The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice

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University of Brighton
School of Architecture and Design
Dedication

For the sake of Allah,

My country, Iraq,

and for all who helped, cared, and wished,

I dedicate this thesis
Abstract

Architectural design competitions are used as a means of judgement and a way of commissioning important architectural projects. Judgement process in architectural competitions appear to be problematic for several reasons. A literature review on the judgment process highlighted several issues related to the quality of judgment in architectural competitions. However, those issues indicated the existence of a problem in current practice that is related to a lack of effective communication between the stakeholders involved in the process, which affects the accountability of the outcomes of this process.

This research aims to contribute to the theory of the judgement process in architectural design competitions with a view to improving current practice. After investigating the methodological possibilities available towards achieving the research aim, the nature of the research problem, and the availability of the data required for the research, it has been envisaged that theory building would be the methodological approach suitable for this study. Relevant theories with the potential to contribute to this research area were investigated, with the aim of facilitating the proposition of a new theoretical framework. The theory of deliberative democracy was interrogated by employing a theory-building methodology to enable the construction of a theoretical framework that is intended to contribute to the formation of practical measures and facilitate and improve communication between all stakeholders involved in the judgement process.

Thematic analysis has been employed to investigate the potentials of the theory of deliberative democracy and how it can contribute to the formation of a framework that encapsulates the core themes of the theory and how to employ them into the context of judgement in architectural competitions. The new framework is anticipated to help improve transparency and accountability of the judgement process, to facilitate, and aid the knowledge exchange between all the parties involved, and consequently, improve the judgement process in architectural design competitions. At theoretical level, it is expected that the findings and recommendations of this research can set out a new meta-theory which can contribute to the enrichment of existing approaches and theoretical standpoints in architecture competitions research and introduce new avenues through which existing research can be improved further. In addition, this research contribution is anticipated to open the ground for the adoption of new theoretical frameworks from other relevant disciplines into contexts that share similar characteristics with the context of this research.
# Table of contents

Dedication ................................................................................................................................. i  
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... iii  
Table of contents ......................................................................................................................... v  
Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................ ix  
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xi  
Author’s declaration ..................................................................................................................... xiii  
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 3  
   1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 3  
       1.1.1 Research questions ....................................................................................................... 4  
       1.1.2 Research aim ................................................................................................................. 4  
       1.1.3 Research objectives ....................................................................................................... 5  
       1.1.4 Contribution ................................................................................................................. 7  
       1.1.5 Setting the research boundaries .................................................................................... 7  
   1.2 Research structure ............................................................................................................... 8  
2 Judging Architectural Design in Competitions ................................................................. 15  
   2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 15  
   2.2 Judging architectural design ............................................................................................... 15  
   2.3 Architectural competitions as a means for judging architectural design ...................... 17  
       2.3.1 Historical milestones of architectural competitions .................................................. 21  
       2.3.2 History of competition regulations ............................................................................. 23  
       2.3.3 Architectural competitions as a field of research ....................................................... 24  
   2.4 Reported failures of the judgement process in architectural competitions .................... 25  
   2.5 Summary ............................................................................................................................ 31  
3 Mapping Research on Architectural Judgement ............................................................. 35  
   3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 35  
   3.2 Mapping previous studies on judgement in architectural competitions ....................... 35  
       3.2.1 Judgement as decision making ...................................................................................... 35  
       3.2.2 Dialogue, critique, rhetoric as judgement strategies ................................................... 37  
       3.2.3 Theoretical modelling of the judgement process ....................................................... 39  
       3.2.4 The role of the people involved in the judgment process: Juries, clients, architects, and end users .......................................................... 41  
       3.2.5 Design product and quality measures ....................................................................... 43  
       3.2.6 Judging architecture in academia .............................................................................. 44  
   3.3 Main areas of focus ............................................................................................................ 46  
       3.3.1 Decision making ........................................................................................................... 46  
       3.3.2 Communication ............................................................................................................ 50  
       3.3.3 Judgement Criteria ...................................................................................................... 57  
   3.4 Summary of literature review ............................................................................................ 62
6 Contextualising the framework into architectural Competitions.................................181
   6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................181

6.2 Contextualising themes in architectural competitions.................................181
   6.2.1 The procedure..................................................................................................182
   6.2.2 The context of deliberation ...........................................................................183
   6.2.3 The input to the deliberation ........................................................................185
   6.2.4 The conditions ...............................................................................................189
   6.2.5 The agents .....................................................................................................195
   6.2.6 The goals of deliberation ..............................................................................196
   6.2.7 The reasoning process ....................................................................................197
   6.2.8 The outcome of deliberation .........................................................................206
   6.3 Summary ............................................................................................................208

7 Framing the Research Contribution and Fictional Application..............................211
   7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................211

7.2 Framing the research contribution ......................................................................211
   7.2.1 The outlines of the deliberative communicative framework .......................212
   7.2.2 The framework ...............................................................................................213
   7.3 The fictional application: What could have been improved? .........................219
   7.3.1 The background to the project .....................................................................219
   7.3.2 Reflection on the faults in this competition ..................................................228
   7.4 The fictional application ....................................................................................231
      7.4.1 Pre-brief ......................................................................................................231
      7.4.2 The brief .....................................................................................................234
      7.4.3 Outline of the procedure ............................................................................235
      7.4.4 Jury formation .............................................................................................236
      7.4.5 Before design preparation .........................................................................237
      7.4.6 The design preparation, deliberation, and reasoning ...............................237
   7.5 Summary ............................................................................................................241

8 Conclusions .............................................................................................................245
   8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................245

8.2 Summary of research milestones .......................................................................245
   8.2.1 Research questions .......................................................................................247
   8.2.2 Research aim ..................................................................................................248
   8.2.3 Research objectives .......................................................................................248
   8.2.4 Methodology summary ..................................................................................248

8.3 Discussion of findings in the political context ....................................................250
      The input to the deliberation ...............................................................................251
      The goals of the deliberation ...............................................................................251
      The conditions for the deliberation .....................................................................251
# Table of Figures

