastly changed world after 1989, through an exploration of some of the major shifts in politics and in intellectual debate on the global level, after the Fall of Communism and the end of the Cold War. As demonstrated in the analysis in the previous chapter, dominant interpretative frameworks informed the international approach to the 1992-1996 war in BiH and the unified understanding of the war as an ethnic conflict. This was decisive for the international approach to the country during the war and to the ongoing peace process. The closer insight into the intellectual debate provides valuable information about the influence of dominant interpretations on the mode of political changes in the post-communist countries of eastern Europe after 1989, and their ramifications for recent EU policies. This review also illuminates the ways in which the changes on a wider level shaped interpretations of the related post-Yugoslav and post-war Bosnian-Herzegovinian contexts in the last three decades.

The overview of the reports and analyses produced by the European Commission, and the current debate among the EU member-states, has shown that the compound cultural and memory landscape in the post-communist countries cannot simply be reduced to two conflicting views of the new pro-European ‘democratic’ elite, and an old communist elite, bearing in mind the blurred distinction between these two categories after the so-called democratic revolutions of 1989. This opposition is far more complex, as shown in Kaldor and Buden’s analyses of the mode of political change in the post-communist transition, which resulted in the formation of a new dominant hegemonic politics which excludes the political subjects who produced the change of 1989. These issues are even more complex in the context of the post-Yugoslav space, which is currently dealing with the legacy of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.

Importantly, Buden points out that the new hegemony is grounded in a new intellectual paradigm. In order to dismantle the post-Cold war’s hegemonic ideologies, and challenge the suggested static hegemony and totalizing post-1989 world-picture, Buden historicises the concepts of transitology, revisionist historical scholarship, and the associated method of the ‘infantilization of political subjects.’ Buden’s analysis discloses new re-structured power relations in the post-communist country, which are maintained through policies termed
‘education for democracy’ and the related process of ‘building of civil society,’ and which are guided and supervised by the new mentors of the transition, through a myriad of policies.

This chapter widens the framework for the analysis of the war in BiH, which, according to Bougarel, cannot be analysed outside of the wider Yugoslav context. In relation to the memory of war in BiH, the comprehensive analysis developed in this chapter demonstrates that memory practices after 1989, which implicitly or explicitly reflect the complex relationships between hegemonic and oppositional politics, and the plurality of historical views, cannot be comprehended without understanding the new broader global hegemonic politics and its effect on European policies.
CHAPTER 4
Towards an Analytical Framework of Politics of War Memory and Commemoration in Bosnia and Herzegovina

This chapter addresses some of the main gaps and challenges for the analysis of memories of war. Along with the gaps in knowledge, and controversies in the post-1989 practices of memory of WWII, identified in the previous chapters, these findings inform the development of a sensitive conceptual and methodological framework for the analysis of the 1992-1996 war in BiH. The first part of this chapter outlines some of the effects of the dual revision on the politics of memory of the Yugoslav wars. This includes the recognised need for the analysis of memory of war in BiH in relation to politics and memory in the wider post-Yugoslav space, the transnational EU, and wider global contexts.

This section introduces some of the critical and comprehensive cultural and historical approaches that are concerned with the politics of time in relation to culture, memory and experience. Firstly, I present the work of historians and cultural theorists who examine different aspects of the problem of historical time in the realm of modernity and globalisation, characterized by shifting temporalities and ‘shrinking space’. This includes the work of historians, philosophers of history and cultural historians – namely Andreas Huyssen, Berber Bevernage, Chris Lorenz, Lynn Hunt, and Michael Pickering. In their respective analyses, the authors develop the debate about altered spatiality and temporality in postmodernity, and question the ideal of history, specifically, Cicero’s concept of history as the school of life, ‘historia magistra vitae’. Secondly, these selected accounts from the recent history and memory debate are enhanced by complementary cultural history and theoretical concepts and analytical methods developed by some of the most influential cultural theorists. Specifically, this section of the chapter considers concepts of culture and cultural analysis suggested by Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, as well as the theoretical and analytical device for the analysis of memory of war and commemoration developed by Timothy Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper. Generally, these and other related accounts elucidate the transformation of contingent historical categories of time and space as the cultural reorganisation in the globalised world, indicate the necessity for critical engagement with the effects of these changes, and call for the reconsideration of some of the dominant modernist approaches.
4.1. Introduction: The Post-Yugoslav Space Between Local and Global Frameworks for Memory Politics and Transitional Justice

The convoluted memories of WWII and of the war of the 1990s-construct complex interrelated symbolic spaces and new meanings across the post-Yugoslav space. While the open vandalism and destruction of WWII monuments in the early 1990s allegedly demonstrated public condemnation of the vestiges of the communism, in the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars, some of the memorials, which survived this first wave of destruction, are increasingly occupied by the politics of oblivion and denial of the war-crimes committed during the wars in the 1990s.

The recently growing wave of revisionist approaches to Yugoslav history, which encourages a politics of memory that glorify the quisling regimes from the WWII, and trivialise the Holocaust, generally combines the ruling ethno-national elites’ representations of the past with peculiar ways of interpreting the dominant EU framework for dealing with the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes. Historian Latinka Perović claims that Jasenovac ‘became the subject of mythology that declared all scientific truth null and void.’¹ The effects of reckless revisionism are illustrated through clashing memory practices as well as by the disputed ‘historical facts’ in two memorial sites, one in Croatia and the other in the BH Entity Republic of Srpska, which were created after the division of the original Memorial Complex Jasenovac, which was built in 1968, after the Yugoslav wars. The original historical sources and official narrative about the crimes of WWII are highly disputed and present a powerful tool for political manipulation. As a result, the number of the victims of different ethnic origins and political affiliations that Yugoslav historians originally estimated in the aftermath of the WWII was drastically changed. While the estimated number of 597,323 victims is reduced to 83,145 victims in the Croatian Jasenovac Memorial museum,² it is inflated to some 700 000 victims in the memorial site Donja Gradina located in the Entity of Republic of Srpska.³ Velikonja designates the controversial interpretations in Jasenovac and similar controversies, as well as

the renewed interest in memory sites from the Second World War, ‘upheavals of memoirs’, in which, as he describes ‘former heroes become criminals – and vice versa, former villains become heroes, former achievements become delusions-and vice versa; the former state becomes a tyranny.’

A significant number of critical (post)Yugoslav scholars share Perović and Velikonja’s position in relation to the growing policies and practices, which they designate as the falsification of history, and deception of the public with inaccurate information about original historical records. The falsification of history also faces strong disapproval from a significant number of formal and informal citizen’s associations, officials, and NGOs. These two dominant tendencies are shaping the post-war cultural and memory landscape of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose constitutions draw on their antifascist legacy.

Generally, the recent revisionism in the (post-)Yugoslav space reveals the contradiction which, grasped in relation to Buden’s argument about Europe’s envisaged project of emancipation through the liberation of the double legacy of totalitarianisms, demonstrates the negative consequences of this equalization for (post-)Yugoslav societies. Instead of the emancipation envisaged by the transition, the post-Yugoslav societies are somehow trapped between two totalitarianisms, and without an adequate legal framework for the prevention and prosecution of tolerance and the recently growing glorification of the local Nazi and fascist collaborationists’ regimes. Some of the responses to this negative turn are evident in popular cultural practices in the post-communist contexts of the post-Yugoslav space and reunified Germany, termed ‘Titostalgia’, and ‘Ostalgia.’

In public discourse, these antagonist politics and cultural practices are commonly reduced on the difference between the progressive politics turned towards the (determined) future, and the regressive politics turned to the past. On the other hand, Buden and Huyssen’s suggestions broaden the view and pinpoint the complexity of the notion of nostalgia in the post-communist context. In his analysis of cultural and memory practices in reunified Germany in the early nineties, Huyssen examines various cultural practices and what he terms the ‘politics of sign’ through the metaphor of Berlin as a void. He depicts some of the ramifications of

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transformations of space after the reunification, and describes how various practices of removal of symbols of the city’s communist past have resulted in nostalgia (Ostalgia). Huyssen describes how this widespread phenomenon was manifested in ‘an upsurge in popularity for the revamped Communist Party (…) even among many in the younger generation who had been active in the opposition to the state in the 1980s.’

In relation to the post-Yugoslav space, Buden explains how the negative effects of the political changes in SFRY and its violent dissolution in the 1990s, generally produced the image of experience of life in the socialist welfare state as politically brighter and economically wealthier. Some of the reasons for nostalgia thus can be interpreted as longing for a particular way of life, and more importantly, for lost political subjectivity.

4.2. Towards a Conceptual and Analytical Framework

Towards the end of the twentieth century, critical theorists from a range of disciplines, including studies of globalisation, sociology, geopolitics, history, cultural and memory studies, and postcolonial theory, contested Western notions of space and time. Most of these critical accounts that are concerned with the ‘shrinking notion of space’ and ‘blurred distinction of past, present and future’, instigated by the ‘vertigo of postmodernity’ draw on a broad range of sources from the Western intellectual tradition. Specifically, these theorists emphasise the experience of time, and pinpoint the semantic shifts which resulted from the immense cultural and political changes on the global scale. In this way, these critical accounts accentuate the need for, and at the same time provide valuable analytical frameworks for, the analysis of the ramifications of transformative events on the notion of temporality in comparative perspective.

The theorists involved in the history and memory debate tackle the modernist ‘politics of time’, which are commonly created around the idea of the past as distant or absent from the present, through the use and further elaboration of Reinhardt Koselleck’s original approach to modern history known as ‘conceptual history’ (Begrieffgeschichte) developed in the 1970s. A decade earlier, in 1964, a time characterised by the increased interest of scholars and wider public for the future, Koselleck and Reinhart Wittram invented the ‘concept of a past future’.

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5 Huyssen, Present Pasts, p.54.
6 Ó Tuathail, The Geopolitics Reader, p.171.
This idea, as Lucian Hölscher explains, considers the future ‘that was not the future of the present but the future as it was conceived of at some time in the past’, which thus became a central concept for understanding the past and the present. Generally, Koselleck’s work is sensitised to the ‘quite decisively’ transformed relations of time and space due to modernisation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which in his terms ‘have engendered completely new forms of organisation.’ It enables the understanding of changing concepts of history and of historical praxis, of the relation of past, present and future, and the exploration of different semantic shifts throughout time.

In his exhaustive account of the historical method, which he labels conceptual history, Koselleck first postulates that all historiography ‘operates on two levels: it either investigates circumstances already articulated at an earlier period in language, or it reconstructs circumstances which were not articulated into language earlier, but which can be worked up with the help of specific methods and indices.’ Thus, at the first level, ‘the received concepts serve as a heuristic means of access to the understanding of past reality’, while on the second ‘history makes use of categories constructed and defined ex post, employed without being present in the source itself.’ On the other hand, conceptual history, in Koselleck’s terms, ‘makes plain the difference prevailing between past and present conceptualisation, whether it translates the older usage and works up its definition for modern research, or whether the modern construction of scientific concepts is examined for its historical viability.’

In accordance with Koselleck’s innovative historical discipline, which as he explains overlaps with social history, some of the contributors to the recent memory-history debate suggest alternative ways of thinking about the intertwined concepts of politics, history, culture, memory, justice and space in relation to the effects of the radical-ruptures also termed as ‘breaking-up times.’ This also incorporates critical approaches to memory that examine its political, cultural and social meanings, thus challenging dogmatic views, which in Huyssen’s terms, see memory as ‘the prison house of the past’, and instead emphasise its role in

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9 Ibid., p.91.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
restructuring and grounding our lives in contemporary society saturated by media and consumption.12

The ‘ideological vacuum’ that was left after the end of the bipolar world division, as Hunt argues, was filled with globalisation. She exemplifies the renewed interest for an old phenomenon of globalisation through the increasing use of the term ‘globalisation’ in academic research during the 1990s and in 2000.13 This trend was followed by the change in academic debate which, as Hunt claims, shifted its focus from the issues related to the ‘free-market capitalism and state-directed Communism’ to the ‘Marxists critique of globalisation as a component of capitalism, and even supporters of globalisation reaffirmed Marx’s continuing relevance […] as a prophet of globalisation.’14 The latter refers to the expansion of the market across the globe, that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels foresaw in their pivotal work, the Communist Manifesto from 1848, and in this way, as Hunt argues, they ‘clearly identified the process of globalisation and began to theorise it.’ 15

On the ground, the tidal wave of political and cultural changes worldwide swept away political and intellectual history of both the political ‘East’ and the ‘South’, together with alternative political and cultural forms they produced during the perpetual Cold War crisis. The expansion of global forms of capitalism that was accompanied by ‘cultural globalisation’16 was conveyed by rapidly developing information technology, which, as Hunt argues, established the new relation between the rise of postmodernist cultural forms and the ‘new round of time-space compression’ 17

The overall post-Cold War geopolitical reorganization of the world added the spatial experiential dimension to the twentieth century’s obsession with time. Colombo and Schnidel term this shift of intellectual paradigm the ‘spatial turn,’ which theoretically largely draw on Henri Lefebvre’s work from the 1970s. His proposal for the new perception of space, and for the development of the ‘science of space’, which as Lefebvre explains, sought to reconsider

13 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 200.
16 Huyssen, Present Pasts.
the role of space in the multifaceted process and overlapping markets that constitute capitalism. Moreover, Lefebvre, structures his thesis around Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, and challenges the common perception of space as fixed ‘passive locus of social relations.’ Instead, he suggests a new understanding of the role of space as active, operational or instrumental, as well as ‘knowledge and action in the existing mode of production.’

On the premises of his comparative analysis of memory practices in Europe, Latin America and the USA, Huyssen considers the connection between the national frameworks and the global one. In his reflections on these complex interconnections, which are prompted by ‘cultural globalisation’ Huyssen clarifies that

[...] however different the mode or medium of commemorating may be in each local or regional case, all such struggles about how to remember a traumatic past of genocide, racial oppression, and dictatorship play themselves out in much larger and more encompassing memory culture of this turn of century in which national patrimony and heritage industries thrive, nostalgias of all kinds abound, and mythic pasts are being resurrected or created. Memory politics, indeed, seems as much as global projects as it is always locally or nationally inflected. Memory projects may construct or revise national narratives (...) but these narratives are now invariably located in a space somewhere between the global and the local.

This locus is also evident in the interconnected histories and transitional justice practices which are partly tackled in the previous sections concerning the post-communist turn, and in the existing shared European framework about the remembrance of the totalitarian past in Europe.

4.3. Horizons of Expectation and Spaces of Experience

“Communism is already visible on the horizon,” declared Khrushchev in a speech. Question from the floor “Comrade Khrushchev, what is a ‘horizon’”? Look it up in a dictionary, replied Nikita Sergeevich. At home the questioner found the following explanation in a reference work ‘Horizon, an apparent line separating the sky from the earth, which retreats as one approaches it.’

Koselleck ponders the immensely changed experience in modernity through establishing the connection between historicity and experience. In his comprehensive approach

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to historical time, based on the idea that chronology and lived time coincide but diverge, Koselleck establishes linkages between ‘a chronological past, a lived present that was once an anticipated future, and expectation of the future – such that any given present is at the same time a “former future.”’\footnote{Koselleck, \textit{Futures Past}, p. xi.} Thus, conceptual history contributes to social history and the analysis of historical time in modernity by joining historicity and experience, and differentiating between ‘the conceptual couple’, the designation Koselleck uses to describe the two ‘present-centred’ concepts, which he defines as ‘space of experience’ (the past) and ‘horizon of expectation’ (the future).\footnote{Ibid.} Specifically, he proposes that both categories ‘resemble as historical categories those of time and space.’\footnote{Ibid., p.257.}

Moreover, the interrelation between the ‘conceptual couple’ which in his terms ‘indicate anthropological condition without which history is neither possible nor conceivable’, Koselleck defines in the following manner ‘the one is not to be had without the other. No expectation without experience, no experience without expectation.’\footnote{Ibid. 260-261.}

In their critical accounts of historical time in the postmodernist condition theorists engaged in the recent memory debate deploy and develop Koselleck’s concepts in order to grasp some of the main cultural and political transformations characterised by shifting once ‘fixed’ cultural borders between past, present and future. Michael Pickering’s analysis is concerned with the relation between experience, everyday life and historical time\footnote{Ibid.} and follows Koselleck’s argument that ‘[n]o event can be narrated, no structure represented no process described without the use of historical concepts which make the past conceivable.’\footnote{Michael Pickering, “Experience as Horizon: Koselleck, Expectation and Historical Time” Cultural Studies, 18: 2-3, 271-298, 2004 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0950238042000201518 > [Accessed on 28 November, 2017].} Accordingly, Pickering first tackles the problem of the conceivability of history through a
closer insight into this complex relation. He then focuses his analysis on the elements of Koselleck’s historical categories, namely, space of experience and horizon of expectation, and builds his argument that ‘such concepts have horizontal qualities.’\textsuperscript{28} Pickering explores and develops further the figurative and analytical device of the concept of horizon, in order to expand its analytical value. Specifically, he shifts Koselleck’s concepts, which he then develops further through Karl Manheim’s concept of conjunctive and communicative experience, and Raymond William’s concept of structures of feeling.

Pickering points out that Koselleck’s acute analysis of the ways in which ‘the temporal dimensions of the past and future are related to any particular present’ has shown that ‘the old ideal of history as a supreme form of instruction, directed our everyday lives in the present by means of exemplary cases, models and types, has been eroded.’\textsuperscript{29} Pickering first clarifies that the concept suggests the connection between history and everyday life on the premises of the constancy of human nature and the human condition, and argues that is untenable in modernity characterised with new temporalities.

In accordance with Koselleck’s work, Pickering explains that ‘[t]he consequence of denaturalized time and the separation of history and chronology which it entails, is that our experience of the temporal gradations of (..) “earlier” and “later”, become sharply differentiated from each other in our historical awareness.’\textsuperscript{30} The new experience, which in his terms thus ‘can no longer be understood in terms of any simple linearity of chronological time’ and its consequences generally contribute to distorted temporality.

Pickering clarifies that the interrelated and ambiguous concepts of experience and expectation ‘[i]n their abstract forms, they can seem true without any relation to reality, whereas in their concrete forms they can seem real but without any relation to what is true. It is in this way that their relations are conceptually characteristic of the formal categories of historical time.’\textsuperscript{31} While Pickering understands the related concept of horizon in accordance with Lakoff and Johnson’s suggestion that horizon be associated with the concept of ‘field of vision’, which is ‘a founding orientational metaphor derived from our spatial experience, where

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{28} Pickering, ‘Experience as Horizon, p.273-274.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid. p.273.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid.,’ 275.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the boundary of territory or open expanse is defined by what we can see.’  

Pickering further clarifies that ‘metaphorical encapsulation of that experience provides the ground for further metaphorical extension into our temporal experience’ in relation to both the ‘distant past’ and with the ‘wider spatial and temporal intersections opened modernity, which Koselleck captures in the phrase ‘the contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous’.”

The complexity of experience in modernity, Pickering illuminates in the following manner

[m]etaphorical extensions based around the organising principles of proximity and distance inform our conceptual understanding of the temporalities of experience, and particularly of the dialectical relationship between situated and mediated forms of experience, so that the “contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous” is now common place in everyday life, whether we are watching the news on TV at home or glancing through CD’s in our local music store.

Pickering uses other aspects of the metaphor of field of vision, specifically boundary and perspective, and links the former with horizon which ‘defines the boundary of our broadest possible perspective at any particular point’ and thus, as he argues, can be conceived in its temporal and spatial sense. Thus understood, the term horizon, as Pickering further explains, enables the perspective we develop as historical subjects, which ‘is formed and transformed by the confrontation of horizons occurring in our present engagement with the past.’

While our historical understanding is conditioned by the distance between historical horizons, in Pickering’s terms ‘history’s concern is threefold: with short-term events, which have their own diachronic structure; with longer term events which persist through the successive flow of events; and with the diverse temporal extensions and connections that follow both events and structures.’

Accordingly, Pickering explains that in cases of changes to experience that are instigated by transformative events, such as war, which particularize structures to which experience is connected, ‘we thread the grounds of what seems starkly actual for us.’ These condition-specific experiences, which Koselleck’s designates as ‘drenched in reality’, in Pickering’s term ‘presuppose alternatives (peace and freedom) though again only as alternatives to what is, on finite terms, historically experienced and exclude other meanings

32 Pickering, ‘Experience as Horizon,’ 275.
33 Ibid., p.275.
34 Ibid., p. 275.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
since they refer to definite semantic fields. However, Pickering illustrates the ‘imaginative potential of thinking in metaphors’ which characterises Koselleck’s work through the example of the distinction he makes between experience and expectation, which suggests that experience in its “space”, can change over time, for various specific experiences may overlap and influence each other while lived experience itself, being reality-drenched “binds together fulfilled or missed possibilities” which enter into it and act back on it, thus changing it after the fact: “This is the temporal structure of experience and without retroactive expectation it cannot be accumulated.” While expectation has a different temporal structure since it consists of what is “not to be had” as yet, directly within the present, new experiences are born out of surprise of the unexpected: “The gain in experience exceeds the limitation of possible future presupposed by previous experience.

Pickering further expands Koselleck’s work with the complementary dimension suggested by Karl Mannheim who ponders the categories of experience and expectation in relation to condition-specific experiences and argues that in every historical event numerous factors are acting upon one another and very often the ostensible triumph by one by no means annihilates the rest, but merely makes them less apparent, on the surface, than those factors the significance of which is more immediately perceptible.

Pickering emphasises Mannheim’s distinction between conjunctive and communicative as a valuable contribution to Koselleck’s concepts, since it extends the temporal horizon of experience and existential space of expectations. Conjunctive experience, as Pickering describes involves a direct and immediate encounter with a particular form of sociality, in definite situations and contexts, and as such is existentially bound, so that any knowledge deriving from it is fully apprehended only for social circles they involve and in the communicative forms locally found within a specific experiential space.

He further explains that a subject’s habitus is formed in this sphere of experience. Mannheim describes how, unlike localised, present-centred experience and knowledge, communicative experience extends beyond specific social milieu. In Pickering terms, this experience is ‘not dependent on the kind of social life involved, but on the realisation of quality and capacity to resonate more broadly beyond the confines of social milieu. It is this which allows it to become

38 Pickering, ‘Experience as Horizon,’ 276.
39 Ibid.p. 277.
40 Mannheim in Pickering, ‘Experience as Horizon,’ p.279.
41 Ibid., p.281.
42 Ibid., p.280.
widely felt and imagined.’ 43 Pickering refers to Jonathan Friedman’s definition of communicative experience as ‘an articulation between local sociality and the larger public sphere’ which, as Pickering argues suggests synthesis of both conjunctive and communicative experiences, which are thus ‘combined in a new synergy.’ 44

4.4. Concepts of ‘Communicative and Conjunctive Experience’ and ‘Structures of Feeling’

In his comprehensive analysis of everyday life and accelerated time, Pickering broadens Koselleck’s historical categories, with Mannheim’s complementary communicative/conjunctive distinction and Raymond William’s ‘structures of feeling’, which in Pickering’s understanding contributes to grasping the cultural phenomena of emergence. The latter, in Pickering’s terms ‘initially develop between conjunctive experience and its communicative expression, marking the first creative impetus towards a new way of configuring experience.’ 45

Within his concept of structures of feeling, Williams distinguishes between three levels of culture, which he frames in the following manner:

the lived culture of a particular time and space, only fully accessible to those living in that time and space. There is the recorded culture, of every kind, from art to the most everyday facts: the culture of period. There is also, as the factor connecting lived culture and period culture, the culture of selective tradition. 46

The proposed categories of culture also disclose the way in which these different levels, which somewhat resemble concepts of conjunctive and communicative experience, are interrelated within the structures of feeling. Williams explains that the latter, which he defines as ‘the particular living result of all elements in the general organisation’ corresponds to the culture of period. Yet, he highlights that structures of feeling cannot be learned in a formal sense, since, in his terms ‘[o]ne generation may train its successor, with reasonable sources, in the social character or the general cultural pattern, but the new generation will have its own structure of feeling, which will not appear to come from anywhere.’ 47 Since the actual living sense of community cannot be fully accessed through recorded communication, which corresponds to

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44 Ibid.
the level of documentary culture, it, as Williams suggests, disappears with the ‘carriers of structure’. This emphasises the importance of documentary culture which, as Williams describes ‘expresses that life to us in direct terms, when the living witnesses are silent.’ But at the same time, it elucidates the limitation of approach to the that actual living sense. This constraint Williams describes in the following manner ‘[t]heoretically, a period is recorded; in practice, this record is absorbed into a selective tradition, and both are different from the culture as lived.’

Williams, Mannheim and Koselleck’s valuable concepts which Pickering applies in his analytical device concerned with experience and sense of historical time in the transient present, are particularly helpful for grasping cultural and political processes in the post-war context that is characterised by experiences ‘drenched in reality’.

4.5. Present Past

The blurred relation between present and the past, which resulted from the immense changes that characterise the transition period of the 1980s, also referred to as the ‘decade of postmodernism’, has also challenged a long-standing nation-state’s model, as well as its geographical and political grounding of the historical past that once guaranteed the community’s stable relation to the past. Under the influence of these temporal and spatial postmodernist dislocations, the twentieth century’s modernist fascination with the future was replaced with an increasing turn to the past and to memory. Most cultural historians suggest that this shift from ‘present futures’ to ‘present pasts’ first emerged in the West in the 1980s with the memory of Holocaust. Accordingly, Huyssen claims that memory emerged as ‘a key cultural and political concern in Western societies,’ and its fast-growing influence has also marked developments of war memory throughout the 1990s.

Berber Bevernage and Chris Lorenz argue that the current ‘crisis in history’ and growing concern with postmodernist notions of time signal the changes in experience of time under the influence of the proliferation of memory and widespread human rights discourse,

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49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. p. 66-67.
52 Ibid. p.11.
which challenge the dominant concepts within politics but also within historicist traditional conceptualisations of time and temporal distance.\textsuperscript{53} Along the same lines, Huyssen explains that under the influence of political and cultural changes, which he labels ‘cultural globalisation’, the ‘form in which we think of the past is increasingly memory without borders rather than history within borders.’\textsuperscript{54} In the light of these expanded horizons of time and space, the contemporary obsession with memory in the present, as Huyssen further argues, indicates a significant change in ‘our ways of thinking and living temporality’ which is, in his understanding, subliminally in the focus of the recent academic ‘debate about memory vs. history.’\textsuperscript{55}

One of the critical standpoints within the growing body of critical approaches in history and memory scholarship as well as in postcolonial theory is questioning ‘traditional’ modern historical approaches. This particularly refers to the Western concept of temporality that commonly assumes time as homogenous and linear, and perceives the past as distant or absent. For instance, by pointing to political aspects of the dominant conceptualisation of time, Bevernage and Lorenz in their joint analysis problematize modern historiography’s ‘politics of periodisation’ which usually ‘regard only (national) political events as borderlines of periodisation’, and argue that longer lasting (transnational) “silent revolutions” […] may have been experienced as more important by contemporaries.\textsuperscript{56} Huyssen also discusses similar issues in relation to Walter Mehring and Walter Benjamin’s criticism of ‘historiography as a tool of domination and ideology’.\textsuperscript{57} Bevernage and Lorenz exemplify recent criticism through Geoffrey Barraclough’s proposal to outline contemporary history as ‘a problem oriented - and thus not period oriented - discipline’ which suggests that the ‘period which is relevant for the contemporary historian depends only on the particular present-day problem he or she is trying to clarify’.\textsuperscript{58}

Among the recent criticism of the Western conception of time and history and the general process of ‘doing history’ they consider, Beverage and Lorenz mention Dipesh Chakrabarty’s argument about the ‘spatialisation of time’, the term which in their terms

\textsuperscript{53} Lorenz and Bevernage, \textit{Breaking up Time}, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{54} Huyssen, \textit{Present Pasts}, p.4.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Bevernage, Lorenz, \textit{Breaking up Time}, p.12.
\textsuperscript{57} Huyssen, \textit{Present Pasts}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{58} Geoffrey Barraclough cited in Lorenz and Bevernage, \textit{Breaking up Time}, p.12.
indicates ‘the implicit connecting of space and time by dividing the world in regions that are ahead in time and regions that lag behind, waiting to “catch up”’ and which thus determines the ways in which historians measure time. On the other hand, Lucian Hölscher’s proposal that ‘the abstract and empty time and space that historians take for granted actually did not exist before the modern era’ as Bevernage and Lorenz argue, has taken the historicisation of time a step further.

Along the same lines, Huyssen claims that the main function of the modernist model of time which was established by the modern nineteenth-century nation-state, was to ‘mobilize and monumentalize national and universal pasts so as to legitimize and give meaning to the present and to envision the future: culturally, politically, socially’, and he further argues that this model no longer works. Accordingly, he suggests that the primary concern of the recent history memory debate is not a disturbance of our notions of the past, but ‘a fundamental crisis in our imagination of alternative futures.’ Huyssen further argues that Hobsbawm’s ‘invention of tradition’ and Halbwach’s approach to collective memory both structured around presumptions of a stable relation to past and memory, are insufficient ‘to grasp the current dynamic of media and temporality, memory, lived time and forgetting’ and need to be reconsidered in the politically and culturally reorganised world. Huyssen develops his argument further in the following manner:

[t]he clashing and even more fragmented memory politics of specific social and ethnic groups raises the question whether forms of collective consensual memory are even still possible today, and if not, whether and in what form social and cultural cohesion can be guaranteed without them. Media memory alone clearly will not suffice, even though media occupy ever larger chunks of the social and political perception of the world.

He perceives today’s obsession with memory as both an indication of a shift in our thinking and living temporality as the search for new paradigm ‘of thinking about time and space, history and geography in the twenty-first century.’

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59 Bevernage, Lorenz, Breaking up Time, p.18.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 2.
64 Ibid., p.4.
65 Ibid., p.17.
Similarly, Bevernage and Lorenz ponder the search of historians for a ‘new professional role and theoretical legitimation for history to make more explicit what was previously based more often on implicit presuppositions than on formal arguments.’ Throughout their extensive analysis they tackle the problem of historical time in relation to the proliferation of memory, in general, and the politics of memory and different aspects of transitional justice (restorative and retributional), in particular. Bevernage and Lorenz examine the ways in which existing postulates of modern historiography based on distancing the past from the present are constructed and articulated. In this process, they accentuate the role of those historians who act as ‘border patrol of the relationship between past and present’, since, as Bevernage and Lorenz explain, although they ‘are quite clear when declaring the need for “border guards”, they are ‘much less clear when it comes to assessing what this “guarding” actually consists of and how it relates to borders it claims to patrol.’ Specifically, in Bevernage and Lorenz’s terms it is not clear from their arguments whether they can best be metaphorically represented as merely observers watching over borders between established “sovereign states”, or as activists aggressively engaged in a reparation policy such as one that intends to defend the “fortress of Europe” against “illegal” intruders, or as implying a more straightforward, performative setting of borders that creates new states, such as the ones that created West and East Germany and North and South Sudan.

As a point of departure in their analysis of temporal distinctions, Bevernage and Lorenz use Hartog’s concept of ‘regimes of historicity’. Hartog suggests that ‘Western thinking about history is characterised by a succession of three ‘regimes of historicity’- from a past orientation until the French Revolution, to a future-orientation until the 1980s, and then a present-orientation in the years since’ and Bevernage and Lorenz argue that his thesis ‘has hardly been empirically tested’, along with the role of historians. The latter question the traditional role of historian as ‘distant, impartial observer’ which in new historical understandings of overlapping temporalities, indicates a more active role of historians. This role is exemplified through the relationship ‘between the political allegiance of historian and the use of periodisation in historical writing’ which was emphasised by Raulff, whose argument, summarised by Beverage and Lorenz, suggests that:

both progressive and conservative thinkers who, for different reasons, abhorred specific political events in the past - such as French Revolution in conservative

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67 Ibid., p. 22.
68 Ibid., p. 20-21.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 9.
thinking and the Restoration in Marxist thinking or a lost war in nationalist thought – used periodisation for political ends.\textsuperscript{71}

Referring to the work of Raulff, Bevernage and Lorenz further explain that ‘the choice historians make when they focus on either ‘events’ or ‘structures’ is “not just a choice between two modes of temporalisation, but also a choice that has aesthetic, ethical and political consequences.”’\textsuperscript{72} This criticism also encompasses the Annales school and particularly Fernand Braudell’s three-level theory of time, which he developed during his imprisonment during the war. The longue durée, as Bevernage and Lorenz argue ‘enabled him to discount both the French defeat and the later contribution of Vichy-France as merely ‘ephemeral’ events in history.’\textsuperscript{73}

They exemplified the ambiguous role of historians as their insistence on proper (linear, characteristic for the classic concept of time in history), and improper (unlinear, prompted by memory) understanding of historical time through French historian Henry Russo and Dutch historian Bob de Graaf ‘arguments against the ‘judicialisation of history.’\textsuperscript{74} Precisely, the first example refers to Russo’s criticism of the process of retrospective justice in France and his refusal to participate as an expert witness in the French trial, since, as he argues, the whole process was influenced by ‘religion of memory’, which ‘ignores the hierarchies of time’ which in Russo’s understanding contradicts the historical project focused on ‘describing, explaining, and situating alterity, in putting it at distance.’\textsuperscript{75}

The second example that Bevernage and Lorenz use to analyse the role of historians in relation to ‘genocidal victimhood’ is concerned with De Graff’s participation in the work of the Dutch commission NIOD report, the inquiry of the Srebrenica Genocide, that was convened by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation. This example reveals the common argument about proper and improper historical time through de Graff’s claim that victims or survivors ‘often live in an “extratemporality,” or in a “synchronic” rather than “diachronic” and “chronological” time. For them the “past remains present”, to them it seems as if atrocities “only happened yesterday or even today.”’\textsuperscript{76} By perceiving victimhood as historically

\textsuperscript{71} Lorenz, Bevernage, \textit{Breaking up Time}, p.11.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p.12.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. p. 21.
\textsuperscript{75} Henry Rousso quoted in Lorenz, Bevernage, \textit{Breaking up Time}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{76} Lorenz, Bevernage, \textit{Breaking up Time}, p. 22.
determined phenomenon which has its beginning and its end, Bevernage and Lorenz further argue that de Graaf acknowledges that the historian “‘brings the past to life or keeps it alive and kills it by letting the past become past. With that he not only creates the past but he also offers a certain autonomy to present.’” 77 Through the use of the metaphors ‘border control’ and ‘guard the borders of the discipline of academic history’ Bevernage and Lorenz designate the practice of drawing a line between ‘real’ and ‘pseudo’ history which in their terms, protects the ‘former against” intruders”, such as memory movements and surviving contemporary witnesses, alias Zeitzeuge.’ 78 In relation to this ‘disciplinary protectionism’, Bevernage and Lorenz argue that [f]rom a nominalist perspective it is indeed quite senseless to even speak about “periods” before time is somehow periodised’, and equally from a more ‘objectivist’ or ‘realist’ perspective in their terms ‘it is as puzzling as it is important to know what exactly historians are doing when they are “letting the past become past”, and how historians can tell “when” exactly “it is time” to “put the past in its place.” When indeed, is this act “timely” and thus “legitimate”? 79 In this way, they question the presupposed objectivity and impartiality of historians, since the distancing of the past, present and future, as well as their naming and demarcation, depend entirely on historians.

The additional issue in relation to historical time which Bevernage and Lorenz address, is the lack of explicit critical reflection of historians to problems central to their notion of historical time, namely the problem of the present (contemporaneity) and of presence prompted by the proliferation of memory. According to Bevernage and Lorenz, some of the grounds for this omission could be found in the ‘waiting period’ or ‘the longstanding taboo among professional historians on the writing of contemporary history or any historiography that does not respect a certain waiting period – defined most often by the opening up of archives or the dying of Zeitzeugen [witness], but sometimes defined in straightforwardly chronological terms, e.g., forty years.’ 80

In his respective account Bevernage challenges the modernist ‘politics of time’ created around the idea of the past as distant or absent from the present. On the premises of Koselleck’s work, Bevernage suggests that the temporal dimension which characterises the modernist

77 Lorenz, Bevernage, Breaking up Time, p. 22.
78 Ibid., p.13.
79 Ibid., p.23
80 Ibid. p. 28; my addition.
understanding of historical time dominates in the concept of transitional justice as well as the understanding of the relation between history and justice. He questions this thesis through the transitional justice forms which are applied in different cultural and political contexts, specifically, he looks at the work and outcomes of truth and reconciliation commissions in post-dictatorship countries in the South America (Argentina, Chile) in the 1980s, and in post-conflict African countries (South Africa, Sierra Leone, Rwanda) in the 1990s, as well as the work of the criminal court that was working parallel with the truth commission in Sierra Leone. Throughout his comparative analysis, as well as in the critical approach to modernist temporality which he underpins with critical accounts from the recent history and memory debate, Bevernage expounds critical historical but also political and sociological accounts and explores the ways in which history can contribute more substantially to the search for justice.\textsuperscript{81}

In his analysis of the role of history in post-conflict contexts, Bevernage argues that the ‘modernist disjuncture between past and present’ is continuously contested by ‘memories of offence.’ By using the term which Primo Levi coined to designate memories of ‘extreme experiences’, Bevernage indicates the ‘persistence of past’ and clarifies some of the main issues in the field of transitional justice that is, as he claims, structured around ‘modernist historical discourse’.\textsuperscript{82} As he further argues, it is precisely this ‘persistence of historical injustices’ along with the problem of the ‘persistence of past’ or ‘present past’ that disable the desired break between past and present and as such, it demands critical engagement with historical time or the construction of an ‘alternative chronosophy’ in order to bridge the contrasting ‘time of jurisdiction’ and ‘time of history’ and to approach recent concepts of transitional justice and truth commissions more critically.\textsuperscript{83}

4.6. Memory Boom: Anniversary Boom

In their distinct analyses Huyssen\textsuperscript{84} and Ashplant, Dawson and Roper\textsuperscript{85} are concerned with the emergence of the memory discourse that was followed by an ‘explosion of historical

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\item[82] Ibid., p. 116.
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scholarship and an ever more voracious museal culture." The authors identified different streams as well as some of the main features of the increased interest in memory, whose centrifugally directed development was manifested through Holocaust discourse, which first emerged in memory discourses in the United States, Israel and Germany, and strongly impacted memory discourses across Europe, Latin America and South Africa after apartheid.

Within this ‘globalisation of culture’, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper distinguish three key features of the general development of war memory, which occupied the public and emerged as the key political and cultural phenomenon since the 1980s. The first feature, as the authors explain, is related to the representation of war memory through different forms and practices, and it encompasses memory projects ranging from the establishment of new museums, film production both documentary and fictional, to campaigning for justice and reparations. The second feature is related to the formation and activism of war-related groups, which increased public interest for witness and survivor testimonies through endeavours of survivors, victims, and other groups of individuals, to gain public recognition of their experience, and to claim material compensation and reparation. And finally, the third feature, which Ashplant, Dawson and Roper also term, ‘anniversary boom’, brings into relation the increased number of commemorative events and public communication media, which in Ashplant Dawson and Roper’s terms, fuel and amplify commemorations by transforming them ‘into a media event trough reporting commemorative ceremonies in special publications, reports and documentary features.’

Some of these features, as the challenges brought by complex transitory changes that marked the last two decades of the twentieth century, are well illustrated through the example of post-fascist Germany, a country once divided along Cold-War lines of demarcation. The social process initiated in the mid-1980s with ‘Historikerstreit’ (the historians debate), commonly perceived as one of the most significant historical debates focused on the legacy of the National-Socialist past, which occurred in the then-Federal Republic of Germany culminated in the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

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86 Huyssen, Present Pasts, p.11.
87 Ashplant and others, The Politics of Memory; Huyssen, Present Pasts.
88 Ashplant and others, The Politics of Memory, p. 3-4.
In this period, memory discourses about the Holocaust that saturated political and public life in the United States also strongly resonated in Europe, and particularly in transforming German societies. Huyssen selects ‘German anniversaries’ as an example of memory practices that occurred in Germany prior to and after the country’s unification, that encompassed, in his terms, ‘a whole series of politically loaded and widely covered fortieth and fiftieth anniversaries.’ These main memory drifts in Germany correspond to the main processes in the global context that Ashplant, Dawson and Roper describe as the ‘anniversary boom’, and particularly to an increasing internationalisation of memory practices, which in the re-unified Germany, as Huyssen further explains, ‘received intense coverage in the international media, stirring-up post-World War II codifications of national history in France, Austria, Italy, Japan, even the United States and most recently Switzerland.’

Within the process which Huyssen labels as ‘hypertrophy of memory’, the dominating Holocaust memory also ‘merged with the discourses of AIDS, slavery, family violence, and child abuse.’ Accordingly, he examines ‘today’s turn against history’ in relation to proliferation of memory at the end of the twentieth century’, which, as he claims, ‘has added significantly to the ways we understand history and deal with the temporal dimensions of social and cultural life’ at a time which is, as he describes, characterised with the ‘threat of socially produced amnesia’.

At the same time, the globalisation of Holocaust memory and growing power of memory culture focused on trauma, were fuelled by the wars and genocide that occurred in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s. While in his argument Huyssen emphasises this interdependence, he also ponders the universality of the Holocaust, and claims that both new political developments which resulted in violence on one side, and the failure of the West to intervene and prevent genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Rwanda, on the other, led to what he terms the ‘globalisation paradox’. Huyssen argues

[o]n the one hand, the Holocaust has become a cypher for the twentieth century as a whole and for the failure of the project of enlightenment. It serves as proof of Western civilisation’s failure to practice anamnesis, to reflect on its constitutive inability to live in peace with difference and otherness, and to draw the consequences from the insidious relationship among enlightened modernity, racial oppression, and

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89 Huyssen, Present Past, p.12.
90 Ibid., p.13.
91 Ibid., p.8.
92 Ibid., p.6.
organised violence. On the other hand, this totalising dimension of Holocaust discourse so prevalent in much postmodern thought is accompanied by a dimension that particularises and localises.\textsuperscript{93}

Furthermore, Huyssen argues that the transnational movement of memory has gradually changed the meaning of Holocaust discourse. Consequently, the internationalised discourse of Holocaust did not designate a specific historical event any longer, but instead it became a ‘metaphor for other traumatic histories and memories.’\textsuperscript{94} This shifting relationship between local and global aspects of the Holocaust has multiple effects, it shapes, but also transforms existing constellations, and as such, requires caution in the analysis of contemporary memory cultures.

Accordingly, Huyssen emphasises the importance of the nexus between universal Holocaust discourse and local memory practices, and suggests that regardless of variations between political and historical contexts, and their national memory debates ‘globali[s]ation and the strong reassessment of respective national, regional, or local pasts will have to be thought together.’\textsuperscript{95} Accordingly, one of the common features of the complex interaction between different aspects within transnational memory, as Huyssen’s claims, is that the ‘political site of memory practices is still national, not post-national or global,’ since, as he further argues, ‘although memory discourses appear to be global in one register, at their core they remain tied to histories of specific nations and states.’\textsuperscript{96} Huyssen further questions the implications of these new constellations manifested in the obsession with memory and forgetting, in relation to the concept he terms as ‘culture of memory.’\textsuperscript{97}

As Huyssen argues, the culture of memory, which first emerged in the Western world in the late 1970s when it appeared as the ‘marketing of memory’ by the Western culture industry, or the ‘commodification of history’ in Callinicos’ terms, after the shift of 1989 ‘acquires more explicit political inflection in the other parts of the world.’\textsuperscript{98}

Specifically, the concept, which was originally associated with the heritage industry and historicising restoration of old cities and museums, the mass marketing of nostalgia and

\textsuperscript{93} Huyssen, \textit{Present Pasts}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p. 15.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
retro fashion, shifted to the politically driven concept of culture of memory in the non-Western world after 1989. The expansion of the culture of memory across the globe that followed the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War is, as Huyssen describes as wide as memory’s political uses are varied, ranging from a mobilisation of mythic pasts to support aggressively chauvinist or fundamentalist politics (e.g. post-communist Serbia, Hindu populism in India) to fledging attempts, in Argentina and Chile, to create public spheres of ‘real memory’ that will counter the politics of forgetting, pursued through the dictatorship regimes either through “reconciliation” and official amnesties or through repressive silencing. But the fault line between mythic past and real past is not always easy to draw - which is one of the conundrums of any politics of memory anywhere.99

Huyssen further examines the implications of the complex and intertwining relations between global and local memory discourses in the globalised and media saturated post-Cold war world. He illustrates the complexity of the analysis of various local memory sites in relation to universal memory discourses through the example of the Holocaust, which as a ‘universal trope of traumatic history has migrated into other nonrelated contexts.’100 Through this example, Huyssen highlights that careful consideration includes questioning ‘whether and how the trope enhances or hinders local memory practices and struggles, or whether and how it may help and hinder at the same time,’ and concludes that however “different and site specific the causes might be, this does suggest that globalization and the strong reassessment of the respective national, regional, or local past will have to be thought together.”101 Huyssen’s emphasis on cultural globalisation and its political and cultural implications on local contexts contributes to a broader understanding of the dynamics and some of the main problems that were revealed in the previous chapter through the analysis of the concepts of civil society and the transnational European framework for remembering crimes committed in totalitarian regimes in Europe.

4.7. Culture

Raymond Williams argues that the term culture is ‘one of the two or three most complicated words in English language.’102 As Williams clarifies, this is a result of the

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100 Ibid., p.16.
101 Ibid.
102 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.87.
concept’s ‘intricate historical development, in several European languages, but mainly because it has now come to be used for important concepts in several distinct intellectual disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of thought.’

Similarly, Terry Eagleton, questions the usage of the word culture and the activities it denotes through one of the fundamental oppositions. Specifically, he focuses on the relation between culture and nature, and argues that

‘[w]ithin this single term, questions of freedom and determinism, agency and endurance, change and identity, the given and the created, come dimly into focus. If culture means the active tending of natural growth, then it suggests the dialectic between the artificial and natural, what we do to the world and what world does to us.’

Eagleton associates this relation with the ‘dialectical turn’ and the constructivist dimension of culture, which is committed to rendering raw material to humanly significant shapes. Accordingly, he argues that ‘in this it is less a matter of deconstructing the opposition between culture and nature than of recognizing that the term ‘culture’ is already such a deconstruction.

Most of the cultural theorists concerned with different meanings and incoherence in the use of the term emphasise the reconciliatory aspect of the conception of culture. For instance, some of the tensions that are amalgamated in the term ‘culture,’ as Eagleton describes, are the tension between making and being made, rationality and spontaneity. It also means both what is around us and inside us, and thus it implies that the culture blends self-overcoming as well as self-realization, and highlights the need for cultivation in a broader sense, as both internal and external processes. In Eagleton’s terms ‘as the word “culture” shift us from the natural to the spiritual, it also intimates an affinity between them.’ On the other hand, Zygmunt Bauman explains that the idea of culture served the reconciliation of a whole series of oppositions unnerving due to their ostensible incompatibility: those of freedom and necessity, of the voluntary and the constrained, of teleological and causal, chosen and routine, novel and repetitive, in short of self-assertion and normative regulation.

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103 Williams, _Keywords_, p. 87.
105 Ibid.
106 Eagleton, _The Idea of Culture_, p. 5.
107 Ibid., p. 6.
Within his approach to the analysis of the ‘complex and still active history’ of the notion of culture, Raymond Williams distinguishes between three core meanings of the concept which, although emblematic for modernism, differs in relation to particular contexts.\(^{109}\) According to Williams, the first shift of the meaning of the term culture occurred in the eighteenth century, the period which Reinhardt Koselleck designates as ‘Sattelzeit’ (the age of mountain-passes) in order to depict the emerging ‘vision’ of man and an expansion of the idea of humanity. In this period, as Williams clarifies, the meaning of the ‘independent and abstract noun culture’ which was originally conceptualised in relation to agriculture, was used to denote the ‘general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development’.\(^{110}\) The culture, which was also a synonym for the term civilisation, was thus envisioned as universally human and reflected the general spirit of the Enlightenment, with its course of secular, progressive self-development.\(^{111}\)

At the same time, it also reflected the ambivalence of the historical condition characterised by sharply different human predicaments, as Eagleton emphasises. In the same line, Bauman describes that this attitudinal ambivalence was reflected in ‘the double-edged – simultaneously “enabling” and “constraining” – character of culture.’\(^{112}\) Alongside the ambiguities of the concept of culture itself, the terms culture and civilisation which were first used as synonyms, also delineated different connotations. While civilisation was a French notion and was mainly used to refer to political, economic and technical life, the term that was largely used in the German context was Kultur (culture), and was used to denote religious, artistic and intellectual aspects of the few, not of majority of the German society of that period. Eagleton argues that this tension between terms culture (Kultur) and civilisation also reflects the rivalry between Germany and France.