- **Figure 1-1**: Research structure
- **Figure 3-1**: Illustrates the grouping of the main research areas
- **Figure 3-2**: Factors and challenges affecting decision-making at different levels
- **Figure 3-3**: An illustration of the “leaps of communication”
- **Figure 4-1**: Positioning communicative action and deliberative democracy within the research boundaries
- **Figure 4-2**: The stages of theory building
- **Figure 5-1**: Example screenshot of manual coding
- **Figure 5-2**: Example of the manual coding; highlighted documents re-read, and codes assigned to each chunk of relevant text
- **Figure 5-3**: Table of political practice codes
- **Figure 5-4**: Mind map of main themes and categories
- **Figure 5-5**: Screenshot from NVivo showing the second stage of coding
- **Figure 5-6**: Group query of the theme framework: connections map
- **Figure 5-7**: Similarities between the practice codes and categories and the theory codes
- **Figure 5-8**: Diagram that shows an example of overlapping in the codes
- **Figure 5-9**: Scanned example of manual work
- **Figure 5-10**: Scanned example of manual coding
- **Figure 5-11**: Mind map of theory themes
- **Figure 5-12**: Screenshot from NVivo for the node “Reasoned agreement”
- **Figure 5-13**: Example of manual work
- **Figure 5-14**: Matrix of conditions and cases (theory statements)
- **Figure 5-15**: Example of tree of word searches in NVivo
- **Figure 5-16**: Description of the relation between a procedure and a process in the literature of the theory of deliberative democracy
- **Figure 5-17**: Diagram of the deliberative procedure
- **Figure 6-1**: The context of judgement in architectural competitions in comparison with the political context
- **Figure 6-2**: The themes resulting from practice and theory studies
Figure 6-3: The levels of public reasoning compared to judgement in architectural competitions..................................................................................................................184

Figure 6-4: The deliberative communicative judgement procedure...........................................207

Figure 7-1: Outline of the deliberative framework ........................................................................213

Figure 7-2: Implementing the framework themes into the competition context .................231

Figure 7-3: Illustrates the role and recommendations of each stakeholder at different stages of the competition ..........................................................................................................................240

Figure 8-1 The levels of disciplinarity; developed by the researcher base on the work of Jensenius (2012) ........................................................................................................................................258
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Author’s declaration

I declare that the research contained in this thesis, unless otherwise formally indicated within the text, is the original work of the author. The thesis has not been previously submitted to this or any other university for a degree, and does not incorporate any material already submitted for a degree.

Signed

[Signature]

Dated 10 - 12 - 2018
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The ultimate goal of architectural design is to help create quality buildings that can host everyday life activities and events, and provide suitable and desirable spaces for people to live and work in. Evidently, maintaining adequate design quality requires a continuous process of revision, comparison, and criticism. This can be achieved through evaluation, assessment, and judgement. Judging architectural design quality was introduced very early in the history of architecture. The architecture of public buildings has always been the subject of criticism and judgement.

Architectural competitions are one of the main venues for judging architectural design quality. Since they were first recorded in 448 BC in ancient Greece (Haan and Haagsma, 1988), architectural competitions have been supposed to represent a democratic practice, where the jury members work as representatives of the client or the public in choosing the best designs. Many of the most significant buildings around the world were the result of architectural competitions. Buildings like the Centre Georges Pompidou, the Sydney Opera House, the Guggenhein Museum Bilbao, the Millennium Bridge in London, and many others, were all the result of an architectural design competition. In addition, more recently, most public buildings are being commissioned through competitions, especially those which are publicly funded.

Architectural competitions act as means of quality control, or a gatekeeper to ensure that only the best buildings are built. They also represent a mechanism to ensure that public money is well spent and the value of it is maximised. However, the history of architectural competitions is full of examples where competitions failed to fulfil their aims, indicating how problematic the practice is. Most of those failures have been linked to the core of the competition practice, which is the judgement process. The subjective nature of judgement, in addition to the differences between people involved, or stakeholders, and their different backgrounds, expertise and priorities, have been found to be the derivation of those failures, in addition to financial, political, construction, and sustainability issues. Therefore, the judgement process in architectural competitions has been chosen as the main focus of this research.

After providing an overview of and background information on architectural competitions as the contexts of the judgement process, its history, regulations, and some recorded failures, this research then reviews the relevant literature on the judgement process in
architectural competitions and identifies three main areas that seem to suggest the existence of a problem related to quality of communication between the different stakeholders involved in the judgement process. These areas are: i) the decision-making process involved in judgement, ii) communication-related issues, and iii) the decision criteria. Further investigation shows that there are gaps related to each of these areas. This study suggests that these phenomena are mostly related to issues pertaining to poor communication. This research then focuses on the communication issues associated with the judgement process in architectural competitions, while arguing that the transparency and fairness of the judgement process could be enhanced through facilitating effective communication between all the stakeholders involved in the decision-making process. The research questions are as follows:

1.1.1 Research questions

1- How can the current practice of judgment in architectural competitions be improved to address controversies around architectural design competitions?
2- How can communication be improved in the judgment process in architectural competitions?
3- Can any social and/or information theories help address this problem? If so, which one(s), how, and in which respect?
4- As a result, what could be seen/done differently compared to the state-of-the-art research in architectural competitions? And how?
5- What changes and improvements can be proposed to enhance the practice of architectural competitions? In which areas and how?

1.1.2 Research aim

This research aims to enhance effective communication between different stakeholders involved in the judgement process in architectural competitions, through forming a framework that works as a communication facilitator to ease the knowledge exchange between those parties. It also aims to improve communication in the current practice of architectural judgment, through relevant theories with the potential to contribute to knowledge produced by this research, and to propose theoretical models and practical measures to facilitate and improve communication between all stakeholders.
1.1.3 Research objectives

The objectives of this study were developed at two different stages. At the first stage, three objectives were developed. However, after carrying out the literature review and investigating the relevant methods, a new research question was developed, consequently adding two more objectives to the previous three. The final two objectives were developed in accordance with the direction of this study as it had already been shaped. The key objectives are as follows:

1- To investigate how communication between all stakeholders in a competition affects their judgement.