With the semantic shift that occurred in the nineteenth-century, the distinction between civilisation and culture became sharper, and the terms that were first used as synonyms turned into antonyms. While the notion of civilisation gradually acquired an imperialist echo, the German Romantics and pre-Marxists appropriated the term culture (Kultur) for their early critique of capitalism.

\(^{109}\) Williams, *Keywords*, p.91.
\(^{110}\) Ibid., p.90.
\(^{112}\) Bauman, *Culture as Praxis*, p. xii.
This differentiation and more independent use of the term culture, led to the second ‘category of usage’, in the late nineteenth and twentieth century. Since then, the term culture is used to designate a ‘particular way of life, whether of people, whether of people, a period, a group, or humanity in general.\textsuperscript{113} Specifically, as Turner explains, the shift which resulted with ‘the use of the word in the plural as when one speaks of “cultures” as opposed to “culture”’ Williams attributes to German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder.\textsuperscript{114} As Turner further clarifies, Herder contested the Enlightenment’s predominant definition of the culture, which designated ‘the official or élite culture of the European societies’, with his argument that ‘the people of other nations as well as different sections of the peoples within Europe (…) had their own cultures –that is their own characteristic patterns of thought and behaviour - which ought to be investigated and understood in their own terms.’\textsuperscript{115} Herder’s suggestion was later adopted by anthropologists and sociologists ‘particularly in speaking of “subcultures”, classes, ages, ethnic, or sex groups.’\textsuperscript{116}

The relatively new, third use of culture as ‘the independent and abstract noun which describes the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity’ as Williams suggests, seems as the most widespread use of the term – culture is ‘music, literature, painting and sculpture.’\textsuperscript{117}

On the other hand, Raymond Williams explains that ‘different meanings and reference in use of culture as term’ emphasizes that the genuine complexity of the concept of culture actually corresponds to ‘real elements in experience.’\textsuperscript{118} Accordingly, Williams distinguishes between the ‘ideal,’ the ’documentary,’ and the ‘social’ categories in definition of culture. According to the first, ‘ideal’ definition, culture is a process of human perfection regarding certain absolute or universal values. The analysis of the concept of culture thus-framed is focused on lives and works within which it seeks to discover and describe values that compose ‘a timeless order’ or refer to the universal human condition.\textsuperscript{119} The second, documentary definition ponders the recorded body of intellectual and imaginative work. According to

\textsuperscript{113} Williams, \textit{Keywords}, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Williams, \textit{Keywords}, p.90,
\textsuperscript{118} Williams, \textit{The Long Revolution}, p.59.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 57.
Williams, the analysis of culture from this perspective is an activity of criticism concerned with the ‘nature of thought and experience, the details of language, form and convention in which these are active.’\textsuperscript{120} This analysis encompasses different and interrelated approaches that range from studies that focus on common, universal values and seek to discover the best works in the world, to the analysis concerned with tradition, which scrutinises relationships between particular works, and particular traditions and societies within which they appeared.

Finally, the third, social definition describes culture as a particular way of life, which conveys certain meanings and values in practices (i.e. art and learning), in everyday life and behaviour as well as in institutions. This analysis that is concerned with the meanings and values that are ‘implicit and explicit in a particular way of life, a particular culture, also includes historical criticism’.\textsuperscript{121} But, as Williams further explains, social analysis also examines those elements that are not included in the previous two definitions of culture, specifically ‘the organisation of production, the structure of the family, the structure of the institutions, which express or govern social relationships’.\textsuperscript{122} As such, social analysis spans the previous two analyses to a certain extent. But instead of the comparative approach to different aspects of culture, social analysis focuses on modes of change in order to discover ‘certain general “laws”, or “trends”, by which social and cultural development as whole can be better understood.’\textsuperscript{123}

In his reflection on complex meanings and different approaches to the study of culture, Williams emphasises the value of each aspect and suggests that any adequate theory of culture must include the three areas of fact to which the definition points, and conversely that any particular definition, within any of the categories, which would exclude reference to the others, is inadequate.\textsuperscript{124}

Accordingly, Williams defines the theory of culture as ‘a study of relationships between elements in the whole way of life’, and thus, the analysis of culture is the ‘attempt to discover the nature of organisation which is the complex of these relationship.’\textsuperscript{125} The analysis thus

\textsuperscript{120} Williams, \textit{The Long Revolution}, p.57.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. p.58
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p.59.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 63.
‘sometimes reveal unexpected identities and correspondence in hitherto separately considered activities, sometimes again reveal discontinuities of an unexpected kind.’

However, Williams emphasises the limitations of our studies of culture of any past period, and claims that the recovering of ‘social character’, and ‘pattern of culture’ are abstract and insufficient to grasp the ‘felt sense of the quality of life and at a particular place and time: a sense of the ways in which the particular activities combined into way of thinking and living.’ This sense responds to lived experience, a valuable aspect of analysis that Williams conjoins to patterns and character.

Within one of his central concepts, the ‘structures of feeling,’ Williams addresses the problem of the dominant procedure, an immediate and regular conversion of experience into finished products, which he designates as the strongest barrier to the recognition of human cultural activity. In his terms ‘[w]hat is defensible as a procedure in conscious history, where on certain assumptions many actions can be definitely taken as having ended, is habitually projected, not only into the always moving substance of the past, but into contemporary life, in which relationships, institutions and formations actively involved are converted, by this procedural mode, into formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes.’

Here, Williams’ distinction between lived, documented and selective tradition highlights the prominence of the selective tradition in the analysis of the culture. He describes this aspect as ‘vital’, since, as he argues, ‘it is often true that some change in this tradition – establishing new lines with the past, breaking or redrawing existing lines – is a radical kind of contemporary change. We tend to underestimate the extent to which the cultural tradition is not only a selection but also an interpretation. We see most past work through our own experience, without even making the effort to see it in something like its original terms.’

Accordingly, he emphasises the importance of approaching the social process as communication and thus as ‘a whole world of active and interacting relationships, which is our

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128 A concept defined by Ruth Benedict that as Williams describes includes ‘a selection and configuration of interests and activities, and a particular valuation of them, producing a distinct organisation, a “way of life.”’
130 Ibid., p. 69.
common associative life,’ which integrates ‘politics, art, science, religion, family life and the other categories we speak as absolute.’\textsuperscript{131} Williams describes communication as a process of making unique experience into common experience, through creation of a network of relationships and communicational systems that form ‘our social organisation.’\textsuperscript{132} On these premises Williams argues that

\[\text{[s]ince our way of seeing things is literally our way of living, the process of communication is in fact the process of community: the sharing of common meanings, and thence common activities and purposes; the offering, reception and comparison of new meanings, leading to the tensions and achievements of growth and change.}\textsuperscript{133}\]

The valuable insights from the debate on culture developed within the innovative field of cultural studies, provide a broader understanding of the uses of the term culture and the advantages and limitations of cultural analysis. One of the great contributions of this fertile field is the focus on history from below, which Ashplant, Dawson and Roper describe in relation to the recently growing academic research on culture and war memory, which in their terms:

\[\text{had always willingness to step outside the academy so as to engage critical theory and analysis in a more self-conscious dialogue with “living memory”; that is, with cultural producers, political and civil rights activists, and those who have perpetrated military violence and been affected by it; for all of whom the remembering and forgetting of war is not an object of disinterested enquiry, but a burning issue at the very core of present-day conflicts over forms of state, social relations and subjectivity.}\textsuperscript{134}\]

The emphasis on culture, experience, and other associated theoretical concepts such as hegemony, as active and transformative processes, within which complex relations are negotiated, provides valuable tools for thinking about the cultural and political processes in the post-war societies.

4.8. Articulation and Ideology

The interrelated concepts of ‘articulation’ and ‘ideology’, used throughout my dissertation, are informed by Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation of ideology, in which he

\textsuperscript{131} Williams, \textit{The Long Revolution}, p.56.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., p.55.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} Ashplant and others, \textit{The Politics of Memory}, p. 6.
clarifies the etymology, definitions and usages of the concept in cultural analysis. The first concept, articulation, as Hall describes, has ‘a nice double meaning because “articulate” means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate. It carries that sense of language-ing, of expressing’, while the second meaning Hall exemplifies with a use of the term in the case of ‘”an articulated lorry” (truck): a lorry where the front (cab) and back (trailer) can, but need not necessarily, be connected to one another. The two parts are connected to each other, but through a specific linkage, they can be broken.’

Drawing on both meanings of the term, Hall defines an articulation as the ‘form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions, and explains further that the so-called “unity” of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary “belonging-ness”’, and thus ‘the “unity” which matters is a linkage between that articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected’. Accordingly, Hall’s theory of articulation, in his own terms examines

how an ideology discovers its subject rather than how the subject thinks the necessary and inevitable thoughts which belong to it; it enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to begin to make some sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socio-economic or class location or social position.

In his analysis of the development of Marxist thought and different usage of the term ideology, Hall suggests a definition of ideology that is more focused on the problem of ideology rather than the theory of ideology, as he emphasizes, and which divulges some of the historical developments that placed the term in the focus of ‘western marxism’. Within the latter Hall specifies the influence of massive growth of the ‘culture industries’ on the fashioning of mass consciousness, and, in his terms, the ‘troubling questions of the “consent” of the mass of the working class to the system in advanced capitalist societies in Europe and thus their partial

136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., p.142.
stabilization, against all expectations’ and argues that both processes, which are closely related to ideology, have contributed to the ‘rise to visibility of the problem of ideology’.\textsuperscript{138}

Hall frames the concept of ideology as ‘the ‘mental frameworks - the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation - which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works.’\textsuperscript{139} The theory of ideology, as Hall further describes, through this more politicised perspective, has to do with the ‘concepts and the languages of practical thought which stabilize a particular form of power and domination: or which reconcile and accommodate the mass of the people to their subordinate place in the social formation.’\textsuperscript{140} Furthermore, some of the questions that ideology in Hall’s understanding entails, are also the ‘processes by which new forms of consciousness, new concepts of world, arise, which move the masses of the people into historical action against the prevailing system.’\textsuperscript{141} Thus, he sees the understanding of these questions, which are in his terms ‘at stake in a range of social struggles’ as critical in grasping the ‘terrain of ideological struggle.’\textsuperscript{142} In this endeavour, as Hall highlights ‘that we need not only a theory but a theory adequate to the complexities of what we are trying to explain.’\textsuperscript{143} The term ideology today has ‘a wider, more descriptive and less systematic reference than it did in the classical Marxists texts. We now use it to refer to all organized forms of social thinking.’\textsuperscript{144} In his terms, ideology refers to the domain of practical thinking and reasoning (the form after all, in which most ideas are likely to grip the minds of the masses and draw them into action), rather than simply to well-elaborated and internally consistent “systems of thought.” We mean the practical as well as the theoretical knowledges which enable people to “figure out” society, and within those categories and discourses “live out” and “experience” our objective positioning in social relations.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p.27.  
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
4.9. The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration: The Theoretical and Analytical Model

Ashplant, Dawson and Roper suggest a theoretical and analytical model, which they developed on the premise of their analysis of the recent public and scholarly debates on memory of war and commemoration. Their model incorporates most of the concepts developed in cultural and memory studies and other related fields, of which some are discussed within this chapter.

Through their analysis Ashplant, Dawson and Roper consider the growing interest for different aspects of war memory and commemoration of war in public and scholarly debates, which have strongly resonated in various ways across the world. While differing in relation to the political and cultural contexts within which they occur, these developments are generally closely related to the major political shifts that occurred on the global level in the last two last decades of the twentieth century. Commonly designated as ‘the turn to memory,’ it was generally manifested, in Ashplant Dawson and Roper’s terms, through a ‘proliferation of public interest and concern throughout the world in the various cultural and political dimensions of the phenomena of war memory, and in the forms and practices of war commemoration.’

Within this general multifaceted process, the authors distinguish between three main shifts. The first occurred with the emergence of memory of the Shoah in the 1980s, and precisely with the central debates concerned with remembrance, commemoration and reparation that were mainly developed in the United States of America, Israel and Germany. Some of the main issues raised in the debates resonated strongly across the world, in most of the European countries where mass murders and torture of citizens of Jewish origin took place. But, as Ashplant and others argue, the impact was also strong in those countries across the world in which expelled Jews and survivors of fascist and Nazi terror found refuge, as in the countries to which perpetrators of war crimes sought to flee.

The second wave of the shift in memory of war and commemoration occurred with the collapse of the so-called ‘Communist East’, and precisely with the outbreak of two major conflicts that occurred in the aftermath of the turn of 1989-1990. Here, the authors refer to the Yugoslav wars and the conflict in Rwanda in 1994, both marked with horrendous violence and

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146 Ashplant and others, *The Politics of Memory*, p. 3.
147 Ibid.
crimes of genocide committed in 1994 in Rwanda and in 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These conflicts restructured and significantly changed the legal framework of transnational justice that resulted in the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1995, and of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in 1993.

In response to the new global developments and wars, a new academic interdisciplinary field of memory studies has emerged worldwide. By taking the phenomenon of war as a central subject of the investigation, the emerging field of memory studies instigated theoretical and historical debate that resulted in the development of vast national, international and in some cases transnational comparative studies of war memory.

The growing interest in war and memory within global academia in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, brought new challenges to the study of history, memory and culture. In a similar way to Huyssen, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper ponder the implications of the increasing global-local perspectives of memory of war and commemoration in public and scholarly debates, and memory practices, on culture and memory studies, and recognise a ‘danger in the push for internalisation at the level of theory and method’. The authors emphasize the importance of the consideration of particularities of different contexts within which war memory and commemoration are studied. Accordingly, in their study, they focus on the recent memory debate in order to develop a nuanced model for the analysis of the politics of war memory and commemoration. The model for the analysis of war memory and commemoration considers transformations of the political and geographical map of the world that occurred in the last three decades and re-defined power relations and political organisation on both intrastate and interstate levels, and has been strongly affected by the process of globalisation.

In their analysis, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper expand their argument with a critical analysis focused on the weaknesses and advantages of two main paradigms, which generally differ in approach as well as in the significance assigned to war memory and commemoration in a greatly globalised world. Accordingly, the authors argue that the first, state-centred paradigm, which is exemplified through the work of Hobsbawm and Anderson, emphasizes the political aspects of war memory and commemoration and encompasses various rituals and

other symbolic practices directed to the building of collective national identity. The second paradigm, designated as social-agency, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper exemplify through the work of Winter and Sivan, which focuses on the psychological function of war memory and commemoration, as ‘an expression of mourning, being a human response to the death and suffering that war engenders on a vast scale.’

Throughout their comprehensive analysis, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper highlight a valuable contribution of both paradigms to the study of war memory and commemoration, but they also pinpoint some of their main limitations. The latter mainly refer to the focus on state-centred politics in the case of the first paradigm, and to an understanding of grief outside of political frameworks in the case of the social-agency paradigm. The authors assess these limitations as some of the fundamental problems with both paradigms since they are, in their terms, ‘very weak on the ground of individual subjectivity, under-conceptualising both the richness and complexity of personal memory.’

In order to overcome this significant lack, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper include the third paradigm, which they designate as the popular-memory approach, in the study of war memory and commemoration. This approach draws upon the work of the ‘Popular Memory Group,’ which was mainly focused on the exploration of complex relation between ‘public presentation’ and ‘private memory.’ The interaction between these two aspects of memory, in Ashplant, Dawson and Roper’s terms, is ‘understood in Gramscian terms, as a hegemonic process of ideological domination and resistance’.

The concept of hegemony, as the authors argue, provide examination of the ‘complex interactions and political and cultural relations that constitute public memory as embodied both in sites and rituals of commemoration, and within national “mythologies” or public ‘legends’.

The popular-memory approach, which focused on personal perspectives, through the examination of the complex relationship between ‘public representations’ and ‘private memory’ use oral-history and life-story methods.

On the premises of their critical analysis of three dominant paradigms in the study of the politics of war memory and commemoration, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper developed a

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150 Ibid., p.11.
151 Ibid., p.13.
152 Ibid., p.16.
mediated model, which incorporates both analysis of the process of the articulation of war memory and analysis of the hegemonic framing of memory. Here, the concept of hegemony permits the analysis of the process on levels other than the nation state. This mainly refers to the social-agency approach and Ashplant, Dawson and Roper term this theoretical and analytical model ‘the politics of war memory and commemoration’, to designate the cultural and political process, which is, in their terms

precisely the struggle of different groups to give public articulation to, and hence gain recognition for, certain memories and the narratives within which they are structured. The history of war memory and commemoration involves tracing the outcomes of particular struggles, as represented both by those memories which are publicly articulated, and by those which have been privatised, fragmented or repressed.\footnote{Ashplant and others, \textit{The Politics of Memory}, p.16.}

The analytical distinction between narratives, arenas of articulation, and agencies, which the authors make, allows for the analysis of different social practices involved in the complex cultural and political process of articulation of war memory. Precisely, it traces the ways in which individuals and groups articulate their war experiences into the narratives, the arenas within which articulated narratives seek recognition and finally, the agencies through which they act.

The first aspect of the politics of war memory and commemoration examines the transformation of individual war memory to shared or common memories, which various social groups project into a public arena. This bottom-up process, which Ashplant, Dawson and Roper describe as the ‘movement from individual remembering to state commemoration’ and ‘transition from direct personal to cultural memory; but these modes of memory are related,’\footnote{Ibid., p.18.} These narratives, which usually draw on the language of wider discourses, which might include discourses of national identity, religious, political, and human rights, generally intersect with national discourses. Through this structured connection, different modes of narrative can contribute to the hegemonic national narrative or offer resources for challenging them. The latter, which Ashplant et al term ‘sectional narrative’, encompasses activities which various social groups commence to extend or transform ‘current regimes of war memory’. Through the process, these interventions in some cases may engage with already existing narratives, while in certain cases the intervention includes construction of new, emergent narratives.\footnote{Ashplant and others, \textit{The Politics of Memory}, 17.}
Generally, the articulation of shared narratives, sectional and official, into the public arena takes different forms of cultural production and political narrative.\(^{156}\)

Regarding the second aspect, the authors use the term ‘arenas of articulation’ to denote socio-political spaces within which different social groups seek both recognition of their war memories and ‘for whatever benefits they seek to derive from that recognition.’\(^{157}\) This includes specific war memories of various social groups that exist in a given society, which encompass a diverse range of groups, from the networks of families of kinship groups, through those of communities of geography or interest, to the public sphere of nation states and transnational power blocks.\(^{158}\) Additionally, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper describe that

[s]ome of these groups have a prior existence independent of war (national and ethnic minorities, political, civic or religious constituencies); others are brought into existence by war itself (veterans, the disabled, war widows, displaced or annexed populations). They vary in their access to political and cultural power, and hence in the resources they command to develop and broadcast their narratives. They may advance claims for the recognition of their memories in any or all of the social arenas. They may work through the agencies of the state, of civil society, or of more informal groupings.”\(^{159}\)

The changing relations between narratives of different social actors, whether sectional or official, are continuously negotiated. As stated earlier, the analysis of these social groups, their narratives and complex dynamics between them, in relation to hegemonic politics, is organised around the suggested concept of hegemony. In order to distinguish between an abstract, theoretical understanding of hegemony as more uniform and static than in practice, Williams suggests the term ‘lived hegemony.’ The latter is, in his terms always a process. Lived hegemony ‘does not just passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continuously to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own.’\(^{160}\) Accordingly, Ashplant et al clarify the complex interaction between hegemonic official and sectional narratives involved in the struggle over meaning, in the following manner

\[\text{only when memories have been woven together into a narrative which is both widely held and publicly expressed do they have the potential to secure political effects. Such}\]

\(^{156}\) Ibid., p.20.

\(^{157}\) Ibid., p.17.

\(^{158}\) Ibid.

\(^{159}\) Ibid.

publicly articulated sectional memory may be subordinate, if accorded only limited or partial recognition; marginalised, if simply neglected or not deemed worthy of recognition; or suppressed, if treated by the nation-state as incompatible with the parameters. (...) it may become oppositional, depending on the extent to which its demands for recognition can be accommodated within the hegemonic frame, and the degree of socio-political mobilisation it can achieve.

Within the third aspect, the agencies of articulation, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper use to designate the institutions ‘through which social actors seek to promote and secure recognition for their war memories’ which encompass a diverse range of agencies involved in the cultural and political process of the articulation of the memory of war. From the top down, this includes the official bodies of the nation-state, organisations of civil society, and more informal agencies such as family and kinship networks, which can spread to the transnational space. Ashplant and others further explain that the informal networks of family and kin and formal organisation of civil society through cooperation in a transnational space create a special kind of association, which Winter terms ‘fictive kinship’ to describe ‘particular groups of survivors, small-scale agents who form what he calls “families of remembrance.”’ Ashplant, Dawson and Roper highlight that in the process of articulation or war memory the ‘experiences of and memories of individuals – both survivors and their successors – need to be understood as analytically distinct from the narratives which (...) agencies endorse.

Within the complex cultural and political process of articulation of war memory, the authors consider the aspect of subjectivity, which is divulged in the subjective responses to war. In their approach, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper highlight the importance of careful consideration of this aspect, which is, as they argue, out of the focus of state-centred and social-agency approaches, which thus failed to provide closer insight into the ways in which subjectivity is constructed through various cultural forms that constitute war memory and remembrance. One of the examples which Ashplant and others use to illustrate the limitation of the social-agency approach that generally focuses on the connection of form and subjectivity, is Winter’s work on memory of WWI.

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162 Ibid., p.29.
163 Ibid., p.32.
164 Ibid., p.33.
The work through which Winter, in their terms, attempts to establish the robust nature of traditional commemorative languages after the First World War, precisely because these were the forms with which individuals identified most easily in coming to terms with personal loss, draw on two problematic assumptions, the universality of human responses to grief, and the ‘view of survivors as physically undifferentiated’. The main limitation of this analysis, in Ashplant, Dawson and Roper’s terms is the generalization of the ‘ways in which individual subjectivity is implicated in particular public narratives of remembrance’, which leaves the question of ‘how subjective understandings and responses to the First World War were themselves constituted though these forms’ unanswered. Through this example Ashplant, Dawson and Roper reveal one of the main methodological problems with the social-agency approach in relation to individual subjectivity, which arises from the assumption that symbols of remembrance are reflecting, rather than constructing subjective meaning, and which in consequence, as they clarify ‘neglects the fact that individual subjects come to identify their experiences through the pre-existing narratives fashioned by agencies of the nation-state and civil society.’

Ashplant, Dawson and Roper ponder subjective responses to war, in order to broaden the understanding of this important aspect, which, as they argue ‘alerts us to a further important dimension in politics of war memory: that is, the psychically charged nature of the struggle between survivors and their successors, as the direct memory of war passes into cultural memory’.

Accordingly, they explore the complex relationship between individuals and public forms of remembrance, and focus on individual responses to the war, which are mediated through the pre-existing narratives or ‘templates of memory.’ As Ashplant, Dawson and Roper describe, the latter comprise cultural narratives, myths and tropes and function as frames ‘through which later conflicts are understood.’ The authors clarify that individual responses to the war, which as they suggest, are shaped in relation to personal experience and to pre-existing narratives, already at the first stage process of transformation of personal memories into cultural memory ‘may invoke elements drawn from experiences and representations which

165 Ashplant and others, The Politics of Memory, p.33.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
originate before the lifetime of current living populations. Even the “eyewitness” memory of war, then is constructed both from personal experience and in relation to pre-existing cultural templates.169

These cultural templates, which Ashplant, Dawson and Roper also term ‘pre-memories,’ circulate in cultural spaces, as the authors suggest, and as such, they can be consciously manipulated by the political elite, and as part of the constitution of personal memory. Thus, cultural templates, as they describe, ‘provide horizon of representation through which later conflicts are understood.’170 In the cultural and political process of politics of war memory and commemoration, the old templates can be adopted, recycled, rejected or criticised, through approaches of different agencies involved in the remembrance of war. Ashplant, Dawson and Roper also highlight the importance of new aesthetic forms of commemoration, which they term the ‘micro-politics of aesthetics forms’, which contribute to wider debate through different forms of cultural production, which can provide alternative understanding of war and its effects, alter the existing space or create new spaces for representation of underrepresented experiences that might appear as ‘lost’ in traditional language.

4.10. Data Collection Process

My analysis draws on a large number of primary and secondary sources. This encompasses the sources published in the unsystematised, highly disputed and scattered body of work of Yugoslav studies; British cultural studies; recently growing culture and memory studies; the vast record collected during and after the Yugoslav wars; literature; journals; documentary film; and media. The variety of sources used in the historical and political analysis, and in the case studies, reflect the disparity between Western scholarship and the gradually growing field of Yugoslav studies. At the same time, it illustrates both the production of knowledge about the Yugoslav wars and the 1992-1996 war in BiH, and methodological challenges for researchers to navigate through the growing, unsystematised record.

Documentation within the local agencies compromises various levels of governmental; nongovernmental (although is not always simple to distinguish between the two); media archives within media houses and centres for investigative journalism; and other more informal

170 Ibid., p.34.
agencies and independent researchers. In his study about different perspectives on the
documentation of war crimes and human rights violation in the Former Yugoslavia Djorde
Djordjevic describes that

[...governmental agencies that hold documentation may include commissions on war
crimes, commissions for missing persons, domestic courts, the Ministry of Justice, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, and liaison offices for cooperation with the ICTY. Though
significant and essential, the work of local NGOs is usually limited in its scope to
designated regions and localities, specific events and incidents, or specific types of
human rights violations. As for international organizations, they are dispersed between
international courts (ICTY and ICJ), international and transnational organizations
through their expert teams of monitors and investigators (UN, OSCE, ICMP), NGO
reports (ICRC, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc.), and war
documentation archives (Balkan Archive, OSI Archive, etc.). Significant materials and
evidence in video and audio recordings are also held by many media agencies around
the world and compiled locally (Radio B92) and internationally (IMI, IWPR). 171

While the number of regional media agencies significantly increased since 2002 when
this survey was published, the closure of the ICTY brought new questions related to the vast
record collected during the Tribunals 24-year long work. The scholar’s approach is crucial in
both the systematisation and critical analysis of a vast record.

Moreover, the academic debate contributes to historicising the context and
marginalised political and cultural practices such as anti-ethnonationalist and democratic civic
platforms that were initiated the late 1980s. However, like in case of the work with the atomized
nature of collected evidence, the researchers who work with concepts in Yugoslav studies face
numerous methodological challenges. Bojan Bilić suggests that some of the main challenges
for researchers are ‘finding his/her way through a dense forest of scattered, misnamed, empty
or overstretched conceptual labels which are sometimes eagerly sticking to social phenomena
and political orientations to which they do not normally belong.’ 172

Additionally, the analyses in this and the previous chapters of my dissertation illuminate
the importance of the historical analysis of the concepts used in the post-war Bosnian-
Herzegovinian context, and in the wider post-Yugoslav and post-communist contexts.

171 Djordje Djordjevic, Summary Report regarding Local, Regional an International Documentation of War
Crimes and Human Rights Violation in the Former Yugoslavia, International Centre for Transitional Justice,
documentation-war-crimes-and> [Accessed on 21 November, 2016].
172 Bojan Bilić, ‘(Post-)Yugoslav Anti-war Engagement: A Research Topic Awaiting Attention’, Filozofija i
In order to find a way to analyse the process of the narration of experiences of war in BiH, and to understand the contexts within which this cultural and political process occurs, I have developed a sensitive theoretical and methodological framework. To do so, I created a dialogic analysis, in order to bridge the silence and the empty space left after the vast material and symbolic destruction of libraries, research institutions and universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the wider post-Yugoslav space in the last three decades.

4.1. (Print) Media

The dramatic political turns and growing political disputes that led to the fragmentation of the Yugoslav federation, its society, economy and shared culture resulted in the fragmentation of coordinated media space. The emerging ethno-nationalist elites in the Yugoslav republics soon took control over the media. Both the restructured and newly formed media have played an important role in the fragmentation of media space through the militant political discourses of ethnonationalist elites.

The media war-mongering campaign played an important role in generating and worsening the political crisis, and in the formation and promotion of hate speech shortly before the wars. These methods were particularly amplified during the wartime to the extent that contested perspectives of the political dispute and subsequent wars were often designated ‘media war’. Moreover, some analysts agree that the media war actually preceded the wars of Yugoslav succession.

The dominant political and associated media strategies, which led to the destruction of common spaces, were continuously contested by independent media established in the early 1990s, such as YUTEL TV and the independent, satirical, Feral Tribune. This also includes informal associations of journalists as well as individual journalists who were criticising political elites and their strategies through analyses and reports about economic and political scandals in which (ethno)politicians across Yugoslavia were involved during the economic and political crisis. Their criticism continued during the wartime, while their critical engagement and practices changed in accordance with the new developments. Thus, most of the critical
journalists were ardently engaged in reporting about war and the events of war, the main actors, human rights violations, and about war atrocities committed in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comprised of Serbia and Montenegro. In this way, they provided valuable, critical, informed insights into the chaos of war, and maintained connections between intellectuals, journalists, artists and activists across the violently divided post-Yugoslav space.

The so-called media landscape in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects the transformation of the media space that occurred as a result of the war and as a result of the changes triggered by recent developing trends in media. Also, the complex political organisation of the country and current political and administrative devolution are reflected in aspects of the media sector.

Since the end of the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina the development of the media sector has been guided and financed by international development and cooperation agencies and other donors. In the first stage of this process the Independent Communication Regulatory Agency (CRA)\textsuperscript{173} and the Press Council\textsuperscript{174} were formed on the national level, and the Press Code\textsuperscript{175} was adopted. Despite these developments, some of the main problems in journalism practice in the country, according to Jusic, are high levels of partisanship, political parallelism in the media, and low levels of adherence to the code of ethics.\textsuperscript{176}

Today, there are ten registered, privately owned daily newspapers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the data presented at the official website of the Press Council indicates. The country’s magazine sector encompasses 112 titles in total that vary from independent political magazines, through religious, business, professional to consumer magazines.

Due to the underdeveloped print media market in the country, limited information about the circulation of daily newspaper and about readership are available in surveys that are occasionally conducted by independent market research agencies on a small, ‘representative’

\textsuperscript{173} CRA is an independent agency established by the Law on Communication of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which regulates radio and TV broadcasting, and telecommunications networks in the country.

\textsuperscript{174} The Council is an independent, non-governmental, non-political, self-regulatory body for print ad online media in BiH, which is working on the state level, meaning in Both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is formed by all associations of journalists in BiH.

\textsuperscript{175} The Press Code is a self-regulatory instrument, which contains ethical and professional principles.

sample of readership. This includes the incomplete information which is obtainable in a summary of results of a survey conducted by the market research institute The Society for Consumer Research (GfK), and published at the local web portal in 2006. According to available results, some of the most widely read newspapers are Dnevni Avaz, Dnevni List, Oslobodenje, Nezavisne Novine and Glas Srpske. Moreover, the study exposes the ‘reading patterns’, of daily newspapers. The latter refers to the correlation between the ethno-territorialisation of the country and the assumed ethnic belonging of readers, on one side, and general readership on the other. Thus, according to the results presented in the GfK study, Dnevni Avaz (36%), which is published in Sarajevo, in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is primarily read in the part of the country with a dominant Bosniak population, the daily newspaper Blic (10%) published in Banja Luka, in the Republic of Srpska, is primarily read in this entity with a dominant Serb population, whilst Jutarnji List (4%) published in Mostar is primarily read in those parts of the country with the dominant Croat population. Caution in the interpretation of the partially presented study data is needed, considering the limited access to the report, and the imprecise terminology used in the article. Despite these limitations, information about circulation and readership are helpful for getting a general idea about the media landscape in the country. Importantly, the editorial policy and content of the print media in BiH is not subject to any form of regulation but is guided by the principles of the Press Code.

Some of the primary sources in my analysis of the politics of memory and commemoration for the analysis of the representation of the commemoration events are articles published in 2010 and in 2012 in some of the most widely read daily newspapers, namely Dnevni Avaz, (Daily Voice) Dnevni List (Daily Paper), Glas Srpske (Voice of Srpska), and Oslobodenje (Liberation).

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177 GfK BH refers to a branch of a market research institute (Gesellschaft fuer Konsumerforschung/Society for consumer research. The results of survey of 2006 are published on a local web-portal Sarajevo-x-com (then). http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/istrazivanje-gfk-bh-citanost-dnevnih-novina-u-bih/060223011


179 Jusic, ‘Media Landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.

180 Ibid.
4.11. Conclusion

While most of the hitherto presented analyses are synchronically concerned with socio-political conditions, Todorova, Kaldor, and particularly Buden’s analyses depict the transformation of these circumstances, through conceptual clarification of the construction and use of notions such as the Balkans, civil society, transition, and post-communist condition. Their respective historical analyses of these concepts, which are uncritically deployed in dominant simplistic and determinist interpretative post-Cold War frameworks, are broadening understandings of the changes that occurred after the turn of 1989 and their ramifications for post-communist societies. These valuable insights are complemented by the work of philosophers of history, historians and cultural theorists who have been involved in recent debates about memory and history.

The contested and overlapping memories of WWII, and memories of the Yugoslav wars reflect the opaqueness of the recent ideological and political framing of the past within the violently fragmented post-Yugoslav space. At the same time, they request a cautious, informed and sensitised analytical approach.

Some of the accounts form the recent memory-history debate, presented in the following sections, illuminate the main theoretical challenges and (mis)uses of the concepts of history and historical experience. The latter are at the core of the politics of memory and commemoration that are the focus of my analysis in the subsequent chapters in the context of post-war BiH. Through the critical examination of the concepts in question, these alternative approaches enable the grasping of the blurred relations of the past, present and future, and as such they provide me with the conceptual framework needed for the analysis of the politics of war memory and commemoration in BiH.

The dominant post-Cold War interpretative frameworks as well as alternative approaches to the ideological restructuring of the world after 1989, outline the manner of the changes and some of the main issues debated in the scholarly and non-scholarly debates on global, European and post-Yugoslav contexts. At the same time the interpretations discussed here clarify the interconnection between these contexts, as well as some of the contradictions that emerged as a result of hegemonic interpretations, and their implications for political and cultural affairs in post-war BiH.
Although some of the approaches tackle the question of the experience of the ‘silent majority’, which is central for the notion of the politics of war memory and commemoration, its locus and meaning in the histories after the Cold War remains uncertain, bearing in mind radically narrowing horizons of future, nullification of the historical experience, ‘cultural autism,’ and the void left after the collapse of Communism. In these remote and empty spaces filled with oblivion, Huyssen’s argues that ‘we need both past and future to articulate our political, social, and cultural dissatisfaction with the present state of the world’. His work is a reminder that despite the complex political and cultural implications of the hypertrophy of memory, which in some cases can lead to a ‘problematic privileging of the traumatic dimension of life with no exit in sight,’ memory discourses play an important role. In Huyssen’s terms a critical engagement with the discourses of memory are ‘absolutely essential to imagine the future and to regain a strong temporal and spatial grounding of life and imagination in a media and consumer society that increasingly voids temporality and collapses spaces.’

181 Iveković in Meredith Tax, ‘Five Women Who Won’t Be Silenced.’
182 Huyssen, Present Past, p.6.
CHAPTER 5
Narrating the Srebrenica Genocide

5.1. Introduction

Srebrenica is a small town located about fifteen kilometres from the border with Republic of Serbia in the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Podrinje region.¹ As the town’s name suggests, this area has been known for its rich silver mines since ancient times. Mining remained one of the main economic activities in the town’s modern history. This mainly refers to the socialist era in Yugoslavia, and particularly to the period between the 1960s and 1970s that was marked by the rapid industrialisation of the Yugoslav federal republics. As the mining sector was particularly progressing in this general process, the Srebrenica municipality soon became one of the leading industrial centre in the Podrinje region as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The industrial development that reached its peak in the 1980s was followed by the shift from primary industries to manufacturing industries in Srebrenica which, as Dujizings explains, enabled ‘the town to profit from its own natural resources through the export of finalised products.’² Specifically, two leading national companies³ had established two industrial zones in Srebrenica municipality, in Potočari and in Zeleni Jadar.⁴ Most of the

¹ The Drina Valley designates the area around the river Drina, which is a natural border between the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the western part of Serbia. Also, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the area of the Podrinje region can be geographically divided on the Upper Podrinje, which includes Višegrad, Foča and Goražde, and Central Podrinje, which includes Srebrenica, Zvornik and Bratunac. As such, this area had great strategic importance for the Army of Bosnian Serbs, and particularly the control of the Central Podrinje area, which ‘was necessary in order to achieve their minimum goal of forming a political entity in Bosnia.’ In ‘Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić (2004) Case No. IT-98-33-T, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf> [accessed 11 March 2016], p. 5.
³ Specifically, the leading Bosnian-Herzegovinian companies such as ‘Energoinvest’, a company with global expertise in mining and related activities, and ‘Šipad’, a company specialised in furniture production both based in Sarajevo.
⁴ The Energoinvest, which also managed the mines, set up the industrial zone in Potočari that included factories that processed minerals such as lead, zinc, silver into final products. This includes the following factories: ‘11 March’; ‘Potočari’; the Battery factory; and ‘Feros.’ The other industrial zone, developed in Zeleni Jadar, south of Srebrenica town, was focused on furniture production and stonecutting. It included a furniture factory ‘Fabrika stolica,’ and ‘Srebrenicakamen’ (a stonecutting workshop). Also, in the town of Srebrenica the national
residents of the municipality of Srebrenica, and from the surrounding municipalities were employed in these industrial zones as well as in newly opened factories in the town, which significantly improved social and economic conditions and the living standard of the municipality’s inhabitants.

Alongside the mining and forestry industry, an additional source of income in the 1980s was tourism which was developed through the organised health practice in ‘Banja Guber’ spa. Generally, as Dujizings emphasizes, with growing industry and health tourism, Srebrenica had almost no private enterprises, and it became ‘one of the few places in eastern Bosnia where the local economy was not characterised by dependency.’

The mounting Yugoslav economic crisis that marked the second half of the 1980s hindered further development of the municipality’s economy. As Dujizings describes:

>a\textit{t} its height, inflation reduced wages almost overnight and completely wiped out people’s savings. Jobs were unavailable to the young and educated, and workers who once assumed that they had a job for life suddenly faced the terrifying prospects of unemployment.\textsuperscript{7}

Towards the end of the 1980s, the economic crisis was overshadowed by the growing political crisis at all levels of government in socialist Yugoslavia. The combined economic and political crisis strongly affected all strata and aspects of Yugoslav society - from employment, social and health care to culture and it caused economic and social insecurity among its citizens. Moreover, the insecurity that most of the citizens experienced at that time was worsened by the rise of militarist, ethno-nationalist discourses, which created a hostile political environment. It is worth mentioning that some of the prominent Yugoslav scholars, many of whom were university professors, politicians, journalists and other public figures, advocated against emergent ethno-nationalist discourses, which signalled the ideological shift in the country.

\textsuperscript{5} company UPI Sarajevo opened a cannery ‘9 Maj’, whilst the company from Zvornik ‘Vezionica’ opened a textile factory. In Dujizings, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia.’

\textsuperscript{5} This includes treatment of various health issues with a highly praised therapeutic and mineral water springs ‘Guber’ that includes 48 natural springs out of which ‘Crni Guber’ is the most popular and which was exploited and exported during the Austro-Hungarian rule. During the socialist era, health tourism made Srebrenica one of the most prosperous spa resorts in socialist Yugoslavia.

\textsuperscript{6} Dujizings, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia, ‘NIOD, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p.58.
On the ground, the combined crisis and ethno-national propaganda characterised by deceptive and aggressive tactics resulted in the interpretation of a series of economic scandals across the state within the frames of the developing exclusivist ethno-nationalist discourses. This led to further deterioration of the relationships among Yugoslav citizens, and increased fear, mistrust and incidents that were growing across the country.

The ethno-nationalist policies built upon the discourse of victimisation were first put into practice in 1989 through Slobodan Milošević’s policy in Kosovo, which resulted in the abolition of the autonomy of this Yugoslav province. Thus, the policy that combined different strategies showed the power and efficiency of an emerging ethno-nationalist model that combined: increasing (scientific) revision of the (shared) modern history of the country; exclusivist political strategies; media propaganda, and particularly misrepresentation of events in Yugoslavia at that time by the majority of the mainstream media, which were controlled by new, emerging (ethno) political elites; and the active involvement of religious institutions, in the case of Kosovo, namely the Orthodox Church of Serbia and Kosovo. The so-called ‘Kosovo model,’ rooted the policy, which was soon applied in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that projected the further developments of the political crisis in socialist Yugoslavia.

The signals of the ideological shift, which first came from the Yugoslav federal republic of Serbia were soon adopted by a majority of political representatives on both federal and republic levels of government. Consequently, the governments of six Yugoslav republics chose to protect the interests of ‘their nations’ over the protection of interest of the Yugoslav federation and the search for an urgent and effective solution for the combined crisis in the federation. The repercussions of the events of 1989 in Yugoslavia only deepened social and political divisions and mistrust across the common country.

On the other hand, in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina the majority of politicians choose a moderated approach to the political crisis on the level of the republic, whilst a significant number of the local politicians at the level of municipalities responded

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8 Dujizings, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia,’ NIOD.
9 In his extensive historical and anthropological study from 2002, Dujizings describes how the anti-Muslim campaign in the Eastern Bosnia coincided with the anti-Albanian campaign in Kosovo in 1989 in the following manner ‘Eastern Bosnia was now presented as a second Kosovo, “a special copy of Kosovo”, Dujizings, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia,’ NIOD, p. 66.
differently to the events in nearby Serbia. The political situation was particularly tense in those areas of the country along the border with Serbia such as the wider Podrinje region, which includes Srebrenica municipality, where some earlier disputes that arose from the growing economic crisis and difficulties overnight ‘acquired the ethnic dimension’ following the new ideological shift. Thus, the crisis caused a division between local politicians who adopted the moderate League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s approach whose main priorities were to keep the political crisis under control, and to minimize the effects of the new policy of Milošević’s government on one side, and those local opportunists that appropriated the antagonistic ethnonational discourses, on the other. The latter, larger camp were already preparing the ground for the upcoming multi-party elections in 1990 through establishing contact with inhabitants of the surrounding villages in the municipality of Srebrenica, where they promoted their biased attitudes.

These and other similar activities preceded the vicious election campaign, which was followed by incidents across Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was also the case in the Srebrenica where the ethno-nationalist coalition won over the Communist Party on the level of the municipality, while in the town Srebrenica the coalition of the pro-Bosnian-Herzegovinian parties without ethno-national insignia won over the ethno-nationalist coalition. However, after the victorious ethno-national coalition failed due to the disputes that were also related to power-sharing, the power in Srebrenica municipality was shared between ‘hardliners’ of two new leading parties SDA and SDS, while the local politicians from non-ethnic parties such as SDP lost their influence.

In the post-election period, the events in the municipality as in the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were still under the strong influence of the dramatic events in surrounding Serbia and in Croatia. The political crisis finally culminated in the violent dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia through the Wars of Yugoslav Succession in 1991. In spite of the toxic, militarist, ethno-nationalist discourses and the numerous isolated incidents that were registered across Yugoslavia and which heralded the coming violence, the war itself, and particularly the scale of destruction and brutality demonstrated during this time, surprised and

11 SDP together with Socialist Reformist party (SRSJ) and Democratic Socialist Alliance (DSS) gained the major support in the town of Srebrenica at the election.
12 Dujizings, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia, ‘NIOD, p.82.
shocked most Yugoslav citizens who had built common political and cultural spaces in socialist Yugoslavia for almost fifty years.

5.2. The 1992-1996 War and the Fall of Srebrenica Enclave

During the destructive 1992-1996 war, the idyllic picture of Srebrenica as a ‘boom town’ in a mountainous area was completely destroyed by the horrendous war crimes that occurred there. As in the other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the first half of 1992, the Serb forces\(^{13}\) captured most of the towns in Podrinje, including Srebrenica and Bratunac. Aiming to ethnically ‘cleanse’ the area seized from the local non-Serb residents, the majority of whom were Muslims, the Serb forces systematically detained, tortured and killed a large number of Muslim population.\(^{14}\) During the three-year long ethnic cleansing campaign in the Podrinje region, once shared social spaces such as factories, schools, and culture houses (domovi kulture) were transformed into places of torture, rape and mass executions.\(^{15}\)

Despite the fact that the case of Srebrenica is today one of the most explored and well documented war crime, the interpretation of events that occurred in the Podrinje region, including casualties, are the subject of strong political contestation and debate. Generally, as Dujizings observes, in the period from the beginning of the war in 1992 to the fall of Srebrenica enclave in 1995

[i]t should be noted, however, that while the Serbs suffered high casualties during the war, the number of Muslim casualties in Srebrenica and Bratunac, even before the July massacre, was considerably higher.\(^{16}\)

Although the Serb forces controlled most of the territory in the Podrinje region, which they seized during the offensive they launched in the first months of the war, some villages, such as Potočari were still under the control of the resistance Armed Forces of Srebrenica that

\(^{13}\) Here, I differentiate between The Serb forces, and the Bosnian Serb forces. While the Bosnian Serb forces include the so-called Army of the Bosnian Serb Republic (BSA), police, and other forces, the designation Serb forces refers to a larger army corps comprised of the Bosnian Serb forces and paramilitary units from Serbia (some of the units that committed war crimes in the Podrinje region were White Tigers led by Željko Ražnatović Arkan; White Eagles; Scorpions and others).


\(^{15}\) The same transformation of once shared industrial and cultural spaces into the places of torture and mass murders occurred in the other places in eastern Bosnia such as in Višegrad, Foča, Rogatica in 1992 as well as in Prijedor, town located in northern part of the country and Konjic and Mostar in the South.

\(^{16}\) Dujizings, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia,’ NIOD, p. 135.
organised ambushes and (counter) attacks on surrounding villages with dominant Serb populations. After the Armed Forces of Srebrenica forces recaptured the town of Srebrenica in May 1992, many refugees from Srebrenica but also from the other surrounding area of the Podrinje region, who were hiding in the nearby forests after they were expelled from their houses, moved to the enclave. Thus, the number of refugees in the enclave dramatically raised from 9000 to 42000 were facing a humanitarian disaster for a long period. After a few attempts at distributing United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter UNHCR) humanitarian aid to desperate refugees failed, due to the blockage policy of the so-called Army of the Bosnian Serb Republic (VRS hereinafter), the first humanitarian assistance convoys arrived in the enclave in November and in December 1992.

In 1993, the United Nations Security Council strongly condemned the ‘ethnic cleansing’ in eastern Bosnia undertaken by the Bosnian Serb forces, which together with the paramilitary units from then Federal Republic Yugoslavia composed of Serbia and Montenegro, destroyed entire villages and towns, and tortured and murdered local residents. Aiming to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas, but also to protect the refugees, as well as the UN peacekeepers based in the war zones that were also exposed to the military actions of the Serb forces, the Security Council issued resolution 819 in April 1993. According to this resolution the area of Srebrenica was declared as a ‘safe zone’ (also referred to as a ‘Safe Haven’) under protection of the United Nations Protection Forces (hereinafter UNPROFOR). The UN sent its troops into the enclave to protect the

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17 Dujizings, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia,’ NIOD, p.117.
18 The Armed Forces of Srebrenica were formed in May 1992 as the Srebrenica Municipal Territorial Defence Staff (TO) and led by Naser Orić. After his forces recaptured the town Srebrenica in May 1992 and other surrounding area, Orić’s command was extended to the municipalities of Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica and Zvornik and was appointed the commander of the Joint Armed Forces of the sub-region Srebrenica in November 1992. In Prosecutor v. Naser Orić (2006) The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
19 Dujizings, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia,’ NIOD, p.121.
21 Dujizings, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia,’ NIOD, p. 129.
22 Only two days after the UN Security Council passed the resolution on Srebrenica on 18 April 1995 the first UNPROFOR troops, which were generally ‘lightly armed and at any one time numbered no more than 600 men’ arrived to the enclave as stated in the judgment to Krstić from 2001. Since then, ‘the fresh troops were rotating approximately every six months.’ In Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić (Trial Judgement), (2001), The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
town’s residents, and the process of the demilitarisation of the Armed forces of Srebrenica located in the safe zone had begun.\(^{23}\) Already in the period of establishing the world’s first UN safe zone, Diego Arria, then the President of the UN Security Council, after this visit to the enclave in April 1993 described the strategies of the Bosnian Serb Army which besieged the town as a ‘slow-motion process of genocide.’\(^{24}\)

Despite the UN decision, the heavily armed VRS held the Srebrenica enclave under siege from 1993 until its fall in 1995, during which time Srebrenica’s trapped residents\(^ {25}\) faced shortages of drinking water, food, medical supplies and fuel. The continuous humanitarian crisis also strongly affected the Dutch battalion of the United Nations Protection Forces (Dutchbat hereinafter) especially during the summer of 1995\(^ {26}\) when the attacks of the Serb forces on the enclave were intensified. The deterioration of the situation and request for support to the poorly equipped Dutchbat\(^ {27}\) which could not protect the refugees from the Bosnian Serb soldiers, nor prevent the humanitarian disaster, were both reported in the letter, which the Dutchbat Commander Karremans sent to the UNPROFOR headquarter in Sarajevo and to the Ministry of Defence in The Hague, the Netherlands on 4 of June 1995.\(^ {28}\)

\(^{23}\) After the UN adopted a draft resolution on a safe zone, which reads that ‘all parties and others treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any hostile act’ and demanded that ‘the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ The UN Security Council declared Srebrenica a safe zone and negotiated the Agreement on demilitarisation that was signed by Sefer Halilović, General of the ARBiH and Ratko Mladić, general of VRS on 18 April 1993, that was followed by the further demilitarization agreement in May 1993. The soldiers of the Bosnian Army based in town handed over the weapon to the UNPROFOR. In The United Nations, *The Fall of Srebrenica*, p. 18-19.


\(^{25}\) This included inhabitants of the town and of villages of the Srebrenica municipality, and refugees from the other surrounding municipalities who sought protection in ‘the Safe Haven’ Srebrenica after they were expelled from the surrounding municipalities (such as Vlasenica and Bratunac), that were seized by the Serb forces. As stated on the official website of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery, there were a few international humanitarian organisations during 1994 in Srebrenica that were providing assistance to the residents, namely, Medicins Sans Frontieres from Belgium, The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Swedish Agency for Development (SIDA).

\(^{26}\) The Dutchbat III was rotated to the enclave in January 1995. Given that the Srebrenica safe zone was overpopulated, SIDA’s team was focused on solving the housing crisis in the safe zone and built a camp for refugees known as ‘Swedish Shelter Project’. Memorijalni Centar Srebrenica-Potočari [Memorial Centre Srebrenica-Potočari] <http://www.potocarimc.org/index.php/11-07-1995/> [Accessed on 22 February, 2017].

\(^{27}\) One third of the 400 Dutch soldiers left the enclave earlier.

On 6 July 1995, the intensive attacks culminated with a large offensive with the code name ‘Operation Krivaja’ launched by the Serb forces composed of the Bosnian Serb forces and paramilitary units from Serbia (such as the unit ‘Scorpions’) with the aim of seizing the UN safe zone Srebrenica. Over the following five days, continuous heavy shelling and infantry attacks supported by tanks, left dozens of killed and wounded civilians, including one Dutchbat soldier. Also, 55 Dutchbat soldiers that guarded observations posts in the enclave were captured by the Serb forces and kept as hostages.29 Between 8 and 11 July the Dutchbat’s commander, Colonel Thomas Karremans urged for air support and sent several requests to the UN officials. His requests were considered and were first rejected in order to protect the hostages, that is, the UN soldiers that were captured by the Serb forces, and to reduce civilian casualties,30 but after the Serb forces captured Srebrenica, the air support was approved. However, after only one air attack on the Serb forces, the UN air strikes were suspended.31

Four days after they launched attacks on the town, on 10 July 1995, the commander of the Serb forces general Ratko Mladić repeated his demands from 1993, which alarmed the international community and instigated the UN declaration on creating the safe zone at first. Mladić again ordered refugees to leave the town within 48 hours, and also demanded the complete demilitarisation of the area, since some of the poorly armed soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter ARBiH) were still in the town. In the dramatic events that occurred in the following hours before the fall of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995, around 15,000 refugees, mainly men, and a small number of women, children and elderly people,32 fled into the hills, aiming to reach the territory under the control of the ARBiH,33 while the majority of the refugees, among whom were some unarmed men from

30 The rejection occurred due to dispute between the UNPROFOR headquarter, which actually considered ‘Close Air Support’, and Karremans, who assessed this form of military support to be inadequate considering the circumstances in the safe zone.
31 The French UN commander General Bernard Janvier suspended the air strikes.
32 ‘Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić’ (Trial Judgement), ICTY.
33 According to available data approximately 15,000 men and boys, both soldiers and civilians, gathered on 11 July 1995 and formed a 15 kilometres long column intending to break through to the territory under control of the ARBiH. Along this, over 100 kilometres long route, the men and boys were exposed to continuous attacks of the Serb forces (artillery and anti-craft fire), which also set up ambushes, but they were also using megaphones, and in some cases, they were using the equipment stolen from the UNPROFOR hostages, which
the ARBiH, sought protection in the Dutch compound in the nearby Potočari. According to a witness in the trial to the war criminal Radislav Krstić, among the small number of refugees that were permitted to enter the Dutchbat compound were women, children and elderly people, and a very limited number of unarmed men. The majority of the refugees were not allowed to enter the compound and they ‘were spread throughout neighbouring factories and fields.’

The fall of the safe area of Srebrenica on 11 July was followed by ethnic cleansing. During the night of 11 July and on 12 July 1995 both refugees and the Dutchbat soldiers witnessed the killing of men and boys, and the rape of women by the Serb soldiers. The murders and rapes occurred nearby the compound, close to a deserted building known as ‘the white house’ that functioned as a place for ‘interrogation’.

The following day, on 12 July, the Serb forces had already started with the process of the separation and evacuation of refugees gathered in and around the Dutch compound in Potočari. These actions were followed by murders of men and boys. Thousands of desperate men who tried to flee through hardly passable forests and mountains towards the city of Tuzla, were captured and executed on this long route and in the nearby villages and hamlets. The fate of the refugees, including of men and boys who stayed in the ‘safe zone’ and sought protection from the Dutchbat, was the same. They were separated from women, children and the elderly during the process of evacuation, which took place on 12 and 13 July 1995. Some of them were executed before the eyes of the soldiers of the Dutchbat compound in Potočari, who oversaw and aided the evacuation. The rest of the imprisoned men and boys they captured earlier, to deceive desperate men and urging men and boys to surrender. A significant number of men died in the minefields. As reported in the UN report from 1999 the 7-day long journey ended in the evening of 16th and 17th July when some 4,500 to 6,000 men and boys crossed into the ARBiH the territory in the southern Sapna area. They were disarmed by the Bosnian Government and transported to the collective shelters in Tuzla where the survivors were searching for their families. The United Nations, The Fall of Srebrenica, p. 77., 84.; ‘Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić,’ (Trial Judgement), ICTY; Sense Tribunal, Srebrenica Genocide in Eight Acts, Sense News Agency <http://srebrenica.sense-agency.com/en/> [Accessed on 17 February, 2016]; Moreover, according to the UN Secretary General Report from 1999 on the fall of Srebrenica, it is estimated that only between 2000 and 3000 men survived the flight through the forests, which is today commemorated as ‘The Peace March—to freedom via route of death.’

34 Also, according to Hasan Nuhanović, who was working as an official interpreter for the Dutchbat at that time, despite the fact there was enough space in the Dutch compound, only 5000 of the refugees were allowed to enter the compound, while 20 000 refugees stayed outside. Also in the The United Nations, The Fall of Srebrenica, and in FAMA Collection, ‘Methodology’ (video) <http://srebrenica.famamethodology.net/eng/> [Accessed on 25 January, 2017].


36 Women, children and elderly that were transported near Kladanj, the town under control of the Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and were forced to walk for 6 kilometres to the ARBiH held territory
were gathered together with those who had surrender, or were captured on their flight through the forests\textsuperscript{37} and taken to various locations in the area of Srebrenica, Bratunac and Zvornik, where they were summarily executed. The bodies of many victims were first buried in the mass graves. Soon the Bosnian Serb forces excavated these mass graves and relocated the bodies, which were often dismembered, over different locations in Srebrenica and Bratunac municipalities in order to hide the traces of their crimes. Zarkov summons accounts of the released Dutch soldiers presented in the Bakker Report and states that

55 Dutch soldiers who were kept hostage in a nearby village have confirmed, upon their release, that as they travelled back to the UN compound, they saw dead bodies scattered around the roads. They also reported seeing a lorry full of bodies and a bulldozer digging a grave.\textsuperscript{38}

Between 11 and 19 July 1995, the Serb forces detained, brutally tortured and later executed around 8000\textsuperscript{39} unarmed Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) men and boys, raped women, and forcibly transferred approximately 25 000 refugees\textsuperscript{40} to the ARBiH controlled area. After these dreadful events, described as ‘the worst massacre that occurred in Europe since the months after the World War II,’\textsuperscript{41} the town of Srebrenica became a ‘symbol of suffering’ in the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Wars of Yugoslav Succession.

5.3. The Aftermath of Srebrenica

Despite numerous testimonies of survivors and eyewitnesses of the mass executions of men and boys, the forcible migration of refugees, the strong protests uttered by some of the international officials and highly ranked UN officers a day after the fall of Srebrenica, on 12 July 1995\textsuperscript{42}, the ‘bloodiest episode’ of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was first hidden

\textsuperscript{37} The murders continued after the 16 of July 1995, when the paramilitary unit ‘Scorpions’ from Serbia captured, tortured and later executed six men and boys who managed to reach the area of Trnovo municipality near Sarajevo. Some of the members of the Scorpions recorded the abuse and executions of defenceless prisoners whose hands were tied behind their backs. Shockingly, the footage showing these executions circulated among the Scorpions and their supporters in Serbia as home videos for 10 years, specifically by 2005, when the video was first shown at the ICTY in June 2005 at the trial against Slobodan Milošević; Sense Tribunal News Agency, ‘Srebrenica, Genocide in Eight Acts.’


\textsuperscript{39} ICMP estimation, 2016.

\textsuperscript{40} figure from 'Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić,' Trial Judgement, ICTY.

\textsuperscript{41} Facts about Srebrenica, ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/view_from_hague/jit_srebrenica_en.pdf>

\textsuperscript{42} Among the reactions of international officials some that were uttered on 12 July 1995 were presented in the NIOD report: ‘UN decries ‘cleansing’ as ‘outrages’, US says it is largest single instance in war. Izetbegović says
from media and public. Also, as stated in the Bakker report from 2000, the information about the Srebrenica massacre was reported to the ICTY only on 15 July 1995, and to the senior politicians in the Netherlands on 18 July.43 But, there was knowledge drawn from video footage, photographs and other relevant material that documented the events following the fall of Srebrenica. This also includes documentation of the meetings held before,44 during45 and after the fall of Srebrenica. In the aftermath of the genocide and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this silence was questioned by different social agencies in various ways in both local and international contexts.

In the Netherlands, but also in wider international media space, the media (under-)reporting of the dreadful crimes committed in the first days after the fall of the UN ‘Safe Haven’ Srebrenica produced controversy. Journalists and critics in the Netherlands questioned the silencing of the Dutch soldiers who witnessed the ethnic cleansing committed in the enclave, and hid information about the massacre from the Dutch and international public. Consequently, as some of the Dutch journalists who were investigating the fall of Srebrenica describe, this first period after the fall of the enclave was characterised by the mistrust of the Dutch government, which grew in the following years. This mistrust, as the Dutch journalist Twat Huys46 asserts, was already noticeable at the series of events organised for the Dutchbat personnel between 21 and 23 July 1995 during their short stay in Zagreb, after they left Srebrenica on 21 July 1995. They include two press conferences, one of which was organised for the international media, while the other was organised only for the Dutch media, which were attended by the Dutchbat personnel, their commander Colonel Karremans, and the Commander in Chief of the Netherlands Army General Couzy.

government probably will not renew UN mandate in November, demands UN restore Safe Area with force. French President Chirac calls for military action to recapture Srebrenica but he is not joined in this. Boutros-Ghali says UN force not capable of defending other Safe Areas, much less recover Srebrenica. President Clinton presses UN to keep troops in Bosnia even though they cannot carry out task. British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind says ‘with. Must remain an option’ but also calls on Milosevic to pressure Bosnian Serbs to ‘behave in a more civilized fashion’. In ‘Chronology of the Bosnian Conflict 1990-1995,’ NIOD p. 270.43
44 Among numerous meetings between high politicians including presidents of the France, the UK but also the UN Security Council, this include the meeting between general Janvier and general Ratko Mladić in June 1995. 45 This include two meetings between the Dutchbat III commander Karremans, VRS general Ratko Mladić, including the third meeting on 12 July which also involved three civilian representatives from Srebrenica enclave. The other meetings that were not mentioned to the public were organised in Belgrade from 15 to 19 July 1995 between the EU/UN negotiators— the European Union’s special envoy Carl Bildt, Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Special Representative of the Secretary General Yasushi Akashi, general Rupert Smith and Serbian president Slobodan Milošević and general Ratko Mladić. In Ivar Amundsen, Commemorating Srebrenica’, 20 July, 2010, Bosnian Institute <http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2737>[Accessed on 17 June, 2016]. 46 Huys was reporting for the Dutch TV Nova at that time.
According to Huys, who had attended both conferences and who already at that time had some knowledge about the crimes committed in Srebrenica, in his statements to the press about the events in Srebrenica General Couzy ‘attempted to play down to extent of the disaster, while Karremans once more expressed his regard to Mladić.’

Additionally, the cancellation of journalists’ interviews which they had earlier scheduled with the Dutchbat soldiers, instigated mistrust of the Dutch authorities. Huys reflects on these developments in the following manner:

I think that events in Zagreb and the way we [journalists] were treated helped to make us realize we were being shafted by the Ministry of Defence, to put it bluntly. There was the film and the list which both disappeared. From then on we took nothing at face value, we assumed that there was something seriously amiss. We never got over that feeling.

Among the events organised by the Dutch authorities in Zagreb was a celebration of the completion of the Dutchbat’s mission. The celebration that was attended by the Dutch crown prince and broadcast in the Netherlands caused great controversies once information about the massacre reached the public. Soon, in the aftermath of the Srebrenica massacre, international media space was saturated with juxtaposed images of the Dutchbat soldiers drinking beer and partying in Zagreb and the weeping faces of women and children who were forcibly separated from their beloved ones and transferred to Tuzla, the images of exhausted men who managed to escape the massacre and survive the ‘road of death’, with images of dead bodies of men and boys scattered by the roads, and the ‘victorious speech’ of general Ratko Mladić after the units under his command overtook the town.

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47 Specifically, Huys had a chance to talk to some of the survivors that arrived to Tuzla and who reported him about ‘rivers of blood’ in the enclave.
49 According to Huys, General Couzy first offered to Huys (Nova TV) a videotape which showed actual executions of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and later after they met at the press conference in Zagreb, the General informed Huys that the videotape ‘had been burnt in Srebrenica “for security reasons”’.
50 Background and Influence of Media Reporting of the Conflict,’ NIOD, p. 56.
51 ‘We present this city to the Serbian people as a gift. Finally, after the rebellion against dahije, the time has come to take revenge on the Turks in this region.’ (The following terms he used- dahije which were local janissary leaders, and Turks, a derogative term for Bosnian Muslims, are referring to the Ottoman period,
footage triggered an avalanche of questions concerning Srebrenica in both local and international arenas. But most of these questions raised by the family members of those who went missing in July 1995, as by activists and critics, echoed for a long time in the quiet zone(s) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the wider post-Yugoslav region, and in the wider international area.

5.4. Construction of Narrative about the Srebrenica Genocide

A vast record of “the largest single crime of the war” today comprises legal, political and scholarly accounts, art and literature, media reports, personal accounts of survivors, memoirs and documentaries, all concerned with the circumstances of the fall of Srebrenica and the massacre that was recognised as genocide in 2004. As such, it incorporates different approaches that use various methods in order to meet specific or more general aims.

For instance, throughout the ICTY trials the analyses and special reports used during the investigation into the cases of individuals indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity that took place during the fall of Srebrenica, created a large body of material that includes more than 1000 survivors’ testimonies and other evidentiary material collected to explore the circumstances under which the genocide occurred. Twenty individuals are convicted for their responsibility for crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995, of whom, one of the accused, Slobodan Milošević, died before the judgement. Among three trials and appeals that have been completed is the case of Dražen Erdemović, a soldier of VRS, whose sentence was revised to five years in 1998 by the Appeals Chamber. Furthermore, Radislav Krstić, commander of the Drina Corps, unit of VRS was sentenced to forty years in 2001, and

\[\text{Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.}\]

\[\text{As stated in the European Parliament resolution on the Srebrenica Commemoration from 9 July, 2015, both}\]

\[\text{the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice recognized}\]


\[\text{Slobodan Milošević died during the trial in 2006. He was arrested in 2001. The charges against Milošević who was indicted for crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo, include responsibility for the massacre in Srebrenica. In Facts about Srebrenica, ICTY.}\]
Dragan Obrenović, a deputy commander of the Zvornik Brigade, unit of VRS, was sentenced to seventeen years in 2003. Along with the ICTY trials, in the period between 1999 and 2004 several national and international investigations were produced, all concerned with the failure of the Dutchbat to protect the desperate refugees after the fall of Srebrenica. The respective investigations and their findings are briefly presented in the following sections.

The introductory part of the judgement against Radislav Krstić in 2001 provides one of the recent views of the complex relationships between the numerous accounts about Srebrenica, through clarification of the role of the ICTY in this particular case. As stated, the ICTY focuses on the individual responsibility of the accused, and thus, it assigns ‘modest tasks’ to find out ‘what happened in the period between July 10-19 1995 in Srebrenica and whether the General Krstić charged with genocide, war crimes against humanity and a violation of the laws and custom of wars, was criminally responsible under the tenets of international laws for his participation in them.’\textsuperscript{55} It further explains that the Trial Chamber focuses its investigation on legal aspect of the genocide, and it ‘leaves it to historians and social psychologists to plumb the depths of this episode of Balkan conflict and to probe for deep-seated causes.’\textsuperscript{56} This suggestion, however, already implies few guidelines. First it recognises its legal approach as only the tip of the iceberg, and recognises the need for additional inquiry, specifying historical and social psychology approaches which should search for ‘deep-seated causes.’ However, by nomination of these two approaches and by pointing to ‘deep causes’ and framing the context as ‘the Balkan’ this suggestion additionally limited the course of future inquiry, which should definitely include more critical approaches in studying the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to Yugoslav Wars.

Many academic and non-academic researchers agree that the Srebrenica genocide is one of the most investigated war crime in the international law and the most investigated war crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The long process of construction of narrative about the crimes that were committed during the fall of Srebrenica in 1995 invoke activist networks, and provoked often controversial political, academic and media debates across the globe that divided protagonists into two opposite camps. One camp claims that the crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995 constitute genocide and is in accordance with the ICTY decision

\textsuperscript{55} Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić,’ Trial Judgement, ICTY, p.1.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
from 2004, while the other camp denies genocide, arguing that the figures were inflated, or that the executed men and boys were soldiers killed in combat.

In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Srebrenica genocide was the turning point in gaining public and political acknowledgement of the crimes committed in this UN safe zone, and for building both the official and public post-war (commemorative) culture. There are numerous reasons for selecting the Srebrenica commemoration as the central commemoration in relation to which the politics of memory and commemoration in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina are bound in a particular way. These complex interrelations are the focus of this part of the analysis.

First I examine the broader process of the construction of narratives about the Srebrenica genocide as well as the commemoration and the establishment of the memorial in Potočari in 2003. Then I will focus my analysis on the Srebrenica genocide commemoration held in 2010. I consider this commemoration event as one of the turning points not only in the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide, but also as the event that fashioned local politics, and memory and culture in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, into wider Post-Yugoslav space, and in Europe.

5.5. Three Stages in the Construction of the Narrative about the 1992-1996 War and the Srebrenica Genocide

The general process of construction of the narrative about the genocide in Srebrenica as well as about the meaning of the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina passed through a series of stages of development. Today the narrative about Srebrenica is comprised of different strategies for breaking the silence about the war crimes committed in the Srebrenica enclave, and present contrasting imperatives: the demands of surviving family members of those brutally murdered in the Srebrenica massacre to find and bury the remains of their loved ones that went missing since July 1995; the efforts of the ICTY to establish the truth about the events that occurred between 11 and 19 July 1995 and bring to justice those individuals responsible for the unthinkable crimes committed in 1995; numerous academic and non-academic accounts concerned with the causes of the genocide, memory of genocide, and its impact on the peace process; critical scholarly approaches to discourses about the
genocide; and gradual changes in the long, prevalent silence and denial of genocide in both Republic of Serbia, and in Republic of Srpska, one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, into which the Srebrenica municipality is included by the Dayton Peace Agreement. The questions that emerged in these local and international arenas due to the prevalent silence about the circumstances of the fall of Srebrenica, opened one of the most contested topics of the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The prevalent silence was first broken through the demands of the family associations and survivors for the truth about the fate of their beloved ones who went missing in July 1995. The associations also opened the issue of criminal accountability in the fall of the safe zone Srebrenica. Their demands were followed by debates about the responsibility of different transnational and international actors for not preventing the genocide. Some of the questions raised in international arenas were mainly concerned with the role of transnational agencies, foremost the UN, the UNPROFOR, and of the international community in the fall of the safe haven Srebrenica, as well as the question of individual responsibility. The list was soon extended to include the governments of the countries which were involved in the peace process negotiations, and those governments whose peacekeeping troops and/or humanitarian agencies were involved in the protection of the refugees in the UN safe haven Srebrenica.

The families of the missing, then gathered around informal associations, had organised protests before the international and transnational organisations located in Sarajevo in 1996. The protests were followed by legal investigations undertaken by the UN, the ICTY and by international and local governments which altogether internationalised the general process of construction of the narrative about the genocide in Srebrenica as the meaning of the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There are two important aspects in the construction of the narrative about the Srebrenica genocide: the centrality of the Srebrenica genocide in the process of tracing the legal and cultural aspects of dealing with the atrocities committed in the 1992-1996 war; and the internationalisation of the debate about the Srebrenica genocide, and these are central in the development of a comprehensive framework for my analysis. The framework encompasses the politics of memory and commemoration that commenced in both BiH, and in a wider context, in relationship to the construction of the narrative about the Srebrenica genocide, and the establishment of the memorial in Potočari.
This part of my analysis draws upon research studies that tackle different aspects of the narrative about the Srebrenica genocide, such as research concerned with the development of the commemoration of Srebrenica genocide\(^{57}\) the ‘strategies of collective action’\(^ {58}\) and with the development of the ICTY investigation, and with the reception of the ICTY by victim associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina\(^{59}\). Within the latter, Delpla differentiates a few stages in the development of the ICTY and its subsequent reception by victim associations.

Here, I integrate some of the findings of their respective analyses, and distinguish between three different stages of the process of development of the narrative about the Srebrenica genocide and commemoration in accordance with their suggestions.

Chronologically, these stages, which chiefly correspond to the timeline suggested by Delpla, also corresponds to the different stages of ‘strategies of collective action’, analysed by Nettelfield, and to the commemoration of the genocide analysed by Dujizing. While, each of the stages discloses the prevalence of particular approaches, anticipated goals, different agencies, and the relationships between them, the core of the narrative construction is the development of an interactive relationship between the victim associations from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ICTY. Three stages demonstrate different dynamics, some of the main turning points in the construction of the narrative, and the altering relationships between promoters of different but somewhat interrelated approaches.

Although the framework encompasses the period from 1993 when the ICTY was established, it is primarily focused on the period after the ethnic cleansing and genocide in Srebrenica until today. Within this time period, the following three stages can be distinguished: public activism, the legalistic turn, and the memory turn.

\(^{57}\) Dujizing, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia,’ NIOD.


5.6. Public Activism

The first stage encompasses the period between 1993 to 1997. Initiated with the first stage of the ICTY work, in which this newly established UN court of law was cooperating closely with other international organisations such as the ICJ, the ICMP, the Red Cross, as well as with the representatives of the international and local governments, this stage saw significant changes in the ICTY work from 1996. The turning points were the commemorative protests organised by family associations and survivors from the UN safe haven Srebrenica after the war, and which targeted the international community. Public activism initiated by the family associations on one side, and the work of ICTY on the other, could be subsumed under two central slogans at that time, which articulate some of the main demands of the families, illuminate the work of the ICTY, and at the same time demonstrate the interconnection between the endeavours of two agencies. The first slogan refers to the protest banner ‘we want justice’ which protestors carried at commemorative protests in Tuzla and Sarajevo. Both Delpla and Nettelfield observe that the slogan reflects the family associations search for truth about the fate of their loved ones who went missing after the fall of Srebrenica safe zone; truth about the events in Srebrenica in July 1995; and demands for accountability of the international and local individuals and organisations. The second slogan ‘fight against impunity’ represents the work of the ICTY focused on the prosecution of first individuals accused for the genocide and other crimes against humanity. These endeavours in the case of the Srebrenica genocide, encompass different activities focused on the establishment of the truth about the events in Srebrenica, such as the collection of evidence that is essential for prosecution, and the search for thousands of victims of genocide that are still missing. Generally, in this period, as Delpla describes, the ICTY work faced strong opposition from the government of the BH Entity Republic of Srpska and the wider public in this Entity.

A few formal and informal family associations and survivors have organised commemorative protests on the 11th day of each month since 1996. These organisations are: Association “Movement of the Mothers of Enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa” established in 1996 with offices in Sarajevo and Srebrenica; Association of Citizens “The Mothers of Srebrenica and Podrinje” both based in Sarajevo; Association of Citizens “Women of

60 Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
61 Delpla, ‘In the Midst of Injustice.’
63 The president of this association is a controversial politician Ibran Mustafić, who was also running for mayor of Srebrenica in 2002. He presented some of his controversial attitudes about the events in Srebrenica and
Srebrenica”, based in Tuzla; and Srebrenica-based Association of Citizens “Srebrenica Mothers”. The first stage of their public activism Nettlefield describes in the following manner:

“Over the postwar period, the sight of these women in the streets, carrying signs and often pillowcases bearing the names of their loved ones, gained something of an iconic status in Bosnia and beyond. In both, Tuzla and Sarajevo, their symbolic protests were a constant reminder that there was still too little information about the tragedy, and that they felt the world had betrayed them.”

All four associations, as Nettlefield further explains, generally share a common strategy for legal mobilisation, which is an important aspect of their work focused on collection of documentation of the facts about the crimes committed in Srebrenica, and cooperation with various courts.

Also, in this period, precisely in 1996, the family associations proposed the transformation of the industrial compound Potočari into memorial complex with an educational centre and museum. But, as Dujizings further explains, their proposal was initially rejected by representatives of the international community and by some of the local politicians, specifically, the representatives of the SDA, who opposed the idea of building the memorial in the BH Entity Republic of Srpska. Nevertheless, the campaign of the associations has continued through their public actions directed towards three main aims: breaking the prevalent silence about the massacre; addressing the lack of information about the fate of their loved ones; and criticising the indolence of the responsible institutions.

The public activism of family associations soon led to the significant changes in dealing with the circumstances that led to the fall of UN safe zone Srebrenica as well as with crimes that were committed. Nettlefield also highlights this turning point from public campaigning to judicialization, which, in her terms occurred after the 1997 protest in
Sarajevo that family associations organised before the OHR, the OSCE and the ICMP offices in Sarajevo.

5.7. Legal Turn

During the legal turn that encompasses the period between 1998 and 2003, the Tribunal became a reality, which, as Delpla explains, was manifested through the increased number of indictments and arrests. This includes the arrest and prosecution of highly ranked politicians, namely, Slobodan Milošević, Biljana Plavšić and Momčilo Krajišnik. Particularly, the judgement from 2004 of the trial to the highly ranked military officer of the VRS general Krstić, is commonly seen as one of the most important ICTY decisions, since it has recognised the massacre committed in Srebrenica in July 1995 as genocide. Moreover, in 2003, Naser Orić, the Senior Commander of Bosnian Army of several municipalities in the eastern Bosnia was arrested and transferred to The Hague. However, the prosecution commenced in 2004, was concluded in 2006 with the Trial Chamber decision which did not find Orić guilty for violation of the customs of war.

These and other important prosecutions resulted in valuable findings and significant developments in the legal aspects of dealing with the atrocities from the 1992-1996 war, but at the same time, they have negatively affected the relationship between the ICTY and victim associations across the country. Some of the reasons, as Delpla suggests, might be that the expectations of victims, who wanted to see more trials of the criminals who executed the orders and for them to have been indicted for superior responsibility have not been met, and

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68 This timeline does not fully correspond to the stages suggested by Delpla. Precisely, in her study about perception of the ICTY in Bosnia and Herzegovina, she differentiates between the second stage which encompasses the period between 1998 and 2002, and the third stage between 2002 and 2003. Here, I encompass both stages suggested by Delpla in one stage, and have designated it the legal turn. Delpla, ‘In the Midst of Injustice,’ p. 214.

69 Delpla, ‘In the Midst of Injustice.’

70 Both Plavšić and Krajišnik were first members of the collective presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as representatives of the SDS, while from February 1992, along with Radovan Karadžić and Nikola Koljević, they were some of the main actors in establishing the so-called ‘Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, and since 1992, they served as members of its acting ‘presidency.’ (Note: In Krstić’s indictment is stated ‘Serbian Republic’ but I am using the designation ‘Serb Republic’, in my reference in order to distinguish between the context of BiH and Serbia). After the war, all the founders of the then illegal Serb Republic and acting members of its presidency are indicted and prosecuted by the ICTY, with the exception of Nikola Koljević, who committed suicide in 1994. After the initial indictment against her was released in 2001, Plavšić surrendered voluntary in 2001. She pled guilty to the Consolidated Indictment, which charged her and Krajišnik with genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of laws and customs of war. In 2003 Plavšić was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment. She was released in 2009, after she served two-third of her sentence, on a basis of her ‘good behaviour’ and cooperation in ‘The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Momčilo Krajišnik and Biljana Plavšić’ (2001) Case No. IT-00-39&40 PT, Consolidated Indictment, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia < http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/ind/en/kra-ci010223e.pdf > [accessed on 14 May, 2016].

71 Namely, Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica and Zvornik.
this, together with the limited number of cases heard has created a distance between the victims and the ICTY.

However, the ICTY recognised this deterioration of the relationship, and developed a strategy for bridging the gap created between the Tribunal and the disappointed victims’ associations, which resulted in the Tribunal’s Outreach Programme in 1999. The new Program, as stated on the official website of the ICTY, is ‘at the heart of the institution’s relationship with the region of the former Yugoslavia’ with its mission ‘to put into practice the principle of open justice’ and its establishment, as described was a milestone in the Tribunal’s progression to maturity. It was a sign that the court had become deeply aware that its work would resonate far beyond the judicial mandate of deciding the guilt or innocence of individual accused. With the establishment of Outreach, the Tribunal recognised that it had a role to play in the process of dealing with the past in the former Yugoslavia, one of the key challenges for societies emerging from conflict.

Along with the development of the scope of the work of the ICTY, the family associations continued to seek truth through public activism and through cooperation with international and local courts. They received significant support for their endeavours, from activists across the globe – local, regional and international – as well as from those international critics who were investigating the causes of the silence and who were demanding the truth about the fall of Srebrenica from their governments. Under public pressure and growing criticism from inside and outside, the organizations and governments which were held responsible for the fall of Srebrenica conducted inquiries that resulted in extensive, but somewhat unsatisfactory reports.

73 Ibid.
74 As specified in its Statute ‘the ICTY has jurisdiction over the territory of the former Yugoslavia from 1991 onwards’, as over individual persons, but not organizations and legal units. As an international legal body that protects and develops international justice, the ICTY has concurrent jurisdiction with national courts over serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia, and as stated in the Statute, it can transfer the cases to the national courts, but it can also ‘claim primacy and may take over national investigations and proceedings at any stage if this proves to be in the interest of international justice.’ ICTY, <http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/mandate-and-crimes-under-icty-jurisdiction> [Accessed on 23 March, 21016]; Moreover, as Delpla describes, the court in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina cooperated closely with the ICTY, while the court in Republika Srpska refused cooperation, and ‘has not handed over a single indicted suspect.’ Delpla, ‘In the Midst of Injustice,’ p. 215.
5.7.1. Transnational and International Inquiries about the Fall of the UN Safe Zone Srebrenica

The first of such reports was published by the UN General Assembly in 1999 and titled ‘Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica.’\(^{75}\) The report, which is also referred to as the ‘UN Srebrenica Report’ encompasses interviews with highly ranked UN and UNPROFOR officials, Srebrenica residents, and includes the findings of the ICTY forensic investigations. One of the conclusions of the UN report was that UN failed to protect the refugees after the fall of Srebrenica and that blame for this rested on the entire UN institution, not on the particular member states. The UN report faced numerous critics who generally objected that long awaited answers were not provided. The family associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina also found the report unsatisfactory because of its general statements about the responsibility of the UN officials and other actors, and particularly the Dutch government, which is somewhat exculpated. Additionally, on the basis of interviews which she conducted with former UN employees, Lara Nettl field claims that ‘[a]mong those close to the UN, it was well known that a more damning version of the report was heavily edited before publication.’\(^{76}\)

Under the pressure of the public, and particularly members of the French Non-governmental organisation Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders\(^{77}\) (MSF hereinafter), who established a mission in the UN safe zone Srebrenica since 1993 until its fall in 1995, the French Parliament formed the Fact-Finding Commission on Srebrenica chaired by the Francois Loncle. The Commission aimed to investigate the political responsibility of France, and the military responsibility of the French UN commander General Bernard Janvier. Some of the conclusions of the report published in 2001 were that general Janvier made an error of judgement, while in the case of national responsibility, the report pointed to the reluctance of France, and other UN member states namely, the United


\(^{76}\) Nettlefield, *Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, p. 121.

\(^{77}\) ‘Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) teams were working in ‘safe zones’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 22 MSF team members were killed during the siege of the safe zone Srebrenica. In ‘Testimony Presented by MSF during the French Parliamentary Hearing into the Srebrenica Tragedy,’ (2001) Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/research/testimony-presented-msf-during-french-parliamentary-hearing-0> [accessed 12 June 2016].
Kingdom, the United States of America, including the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government, to intervene and prevent the fall of the UN safe zone Srebrenica. 78

In the same period, the government of the Netherlands initiated two inquiries 79 that resulted in two reports, namely the Bakker Report from 2000, 80 and the NIOD Srebrenica report delivered in 2002. 81 The Committee was set up in 1999 by the Dutch Parliament with the aim of investigating some of the general characteristics of the decision-making process in the Dutch peacekeeping operation, which also included the failure of the Dutchbat in Srebrenica. 82 Considering the main aims of the investigation, the report, as Zarkov argues, does not explore the circumstances under which the genocide occurred and it is not concerned with questions about responsibility, but rather with the aspect of the decision-making process in relation to Dutch participation in peacekeeping operations, the process that is, as stated, generally affected by a lack of relevant information and insufficient communication between different ministries. In Zarkov’s terms ‘[a]s responsibility was not the issue for the Baker Committee, it only quoted the UN Secretary General’s report to the effect that the Netherlands can be blamed only inasmuch as it was a part of the international community.’ 83

Also, the Bakker Report was criticised because of the lack of sufficient information about the events that led to the fall of the ‘safe zone Srebrenica.’ At that time, the contrasting descriptions of the public information process concerning the issues on Srebrenica were

79 Some of the main grounds for conducting reports in the Netherlands were first, the fact that the focus of sporadic media reporting about Srebrenica was mainly on the Dutchbat soldiers who returned home and who suffered trauma; and second, most of the critics argue that the work of the Ministry of Defence was mainly characterised by its ten-years long avoidance to open publicly the questions concerning Srebrenica.
80 ‘Report of the Interim Commission for Decision-making on Peacekeeping’ (Rapport van de Tijedelijke commissie besluitvorming uitzendigen also known as the Bakker Committee) was delivered in 2000. In Zarkov, ‘Srebrenica Trauma,’ p.187-188.
81 The six-years long scholarly inquiry of the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie) that was requested by the Government in 1996 in order to investigate events prior to, during and after the fall of Srebrenica was finally concluded in 2002 when the NIOD Srebrenica report was published. This 7,000-pages long report presents the largest investigation about Srebrenica in the Netherlands. The NIOD, ‘Srebrenica: a “Safe” Area,’ <https://www.niod.nl/en/srebrenica-report/report> [Accessed on 12 May, 2016].
83 Zarkov, ‘Srebrenica Trauma,’ p.188.
illustrated in the statement of the then Dutch Ministry of Defence spokesman who termed it as a ‘classic information failure,’ while the Dutch journalist Carolien Brugma claimed that she could ‘talk for hours about the things that were hushed up or brushed under the carpet.’ Generally, the information process, as described in the subsequent NIOD report, was characterised by ‘half-truths, incomplete information, disinformation, blunders, and clumsiness, all resulting in enormous mutual suspicion.’

Nonetheless, this omission was later corrected with the extensive investigation presented in the NIOD report, which outlined the events that led to the fall of the UN safe zone, and explored some of the questions that were addressed in the previously published reports in more detail. Specifically, the NIOD report presented findings about the role of the French General Janvier, which to a great extent confirmed the evidence of the French report.

One of the conclusions of the NIOD report echoes the UN conclusions with the statement that that both the UN and the Dutchbat share the blame for not preventing the fall of the safe zone Srebrenica. Although the NIOD report contributed an extensive historical analysis written by historian Geer Dujizings, as with valuable insights into the national public debate, this report, as the Bakker report caused great disappointment among the survivors and family associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina who interpreted the reports matching conclusions as the unwillingness of the Dutch government to undertake responsibility for the Srebrenica massacre. Thus, in response to the vague conclusions of the NIOD report, they organised public protests in the Netherlands in 2002 on the occasion of the public presentation of the report, and continued to demand truth and justice though public campaigns and legal cases. Also, it is worth mentioning that only a week after the report was published, the former Prime Minister Wim Kok who was held politically responsible for not doing enough to prevent the massacre, and 15 members of his centre-left cabinet collectively resigned. However, the main responsibility for the genocide in Srebrenica, as the report concludes, is laid on Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić who were still at large at the time when the report was published.

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84 Background and Influence of Media Reporting of the Conflict,’ NIOD, p.57.
5.7.2. National Inquiries in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Concurrently, in the local arena specifically, in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Entity Republic of Srpska, the report published in 2002 by the Entity government maintained the denial of crimes committed in Srebrenica through misinterpretation of the events, and by underestimating the numbers of the murdered men in Srebrenica who were exclusively presented as soldiers who died in combat. The denial was manifested in the report published by the Bureau of the Government of the Republic of Srpska for Relations with the ICTY, which challenged the findings, and declined some of the decisions made by the ICTY at that time in Krstić case. The report was criticised furiously by both locals and internationals. Moreover, the ICTY, the High Representative and the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina (HRC hereinafter) requested that the Government of Republic of Srpska to take responsibility for the ‘disappointing’ report from 2002. The HRC’s request was more specific and they asked the RS Entity Government to initiate a new investigation, which should provide accurate information about the events that led to the massacre, and about the fate and whereabouts of the thousands of missing persons, to their relatives and to those international organisations responsible for searching for the missing persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

However, after the government of Republika Srpska failed to respond to all requirements specified by the HRC directive by the agreed deadline in the autumn 2003, the High Representative Paddy Ashdown (hereinafter HR) intervened and endorsed the HRC’s request. Furthermore, HR Ashdown initiated the creation of the Government of the Republic of Srpska temporary commission called ‘The Commission for Investigation of the Events in and around Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995’ (Hereinafter RS Srebrenica Commission). The six-member RS Srebrenica Commission chaired by Marko Arsović, was

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86 The report designates the Srebrenica massacre as an ‘alleged massacre’ and claims that only 2500 Muslim men that were soldiers died in combat, out of which some could have been murdered by the Bosnian Serb forces, as stated ‘by angry Bosnian Serb soldiers unaware of international laws regarding the prisoners of war’; in ‘Regional Report: Bosnian Serb Play Down Srebrenica,’ Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 7 September 2002 <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/regional-report-bosnian-serbs-play-down> [Accessed on 14 April, 2016].

87 The Human Rights Chamber was a judicial body established by the Annex 6 of the DPA in 1995, which was dealing with defence of individual human rights in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by the end of 2003, when its mandate expired. The Chamber, which had jurisdiction over the whole country and all the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was composed of eight international judges that were appointed by the Council of Europe, and six local judges appointed by the Entities, two for each ‘constituent people’. (In Delpla and others, Investigating Srebrenica, p.132.

88 Lord Paddy Ashdown was the fourth High Representative in BiH between 2002 to 2005.
composed of some of the prominent layers, judges and historians from Republic of Srpska, one historian who represented the victim community, and one representative of the international community.\(^89\) The ICTY and the OHR observed the work of the RS Srebrenica Commission.

During its 6-month long investigation focused on the events in the UN safe zone Srebrenica, and the fate of the missing men and boys, and identification of both primary and secondary mass graves, the RS Srebrenica Commission faced numerous challenges. One of the greatest challenges was the obstruction of the investigation by some of the highly-ranked officials of the Republic of Srpska. This triggered significant changes in the team of the RS Srebrenica Commission, but also in the RS Government which was responsible for unobstructed work of the Commission, after the High Representative had removed the responsible officials from their positions, together with the chairman of the Commission, Marko Arsović.\(^90\) Despite the numerous challenges that members of the RS Srebrenica Commission experienced throughout the investigation,\(^91\) in June 2004 the Commission published the report, which provided the required information about the fate of those who have gone missing since the fall of the safe zone.

In 2003, the ICTY created the strategy for completion of its work by 2008. The new strategy also incorporated the transfer of the ongoing cases to the national courts. These changes, as Delpla observes, have significantly changed how the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina perceive the ICTY, where on a general level, victim associations across the country opposed the closure of the ICTY. However, considering the different expectations of different war-related groups, Delpla provides more specific insight and claims that in the case of Bosniak associations the change in perception occurred after Plavšić’s trial, when most of

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\(^89\) Namely, Milan Bogdanić, Milorad Ivošević, Dorde Stojaković, Gojko Vukotić, Smail Čekić and Gordon Bacon.

\(^90\) After he received the interim report from the RS Srebrenica Commission, which informed about constant and systematic obstruction by the Government of Republic of Srpska, the High Representative Paddy Ashdown had used Bonn powers against senior officials in the VRS and in the RS Office for ICTY Liaison, and against the chairman of the RS Srebrenica Commission Marko Arsović, and replaced them from their positions. By describing the work of the Commission as ‘crucial to BiH’s future, the High Representative invited the Government of the Republic of Srpska to fully support the work of the Commission. He held then the RS president Dragan Čavić, and the Prime Minister Dragan Mikerević ultimate responsibility for the successful completion of the work by the agreed deadline (June, 2004).; In ‘High representative Announce Srebrenica Commission Support Measures,’ The Office of High Representative BiH, April 16, 2004 <http://www.ohr.int/?p=46143> [Accessed on 11 March, 2016].

\(^91\) Also, some of the members of the Commission reported that they and members of their families were threatened during the investigation. In Delpla et al, Investigating Srebrenica, p. 139.
the Bosniak associations became critical of the ICTY sentences, while the Bosnian Serb victim associations ‘fear the transfer of cases to Sarajevo and hope that more crimes against Serb victims will be judged.’\textsuperscript{92} Intensive changes and developments that marked the period after the legal turn, have initiated changes in the local and international political environment within which new form of commemoration were initiated.

The overlapping stages in the development of the narrative about the Srebrenica genocide, and about the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also illuminate the ways in which the ICTY was developing its international justice approach in relation to the former Yugoslavia. But it also clarifies its relation to other international agencies, such as ICC, ICMP, ICRC, international governments and their respective approaches to justice involved in this long and complex process. The dynamics of the development of the international justice model for the former Yugoslavia, and the interplay between different agencies are particularly noticeable within the period of judicialization, through the complex relationships between the ICTY and international agencies on one side, and family associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other. Accordingly, commemorative practices, which were, and remain the core of this relationship, passed through different stages of development. They are the focus of the third stage that I designate the memory turn.

5.8. Memory Turn

While the top-down approach dominates the legal turn, a nexus of top-down and bottom-up approaches characterises the memory turn, which occurred in 2003 with the official opening of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Centre, Monument and Cemetery for Victims of the Genocide from 1995 (hereinafter Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery).\textsuperscript{93} In the case of Srebrenica the memory turn symbolizes the shift in both commemorative practices and respective approaches to truth, which are characterised by the primacy of the top-down approach. Together with some of the crucial decisions and

\textsuperscript{92} Delpla, ‘In the Midst of Injustice,’ p. 215.

\textsuperscript{93} Memorijalni Centar Srebrenica-Potočari, Spomen Obilježje i Mezarje za Žrtve Genocida iz 1995. Godine (in local language/s) is established in 2001, but it was officially opened in 2003 by the president of the United States of America Bill Clinton.
developments from the judicialization stage, this shift brought new political narratives about the Srebrenica Genocide, illuminated counter-commemoration, and stirred political debate in the country, in the post-Yugoslav space, and in the global context. But, the centrality of the commemoration of the Srebrenica Genocide in a certain way also fashioned political narratives and commemoration about other war events from the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While the commemoration practices prior to 2003 were mainly organised by family associations and activists who were supporting their endeavours, the shift from a bottom-up to top-down approach in commemorative politics occurred with the official opening of the Memorial Potočari-Srebrenica. Earlier commemoration events and initiatives were at first not supported by the governmental and international agencies. Disapprovals are manifested in the aforementioned example from 1996, with a lack of support from the SDA party, and OHR for the first initiative of family associations to bury their beloved ones if they were found dead in Potočari near Srebrenica, did not get support. As Dujizing explains, SDA party leadership opposed the idea because both Potočari and Srebrenica are included in the territory of the Republic of Srpska by the DPA. Thus, they advocated building a memorial near Kladanj, a town in the Entity Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which, at that time, a significant number of non-Serb residents from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas who survived the genocide were living, while more than a third of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian population

94 A heterogeneous mix of local and international organisations that includes members of diaspora, local human right groups and women’s organisations that Nettlefield terms a ‘transnational advocacy network.’

95 Dujizing, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia,’ NIOD.

96 War violence and partly the reintegration of the particular parts of the country’s territory that occurred after the signature of the DPA, resulted with displacement of 2.2 million people. While some 1.5 million sought refuge abroad, nearly 700,000 people are scattered across the country and registered as internally displaced persons (IDPs hereinafter). Figures from 2014 show that 580,000 people have returned to their pre-war homes since the signing of the DPA. In 2014, as the government, which is the sole source of IDP figures in the country, reported around 103,000 registered IDPs did not return to their pre-war homes they were forced to leave during the wartime, and have mostly remained in the areas where they are part of the majority ethnic groups. Around 90 percent of the registered IDPs live in private accommodation, while 8500 displaced persons continue to live in ‘dilapidated collective centres, in which half of all families are female-headed and one-fifth are chronically ill, physically or mentally disabled. In the last few years the government and the international organisations that are working on the safe return of all refugees that is guaranteed by the Article VII of the DPA registered backdrop in number of returns (in 2013 only 151 IDP returns were recorded by the UNHCR), due to hostile political environment where rhetoric of ethno-nationalist politicians is directed against minority returnees, limited access to health care, employment, limited infrastructure, and hate crimes. In 2012 some returned minority IDPs were murder ‘for unknown reasons’ what forced some returned IDPs to fled again. In Stakeholder Report ‘Internal Displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2014) The Internal Monitoring Displacement Centre (IDMC) of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) < http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Europe/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/pdf/5-IDMC-UPR-BiH-2014-march.pdf> [Accessed on 17 June, 2016].
lives permanently outside of the country, in diaspora.97

On the other side, in the Entity Republic of Srpska, after the signing of the DPA in 1995, the leadership of this Entity influenced the Serb population to leave those areas that were included into territory of the other Entity, and to occupy private property in Republic of Srpska that was left deserted after the ethnic cleansing executed by the Serb Forces during the war. The territory included in the Republic of Srpska by the DPA, also integrates Srebrenica and its surrounding area. The vast population transfer from the war thus deeply shaped the dynamics of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian post war society. Accordingly, the Annex 7 of the DPA, which is focused on the problem of refugees and internally displaces persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, defines their return as ‘an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 98

These and other repercussions of the war politics of ethnic cleansing as well as the post-war politics of the fortification of monoethnic places and even whole cities, strongly influenced the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide. Among the earlier tireless efforts of women’s associations in their search for justice, was the organisation of the first commemorations of the fall of Srebrenica in June 1998 in Srebrenica, when the women’s associations visited the graveyards of their beloved ones who were killed before the genocide. As Geer Dujizings, a researcher who attended the commemoration describes, that the first commemoration was held in very hostile environment created by the old and new Serb residents of Srebrenica who jeered at the women and displayed nationalist insignia.99

Yet, only a month later the SDA representatives organised a commemoration of the Srebrenica massacre near Kladanj, a town in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The commemoration was also attended by the party leaders, including the President of the state,

97 On a basis of the UNHCR report from 2005 and from his own observations and research on the Bosnian-Herzegovinian diaspora community, Hariz Halilovich states that the dispersal of Bosnian-Herzegovinians ‘has been much broader than generally acknowledged and includes over 100 countries where Bosnians have found temporary or permanent refugee. The host countries include some less expected destinations, such as Israel, Malaysia and Columbia.’ In his study Halilovich also explores ‘chain migrations’ of the refugees/migrants, and included the diaspora community in St Louis in the USA, which is also called the largest ‘eastern Bosnian town’ in the world, given that 70,000 refugees and migrants mostly from Podrinje region settled there after the war. In Halilovich, Hariz, ‘Trans-Local Communities in the Age of Transnationalism: Bosnians in Diaspora’, International Migration 50 (2012) <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2011.00721.x> [accessed 4 July 2016].