2- To investigate how communication in the competition process could be improved and how to do so through exploring theories with the potential to contribute to solving the research problem.

3- To explore how theoretical insights from relative theories can help improve the current understanding of the judgment process, to be able then to suggest enhancements to current practice.

After investigating the methods and methodologies required to achieve the aims via the research objectives, this thesis provides an overview of how other researchers in the field have responded to the research problems they had in hand, as well as considering the main and most significant contributions in the field of research in architectural competitions. This research presents the general perspectives relating to the ontological and epistemological orientation of this research, which takes the constructivist position due to the nature of the research question and the nature of the judgement process itself, where human perception and subjective interpretation of architectural design – as a futuristic representation of an imagined reality-to-be – play a significant role in the decision process, in addition to the nature of architecture itself and the representation tools used to reproduce reality, and how they allow spectators to interpret according to their personal background. Regarding the epistemological approach adopted, this research follows the tradition of critical realism, based on the study’s aims, to understand the reality of the judgement process in its natural settings – architectural competitions – to be able to then make the changes or enhancement that this study is aiming at.

The study then focuses on exploring the potentials of an alternative/emergent approach, which is expected to add more depth to existing understanding of the process of judgement
in architectural competitions. The theory of communicative action seemed to provide a potential theoretical standpoint for this research, because the main issues this research aims to explore fall within the range of this theory, i.e. the role of communication in directing people’s understanding and then action; in this case judgement is the action. Besides, one of the main applications of communicative action theory is the concept of deliberative democracy, which is defined as a collective decision-making system through public deliberation. Deliberative democracy has a lot of similarities with the judgement process in architectural competitions. Firstly, because the judgement process can be seen as indirect democracy, exercised through a group of representatives (jury members), each of whom represents a party, a profession, a stakeholder, or in most of the cases the public. Secondly, it can also be seen as a collective decision-making process as described by many researchers in the field of research in architectural competitions. Hence, another research question was added:

- How can insight from the theory of deliberative democracy enhance judgement between all stakeholders involved in the process?

Hence, two subsequent objectives were developed, and added to the existing preliminary objectives:

- To explore the relevance of the theory of deliberative democracy to the judgement process, and whether it can provide a base for the framework produced by this research.
- To use critical reality as a theoretical lens to investigate how features of deliberative democracy contribute to an improved understanding of the process of judgement in architectural competitions, and to add this to the framework produced by this research.

Because the aim of this research is to provide a more inclusive perspective through overarching the main issues and concepts highlighted by the literature into a more comprehensive understanding, in the shape of a framework that exposes the nature of the judgement process, the roles of each stakeholder, and improve communication between them, theory-building was identified as a suitable methodological approach for this inquiry, utilising the theory of communicative action and deliberative democracy as means to interpret and improve the judgement process in architectural competitions, with the aim of making the whole process more transparent for all the stakeholders involved in it.
To be able to comprehend the limits and bases of the practice of deliberative democracy in the political context, thematic analysis was used as means to extract the relevant themes in the data. A group of eight studies of the practice of deliberative democracy were selected for the analysis. However, the fact that any model of deliberation is context-related resulted in the need for further exploration of the theoretical bases of deliberative democracy. A second round of thematic analysis was conducted on selected studies that are considered seminal to the development of the contemporary state of the theory of deliberative democracy. The two rounds of analysis resulted in the formation of a thematic framework that contains the main themes and relations that are the bases of a deliberative democratic procedure. Those themes and concepts were then contextualised and operationalised into the context of the judgment process in competitions. This resulted in the formation of the framework required to implement the deliberative communicative procedure into the context of judgment in architectural competitions. Subsequently, a fictional application exercise was conducted to explore the applicability of the framework in the practice of architectural competitions. This fictional account contributed to forming a better insight into the possibilities of applying the deliberative procedure into the context of competitions at different stages of the process, and how it could contribute to improving current practice.

1.1.4 Contribution

This research contributes to the field in terms of the theoretical modelling of the judgement process in architectural competitions, through forming a framework that utilises features of the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, which are then contextualised into the theory and practice of the judgement process in architectural design competitions. This framework is intended to aid the knowledge exchange between all the parties involved and, consequently, improve the judgement process and future organising of fair and transparent architectural competitions.

1.1.5 Setting the research boundaries

This research has certain boundaries within which it aims to investigate what it promises to deliver. These boundaries are related to few very important but contextual factors that would not have been taken into account while designing the deliberative procedure. These are the effects of the political and financial considerations, and media. The reason for excluding them at this stage of designation of the deliberative procedure is that, they are very much context related, which means that every competition will most certainly happen.
in its specific yet very different political environment, has its unique financial status, and will benefit from (or otherwise negatively affected by) media coverage depending on the nature, size, subject, and settings of the competition itself and its contextual conditions. However, these considerations have to be taken into account – by the competition client and organisers – while contextualising the deliberative procedure proposed in this study into the certain competition context specifics, within the pre-briefing stage. This is deemed crucial and if ignored, overlooked or discounted, can seriously impact on the applicability, validity and reliability of the findings and propositions of this study.

1.2 Research structure

The thesis begins with the first chapter, where the research introduction, questions, contribution and structure are presented.

The second chapter sets the background of the study by introducing the concepts of judgement, and architectural competitions as the context of judging architectural design quality.

The third chapter maps the field of research around the judgement process in architectural competitions. It begins with a general introduction to the main approaches taken by other researchers in the field. Then, it focuses on three main areas that seemed to be problematic, namely decision making, communication, and criteria. Finally, it identifies the gaps in the field in order to then be able to formulate the research questions, aims, and objectives.