98 The Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 7, Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons <http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63261> [Accessed on April 17, 2012]; The DPA guarantees to refugees and displaced persons the right to return to their homes and to restore the property if needed, or to receive compensation in cases if the property cannot be restored.

and the head of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\(^{100}\) In this period they also initiated the building of the monument on this site.

However, the continuation of public activism and organisation of commemoration in Srebrenica demonstrated that the aspirations of family associations was to bury their beloved ones that were already at that time found in located mass graves and identified in the ICMP laboratory,\(^{101}\) and to honour those who went missing. In July 2000, they organised the largest commemoration near the Dutchbat compound Potočari which was attended by nearly three thousand people. Among attendees were representatives of the international community, ambassadors of both western and Middle Eastern countries, and the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the representatives of the Entity Republic of Srpska were absent.

5.8.1. Establishing the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery

Apart from this commemoration, the year 2000 was particularly important because of a small, but encouraging number of first Bosniak returnees to Srebrenica, and several decisions made by the High Representative Wolfgang Petrisch\(^{102}\) (hereinafter HR), which were concerned with issues relating to the return of minorities to Srebrenica and with the commemoration of the dead and missing from the time of the Srebrenica genocide. Precisely, this includes the Decision about the Srebrenica Cemetery and Monument location\(^{103}\) followed by one more related decision about the abolition of the so-called Municipality of Skelani, established in 1992 by the National Assembly of the so-called Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (then). Some of the grounds of the decision are clarified in the earlier HR’s decision from 1999 on the same matter. One of the main arguments was that the decision of the establishment of the ‘Municipality Skelani’ in 1992 was decided without consulting with the majority Bosniak population of municipality of Srebrenica, and therefore its apparent aim, as stated, was

> to strip Srebrenica of territory, security and economic resources. More recently, the illegal existence of this alleged “municipality” had hampered returns and reconciliation and put back Srebrenica’s economic recovery. It has promoted

\(^{100}\) Dujizings, ‘Commemorating Srebrenica,’ p.157.

\(^{101}\) In accordance to the list of individuals that went missing since July 1995 and that are reported to the ICMP (of 7754 persons), out of which 6967 persons are identified, while 787 are still missing. ‘Statistics of Missing Persons per Municipality of Disappearance, International Commission of Missing Persons, ICMP Online Inquiry Centre’) <https://oic.icmp.int/index.php?w=per_municipality2&l=en&x=search&ampw=perMunicipalityLoadMunicipalities2&amp_x_region_id_sel=&amp_x_municipality_id_sel=&amp_country_id=33&amp_region_id=999> [Accessed on 17 June, 2017].

\(^{102}\) An Austrian diplomat was appointed as the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from August 1999- May 2002.

division, separation, isolation and stagnation.\textsuperscript{104}

Before the end of his tenure in May 2002, Petrisch also made decisions about the establishment of the Foundation for the Potočari Memorial and Cemetery in 2001.\textsuperscript{105} The commitment to the Civil Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to bring about reconciliation and to facilitate the return of displaced persons through the establishment of the memorial complex in Potočari near Srebrenica, also marked the work of British politician Lord Paddy Ashdown, who succeeded Petrisch in 2002. Accordingly, after consultations with members of both Boards of the Potočari Memorial Foundation, including representatives of family associations,\textsuperscript{106} and the Republic of Srpska authorities in 2003, the HR announced the decision about the location of the memorial, which was designated in the earlier decision, and about the formation of the Compensation Commission responsible for the regulation of the ownership transfer and compensation. As stated, the HR confirmed the decision because ‘the Battery factory site has special place in the memory of Srebrenica families as it was the last place many of them saw their beloved relatives alive’.\textsuperscript{107} Beside the initial stage during which decisions that were crucial for the establishment of the memorial complex were taken, the international community and the HR remained actively engaged in the multi-stage process of building of the memorial complex\textsuperscript{108} from planning, design, fundraising and building to the


\textsuperscript{106} The Foundation that was created to oversee the construction of the memorial complex had two boards, namely the Executive Board, chaired by the HR Wolfgang Petrisch, and composed of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary Jacques Paul Klein, US ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina Thomas Miller, the Reis-Ulema Mustafa Cerić, the representative of the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees Kadrija Sabic-Haracic, and the representative of the Stabilisation Force in BiH (COMSFOR) General Michael Dodson; and the Advisory Working Group composed of three representatives of the families, namely, Sadik Semilović, Hasan Nuhanović and Ibran Mustafić, one representative of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mufti Husein Kavazović, representative appointed by the Mayor of Srebrenica Sefket Hafizović, The OHR, High Representative issues decision registering Foundation for the Potocari/Srebrenica Memorial and Cemetery, 10 May 2001, URL: http://www.ohr.int/?p=56135


\textsuperscript{108} While the sacral part of the memorial was completed in the first stage of building, the planning, reconstruction and concept of the visitor’s centre as the capacity building was developed in few stages. Accordingly, the process of design, building as the concept the Memorial Room opened in July 2007, includes cooperation between international institutions such as the Imperial War Museum, King’s College London, the ICMP, local institutions such as the National Museum of BiH, ‘arch studio’ from Sarajevo and individuals, mainly survivors and witnesses of the genocide.
memorial’s capacity building. Throughout the project among the main donors were the governments of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States of America, and significant donations were provided by other governments. Local representatives and family associations were also involved in the process of building and in the development of the Memorial through the work of the Foundation.

5.8.2. The Memorial Complex Srebrenica-Potočari. Commemoration of the Srebrenica Genocide and Burial of Identified Victims

The Memorial complex Srebrenica-Potočari (The Memorial complex hereinafter) consists of a cemetery for the victims of the genocide from 1995 and the visitor centre located on both sides of road that connects Srebrenica and Bratunac. In accordance with the decision of the HR Christian Swartz Schilling from 2007 the Memorial complex is under the jurisdiction of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first stage of the planning and building of the memorial was completed in September 2003 with the official ceremony of opening of the cemetery by the president of the United States Bill Clinton and mass burial of the identified victims of the genocide. Every year, since 2003 in which almost 1000 victims were buried, commemorations and the collective burial of the victims in accordance with their religious beliefs are organised in the cemetery. The commemorations include political speeches, religious services and burials of identified victims recovered from the identified mass graves. The numbers of victims vary from year to year, while the skeleton remains of most of the 6504 victims interred in the cemetery so far are rarely completed.

By the main entrance to the cemetery is conceptualised as a landscape park with white gravestones for 6504 of 8372 victims. Near the main entrance to the cemetery there is a semicircle shaped open space called a ‘musala’, which is a gathering-space for joint

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109 I.e. the Program of the Dutch government, which financed the second phase of the development of the Potocari Memorial Centre, implemented in the period from 2014 to 2016 includes reconstruction works, but also capacity building through support in development of the educational programme, of the collection that is exhibited in the Memorial and training of the staff employed in Srebrenica Potocari Memorial. The part of the project focused on the capacity building established the cooperation between the National Westerbork Memorial from the Netherlands and the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery.

110 ‘Decision Enacting the Law on the Centre for the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide’ (2007), 53/07, The Office of the High Representative BiH [http://www.ohr.int/?p=64715] [accessed 14 May 2016]. The Law declares that the Memorial Centre is a legal Successor of the Foundation, and it establishes its institutional structure that is composed of the Governing Body, which includes seven members, through which the Government of BiH shall manage the Memorial Centre (four-years group); and the Advisory Working group composed of up to nine members, specifically ‘representatives of families of victims of the genocide, representatives of the Islamic Community of BiH, and representatives of executive authorities of the Srebrenica Municipality.’ In ‘Decision Enacting the Law on the Centre for the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery,’ OHR.

111 Precisely the Council of Ministers of BiH.

112 ICMP figures.

113 The figure stated at the official website of the Memorial Centre Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery for victims of the 1995 Genocide <http://www.potocarimc.org> [accessed on 19 March 2017].
prayer before the burial of the victims.\textsuperscript{114} The central area is surrounded by white granite slabs that form the ‘memorial wall’ carved with the names, father names, surnames, and ages of the 8372 people who were killed and missing in the genocide in 1995. The central area also includes the headstone with an inscription from the holy book the Qur’an, a fountain with drinking water for the visitors, but also the place where the visitors who pray for dead in the Muslim way may undertake the obligatory ritual cleansing before the pray. There are a few more drinking water fountains within the cemetery. Another object located close to the main entrance is a room known as ‘the Museum of Genocide’\textsuperscript{115} or the ‘Memorial Room’,\textsuperscript{116} which displays an exhibition of documentary photography titled ‘11 July’. The first works of art donated in 2003 by the USA Ambassador Swanee Hunt, was the globally exhibited collection of photography made by the Sarajevo-based photographer Tarik Samarah. The author documented different stages of the process of the search for missing - from the location of the mass graves, the recovery of body remains to the process of identification of victims to the burial.

\textsuperscript{114} The term ‘musala’ derives from Arabic language and it means ‘near God’ or ‘place for pray’. The musala in the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial can hold up to 1000 persons who gather to pray.
\textsuperscript{115} The official website of the Memorial complex Srebrenica-Potočari.
The architects from the Sarajevo based studio ‘.arch’ who designed and built the cemetery describe the cobblestone pathways that lead from the central area to the cemetery as delineating eight ‘petal-shaped parcels’ overgrown with the grass, and with different number of tombs. Thus, the pathways are forming a flower cut by the road that connects Srebrenica and Bratunac. This is the same road that was used for transportation of the men and boys to the ‘killing fields’, for the deportation of refugees, and which today divides the cemetery and the former Dutchbat compound in which the refugees sought protection, in temporally not so distant July 1995.

The visitor centre is located across the cemetery in a vast compound of the pre-war ‘Battery Factory’, in which the headquarters of the Dutchbat was situated during the wartime. This site is often described as a place where the genocide began since it was here where horrified refugees sought protection from the UN, where the first murders and rapes occurred and finally, where some of the victims of the genocide, men and boys, were separated from their beloved ones and taken to the ‘killing fields’ around Srebrenica.

The visitor centre’s development passed through different stages that include cooperation with the ICTY and partner institutions from the UK and the Netherlands, encompassing the Memorial Room opened in July 2007; the Sense Documentation Centre – also called the Multimedia Room, opened in September 2014; and the permanent exhibition ‘Srebrenica Genocide – The Failure of the International Community’ officially opened in February 2017 in both the Memorial Potočari-Srebrenica and in the Dutch Memorial Centre Kamp Westerbork. The timeline and different concepts of the educational platform that conveys the narrative about the fall of the UN Safe Zone Srebrenica, the genocide and its aftermath, developed gradually and indicates the stages in the centre’s development and its capacity building.

In the first stage, the development was supervised by the OHR and financed by the governments of the UK and the Netherlands. Initially, the idea of the exhibition and cooperation with Imperial War Museum were introduced by the former HR Lord Paddy Ashdown who, inspired by the Holocaust Exhibition as Wagner and Nettlefield describe, felt that ‘Bosnia need[ed] something like this’. The envisaged ‘museum-style display’ at the Memorial Room was developed by a broad multi-disciplinary transnational project team in continuous consultation with the Foundations’ Advisory Group and scholars. Specifically, the project included the cooperation between various professionals from the Imperial War Museum London, King’s College London, the ICMP, and local institutions such as the National Museum of BiH, Sarajevo based ‘.arch’ studio, and individuals, mainly survivors and witnesses of the genocide.

Suzanne Bardgett, the director of the Holocaust Exhibition at the Imperial War Museum London whose team consulted the Potočari-Srebrenica Memorial team on content and visitor service aspects, explains that the Memorial Room has two main narratives: ‘a thirty-minute film to inform visitors about what happened in July 1995; and series of personal stories based on the objects excavated by the ICMP.’ The personal stories were collected and written by then-journalist Emir Suljagić, survivor of the genocide whose testimony, published in 2005, is one of the most praised accounts about the fall of Srebrenica and the massacre that followed. After the opening of the Memorial Room, Bardgett, who together with some of the project team members had a chance to encounter members of

119 The film resulted from the cooperation of a renowned British documentary filmmaker Leslie Woodhead, the documentary film maker and the author of a harrowing documentary ‘Srebrenica- A Cry from the Grave’ released in 1999, and Muhamed Mujkić, the official cameraman with the Federal Commission for Missing Persons.
bereaved families and other visitors, describes that ‘one of the architects was moved to tears as he described to me one of the mothers reading her husband’s story’, while one other visitor said that Bosnia and Herzegovina ‘needs to heal its wounds if it is to move forward’. On the basis of the first responses, Bardgett perceives the Memorial Room, as a ‘special space – dignified, solid, sensitively executed’, which ‘may offer some comfort’ to bereaved families.122

The second narrative of the visitors’ centre is primarily concerned with the legal aspect of the fall of Srebrenica and the genocide, the Sense News Agency’s Documentation Centre, also called the Multi-Media Room. Described as ‘a living multi-media library open to everyone’, it contains a vast amount of material collected during more than fifteen years work on covering the ICTY trials. The multimedia presentation of the SENSE collection is organised in two main formats. The first is a multi-screen projection of the chronicle of events from July 1995, which also includes supporting comprehensive narratives from witness testimonies to evidence from trials, which are displayed on eight large screens. The second, is the research point, equipped with computers with access to the complete materials used in the court, which incorporates, as described

thousands of hours of video footage of witnesses' testimonies, including survivors, investigators and perpetrators; video recordings from July 1995; crime scene and aerial photos; as well as military documents seized in the headquarters of units involved in July 1995 attack on the protected area.124

By highlighting the complexity of the events from the 1992-1996 war in the country as well as in Srebrenica, the SENSE team states that the Documentation Centre’s collection aims to provide a rather modest contribution to the narrative about the Srebrenica genocide through the presentation of the ways in which the events that occurred in 1995 in Srebrenica have been investigated, reconstructed and prosecuted by the ICTY on the basis of gathered material.125

The third approach provides narratives about the international presence in Srebrenica from 1993 to 1995 through reconstruction of the Dutchbat headquarters, that is expanded to a narrative about the special relationship between Srebrenica and the Netherlands that has been

122 Susanne Bardgett, Remembering Srebrenica.
123 The work of the Sense News Agency established in 1998 in the ICTY, encompasses the production of daily news reports, weekly television program (TV Tribunal) for the post-Yugoslav countries, and the production of documentaries. As stated on the Sense Agency’s official website, through its work, the Sense is aiming to provide ‘regular, balanced and comprehensive coverage of the work of the ICTY, the ICJ and the ICC (the International Criminal Court), Sense -Tribunal < https://www.sense-agency.com/sense.5.html > [Accessed on 12 March, 2014].
125 Ibid.
developed in the aftermath of the genocide through the exhibition titled ‘Srebrenica Genocide – The Failure of the International Community.’ The permanent exhibition is an integral segment of the larger project that included the reconstruction of the Dutchbat headquarter, setting up the exhibition and the capacity building of the Memorial Centre Potočari-Srebrenica.126

The work on the exhibition is described as an attempt to develop ‘a common narrative’ on a basis of existing facts and figures, but also to present ‘multiple narratives’ about Srebrenica of both the Dutch veterans and survivors of the genocide. The narrative forms displayed at the exhibition that provide accounts of Dutchbat veterans is comprised of photo and video collections made by the veterans, survivors and by well-known photographers from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Netherlands; it also incorporates Cinema for Peace collection; Collection of the Gallery 11/07/1995 based in Sarajevo; as well as the recorded statements of veterans. Situated in the reconstructed compound of the Dutchbat headquarters which also includes the reconstruction of General Karremans’ office, the exhibition merges with the space with preserved graffiti of the Dutchbat soldiers inscribed during the war. Those also include offensive graffiti, which produced controversy and inspired the widely-known artwork ‘Bosnian Girl’, co-authored by local artists Šejla Kamerić and Tarik Samarah.

As the organisers describe, one of the important aspects of the development of this project, was the establishment of close cooperation between the associations of Srebrenica survivors, the bereaved families and the Dutchbat veterans, throughout the process of collection of artefacts and testimonies. The co-work of associations was mediated by the Dutch Nongovernmental peace organisation PAX. Both the exhibition and the capacity building were designed by the team of professionals from National Memorial Centre Kamp Westerbork from the Netherlands in cooperation with the PAX, while the capacity building also included experts from the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA hereinafter).

126 ‘The multi-projects program ‘focused on the development of the Potočari Memorial Centre titled ‘The Dutch Contribution to the Potocari Memorial Centre second phase,’ was implemented from 2014 to 2016, Memorial Centre Srebrenica-Potočari <https://www.potocarime.org> [accessed on 22 February, 2017].
5.9. Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter, which draws on a myriad of sources, traces the transformation of the relatively prosperous socialist town Srebrenica to the place haunted with the memory of the genocide committed against the local non-Serbs, mainly Bosniac population, in July 1995.

Focused on the aftermath of the genocide and the mass expulsion, this chapter first sketches the recent history of the town. It provides a brief overview of the ways in which some of the major changes that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia led to a deterioration of the economy and politics in the town and Podrinje region; the outburst of war violence and the humanitarian disaster which both residents and refugees from the surrounding area of the Podrinje region faced in the besieged Srebrenica, and which impelled the proclamation of the UN ‘safe zone’ Srebrenica under the UNPROFOR protection in 1993; the attack of the Bosnian Serb Army in July 1995 and the failure of the Dutchbat and the international community to prevent the genocide.

My analysis, in which I carefully examined and compared a range of sources, then focuses on the aftermath of the genocide, and the endeavours of the survivors to break the silence about the war atrocities, and to search for more than 8000 people, mostly men and boys, who went missing after the fall of Srebrenica. Within this long and ongoing process, which encompasses the first protests of formal and non-formal groups of the survivors before the international organisations in Sarajevo, the ICTY trials, the building of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial, and annual commemorations, main three stages in the construction of the narrative about the Srebrenica genocide can be distinguished: public activism, the legal turn, and the memory turn. Due to the centrality of the Srebrenica genocide in the process of tracing the legal and cultural aspects of dealing with the atrocities committed during the 1992-1996 war, and the internationalisation of the debate about the Srebrenica genocide, the outline of different stages of the process of the narrative construction provide valuable insights into some of the main cultural and legal processes in local, regional and international contexts. Specifically, drawing on the complementary analyses of Isabele Delpla, Lara Nettelfield and Ger Dujizing, who are in their respective studies concerned with the different aspects of this process, the outline depicts the development of the ICTY and its relationship
with the associations of survivors and families of the missing persons, associations’ public
actions, and the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide.

The overview of the process of the construction of narratives about the Srebrenica
genocide depicts legal, social and cultural practices which reveal the endeavours of various
actors involved in the search for missing persons in Srebrenica, and to build an on-site
memorial in which those whose bodies were retrieved and identified could be buried and
commemorated. In relation to the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide, these stages
clearly reflect the alteration of memory practices from a bottom-up to a top-down approach,
and the ways in which sectional memory was appropriated and incorporated into local,
regional and international official memory. At the same time, the stages of development
demonstrate the impact of the activism of women’s associations on the construction of the
memory of other war events, including the counter-commemoration in Kravica. They also
trace some significant changes in the persistent politics of the denial of the Srebrenica
genocide as well as the ways in which they are challenged in local, regional and international
contexts.

A brief overview of legal approaches to crimes committed between 11 and 19 July
1995 in the UN safe zone Srebrenica indicates to what extent the genocide in Srebrenica has
influenced international law and the work of transnational agencies such as the UN and the
EU. Consequently, it shifted political discourses in the country, region and in international
contexts. The questions concerned with legal and political accountability instigated several
national inquiries and brought legal cases to the national courts (i.e. ‘Nuhanović v. the
Netherlands’). The controversies and developments after the fall of Srebrenica in 1995 also
demonstrate the predominance of legal language in the general process of dealing with the
legacy of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The legal aspect encompasses justice initiatives,

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127 The genocide survivor Hasan Nuhanović, was employed as an interpreter the Dutchbat compound in 1995. As an employee of the United Nations Nuhanović could be evacuated together with the Dutchbat, but not his family who sought refuge in the compound after the fall of Srebrenica. Nuhanović has sued the Netherlands and the United Nation in 2008 for sending away from the compound his parents and minor brother. The father of Hasan Nuhanović, Ibro was one of the three civilians that accompanied the Dutchbat General to the meeting on 12 July with General Mladić in order to negotiate the safe departure of refugees after the Serb forces overtook UN safe zone Srebrenica. Ibro was allowed to stay, but he refused to stay without his wife and younger son. After they left the compound, all the members of Hasan’s family were murdered by the Serb forces. In September 2013, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands found the Netherlands liable on the grounds of wrongful conduct for the death of his family. ‘The State of the Netherlands v Hasan Nuhanović’ (2013) The Supreme Court of the Netherlands, <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad-der-Nederlanden/Supreme-court-of-the-Netherlands/Documents/12%2003324.pdf> [accessed 17 July 2017]
which are commonly prompted as responses to serious human rights violations. Subsumed into the diverse field of transitional justice, these include criminal trials, requests for justice and reparation, commemoration and truth commissions.\textsuperscript{128} These practices provide valuable insights into the construction of the Srebrenica genocide and reveal different interpretations of the events of the war. The existing interpretative frameworks continue to shape dynamic and shifting relationships between different agencies involved in the processes of the construction of the narratives about the genocide.

At the same time, both legal and cultural practices indicate difficulties in demarcating the arenas of articulation of war experience and agencies due to exclusivist ethnopolitics which ethnicize identity and space. In addition, the displacement of the population resulted in a small number of returnees, a large number of internally displaced persons and a large diaspora community scattered across the country, and across the globe. Political and structural changes caused by the violence of the war in conjunction with globalization somewhat blurred the distinction between local-national, regional and international, and thus created a unique transnational arena in Srebrenica-Potočari. Additionally, the ‘special relations’ established between different contexts, as in the case of the relation between the Netherlands and Bosnia and Herzegovina reflect the complexity of the process of the construction of an inclusive narrative of the genocide in Srebrenica.

Taking into consideration that the Srebrenica genocide is one of the most investigated and documented war crimes in international law and the most documented war crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the legal aspect, justice and truth initiatives, and political debates that marked the aftermath of Srebrenica inform my analysis of the 15\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide in the subsequent chapter, as well as in the other case studies. However, what distinguishes this from the international arena for articulation of the memory created in Srebrenica, is the existence of a material memorial, which commemorates the victims of the genocide and represents events that occurred shortly before, and during the fall of Srebrenica. Moreover, the presences of local, regional and international, agencies in the Srebrenica-Potočari memorial complex, and the fusion of different interventions in the desolate space of

the Battery factory, in which the memorial is located, suggests the flux of the process of construction of the narrative about the Srebrenica genocide.

The permanent exhibition and the information and media centre are mainly framed around the transitional justice approach, and focused on representation of the facts and on the stages of the processes involved in finding the missing.

Some other interventions which are opening space for reflection include: unsettling photos of survivors, the *Bosnian Girl* poster, which re-engages with the offensive graffiti of the Dutchbat soldiers, and the preserved hate-mongering drawings of the Bosnian Serb soldiers that were inscribed during the war. Within the space of the Memorial filled with contents and media which aim to inform and educate, is a differently conceptualised approach, specifically the text titled ‘Srebrenica After Commemoration: Towards a Politics of Revenge,’ written by Boris Buden and exhibited as a part of the exhibition ‘Twenty years after the genocide: Srebrenica Today,’ that was displayed in the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial in 2015. Specifically, the exhibition comprised of eight two-sided posters, of which each contains a story about life in Srebenica today narrated by a recent resident of Srebrenica, on one side of the poster, and a text written by artists, cultural or art theorists, on the other side. Buden’s text intervenes and breaks with the guided process and reflection, and invites visitors to engage and further their understanding of the memorial and commemorative practices in general. He addresses some of the limitations of the transitional justice paradigm, and by focusing on a broad concept of the culture of commemoration, which as Buden asserts remembers the past only as a mirror image of the present (…) If on one side, the current culture of commemoration has reduced the highly complex political conflict, emerged out of the collapse of historical communism and Yugoslav federal state, to a totally abstract and non-political relation between perpetrators and victims, it has, on the other side, completely recognised general political outcome of this conflict. The culture of commemoration articulates itself totally in accordance with the political paradigm that was established as the result of war and crime. ¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Boris Buden, ‘Srebrenica After Commemoration: Towards a Politics of Revenge,’ in Christiane Erharter (ed) *Twenty years after the genocide: Srebrenica Today* (Erste Stiftung Foundation, 2015). Buden’s text was published in both English and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian as a part of the exhibition and publication project *Srebrenica Today*, which was shown on 11 July 2015 at the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Centre.
Frequently addressed limitations of the ‘one fits-all model’ of the transitional justice paradigm, and the issues such as the myopic image of the past retained by the culture of commemoration, which results, as Buden suggests, in extracting politics out of memory, are tackled in the emerging memory practices and interventions engendered in 2012. Particularly, they are at the core of the four-year long work of the Monument Group, whose theoretically informed memory practices explicitly challenge the limitations of the predominant transitional justice paradigm and signal the novel politics of memory turn in BiH and in the wider post-Yugoslav space.
CHAPTER 6
15th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide

This chapter examines the different memory practices that constitute the commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide that span the period from 8 to 13 July, 2010, and the counter-commemoration organised in the nearby village Kravica, held on 12 July, 2010.

6.1. Introduction

The commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide includes three commemorative practices. The first is a protest march that has been organised since 2005 titled ‘Peace March – to freedom via death route’ that starts on 8 July and finishes on 10 July, when the marchers arrive at the Memorial Complex Potočari-Srebrenica. Most of the marchers take part in the preparatory activates for the annual central ceremony scheduled for 11 July, which usually as encompasses a similar programme of commemoration. This includes commemorative speeches, religious prayers, and the mass burial of victims. The third commemorative practice, which Wagner and Nettelfield designate as the ‘memorial journey’ was organized on July 13, 2010. Since 2007, the members of the four women’s associations from Srebrenica, Sarajevo and Tuzla, who initiated the ‘journey’, visit the sites of detention and mass executions of the victims of the genocide to raise awareness of the crimes committed there. This includes the following organisations: the Association ‘Movement of the Mothers of Enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa,’ the Association of Citizens ‘The Mothers of Srebrenica and Podrinje,’ the Association of Citizens ‘Women of Srebrenica,’ and the Association of Citizens ‘Srebrenica Mothers’.

The reconstruction and the analysis of the commemorative practices from 2010 are supported by a number of primary sources that include academic accounts, activists accounts, civic journalism, and official documents and reports. My primary sources also include accessible audio-visual material, a private visit to the memorial that I undertook during my

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1 Also translated as the ‘Peace March – to freedom via route of death’ it was initiated in 2005 by survivors of the genocide who fled through the woods.
work on the chapter, which is documented through photographs, and the reports about commemoration in the daily newspapers.

The counter commemoration refers to the annual commemoration, which is organised by the political authorities of the BH Entity Republic of Srpska and local war veterans’ association in the nearby village of Kravica, on 12 July, 2010, to commemorate Serb civilian and military victims from the Srebrenica municipality who died during the Second World War and during the war in the 1990s. Since the first commemoration organised in 2005, Kravica became one of the main sites of the counter-narrative of the Srebrenica genocide. Kravica is also one of the sites of torture and mass execution of over 1000 men from the column fleeing through the woods in 1995.

The debates about the Srebrenica genocide and the process of establishing the facts and truth about the genocide and the commemoration of the genocide are sufficiently explored in both non-academic and academic research. The latter encompasses disciplinary, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary studies which deploy different approaches and theoretical concepts to examine various aspects and agencies involved in the process of dealing with the legacy of the genocide, and of the 1992-1996 war.

This includes historical accounts concerned with the causes of the genocide in 1995\(^2\) interdisciplinary studies focused on the ongoing, agonizing process of searching for the missing, commemoration of the victims of the genocide, and the production of the knowledge about the genocide.\(^3\) Anthropological research has primarily focused on the complex relationships between displacement and the dynamics involved in re-producing Bosnian and Herzegovinian diasporic identity and memory.\(^4\) while feminist studies have focused on the special relationships between Srebrenica and the Netherlands through exploration of the notion of ‘Srebrenica trauma’ and masculinities in the Dutch context.\(^5\) The authors work with different documents, and historical records that were preserved during the horrendous war violence.

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\(^2\) Dujizings, ‘History and Reminders in East Bosnia,’ NIOD; Dujizings, ‘Commemorating Srebrenica.’
\(^3\) Nettelfield and Wagner, *Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide.*
\(^5\) Zarkov, ‘Srebrenica Trauma.’
They collect and analyse various uncompleted, and often disputed data, and contribute to the production of new data.

Their accounts shed light on the continuous endeavours of those members of the pre-war community who survived the genocide, to break the silence about the genocide, to address war crime and injustice, and to re-establish their lives in Srebrenica after the genocide. The long and conflicted process of construction of the space for memory of the genocide reflects the vast changes of the country’s post-war landscape.

One of the limitations in this analysis is an evident discord in organisation of narratives. There is a significant lack of academic and non-academic accounts that provide essential information about the counter-commemoration in Kravica, and about the agencies that construct this narrative. Closer insight into the ways in which the counter-commemoration in Kravica in 2010 is represented is limited to an examination of the media reporting.

The first part of this chapter briefly presents Halilovich, Nettelfield and Wagner’s interpretations of the shifting relationships between place, identity and memory through displacement. Different memory practices which commemorate the 15th anniversary of Srebrenica, also reflect different experiences after the fall of the ‘safe zone Srebrenica.’

The second part of the analysis is methodically organised in two interconnected analyses of the commemoration of the 15th anniversaries of the Srebrenica genocide and the counter-commemoration of Serb victims of the war(s) in Kravica. Within the first part I study three events organised by different agencies to commemorate one of the major anniversaries of the Srebrenica genocide in 2010. Specifically, the commemorative events that span the period from 8 to 13 July 2010 include: The Peace March; the Central Commemoration and burial of 775 victims at the Potočari-Srebrenica Memorial; and the Memorial Convoy. The second part of the analysis is focused on the counter-commemoration in Kravica.

6.2. (Dis)Placing Memory of the Srebrenica Genocide

In their interdisciplinary research, Lara Nettelfield and Sarah Wagner examine the relationship between site and memory in relation to the annual commemorations held at the
Srebrenica–Potočari memorial. The authors generally explore the ways in which public remembrance of Srebrenica forged knowledge about its past, through the commemorative practices demonstrated at the remembrance of the 15th anniversary of the genocide in 2010 at the Potočari Memorial, which they see as a place ‘through which people move and, through that movement, remember’ rather than as a static place.⁶

Accordingly, Nettelfield and Wagner describe public practices of commemoration and the collective burial of the victims as reconvening and re-grounding the community of those who survived crimes and who were expelled from their homes and places during the war. They underpin their claims by drawing on Halilovich’s arguments developed in his analysis of mass burial and commemoration of the victims of war crimes committed in Prijedor in 1992. Specifically, he emphasises the importance of the commemorative practices and reassembling, which he describes as

> crucial steps in regaining control over their memories in place, even if they now live thousands of kilometres away. The return of the dead becomes a symbolic return of those who survived. By re-burying the dead, survivors are re-grounding themselves – their identities, life stories and communities – in the place that was taken away from them.’

Nettelfield and Wagner develop Halilovich’s argument further in relation to the commemoration of the genocide in the Potočari-Srebrenica Memorial, and describe the nexus of memory and movement in the following manner

> [p]eople travel to remember, often across oceans and time zones; they squeeze their bodies into the suffocating, tight crowds assembled in the memorial centre each July 11 to remember; they walk some 20 kilometres a day for three days, retracing the steps of the men and boys who tried to escape, in order to remember; they board buses bound for the sites of detention and execution to remember.⁷

Movement, described here through three different commemorative rituals from 2010 also includes permanent or temporal return when mourners ‘repopulate’ the town and surrounding villages for few days. Nettelfield and Wagner suggest that movement and mourning ‘encourages recollection of life before war’ and ‘enables reunion otherwise impossible or highly infrequent.’⁸

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⁶ Nettelfield and Wagner, *Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide.*
⁷ Ibid. p.38.
⁸ Ibid. p.45.
Additionally, the cemetery of the Potočari-Srebrenica Memorial is, as the authors describe, purposely designed to ‘further reveal itself.’ This site of mass burial and commemoration, which is originally designed in the shape of a ‘flower’, has significantly transformed since 2003 with every July 11 and new mass burial of identified victims of the genocide. Specifically, ‘the flower’ grows after a separate section of lawns designated as ‘petals’ expand with hundreds of new white tombstones.

This metaphor of transformation, nature and innocence, which is symbolised through the architectural design, is further enhanced by the design of a symbol of commemoration designated as a ‘remembrance flower,’ which soon became widely known as the ‘Srebrenica flower’. According to the president of the women’s crocheting association from the Bosnian-Herzegovinian town Gračanica who designed and promoted the crocheted flower in 2011, it symbolises remembrance of the victims of the Srebrenica genocide, but it also conveys a universal message for peace. As she describes it, the green centre of the flower signifies hope and ‘awakening’, while the white of the eleven petals that stand for July 11, 1995, signifies innocence and thus symbolize the innocent victims of the genocide. Wearing the ‘Srebrenica flower’ thus demonstrates acknowledgment of the genocide, paying respect to the victims of the genocide and expressing compassion with the families and friends who lost their beloved ones in this horrendous war crime.

6.3. The 15th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide, 11 July 2010

The resolutions on the Srebrenica genocide adopted prior to the 15th anniversary of the genocide have shifted official politics towards, and within post-Yugoslav space. The first resolution on Srebrenica was adopted in 2005, after the material evidence of crimes committed in July 1995 in the UN safe zone Srebrenica was presented throughout the trial against Krstić, where in the Appeals Judgement Prosecutor vs. Krstić from April 2004, the ICTY recognized the Srebrenica massacre as genocide.

9 Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, p. 43.
10 With its look and symbolism, the ‘Srebrenica flower’ resembles the ‘White Poppy’, a flower that commemorates all victims of the war, and symbolises commitment to peace and a challenge to glamorise and celebrate war. White poppies have been worn in the UK for over eighty years at the Alternative Remembrance Sunday Ceremony.
The European Parliament Resolution from 2005 that prepared the ground for the subsequent resolutions from 2009 and 2015, has termed the ‘tragedy’ in the UN safe haven Srebrenica, in accordance with the ICTY decision, as an act of genocide. It highlighted the European future of the ‘Western Balkans’ and specified clear directives to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, which among others included the request for closer cooperation with the ICTY as one of the main preconditions for cooperation with the EU. While some of the positive steps of the Serbian government were recognised, among the clear directives for cooperation is a call to Republic of Srpska, Serbia and Montenegro to bring those responsible for the war crimes to justice, and specifically the ‘two most prominent indicted persons’ Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, who were then still at large. The European Parliament condemned the Srebrenica massacre, and expressed ‘its condolences to and solidarity with the families of the victims, many of whom are living without final confirmation of the fate their fathers, sons, husbands or brothers’. It also invited the Council and Commission to pay remembrance to the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, and expressed its disappointment in the failure of the Serbian Parliament to recognize and condemn the Srebrenica massacre given that a considerable part of Serbian public opinion does not recognize war crimes that were committed against ‘Muslim civilians’. Accordingly, the European Parliament invited the government to ‘curb the hero-worship of indicated war crimes’.11 In the closing paragraphs of the resolution, the European Parliament underlines the importance of policies of reconciliation, and emphasizes the important role of the religious authorities, the media and educational system in this difficult process, so that civilians of all ethnicities may overcome the tensions of the past and begin a peaceful and sincere coexistence fit for enduring stability and economic growth; in this respect asks for consideration to be given to establishing a truth and reconciliation commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.12

The next resolution of the European Parliament from 2009,13 which institutionalized July 11 as the official day of remembrance of the Srebrenica Genocide all over the EU, was followed by the Declaration on Srebrenica adopted in 2010 after a 13 hour-long debate by a narrow

12 Ibid.
majority of representatives in the National Assembly of Serbia.\textsuperscript{14} Although in the four paragraphs of the Declaration, the Assembly condemns the crimes committed in Srebrenica over the Bosniak population, expresses its condolences to the families of the victims, and apologises for not doing everything in its power to prevent the crimes, it does not use the term genocide. The wording of the Declaration faced criticism from the representatives of the European Parliament, who described the declaration as ‘the smallest possible step that was taken, adding that until the crimes are given their proper descriptions the goal will not be reached, and a proper apology will not be given.’\textsuperscript{15} Strong criticism also came from numerous activists, representatives of those NGO organizations, intellectuals and politicians in Serbia who have continuously and ardently criticized the inaction of the Serbian government to condemn the genocide in accordance with the judgement of the ICTY from 2004 and to break with the regime of Slobodan Milošević.

It is worth mentioning the earlier joint initiative of eight NGOs from Serbia who wrote the text titled ‘The Draft of a Declaration on the State of Serbia’s Obligation to undertake all Measures aimed at protecting the Rights of the Victims of War crimes, Particularly the Rights of the Victims of Srebrenica Genocide,’ in 2005.\textsuperscript{16} This initiative was supported by the International Helsinki Federation (IHF),\textsuperscript{17} and by Žarko Korać and Nataša Mičić, both deputies in the Serbian Parliament who submitted the declaration on behalf of the NGO’s. ‘The Draft of a ‘Declaration on the State of Serbia’s Obligation’ demands that the Parliament formally recognize and condemn the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995 and, as stated in the text of the Declaration, to ‘take all available measures so as to secure full implementation of the provisions of international documents and domestic legislations,’ which are ‘aimed at facing up genocide and war crimes, and assisting the rehabilitation of the victims of genocide and

\textsuperscript{16} ‘The Draft of a Declaration on the State of Serbia’s Obligation to undertake all Measures aimed at protecting the Rights of the Victims of War crimes, Particularly the Rights of the Victims of Srebrenica Genocide,’ (2005) proposed to the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia by the following NGO’s: Belgrade Circle, Centre for Cultural Decontamination, Civic Initiatives, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Humanitarian Law Centre, Layers Committee for Human Rights, Women in Black and Youth Initiative for Human Rights < https://www.helsinki.org.rs> [accessed on 28 April, 2016].
\textsuperscript{17} ‘The Need for Accountability Regarding Srebrenica,’ The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), \textit{Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia}, 30 May 2005 < https://www.helsinki.org.rs/tjsrebrenica_t05.html > [accessed on 28 April, 2016].
their families.\textsuperscript{18} However, the Serbian Parliament rejected the suggested ‘The Draft of a Declaration on the State of Serbia’s Obligation.’ While some commentators have seen the disagreement about the wording of the draft of the declaration as the main reason for the rejection, the initiators of the declaration strongly criticised the rejection which they described as the fear that an ‘acknowledgment of the Srebrenica crimes would implicate those parties who sit in the Parliament.’\textsuperscript{19} Additionally, one of the publicly stated reasons for the rejection that was directly related to the political dynamics at that time, refers to the fear that was associated with the possible negative impact of the declaration in which the Serbian government condemns and clearly states that the genocide was committed in Srebrenica on the then ongoing case of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro successor state) for its aggression on the country.\textsuperscript{20} Accordingly, the critics perceived this fear as absurd, and explained that ‘if the International Court of Justice rules in favour of Bosnia and Herzegovina we will have to pay reparations and we cannot avoid it by denying or refusing to adopt the declaration.’\textsuperscript{21} Additionally, some of the critics of the Parliament’s decision describe the declaration as ‘a moral act, which could not be used in the International Court of Justice,’\textsuperscript{22} and clarifying that the ‘policy, which resulted in the massacre of 7,800 Bosniaks in Srebrenica was created in Belgrade,’ is one of the main reasons ‘why it is so difficult to accept responsibility and offer an apology - from the place where the whole project was devi[s]ed’.\textsuperscript{23} However, the law suit of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia was rejected by the ICTY in 2007.

After the long debate over the declaration in 2010,\textsuperscript{24} the new initiative of the then President Boris Tadic,\textsuperscript{25} resulted in the adoption of the ‘Declaration on Condemnation of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} ‘The Draft of a Declaration on the State of Serbia’s Obligation,’ (2005), p. 3-6.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ljiljana Smajlovic, ‘The Genocidal Circle Completes: Srebrenica as a Fate,’ \textit{The NIN Weekly}, 3 June, 2005 <https://www.helsinki.org.rs/tjsrebrenica_t03.html> [accessed on 30 April, 2016].
\item \textsuperscript{21} Statement of Biljana Kovačević Vučo, was then the president of the Human Rights Lawyers Committee, drafted the text of the NGOs’ declaration in Vucenic, ‘Serb Parliament Rejects Srebrenica Declaration,’ IWPR.
\item \textsuperscript{22} The statement of Vojin Dimitrijević, the then director of the Belgrade Centre for Humanitarian Law in Vucenic, ‘Serb Parliament Rejects Srebrenica Declaration,’ IWPR.
\item \textsuperscript{23} The statement of Žarko Korać, deputy in the National Assembly of Serbia in Vucenic, ‘Serb Parliament Rejects Srebrenica Declaration,’ IWPR.
\item \textsuperscript{24} The President Tadić was elected in 2008.
\end{itemize}
crimes committed in Srebrenica, by the Serbian Parliament on 31 March, 2010. Containing ambiguous terms, the adopted Declaration faced strong criticism from the political opposition in Serbia, from the international community, survivors of the Srebrenica genocide, members of survivor’s associations, and from activists. Accordingly, one of the initiations of the draft declaration from 2005, Nataša Kandić argues that ‘[t]his state has recognised the genocide and accepted responsibility for it under the condition that it does not use the word “genocide,”’ but rather, camouflaged it with a reference to the ruling of the International Court of Justice.’

While the The International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) underlines that

‘[t]he Srebrenica declaration remains silent or ambiguous on some important issues, such as the number of people killed and the terminology to describe the crimes. Silence or ambiguity plays into the hands of historical revisionism a troubling phenomenon in Europe, as Holocaust deniers and neo-Nazis prove quite often.’

In the following period, most of the activists continued with their various political and artistic practices which problematized the government’s lack of will to take moral and political responsibility and make a clear statement about the crimes committed in Serbia’s name during the Yugoslav Wars. The NGOs from Serbia continued with building solidarity with other formal and informal organisations across the post-Yugoslav space through dialogue and cooperation in order to acknowledge the crimes committed during the wartime and to provide support to the victims of the crimes and to the bereaved families. Some of these activities are evident in the commemoration of 2010.

6.4. The Peace March – To Freedom via Death Route, 8-10 July 2010

Altogether, the new political dynamics and events of 2010 were strongly reflected at the annual commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide in 2010, the year in which 775 men and boys were collectively buried at the cemetery of the Potočari –

29 ‘Serbian Declaration in Srebrenica Massacre an Imperfect but Important Step,’ ICTJ.
Srebrenica Memorial Centre. This is the highest number of identified victims of the genocide and biggest collective burial since the opening of the cemetery.

The commemoration of the victims of the genocide in 2010 already started on 8 July with a group of participants gathered for the memorial march titled ‘Peace March –to freedom via death route’ in a nearby hamlet Nezuk. Over the following three days they retraced the route through the woods, in which of thousands of men and boys from the original column perished fifteen years ago. Yet, although the route was followed closely, it was not the exact route of the original column from 1995.

The Peace March was initiated by the survivors of the original column who fled in 1995 and who both organise and participate in the Peace March. The survivors are mainly men of different ages who have suffered horrendous violence and hunger on their flight to free territory, a long journey which for some survivors lasted 6 days while others spent more than 60 days in an attempt to find their way out of territory under the control of Serb forces. Many of survivors were badly injured. Also, they had witnessed the murders of their family members, friends, and neighbours. Some of the survivors witnessed rapes of young women that Serb soldiers captured after the fall of the safe haven Srebrenica.

As the official statement reads, which was disseminated in numerous media reports, the March is a form of protest against the slow pace of justice. Thus, through marching, survivors, activists and other supporters are inviting the local and international authorities to act faster and to bring to justice those indicted for war crimes committed during the war, which is, as stated by the organisers, one of the essential prerequisites for building lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

During the march, the participants have a unique opportunity to encounter survivors of the genocide and to engage with the living memory of the horrors they had previously learned about through different forms of representation. There are many participants who have supported the Peace March regularly since 2005. On the other hand, the survivors experience

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30 in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian languages, ‘Marš mira – putem smrti do slobode.’
31 Netelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, 56.
32 Ibid., p. 53.
the Peace March differently. Some of them have participated every year since 2005, others needed a long time to come back to the place which invokes so many painful memories, and they have joined the March for the first time in 2010. Also, during the Peace March some survivors were eager to talk to participants and to the media about their experiences from 1995 during the three–day long journey, while others remained quiet.

The organisers describe the Peace March as ‘a protest campaign of [an] open character, with international participation’.

It gathers support from a large number of Bosnian-Herzegovinians, of whom the majority were Bosniaks, from all over the country, participants from the Post-Yugoslav region, and from different parts of the world. The arrival in the village Nezuk, the place where some of the first survivors of the ‘death route’ arrived, is a symbolic tribute to the victims of the genocide for some groups of participants. Thus, some organised groups of participants from Bosnia and Herzegovina walk for hundreds of kilometres from their hometowns (i.e. Konjic, Bihać, Tuzla) to Srebrenica, to join the March, while other organised groups such as groups of motorcyclists and cyclists from the country, the region and other parts of Europe are also start their journey to honour the victims of genocide a few days earlier.

The sixth Peace March in 2010 had the largest number of participants thus far, more than 5,000 boys, girls, men and women of all ages were registered. They came individually or in organised groups from different parts of BiH, but also from Croatia, France, Italy, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other parts of the world. As reported, among the ‘members of diaspora, the

36 Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide.
37 For in 2011 the marathon from Vukovar in Croatia to Srebrenica is organised; also, cyclists from Bihać (BiH) and Belgrade were cycling in organised group to Srebrenica. In 2014, the group of Women in Black activists and cyclists was attacked by supporters of the war criminals who had beaten activists gathered to commemorate victims of the Srebrenica genocide in the Serbian town Valjevo, on their journey to Srebrenica. This is not the first attack on the Women in Black activists who are challenging the official politics of denial, and who have organised commemorative protests to raise awareness about the genocide in Srebrenica since the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
38 It is worth mentioning that in some years the time of the Peace March concurs with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, when the believers are fasting and they are abstinent from all food and liquid from the sunrise to the sunset. Thus, the strict fasting during the daytime in the summer lasts over 15 hours.
39 While some sources (newspapers, reports, scholar accounts) stated that they were 5000 participants, others assessed that around 7000 people participated in the Peace March 2010.
local and international media, activists, scholars, artists, hiking enthusiasts, are also the students of the International Summer University Srebrenica who have participated in the Peace March since 2010, when the Summer University was established.

As stated in the guidelines at the official website of the Peace March, the organisers try to ensure a safe and welcoming environment for all participants, but they also expect the Peace March participants to be respectful to the locals from the villages they are passing through and ‘to pass gracefully, in peace and order’. At the very start of the journey the participants are informed that the Peace March is not a religious manifestation and to respect all villagers, particularly the inhabitants of Serb villages along the route of the march. Nettelfield, Wagner and representatives of Women in Black who participated in the March describe that among marchers were groups of participants from Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The members of these groups, as they describe, wore religious insignia and rang religious slogans to which, in some cases, some Bosnian-Herzegovinian marchers responded with humorous comments. No incident was registered during the Peace March 2010. Most of the considered reports and organiser’s announcements highlighted that the irresponsibility and the lack of sensibility for the efforts in re-building trust and re-building relationships in the municipality of Srebrenica after the genocide, could cause numerous problems not only to the organisers who are themselves returnees to Srebrenica, but generally to all of the local population.

The organisational part of the Peace March, which includes coordination and the transportation, food, accommodation, medical aid and security details, is ‘an enormous logistical undertaking.’ Support in organisation for the March in 2010 was provided by numerous volunteers, both individual and organised groups such as the medical team from Tuzla whose staff provided medical aid to participants, as well as the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina who provide tents and transportation services during the Peace March, and the Police Forces of the Republic of Srpska who secure the memorial march and the annual commemoration and burial of the victims in the Memorial Centre.

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41 Summer University Srebrenica <http://www.srebrenica.international> [Accessed on 17 March, 2016]
42 The Peace March, official website.
43 In their account about the Srebrenica commemoration in Srebrenica in 2010, Nettelfield and Wagner report about an incident that occurred during the Peace March in 2009 due to improper behaviour of some of the participants.
45 Joint Army Forces were established after the long defence system reform that has been completed in 2006.
In most of the accounts about the March, the interaction between the Peace March participants and the villagers from some of the villages along the route to the Potočari Memorial is commonly described in a poignant and inspiring manner. Nettelfield and Wagner describe that in the periodic stops during the march in 2010 villagers opened their homes, their yards, and their wells to thousands of marchers passing through. At one such site on the first day, large copper vats of water steamed beside the road as local women prepared tea for the trekkers. (…) At another stop, an old woman clad in the traditional Bosniak garb of dimije walked among the participants holding out a tray of homemade pastries urging people “bujrum” (“help yourself”). These refreshments were a communal display of support, in the most basic and material of senses. Perhaps one of the most touching, coffee was poured into tiny porcelain cups, fildani, and offered by individual households. In the yards of these private residences, the marchers would find a spot of shade, rest, enjoy a conversation or silence, and sip coffee, an enduring gesture of Bosnian hospitality.46

Along the route through the emerald green forests, clear streams, and fields covered with soft green grass in the villages on the way, the images of the distant and recent past are shifting before the eyes of the marchers, from the medieval well-preserved gravestones ‘stećci’, over the warning signs that mark the area covered with landmines, to the signs with details about the mass graves. The signs indicate whether the graves are primary or secondary mass graves and how many incomplete or complete body remains of the victims have been found there. These sites also contain other, in Nettelfield and Wagner’s terms ‘equally unsettling series of commemorative markers’ such as the remains of clothes, shoes and other personal belongings of men and boys killed along the route in July 1995.47

Nettelfield and Wagner describe the Peace March participants who were walking in an opposite direction, towards the Potočari Memorial complex as an act to ‘both document and demand accountability for the suffering of the original fleeing column’.48 Similarly, the participants from the Belgrade-based feminist organisation ‘Women in Black’, who participated in the Peace March for the first time in 2010, vividly describes their experience of retracing the route of the original column

46 Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, p. 57.
47 Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, p. 57.
48 Ibid., p. 54.
in contrast to us, they walked more through the forests and mine fields rather than well-traced paths. It is symbolically like a breath of life, a return of survivors...[but] and only symbolically unfortunately. 49

The Peace March, which is envisaged as an event that conveys messages of peace and tolerance, is described by one of the Women in Black activists in the following way

the atmosphere is so incredible that you do not really think about tiredness. Everyone speaks with everyone, fellow walkers socialize, people stop anywhere of the sides of the path, whenever they feel like it, and offer what they have – coffee, Drina cigarettes, [d]ry fruits, cakes, sardines, etc. People exchange their impressions, explain where they come from, why they came to march, how many times they have participated in this march. 50

In an integral part of the march titled ‘history lessons’ the survivors, politicians, forensic specialists, members of the planning committee, and military leaders shared stories about the route(s) through the woods, about the experiences of the original fleeing column as well as about the mass graves located in the surrounding area. 51 On the final day of the march, on 10 of July, the column walked towards the Potočari-Srebrenica Memorial that marks the end of the Peace March and preparation of the annual commemoration and mass burial. In 2010, the president of the Presidency of BiH Haris Silajdžić and the Ambassador of the USA, Charles English, joined to the marchers in the last part of the route, and symbolically supported their protest against the slow process of bringing to justice many indicted war criminals responsible for the genocide.

Nettelfield and Wagner vividly depict the end of the march, and the moment of the marcher’s arrival at the Memorial. In their terms

[The final stretch was a bittersweet procession: visible was the deep sorrow felt by those who had retraced the steps that had taken – and survived- fifteen years before, and by those who, in welcoming the marchers, were transported back in the heart-wrenching moments of separation of the searing dread that met the phrase “nije došao” (he didn’t come: that is, “nije prešao preko šume,” he didn’t make it through the forest). Tearful eyes and warm embraces between marchers and those awaiting them –family members, neighbours, ex-soldiers, members of the Srebrenica community– brought to the surface the undercurrent of grief, the memory of lives lost and suffering endured. 52

50 ‘Trasom smrti do slobode,’ Women in Black.
51 Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, p. 56.
52 Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, p. 60.
After their arrival at the Memorial complex, most of the marchers joined the other men, mainly family members of the victims, to help them to bear coffins with the remains of the identified victims that were transported on that day from the morgue located in Visoko.\footnote{Visoko is a town in the central part of the country, to which the forensic team from the forensic laboratory located in Tuzla transports the identified remains of the victims. The remains are kept in the town’s cemetery, where the employees of the cemetery prepare the remains for the mass burial in Potočari –Srebrenica Memorial Centre.} On its way to the Potočari-Srebrenica Memorial Centre, a convoy of four trucks carrying the coffins with remains of the victims passed through Sarajevo. A number of citizens from Visoko and Sarajevo, among whom were family members and internally displaced people from Srebrenica, gathered along the road to pay respect to the victims. The coffins were temporarily placed in the battery factory. The men gathered in Potočari-Srebrenica Memorial formed a line to bear the coffins from the factory to the Memorial’s cemetery, where 775 identified victims of the genocide in Srebrenica were collectively buried on the following day, on 11 July 2010.

6.5. The Central Commemoration and Collective Burial of 775 Victims of the Genocide, 11 July 2010

As the Peace March 2010 registered the highest number of the participants from across the globe, the 15\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the genocide was also the most attended of all annual commemorations. As a result, prior to the central commemoration on 11 July 2010, the town Srebrenica and surrounding villages and hamlets, as well as the Memorial Complex were crowded with visitors, including bereaved family members, survivors, peace march participants, local and international politicians, and local, regional and international press that broadcast the commemoration and mass burial.

Bearing in mind the scale of the event and the sensitive political situation in the municipality, all commemorative rites, and particularly the central commemoration on 11 July, were assessed as ‘high risk’ events, and accordingly a high level of security measures were applied. This includes positioning of a number of the Republic of Srpska police officers at the entrances to, and at different locations across the town and the Memorial Complex, in order to secure the area and numerous visitors on the eve of the event, and particularly during the commemoration and the mass burial of the victims of the genocide. Furthermore, the security included the bodyguards of political elites. Nettelfield and Wagner focus on the example of the...
fifty-six person entourage of the Turkish Prime Minister that includes bodyguards. They question the accessibility of the memorial space for bereaved families since, ‘many of whom had been delayed in arriving at the services by the convoys of international representatives and diplomatic personnel.’

It is estimated that nearly 50,000 visitors attended the commemoration that started at the noon with the intonation of the national anthem of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the performance of the music piece ‘Srebrenica inferno’. The commemorative speeches that preceded the religious prayers and collective burial of the victims, were opened by Muharem Osmić, an actor from Tuzla who was standing between the coffins covered with green clothes, and who recited parts from a novel ‘Death and The Darvish’, written in 1966 by one of the most prominent writers of the Yugoslav literature, Meša Selimović, which reads

*Dear brothers and sisters. I want to see each of you and I want each of you to see me. For us to remember each other. (...) You have waited, and wanted for us to be together, to look one another in the eye, sorrowful about the death of an innocent man, and troubled by a crime. And that crime concerns you as well, since you know: whenever someone kills an innocent man, it is as if he killed all men. They have killed all of us countless times, my murdered brothers, but we are horrified when they strike our most beloved. Maybe I should hate them, but I cannot. I do not have two hearts, one for hatred and one for love. The heart that I have knows only grief now. (...) My prayer and my repentance, my life and my dead – all of it belongs to God, creator of the world. But my sorrow belongs to me. (...) Give me the strength to forgive, since he who forgives is greatest. And I know, I know, I know I know, I cannot forget.*

Among the numerous delegations that attended the commemoration were local and state politicians. Specifically, two or three members of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian presidency, and leading politicians from both entities, although as Nettelfield and Wagner describe ‘[i]t was absences that were most telling. In contrast to previous years, there were very few officials from Republika Srpska present’, which they perceive as ‘a sign of the deteriorating political situation within the country and the increasingly pointed stratagem of interpretive denial

54 Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, p. 50.
55 The music theme of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian anthem is composed by the composer from Banja Luka. After long time of dispute over the national anthem, the adopted anthem does not have lyrics.
56 Extract from the video the 15th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide broadcasted by the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Television (BHT) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZy99BEGP2w> [Accessed on 11 June, 2017]; My Italics, the text adapted for the occasion (i.e. brothers and sisters) is originally read in Bosnian language. Original translation in English here is quoted from Meša Selimović, Death and The Darvish, Translated by Bogdan Rakić and Stephen M. Dickey, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1996, p. 200-203.
embraced by the RS president Milorad Dodik, who would seize the opportunity the very next
day to argue that there was no genocide at Srebrenica.\textsuperscript{57} Also, among attendees were also the
presidents and delegations from the neighbouring countries, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro
as well as highly ranked international politicians from France, special delegations of the
president of the USA, Barack Obama, and of the European Parliament.

Among the politicians that addressed family members and visitors gathered at the
musala, the central site of the Memorial’s cemetery, were Haris Silajdžić, Bosniak member and
the then president of the tripartite presidency of BiH; Charles English, the then Ambassador of
the USA who read the letter of the president of the USA Barack Obama; Osman Suljić, the
then Major of Srebrenica and Predrag Petrović; the president of the Assembly of the Srebrenica
Municipality; Valentin Inzko, the HR in BiH; Sadik Omerović, the Minister of the Security of
BiH, Thorbjorn Jagland; General Secretary of the Council of Europe, Yves Laerme; Recep
Erdogan, the then Prime Minister of Turkey; the Prime Minister of Belgium, and the Head of
the then Bosnian-Herzegovinian Islamic Community the Grand Mufti (reis –ul-ulema) Mustafa
Cerić, who also led the religious prayer. In all their speeches the speakers expressed their
condolences and solidarity to the families of the victims, highlighted the magnitude of the
genocide and listed priorities among which one of the main was the arrest of General Ratko
Mladić, who was still at large. Accordingly, Wagner and Nettelfield assert that the
commemoration and its ‘concomitant care for the dead have provided members of the political
elites – both among Bosniak leaders and the international community – with opportunities to
confront publicly the rhetoric of denial [of genocide] and to advance the political agendas for
post-war Bosnia\textsuperscript{58}. After the speeches the midday religious prayer led by the Grand Mufti took
place and was followed by the burial of the victims according to Islamic and Catholic\textsuperscript{59}
conventions.

Besides the local, state, regional and international political elite and dignitaries,
bereaved family members from the country and diaspora, there were numerous representatives
from activist networks. This included activists from Srebrenica, from other parts of the country,
from neighbouring states as well as international activists. Generally, the activists’ attendance

\textsuperscript{57} Nettelfield and Wagner, \textit{Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide}, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{58} Nettelfield and Wagner, \textit{Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide}, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{59} One of the identified victims was Bosnian Catholic, killed together with other men and boys from the column
that tried to escape through the woods. His younger brother was killed in Srebrenica at the beginning of the war,
of the commemoration at the site of reverence and mourning is commonly interpreted as the acknowledgement of the genocide and other crimes committed in the area, and as honouring the victims of the genocide. But some of the activists provided a poignant form of support to bereaved mothers from women’s associations from Srebrenica, and family and friends on this very day when their long-lived hopes that their beloved ones still ‘might come’ were buried together with the few remains that were collected after the fifteen year-long search, from one of the recently identified mass graves.

Accordingly, during the commemorative ceremony, the activists from the Belgrade based activist peace organisation Women in Black, who had attended commemorations since 2003, were standing by the grieving mothers who buried their children, husbands, brothers, and relatives. One activist was supporting a mother, the president of the Association of mothers from Srebrenica who buried in the same day her two underage sons and a husband. Also, among numerous spontaneous interactions and informal gestures recorded at the 15th commemoration of the genocide was the striking moment when this same mother welcomed Boris Tadić, the president of Serbia, upon his arrival to the Potočari Memorial cemetery, and thanked him on behalf of bereaved mothers and families, for coming to pay respect to the victims of genocide and to express his solidarity with the families.

6.6. ‘Memorial journey’: Reopening the “Forgotten” Places of Torture and Mass Execution, 13 July 2010

In 2007, activists from three different associations of the mothers of Srebrenica, namely, the Women of Srebrenica, the Mothers of the enclaves of Srebrenica and Čepa, and the Srebrenica mothers, initiated one more ‘momentum of commemorative activities’. Precisely, they initiated visits to sites in the surrounding area of Srebrenica, Zvornik and Bratunac where some of the worst crimes occurred in July 1995. Additionally, in this area some of the biggest mass graves with remains of the victims of the genocide have been found on the basis of the evidence provided in the testimonies of the few survivors from the massacres committed in these locations, and some of the former soldiers of the VRS.

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60 Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, p. 62.
61 ‘Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović,’ ICTY.
The buses that were organised from Tuzla, Sarajevo and Srebrenica, gathered on 13 July 2010, at the village Konjević Polje. The buses formed a convoy that transported women who were accompanied by activists, local Bosniak politicians, journalists, researchers and the Imam\(^{62}\) of Srebrenica who led prayers at the sites of torture and mass executions. Women also laid wreaths of flowers to honour their beloved ones and all those who ‘didn’t make it’ (oni koji nisu došli) fifteen years earlier.\(^{63}\)

Headed by Republic of Srpska police car, the ‘memorial convoy’ in 2010 visited Agricultural Cooperative warehouse Kravica, two primary schools, one in Grbavci and other in Petkovci, Petkovci Dam; the former military farm in Branjevo and the Pštica Cultural Centre. As Wagner and Nettelfield, who joined the convoy describe, almost all of these places they have visited are today ‘empty warehouses, abandoned school buildings, and open fields – places whose histories are not forgotten but, in most instances, deliberately ignored.’\(^{64}\)

The inaccessibility of these places for the mourners is reflected physically and symbolically and is particularly noticeable in the example of the Kravica warehouse located 15 kilometres northwest of Srebrenica, in the village Kravica in the Bratunac municipality. The village that was a site of clashes between the Bosnian Serb forces and ARBiH that occurred in January\(^{65}\) and in March 1993 is today ‘one of the most ardently nationalist communities in the RS’\(^{66}\). Since 2005 the village is a central site of the counter-commemoration to the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide. Precisely, every year on 12 July the counter-commemorations are organised in few villages and hamlets in Bratunac and Srebrenica municipalities, and in Kravica where the Entity and local governments erected a monument to commemorate all Serbs from Birač\(^{67}\) and the wider Podrinje region killed in both the 1992-1995 and the 1941-1945 wars.

The Kravica warehouse was the first site that the memory convoy visited in 2010. Its unreconstructed facade covered with traces of bullets testifies to the bloodbath that took place

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\(^{62}\) Imam is a worship leader of a local mosque and community.


\(^{64}\) Ibid., p. 63.


\(^{66}\) Nettelfield and Wagner, *Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide*, p. 66.

\(^{67}\) The Birač region includes municipalities of Bratunac, Milići, Srebrenica, Šekovići, Zvornik and Vlasenica.
there on 13 July 1995 when the Serb forces executed between 1000 and 1500 Bosniak men from the column. At the same time, the warehouse was the first physical, social and symbolic barrier that the participants of the convoy continuously faced during the memorial journey. The physical and symbolic inaccessibility of the building, which today ‘exists securely within the bounds of Bosnian Serb proprietorship, in a material and social sense alike’ was reflected through the locked chain-link fence, and the uniformed guards who stood between women and the place in which their beloved ones were tortured and executed fifteen years before. As Nettelfield and Wagner explain, apart from securing the area around the privately owned warehouse complex, the task of the guards was also to prevent interference with the memorial convoy, and any encounter between the local residents and commemoration participants.

The only building to which women were permitted to enter during their journey was the collapsing and abandoned Pilica Cultural Centre in which women found the dried flowers which they left there during their visit the previous year. Those flowers are the only marker of honouring 500 men who were detained, tortured and executed in this place. However, this narrative is bound up with the counter-narrative of the local Serb residents and with the memory of the Second World War. Only a few meters away from the former Pilica Cultural Centre building is the monument to the fallen soldiers of the VRS and residents of Pilica, erected as Wagner and Nettelfield describe ‘literally next, and on top of a World War II monument to Tito’s partisans.’ Thus, while the narrative of murders and torture that occurred within the building are denoted by the bullet holes on the walls of deserted and collapsing building of the pre-war Pilica Cultural Centre, the memory of partisans’ resistance, as Nettelfield and Wagner explain is ‘christened’ through ‘a clumsy yoking of the Orthodox cross with implicitly atheist emblem of the Partisan red star.’

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68 ‘Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić’ (Trial Judgement), ICTY.
69 Ibid., p. 66.
70 However, in the following years, precisely in 2013 women were again denied to access to the Kravica warehouse. A few women were injured in a clash with the policemen who were securing the area, after they broke into the warehouse space, despite the restriction. This incident resulted in criminal charges against few women, mostly the organisers and presidents of the family associations, which were later dismissed at the local court in Srebrenica.
71 Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, p. 68.
72 Ibid., Figure 2.11. ‘Pilica: Memorial to fallen soldiers stands before the dilapidated cultural centre, July 13, 2010. Author photograph,’ p. 68.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., p. 69.
However, this is not the only place where clashing memories are layered in this way. Almost identically, the order of the objects and interventions on the site of torture and murder occurs in the Cultural House in Trnopolje near Prijedor in which the local non-Serb residents were tortured and murdered. The surreal reminder of the socialist era is the pre-war slogan ‘Long Live Comrade Tito’ written in surprisingly well-preserved bright red colour, which dominates the interior of the collapsing Trnopolje Cultural House in which the imprisoned local non-Serbs were held and tortured before the transition to one of the larger death camps in the Prijedor municipality – Omarska, Keraterm or Manjača. Similarly, like in Pilica, in front of the crumbling Trnopolje Cultural House building is the newly erected monument to the fallen soldiers of the VRS. Some of the commemorations of the victims of the horrendous crimes committed in the municipality Prijedor in 1992 provide the focus of the analysis in the chapter eight.

No confrontation between different commemorative groups was recorded on this, one more ‘inverse journey’ as Nettelfield and Wagner describe it. During the deportation in July 1995, women, the initiators of the memory convoy ‘had seen, from the bus windows, groups of captured Bosniak men and boys’, and fifteen years later they ‘found themselves on buses again, this time to memorialize the violence they had watched unfolding.’ As Wagner and Nettelfield explain, the memorial journey organised in 2010, although initiated by women’s associations, entirely depended on international intervention which enabled women to enter ‘into various sites, which in the past had been denied.’ The intervention that occurred mainly because of the political and media focus on one of the major commemorations of the genocide, resulted in limited access to the sites of execution and ensured the security of the visitors.

6.7. The Counter-Memory: the 18th Anniversary of the Murder of Serb Civilians and Soldiers from the Municipalities of Srebrenica and Bratunac, 12 July 2010

The programme of commemoration in 2010 was organised by the agency of the Republic of Srpska called The Committee for Fostering/Preserving the Tradition of the

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75 My observation during the visit to the Trnopolje Cultural Centre (Dom Kulture) in October, 2011, in the scope of the workshop organised by the pan-European network ‘Memory Lab,’ which gathers researchers practitioners, activists and survivors of war atrocity, from the post-Yugoslav space and the wider European context.  
76 Nettelfield and Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, p. 62.  
77 Ibid.
In accordance to the Committee’s programme the commemoration in Kravica is one of 18 of the most important dates in the newer history of the Serb people. The commemoration included visits to the monuments in the surrounding villages, Biljače, Sase, Zalazje and Zagoni, where family members and veteran’s organisations laid flowers to commemorate 69 Serb civilian and military victim killed by the soldiers of the ARBiH on 12 July 1992, on the feast of the Saint Peter (Petrovdan) as stated in the article in the daily Glas Srpske.

The central commemoration that was held at the ‘military cemetery at the memorial Kravica,’ was attended by representatives of the Entity government including the then prime minister Milorad Dodik who addressed the attendees, Jadranka Derajić, general consul of Serbia in Banja Luka, Christopher Bennett, the then deputy of the HR in BiH, as the delegation of the Serb Progressive Party from Serbia led by Aleksandar Vučić. At the commemoration, the family members, representatives of veteran’s associations and delegates laid wreaths at the memorial and light candles to honour the victims, both civilian and military. Also, an orthodox priest led the Parastos for 3267 Serb civilians and soldiers murdered in Podrinje.

In the central part of the circular memorial is a black, seven-metre concrete cross inscribed with the coat of arms of the Entity of Republic of Srpska and the text that reads

Memorial to fallen combatants and civilian victims of the defensive and fatherland war and to Serb victims of the Second World War from the Birač and Srednje Podrinje

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78 In Bosnian and Croatian: Odbor za njegovanje tradicije oslobodilačkih ratova Vlade Republike Srpske. The name is almost identical to the state agency ‘The Committee for Fostering/Preserving the Tradition of the Serbia’s Wars’ from Serbia (In Serbian: Odbor za negovanje tradicija oslobodilačkih ratova Srbije), which every year organises commemorative events in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo to commemorate crimes committed against Serbs orli Fridman, ‘Alternative Calendars and Memory Work in Serbia: Anti-War Activism after Milošević’, Memory Studies, 8 (2015), 212-226.


80 ‘Parastos za 3.267 ubijenih Srba’, Glas Srpske, 12 July 2010, Media Centre Archive [accessed in September, 2014], p. 4.; ‘The article is signed with the journalists’ initials of the first name and family name - K.Č.

81 Formerly the member of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the Serbian politician Aleksandar Vučić visited the forces that held Sarajevo under siege in 1992-1996, together with the former Serbian president Tomislav Nikolić (SRS). His statements made during his wartime visit that ‘for every Serb killed we will kill 100 Muslims’ are documented in media reports from that period. Today, Vučić whose policies are considered as pro-EU oriented by the international community, won the presidential elections in Serbia in 2017 and replaced Tomislav Nikolić. However, his policies face strong criticism from the opposition in Serbia, and from critics from the Post-Yugoslav and western countries; Robert Fisk, ‘Europe has a Troublingly Short Memory over Serbia’s Aleksandar Vucic’, The Independent, May, 2016 <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/europe-has-a-troublingly-short-memory-over-serbia-s-aleksander-vucic-a7029221.html> [Accessed on 20 June, 2017].

82 Parastos stands for the memorial service for death in the orthodox religious tradition.

83 Parastos za 3.267 ubijenih Srba, Glas Srpske, 12 July 2010.
region of Republic of Srpska. From 1992 to 1995 3267 Serb victims. From 1941 to 1945 6469 victims.⁸⁴

Encircled by three gates each with cross at the top, the memorial was officially opened on 12 July 2005. According to the Balkan Crisis Report (BCR hereinafter) the original plan for the official opening was shifted from August to July 12, 2005 and thus, it concurred with the tenth anniversary of the commemoration of the genocide at the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial. But, it also concurred with the feast of the Saint Peter, the day on which in 1995 ‘General Mladic formally presented “liberated Srebrenica to the Serb people.”’⁸⁵ The opening of the memorial one day after the commemoration of the genocide was criticised by some of the highly ranked representatives of the international community.⁸⁶

*Figure 2 The Memorial Complex in Kravica; Source, Centre for Non-violent Action*


⁸⁶ Ibid.
In his statement for the BCR journal given prior to the official opening of the memorial in 2005, the president of the local branch of the local veterans explained the meaning of the monument in the following way ‘[w]e want to have a place where we can pray for the souls of our victims that will not have political connotations, like the memorial in Potočari.’ Yet, from the selection of the date of the commemoration to the unconfirmed and inflated casualty figures, to the denial of the genocide, and the organised gatherings of the radical groups in Srebrenica on the day of the commemoration in Kravica, the counter-commemoration in Bratunac remained a highly politicised event. Every 12 July, since 2005, some of the radical groups that include visitors from different part of the country and from Serbia, on their way to the Kravica commemoration, gather on the streets of Srebrenica to celebrate the ‘liberation of Srebrenica’. These groups chant nationalist songs that celebrate Četnik’s movement; they wear Četnik’s insignia glorifying those identified as war criminals and t-shirts that celebrate Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, both of whom were sentenced for the genocide in Srebrenica before the ICTY in 2017, and Vojislav Šešelj, who is also prosecuted at the ICTY.

The hostility demonstrated over previous years in the streets of Srebrenica, and public glorification of those accused of war crimes, resonates with experiences from 1996, and hostility towards the members of women’s association during their first visits to Srebrenica after the genocide, and commemorations of their beloved ones who were killed and buried in the besieged Srebrenica, and those who went missing after the genocide. Since then, the contrasting narratives about the Srebrenica genocide have gradually taken different forms and become more integrated. One of the great shifts occurred with the return of the survivors after the establishment of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial, which transformed the mono-ethnic spaces created after the genocide in Srebrenica and its surrounding municipalities. It also altered the course of the politics in both Entities, but also in the wider post-Yugoslav region, and in international contexts.

87 Jelacic, ‘Serbs Subvert Srebrenica Commemoration,’ BCR, IWPR.
88 During the Yugoslav Wars and in its aftermath, Šešelj has become one of the most controversial right-wing politicians, leader of the Serb Radical Party, and a military leader of the paramilitary troops from Serbia who fought in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. He is also addressed as Vojvoda which is a commander in the Četnik’s movement. After he was temporary released from the ICTY prison due to his poor health, he came back to Serbia where he continues his political engagement, mainly characterised with war rhetoric and discrediting the ICTY. Šešelj ran for the presidential elections in 2017.
Some of these changes were strongly demonstrated in 2010, when for the first time the Republic of Srpska police prohibited the gathering of radical groups in Srebrenica, in order to respect the grief of bereaved families, neighbours and friends, both permanent inhabitants and visitors who buried their beloved ones only a day earlier. As stated in the daily *Dnevni Avaz*, the ambassador of the United States personally guaranteed the bereaved families that the gatherings of radical groups would be prevented. As reported, in 2010 only a few visitors from Serbia stayed in the town before continuing on to the central commemoration in Kravica.

Yet, an incident related to the gathering of the radical groups prior to the commemoration in Kravica, was registered in nearby Bratunac, when the local police intervened and blocked a gathering. The protestors were allowed to attend the commemoration under the condition that they remove all offensive insignia that glorifies war crimes and war criminals before joining the central commemoration. However, as stated in the same article, during the commemoration and the speech of Milorad Dodik, the members of the radical groups held up banners with slogans that read ‘Tadić [Boris] is not Serbia’ and ‘Srpska [Republic] is not genocidal’. During his speech, the then RS Prime Minister Dodik reflected on one of the banners and confirmed that the Republic of Srpska is not genocidal. In his speech, he stated that mass crimes had been committed in Srebrenica during the war, but he denied that it was the genocide as the ICTY ruled. Additionally, Dodik claimed that if there was genocide that was committed during the war, it was a genocide committed over the Serb people from Podrinje, where the mass killing of women, children and elderly occurred. In accordance with his statement Dodik assessed the existing justice process as selective, and described the approaches of the main institutions of justice, namely the ICTY and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina as biased. Later in his speech Dodik emphasized that the only suspect for the crimes committed against Serbs in Podrinje, the commander of the ARBiH Naser Orić, was

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90 ‘Prvi put od povratka 12. jula nije bilo orgijanja’, *Dnevni Avaz*, 13.juli/srpanj, 2010, p. 3. (The article is signed with the journalists’ initials of the first name and family name – Me. Sm.).

91 With vehicle registration plates from Serbia, as reported in daily *Dnevni Avaz*.

92 ‘Fašističke odore i negiranje genocida,’ 13.juli/srpanj, 2010, *Dnevni Avaz*, p.3. (The article is signed with the journalists’ initials of the first name and family name – Me. Mustafić.).


94 ‘Institucije BiH ignorišu stradanje 3.267 Srba Podrinja’, *Glas Srpske*, 13 Juli, 2010, p. 3.; ‘Zločin u Srebrenici nije genocid’, in *Oslobodenje*, 13 July, 2010, p. 2; ‘Fašističke odore i negiranje genocida’ *Dnevni Avaz*, p.3. The ICTY released Orić, since as stated it could not find evidence about his responsibility for murders that occurred during the mutual fighting in Srebrenica and its surrounding villages during the wartime.
released, and reminded that no representative from the Entity of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina honoured the Serb victims in Bratunac so far.

These and other similar statements expressed at the commemoration reflect the conflicting, and persisting dominant interpretation of the events that occurred in Srebrenica and its surroundings during the 1992-1996 war. They also reflect the deterioration of the relationships between the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Entities, and particularly between the Entity of Republic of Srpska authorities and international agencies and their representatives. This deterioration was evident in the daily news published at the time of both the commemorations in Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and in Kravica.  

The public denial of the genocide that was articulated in 2010 and which was supported by loudly criticised sources has signalled the negative drift in the official politics of the Entity Republic of Srpska. The negative turn in official politics is particularly evident in comparison to some earlier endeavours, and precisely the official acknowledgement of the war crimes and genocide committed in Srebrenica that followed the completion of the RS Report on Srebrenica in 2004. The significant rupture in the circle of denial and ignorance in the official politics of this Entity occurred after the public announcement of the then BH Entity RS president Dragan Čavić. Specifically, in June 2004 Čavić acknowledged that the massacre of Bosniak men and boys was committed in Srebrenica and condemned the crimes as the president of the Republic of Srpska, but as he stated in the closing remarks, he also did so as: a Serb; a citizen of the Republic of Srpska and of Bosnia and Herzegovina; a father of two children who see their future here. In his statement broadcast on public television, Čavić highlighted the nine days of July 1995 within which the massacre was committed as a black page in the history of Serb people.

In contrast, one year later, in 2005 the inhabitants of the village Kravica interviewed for the Balkan Crisis Report (BCR) online journal characterised the narrative about the massacre in Srebrenica as ‘a lie’ claiming that the genocide is propaganda ‘created to portray the Serbian people in a bad light.’ This was the interpretation of most of those interviewed for

96 Glas Srpske and Dnevni Avaz.
the journal, which included a statement from one of the prominent inhabitants who claimed that ‘[t]he Muslims are lying and are manipulating the numbers and exaggerating what happened. Far more Serbs died in Srebrenica than Muslims.’\textsuperscript{98} Besides the denial of the genocide and the massacre that occurred in the village in the warehouse Kravica, there is reluctance to talk about the genocide and the mass executions committed in the village on July 13, 1995. The reluctance was notable in the statements of the villagers interviewed by journalists of the BCR (2005) and of the British daily Independent (2015). Commonly, most of the villagers stated that ‘[w]e were not here. We went with ou[r] families to Serbia.’\textsuperscript{99} However, the journalist from the Independent observed a significant change in the attitude of one local woman he interviewed who stated that she heard nothing and knows nothing about murders in the Kravica warehouse, but ‘only when it comes to Karadžić and Mladić, does the woman become animated. They should never have been sent to The Hague, she says. The two men had simply been “defending the Serb people.”’\textsuperscript{100} Two separate journalist investigations, which spanned a period of 10 years indicate the persistence of the denial of the genocide among the inhabitants of Kravica village who were interviewed, and exposes their support for ‘the most wanted’ war criminals, namely Karadžić and Mladić.


In approximately the same period, specifically, from 2004 to 2010, the official politics of the Republic of Srpska saw significant changes. The abovementioned acknowledgment of the Srebrenica massacre in 2004 by the then president Dragan Čavić, was followed by the Milorad Dodik’s public acknowledgment of the genocide in 2008. Dodik, the then Prime Minister and the leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) publicly stated in a TV interview in 2008\textsuperscript{101} that the massacre, which was committed in Srebrenica in

\textsuperscript{98} Statement of Miloš Milovanović, the leader of the local war veteran association and a member of the Srebrenica council for the Serbian Democratic Party in BCR, Serbs Subvert Srebrenica Commemoration in Jelacic, ‘Serbs Subvert Srebrenica Commemoration,’ BCR, IWPR.


\textsuperscript{100} Crawshaw, ‘Srebrenica 20 years after the genocide,’ The Independent.

July 1995 was genocide. In the same interview, he further explained that the Srebrenica genocide is a legal and undeniable fact, which was recognised by the ICTY. Also, he highlighted the building of trust as one of the main priorities in his politics. In this period, Dodik was recognised as a leader with a fresh and conciliatory approach, which ensured significant political and financial international support to him and to the Entity Republic of Srpska.

However, his position towards Srebrenica and in relation to other crimes committed by the so-called VRS and JNA has changed drastically since that time and which consequently worsened relationship with the international community. This culminated in 2010, when Milorad Dodik, who was then running for the president of the BH Entity RS in numerous interviews for national and international media as well as in his official speeches stated that he had changed his mind and that he does not agree that the crimes committed in Srebrenica constitute genocide, despite the ICTY decision.

In response, other politicians from the RS Entity, including Dragan Čavić, the leader of the Democratic Party and former President of the Entity, acknowledged the Srebrenica genocide in his public statements. This confirmation of his earlier statement from 2004, was criticised by his opponents and particularly by Milorad Dodik who accused Čavić for his ‘betrayal of Serbdom.’ Čavić emphasized that at that time, as the president of the Entity Republic of Srpska, he felt it to be his political responsibility to acknowledge the ‘massacre’ in Srebrenica, which the ICTY later recognised as genocide. Similarly, in July 2010, the then president of the new pro-Bosnian-Herzegovinian party Naša Stranka (Our Party), Bojan Bajić stated that he, as a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Serb nationality, feels shame because of the genocide that was committed in his name by ‘non-humans.’

102 Milorad Dodik and his party won the elections. Since 2010 the relationships between his cabinet and the international community have significantly deteriorated, due to his controversial politics and statements, and particularly through the discrediting of the political role of the HR Valentin Inzko as well as his growing criticism and mistrust towards the BH State Prosecutor’s Office of BiH. Dodik’s politics were criticised by the media, political opposition and activists in RS who have also accusing him of corruption.


These and other examples of criticism of the official politics and the activism in everyday life are often veiled by the dominant interpretations and politics of denial and, in most cases, they are visible only in some parts of the country. These dominant stories of denial and misinterpretations of the events of the war were particularly evident in the articles published in the daily *Glas Srpske* in the period when both commemorations were held. For instance, on the eve of the commemoration in Srebrenica some of the main headlines reported on the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide in Australia that was to be organised in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian embassy in Canberra. As reported, this was an initiative of one part of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian diaspora, and it initiated a protest by a few individuals including one of the advisors in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Embassy in Melbourne and by the Bishop for Australia and New Zealand who objected to the commemoration because it included Muslim religious rituals. Along with this news, some of the main headlines in this period were related to criticism of the relevant institutions of the RS Entity and of war veteran’s and family associations towards the work of the state (BH) Commission for missing persons. Specifically, the articles addressed a few recent cases in which the state Commission allegedly failed to cooperate with the respective institutions form RS.

Thus, the news about the event in Australia covered most of the space in the daily papers in the following days, including the double edition for 10 and 11 July 2010. The main argument against the planned commemoration in the Embassy was the Muslim religious ritual that was included in the commemoration and which the commentators in *Glas Srpske* assessed as scandalous and ‘anti-constitutional.’ The story focused on addressing some of the highly-ranked politicians in the Council of Ministry of BiH as responsible for the ‘dominance of Bosniak politics’ in the embassy in Australia, while fragmented pieces of information about the event in the Embassy were isolated from the context of the diaspora community in Australia. This story, together with the story constructed around incomplete and rather speculative information that undermined the work of the state Commission for missing persons, supported the dominant discourse which advocates mistrust towards the common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accordingly, these discourses were articulated in some of the statements at the commemoration in Kravica on 12 July, 2010.105

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105 ‘Institucije BiH ignorišu stradanje 3,267 Srba Podrinja’ (The Institutions of BiH are ignoring murders of 3,267 Serbs in Podrinje), Glas Srpske, 13 July 2010, p. 3.
The other debate regarding the commemoration in Kravica is related to the number of victims present at the monument. These figures, however, vary in both media reports and in the speeches from the commemoration in Kravica from 2010. Generally, the figures are not in accordance with findings of some of the investigations about the crimes in Podrinje and Birač region. Accordingly, the ICTY investigation showed that on 7 and 8 July 1993 in the villages Kravica, Ježestica, Opravdići and Mandići 43 people were killed, where 13 of the 43 were civilians. They were killed in direct fights that occurred between the ABIIH and the well-armed Serb forces composed of village guards, Serb and Bosnian Serb military. These figures match with the internal VRS reports, as Florence Hartmann the then Spokesperson of the Office of the Prosecutor, stated at the ICTY weekly briefing from July 2005. Hartmann also addressed the discrepancies in various figures about the Kravica attack, as inconsistent interpretations of the events from July 1995 in Srebrenica, Bratunac and surrounding municipalities in Podrinje in the following manner:

[for the whole region, i.e. the municipalities of Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica and Skelani, the Serb authorities claimed previously that about 1400 were killed due to attacks committed by the BH Army forces for the period of May 1992 to March 1995, when Srebrenica was under the control of Naser Orić. Now the figure has become 3,500 Serbs killed. This figure may have been inflated. Taking the term “victim” as defined previously, these figures just does not reflect the reality.]

Furthermore, Hartmann briefly reviewed the existing sources from both Republic of Srpska and Serbia concerned with the crimes in Podrinje and Serb victims that were ‘circulated until recently’. She mentioned that the RS Commission for War Crimes figures reported 995 victims for the Srebrenica-Bratunac-Skelani region were, specifically ‘457 in Srebrenica area, 520 in Bratunac area, of which Kravica 43 victims’. The other sources, such as the book titled ‘The Chronicle of Our Graves’ written by Milivoje Ivanišević, stated that the number of Serb victims for Srebrenica-Bratunac-Skelani region was 1,200 victims but stated that personal details were available for only 624 victims. Furthermore, Hartmann argues that ‘[t]he author claimed that all 353 inhabitants of Kravica were “virtually completely destroyed” which is not accurate.’ And according to the last source Hartmann referred to ‘all war-related victims’ for Srebrenica-Bratunac-Skelani region is 641. She describe the latter as 1,500-pages long book written by unknown authors from RS in collaboration with the RS Entity Ministry of Interior.

108 Ivanišević is the president of the Belgrade Centre for Investigating Crimes Committed against the Serbian People; Also in Duijizing, 2008.
As the reports studied in this analysis show, the clash between the factual and legal evidence collected through the ICTY prosecutions was replicated in the Kravica commemoration. The dominant narratives reject the findings of the vast ICTY record which encompasses testimonies of survivors, soldiers of both the ARBiH and the VRS, as well as of the internal documentation of the VRS, as the RS Commission report. Instead the ambiguous narrative about the crimes in Kravica is structured around disputed figures presented in different sources from the RS Entity and Serbia. Some of the repercussions of the ignorance and refusal to recognise and comply with the legal decisions, and the findings of the international institutions of justice (ICTY, ICC) are the denial, misinterpretation of the genocide and events in Srebrenica and its surrounding municipalities whose inhabitants thus, as the BCR journalists describe, are still ‘dwelling on their own suffering’. The commemoration in Kravica also signals the new turn in the official politics of the BH Entity RS, which is characterised by denial of the genocide, and the glorification of war criminals.

110 Nerma Jelacic, ‘Serbs Subvert Srebrenica Commemoration,’ BCR, IWPR.
6.9. Conclusion

The commemoration practices incorporated into the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide reveal the complexity of the narrative and depict a number of the different agencies involved in the biggest international arena in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider post-Yugoslav space. As the only Remembrance Day in recent Bosnian-Herzegovinian and post-Yugoslav history which is institutionalized at the European Union level, the anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide held in 2010 illustrates some of the recent dynamics and shifts in international, regional and local political and cultural contexts. This prominence of the 15th year anniversary is shown in the number of delegations from the USA, EU, Turkey and post-Yugoslav countries that attended the official programme of the commemoration on 11 July, 2010. Additionally, the amalgamation of different practices initiated by the family associations and survivors who aim to raise awareness about the genocide and to protest against the slow process of justice and to contest the denial of the genocide were largely supported by a number of local, regional and international formal and informal groups. These practices reveal both family and fictive kinships developed within the continuously widening arena of commemoration in Srebrenica. Moreover, some of the participants at the Peace March from the Belgrade based NGO, Women in Black, emphasise that the kinship established during the march between the survivors, local and regional (post-Yugoslav) participants was much closer, in comparison to the relation established with international participants. A similar structure of feeling, which implies (the remains of common) cultural knowledge is evident through the different gestures and interactions demonstrated at the commemoration.

The analysis in this chapter provides a closer insight into the recent initiatives of the members of the mothers’ associations and survivors. These alternative memory practices expanded the space of commemoration beyond the Memorial Potočari-Srebrenica, which is under the jurisdiction of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The small progress in their restless struggle for truth as the efforts of majority of the survivors to return to their pre-war homes and rebuild their lives in Srebrenica municipality, the returnees, including survivors and mother’s associations remain silenced in the prevalent noise of the denial of genocide in Srebrenica municipality and in the wider BH Entity RS. Also, their need to retrace the ‘route of death’ and revisit the ‘killing fields,’ can also imply some of the limitations of the transitional justice approach.
Through their visits to the sites which testify to the inscription of violent ethnic divisions into the topography of once shared places of life and work, members of women’s associations and survivors re-claim these places through commemorative practices. These practices resemble the practices of civil society groups in Argentina, who, in Ashplant, Dawson and Roper’s terms, transformed sites of disappearance into sites of commemoration after the government’s attempts to suppress the popular activism which confronts state terrorism.  

On the other hand, the survivors of the Peace March also created their own spaces of remembrance. Some of them returned to the so-called route of death for the first time after the war, to commemorate dead family members and friends through the supportive platform created through their reunion with others who shared their experiences and through the support of activists and of the wider public who participated in the March. Through different practices of ‘memory through movement’ the survivors and the bereaved families are broadening the sites of reverence and mourning, while the flux of memory signals the interconnectedness of individual and collective memory as well as the active and challenging process of the articulation of private memory into the public arena of commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide. In this process, which is dominated by the transitional justice paradigm and mainly uttered through legal language, the protests of family associations and survivors against the slow pace of justice, and against the politics of denial, imply both the recognition of some of the limitations of the dominant model of transitional justice, and the difficulty of addressing and challenging them within the dominant language and concepts. The initiated practices which embody this unsettledness can also be related to some general limitations of public commemorations, which in Jelin and Kaufman’s terms ‘can never fully deal with individual memories of trauma, necessitating the ongoing performance of small acts of private memories.’

Some of the issues revealed in the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide are readdressed in the work of the Monument Group, which signal the turn to the politics of memory, through ‘endangering a different public language of witnessing trauma, re-

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112 Ibid., p. 42.
politicianising the effects of it, thinking about political violence, and acting upon radical contingencies in the world around us.\textsuperscript{113}

In their criticism of the dominant management of memory in B-H and the wider post-Yugoslav space, Arsenijević, Husanović and Wastel identify the post-genocide culture as a ‘culture of lies, culture of denial and a culture of amnesia,’ and ‘the inability of various forms of authority to find properly political rather than managerial solution to the crises of transitional societies.’\textsuperscript{114} The effects of these crises are most salient in Srebrenica, which is today, the authors argue ‘the stalemate in the form of ethnic apartheid,’ which is, in their terms involving post-genocide collectives, including not the relationships existing between refugees, survivors (women, men, children), the international scientific community, the local government, civil society initiatives, and NGOs but also the destroyed houses and newly built ones, identified and non-identified human remains, buried and non-buried individuals, identified and non-identified mass graves and so on.\textsuperscript{115}

In their work, the authors strive to engage critically with ethno-national politics and multiculturalist identity, and ‘the ideology of reconciliation [which] has left a political wasteland in Srebrenica today, rendering it a society of the symbiosis of death and living, perpetrators and victims, functioning through apartheid where traumatic injustices endure,’ and explore one of the fundamental questions specifically, ‘[h]ow is it possible to think and enact new collectivities, communalities and solidarities in the face of the material abject that permeates the everyday of the post-genocide society?’\textsuperscript{116}

The 15\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide exposes some of the issues which Buden, and Arsenijević, Husanović and Wastel address in their reflections on commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide. The commemorative practices and the language used in various texts considered in the analysis of the commemoration and the counter-commemoration, reflect the challenges to overcome the unstable management of memory largely driven by ethno-politics. As argued earlier, the objects of these dominant ideologies as well as the dynamics among them are reduced to mere oppositions, for instance to the members of opposed ethnic

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 269-270.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p.270.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
groups, victims and perpetrators, men and women, which impede the articulation of their memories of war and their solitude in the deserted social, cultural and political space left after the genocide.
CHAPTER 7
Memory Meeting Point: Parallel gatherings in Dobrovoljačka street
in Sarajevo on 3 May 2010

The analysis in this chapter focuses on the parallel commemorations held on 3 May, 2010 to mark the 18th anniversary of the victims of the event(s) that occurred in former Dobrovoljačka street, (today Hamdije Kreševljaković street) in Sarajevo. Despite the change of the name of the street in the post-war period, throughout my analysis I make use of the street’s former name. This is in accordance with the designation used in commemorations, media reports as well as in ongoing judicial investigations.

7.1. Introduction

Both gatherings commemorate the incident that occurred in 1992, which resulted in the murder of the JNA personnel. The parties involved in the incident were the JNA personnel of the Second Military District that was located in the end of Dobrovoljačka street, in the central part, the then uncoordinated formal forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH), and a number of informal city’s defence forces, on the other.¹ The number of casualties as a result of the shooting that occurred in Dobrovoljačka street vary greatly between the two contested narratives of the agencies from both BH Entities, namely the BH Entity FBiH and the BH Entity RS. These opposing narratives were publicly articulated in 2010 through parallel commemorations held at the site where the shooting occurred, and created a unique space for public memory of the siege of the city as well as the first direct encounter of the opposing politics of war.

¹ The witnesses who were close to the place where the JNA members were murdered claim that there were different paramilitary forces and armed civilians at the place where murder occurred. Due to the political chaos the Bosnian forces had a dual command, and consisted of the Territorial Defence Unit and The Bosnian Patriotic League. The Special Police Unit also had a significant role in the defence of the besieged city of Sarajevo. Generally, during the period of political chaos in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991, the fragmentation of power prevented any kind of unified force, which resulted in the formation of illegal army forces. Accordingly, Andjelic, argues that exactly these illegal paramilitaries, organized and armed by the ruling nationalist parties since 1990, are reflecting a paradoxical situation in which those in power were ‘actually undermining the state’, thus, in his terms the ‘Serbs had, besides their own paramilitaries, the JNA on their side, while the Croats were helped by Zagreb [Croatia]. This left the M[u]sl[im]s as the weakest, despite their own paramilitary force, controlled by the SDA.’ In Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy, p.200.; The Bosnian-Herzegovinian war-government mobilized units of the Territorial Defense (TO), which consists of ordinary people drafted into brigades to defend their own regions and neighbourhoods.
The analysis in this chapter is organised in three main sections. The first section outlines some of the key events that preceded the attack on the JNA column during their negotiated peaceful withdrawal from the city on 3 May, 1992, in order to present some of the parties involved in the Dobrovoljačka event during the wartime. This framework provides a basis for the analysis of the contested interpretations of the attack and both popular and judicial allegations in the post-war period. The subsequent section is focused on the presentation of parallel commemorations: the first, organised by the BH Entity RS government, which commemorates the JNA soldiers killed in Dobrovoljačka Street first initiated in 2010; and the second, the annual commemoration of the defenders of the city and civilians killed during the Siege of Sarajevo. The examination of this arena includes the ways in which the memories of the event are mobilised and contested, as well as the ways in which the contested narratives articulated in the Dobrovoljačka street arena have been represented in the media.

As in the other case studies that have provided the focus of my research, the Dobrovoljačka commemoration brings a new challenge in collection of data for the analysis, due to the limited amount of academic research concerned with the Dobrovoljačka commemoration that has been published on one side, and unsystematised available data on the other. In contrast to the range of data available for the analysis of the commemoration of 15th anniversary of Srebrenica genocide held in the same year, the analysis of the commemoration of the event in Dobrovoljačka street requires a different approach. There are limited ICTY records on the Dobrovoljačka incident, since the Tribunal withdrew the case due to a lack of evidence. Additionally, the findings of the current parallel judicial investigation in BiH and Serbia are closed to the media and public. The shooting in Dobrovoljačka street is one of a series of events that occurred on 2 and 3 May 1992, which, in the collective memory of the citizens are perceived as symbolising the beginning of the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The general process of data collection for this case study includes close observation and attendance of the commemoration. My analysis of the events from May 1992 draw on the following sources: the UN report from 1994; relevant ICTY documents and cases\(^2\) as well as a

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consideration of existing documentary material (documentary films, available footage as the excerpts from the communication broadcast between the country’s’ officials and highly ranked JNA officers; available databases (FAMA collection, and Research Documentation Centre Sarajevo (IDC). The analysis of the post-war period and commemoration draws on studies by several scholars media analysis the Central Register of Monuments in BiH; related documents and information available at the official websites of different specialist institutions in Canton Sarajevo, the BH Entity FBiH, the BH Entity RS, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Serbia, and the OHR; memoirs and my previous research papers from 2010 and 2013. The long list of materials used for the reconstruction of the incident in Dobrovoljačka street and other related events, and the analysis of the commemoration, includes both international and local media reports, the reporting of selected local print media, and the media debate that preceded the commemorations.