The fourth chapter focuses on the methods and methodologies that were found to be the most relevant to achieving the research aims through finding answers to the research questions. First, the research looked at how others in the field have approached their research problems, the methods they utilised, the type of data they acquired, the data analysis methods they used, and the difficulties associated with research in this field. Then, this chapter presents the general perspectives relating to the ontological and epistemological orientations of this research, and, accordingly, the research methodology and research design proposed for this study.

The fifth chapter focuses on investigating the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. This was done by analysing a select number of studies deemed to be seminal in the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. Then, the findings of both parts of the analysis are used to form a framework or a model of the deliberative democratic procedure.
In the sixth chapter, this framework is contextualised into the context of the judgement process in architectural competitions, through extensive interrogation of each of the themes and concepts resulting from the analysis phase.

In the seventh chapter, the concepts and themes resulting from the contextualisation phase are formed in the shape of a framework that aims to improve communication between the stakeholders involved in the judgement process, and eventually improve the quality of the outcomes and the whole process. Then this framework is applied to a previous case study – Cardiff Bay Opera House – in the form of a fictional competition. This fictional competition shows that the procedure should be moulded for each competition separately and should be detailed for each stage of the competition.

Finally, in the eighth chapter, the research conclusions are presented along with a brief demonstration of the research background, and discussion of findings of the analysis at the three levels, the theory and practice of deliberative democracy in the political context and the practice of architectural competitions. The diagram below illustrates the research structure (Figure 1-1).
The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice

N. Al-Qaysi

Judging architectural design

Architectural competitions as a means for judging architectural design

Reported failures of the judgement process in architectural competitions

Historical milestones of architectural competitions

History of competition regulations

Architectural competitions as a field of research

Mapping previous studies of judgement in architectural competitions

Judging architecture in academia

Design product and quality measures

The role of the people involved in the process: jurors, clients, architects, and end users

Judgement as a decision-making process

Theoretical modelling of the judgement process

Dialogue, critique, rhetoric as a judgement strategy

Main areas of focus

Criteria

Communication

Decision making

• Criteria as a judgment tool
  • The evolving criteria

• Dialogue
  • Critique
  • Rhetoric

• Judgment as decision-making

Highlighted problems associated with poor communication between stakeholders involved in the judgement process
Mapping methods and methodologies in architectural competition research

Epistemology
- Positivism
  - Critical realism
    - Critical theory
      - Communicative action

Interpretivism

Ontology
- Constructivist
  - Constructivist approach with an eye on realism
- Objectivist

Methodology
- Qualitative

Deliberative democracy

Theory building

Thematic analysis

Theory of Deliberative democracy

Practice of deliberative democracy

The reasoning process

The conditions for deliberation

The goal of deliberation

The context of deliberation

Agents of action

The input to the process

The outcomes of the process

The deliberative procedure
Contextualising the deliberative procedure into architectural competitions

The Framework

- The outline of the procedure
- The revised normative part

Fictional application

Conclusions

Figure 1-1: Research structure
CHAPTER TWO

JUDGING ARCHITECTURAL

DESIGN IN COMPETITIONS
The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice

N. Al-Qaysi
2 Judging Architectural Design in Competitions

2.1 Introduction
Architectural competitions have always been seen as the generator of the most significant buildings and urban development projects around the world, and throughout the history of architecture. And as one of the most open and democratic ways of enhancing quality, increasing fairness and equality, and employing talent and skills. They have been practiced throughout the history of architecture, where the jury and the judgment process play a pivotal role and of a paramount importance within the competition (Rönn, 2011, Kreiner, 2013). This chapter sets out to provide an overview of the concept of judgement in general and its importance in the field of architecture practice and education, in particular. It will then investigate the architectural competition as the main context or the vehicle for judging architectural design in the pre-construction project stage. It outlines the background of this practice and scrutinises its main contributory components and milestones by which it is known to have been shaped or reshaped to date. Last but not least, the chapter interrogate the reported failures of the judgment process through history of architectural competitions and their causes and drivers to be able to take up on the emergence of architectural competitions as a field of research, in the following chapter.

2.2 Judging architectural design
Life is about making choices and decisions. People use judgments for every single decision they make in their lives. Yet when it comes to notions whose definition is a matter of dispute, such as aesthetics, excellence, or uniqueness, it is not that simple. This is especially true when the decision-making process switches from an individual to a collective mode; it is more likely to have broader, deeper, and longer impacts on society when many stakeholders are involved in the judgment process. As a result of such process, even simple questions like what is “good”, for instance, might bring up the questions of “good to who?”, “good to what extent?” and “good for what?” (Benedikt, 2007). Therefore, if the concept of judgment in architecture is to be understood properly one should pose the questions of what is to be judged (the architecture or the architect), by which criteria, by whom, and why. Also, at what phase of the design process does the judgment occur, and for what purpose? In order to answer such questions, one requires understanding of the factors involved, which are: the context in which architects or architectural designs are being judged, and the judges themselves, who evaluate and decide (peer architects, public clients, observers, or allied professionals – contractors, engineers,
etc.). In addition, one should point out the importance of architectural competitions as one of the biggest and most important contexts in which architectural design is peer-reviewed and judged (Benedikt, 2007).

In the English language “judgement” is a mass noun defined by Oxford Living Dictionary as “the ability to make considered decisions or come to the sensible conclusion” (OLD, 2014). This definition includes three main elements: ability (experience or expertise), a considered decision (considering all the circumstances and others related to the decision), and a sensible conclusion (reaching a final conclusion or choice based on sensibility for all considerations).

Judgement is also defined by the OLD (2014) as “an opinion or conclusion”. This definition takes into consideration the idea of an opinion, which conveys the subjective feature of judgment. In addition, the third definition of judgement is “to criticize or condemn someone from a position of assumed moral superiority”. This definition carries very interesting features of judgement, including criticism as one of the main factors affecting judgement, and also moral superiority, which conveys features of the personal qualities required in the judgement-makers; these qualities can be understood not only in the moral context of integrity, but also in the practice context as expertise and knowledge. According to Cambridge Dictionaries Online the definition of the word judgement is “the evaluation of evidence to make a decision” (CDO, 2014). This definition holds another important feature of judgement, which is evidence; this implies that for a judgement to be made an evidence is required to back the decision.