7.2. The Beginning of the Siege of Sarajevo

In a similar way to other towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo was privileged with cultural diversity and inclusiveness developed through country’s turbulent history, and enhanced with significant collective experience in the self-management system during the


6 The conference paper titled ‘Ethnicization of Memory, Re-Membering Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ presented at The International Seminar of Young Researchers from BiH and Europe: Bosnia: Looking Beyond the Institutions, organised by the University of Leuven, Brussels, 27-28 June, 2010; and at the International Workshop SCOPES Program (Scientific co-operation between Eastern Europe and Switzerland), International of Institutional Partnership between Centre for Human Rights University of Sarajevo and University of Zurich, ‘Memory, History and State Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Critically Assessing and Re-Thinking the Teaching of Memory Politics in Bosnian University Curricula’, organised by the University of Zurich, 13-14 March, 2014, in Zurich.
socialist era. However, the emerging exclusivist historic myths focused on the construction of an ethnic sameness, and other negative economic and political developments largely targeted Bosnian-Herzegovinian shared political and cultural values. The politics of fear generated by the emerging divisive ethnopolitical discourse soon created great uncertainty among citizens across the country. The growing insecurity was soon transformed into mistrust under the influence of a warmongering media campaign, and increased militarisation coordinated by the SDS (Serb Democratic Party) and Serbian leadership.

In the autumn of 1991, the JNA, then formally under the control of the Serbian leadership, was still located in JNA installations scattered across Sarajevo’s urban area. This includes the following military barracks: Bosut, Butile, Faletići, Jajce, Jusuf Đonlić, Maršal Tito, Nedžarići, Rajlovac, Slobodan Princip Seljo, Viktor Bubanj, Zmajevac. and the newly formed Command of the Second Military District. The latter was located in the very central part of the city called Bistrik, and it was under the command of the general Milutin Kukanjac who was relocated from Belgrade to this instalment, upon its formation at the end of 1991. Additionally, Kukanjac described that in the District under his command, in the period from February to April 1992, a significant number of the JNA generals were repositioned following orders from the military authorities located in the JNA HQ in Belgrade, while a large number of JNA soldiers of ‘all nationalities’ were deserting from the JNA.

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The Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens turned out in large numbers at the referendum on the independence of BiH held at the beginning of 1992, despite the SDS campaign calling for people to boycott the referendum. According to the official report of the 1992 referendum, of the 63% of registered voters who took part at the two-day referendum held on February 29 and March 1, 1992, 99% were in favour of the independence of BiH from the then SFRY.

The eruption of enthusiasm and hope for a shared future demonstrated on 29 February and 1 March 1992, was overshadowed on the second day of the referendum, with the murder of a man who carried a Serbian flag at the son’s wedding ceremony in Sarajevo’s Baščaršija (the Old Town). These developments stirred an already hostile political environment and led to violence. Over the next few days, the SDS coordinated forces set up barricades across the city and also across the country, while a number of civilians were killed in the rapidly growing ‘local’ incidents across the country. Most of the citizens who made their democratic choice and raised some hope for a non-violent resolution of the crisis, followed the increased military activities with fear as more and more intense night firing occurred, as the JNA aircrafts which sporadically flew over cities broke the sound barrier.

A glimmer of hope was soon transformed into despair in the spring of 1992 when the SDS coordinated forces set up barricades, and the presence and activities of the JNA armed soldiers became more visible in some parts of the city. Specifically, in their ‘mission to prevent a conflict’ they occupied the city’s infrastructure, such as one of the main water pumping installations, located on Mojmilo hill on 3 April 1992. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that by the beginning of April, fundamental facilities in the country were occupied and in some cases disabled, while most of the cities were completely isolated and surrounded by paramilitary Serb forces. On 5 April, 1992, a small group of Sarajevans initiated street

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12 The SDS campaign also includes the Congress of Serbian Intellectuals entitled ‘The Yugoslav Crisis and the Serbian Question,’ organised and sponsored by the SDS leadership a day before the referendum, on 28 March, 1992 in Sarajevo, and attended by 500 intellectuals. Most of the prominent historians and intellectuals from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, out of which some were members of the SDS party who contributed to this one-day long revisionist historical discussion, challenged the Yugoslav WWII historiography and resonated the fear of genocide and justified ‘preventive’ strategies, which also includes the ongoing occupation of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Donia, ‘The Origins of Republika Srpska, 1990-1992: A Background Report,’ ICTY, p.37.

13 The person suspected for his murder was a local criminal who was later involved in the BH Army as commander of one of the renegade units (ICTY).

14 The hill overlooks Sarajevsko polje, which includes some of the largest of the city’s neighbourhoods, namely Alipašino Polje, Vojničko Polje, Lukavica and Dobrinja, located nearby Sarajevo’s international Airport.

15 Among others, this includes then Bosanski Brod (today Brod), Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brčko, Foča, Višegrad, Zvornik.
protests in response to a blockage of both the city and the country, and to a number of checkpoints set up across the city at which armed and masked paramilitary Serb forces terrorised the citizens and obstructed everyday life. Specifically, the snowballing nearly 10 kilometre-long protest walk to the city centre, was initiated by residents of the suburban neighbourhood called Dobrinja, located on the south-western end of the city. The first, small group of demonstrators marched with signs, chanted traditional Bosnian-Herzegovinian songs ‘sevdalinke,’ and invited other citizens to joined them in their peace protest against the division of the country. Very soon, both the national broadcaster, Bosnian-Herzegovinian Radio and Television Sarajevo (RTVSA) and the regional broadcaster Yugoslav Television (YUTEL) supported the civic initiative and broadcast the protest walk. Soon, another group of citizens started their protest walk from the opposite direction, from the Old Town (Baščaršija) towards the BiH Parliament square to join the protest, which in less than 24 hours grew into the largest demonstrations of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Despite the firing of the Serb forces scattered around the Parliament building, a large number of demonstrators from all walks of life, mainly workers, students, pensioners and even school children, gathered at the Parliament square. From there they decided to march against the barricades set up at the nearby Vrbanja bridge a month earlier. However, on the bridge, which connects two banks of the river Miljacka, Serb forces, which were located on various locations in the Vrbanja neighbourhood, opened fire and killed two women, and wounded a few unarmed demonstrators.

The demonstrators found refuge in the empty Parliament building, where they initiated the formation of what they termed the ‘People’s Parliament’ (Narodni Parlament). Through RTVSA and YUTEL, which broadcasted the two-day demonstrations from the occupied Parliament and its square, the demonstrators invited all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to join them and help to overthrow the leading ethno-nationalist parties in order to save the country.

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16 Sevdalinka is a traditional Bosnian-Herzegovinian song.
18 Namely, Suada Dilberović, a medicine student from Dubrovnik, Croatia and Olga Sučić, an employee of the B-H Parliament from Sarajevo were killed.
country from division. During open and free ‘People’s Parliament’ sessions, the demonstrators voiced their shared love for their country, the city, and shared culture, in various ways, mainly through: protest banners; in their speeches; chorus signing of ‘sevdalinke’ and the socialist Yugoslav anthem ‘Hey Slovene’; but also through shared symbols they carried - the flags of the Republic of BiH and Tito’s pictures. As some of the demonstrators later described it, one of the supporters advised the assembled citizens that all these communist insignia could be interpreted differently in the West, and suggested that they to organise and structure their demands and communicate them more clearly, rather than sending confused visual messages to the world.\(^19\) The members of an informal anti-establishment platform of citizens in formation, as one of the participants describes it,\(^20\) also invited a few public figures to join them and to contribute in defining the objectives and to the building of an alternative civil platform. Their powerful synergy strongly echoed and filled the empty space of the BiH Parliament, and its square.

The next day, on April 6, the citizens call for the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, grew surprisingly after a number of rapidly organised buses with workers, miners and students from Tuzla, Zenica, Kakanj, and other Bosnian-Herzegovinian places managed to pass through barricades set up across the country to join to the ‘People’s Parliament’ at the BH Parliament square.\(^21\) As some of the participants describe it, during these two days, a number of public figures - activists, journalists, actors – as well as numerous workers, addressed the gathered citizens.

As some participants observe, most of the leadership of the opposition parties were following with suspicion the developments of the two-days citizens’ protest at the Parliament Square, which swelled to more than a hundred thousand. Most of the politicians perceived the ‘People’s Parliament’ as a threat and described it as a coup d’ètat orchestrated by a counter party.\(^22\)

\(^{19}\) According to testimony of the demonstrator interviewed in the documentary *This Day in History*, this was suggested by Rade Šerbedžija, one of the most prominent Yugoslav actors, who together with his Belgrade based colleague Mirjana Karanović held a series of anti-war performances in Sarajevo in the early 1990s; in the documentary ‘This day in History,’ 2008.

\(^{20}\) In ‘60 Minutes Political TV Magazine.’

\(^{21}\) *This Day in History*.

\(^{22}\) Pejić, ‘How I failed to Stop the War in Bosnia’; 60 Minutes Political TV Magazine, 2012; *This Day in History*, 2008.
However, on the second day of the protests on April 6, 1992 the people’s voices which desperately sought to be articulated in a civil platform, were silenced with gunshots fired by snipers hidden in one of the SDS Crisis Staffs\(^{23}\) at the hotel Holiday Inn, which was located across from the Parliament. A few citizens were injured in this attack. The spontaneously initiated mass movement of citizens devoted to living together in peace rapidly dwindled as a result of the attack into a frozen image of horrified citizens huddled together for protection from surrounding snipers. The European Community (EC)’s recognition of the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the same day, 6 April 1992, did not stop the disillusionment of the citizens exposed to the weapons of the Serb forces and the JNA, and who were still faced with both an unannounced and undeclared war, and with the ‘inevitable’ push into ethnic collectives.

7.3. The Politics of the Division of BiH and its Capital

Later, in April 1992, the SDS representatives resigned from the RBiH presidency located in Sarajevo, and moved to its nearby rural municipality Pale, which thus became a capital of the new Serb ‘ethnic state’ they formed earlier in January 1992 and first named the ‘Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Its acronym was then identical to that of the legitimate SRBiH (Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina).\(^{24}\) Thus, it dauntingly symbolised the initiation of the process of creation of the parallel world through territorial and discursive practices, specifically, through both horrendous destruction of Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture and the cultural institutions and heritage they preserve on one side, as well as the appropriation and reinterpretation of Bosnian-Herzegovina spatial, cultural, and historical signifiers, which were increasingly replaced with the adjective ‘Serb’, on the other. The examples of the latter are endless. This includes the change of the names of towns, particularly the names of those towns with the adjective ‘Bosanski’ (Bosnian), which were eliminated in the first wave of destruction, together with their non-Serb inhabitants, and replaced with adjective ‘Serb’. In accordance with the post-Dayton policies of the international community, the new imposed adjective ‘Serb’ was, after the war replaced with the ‘East.’\(^{25}\)

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\(^{23}\) ‘SDS Krizni Štab’ in Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian.

\(^{24}\) SRBiH was the official name of the country throughout the socialist era, from 25 November 1943 to 8 April 1992, when the Presidency of the country, in accordance to the international recognition of its independency and sovereignty, renamed SRBiH to Republic of BiH.

\(^{25}\) The Constitutional Court of BiH, Decision from 22 September 2004 (No. U 44/01) The Court review the constitutionality under Article VI (3a) (a), and found that some of the articles of the Law on the territorial organisation and local self-government of the BH Entity Republic of Srpska, specifically the articles from
The strategies of spatial and cultural separation and appropriation coordinated by the SDS leadership, also included the changing of streets names; destruction and increased appropriation of monuments from the socialist era; the creation of new municipalities (i.e. municipality Skelani), and even the establishment of new towns such as ‘Serb Sarajevo,’ that first included the occupied urban and suburban area around the city. The municipalities within the newly formed town, which was later renamed ‘East Sarajevo’, were named after those of the city of Sarajevo, with the difference being that each municipality’s name has the adjective ‘East’ (i.e. East Old Town Municipality). Importantly, as Donia explains, the Constitutional Court of SRBiH by its rule from November 1992, decreed these new exclusivist parallel institutions formed by the SDS delegates, as anti-constitutional and illegal formations ‘which usurped the constitutional authority of the Republican government.’

Accordingly, Armakolas describes how the formation of the mono-ethnic ‘Serb state’ in BH, with ‘its own government, its own army, its own flag, its own currency’, reinforced feelings of insecurity, which the SDS campaign produced earlier among Bosnian Serbs, and as such, it provides ‘the proof’ that ‘their security was there now, and so was the “proof” of their lack of security in the neighbouring territory.’ Moreover, the newly created Serb parallel institutions also established its own media service, as well as educational institutions responsible for warmongering propaganda and the reckless revision of history. Both educational and (in)formative practices were needed to justify, or rather to say ‘naturalise’ newly created myths that supported the both illegal and violent occupation of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory and its cultural and political appropriation, followed by the expulsion, torture and mass killings of non-Serbs, and those Serbs who opposed the SDS war strategies.

The SDS strategies of separation were executed in Sarajevo during April and May 1992. On the ground, some of the violent actions that included occupation of a few parts of the city, terror over citizens, and aggressive warmongering politics and propaganda, resulted in

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1993(25/3); 1994 (11/94), 1995 (6/95) and (26/95); 1996 (8/96), (15/96), (17/96), (19/96) and (27/96); and 1997 (33/97) that refer to the changed names of the towns across BiH that were under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces during the wartime, and which are included into the Entity RS after the signing of the DPA, are not in accordance to the articles II/4, II/3 and II/5 of the Constitution of BiH <http://www.ccbh.ba/odluke/> [Accessed on 19 September 2017].


Armakolas, ‘Sarajevo No More? Identity and Experience of Place among Bosnian Serb Sarajevans in Republika Srpska,’ p. 82.
barricades set up by Serb forces, street clashes and the first victims. The chaos that occurred with the violence, partly accomplished the division of the city, and the beginning of the Siege, which, as commonly agreed, has started on 6 April, 1992, was amplified by highly manipulating propaganda of the SDS Crisis Staff HQ. The harsh media war, thus preceded the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was announced on 2 June, 1992 by the RBiH Presidency, which resulted in a large wave of migrations both organised and self-organised.

Throughout the nearly four-year long siege, all Sarajevo residents, both those who remained in the city as well as those who arrived in the city, were exposed to day-to-day psychological and physical violence. This includes the blockage policy and the constant destruction of the city that was executed by the Serb forces, which were located on the surrounding hills and in the outskirts of the city, and in some part of inner city area, due to which the citizens of Sarajevo faced a shortage of basic supplies such as water, food, electricity, gas, and medication. Also, during their ardent efforts to survive not only physically, but psychologically and culturally, the process which Ivana Maček frames as ‘negotiating normality,’ the citizens were exposed to systematic heavy shelling and sniper fire.

The end of the siege on 1 March 1996 was followed by the reintegration of urban areas of the divided city, which was agreed on by the DPA in December 1995. However, the reintegration of the city resulted in a new large wave of migration. Largely influenced by the Serb authorities, a number of Serbs who resided in those parts during the war (Grbavica, Ilidža, Vogošća) left, and in some cases burnt, the property on the territory of the reintegrated

30 Among the first evacuations that were organised by different parties in the period from March to August, 1992, was a gradual evacuation of a number of Sarajevo’s Serbs, coordinated by the SDS. Also, this was followed by the transfer of JNA personnel and their families to Belgrade organised by the JNA, after they took control over the Sarajevo Airport in the end of March and the beginning of April 1992.; (in the ‘Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić’ (2016) Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, ICTY, p. 1337.) This was followed by an evacuation organised by Sarajevo’s Jewish Community in April 1992, which enable a number of Sarajevo’s Jews to leave the besieged city. The next month, a convoy with around 500 women and children, under protection of the international organisations, was first stopped by the Serb forces for few hours in the Serb occupied neighbourhood Ilidža, and it left the city after the negotiation between Serb forces and the Government BH forces was achieved. Moreover, in August, the Serb forces opened fire on a convoy which transported orphans from the orphanage then ‘Ljubica Ivezic,’ and killed two babies; in S. Mulić-Bušatić and E. Imamović, ‘Chronology of the Siege,’ BH Dani; Also in Dževad Karahasan, Sarajevo, Exodus of a City (Sarajevo: Connectum, 2010).
municipalities in and around the city, and moved to the places that were included to the BH Entity RS by the DPA. Also, a significant number of Serbs continued to live in these parts after their reintegration.

According to statements of a significant number of the citizens who left the city in period from 1992 and 1996, their decisions were mainly motivated by their desire for safety. (Armakolas, Maček, Stefansson). In some cases, as Maček describes, some citizens ‘who felt that they could not live in a state where a division of people into nationalities was to be the new socio-political order’ left for ideological reasons.33

Against this ‘ideological escape’, as Maček frames it, are conflicting ideological reasons that were concealed as security reasons, notable in statements presented in Armakolas’ longitudinal study of the experience of ‘Bosnian Serb Sarajevans’ who left the city in 1992. Accordingly, most of the interviewees described that they left the city because of ‘fear of Muslim paramilitary the ‘zelene beretke (“Green Berets”), which was intensified by ‘rumors or unconfirmed information about “plans” devised against Serbs, often spread by local SDS activists.’34 It is worth mentioning here, that beside the migrations from the city, there were many migrations to the city during the siege, precisely, after the tunnel under the Sarajevo’s Airport was built in order to enable the exit out of the besieged city to the territory under control of the ARBiH, HVO and HOS. Since 1993, when what was commonly called the ‘tunnel of salvation’ was built, many of those Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens, who survived expulsion and torture in places occupied by Serb forces, found refuge in Sarajevo.35

Later, in the post-war period, many Sarajevans who left the city during the war, came back to Sarajevo, due to emotional reasons, commonly described as nostalgia; longing for social networks, family and friends; economic reasons such as better prospects for jobs; and socio-economic reasons, such as reclaiming their properties owned before the war, the right enacted by the property restitution polices applied throughout the country from 2003.36 It would be inadequate to reduce people’s movements in the post-war period only to Sarajevans

35 According to UNCHR estimation, in 1994, nearly 140,000 out of 440,000 residents of Sarajevo, were refugees from outside Sarajevo; in Maček, “Imitation of Life,” p. 52.
36 Stefansson, “Urban Exile: Locals, Newcomers and the Cultural Transformation of Sarajevo”; Also, in Armakolas, ‘Sarajevo No More? Identity and Experience of Place among Bosnian Serb Sarajevans in Republika Srpska.’
who returned to the city, bearing in mind that Sarajevo’s vibrant post-war dynamics and cultural and political scene are the result of a specific synergy between people who were leaving and returning to the city, and people who moved to the city from other parts of the country, region and the world. Thus, the process of narration of the experience of the siege occurs in a place transformed not only by the dynamics of the war and post-war divisions, changes in political and cultural politics, or by generational changes, but also by various dynamics, which are continuously producing new meanings and new modes of communalities.

Sarajevo today, like many other places in the post-Daytonian BiH, reflects the ongoing parallel processes that were outlined at the beginning of the war. First is the dominant political discourse in the BH Entity RS, typified by the maintenance of the country’s fragmentation through the generation of insecurity, and social construction of the ‘Serb people’. The second process, dominant within a large part of the Entity Federation of BiH, and recently among a significant number of the activists from the BH entity RS, upholds cultural and spatial unity and thus the historical continuity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the country of all of its citizens. This political concept that was confirmed and clearly articulated in 1943, with the establishment of the SRBiH, was reaffirmed in 1992 by the referendum results, in the midst of political divisions in the country and in the region, and endorsed in 1995 by the DPA, which guarantees this continuity. At the same time, this political framework is continuously challenged by the ethno-territorial organisation of the country, on one side, and antagonism between ethnonational parties, as between opposing non-ethnic, ‘citizens’ parties. Yet, the ethno-national territorialisation of the country and identification of its citizens was continuously and ardently challenged. These complex opposing strategies that were initiated by a number of local and international activists’ platforms, individuals, and informal groups of citizens, were somewhat encouraged by the post-war developments that were enabled by some aspects of the DPA peace framework (i.e. minority return) and by various policies of the international community. However, the social question, like the question of cultural and political power, visibility and more importantly the articulation of citizens’ initiatives that openly challenge ‘the dominant ethnic principle’ remains open within the ethnopolitical post-Dayton framework.

The question of the articulation of political and cultural heterogeneity in post-war Sarajevo, was explored by Armakolas, Maček, and Stefansson in their distinct studies. Accordingly, some of the alternative cultural identifications and the ambiguity within the
widely accepted ‘ethno-national’ frameworks are illustrated in distinctions between: secular versus religious identity among other ambiguities within residents of Sarajevo during the siege;\textsuperscript{37} between newcomers and old residents of Sarajevo identified as ‘cultured’ and ‘non-cultured’ residents of the city,\textsuperscript{38} and the ambiguous urban identity of Bosnian Serbs Sarajevans who migrated to the nearby rural municipality of Pale on one side, and their Serb identity in relation to the ‘ethnic other’ residents of Sarajevo, on the other.\textsuperscript{39}

These ambiguities, along with other findings of the abovementioned scholarly studies are helpful for understanding the dynamics of identity transformations largely determined and amplified by the experience of the siege. Armakolas’ remarks about the accomplishment of ‘ethnic reading’, the term he uses to describe both the exclusivist interpretations of the war and post-war politics and practices through the discourses of the dominant ethnopolitical parties in the country, and the transformation of some spatial and social practices in the period between 1999 and 2003 among interviewed Sarajevan Serbs who returned to the city are also helpful in understanding the long-term effects of the siege. These findings broaden understandings of the process of the post-war re-construction of the city, and the related disintegration and re-integration of its community. Together with the other experiences presented in the additional material that informs my analysis in this chapter, these findings significantly contribute to my attempts to construct a kaleidoscopic view of the events that occurred at the beginning of the war in Sarajevo. This informed approach sensitizes my analysis of the interactive cultural and political process of the politics of war memory and commemoration, and it broadens understandings of the ways in which differing war experiences are narrated in post-war Sarajevo.

\textsuperscript{37} Maček, “Imitation of Life: Negotiating Normality in Sarajevo Under the Siege.”

\textsuperscript{38} Stefansson, “Urban Exile: Locals, Newcomers and the Cultural Transformation of Sarajevo.”

\textsuperscript{39} Armakolas, ‘Sarajevo No More? Identity and Experience of Place among Bosnian Serb Sarajevans in Republika Srpska.’
7.4. The JNA attack on Sarajevo and Street Clashes on 2 and 3 May 1992

The intensified street fights between the JNA and joint Serb forces on one side, and Sarajevo’s resistant groups composed of both the formal Bosnian-Herzegovina government’s forces as well as non-formal groups of self-organized city residents on the other, culminated on 2 May, 1992. The whole city was turned into a real war zone, when a vast amount of ammunition and grenades, enhanced by air strikes, were fired across the city, and particularly in the central part of the city in which direct clashes occurred. After the attempt of the JNA and Serb forces to take control over the central part of Sarajevo, precisely where the governmental institutions and infrastructure were located failed, the JNA forces, which controlled the International Sarajevo Airport, seized the three-member Bosnian-Herzegovinian negotiation team who had just returned from failed peace negotiations in Lisbon, organized by the European Community. All three captives, the legitimately elected president of the country Alija Izetbegović (SDA), the prime minister Zlatko Lagumdžija (SDP) and a translator Sabina Berberović (a daughter of the president Alija Izetbegović) were forcibly transferred to the JNA military barracks in the nearby Lukavica. On the other side, the JNA Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac, who was based in the Second Military District Headquarters negotiated the release of the Bosnian negotiation team on condition that a safe passage be permitted for the JNA soldiers and personnel out of the city.

Since the telephone lines were cut due to the complete destruction of the main post building located in the city centre in the JNA forces attacks on the city, the first contact between the members of the Presidency of BiH located in Sarajevo on one side, and the country’s seized president and the JNA Sarajevo Corps General Vojislav Djurdjevac located in Lukavica on the other, was established through the national RTVSA.40 In the broadcast conversation, members of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government Euj Ganić (SDA) and Stjepan Kljujić (then HDZ) informed the president about the JNA attacks on Sarajevo, since he was told by the JNA officials in Lukavica that the JNA forces located in Sarajevo are under fierce attack of the BH

40 Extracts from communication broadcasted on ‘Breaking News,’ Radio and Television Sarajevo (RTVSA) 2 May 1992, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7q64nsU96Y> [Accessed on 29 November 2016]; Video Synopsis: On 2 May 1992 the journalists of the RTVSA, Vladimir Bilić and Senad Hadžifejzović were commenting the dramatic events in the city, broadcasted conversation with the JNA officials, and appealed to them to stop shooting innocent citizens, since they were receiving the first reports about deaths of a dozen of Sarajevans. Given the complete blockage of the city, the RTVSA was the only source of information about the violent events in the city for all these citizens who still had an electricity and safe place to follow the breaking news. This role of the national RTVSA station was documented by a journalist Senad Hadžifejzović in his book Rat uživo: Ratni televizijski dnevnik [War: Live on Air. War TV News] (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 2002).
forces. In the open and broadcasted television program, each side accused the other for instigating the attacks and justified their actions as defence. Both Ganić and Kljujić expressed their concern for the president’s safety, and insisted on two main pre-conditions for any further negotiations with the JNA officials: first to cease fire and stop shooting at the civilians and civilian objects; and second, to ensure a safe transport of the state’s president and other captives from the JNA military barracks in Lukavica to the Presidency house. Also, they suggested that negotiations should be mediated by the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) representative Colm Doyle, and the UNPROFOR Commander Lewis MacKenzie. However, the demands of the BiH Presidency, which were articulated in the broadcast conversation, were only partially fulfilled in the negotiated agreement, mediated by the UNPROFOR and ECMM representatives that guaranteed the peaceful withdrawal of the JNA soldiers and personnel of the Second Military District from the city area on 3 May 1992. Specifically, Doyle was held in Lukavica, while commander MacKenzie escorted the BH negotiation team from Lukavica to Sarajevo, and later the JNA column to the checkpoint that was under the control of Serb forces.

7.5. The Peaceful Withdrawal of the JNA Soldiers of the Second Military District from the City to the territory occupied by the Serb forces and the Attack in Dobrovoljačka on the JNA Column

On 3 May, 1992, the seized BiH negotiation team and general MacKenzie were transported in one UN armoured personnel carrier (APC) from the military barracks in Lukavica to the Second Military District, where General Kukanjac joined them. From the District, located at the end of former Dobrovoljačka street, to the checkpoint set up earlier by the Serb and the JNA forces at the Vrbanja bridge, the JNA column comprised of thirty-eight JNA trucks with 261 fully armed JNA personnel who, according to Kukanjac, were instructed to defend themselves if attacked, was led by the UN APC.

In this second stage through Dobrovoljačka street it was planned that the UN APC with the president and other captives make a turn on Skenderija bridge, and transport them to the Presidency house, while the JNA column should continue its peaceful withdrawal towards the

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41 Kljujić, the Croat member of the Presidency House was excluded from the HDZ party in 1992 due to a disagreement with the Party’s policy of the division of BiH.
43 Filip Švarm, Tamara Skrozza, Biljana Vasić, ‘Interview with the General Milutin Kukanjac.’
checkpoint at the Vrbanja bridge. Specifically, from the checkpoint, the JNA column continued withdrawal through the city’s neighbourhoods Kovačići, Grbavica and Vraca, which the JNA and Serb forces had occupied earlier in April, and thus established the corridor which connects the occupied territory in the city with surrounding territories.

The first stage of the journey into the city went to plan. However, from the moment the JNA personnel left the Military District, as the general Jovan Divjak, former JNA colonel who joined the TO RBiH describes, various groups of people followed the retreating JNA column. He explains that among those were groups assigned to the President Izetbegović’s security detail, as well as other groups of formal and informal military units that were involved in the city’s defence.

The peaceful withdrawal was disturbed at the very beginning of the second stage, after the UN APC was unexpectedly stopped close to Čobanija bridge, when, according to evidence which includes the witnesses testimonials that compromise member of the forces of all parties, and the available footage, two TO RBiH commanders verified that the country’s President is really in the UN APC, and received assurance that the other captives will be exchanged through the conversation with the President. Yet, as stated, some individuals who were positioned some 300 meters away from the point where the UN APC was stopped at the bus intersection, close to Drvenija bridge, abused this unplanned check, and attacked the JNA column. The attack executed by still unidentified individuals resulted in a still unconfirmed death toll, and it significantly twisted the course of events.

As the available footage shows, the General Jovan Divjak had tried to control the uncoordinated forces and to calm the hostile situation. In the chaos that occurred after the attack, some of the JNA members who drove vehicles transported wounded JNA members to the former Military hospital, located in the central part of the city. Also, a number of the JNA soldiers were taken hostage, while the rest of the column led by the PAC with the president, the JNA general and the UNPROFOR commander continued with the withdrawal towards the

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 The Death of Yugoslavia, (The British Broadcasting Corporation BBC, 1995) [on DVD].
checkpoint at the Vrbanja bridge. On their way to the Vrbanja bridge checkpoint, at the Skenderija bridge, the PAC with the country’s president and other captives turned towards the RBiH Presidency house.

7.6. Parallel Judicial Investigations on the ‘Dobrovoljačka Street’ Event

Controversy over the shootings in the former Dobrovoljačka street was publicly revealed only recently. Specifically, the event in Dobrovoljačka and other related events, are the subject of two parallel judicial investigations, one at the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia, and at the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both Prosecutor’s offices keep evidence collected throughout the course of their distinctive ongoing investigations closed to the media and the public. Thus, the causes of the shooting, the perpetrators, an accurate number of the dead and wounded, as well as the number of captured soldiers and the circumstances under which they were held in the TO RBiH Headquarter have been manipulated.48

The first military enquiry was opened in Belgrade in 1994 by the War Prosecutor at the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, on the basis of criminal charges, which were submitted in 1993, against Ganić and 18 other Bosnian-Herzegovinian highly ranked politicians and military officers allegedly related to the shootings.49 The further progress of this enquiry is summarised in the analysis of the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) from Ljubljana, which reads

[a]fter the military investigation court in Belgrade referred the complete dossier, which contained statements of several security officers and [JNA] generals, from Milutin Kukanjac to Aleksandar Vasiljevic, to the Military Prosecutor on 31 January 2002, the Serbian Government reached a decision to use Republika Srpska (RS) and to submit the dossier to ICTY through RS. The dossier was submitted to ICTY in The Hague in July 2002 by expedited procedure through the Secretariat for Cooperation of RS.50

48 Territorial Defence of the then Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
50 Ibid.
Accordingly, the ICTY judges reviewed the collected evidence and assessed it to be inconsistent with international legal standards. Accordingly, in 2003, the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) referred the ‘Dobrovoljačka case’ to the newly established Prosecutor Office of BiH located in Sarajevo, and clarified that evidence received from the BiH Entity RS is insufficient for the prosecution of the war crimes. Following the ICTY recommendation to investigate further the allegations against Ganić and others, in order to determine whether there were grounds for a war crimes trial, the Prosecutor’s Office BiH opened the investigation in 2006.

The legal procedure, which progressed slowly since then, reappeared again in May 2009 and was the focus of local, regional and international media, after the Interpol office in Belgrade issued 13 red warrants for the arrest of Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens suspected for committing crimes in Dobrovoljačka street. This immediately instigated a legal dispute between BiH and Serbia, and instigated a strong reaction on the part of the public in the BH Entity FBiH. Specifically, the ‘Patriotic League’ veteran’s association organised a protest against the warrants before the Embassies of the UK and the Republic of Serbia in Sarajevo, while the Minister of the BiH Ministry of Interior Affairs requested the withdrawal of the arrest warrants from the Interpol office. The allegations became the subject of a highly-politicised quarrel. On one side, the representatives of the Republic of Serbia and The BH Entity RS claimed that there were 42 dead JNA members, while the officials in the BH Entity FBiH claimed that only eight were killed in accordance with the figures presented by the JNA General Kukanjac in his statements after the attack.

The problem came to a head after the Metropolitan Police detained Ganić at Heathrow Airport in London on 1 March 2010, on a basis of the provisional extradition request from Serbia. The arrest instigated strong criticism in the BH Entity FBiH directed towards the

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51 In ‘Serbia and Republika Srpska with joined forces against Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ IFIMES; and ‘Press Briefing of 9 March, 2011,’ ICTY [Accessed on 27 November 2016].
52 Established in 2003.
55 As stated, these estimations are in accordance with the evidence provided by the Police of East Sarajevo, in Željka Domazet, ‘Candles and roses for those killed in Dobrovoljačka’, Glas Srpske, 4 May, 2010, p. 2-3.; Also in Esad Hečimović, ‘Dosije dana: Dobrovoljačka-Ko je nadležan za sudjenje? Pravno ili moralno pitanje?,’ Dani, No 613, 13 March, 2009.
Serbian warrants, but also towards BH authorities and their insufficient commitment and lack of awareness regarding the Serbian requests for extradition. After a five-month-long investigation, the High Court in London rejected the Serbian request for the extradition of Ejup Ganić. As reported, some of the grounds of the Court’s decision were the ‘political motivation’ of the Serbian-run trial.56

It is notable that Ganić’s arrest occurred on the Independence Day of Bosnia and Herzegovina observed on 1 March only in the BH Entity FBH. Thus, Ganić’s case amplified and re-heated the political debate about contrasting interpretations of events and actors as well as about the death toll of the shooting that occurred on 3 May, 1992 in Dobrovoljačka street. Hostile media debate on Ganić’s arrestment and the legal procedure at the High Court in London thus preceded the public request for commemoration sent to the Sarajevo police authorities in the second half of April 2010.

7.7. The Request for the First Commemoration of Killed Members of the JNA Personnel in former Dobrovoljačka Street in Sarajevo in 2010

The request for the first commemorations of killed members of the JNA personnel in Sarajevo at the site where the shooting occurred, was announced in April, 2010. Specifically, the Ministry of Labour, War Veterans and Disabled Veteran’s Protection of the BiH Entity RS sent a request for the commemoration of the 18th anniversary of ‘the murders of the JNA soldiers in former Dobrovoljačka street’ to the Cantonal Ministry of Interior Affairs (MUP KS).

The request was submitted in the period of the post-election reconciliation initiative instigated by the new president of Croatia Ivo Josipović, and epitomised by apologetic politics in the region,57 as well as the beginning of the fierce general election campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the election scheduled for October 3, 2010. The mobilisation of the electorate

57 Media described Josipović as the ‘first president since the Balkan Wars to visit a neighbouring state and formally apologise for his country’s past policies.’ In ‘Croatia’s President Honours Victims of Croatian War Crimes in Bosnia,’ Radio Free Europe (RFE), RFE Balkan Service, 15 April, 2010. <https://www.rferl.org/a/Croatias_President_Honors_Victims_Of_Croatian_War_Crimes_In_Bosnia/2013355.html> [Accessed on 11 November 2016].
started early in the year with the renewed dispute from 2009 over the ‘Dobrovoljačka case’ that occurred with the Ganić’s arrest in the UK, and contrasting narratives about the event from 1992 in Dobrovoljačka street. Alongside the official politics, the few local and international non-governmental organizations focused on dealing with the past organised conferences and debates on memorialisation and reconciliation.  

Also, during this period, local and international politics and media were focused on the then-ongoing prosecution of Radovan Karadžić, who was indicted for war crimes and genocide, before the ICTY, as well as on the Srebrenica Declaration, which was adopted in March 2010 by the Serbian Parliament, after 15 years long silence of Serbia’s government. Both memory-mania and the dramatic turns in the official regional politics, strongly resonated on international, regional, state and entity levels. Also, these dynamics were featured with the internal crisis in the country generated by the then-Prime Minister, and today the president of the BiH Entity RS, who has expressed growing criticism and mistrust towards the BH State Prosecutor’s Office of BiH. These unconstructive developments within the legal aspects of the ‘Dobrovoljačka case’ where soon projected into the commemorative aspect.

The commemoration of the JNA soldiers was initiated by the Entity RS government’s agency called the ‘Council for fostering traditions of liberation wars of Republika Srpska’ (the Entity RS Council). The public announcement of the commemoration was at the same time the first public introduction of the Council, which consists of the Entity RS representatives, and its ‘Program of the commemoration of the events of historical significance for the Serb's history’, which the Entity RS government adopted in 2006. However, details about the Council, which enlisted the Dobrovoljačka Street event in its Programme, were omitted from the highly politicised media debate, while full information about the process of the establishment of the Entity RS Council as well as details about 20 events included in its Program remain hardly obtainable in media and available research.

In order to build a sufficient understanding of the Entity’ agency and its programme I explore social practices and statements of the BH Entity RS Council’s representatives presented in the Dobrovoljačka commemoration in relation to the Serbian government agency with an identical name and purpose, whose structure and purpose are somewhat more

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59 Željka Domazet, ‘Candles and roses for those killed in Dobrovoljačka’
accessible through occasional media reports and scholarly studies. Specifically, ‘The Council for fostering traditions of the Liberation Wars of Republic of Serbia’ was initiated in 1997. It consists of highly ranked politicians and intellectuals, responsible for implementation of the state ‘program for commemorating the anniversaries of historic events of the Serbian Liberation Wars’ that includes 21 events, and which was finalised in 2009. The relationship between respective agencies and their programmes is discussed in the subsequent analysis in this chapter.

Due to the important role of majority media during the war and in BiH as in other countries in the region, media space in post-Dayton BiH thus often functions as the only public space in the country within which dominant, largely isolated and oppositional politics at different levels of the complex governmental system are juxtaposed. Thus, the re-activated, and gradually growing disputes over Dobrovoljačka street events were entirely channelled through local and regional media.

According to media, in the submitted request for the gathering, the Entity RS Council, the organiser of the commemoration, announced details of the official program. Specifically, it was planned that during their first visit to former Dobrovoljačka street, the delegation of some 300 people, which included members of the bereaved family and the Entity RS government representatives, laid flowers and lit candles in memory to ‘42 members of the JNA killed on 3 May 1992 in former Dobrovoljačka street.’

Accordingly, in their statements to media, the initiators of the commemoration, the Entity RS government described the murders that occurred in Dobrovoljačka street on 3 May, 1992 as a ‘war crime’ in which ‘innocent victims’ were killed, and claim that 42 unarmed JNA members were killed, 73 were wounded, while 215 were imprisoned. These interpretations as

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61 As Fridman describes, the State program which was ‘designed as a set of protocols’ consists of ‘a total of 21 events (…) from which one is dedicated to the distant past and celebrates the Kosovo battle, eight are related to nineteenth century Serbia, six to Balkan wars and First world War, five to Second World War and only one to recent wars of the 1990s.’ in Fridman, ‘Alternative calendars and memory work in Serbia: Anti-war activism after Milošević,’ p.215.
well as casualties were strongly opposed by the officials in Sarajevo who constructed their interpretations on the basis of the official statements highly ranked officials of the JNA, including General Kukanjac’s statements from 1994 and 2001, and the aforementioned ICTY judgement from 2003.

7.8. The Media Debate about the Dobrovoljačka Commemoration in 2010

The request for commemoration of the JNA soldiers faced strong resistance among local war veterans’ associations, particularly those veterans gathered around the umbrella Association of citizens ‘Bosnae – Green Berets’ registered at the level of the Sarajevo Canton (The Green Berets’ Association). The Green Berets were one of the first organised units of the defensive forces of the Bosnian-Herzegovina Government. Today, the Association organises an annual gathering on 3 May in former Dobrovoljačka Street in order to commemorate their fearless resistance to the ‘aggression on RBiH and the city of Sarajevo.’ Their commemorative ritual includes laying wreaths of flowers on the memorial plaques engraved with the names of members of the ARBiH soldiers killed during the Siege of Sarajevo, which are placed on the wall of the Secondary School of Agriculture and Food Science, located by the Drvenija bridge, from where the Association members, accompanied by interested citizens, walk through former Dobrovoljačka street to the Suada and Olga’ bridge.62 (the former Vrbanja bridge).63 Provoked by the contrasting interpretations, first introduced in the request and soon underlined through the media statements, the Green Berets Association members invited citizens of Sarajevo to join them on 3 May, 2010 to commemorate all fellow citizens killed during the Siege of Sarajevo.

Moreover, the request has faced strong criticism from the city’s mayor and a majority of the City Council representatives. As is notable from statements which soon saturated the media at the end of April 2010 and during the first two days of May, 2010, whereas there were no dispute in the opposing narratives that in the shooting that occurred on 3 May, 1992, a few members of the JNA personnel were killed, the interpretations of the event, circumstances, protagonists and casualties varied largely.

63 The Vrbanja bridge was renamed in 1999 in the ‘Bridge of Suada and Olga’ in order to commemorate the first victims killed by Serb forces on 5 April 1992, the first-day of the two-day peaceful anti-war demonstrations held at the BiH Parliament square.
Upon the announcement of the request of the BH Entity RS Council, then the City mayor Alija Behmen (SDP party member) who stated that he learned about the request from the media, urged the Minister of the MUP KS to propose to ban the ‘high-risk’ gathering, and called on the Cantonal Law on Public Gatherings policy on prohibition of incitement to national religious or other forms of hatred. The mayor’s initiative, amplified by news constructed by biased media, divided public opinion among politicians and highly ranked officials in the BH Entity FBIH, the BH Entity RS, and at the state level.

For instance, in the same line with Naša Stranka party who opposed the mayor’s initiative, the president of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina Meddzida Kreso argued that families of all victims should have an opportunity to pay respect to their beloved ones in peaceful and dignified way. On the other side, while most of the politicians from both cantonal (Canton Sarajevo) and federal (the BH Entity FBiH) levels avoided commenting on the announced commemoration of JNA soldiers in Dobrovoljačka street, Željko Komšić, the then SDP member, and Croat member of the triparty BH Presidency, has described the request for the gathering as political manipulation of established facts.

On the other side, the mayor’s initiative faced fierce criticism from the Entity RS politicians who accused the mayor of denying the ‘massacre’ committed in Dobrovoljačka Street in 1992 with his suggested prohibition. The president of the People’s Assembly of the Republic of Srpska designated Sarajevo as a city whose political and ethnic structure is ‘one-national’, and stated that the first commemoration of JNA soldiers in Sarajevo presents a ‘test for multi-ethnic Sarajevo.’ The same phrase reverberated in the public statement of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) from 30 April, 2010, whose members reaffirmed ‘the right of any group anywhere in BiH to peacefully demonstrate, including the planned May 3 commemoration in Sarajevo.’ Furthermore, they invited city and cantonal officials and the

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66 Interview with Igor Radojičić, Politika, 28 April, 2010.
citizens of Sarajevo to restrain from any incident, and to ensure that the commemoration ‘proceed and conclude in a dignified way’ which will be ‘a strong symbol that Sarajevo is a multi-ethnic city where all are welcome.’ Generally, the heated media debate from the end of April to beginning of May 2010 resulted in a widespread perception of the announced commemoration(s) as an event that may trigger new violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7.9. Parallel Commemorations on 3 May, 2010 in former Dobrovoljačka Street

After the disputed request for the commemoration of the JNA soldiers was approved at the end of April, both commemorations were to take place at the part of former Dobrovoljačka street where the event from 1992 occurred. Specifically, at a small bus and trolleybus intersection of Dobrovoljačka and Skenderija streets (the Drvenija intersection). The latter starts at the Skenderija bridge and ends at the Drvenija intersection, while the parallel Dobrovoljačka street, which also starts at the Skenderija bridge, crosses through the intersection towards the east and ends at the Trg Austrije (The Square of Austria). Moreover, a dominant building east of the intersection, the Secondary School of Agriculture and Food Science, stretches between Dobrovoljačka street on its right corner, and the pedestrian Drvenija bridge on its left. On the north side of the intersection are small shops, whereas residential buildings are located along the opposite south side.

On the day of parallel gathering, on 3 May 2010, well-equipped cantonal police cordons were put at the Drvenija intersection and along former Dobrovoljačka street. More than 500 policemen were deployed at and around the Drvenija roundabout, and across the city. One part of the police forces secured the participants of the BH Entity RS Council’s commemoration, who arrived from the nearby village Miljevići located in East Sarajevo. Specifically, the police escorted two buses with participants from the inter-Entity borderline, which divides Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, to the site of commemoration in Dobrovoljačka street, where the fully equipped special police units stood between two commemorative groups, that were positioned on the opposite sides of the street. Thus, the plots already introduced in the heated media debate were staged at the parallel gathering, where a physical position of two commemorative groups

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68 Statement by the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board Ambassadors’ (PIC SB), 30 `April, 2010.
69 The former name of the square – The Square of 6 April (Trg 6. aprila) adopted in 1946 was changed after the 1992-1996 war to The Square of Austria.
flamboyantly reflected the contrasting politics of war as the interpretations of the event that both groups commemorated.

The first group of over 100 people, comprised of veterans of the Green Beret, citizens of Sarajevo, and local and international journalists, gathered at 9 am. Since the Drvenija intersection was filled by the police and police cars, a small number of the participants were stretched along the narrow pedestrian in front of the secondary school’s wall with memorial plaques, while the majority were located at the Drvenija bridge and thus did not have access to the narrow place where the central commemoration was held. The mayor of the city’s municipality Old Town (Stari Grad) attended the commemoration. Together with the Association’s members, he laid a wreath of flowers on the memorial plaques and paid tribute to the defenders of the city and citizens who were killed by reciting the Muslim religious prayer for death (Fatiha), and with the observance of a minute of silence.

Afterwards, in statements to media, the mayor of the city’s municipality invited gathered citizens to resist the ‘political provocations’ from the BH Entity RS, and to commemorate city defenders and the citizens who were killed in a dignified manner. On this occasion, the president of the Association ‘Bosnae-Green Berets’ emphasised that they commemorate 14,000 citizens of Sarajevo killed during the siege, out of which 1600 were children. He mentioned that all those defenders of the city of Sarajevo who stopped the joint attacks of the JNA and Serb forces on the city that occurred on 2 and 3 May 1992, did not perceive themselves as members of one of the ethnic collectives that make ‘multi ethnic’ Sarajevo, but primarily as Sarajevans.70 These statements were supported with statements of other members of the Association who emphasised the importance of 2 and 3 May for the defence of the city of Sarajevo, but also of the whole country. In his speech, the president expressed his disappointment because the city defenders who were killed by the JNA soldiers on 3 May, 1992, are ‘forgotten.’ He also expressed dissatisfaction due to the undermining of the importance of these two days in narratives of the city defence, and a slow and unsatisfactory justice process.71 After brief speeches and laying the wreath, the Association’s president announced that the walk to the Suada and Olga’ bridge was cancelled, and asked gathered members and citizens to leave quietly before the buses with participants of the counter-

70 ‘Dobrovoljačka 3.maj 2010: Kordoni Policije, vijenci i ruže, parole i novinari sabijeni u ćoše’ [Cordons of police, wreaths and roses, paroles and journalists pressed into a corner], Oslobodjenje, 4 May, 2010, p. 2-3.
71 Ibid.
commemorative arrive from East Sarajevo. However, despite his and repeated requests of policemen who secured the counter-commemoration, the gathered citizens and numerous local and international journalists remained by the secondary school, squeezed on the narrow pavement along the school from where they tried to find a spot from which they could see the other side of the street.

The counter-commemoration was moved on the request of the organisers, as the Head of the Cabinet of Federal MUP explained to gathered local and international journalists. Moreover, the journalists were not permitted to pass through the police cordon, which prevented them from collecting information necessary for their reports about the other commemoration.

An hour and a half later, some 250 metres away, towards the west, the second group, comprised of the BH Entity RS representatives, members of bereaved families, accompanied by journalists, arrived at the former Dobrovoljačka street and held a commemoration for the JNA soldiers. The memorial ritual that was performed in silence included laying white roses and lighting candles for the JNA soldiers. After the short commemoration without speeches, and without statements to media gathered on the other side of the street, the buses with the BH Entity RS Council and bereaved family members returned to the nearby village Miljevići, in East Sarajevo, to continue with the central commemoration. Specifically, as the organisers described, after paying tribute to JNA soldiers in former Dobrovoljačka street, they continued with Parastos, a religious memorial service for death, in the orthodox Church of Saint martyr George. The central commemoration also included the ritual of the laying of wreaths of flowers at the ‘memorial cross’ at the Military Cemetery in Miljevići, and a roundtable, without details about the topic and participants.