All the previous definitions of the word judgement can be summarised in few points:

- It is closely related to decision making.
- In judgement all related circumstances and people involved must be carefully considered.
- There will always be an element of unavoidable subjectivity.
- Criticism is a valuable feature of judgement.
- Evaluation of evidence is vital for judgement.
- Integrity, knowledge, and expertise are essential requirements in those who make judgements.

Because buildings are not disposable products, judgments about their value or quality need to be carried out carefully. They will last for a long time, with unforeseen immediate, mid-
term, and long-term effects. Poor judgment may even result in life-threatening effects if it is related to construction or environmental issues. Therefore, in architecture, rigorous assessment is essential. In addition, the fact that buildings are subject to public exposure makes architecture and the process of judgment of paramount importance, way beyond principal technicalities pertaining to buildings as an artefact within the built and natural environment. Therefore, judgment of architecture is an important part of people’s lives. It is a matter of public interest as much as it is personal to those who use, live, or work in buildings.

2.3 Architectural competitions as a means for judging architectural design

Architectural competitions illustrate potential futures through the visualisation of the projects, where the prospect of a certain place is explored, tested, evaluated, and judged. They are a way of pre-conceptualising how it could be if the proposals were to be applied. They are also the venue to investigate closely how organizers, juries, and competition teams produce, communicate, visualize, and evaluate images of the future built environment (Andersson et al., 2013a, Volker, 2011). In addition, architectural design competitions enable a choice between different designs in the shape of visualised proposals to those representing the public or the client (Spreiregen, 1979). In an attempt to pursue excellence in architecture, it is conventional that the quality of design proposals is judged by jury panels (or committees) of experts specially commissioned to work together with representatives of the client in an effort to decide on the best-proposed entry (Rönn, 2010, Volker, 2010a, Rönn, 2011b).

In architectural competitions, the centre of the event is related to evaluating the entries (proposals) and making a judgment about their quality; the jury then discuss and gradually come to the final selection by considering each entry and its potential to fulfil the competition programme. The selection is carried out in the form of negotiations based on the quality of the entries (Rönn, 2011b). One of the premium templates for architectural judgment is architectural competition, where a group of people assumed to be competent (jury members) are given the task of finding the best design solutions among many entries (Rönn, 2011b). In fact, architectural competitions have long been used as a method to seek out the best designs, and as a democratic opportunity where a set of alternatives can be tested through the judgment process, in an effort to select the best project in a transparent manner (Chupin, 2011). Although they open the way to the art of architecture and creative freedom, this has to be done within a set of rules and criteria through a transparent process,

The judgement process in architectural competitions normally starts after the submission of the entries. The jury is usually formed of representatives of all the interested parties in architectural competitions (clients, organising bodies, experts, and sometimes even members of the community). The jury’s assignment is to identify the proposal which best meets the competition’s objectives. Judging the entries is done in several steps (Rönn, 2009). First the jury members meet to discuss the competition task, the judgement criteria and priorities, and the decision conditions. After that the first viewing will take place, and the juries pick their preferred entries based on the preliminary criteria. Then the best proposals are shortlisted and poor solutions are eliminated (Volker, 2010a). These quality judgements are made by keeping in mind the goals, intentions, and requirements of the competition programme, but the choice of winner can also be influenced by “tacit knowledge” in the professional quality assessment of the proposal (Rönn, 2009), in addition to several factors arising from the fact that judgement in any subject can be affected by the personalities, expertise, knowledge, and personal taste of the people who are responsible for making the judgement. This description is meant to be only abstract, to give an overview of the jury session.

The Royal Architectural Institute of Canada defines architectural competition as a “method of obtaining a design solution to a sponsor’s requirements that relies on a process which is fair and equitable to all stakeholders”. Stakeholders here refer to the sponsor, the professional advisor, the jury, the technical committee, the competitors, and the public (Chupin, 2011, p. 147).

Svensson (2013, p. 148) quotes Guilherm and Rocha (2013), who assert that:

> Competitions are a standard administrative method for procuring design services and reflect the equitable distribution of design commissions, the need for openness in the distribution of public funds, the quest for better design, further public participation and overall improvement of the built environment.

In other words, these definitions focus on the fairness and equitability of the process, and the importance of openness and transparency as the methods by which this can be achieved. Architectural competitions – as highlighted by (Andersson et al., 2013d) – presumably earn their most effective powers only through the use of a structural framework, a framework that sustains a driving force that fosters the gradual – but finally
complete – inclusion of all stakeholders (the organisers, the client, the future users, and the competing architects, alongside jury members and experts) in the process of creating a winning design. Eventually, this force will accomplish a multi-dimensional artefact. This unique masterpiece of architecture will induce and motivate others to push the boundaries of the quality concept in architecture to the next level of excellence, leading the way towards new and inspirational experiences.

Architectural competitions have a vital role in constituting an arena for best practice of architectural production and evaluation. They have been part of the design tradition since 448 BC when the ancient Greeks first organised a design competition for the design of a war memorial on the Acropolis; since then the quality and the value of architectural designs have been a matter of public debate ((Haan and Haagsma, 1988). It is the combination of the pursuit of excellence in design, and the competitive dimension of this practice (Volker, 2010a), that makes design competitions a lively context for investigating the motivations and patterns that lie behind this interesting practice and make it a fertile ground for research. Nevertheless, knowledge about the fundamental dynamics of architectural competitions is still a largely unexplored realm (Andersson et al., 2013d, Volker, 2010a).

According to the American Institute of Architects AIA (2010b), competitions can be classified according to three main aspects:

First, competition goals and outcomes:

1- **Project competitions** are held when a specific project is required to be built on a specific site; the goal is to select the best design solution and to select the architect who will be commissioned to develop the design and realize the project.

2- **Idea competitions** are held for projects that are not intended to be built. They are meant as explorations of significant design possibilities; they also aim to stimulate interest in untried possibilities.

3- **Product competitions** require use of a certain product in the design process and are usually sponsored by manufacturers of this product that are interested in promoting this particular type or brand of building materials.

4- **Prototype competitions** are generally sponsored by corporations interested in the prefabrication of various kinds of structures.

Second, competition entrants:
1- **Open** competitions are addressed to the entire national or international architectural community. Sometimes even students are allowed to participate in these competitions; they normally aim for a large and diverse participation. They are also used when a project requires the widest exploration of potential solutions.

2- **Limited** competitions limit the submission of entries to a specific set of architects, such as those who work within a specified area, or are licensed to practice within a specified area, or who fulfil other conditional requirements.

3- **Invited** competitions are when a limited number of designers only are invited to enter the competitions based on their previous reputation or work experience.

Third, competition format:

1- **One- and two-stage competitions**: in one-stage competitions, the jury selects a winner and ranks prize-winning designs in a single sequence. Two-stage competitions offer competitors the chance to develop their initial designs further into more detailed second-stage entries.

2- **Developer/architect competitions** enable developers to propose solutions to develop a particular site. They are thus able to realise the potential of a certain site.

3- **Design/build competitions** involve a contractor teaming up with an architect. This aims to allow the client to review solutions that combine the elements of design and cost.

4- **RFQ competitions** or request for qualifications (previous work by architects) competition are a qualifications-based process, where the client requires qualifications (either in open or invited form) from architects for the project at hand.

5- **Interviews with design concepts** are a qualifications-based process, where the client requires qualifications from architects for the project; this is followed by a second stage during which shortlisted architects are requested to prepare design concepts. These concepts are then presented to the client and/or jury via interviews, and the jury members choose the winning architect based on the discussions.

6- **Other types of competitions**, in which organization such as the International Union of Architects (UIA) has its own guidelines, hypothetical, and student (any delivery outlined above, but limited to architecture students).
In general, all these types have different reasons and purposes, nevertheless, they all share the same features: competition, choice, and judgement. They also have the same initial formation of stakeholders: client/sponsor, juries, and participating architects. Thus, the judgement process is the main activity of the competition process in determining the quality of the architectural design.

2.3.1 Historical milestones of architectural competitions

The history of architectural competitions can be traced back to Ancient Greece, specifically the Acropolis of Athens, when the council of the city wanted to create a war memorial in 448BC, after the Persian war. Several artists were invited to submit their designs to be then put on display for ten days. The public was then allowed to vote for the best in their opinion (Haan and Haagsma, 1988). This demonstrates that even at a very early stage, architectural competitions were seen as a democratic practice (Andersson et al., 2013d, Chupin, 2011).

In 1419, a competition was announced in Florence for the dome of the cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore. This time, the judgment was undertaken by an appointed jury panel (Haan and Haagsma, 1988). This example points to the first appearance of two main aspects of the architectural competitions in their contemporary form, a selected jury panel and a written competition brief, where for the first time the translation of written requirements into architectural visualizations was presented (Prinz, 2011, Andersson et al., 2013c).

In the sixteenth century, another significant competition signalled the moment this practice began to gain the reputation of being controversial. King Philip II of Spain invited 22 architects to submit their designs for the monastery at Escorial, to be judged by one single architect, the Italian Giacomo Barozzi da Vignola; however, what this judge did was the base of the controversy. Apparently, he combined the best entries in one new design that he then presented to King Philip, so that he himself would be commissioned to build the monastery (Haan and Haagsma, 1988). This case presents the fragility of the practice; clearly, the absence of robust rules for competing in architecture opens the way to personal weaknesses, rivalry, and corruption.

Despite the fact that architectural competitions have sometimes been regarded as controversial, they continue to grow in popularity (Haan and Haagsma, 1988). This is evident in the increasing number of competitions organised through history, which might seem surprising. However, the fact that most of the world’s greatest buildings were the result of architectural competitions (Andersson et al., 2013b), and the publicity they bring
to both clients and the winning architects, has maintained and even boosted the popularity of this practice.

The architectural competition has been developing and growing around the world, for instance, in Great Britain, where several famous buildings were the result of architectural competitions; buildings such as the Bank of England (1788), the National Gallery (1832), and the Houses of Parliament (1835). Also, under the reign of Queen Victoria, there were more than a hundred competitions per year, resulting in buildings like the Town Halls of Cardiff, Glasgow and Manchester, Liverpool Cathedral, and the Victoria and Albert Museum (Haan and Haagsma, 1988). In the United States, the same trend occurred, and many public and significant buildings were the result of architectural competitions, buildings like the White House (1792) and the Capitol building in Washington, DC (1791), the Washington Monument (1848), and a new town hall for the City of Philadelphia (1871) (Haan and Haagsma, 1988).

Another significant element in the development of the architectural competition appeared in the 1860s. Before that, most if not all architectural competitions were held for public buildings with symbolic value. At this time, however, the New York City State advised that every bedroom should have at least one window, which triggered a form of idea competition that is referred to as the model tenement for large families (Haan and Haagsma, 1988). This competition signals the establishment of a new type of competition which is the “ideas competition”, a tool to find solutions to the problems affecting normal people’s lives, not only the elite minority architecture represented in government buildings, monuments, museums, cathedrals, and palaces. Later, this trend was used to justify what Giacomo Barrozzi had stated: a way to collect many ideas legitimately and with the least cost, then to be able to use them to develop a scheme for the intended building by clients, authorities, and/or the competition convenors (Haan and Haagsma, 1988).