Among the high officers of the Entity RS government that attended the first visit to the former Dobrovoljačka street, were the Minister of Labour, War Veterans and Disabled Veterans’ Protection, President of the Entity RS Veterans’ Association, the chairman of the Coordination Team of the Entity RS government, representatives of the Entity RS in the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the deputy director of the Entity RS Centre for War Research, War Crimes and Search for Missing Persons. A few family members of ‘soldiers

72 Crkva Svetog velikomučenika Djordja u Miljevićima, Istočno Sarajevo.
and civilians’ who were killed,\textsuperscript{73} and a JNA general who was part of the retreating JNA column in 1992, attended this part of the commemoration in Sarajevo.

Both commemorations passed without incident, and thus, the possibility for instigating a ‘new conflict’ in the country as was foreseen in the media debate, was avoided. Instead, an eerie silence pervaded the Drvenija intersection, which was occupied by participants of two parallel commemorations, journalists and police. Gathered on two opposite parts of the Drvenija intersection, and separated by the cordons of police and police cars, the participants of the contesting gatherings did not have an opportunity to face each other.

7.10. Reading the Commemorations a Day After: Media Presentation of the Parallel Commemorations

The initiators and participants of the parallel commemorations held on 3 May, 2010, together with journalists have created a specific social and political space for the articulation of war memories (the ‘former Dobrovoljačka street’ arena). The constructed place, which was seemingly opened for commemoration at the same time was symbolically closed for articulation of the event(s). As such, the place functioned instead as an interval in the narration process, which started shortly before 3 May 2010 through media debate, and continued in the following days through the media reports about the commemoration and then ongoing Ganić legal fight in London.

The presentation of the commemorations in the media produced different meanings which went beyond the scope of the commemorated event. In their reporting about the parallel gatherings, Dnevni Avaz, Dnevni List, and Oslobodenje appear more inclusive, through publishing photographs of participants at both commemorations on their cover pages and beside the main texts, and by including their statements in the report. Generally, the Green Berets Association’s commemoration was represented through images of commemorative acts, the laying of wreaths of flowers or the prayer of gathered Association members, as through images of citizens gathered at the bridge and around the secondary school. The Council’s commemoration was represented through photographs that represent the delegation with a

\textsuperscript{73} Željka Domazet, ‘Svijeće i ruže za ubijene u Dobrovoljačkoj’ [Candles and Roses for Those Killed in Dobrovoljačka].
mourning mother, as those with a mother and a sister of the JNA soldiers who carried framed photos of their beloved sons and brothers, and who were surrounded by politicians in suits with name tags on their blazers, all holding white roses in their hands.

On the other hand, Glas Srpske, only reported on the Council’s commemoration. Despite a few statements of members of the bereaved families, the statements of the politicians and military officials who offered both nebulous classification of the war, and description of the events from May 1992 dominate in the extensive reportage of Glas Srpske.

The eerie silence in former Dobrovoljačka street during the parallel commemoration rituals held on 3 May 2010 was not mentioned in any of the reports. Instead, the reports written by those journalists gathered at the Association Green Berets’ commemoration, namely Dnevni Avaz, Oslobodenje and Dnevni List, tackled the issue of restriction to information about the organiser, the BH Entity RS Council’s commemoration due to the limited movement. However, all three dailies cited a few statements of some of the participants of the Council’s commemoration, obtained through the news agency.

An issue of inaccessibility was also opened in the Glas Srpske. Yet, a journalist refers to the inaccessibility of the envisaged place for commemoration, which the participants from the Entity RS first experienced at the Inter Entity Boundary Line, when they were stopped by the police that secured the commemoration, due to security reason. While the second aspect, as she states, occurred when the Council made changes to its official protocol, since the place envisaged for the commemoration was ‘occupied’ by the participants of the counter-commemoration, which she vaguely termed as ‘green berets’, who in her terms, refused to leave the place after the commemoration finished. This statement, thus provides a different interpretation from that described in the daily Oslobodenje, which informs readers that citizens and journalists gathered for the commemoration refused to leave despite the organisers’ request.

It is important to notice that each newspaper stated a significantly different number of participants of the Green Berets Association’ commemoration varying between 100 (Oslobodenje) to 300 (Dnevni Avaz). A slight inconsistency in the number of the Council’s gathering participants is reflected in the difference between 150 participants (Glas Srpske) against 120 (Dnevni Avaz). Altogether, in their generally biased reports, with the minor
exception of Oslobodenje’s report, all newspapers provided partial information and framed the event in accordance with opposing dominant narratives.

The sensationalism and amplified sense of ‘insecurity’ of the Entity RS Council’s commemoration participants was particularly expressed in the writing of journalist of Dnevni List. She presented participants of the Association Green Berets gathering as ‘threatening’ and even mentioned vague information which she obtained from ‘unofficial sources’ about an alleged armed attack on the participants of the counter-commemoration. This report exceeded the sensationalism and vagueness in the writing of the journalist of Glas Srpske, who also invoked war antagonisms by describing participants of the other gathering as ‘green beret,’ which somewhat resonates with the previously mentioned common beliefs and ‘[f]ear of Muslim paramilitary the ‘zelene beretke’ mentioned in Armacolas study.74 The suggested ‘ethnic reading’ of the event, which was commonly perceived as a formative event in both narratives of war, as the invocation of war vocabulary dominated the media reporting on the parallel commemorations.

7.11. Framing the incident(s) in former Dobrovoljačka Street: Agencies and Their Narratives

The motivated use of terms to describe the shooting that occurred on 3 May, 1992, as presented in available material, often suggests the approach of each agency to the event. Accordingly, the ICTY’s usage of the term ‘events in former Dobrovoljačka street’ in press briefings, might suggest two articulated aspects of the ICTY relation to the ‘Dobrovoljačka case.’ First, the ICTY’s intention to avoid interpreting the events, since the Tribunal did not open the inquiry due to insufficient evidence in terms of the standards of the international investigation. And, second, by using the plural form ‘events’ the term implies causality of events that led to the shooting that occurred in former Dobrovoljačka street. Since 2003, the ICTY has remained neutral and distant in relation to the fast-developing dispute over ‘Dobrovoljačka case’. A similar position is indicated in public statements of the OHR and the PIC during the 2010 dispute. While the HR accentuated the importance of the legal investigations of the case, and generally restrained from interference and comments in relation to the media debates from 2010 over the commemorations, the PIC in its brief press statement

74 Armacolas, ‘Sarajevo No More? Identity and Experience of Place among Bosnian Serb Sarajevans in Republika Srpska.’
announced on the eve of the parallel commemorations, invited all parties to proceed with commemorations in dignified manner.

On the other hand, the terms used throughout the media debate and during the commemoration by the initiators of the two commemorations from 2010, reflect the framing and interpretations which commonly went beyond the interpretation of the event, which in both narratives of war symbolises the beginning of the war. Thus, the conflicting interpretations of the event articulated by different agencies through their statements to the media and through their respective commemorative rituals, revealed dominant narratives of war. This is in accordance with the Ashplant, Dawson and Roper’s argument that ‘the naming of the war is closely bound up with attempts to frame the significance of a conflict in relation to competing constructions of meaning; and, as such, it provides a basis for the contestation of war memory.’

The issues of the contested war memory within the Dobrovoljačka street arena is even more complex when analysed through the suggested politics of war memory model, which distinguishes between hegemonic and sectional narratives. The former, as the authors explain, refers to official memory, commonly associated with the concept of the nation, and thus it encompasses those dominant or hegemonic narratives that have the power to reinforce and ‘help to organise the remembrance and commemoration of war at the level of nation-state’. Also, the official memory is uttered more explicitly through ‘permanent memorials, and through a calendar of ceremonies (annual and anniversary), which repeatedly recall key wartime events, and meditate on their own meaning.’ On the other hand, as the authors asserts, the term sectional refers to ‘those memories, which though they have achieved the level of open articulation, have not yet secured recognition within the existing framework of official memory.’

Although with some significant discrepancies in their approaches, power, and practices, both agencies appear to articulate official memory(ies). Narratives of both agencies, that one of the Green Berets Associations’ veterans as the one of the BH Entity RS Council, term the

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76 Ibid., p. 22.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., p. 20.
The 1992-1996 war as defensive, with significant differences in naming. Specifically, the full designation of the war in the BH Entity FBiH is ‘defensive-liberation war,’ while in the BH Entity RS the war is designated as ‘defensive-fatherland war.’

The second aspect includes the articulation of official memories through a calendar of ceremonies, which both agencies repeatedly practice with an important difference in power. Accordingly, the commemoration of the social agency the Green Berets Association, organised annually on 3 May is an important part of three interconnected calendars, which recognise the importance of the decisive battles for the city and the country that occurred on 2 and 3 May 1992. This includes the main annual calendar of ceremonies on the cantonal level titled ‘Days of the Canton of Sarajevo’ that takes place from 2 to 9 May; also, ‘The Day of the Municipality Centre; and ‘The Day of the Municipality Old Town,’ both celebrated annually on 2 May.

Also, the plaques with names of martyrs (šehids) and fallen soldiers of the ARBiH are inaugurated as a part of the larger ongoing project of the Foundation of the Canton Sarajevo for building and maintenance of the šehid (martyr) and fallen solders cemeteries, memorial centres and genocide memorial sites. The Programme, which was approved by the Government of the Canton Sarajevo in 2000 is implemented by the Cantonal Ministry for Veterans’ Issues. Thus, the site at which the event occurred is without any material monument that exclusively commemorates the contested event.

On the other hand, the commemoration of the killed JNA soldiers in Dobrovoljačka street is included in the aforementioned BH Entity RS ‘program for commemorating the anniversaries of historic events of the Liberation War of the Republic of Srpska’. As designated in the media statement, the programme implemented by the Council also includes commemoration of the events from the Second World War, and thus includes visits to some of the memorial sites that were built during the socialist period, and as such were a part of socialist narrative of the People’s Liberation Struggle (Narodno-oslobodilačka borba, NOB).

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79 This refers to those parts of the country, in which the RBiH Government forces included ARBiH, HVO and HOS and other formations.
81 Official Gazette of the Canton of Sarajevo, No. 6/00.
As mentioned earlier, these strategies of official memory are entirely constructed upon an identical programme to that of the Serbian Committee for fostering traditions of the Liberations Wars,82 and its ‘State Programme for commemorating the anniversaries of historic events of the Serbian Liberation Wars’. The Serbian Council, which functions as the government body of Serbian government, initiated its Programme in 1997, which was established in 2001. The latest revision of the Programme that was finalised in March 2009, functions ‘as set of protocols aiming to ‘fulfil the need for the dignified remembrance of the victims and participants in the armed struggles of the past.’ 83 While the dominant narrative is placed in the nineteenth century and thus, as Fridman argues, it is
designed to legitimize the current Serbian nation state as being born out of a prolonged struggle for freedom, the program consists of 21 events designated as “historical events of the liberation of Serbia”, from which one is dedicated to the distant past and celebrates the Kosovo battle, eight are related to nineteenth century Serbia, six to Balkans wars and First World War, five to Second World War and only one to the recent wars of the 1990s.84

The latter, in Fridman’s terms, commemorates the ‘Serbian victimhood during the 1999 NATO bombing as if it were the central motive of the wars in the 1990s,’ while, as she concludes, the events from the decade of the wars are ‘buried in heavy silence.’ 85

The initial institutional parallelism as well as cultural and spatial appropriation which was outlined and executed in the first years of the war by the SDS leadership and its forces, is maintained in the post-war politics of war memory. Specifically, although different in content, the level of ‘official memory’ by the BH Entity RS Council and its programme completely imitates the official memory of the Republic of Serbia. This also includes replication of some of the main strategies of the ‘state program for commemorating the anniversaries of historic events of the Serbian Liberation Wars’ which, by rooting its master-narrative in the 19th century, as Fridman describes, replaced the Yugoslav commemorative master narrative with a new Serbian master national narrative, whereas in

this process of change, ethno-national identities were back at the forefront of daily politics and, hence, of mnemonic discussions. The shift in the role of

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82 I am using the term ‘Council,’ which is more common translation in relation to reporting of Dobrovoljačka street commemoration, while Fridman uses term ‘Committee’ for same term in Serbian and Bosnian and Croatian – ‘Odbor.’
84 Ibid., p. 215.
85 Ibid.
religion can also be traced in the new calendars, asserting the indisputably Orthodox character of the Serbian nation.  

Some of the features described here are visible in the ritual of the commemoration of the JNA soldiers, which includes elements of public rituals from the time of socialism, and thus from Yugoslav memory culture, such as: public commemoration, laying memorial wreaths at sites of death, building memorials for fallen soldiers, civilians, and victims of mass crimes, and the organisation of historical lessons (round table). But also, it incorporates the religious rites in central commemorations, such as lighting candles and serving the Parastos. The inclusion of religious rites thus implies both the Orthodox character of the program of the dominant ethnic group in the BH Entity RS, and a distancing from the other ethnic groups in this Entity and the country.

Accordingly, although the political organisation of the other BH Entity FBiH is more complex, some of the similar changes in relation to the Yugoslav master narrative and the role of religion are visible in the Association Green Berets’ commemoration. Specifically, it includes an observation of a minute of silence, which symbolises the socialist commemorative practices, together with laying wreaths of flowers and placing memorial plaques to commemorate ARBiH soldiers. These traces of Yugoslav memory culture are amalgamated with traces of traditional religious practices, such as the Muslim prayer for death (Fatiha), but also with new meanings produced during the wartime, such as the designation of fallen soldiers of the Muslim religious tradition as martyrs ‘šehids.’ These commemorative rites reflect both inclusiveness and the transformation of cultural practices, but they also expose the dominance of religious - ethnic identification.

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7.12. Conclusion

The arena of articulation created in former Dobrovoljačka street on 3 May 2010 juxtaposes two conflicting interpretations of the 1992-1996 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and about the Siege of Sarajevo. At the same time, this was the first direct encounter of the opposing agencies, the veteran association and citizens of Sarajevo on one side, and the representatives of the government of the BH Entity RS, former members of the JNA from both BiH and Serbia, and the members of the bereaved families whose loved ones were killed in Dobrovoljačka street.

The distinctive gestures and rituals performed simultaneously within the Dobrovoljačka arena at the commemorations, demonstrated some differences both in public commemorative rituals and the interpretation of the event. However, the similarities which were exposed confirm some of the arguments presented by scholars and activists. Specifically, what is common to both parallel counter-commemorations is the difficulty of narrating the event outside of the ethnopolitical matrix imposed by the war violence, and the overarching transitional justice paradigm, which all gathered actors experienced. Specifically, both narratives, which although they commemorate a shooting which involved military units, attempted to include civilians, yet they failed to achieve ‘political purchase’ which require ‘articulation in the double sense of ‘linked together’ and ‘expressed.’

This is also the case with some attempts to frame their commemoration around supra-ethnic identities: civic, which here refers to Sarajevans who experienced the siege of their city in the 1990s, on one side (of the street, literally); and Yugoslav, through recalling JNA kinship, which was seen as the embodiment of Yugoslavism, on the other.

In the case of the BH Entity RS Council’s commemoration, which commemorated members of the JNA personnel, the political articulation was omitted due to the confusing interplay between two interpretations within the agency, specifically those of the politicians who insisted on the (mono-) ethnicity of the victims, and thus emphasised their Serb ethnic origins, on one side, and those of the JNA General and a member of bereaved family who insisted on the multi-ethnicity of the JNA army and thus of the victims of the shooting. Besides the strongly disputed number of the killed members of the JNA personnel, one of the victims,

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whom the JNA General Kukanjac named immediately after the attack and described as ‘a woman of Muslim origin’ and a member of the JNA personnel, was not commemorated. She remained unidentified, ‘stateless’, since the only information that was presented in the media was her affiliation to the JNA, and unmournable at the commemoration, whose main purpose, as stated by the organisers, was to enable bereaved families who lost their ‘sons and brothers’ to pay tribute to their beloved ones at the site where they were killed. To a certain extent, the arena of articulation in Dobrovoljačka thus confirms the persistence of a ‘political economy,’ a term that somewhat corresponds to Mujkić’s ethnopolitics, which Arsenijević and Eminagić use to designate a space ‘where any political agency citizens can have will exclusively be defined by their ethnicity, while continuing the fearmongering and politics of terror of everyday life.’

One of the striking differences between the two commemorations is evident in the narrativity of the murders that occurred in Dobrovoljačka in 1992. While, in the case of the commemoration organised by the Green Berets Association, this incident is related to a series of dramatic events that occurred on 3 May, as well as the subsequent events that occurred during the siege of the city, the incident is incorporated into the larger narrative of the siege of Sarajevo. On the other side, the commemoration of the JNA soldiers lacks this minimum in narration, since the circumstances that preceded and followed the incident in Dobrovoljačka street are omitted, and thus, it remains entirely focused on this fragment of the event, the moment when the murders of members of the JNA personnel occurred. However, the ‘slippery’ event that occurred on 3 May 1992 in Dobrovoljačka street, which attained centrality in the arguments of both agencies that this was (one of) the event(s) which instigated the war, during the commemoration remained remote in the narratives of both agencies. Although parallel commemorations within the Dobrovoljačka street arena appeared completely opposed, some similarities in commemorative practices were revealed through cultural templates which denote shared and once jointly practiced social and cultural experiences.

A number of citizens that joined the commemoration organized by the veteran’s Association Green Berets may suggest that their attempt to underscore belonging to the city and commemorate the defenders of the city and civilians killed during the siege, primarily as

Sarajevans. However, the ways in which their memories are linked and shared into memories of the Siege of Sarajevo, should be explored further, along with different senses of belonging to the city, complexities which are partly demonstrated in scholarly research. Additionally, in relation to news reporting about this commemoration, the presence of some of the politicians, activists and individuals some of whom play pivotal roles in the construction of the inclusive cultural narrative of the Siege of Sarajevo, among gathered citizens, was not acknowledged in media. While it is impossible to approach individual responses to both commemoration and counter-commemoration, it can be argued that the PIC’s claim that both the city and cantonal officials’ permission as well as the citizens’ respect for the bereavement of the others ‘will be a strong symbol that Sarajevo is a multi-ethnic city where all are welcome’ addresses some of the abovementioned issues.  

This statement, which became a catch-phrase in the public media debate about the Dobrovoljačka commemoration, along with the impossibility to commemorate the ethnic other – a woman of ‘Muslim origin’ killed in the attack on the JNA column, best voice the political economy and limitations in declaring oneself in any other identification but ethnic. The problem of ‘the new regime’ in BiH, which in Arsenijević and Eminagić’s terms ‘produces the subject - the ethnic victim, whether dead or alive, it matters little,’ and in which ‘victims, themselves being politically reduced solely to members of an ethnic group,’ was articulated and challenged through different practices initiated by the grassroots platform ‘Because it Concerns Me,’ and ‘the Monument Group’ in 2012, which are the focus of the analysis in the subsequent chapter.

What started as a political dispute between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and followed by a number of controversial events which dominated international, regional and local media coverage, and involved regional and international judiciary, on the day of the commemoration of the JNA soldiers killed in Dobrovoljačka street, was limited to memory regimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to opposing interpretations of the incident. This unexpected locality of the arena of articulation in Dobrovoljačka street is demonstrated through the complete absence of representatives of the international community, who were engaged in the public media debate as well as in the commemoration to a much lesser extent than in the case of the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide held two months later. One of the possible interpretations for their marginal involvement can be the shift in focus from the dispute

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between the two countries and the associated quarrel between two B-H entities that followed the organisation of the first commemoration in Dobrovoljačka, to the reconciliatory politics introduced by the Serbian President Boris Tadić and Croatian President Ivo Josipović, and prompted by the adoption of the Declaration on Srebrenica by the Serbian Parliament in March, 2010.

The lack of legal truth in the multi-layered spaces of experiences concentrated in Dobrovoljačka Street arena on 3 May, 2010, led to the difficulties in narrating the event, and the gathered participants of both commemorations confronted each other in silence. At the same time the event was represented by local, regional and international news media, and the participants’ experiences were communicated in the news. In relation to the prevailing silence at the Dobrovoljačka Street commemoration, it can be argued that this silence signals the difficulty in articulating experiences and in thinking and narrating the event outside of the overarching transitional justice paradigm and in the absence of what Arsenijević, Husanović and Wastell refer to as legal truths. This could be a basis for exploring the ways to articulate war experience, to intervene and ‘politicise it,’ something that the activists, theorists and artists effected two years later in Prijedor. Given that the incident in Dobrovoljačka from 1992 and the subsequent political quarrel as well as other associated events are mainly represented through news media, the complex process of the news representation should be understood in accordance to Hall’s analysis of the processes and elements of news production as well as the associated processes which reproduce dominant ideologies. Accordingly, Hall and others assert that

[t]he media help to reproduce and sustain the definitions of the situations which favour the powerful, not only by actively recruiting the powerful in the initial stages where topic are structured by favouring certain ways of setting up topics, and maintaining certain strategic areas of silence. Many of these structured forms of communication are so common, so natural, so taken for granted so deeply embedded in the very communication forms which are employed, that they are hardly visible at all, as ideological constructs, unless we deliberately set out to ask, ‘What, other than this what has been said about this topic, could be said?’ ‘What questions are omitted?’ ‘Why do the questions - which always presuppose answers of particular kind – so often recur in this form?’ why do certain other questions never appear?”

Understanding the complexity of both processes news production and construction and reconstruction of meaning, the suggested questions are helpful for grasping the need for critical reading of news but also for thinking about prevalent commemoration practices and discourses which attempt to redraw ‘maps of meaning,’ established after the war destruction of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the questions Hall suggests were omitted in 2010 and in the previous year in BiH and wider post-Yugoslav memory landscape, they come to the fore in 2012 through some of the emergent memory practices, which are the focus of my analysis in the subsequent chapter.
CHAPTER 8
The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration in 2012

8.1. Introduction

As argued in the previous chapters, the great impact of the demographic consequences of the 1992-1996 war, the complex political and territorial restructuring of the country established by the Dayton Peace Agreement, and the effect of recent hegemonic politics on post-war contemporary Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture and society requires the analysis of wider post-Yugoslav and global contexts. As I have shown, this is particularly important in the analysis of cultural production and commemorative practices, which in some cases construct shared spaces for communication, not only within, but also between collectives, which are reduced to ethnic difference in the fragmented post-Dayton BiH. In their analysis, Arsenijević, Husanović and Wastell describe the ramifications of the country’s ethnic division, along with the supposed ‘volatile relations between different ethnic communities’, in the following manner:

[i]n the name of political correctness and for fear of instigating further ethnic violence, there is an injunction not to say many things. Human rights and the dangers of hate speech are often invoked by international community to silence debates that might threaten to unleash the affective, ethnic ties they have tried so hard to contain. As a result, civil society in Bosnia remains fractured, controlled, and worryingly stagnant. ¹

Additionally, some of the grounds of the resultant apathy and ‘intellectual atrophy’ in post-war BiH,² as well as in the wider post-communist context, Buden, Arsenijević and Eminagić see as the effects of ‘Denkverbot’ (a ban on thinking). The latter, as Buden clarifies, is the term which Freud uses to designate the effects of the ‘intellectual inhibition that culture implants in its pupils through education to make them more obedient and compliant.’³ Arsenijević and Eminagić make use of the term ‘Denkverbot to refer to a ‘political economy in BiH,’ which is

³Buden, ‘Children of Post-Communism,’ p. 23.
‘suturing Bosnia’s citizens into a position of constant melancholia, which then is proliferated through the dominant modes of commemoration.’

The twenty-year long process of ethnicization of society and culture, along with the politics of denial of crimes committed in the 1992-1996, came to the fore in 2012, in the first and the largest debate about the preservation of national (Bosnian-Herzegovinian) cultural heritage, and in commemorative practices that followed the twentieth anniversaries of the Siege of Sarajevo in April, and of the war crimes committed in the municipality of Prijedor, between May and September, 1992.

This chapter provides an overview of the public debate about the ‘legal vacuum’ which resulted in the closure of some of the seven institutions of national importance. The main issues raised in the broader debate are analysed in relation to the debate held in the Historical Museum of BIH, the analysis of which draws on my earlier work. The second part of this chapter considers the memorial event titled ‘Sarajevo Red Line’, which commemorates the citizens killed during the siege of Sarajevo, and an artistic protest, which was a part of the global campaign, ‘Worldwide White Armband Day’ initiated after the mayor of Prijedor rejected the request for the commemoration of non-Serb citizens of the municipality of Prijedor killed in 1992. Both practices brought different forms of commemoration. At the same time, both commemorative events strikingly demonstrate the ramifications of the official politics of denial in the RS Entity BIH, which impelled the Armband Day Campaign, and illuminate the impact of these politics on ‘limbo people’, the term expelled survivors of the horrendous crimes committed in Prijedor use to describe their lives after 1992.

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5 The sections on the public debate about the Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture draws on Melina Sadiković, ‘Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture between erasure and ethnopolitics: reflection on the crisis of national cultural institutions’, my article published in the peer-reviewed journal; Museological Review: Global Microphone, Issue 20, April, 2016, School of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, pp. 84-94.

The open destruction of culture and cultural heritage that bore witness to more than a thousand years of vibrant Bosnian-Herzegovinian history is continuously resisted through various efforts to preserve and reconstruct those items and stories, which are endangered by the ambiguous legal framework of the post-war period. As Pearce and Mujkanović point out ‘the Accords [Dayton Peace Accords] failed to establish a ministry of culture in its requirements. They did, however, recognize the standing national cultural institutions — museums, galleries, and libraries — and required that governmental entities take public stands on the oversight, leadership, and care of these institutions. To date, none of the entities have stepped up to the plate.’ Moreover, after the institutionalisation of the ethnic principles by the Dayton Peace Agreement, the end of war and violence saw the beginning of a new struggle for the survival of the culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although the repercussions of the continued process of destruction are numerous, there is within Bosnia and Herzegovina remarkably persistent public opposition. This resistance, which was demonstrated in the pre-war period through civic engagement, endured through various forms during the wartime as a response to the division and destruction of the country. Accordingly, in her examinations of the role of art exhibitions within the larger theoretical and historical framework of culture and society in besieged Sarajevo where ‘[a]bout one hundred solo exhibitions, and dozens of groups shows were organized in various locations’, art historian Asja Mandić refers to these forms of cultural production as a culture of critical resistance.

The issues related to the promotion of Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture and the protection of cultural heritage came to a head in 2012 due to intensified political disputes, and a financial crisis caused primarily by the unresolved constitutional status of a number of the national cultural institutions. The former is related to the advocacy of the politicians from the BH Entity RS for the country’s dissolution. Valentin Inzko, the High Representative for BiH

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7 The phrase coined by the representative of the respective cultural institutions, and frequently used in media during the debate of 2012.
in his report to the UN Security Council, describes this rhetorical campaign for secession the following manner ‘[s]enior RS officials have publicly acknowledged deliberate obstruction of Dayton institutions, asked for RS to have its own path towards the EU, and asserted that it is up to the RS to decide whether or not Bosnia and Herzegovina exists.’

Under the influence of the long-term political and financial crisis, the country’s seven (leading) cultural institutions had been facing funding problems for an extended period, which had endangered their work and forced several museums to close their doors to the public. The institutions are vastly different in terms of their functions, but all are located in Sarajevo and all are concerned with the protection and presentation of Bosnian-Herzegovinian cultural heritage. They are: the National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Historical Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Art Gallery of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the National Film Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Museum of Literature and Performing Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the National Library for Blind and Partially Sighted Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, the territorial location of each of the seven cultural institutions of national significance is central to their access to funding. The importance of this territorial positioning became obvious during the financial and functional crisis, leading to questions about the ‘national significance’ of the cultural institutions located in Sarajevo, which, despite being the capital of the country, is also physically located in one of the two entities which make up Bosnia and Herzegovina, (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina).


11 Founded in 1888. This cultural-scientific institution cares for diverse collections such as archaeology, ethnology, art and natural history.

12 Founded in 1945 the Historical Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a central institution for research, preservation and displaying of objects from all periods of the history of BiH.

13 Before it was burned in August 1992, in ‘a three-day inferno’ the National Library held an estimated two million items, including special collections, rare books and manuscripts, unique archives, the national catalogue for all books and records, newspapers and journals published in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An estimated 90 per cent of its collection was reduced to ashes. See Andreas J. Riedlmayer, ‘Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace: Destruction of Libraries during and after the Balkans Wars of the 1990s,’ Library Trends, Special Issue: Preserving Cultural Heritage, ed. By Michèle V. Cloonan and Ros Harvey, Vol.56, No.1., Summer 2007 <http://muse.jhu.edu/article/223260 > [accessed on 18 March, 2017].

14 Established in 1946, through research, restoration and presentation this institution cares for a rich collection of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian art, Yugoslav art and international works of art.

15 Founded in 1994, this institution cares for a valuable film collection of BiH and foreign film and archive materials.

16 Established in 1961, the Museum holds precious literary and theatrical collections.

17 Established in 1972, it is a highly-specialised library collection for blind and partially sighted persons.
Herzegovina), and in one of the ten Cantons which make up the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (the Canton of Sarajevo).

8.2.1. Alternative Approaches to the ‘Intolerable Impasse’: The Public Debate and Civic Initiatives

The public debate initiated at the beginning of 2012 was the largest discussion on culture to take place in post-war BiH. It was comprised of a range of discussions and reflections involving representatives from cultural institutions, government, non-governmental organisations, political parties, professionals from a wide spectrum of cultural production, academics, activists and interested citizens. To a lesser extent, local, regional and international media perspectives also helped foster debate. Local and international perspectives and reflections on the problems of the unresolved legal status and a failure to provide adequate support to the seven cultural institutions were presented, with the aim of analysing and examining possible solutions. Fundamentally, the public debate of 2012 concerned the unresolved legal status of the institutions, which was generally perceived as a political problem. Arguments and analysis thus focused on and incorporated the confused disruption in the legal framework regarding the cultural sector, particularly in those areas where the institutions were based, as well as on a general lack of cultural policy at all levels of local and central government.

The broader public debate and particularly the permanent closure of the National Museum of BiH resulted in several initiatives, at local and international levels. Generally, these initiatives aimed to raise awareness of the country’s threatened cultural heritage, as well as to situate discussion within the public arena, and to involve the wider public through various practices of solidarity that were initiated in 2012 and 2013. Relevant parties were also invited to contribute. One of the most prominent of these initiatives is ‘Cultureshutdown.net’ which was created with aim to ‘unite on a global level to help prevent the destruction of a cultural heritage that belongs to all the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and enriches world heritage’. The platform was founded in 2012 and gathered a significant number of academics, artists, librarians and cultural activists from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the wider post-Yugoslav space, and beyond.

Another important initiative was held in February, 2012 in the Historical Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Earlier in the year, the Managerial staff decided to close the Historical Museum of BiH to the public. They argued that impossible and inadequate working conditions were increasing the risk of damage to the museum’s collections.\(^1\) Very soon after the closure however, management made a decision to initiate an ‘Open Door Week’ under the catchphrase ‘Show solidarity, let’s warm up the Museum.’ According to the organisers the initiative was aimed at re-establishing a connection between the Museum and the public.

On the first day, the museum hosted a public discussion titled ‘The Historical Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the modern Bosnian-Herzegovinian society: In what way can the Museum contribute to society and how can society contribute to the work of the Museum?’ An unusually interactive moderated discussion attracted a range of contributors and a sizeable audience. By giving diverse but related explanations for the difficult situation of the Historical Museum, one of the contributors emphasised that the museum is confronted with difficulties mainly because it is associated with the socialist period.\(^2\) The contributors to the public discussion agreed that the tendency of the dominant ideologies to distance ‘new democracies’ from a communist socialist past, also affects the cultural sector by sustaining ‘a legal vacuum’ and consequently, the (non-existent) legal status of institutions in crisis. One of the most prominent arguments, with regards to the ethnopolitics and ethno-territorialisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was that everything referring to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian dimension; everything that inherits the idea of a shared Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture, is today redundant. As clarified in the discussion that follows, this attitude of apparent redundancy is reflected within the examples of museums and other educational and cultural institutions and cultural goods. All of these institutions, as indicated, together with the discourses they are witnessing, developing and remembering, are slowly dissolving after twenty years of ethnopolitics.

\(^1\) In a similar way to other institutions, the staff at the Historical Museum continue to face lack of financial support for both their work and war damage to their building (the building has been without heating for more than 17 years).

\(^2\) Retrieved from audio record of the public discussion ‘The Historical Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the modern Bosnian-Herzegovinian society. In what way can the Museum contribute to society and how can society contribute to the work of the Museum?’ recorded on 23 February 2012. (I attended and recorded the public discussion held on 23\(^\text{rd}\) February 2012 in The Historical Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo).
The public discussions held in the Museum unfolded a number of issues related to the impact of dominant ethnopolitics on history, culture and education. The cross-disciplinary approach of the discussion emphasised the problem of the missing critical academic approaches to (modern) history. More precisely, most of the questions addressed in the 2012 public discussion held in the Historical Museum of BiH were focused on cultural and educational practices that mirror the paradoxes of ethnopolitical segregation, as incorporated within all levels of the post-war Bosnian-Herzegovinian society.

These issues are additionally entangled with uncritical deployment of the concepts developed in different academic fields into the dominant ethnopolitics. This problem was prominent in the broader debate, which illuminated generally ambiguous, different and often conflicting concepts of culture and history. As a consequence, nearly all of the questions raised during the broader public debate of 2012-2013 remained unaddressed. Thus, the public debate only scratched the surface of the multi-layered, accumulated problems regarding the greatly selective dominant post-war Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture.

Two years after the ethno-national elite actively underlined the ethnically divided political spaces in the country for political ends, the commemorations held in 2012 demonstrated different approaches to the politics of denial and disputed interpretations about the war events, which reproduce post-war politics.


The year 2012 marks 20 years since the beginning of the siege of Sarajevo, and 20 years since the mass killings, war crimes of torture and rape, and expulsion of non-Serbs from Prijedor, which Bosnian forces occupied on 30 April, 2012. The commemoration of two war crimes that were documented at the ICTY, through the individual cases of convicted war criminals, and special UN reports, today reflect contrasting pictures of the narration of these crimes, which occurred in the first months after the outbreak of the war in BiH. They also

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21 Professor Asim Mujkić, one of the discussants at the public discussion.
demonstrate the different positions from which the individuals involved in the cultural production act.

Two commemorations that occurred in Sarajevo and Prijedor depict two contrasting sites of memory, one in the BH Entity FBiH, and one in the BH Entity of RS. While the commemoration of 11,541 Sarajevans killed during the Siege of Sarajevo, was organised in cooperation of the city authorities in Sarajevo, the local theatre company ‘East West Theatre’, and over 50 public federal and city institutions, at the same time the mayor of the city of Prijedor rejected the request for the commemoration of 266 women and young girls raped and killed in the campaign of ethnic cleansing the followed the occupation of the city in 1992. Both commemorations of 2012 brought new cultural and artistic forms of representations of the 1992-1996 war.

8.3.1. Remembering Beyond the Ethnic Divisions: Sarajevo Red Line, 6 April, 2012

Sarajevo Red Line was an artistic, one-day event, which commemorated the human losses suffered by Sarajevo during the 1992-1996 siege of the capital city. This was the central event of the official programme of commemoration to celebrate the date which intertwines events from WWII and events from the war in the 1990s in the city. The former refers to the liberation of Sarajevo from the NDH fascist regime on 6 April, 1945. The events from the early 1990s includes the violent breakup of the largest anti-war demonstrations in the city and country’s history that occurred on 6 April 1992. Despite the recognition of the country’s independence on the same day, on April 6 1992 Sarajevo became engulfed in the longest siege of a city in modern European history.

The City Council’s programme incorporated commemoration of both the events from WWII and the 1992-1996 war. The city delegation laid wreaths on monuments located in the city centre, which commemorates heroes from WWII, the first victims killed in the peace demonstration on 5 April, and later joined the central memorial event to commemorate Sarajevans killed during the siege.

The Sarajevo Red line was organised in the city’s central street called Tito’s Street (Titova). One of the most striking forms of the performance, which incorporated a concert, poetry reading, and an exhibition of the great collection of the war posters, was a large chair installation titled ‘red audience.’ It consisted of 11,541 red chairs which were arranged in 825
rows. According to the artist, the ‘red audience’ represented the 11,541 Sarajevans killed during the 1992-1996 siege, of which over 1500 were children. The red audience stretched for some 800 meters from the music stage located at the beginning of Tito’s street to the Great Park (Veliki Park). The chairs were turned towards the large music stage that was installed in front of the monument called ‘Eternal flame’ (‘Vječna vatra’), which commemorates both citizens killed in WWII and the those who liberated the city from the fascist occupation on 6 April 1945, to the ‘Memorial to Children killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995’. During the performance, the names of fellow-citizens killed during the Sarajevo siege were projected on large screens installed close to the music stage and on a few locations on Tito’s street.

22 A. Dučić, ‘Stolice Postavljane od ponoći do zore,’ [Chairs were arranged from midnight to dawn], Dnevni Avaz, 7 April, 2012, p.7.
23 According to the ICTY evidence, estimates of the number of children killed in the Siege of Sarajevo vary.
24 ‘Crvena linija za ubijene Sarajlije,’ Oslobodjenje, 6 April, 2012, p.2. The article is signed with the journalists’ initials of the first name and family name – A.Nu. -M.G.
25 In official BH language(s), ‘Vječna vatra’ commemorates both civil victims killed during the four-years long fascist occupation of the city of Sarajevo during the WW2, and the Yugoslav ‘partisans’ (partizani) who liberated the city on 6 April 1945.
26 The monument was erected in 1946.
27 Spomenik ubijenoj djeci Sarajeva was erected on 9 May, 2009.
Several thousand citizens, local, regional and international officials attended the commemoration that most of the politicians and artists who were interviewed described as a dignified way to commemorate the enormous human loss, which is powerfully symbolised by the ‘river of blood’ which flowed through the capital in the 1990s. In his statements to the media, the author of the memorial event, the director of the theatre company which organized the event, and a prominent Bosnian-Herzegovinian theatre director Haris Pašović, described the powerful response of gathered citizens. They laid flowers on the chairs, messages, and in
in some cases, obituaries. The most moving were toys left on the small chairs which signified children killed during the siege.\textsuperscript{28} Most of the interviewed officials and artists described the commemoration as dignified, as a site filled with sadness, but also as a place of interaction of people who shared stories about their experiences of war. Pašović described how the commemoration opened the space for shared mourning, and enabled the survivors of the siege to recognised each other in their shared grief, for the first time.\textsuperscript{29} The incident which involved French journalist and former ICTY spokesperson Florence Hartmann, British journalist Ed Vulliamy, who discovered the concentration camps in Prijedor in 1992, and Swedish politician and EU envoy during the war in BiH, Carl Bildt interrupted the overwhelming silence in Tito’s street. Hartmann and Vulliamy confronted Bildt, and criticised him for attending the commemoration, since he did not do enough to protect the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the wartime.\textsuperscript{30}

However, the articles in print media in the BH Entity RS propagated the politics of denial of the war crimes committed by the Serb forces during the wartime. In the article published in the daily Glas Srpske, politicians, including sentenced war criminal Biljana Plavšić, and academics, some of whom lived in Sarajevo before 1992, denied that Sarajevo was under the siege during the wartime. Accordingly, they have argued that all the events of 2012 organised by the City Council (SDP) to commemorate the siege of Sarajevo were a part of the political strategy of the Bosniac party SDA to conceal the ‘evidence’ and deny ‘the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Sarajevo in 1992.’\textsuperscript{31} The Serbian intellectuals and politicians who were interviewed highlight that 6 April, 1992 symbolises the beginning of the largest ethnic cleansing in the history of Europe after WWII.\textsuperscript{32}

This counter-narrative about 6 April, 1992, which appropriated the common description of the Srebrenica genocide, word for word, sounded the politics of denial which the associations of the survivors from Prijedor confronted in May, 2012. The mayor of Prijedor (SNSD) rejected their request for a commemoration ceremony for their loved ones who were

\begin{footnotes}
\item[28] ‘Crvene Stolice za Memorijalni Park!’ [Red Chairs for the Memorial Park!], \textit{Dnevni Avaz}, 8 April, 2012, p.2. The article is signed with the journalists’ initials of the first name and family name – A.Nu.
\item[29] ‘Zajednička Bol Nas je Ujedinila’ [Shared Pain Brought Us Together], \textit{Dnevni Avaz}, 7 April, 2012, p.4.
\item[32] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
tortured and killed in the ethnic cleansing that followed the occupation of the city in April, 1992. In response, the associations of family members and survivors from Prijedor, supported by few civil society groups and individuals from BIH, as well as from the countries of the region and beyond, initiated a global campaign against genocide denial titled ‘the White Armband Day.’


The ‘White Armband Day’ campaign, as stated in the public call, aims to give a voice to victims of mass atrocities from around the world in their struggle for truth, dignity and remembrance. The invitation is addressed to the wider public to take become involved in the commemoration of 31st May by placing a white sheet in their window for ten minutes or by wearing a white armband in memory of the non-Serb citizens of Prijedor, who were subjected to a campaign of extermination in 1992. The campaign, which bridges the local and global level, is dedicated to all victims throughout the world who are facing denial of their suffering.

Both objects, the white sheet and white armbands, invoke the events of May 1992, when the local radio broadcast the order of the occupying authorities that all non-Serbs must wear a white armband and mark their houses with a white piece of cloth to demonstrate loyalty to the newly formed Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.33

The members of the UN team of experts who produced a study about the events in Prijedor in 1992, which reconstructs some of the events from 1992, including the method of the occupation of the town and municipality and the establishment of ‘collection camps’, notes that a fierce media campaign backed the campaign of ethnic cleansing of non-Serb citizens of the municipality.34 According to the UN report of 1994, the non-Serbs, who were portrayed in

33 The sequence of the appeal broadcasted by Radio Prijedor Kozara is documented in documentary film Dani ubijanja [Killing Days], dir. by Enes Hotić (Al Jazeera Balkans, 2013) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SP-yXR_OlNg> [accessed on 17 June 2016]. The film is named after the book ‘The Killing Days,’ published in 1999 by the survivor of the Omarska camp, the peace activist and the founder of the charity Most Mira- Bridge of Peace, Kemal Pervanić.

34 This campaign started in the early 1992 when the JNA soldiers, who took over the TV relay at the mountain Kozara near Prijedor, as stated in Karadžić’s judgement, blocked ‘TV broadcasts from Croatia and Sarajevo and only permitting broadcasts from Belgrade and Banja Luka. Radio and TV broadcasts relayed propaganda and
local media as extremists who were planning genocide against the local Serb population ‘have been instructed over the radio to hang a white piece of cloth on their home to signal surrender.’

From the end of the April, the Serb forces backed by the paramilitary from Serbia, launched attacks on the town and surrounding villages, and collected most of the members of the population who had survived the attacks and transported them to the JNA military barraks, with assistance of the JNA. The non-Serbs from the municipality of Prijedor were detained in the Prijedor Public Security Station (Stanica Javne Bezbjednosti Prijedor –SJB), Omarska camp, Trnopolje camp, Keraterm camp, the Miška Glava Community Centre, the Ljubija Football Stadium and in Prijedor JNA barraks, established by the Bosnian Serb forces and police.

The torture and killings which occurred in these camps, which Serb forces termed ‘collection centres for displaced persons’, were revealed by British journalist Ed Vulliamy, and the crew from Independent Television News (ITN) on 5 August 1992. Vulliamy, who, as he describes it, had the ‘accursed honour’ of finding a way to the camp Omarska, describes the camp as the site of ‘an orgy of killing, mutilation, beating, rape, prior to enforced deportation for those lucky enough to survive.’

The Serb forces closed the camp Omarska a day after the international journalists broadcast photographs of the horrors of Omarska to the world. The closure of the camps and removal of the traces of the torture was followed by new massacres. This includes the massacre of detainees of the Trnopolje camp. The killings occurred during the organised transfer of non-Serb civilians, who were subjected to torture, sexual assaults, physical and psychological abuse in the Trnopolje camp, to the municipality of Travnik, which was under the control of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Government’s forces. The convoy was ushered by a Prijedor civilian police unit the ‘Intervention Squad,’ whose members stopped the convoy close to the mountain Vlašić, and separated military-age men from the rest of the convoy. According to the ICTY findings, approximately 200 men were escorted to Koričanske Stijene at Vlašić mountain, where they were executed. Only 12 men survived the massacre.

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In accordance to the ICTY evidence collected through the investigation in the municipality of Prijedor, the initial strategic plan of the Serb authorities ‘to reduce the number of Bosnian Muslims in Prijedor to 10% or less, and then later to reduce this to 2% or less’ was almost completely achieved by 1995. In the period from May to September 1992, more than 3000 non-Serb civilians were killed, of which 256 were women and 102 were children. As specified in the ICTY judgement to Karadžić, 53.000 non-Serbs who were forcibly expelled from Prijedor were exposed to immense pressure, precisely to ‘armed attacks against their towns, villages and homes; (...) destruction of religious and cultural property; (...) forcible arrest and removal from their homes; (...) detention in multiple detention in multiple detention facilities; as well as mistreatment and killings,’ and as in the other municipalities across the country, they were ‘forced to sign over their property to Serb authorities.’

This campaign of ethnic cleansing resulted in the murder and expulsion of 94% of the pre-war population from the territory of the municipality of Prijedor. In 2012, twenty years after the horrendous crimes were committed in Prijedor municipality in the period from April to August 1992, survivors, including the bereaved families were prevented from commemorating the victims. This also includes the families who are still searching for their loved ones, since according to the recent data available on the ICMP’s Central Record on Missing persons, more than 500 men, women and children are still missing. The Worldwide White Armband Day campaign was initiated in response to the decision of the mayor of Prijedor, Marko Pavić to ban the announced gathering of associations of survivors on the 22 May, 2012. In his statements to media, Pavić trivialised and denied the crimes committed in the municipality which he governs, in spite of the evidence collected through the ICTY investigations which led to some of the war criminals responsible for murders and torture in the concentration camps being punished for their deeds. His public

40 Ibid.
statements from 2012 thus contradicted his vision of the city of Prijedor and hopes for the future of the city, which he expressed earlier at the ICTY Outreach Meeting from 2005, in the following words

[i]t is my personal conviction that Prijedor is a place where mutual trust is beginning to return and where people again wish to peacefully coexist. It is a town we no longer wish to be divided into returnees, refugees, displaced persons and alike, but where there will be only citizens of Prijedor who want to ensure a better future for themselves and the future generations. 44

Pavić also made disrespectful comments in relation to the planned commemoration, which he assessed as an ‘undignified’ way of paying respect to the victims. This refers to the proposal of the associations of survivors, and family members of the victims and missing persons, who planned to bring 256 white bags and red roses to the central square in Prijedor, to commemorate the 256 women and young girls raped and murdered in the concentration camps in 1992.

The mayor’s ban and disrespectful comments, along with the official commemoration of the ‘liberation’ of Prijedor in the 1990s, organised on 30 May, 2012 by the Municipality of Prijedor and the Government of the BH Entity Republic of Srpska, 45 provoked strong reactions among survivors, local and international activists, and the wider public. This includes the comments of an activist, and the director of communication at the ICTJ, Refik Hodžić who argues that ‘Marko Pavić cannot decide on behalf of the victims how they should name the commemoration of their suffering’. Hodžić further explains that they did not violate any law of Bosnia and Herzegovina by naming the commemoration “the 20 years from genocide.” 46

Two days after the ban, on 24 May, 2012, the Belgrade-based association Women in Black organised the commemoration of 256 women and young girls on Belgrade’s Square of Republic as a sign of their support for the associations from Prijedor. 47

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The Worldwide White Armband global initiative, received strong support in BIH, Serbia, and in the wider global context. The members of associations of survivors, and supporters of the campaign organised gatherings on 31 May 2012 in towns across BIH, Belgrade in Serbia as well as towns across the world, including those places in which the survivors found refuge after 1992. Earlier, on 23 May, 1992, an artist and activist Emir Hodžić decided to commemorate 256 women and young girls in Prijedor. This was his first visit to Prijedor after he and his family were expelled in 1992. He wore a white armband and a white bag, which symbolise both the discrimination to which non-Serbs were subject and the murders of non-Serbs in Prijedor in 1992.

Hodžić, whose father and brother were detained in the camp Omarska, originally planned to visit this site of torture to pay respects to the victims who were killed and tortured in the concentration camps in the municipality of Prijedor. After the security guards of the multinational mining and steel company Arcelor Mittal Prijedor, prevented him from accessing the former concentration camp Omarska, within and around which few mass graves were of murdered civilians were retrieved, Hodžić decided to commemorate the victims at the main square of Prijedor, where the original commemoration was planned.