Another important manifestation of competitions that forms a turning point in the history of architecture is integrating competition practice into the academic training of architects. The Beaux Arts started this tradition by introducing the ‘ideas competition’ (Andersson et al., 2013d, Haan and Haagsma, 1988). Being given the chance to compete with a mentor, who had the task of inspiring their learning process, students were encouraged to participate in these competitions (Liedman, 2007, cited in (Rönn et al., 2010). Through rigorous comparisons, the students were urged to develop their performance, in a way that meant they could learn how to be both colleagues and rivals (Rönn et al., 2010).
All this shows the growing importance of the phenomenon of architectural competitions in both practice and academia, which later resulted in two important milestones in the history of this practice: the first is the need for regulation and legislation to control the growing complexity of architectural competitions as a practice; the second is the transformation of architectural competitions into a research field.

### 2.3.2 History of competition regulations

Over the centuries, architectural competitions grew in popularity. Because of this popularity, in addition to the publicity they provided for winners (Volker, 2010a), they were increasingly becoming an arena to promote creativity and distinction (Andersson et al., 2013b). However, at the same time, architectural competitions gained the reputation of being controversial, as they commemorate the story of architectural rivalries (Prinz, 2011). Criticisms have mostly been concerned with the credibility and transparency of judgment (Collins, 1971); Lipstadt and Bergdoll, 1989; Cees De Jong, 1994; Nassar, 1999, cited in (Chupin, 2011, p. 147). This has led to the urgent need for methods to control, legalise, or regulate the practice of architectural competitions.

The Institute of British Architects (IBA, 1839) and the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA, 1872) established the first known fixed rules to regulate the practice of architectural competitions (Prinz, 2011). Later, different institutes followed the same path, for example the association of Swiss Engineers and Architects (SIA) and the Union International d’Architects (Jong and Mattie, 1994). In 1870, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) issued the “Schedule of Terms”, which is a set of guidelines that defines fair conduct and a judicious process for selecting designs and architects through the competition process (AIA, 2010b).

Although these regulations have served their purpose for about 100 years, scandals and public rows are still features of many competitions (Jong and Mattie, 1994). This has resulted in the need for contemporary attempts to regulate the process of competition in architecture. Therefore, in 1986, the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) issued a new set of regulations in the form of a Code of Practice (RIBA, 1986b), followed by a set of Guidelines for Promoters on the briefing of architectural competitions (RIBA, 1986a). Shortly after that, in 1988, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) published *The Handbook of Architectural Design Competitions*, which was also a set of guidelines for architects and promotors of architectural competitions (AIA, 1988).
Towards the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, as architectural competitions grew more popular and paradoxically more controversial and complex, the architectural community needed up-to-date legislation to control the practice. This growing interest in improving architectural competitions, as an expanding essential practice, and because of the fundamental role they play in shaping the built environment and people’s lifestyles, drew the attention of the European Parliament. In the 1990s, through a European Parliament and Council directive 2004/18/EC, regulations that were shifted to the national legislation of the member countries were seen as a way of promoting competitions. This directive had some controversial elements like the demand for anonymity in article 74 (Andersson et al., 2013c). Through revisions to the legislation after 1994,

the competition has attained a double role, becoming both (a) a method for producing good solutions to design problems in architecture and urban design, and (b) a formal instrument for the procurement of services for public architecture commissions. (Andersson et al., 2013a, p. 68)

These strict instructions for the tendering of public contracts were meant to enhance equal opportunities, as well as the integrity, objectivity, and transparency of the selection process (Volker et al., 2008). The supposed improvement, in addition to failing to end the continuing dispute associated with competitions, added more complications to an already complex practice. The implications of this directive were massive in the field of architectural competitions as both a practice and research field. It led to a very important phase in the history of architectural competitions, and that is the birth of a new field of research in architectural competitions (Volker, 2010a).

2.3.3 Architectural competitions as a field of research

In 1990, the first doctoral thesis on architectural competitions was presented at institutions for architecture in Sweden and Norway (Andersson et al., 2013c, Volker, 2010a), followed by fifteen academic dissertations and a number of doctoral projects in Canada and Europe. Another indicator of the growing research interest was the spread of scholarly conferences on architectural competitions.

Until now, six conferences have been conducted in the area, starting in 2008 at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm. It had four main themes: architectural history related to competitions, architectural judgement, professional practice, and political power and urban design. The second conference was held in 2010 and organised by the
Copenhagen Business School (CBC) in Copenhagen. The main themes for this conference were related to management issues generally, very close to the themes of first conference. Then, in March 2012, La Université de Montréal held the third conference, which bridged the gap between the two continents, the old and new, Europe, Canada, Brazil, and the US. The main theme of this conference was architectural quality in the global age and it was more concerned with understanding the quality concept in competitions. The fourth conference on architectural competitions took place at Alto University in Helsinki in October 2012; the main theme of this conference was architecture as a human interface (Andersson et al., 2013b). In February 2014 the fifth conference was held at the University of Delft TU. The general theme of this conference related to interactions between clients and architects and the conditions for design; the proceedings of this conference are to be published soon (Andersson et al., 2013c, Rönn et al., 2010). The sixth conference was held in Leeds at the end of 2016 under the title The Competition Mesh: Experimenting with and Within Architecture Competitions. This conference focused on scrutinising and mapping the concept of experimentation within architecture competitions. The themes of this conferences and the contributions reflected the complexity of the field, partly because of the multi-disciplinary nature of architectural competitions as a field of practice and as an academic experience, as well as because of the diversity of the stakeholders involved and their expertise. The contributions made in these conferences can be classified into three main aspects:

- First: the history and management issues of this practice.
- Second: the different stakeholders involved in the practice (organisers, clients, judges, and contestants).
- Third: the nature of the judgment process as the core of the competition practice.

In general, the field of study of architectural competition is still young, and this might explain the lack of more intensive and deep analysis of the problematic practice of architectural competition.

### 2.4 Reported failures of the judgement process in architectural competitions

Architectural competitions as perceived to be a legitimate tool for choosing the best design, and have been in fact seen as a democratic opportunity where a set of alternatives are tested through the judgment process, in an attempt to select the best project in a transparent manner (Chupin, 2011). However, as with any democratic process, competitions have
proponents and opponents. The criticisms are mostly concerned with the credibility and transparency of judgment (Collins, 1971; Lipstadt and Bergdoll, 1989; Cees De Jong, 1994; Nassar, 1999, cited in (Chupin, 2011, p. 174).