He placed the white bag on the pavement and stood there in silence, for hours. His performance attracted the attention of some of the passers-by, some of whom made comments, and mocked him, as his later statements to the media reveal. In his statements Hodžić

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49 In the process of identification of the remains of victim’s bodies which are excavated from the mass graves in BiH, the body remains are kept in ‘white body bags of remains’ in ICMP morgue in Tuzla, BiH. In Lisa DiCaprio, ‘Report from the Field. The Betrayal of Srebrenica: The Ten-Year Commemoration,’ The Public Historian, Vol.31, No.3 (August 2009), 73-95 (p.89).

50 The multinational steel manufacturing corporation Arcelor Mittal S.A. privatised 51% of the Ljubija mining complex, an acquisition that included Omarska mine, in 2004. The survivors of the camp and members of the families have limited access to the mining complex Omarska – they are allowed to gather only on 6 August, when the survivors commemorate the day when the camp was revealed by the British journalists, the event which led to the closure of the camps in Prijedor.


describes how the experience of returning to the place that he associates with many beautiful memories from his childhood, and traumatic experience from the war, produced many conflicting emotions of sadness and fear. During his performance in Prijedor, as Hodžić further describes, he was hoping that some of the passers-by would stop and talk to him. But, most of the passers-by ignored him.53

However, Hodžić’s personal protest raises awareness about discrimination against non-Serbs in Prijedor during the war and in the post-war period, and received support from activists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including a few activists from Prijedor. In the following period, after few meetings and discussions, a great number of activists, formal and informal associations from BiH formed the grassroots organisation ‘Because it concerns me’ (Jer me se tiče) in 2013. Some of the main activities of the association were focused on bridging the ethnic divisions in the country, and the organisation of joint commemorations of civilian victims of the 1992-1996 war. According to some of the members, activists gathered around the platform ‘Because it concerns me,’ challenge the hegemonic politics of ethnic elites. As they further

53 Refik Hodžić, ‘Dan bijelih traka.’
argue, the citizens of BIH are hostages of their mono-ethnic politics, which perpetuate the long-standing political deadlock and which serve to profit the ethnic elites.\textsuperscript{54}

Aiming to de-ethnicize the civil victims and commemorate them as human beings, the association organised a collective visit to former concentration camps which were established during the wartime by different army forces, which are located along the road from Sarajevo to Mostar. Also, since 2013 the association ‘Because it concerns me’ together with other activists and civil society groups from BiH, Serbia, and the wider post-Yugoslav space, have organised annual commemorations in Prijedor on 31 May, despite the various legal obstacles imposed by the mayor Pavić. The mayor first argued that the commemoration and recalling past events generally leads to the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in Prijedor. However, after the first joint commemoration of the victims of the war crimes committed in the municipality Prijedor in the 1990s was held in 2013, he referred to it as a ‘gay parade’.\textsuperscript{55}

Since 2013, Prijedor became a space in which the opposing or, in Williams’ terms, alternative hegemonies, continuously construct and widen new political and social spaces for the articulation of memory of war. By recycling some of the previously shared cultural templates, illustrated through the slogans ‘proletarians of all identities-unite’,\textsuperscript{56} they confront essentialist hegemonic ideologies, which are, in this case, embodied in the role of the city’s mayor (SNSD).\textsuperscript{57} These politics are perpetuated through the othering of the pre-war non-Serb inhabitants, some of whom have returned to their houses after the war, including members of the LGBT community.

8.3.3. Intervention in a Space and Construction of a Space: Sarajevo Red Line and Worldwide Armband Day

Although seemingly congruent, these initiatives are very different in their approaches to memory of war and forms which mediate bereavement. Both artistic interventions in the public space the Sarajevo Red Line and Emir Hodžić’s personal act of commemoration of the

\textsuperscript{54} Trideset Prvi Maj [Thirty First of May], dir. by Mirza Ajnadžić.
\textsuperscript{55} Trideset Prvi Maj [Thirty First of May]; Also, Eldin Hadžović, ‘Jer me se tiče,’ [Because it Concerns Me] 31 May, 2013, Associazione Trentino con Baltani ATB <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYBBu9-EcTs> [accessed on 16 May, 2014].
\textsuperscript{56} Trideset Prvi Maj [Thirty First of May].
\textsuperscript{57} Poziv gradjanima’ [Invitation to citizens], ‘Jer me se tiče’ [Because it concerns me], 22, May, 2013 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Lfpuzla_os> [accessed on 16 May, 2014].
victims of the crimes committed in the municipality Prijedor engaged with the agonising post-war reality. These interventions delineated two distinct public spaces for social interaction, which as it was demonstrated, was considerably influenced by the official politics as well as by the media reporting. In relation to this, a distinct interaction that was established among those people gathered around the ‘red audience’ during the officially supported commemoration of the citizens murdered during the siege of Sarajevo, is contrasted with the lack of any interaction in Prijedor due to the official denial of the crimes and the ongoing struggle of the survivors and forcibly expelled citizens of Prijedor to acknowledge the war’s wrongdoings and to commemorate the victims of the war crimes that were committed there.

Thus, while both performances articulate shared memories that go beyond the ethnic identification of the victims, who are commemorated as citizens of Sarajevo and Prijedor, they differ in their relation to official memories. Bearing in mind the complex political organisation of the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina the latter refers to different levels of government, the city of Sarajevo and the entity of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on one side, and the city of Prijedor and the Republic of Srpska on the other. This significant discrepancy in both the discourse and the form, indicates how the Sarajevo Red Line, which poignantly displays the human loss during siege of the city, also articulates official memory. However, at the same time, the Sarajevo Red Line functions as a counter narrative in relation to the denial of the siege by the BH Entity RS, which is uttered by some of the leading Serbian politicians in the media. Also, it can be argued that with its cultural programme performed for the ‘red audience,’ and the arrangement of both, large and small red chairs between the WWII memorial which commemorates the killed citizens of Sarajevo the liberators of Sarajevo, and the ‘Memorial to Children killed in the Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1995,’ the Sarajevo Red Line through this temporary spatial connection establishes a relation between the city’s past and present. Additionally, the the author and organisers sought to create a link between the living and dead, initiated through their invitation to leave the flowers on the chairs, thus opening a space for personal remembrance.

On the other hand, Hodžić’s performance, which articulates an oppositional narrative, discloses the rupture and violent break which transformed the social, cultural and political space of the municipality and town Prijedor. His silent presence at the main square of his hometown Prijedor with reminders of the crimes that took place in the town twenty years ago - the white armband which signifies the beginning, and the white bag which symbolises the
outcomes of the ethnic cleansing – disturbed the prevailing ignorance and the pact of silence about the recent wrongdoings. Publicly exposed reminders at the main square and Hodžić’s persistence to claim the public space of his hometown for the commemorations of the killed fellow-citizens, recalled the silenced memories of the events from the recent past and directly challenged the denial uttered a day earlier by the by the city authorities. Additionally, Hodžić’s reflection on his personal experience of expulsion and his commemoration of war crimes in the place in which they are denied, points to the void left after the horror of concentration camps.

This void and silence recalls Hannah Arendt’s reflections on her visit to Germany after the Holocaust in 1949. In a conversation with German journalist Guenter Gaus which was broadcast on West German Television in 1964, she describes her return as the experience of recognition, and notes that the ‘return’ is always in the core of action in Greek tragedy.58 When she is asked what remained in post-war Germany, Arendt stated that language remains and added that ‘[t]he German language is the essential thing that has remained and that I have always consciously preserved.’59 She confirmed that language ‘always’, remains, after being asked does language remain even after ‘the most bitter times.’ Arendt suggests that communication should be initiated ‘precisely in the abyss of Auschwitz’ and exemplifies her proposal through personal experience of re-establishing relations with her friends who lived and worked in Nazi Germany. 60

A significant number of formal and informal civil society groups provide support to the associations of survivors and family members in their efforts to articulate their traumatic memories, to build the memorial in Prijedor, and to have access to the sites of torture in order to commemorate their beloved ones. This also refers to some of the innovative approaches of the art/theory ‘Monument Group,’ [Grupa Spomenik] 61 developed through the collaborative work of theorists and artists from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated in 2008 until the break-up of the group in 2012.

61 The members of the Monument group are the artists and theorists from Tuzla, Belgrade, Rijeka and Ljubljana, namely: Damir Arsenijević, Ana Bezić, Jasmina Husanović, Jelena Petrović, Branimir Stojanović i Milica Tomić. Grupa Spomenik <https://grupaspomenik.wordpress.com.[accessed on 17 May, 2014].
8.4. The Monument Group: Construction of Language and a Space for New Sociality after the Genocide

On basis of the premise ‘that there could be no successful three-dimensional monument built to the Yugoslav wars’ on which the Monument Group based its four-year long collaborative work, the group members argue that ‘the only possible monument would be a public discussion about the war and its ongoing effects.’ In this process, as Arsenijević, Husanović and Wastell clarify:

[p]oetry has been pivotal in initiating and developing such discussions, so the format of ‘public reading and analysis of poetry’ was devised and realised as installations with a particular duration. Each installation is accompanied by a ‘distributive monument,’ a physical object containing a poem and a short essay written by individual poets discussing their motivations for writing the select poems. Public discussions through poetry were devised not to fetishize the dead but to stand as a call to the living and to engage in the joint creation of memory and a social script by taking a stance in relation to war and genocide with no prior guarantees.

This ‘new Yugoslav group of artists and theorists’ tackled the politics of denial of genocide and crimes dominant in Prijedor, and in wider Bosnian-Herzegovinian and Serbian contexts, and commenced different innovative cultural practices. One of their latest initiatives titled ‘Four faces of Omarska,’ which reverberates with Huyssen’s suggestion of applying literary techniques of reading the ‘urban spaces as lived spaces that shape collective imaginaries,’ highlights the palimpsestic nature of the mining complex Omarska. In this initiative, the existing Monument Group’s collaborative platform, which also included researchers from Goldsmith University of London, theorists and artists from Belgrade, Prijedor and Graz, along with the survivors of the torture and horrendous violence committed in the municipality of Prijedor. In the ‘Four Faces of Omarska’, the Monument group perceives the

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63 Ibid.
64 The members of the art/theory group are the artists and theorists from BiH and Serbia, namely: Damir Arsenijević, Ana Bezić, Jasmina Husanović, Jelena Petrović, Branimir Stojanović and Milica Tomić. Grupa Spomenik <https://grupaspomenik.wordpress.com. [accessed on 17 May, 2014].
65 Huyssen, Present Pasts, p.7.
66 Susan Shuppli, ‘A Memorial in Exile in London’s Olympics: Orbits of responsibility.’
camp as a paradigm of the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, within which they distinguish between four different transitions. These four stages trace the socialist past, when the majority of the population from the municipality was employed in the Omarska mine; the war period, during which the concentration camp was established in the mining complex; the transition from market socialism to global capitalism, symbolised through the privatisation of the complex; and the commodification of memory as entertainment, which was demonstrated through two events, the shooting of the most expensive historical blockbuster in Serbian history ‘St George Shoots the Dragon’ in 2009 on location at the Omarska mine, and the building of the ArcelorMittal Orbit (Olympic Tower) in 2012 in London, which contains material from every country where the company has operations, including Prijedor.67

Through tracing the different stages inscribed in the Omarska site, the Monument group links local, regional and global contexts. In July 2012, the group members and survivors re-claimed the Olympic Tower in London as the ‘Omarska Monument in Exile’ in the absence of the promised monument.68

The widening of the commemorative arenas was followed by other initiatives that confront the politics of the denial of genocide in Srebrenica. This includes the building of ‘social sculptures’ through organising a series of workshops as a form of remembrance, through witnessing and storytelling, thus opening a space of ‘new socality.’69 The innovative practices and politics of hope and solidarity, which remained out of the media spotlight, generated the construction of a new language and new approaches to the politics of memory in BiH, in accordance with the Monument Group’s premise that there is ‘no memory without politics.’70

The Group’s innovative approach to memory in the post-genocide society is represented through collaborative work which encompasses art exhibitions, performances,}

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68 Susan Shuppli, ‘A Memorial in Exile in London’s Olympics: Orbits of responsibility’


public readings of contemporary Bosnian poetry, workshops, and publications. Their work was designed around the Monument Groups’ assumption that ‘there is a lack of language that could re-politicise the objects of the (post)-war everyday life collected after mass killings, rapes, deportations, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps and other mass crimes’\(^ {71}\) and it aimed to ‘navigate politically through the terrain of post-genocide culture as a culture of lies, a culture of denial and a culture of amnesia.’\(^ {72}\)

In 2008, the Group Monument and members of the Bosnian–Herzegovinian theoretical and artistic scene, developed a platform entitled ‘Mathemes of Re-Association.’ Precisely, the Group established the editorial board of the newspaper ‘Mathemes of Re-Association,’ which after its work in the exhibition space, as Arsenijević describes, ‘will inform about, and cover the effects of dislocation of the scene of contemporary science and theory from Bosnia and Herzegovina, into Serbia, that is, to say, the editorial board space will serve as an intermediary in the databases initiated by these two discourses within Serbia’s public and intellectual space.’\(^ {73}\)

With this intervention, the emergent platform for articulation disturbed the prevailing silence and initiated a space for public reflection and social and political transformation, which, as stated on the Group’s website, allows discussion between various actors on some of the critical questions such as ‘what is to be done with the everydayness of genocide (…) in the context where dominate a mute fascination with the horror of genocide, resignation to the status quo or an outright disbelief.’\(^ {74}\)

Through a series of events which encompass poetry readings at the October Salon in Belgrade in 2008, the activists gathered around the platform ‘Mathemes of Re-Association’ and use Bosnian poetry to open public discussions about the genocide. In Arsenijević, Husanović, and Wastell’s terms, the platform created ‘new solidarities and subjectivities beyond the closure of institutional politics.’\(^ {75}\) In 2010, the group organised a public reading and the analysis of poetry in Banja Luka. These innovative, but also ‘risky’ approaches, as the

\(^{72}\) Ibid., p.269.
\(^{73}\) Ibid.
\(^{74}\) Grupa spomenik/Monument group <https://grupaspomenik.wordpress.com/mathemes-of-re-association/> [accessed on 17 March, 2014].
\(^{75}\) Arsenijević and others, ‘A Public Language of Grief,’ p.273.
authors describe them, ‘led to creation of public space in Serbia, where denial of genocide and war dominates. Within this space, the artistic and theoretical scene from Bosnia could posit genocide and its effects as topics to be discussed publicly using the concepts of the critique of ideology.’

Through public classes and public readings, the theorists and artists gathered around the platform provide a strong critique of the dominant management of memory in post-genocide society, endorsed by hegemonic politics. They further argue that ‘[t]his culturalized terror of governance, produced and practiced by a range of local, regional, and international actors, is understood to mask the ongoing exploitation of governed life (…) turning it into a collections of enclaves.’ Moreover, for the last three decades in this terrain, which is in their terms ‘framed by two issues “telling the story of a mass grave, and “mapping a genocide”’ were characterised by artistic cultural and knowledge production through which ‘[m]any interventions and collaborations of artists, scholars, students and activists have fought the inability to think and talk about the wars and the (post)-war collectivises, struggling to do so within the framework of emancipatory politics.’

The persistent struggle to find words, and intervene in a cultural space galvanised the new project entitled ‘Jokes, War and Genocide.’ The explorative and collaborative platform was commenced by a group of Bosnian-Herzegovinian theorists and artists, who perceive jokes about war and genocide as a specific ‘forms of witnessing’, and suggest that ‘analysing parapraxis – such as jokes related to war and genocide – is a productive way to explore the unconscious of war and genocide and counter the predominant denial and silence about painful process.’ Some of the participants who took part in the public classrooms responded negatively and described both the jokes that were shared and other associated jokes as inappropriate. These responses are in contrast with the reflections of a Bosnian-Herzegovinian women writer, who highlighted the importance of opening and exploring these questions in public space. In her terms ‘[t]he inability to speak your own words about the pain, repeating phrases used on TV reports, petrified expressions, ossified language, precisely talk about trauma that has not been talked about. Instead of speech about pain, the man repeats Betrayal!

76 Ibid., p. 266.
79 Arsenijević and Eminagić, ‘Genocide Can Be Mourned,’ p.3.
And NEVER! That is why the man despises and pronounces people hopeless. And nothing is ever hopeless.\textsuperscript{80} The quest for ‘a shared and share-able “public language of grief”’\textsuperscript{81} along with other congruent initiatives that occurred in this period created a new politics of hope and solidarity among citizens of BiH, and among citizens of Serbia. Also, through the insightful analysis of the hegemonic politics deployed through the management of memory, and examined through innovative and challenging cultural practices, the artists and theorists detected that the ‘position of vast majority of citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a “new community of the excluded.”’\textsuperscript{82} Arsenijević and Eminagić’s reference to ethno-capitalists, outlines some of the arguments stated earlier at the protests of the members of the ‘Because it Concerns Me’ and the Monument group.

While the return to Prijedor initiated communication, the dominant commemorative practices in Srebrenica, articulated in relation to the ethnic identification of the victims are, in Arsenijević and Eminagić’s terms

rendering any other metaphorization of terms like Srebrenica impossible. The subject is demarcated always exclusively ethnic, thus causing it to disavow its own past. Through such an ethnicization victims become included into a reified imagined past that has never been their own, whilst being entwined in the privatization logic that followed the war.\textsuperscript{83}

Similarly, in his recent reflection on the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide, Buden writes of the problem of the distorted spaces of experiences, and the lack of future imaginaries due to the effects of the ongoing triple transition in BiH and describes this in the following manner

in commemoration the event appears retrospectively as a single issue between two identities, Serbs and Muslims, which perfectly translates into the actual political reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina (…) The culture of commemoration articulates itself totally in accordance with the political paradigm that was established as a result of war and crime and concludes that finally, if the goal of commemoration was to build at the scene of the crime and on the ruins of war a culture that will never forget what happened,

\textsuperscript{80} Šejla Šehabović in Arsenijević and Eminagić, ‘Genocide Can Be Mourned: The Wager of Psychoanalysis in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ p.7.
\textsuperscript{82} Arsenijević and others, ‘A Public Language of Grief,’ p.273.
\textsuperscript{83} Arsenijević and Eminagić, ‘Genocide Can Be Mourned,’ p.5.
the goal of a politics after the commemoration is rather to ruin what the crime and war have achieved.84

The initiatives of artistic and theorist platforms which insists on the critical engagement with the existing management of memory in Bosnia and Herzegovina and with the politics of memory and the articulation of the unspeakable in public, also create a good basis for thinking about the prevalent silence, which veiled the commemorations presented in this and the preceding chapters.

Thus, the importance and novelty of the work of the Monument Group is exactly in their insistence on the need for consideration of different stages and the effects of the fragmentation of Yugoslav society, as well as of critical engagement with local, regional and global hegemonic politics. Their four-year long collaborative research work draws on anthropology, art, cultural and critical theory, forensic archaeology, psychoanalysis and philosophy. This vibrant learning and sharing platform, coupled with cultural interventions in cultural, social and political space of BiH, Serbia as well as in wider international space provides valuable insight into the effects of the convoluted post-communist and post-war transitions.

84 Boris Buden, ‘Srebrenica After Commemoration: Towards a Politics of Revenge,’ in Christiane Erharter (ed) Twenty years after the genocide: Srebrenica Today (Erste Stiftung Foundation, 2015). Buden’s text was published in both English and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian as a part of the exhibition and publication project Srebrenica Today, which was shown on 11 July 2015 at the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Centre.
8.5. Conclusion

The year 2012 marked a significant shift towards the articulation of the politics of solidarity, and emergent public practices of memory, which are directed towards the opening of a space in Bosnian-Herzegovinian society within which the ‘genocide can be mourned.’ Both the public debate on culture and two commemorations occurred in the year when the permanent political crisis in the country deteriorated sharply due to the growing disrespect for the state institutions as articulated by the high-ranking politicians from the BH Entity RS, and their demands for the secession of this Entity from Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were frequently repeated in the media in this period. Thus, the commemorative practices I have analysed can be seen as a response to the divisive ethnopolitics spawned by the ethnonational elites on power, and the resultant political stalemate, which activists, artists and theorists on different occasions describe as ‘the form of ethnic apartheid,’ and enduring economic crisis.

Bearing in mind some fundamental differences within the emergent memory practices which are analysed in this chapter, they can be differentiated in relation to the effects of these interventions, and their critical reflection towards the dominant memory regimes. In relation to the former, it can be argued that Hodžić’s personal protest and the associated ‘Worldwide White Armband Day,’ and the Monument Group initiated new forms of collaboration and solidarity, which resulted in the development of new spaces of sociality and which in the following years led to the emergence of different memory practices as well as a number of politically and socially engaged initiatives.

One of the aspects of the innovative and inspiring work of the Monument Group, which distinguishes them from the other memory practices and intervention in BiH, is their articulation of the problem of the lack of subjectivity in dominant memory practices. Their focus on collaborative work relating to the politics of subjectivity, recognises and challenges the limitations of the social-agency approach which, to an extent, characterises other approaches to memory considered in the scope of this study: the 15th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide, the first Dobrovoljačka Sreet parallel gathering both held in 2010; the Sarajevo Red Line, Emir Hodžić’s artistic performance in Prijedor, and the Worldwide White Armband Day, all held in 2012.

85 Arsenijević, Husanović and Wastell; Refik Hodžić.
The limitations of the social-agency approach which is focused on politics from below, additionally emphasises the importance of the interventions of the interrelated Monument Group, Matheme of Re-Association platform, and Joke War and Genocide group. Accordingly, in relation to the limitations of the social-agency approach, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper problematize the assumed relation between grief and commemoration, and the related view of commemoration as a ‘kind of therapeutic reflex,’ which as they explain

presumes an organic relationship between the individual, the agencies of civil society, and the nation state (...) takes the politics out of mourning. In doing so, it projects a contemporary emphasis on the recuperative function of narrative back on to both the commemorative activities and psychic realities of people in the past. 86

In their work, ‘Because it Concerns me’ and the Monument Group recognise and problematise these aspects. The Monument Group articulate this in their collaborative platform ‘Mathemes of Re-Association, which is concerned with the question ‘how to embody justice in a post-genocidal political community that lives with the realities of mass atrocity.’ 87

In their criticism of ‘the paradigm of reconciliation,’ which, as Arsenijević, Husanović and Wastel argue ‘has its distinct technologies and economies, a coalition of science, administration, and religion encircling the management of remains of those killed in genocide’ 88 they emphasise the need and the importance of the construction of language which will enable participants of the public discussions, organised in different town across the post-Yugoslav space, to ‘position her or himself politically in relation to genocide.’ 89 Additionally, they argue that ‘academic engagement needs to follow non-institutionalized and non-state spaces of publicity (fields of cultural production, art and activism),’ whereas ‘[s]paces and public voices created by new solidarities and subjectivities beyond the closures of institutional politics are the promising site for social and political transformation.’ 90

The spaces and politics of solidarity, which the emergent initiatives in BiH initiated in 2012, incorporated the protests of disenfranchised workers which spread across the BH Entity FBiH in 2012 and subsequent years. The rapidly growing protests against ethno-capitalists in

86 Ashplant and others, The Politics of Memory, p.43.
88 Ibid., p. 271.
89 Ibid., p. 272.
90 Ibid., p.273.
power prompted the establishment of a common platform of academics, activists and workers titled the Worker’s University in 2014 in Tuzla.\footnote{Radnički Univerzitet Tuzla,’[Workers University Tuzla], Methodological Framework-What Happened’ \<http://radnickiuniverzitet.org/kako-radimo-skupa> [Accessed on 21 March, 2015].} The ‘Open University’ is a collaborative non-institutional platform that brings together artists, theorists and activists and expands a space of ‘public classrooms,’ and endorses public discussions that is held annually in Sarajevo and other cities in BiH since its commencement in 2011.\footnote{The Open University/The Centre for the Promotion of Interactive Education and Social Action (CODA) \<http://otvoreni-magazin.net/en/coda/> [accessed on 15 August, 2014].} Initiated by local scholars and artists, and supported by local and international NGO’s, ‘the Open University’ gathers local scholars from the post-Yugoslav space and international scholars, artists, activists and members of the wider public who, through discussion, tackle different topics related to the effects of the hegemonic politics of distancing from the socialist past, Yugoslav social, cultural and intellectual legacy, and lost imaginaries of the future.
9. Conclusion

This thesis has explored the aftermath of the vast destruction of the Bosnian-Herzegovinan and the broader Yugoslav cultures and societies during the Yugoslav Wars. My study has primarily concerned the politics of memory of the 1992-1996 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and has focused in particular on the problem of how to approach analytically the endeavours of those Bosnian-Herzegovinians who survived the horrendous war violence to articulate their war experiences and to address the injustice they suffered during the 1992-1996 War as well as in the post-war period. Some of the aspects of this problem are evident in the bulk of the work in the field of (post)Yugoslav studies that encompasses approaches from various academic disciplines as well as multidisciplinary approaches, and they are mainly reflected in: the exclusive focus on (a) cause(s) of the Yugoslav Wars, which generally impede understanding of the diversity and complexity of the tangled political, cultural and social processes in the (post-)Yugoslav historical and cultural context; the prevalence of the determinist and essentialist theoretical approaches employed in a vast number of analyses of the Yugoslav Wars and interrelated 1992-1996 War in BiH as well of the respective post-war contexts that simplify complex political and cultural processes; the reduction of complex social and political differences to ethnic and ‘cultural’ differences, which results in cementing and ‘naturalising’ the (post-)war dynamics in both the post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina and the wider post-Yugoslav space; most of the work that has been done in the field of the (post-)Yugoslav studies show a propensity to employ the dominant set of ideas without critical engagement with the conceptual tools they use, and without reflection on some of the important semantic shifts in the second half of the twentieth century as well as the changes in the intellectual paradigms before, and after the historical turn of 1989 and the Fall of Communism.

At the same time, these largely divergent studies that are concerned with one or more particular roots of the violent dissolution of the socialist Yugoslav federation, of which some are considered in the scope of my analysis, offer valuable facts and foster academic debate. In their disciplinary or interdisciplinary approaches, the majority of scholars focus on different periods, highlight the importance of one or more aspects of the Yugoslav crisis that preceded its violent disintegration, and outline different frameworks for interpretations of (post)Yugoslav modern history. On the premises of her critical overview of the debate in the field of the (post-)Yugoslav studies about causes of the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, which encompasses a number of scholarly and non-scholarly accounts, Sabrina P. Ramet
recapped the following aspects: economic, political, religious, cultural, historical, including the focus on the ‘so-called ancient ethnic hatred,’¹ and human agency (this refers mainly to the key ethno-political leaders).² Despite the existing and legitimate criticism of some of the determinist and reductionist theories, and arguments proposed by some of the scholars in their analyses of the (post)Yugoslav context, I generally agree with Ramet’s suggestion that these divergent approaches from different academic disciplines ‘need not to be incompatible; on the contrary, they may be seen as complementary parts of the whole.’³ However, I understand that the ‘whole’ is questionable without taking into consideration the recently growing number of studies of the scholars who in their studies mainly foreground those fragments of culture, politics and history of Yugoslavia, which are annihilated and in some cases demonized by the recent political and cultural hegemony. These new areas of work which mainly focus on uncovering suppressed experiences and histories from the socialist period as well as political and cultural alternatives tackle the limitations of the dominant interpretative frameworks. One of the main arguments of these scholars is that the emphasis on the political elites hinders (pre-)existing political, social and cultural pluralism.

This research incorporates these new strands of thinking, and shows the importance of recapturing some of the fragments of the political, cultural and social structure that was deliberately destroyed during the Yugoslav Wars. I see this structure, which is further fragmented through the post-war peace settlement in BiH, and divisive politics in the wider (post-)Yugoslav space, as central for grasping the structures of feeling of the Post-Yugoslav and post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, the repercussions of the violent changes and post-war management of memory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and challenges which activists, practitioners, scholars, and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina encounter in their work and everyday life.

Drawing on complementary accounts, which provide valuable insights into some of the key events and agencies relevant for the analysis of the post-war context, and particularly on those critical approaches that go beyond the ancient ethnic hatred theory, this thesis shows the emergence of both ethno-politics and the revisionist history wave as contemporary phenomena.

¹ One of the eight alternative theories concerned with the violent Yugoslav dissolution outlined by Dejan Jović in Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking About Yugoslavia, p. 70.
² Ramet, Thinking About Yugoslavia.
³ Ibid., p. 67.
Some of the issues identified in the historical and political analysis in the first part of my thesis, inform my understanding of the inter-related post-Yugoslav and post-war Bosnian-Herzegovinian contexts, and underscore the need for the development of a comprehensive, critical, and contextually sensitive approach to the analysis of politics of memory of war and commemoration in B&H. This refers to Bilić’s argument that ‘a specifically social scientific “partitioning” of the Yugoslav space in which it has now become more “natural” to focus only on one of the newly created nation-states represents in itself a consequence of the war.’ The identification of the problem of the reductive interpretative framework is augmented by Svetlana Slabšak’s observation that even those (post-)Yugoslav activists who advocated for the democratisation of the country and stood up against hate-mongering ethno-mobilisation have ‘discovered that they lacked even the language to describe their own identities.’ The recently growing analysis along with the ongoing process of documenting (post)Yugoslav civic engagement and alternative political approaches provide valuable material for critical engagement with (post)Yugoslav (memory) culture, and for understanding of the ways in which once shared feelings and principles have been transformed and naturalised in the last three decades.

The theoretical framework developed in the third and fourth chapters, provides a sufficient basis for grasping some of the main analytical distinctions between dissimilar and divergent memory practices and interventions that were initiated and conducted in the scope of the considered period. The constructive criticism of some of the main arguments that dominated the academic debate that developed after the fall of Communism, illuminated the mode of change of the new post-Cold War ideology of the West. Through reviving and redefining some of the orthodox approaches developed earlier in political science and philosophy, such as the one-size-fits-all concept of ‘transition to democracy’, and ‘end of history’, the dominant perspective, as I have argued, has depoliticised and de-historicised the political subject of the East, through rearticulating Cold-War ideological antagonism into cultural and civilizational difference. Recently, both the scholars concerned with the post-communist turn, as well as those scholars involved in recent debates about memory and history largely contributed to grasping the mode of change in the post-Cold War conveyed by the ‘new’ political science, and move the focus of their argument from ambiguous and allegedly

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4 Bilić, ‘(Post)Yugoslav Anti-war Engagement’, p.86.
5 Slabšak’s comment presented here is paraphrased in Ana Dević, ‘Anti-War Initiatives’, p. 148.
incompatible cultural and civilizational differences and ‘end of history’ to the recent ‘crisis in history’ and questioning ‘traditional’ modern historical approaches.

The part of my analysis focused on the production of knowledge about the (post-)Yugoslav and the (post-war) Bosnian-Herzegovinian contexts, demonstrates the importance of critical engagement with the dominant interpretative frameworks, since, as this part of the analysis shows, most of these theories informed policies directed towards the resolution of the Yugoslav conflicts. Today, they inform a myriad of legal, political and cultural policies, which are structured around the prevalent transitional justice mechanism, and integrated into the long-term process of ‘dealing with the difficult past’ structured around the transitional justice paradigm.

Accordingly, this thesis highlights the need for consideration of these different approaches. At the same time, it shows the need for critical evaluation and caution in the interpretation of a variety of available national, international and transnational legislative and non-governmental sources, media reports, articles and other cultural texts, which often provide contradictory insights into the political and cultural dynamics in the interrelated (post-war) Bosnian-Herzegovinian, (post-)Yugoslav contexts, transnational European and the broader global context. The gaps I have identified in the conceptual and methodological framing of the post-war Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, shifted the focus of my analysis from the structural changes that occurred after the turn of 1989-1990 in the local contexts to the concurrent changes on a wider transnational European, and global levels.

In order to overcome some of the theoretical and methodological challenges in gathering and interpreting data which inform my analysis of the politics of memory in BiH, as well as to tackle dominant chronocentric viewpoints, I developed a comparative and diachronic analysis which explores some of the main critical theories and key questions raised in recent memory and history debates. This analysis shows the importance of thinking about culture, the politics of memory and history through politicised and historicised perspectives and to deploy the critical concepts developed by historians and cultural theorists who have contested the traditional and revisionist historical approaches. This thesis foregrounds the historical development of the dominant intellectual paradigm, the complex relationships between hegemonic and oppositional politics, the plurality of historical views, which cannot be comprehended without understanding the new broader global hegemonic politics and its effect
on European policies. The analysis also underscores the need for applying interdisciplinarity in thinking and analysing the concepts of culture, politics, history and recent approaches to justice in the (post-)Yugoslav and (the post-war) Bosnian-Herzegovinian contexts. This includes the critical tradition in the fields of cultural and memory studies, history, social history and philosophy of history, critical political theory, philosophy, post-colonial theory, and gender studies, in which the relation between local and global in cultural and memory practices in different post-conflict, post-authoritarian and post-dictatorship contexts across the globe are considered. These theories inform my understanding of concepts of culture, memory, history and transitional justice.

In my analysis of the politics of memory in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina I explored the post-war cultural and political processes and memory practices through selected cases of commemoration in Bosnia and Herzegovina held in 2010 and 2012. I have analysed these ongoing cultural and political processes through the approaches of those scholars who have problematized the academic concepts and vocabulary that permeate popular discourse on the subject in light of some of the main political and ideological shifts that occurred after the historical turn of 1989 on a global scale, after the ‘Velvet Curtain of Culture replaced the Iron Curtain of Ideology.’

These valuable insights that also question the interrelation between universal and local memory practices amplified by cultural globalisation, and which are introduced in the theoretical part of the thesis, are coupled with critical accounts that merge both cultural studies paradigms – structuralism and culturalism. The concepts developed by Hall, Pickering and Ashplant, Dawson and Roper provided the broad, theoretical and analytically sensitive interpretative framework, which allowed for my analysis of the ongoing political and cultural process of the construction of war memory. Specifically, this structured interpretative framework allowed for a focus on culture, which I understood as the critical concept that is ‘threaded through all social practices.’ This broad understanding of culture is critical for understanding some of the key aspects and relations between different agencies within the political and cultural process of ‘the politics of war memory and commemoration,’ the

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6 Huntington ‘The Clash of Civilisations,’ in Huntington and others, Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilisations, p.3.
comprehensive theoretical and analytical model proposed by Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, some of which are presented in the scope of this thesis.

With its theoretically and analytically comprehensive framework for the analysis of cultural and political processes in the post-communist contexts, this thesis contributes to the fields of post-Yugoslav and cultural and memory studies, through a detailed exploration of the grounds, for as well as of the evidence that provides some of the reasons why the analysis of culture, history and memory is critical for understanding the contemporary Bosnian-Herzegovinian context. As argued earlier, the latter is shaped by the triple transition: from the war to peace; from socialism to democracy; and from the ‘waiting room’ to the candidature for the accession to the EU. Bearing in mind that this multifaceted transition establishes a direct connection between the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context with wider post-Yugoslav, European and global contexts, examining the dialectical relationships between these respective contexts contributes to the broader understanding of some of the effects of the new political relations consolidated after the historical turn of 1989 and articulated though cultural difference.

Additionally, the concomitant alterations of the notion of civil society which, as Kaldor suggests, relates to different categories of actors, fashions new relationships on national and transnational levels, provides a helpful framework for distinguishing different actors and their strategies in the post-war B-H. Different meanings of civil society which, as Kaldor suggests should not necessarily be restricted to the respective models, transformed from the activist model of civil society, which corresponds to civil society composed of social movements and civic networks from the 1980s; through the emergence of state-associated, ‘third sector,’ which often acts as a substitute for the state, as Kaldor clarifies, and corresponds to the idea of a civil society composed of a market of NGOs that emerged after 1989; to the latest postmodern version which would include the nationalist and fundamentalists as well.’

Some of these complex and convoluted effects of the radical changes on the interrelated transnational and national levels are salient in the memory practices in B-H, as my analysis of the politics of memory of war in B-H demonstrated. Specifically, focused on four disparate case studies which revealed different agencies involved in commemorations of four different events that occurred during the 1992-1996 war, my analysis revealed differences in their

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8 Kaldor, Global Civil Society, p.9.
approaches to current regimes of memory. Some of the findings of my comparative analysis also supported my argument that the war memories of various groups are closely related around their often contrasting war experiences that are, according to Bougarel, Helms and Dujzings, less related to ethnicity and more, to place, and precisely to ‘the side of the frontline on which people were trapped during the war.’² The analysis of the articulation of memory of war in public arenas in each of the case studies reveals shifting relationships, changing maps of meaning, and structures integrated into the category of experience - the structures of feelings-framed in accordance with Williams’s suggestion, and complemented by Hall’s understanding of ideology.

Accordingly, I complemented the analysis of the commemoration held in 2010 and in 2012 in Prijedor, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica, with the analysis of the cultural and political processes in these respective places. Specifically, I analysed and compared various texts in order to grasp the social, political and cultural relations and the ways in which the political and cultural crisis of the 1980s, and the subsequent fragmentation of the broader Yugoslav and Bosnian and Herzegovinian structures in the 1990s, transformed these places.

Two of the four commemorations, the 15th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide in Srebrenica-Potočari memorial and the first Dobrovoljačka Sreet parallel gathering in Sarajevo were held in 2010, and the Sarajevo Red Line, Emir Hodžić’s artistic performance in Prijedor, and the Worldwide White Armband Day organised across the country, were held in 2012.

The commemorations analysed in the scope of my study, mark some of the key events of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian war: its beginning in 1992 (Sarajevo Red Line and the parallel gathering in Dobrovoljačka Street commemorations); the first mass atrocities committed in town Prijedor in 1992 (Emir Hodžić’s artistic performance in Prijedor, and the Worldwide White Armband Day); the event that change the course of the international politics towards the war and hastened the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide). At the same time, the narratives about these events articulated in the arenas of articulation in the three places, reflected the complex political and administrative division of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ways in which the post-war arrangement

sustains the divisions primarily organised around ethnic differences, which became the main principle around which the politics are structured in the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prijedor and Srebrenica are located in the B-H Entity Republic of Srpska. The other two commemorations are held in Sarajevo, which is located in the B-H Entity Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is also the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This study has provided a detailed reading of the ways in which analysis of the commemorations of these events reveals a kaleidoscopic picture of different agencies and diverse strategies performed since 1996 to address experiences of war violence, mass atrocities, torture and plundering. It also disclosed the ways in which some of these initiatives altered, and expanded the spaces within which they acted over time. This transformation can be illustrated through the activism of the association of mothers from Srebrenica: ‘Movement of the Mothers of Enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa,’ the Association of Citizens ‘The Mothers of Srebrenica and Podrinje,’ the Association of Citizens ‘Women of Srebrenica,’ and the Association of Citizens ‘Srebrenica Mothers,’ and their campaign, which began in 1996, against the denial of the genocide. Throughout the course of 20 years the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide which started with the public activism of the mothers and which prompted the legal turn marked by more efficient work and an increase in the number of trials to the indictment of war criminals before the ICTY, that was accompanied by the (official) memory turn. The latter is marked by the establishment of the Memorial Centre and Cemetery Srebrenica-Potočari in 2003, which is under the jurisdiction of the state Bosnia and Herzegovina. This dissertation has analysed the ongoing three stages in the construction of the narrative about Srebrenica genocide which made Srebrenica a central transnational, regional and national arena of commemoration in the country, within which some of the main turns in the public memory in Bosnia and Herzegovina and wider region were demonstrated.

The dynamics within and between the four case studies I have focused on here clearly show how the approaches of the different agencies diverge and converge, particularly in their relation towards ethno-politics and the dominant transitional justice mechanisms and associated reconciliation paradigm.

Generally, in relation to the global-local nexus, this thesis confirms the importance of the historicising particular contexts within which the memory practices are analysed. This is exemplified in relation to the different ways in which the agencies in some of the analysed
arenas of articulation connect global, local and transnational aspects and link their memories to transnational memory. This is the case with linking narratives about the genocide in Srebrenica as well as the strategies of ethnic cleansing in the White Armband Day in Prijedor to the universal Holocaust narrative. In relation to this, this study confirms Huyssen’s argument that political sites of memory practices are ‘still national,’ and that they ‘remain tied to histories of specific nations and states.’ This is also exemplified through the overlapping contrasted memories endorsed by different agencies, which are mostly linked to the official local, national or regional narratives.

The importance of the historical aspect in the analysis of the complex and intertwined link between transnational and national memory practices is particularly important in relation to the post-communist paradigm, and the ongoing revisionist politics in the country and the wider post-Yugoslav space. Trivialisation of the war crimes committed in Yugoslavia during the Second World War, and glorification of some of the notorious Nazi and fascist collaborators endorsed by the revisionist politics which have been increasingly incorporated into the memory practices of the events from the 1990s, is also linked to the denial of the genocide and glorification of the sentenced war criminals responsible for the war crimes committed in the 1990s.

This thesis demonstrates the dominance of the concept of the culture of memory in the post-war culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the wider Post-Yugoslav region in the commemorative practices in 2010, and in 2012. According to Huyssen, the concept refers to localised memory practices which re-emerged after the fall of communism in 1989 across the world, and signal the new obsession with memory and history to the detriment of historical scholarship. In his terms, the broad concept of culture of memory is ‘as wide as memory’s political uses are varied, ranging from a mobilisation of mythic pasts to support aggressively chauvinist or fundamentalist politics (…) to fledging attempts (…) to create public spheres of ‘real memory’ that will counter the politics of forgetting, pursued through the dictatorship regimes either through “reconciliation” and official amnesties or through repressive silencing. But the fault line between mythic past and real past is not always easy to draw - which is one of the conundrums of any politics of memory anywhere.’

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10 Huyssens, Present Pasts, p.16.
The Sarajevo, Red Line performance is one of the examples of culture of memory analysed in my thesis, which provoked strong reactions from the members of the public who attended the commemoration and responded to invitations of the organisers of the Sarajevo, Red Line performance to commemorate their loved ones. However, one of the criticisms of similar forms of commemoration associated with the social-agency approach, which Jan Winter studied in relation to the First World War, that proposes ‘a universal response’ and ‘a psychic universalism’ is stated by Ashplant, Dawson and Roper who argue that

[t]here is no exploration here, of the articulation of meaning within the process of production itself; nor of the various kinds of identification with such forms, and interpretations of their significance, which viewers actually make and have made. In effect this argument takes the history out of commemoration.’  

Huyssem’s cautious approach to culture of memory and Ashplant, Dawson and Roper’s emphasis on the question of subjectivity in public memory were some of the aspects considered through the explorative and collaborative work of the art/theory Memory Group, whose members have developed emergent memory practices, in response to the dominant management of memory and affect in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider post-Yugosav space. The Group pinpointed and evaluated some of the main political and cultural issues in the country which remain unchallenged due to the difficulty of thinking and talking about the wars and the (post)-war collectivises, experienced by various actors, researchers, practitioners.

Emir Hodžić’s personal protest performance and the work of activists gathered around the grassroots organisation ‘Because it Concerns Me’ implicitly addressed the effects of the dominant ethnopolitics and developed a network of solidarity in the national and regional contexts to create ‘a shared and share-able “public language of grief”.’

Arsenijević, Husanović and Wastell propose this term to describe ‘a particular sort of affect that engages with the losses and remnants of the catastrophe besetting forms of sociality and politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its regional and global contexts.’ Their focus on language ‘that could re-politicise the objects of the (post)-war everyday life collected after mass killings, rapes, deportations, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps and other mass crimes’ historical

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12 Ashplant and others, *The Politics of Memory*, p.11.
15 Ibid., p.266.
reading of the sites of torture, and critical engagement with the transition and current regime of memory, signal the new turn to the politics of memory in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In a nutshell, this turn that occurred with the interventions of the Monument Group, is directed towards establishing ‘a supra-ethnic civil society capable of debating its own future’ and, as the authors emphasise, focused on engagements and interventions in knowledge and cultural production as a way to generate hopeful solidarities and communalities and to host an emergent subject of the politics of hope, a subject capable of materialising new possibilities of social and political transformation towards equality.16

The Monument Group’s approach is in contrast to the dominant modes of commemoration in the B-H post-war context established and maintained by ‘the alliance between the Scientist, the Bureaucrat, and the Priest,’ which, as the authors clarify, refers to the strategic collaboration of: forensic science; multiculturalist post-conflict management with its politics of reconciliation; and a religious ritual.17 As Arsenijević and Eminagić further describe ‘each day (...) bodily remains are exhumed, counted, re-associated, managed and consecrated as ethnic remains’ while ‘in the public domain, those who survived can only mourn their loved ones as ethnic dead victims, themselves being politically reduced solely to members of an ethnic group.’18

Outlining the political space for their ‘transformative quest’ within the post-Yugoslav space, members of the Monument Group propose that ‘there could be no successful three-dimensional monuments built to the Yugoslav wars; the only possible monument would be a public discussion about the war and its ongoing effects’ 19 Based on this premise they assume that there is ‘a lack of language that could re-politicise the objects of (post-)war everyday life collected after mass killings, rapes, deportations, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, and other mass crimes,’20 and use Bosnian poetry to introduce and develop the format of ‘public reading and analysis of poetry,’ which members of the Monument Group term as ‘distributive monuments’ with a particular duration.

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18 Ibid.
19 Arsenijević and others, ‘A Public Language of Grief,’ p. 266.
20 Ibid.
Their novel approach to reading the places in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the mass crimes took place as palimpsests, which goes beyond the ethnic reading that saturates Bosnian-Herzegovinian media and public domain in general, draw together the implications of different transitions divulged through this reading. In relation to this, their work also elucidates the emergence of a new figure of the multifaceted transition, that of the ethno-capitalist, who somewhat resembles the ‘ideological, postcommunist child,’ defined earlier, in Buden’s argument. A child without the past, as Buden explains, is unaccountable for all crimes – for the communist past and for the crimes of postcommunism and specifically, for

the criminal privatisation, in which the wealth of whole nation has become the property of the few, almost overnight: for the new postcommunist pauperization of the masses with all its social and individual consequences; for historical regression that in some places have thrown postcommunist societies, economically, culturally and morally, back below the levels that had already been reached under communism; and, finally, for all the nationalisms, racisms, bloody civil wars and even genocides.21

Similar issues are openly addressed within the collaborative spaces of ‘distributive monuments,’ in which the participants, as Arsenijević, Husanović, and Wastell describe

jointly discuss two most important themes – past and commonality – with poetry creating a setting for the discussion in such a way that the collective coming together to read and analyse poetry thinks about the future that they desire: that forgotten future that they are forbidden to contemplate in the current political framework, which presents itself as the only possible one.22

The distributive monuments, which the authors explain were ‘devised (…) to stand as a call to the living (…) to engage in the joint creation of memory and the social script by taking a stance in relation to war and genocide with no prior guarantees,’23 finally broke the prevailing silences at the commemorations of the genocide in Srebrenica, the parallel gathering at the Dobrovoljačka street in 2010, and the commemoration of the siege of Sarajevo in 2012. They also interpret the silence, which Hodžić demonstrated through his performance in Prijedor in 2012.

The theoretical and artistic participatory mode of the Monument Group’s work and the subsequent interventions of the authors that formed the group, and which continue to be developed after the Group’s split in 2012, intervene in the transitional justice mechanisms

23 Ibid., p. 266.
applied in the Bosnian-Herzegovinan, and wider post-Yugoslav space. This comprehensive work creates innovative social practices both informed by, and investigated through, critical art and cultural theory, psychoanalysis and philosophy. Their interventions facilitate a discussion about loss in social space and raise the question of how to mourn those victims which remain outside of the dominant ethnic frames of identification, precisely a number of unidentified human remains in the morgues across B-H, which, cannot be re-associated and ‘cannot be identified by modern science.’ This ‘abject remainder,’ as Arsenijević, Husanović and Wastel suggest ‘opens up the space of politics, of a specific type of subjectification that is not based on identity or counting and that opens up a process of remembering whose task is to break up parallel convergences of contemporary construction of identity and the culturalized politics of terror.’ 24

The questions they have articulated and the general contribution of the Monument Group’s work as well as the interventions that have taken place after 2012, developed by moving through the poetic space of art and culture, can be understood in relation to the statement that opens Shoshana Felman and Dory Laub’s study on the crisis of witnessing. The authors reference Dostoevsky who proclaims that ‘[w]e have all the answers, it is the questions we do not know,’25 and this signals the critical importance of the search for those questions ‘that we do not as yet possess as questions’ but which, in Felman and Laub’s words ‘compellingly address us from within contemporary art and from within contemporary history.’26 Thus, the ‘transformative quest’ of the Monument Group along with other critical accounts, some of which have been presented in this thesis, provide vital critical space for thinking about the past, which is, as Pickering suggests, always reconstructed in accordance with ‘present-oriented criteria of selection and approach in play - cultural, ideological and political criteria,’27 and about forgotten futures, which enable the development of new, more inclusive politics.

26 Ibid.
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Appendix 1

Appendix 2