According to the British Architect and Northern Engineer (architect, 1877), the history of competitions presents a sad picture of disappointment, deceit, deliberate injustice, and strange coincidences. (Haan and Haagsma, 1988) also point out that architectural competitions were usually accompanied by gossip, backbiting, argument, quarrels, reproaches, and vilification. They also state that the idea of competing in architecture became associated with wrangling, quarrelling, and controversial decisions (Haan and Haagsma (1988).

The history of architectural competitions is full of disreputable stories. From the very beginning, the competition phenomenon seems to have inherited the rivalry associated with the competition concept in general; jealousy, quarrelling, and backstabbing were a distinctive feature of most architectural design competitions (Haan and Haagsma, 1988).

For instance, in 1664, a competition for the extension of the Louvre in Paris was organised by the minister of finance at the court of Louis XIV, Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Colbert sent the competing proposals to be assessed in Rome by Italian architects. They responded by sending their own proposals instead. This naturally upset the French architects, who decided to challenge the Italian architect’s (Bernini’s) design, and they eventually succeeded. Bernini’s proposal was rejected by Louis XIV, and three French architects were assigned to complete the task (Haan and Haagsma, 1988). Although this story reflects one of the ugliest faces of rivalry associated with competition, it is a perfect example of cross-interest that leads to a judgment being biased for the sake and benefit of winning.

Three other competitions, two in Amsterdam and one in Paris, tell another controversial story of prejudice against foreign architects. These include a competition for a new exchange in the city centre of Amsterdam in 1884, and another competition for a new town hall. Then, ninety years later in 1971, in France there was a competition for a National Centre for Art and Culture in Paris, when the jury awarded first prize to the Italian architect, Renzo Piano, and the British architect, Richard Rogers; this was not welcomed by French architects, who united to legally challenge the decision, though with no success (Haan and Haagsma, 1988).

In 1926, in the well-known competition of the League of Nations in Geneva, at first, the jury members seemed to have agreed on the entries by Le Corbusier, Pierre Jeanneret, and
Hannes Meyer, until one conservative juror insisted that the design had not been printed in ink as instructed. This resulted in the jury’s failure to reach consensus (Haan and Haagsma, 1988, Chupin, 2011). This competition is an example of the effect of juries’ preferences for a certain trend or architectural style, which can influence the decision. This project was intended to symbolise the meeting of the free nations after the First World War. In the end, the jury selected an ultra-conservative project by the architects Nemot and Flegenheimer over the projects of Le Corbusier, Jeanneret, and Meyer, which were resolutely modern. Le Corbusier simply could not accept the result of the competition and made an appeal, which represents the struggle between modern architecture and the academy. This has been referred to as a symbol of how architectural competitions can go wrong in the history of architecture ever since (Chupin, 2011).

There is another example, this time from France in 1983. The competition was for a design for a new opera house at the Place de la Bastille and represents the jury’s failure to agree on one entry; the discussions and arguments did not lead to an easy decision. Then it was decided to present the six favourite designs to the French president, Francois Mitterrand, who then picked the design by Carlos Ott, a Canadian architect, (Haan and Haagsma, 1988). The failure to reach a unanimous consensus resulted in degrading the concept of the competition as a democratic experience; once again a ruler had to decide for the public. This failure might represent one of the competition’s major weaknesses, the lack of understanding and communication between the judges, the sponsors, and the contestants, which resulted here in a controversial ending. This ambiguity might be embedded in vague criteria and/or a lack of clear communication.

In the second half of the twentieth century one of the most controversial design competitions was held and in the United States, in 1983, the competition to design the Wexner Centre for the Visual Arts at Ohio State University. Jack L. Nasar (2006) illustrates the case of the Wexner Centre as an example of the jury’s failure to choose the best solution. The project went over budget and faced many problems during competition and in the post-occupancy stage. He claims that “the vague program, ad-hoc criteria used by the jury, and a hands-off position by the client towards the designers were the cause behind the bad judgment. Although each competition has its own quirks, the Wexner story illustrates the case of many competitions” (Nasar, 2006).

In the competition to design Cardiff Opera House in September 1994, Zaha Hadid was announced as the winner. Shortly after, however, public opposition to Hadid’s design
quickly resulted in labelling the project “elitist”, which subsequently ended up in the
design being rejected based on financial concerns. Shortly after, another competition was
held without Hadid being invited. They claimed that “the chances of success of Hadid’s
design proposal would be extremely limited and a different approach was needed”
(Crickhowell, 1997a, p. 59). It looks like neither the client, the competition organisers or
the jurors had a clear vision of what they really wanted. The problem was that they did not
signify in the programme the real/or any criteria that both the jury and the committee
could rely on (Crickhowell, 1997a).

Perhaps the most recent example is associated with the same architect, Zaha Hadid.
Following a restricted-entry international competition in 2012, Hadid was chosen to
design the 80,000-seat national stadium in Japan (Howarth, 2014). The proposed design
faced criticism from the public and a number of high-profile Japanese architects, however,
who complained that the stadium was too large and expensive (Howarth, 2014). A
symposium for Japanese architects was held in October 2013 – to protest against the size
of the design in relation to its surroundings – and described the design as “a disgrace to
future generations” (Howarth, 2014). After that, Zaha Hadid Architects revised their design
following budget changes and the ongoing criticism – including a 500-person street protest
– then teamed up with Japanese architecture and engineering firm Nikken Sekkei to renew
the bid for the stadium design. However, this construction firm then refused to carry on
with the competition for unknown reasons. This resulted in Zaha Hadid Architects giving
up the battle, stating that “the design cannot be further developed to meet the new brief
through the new design competition” (Howarth, 2015). Then a new “design and build”
competition was opened for the project after the Japanese prime minister scrapped Hadid’s
original winning proposal in July 2015 (Howarth, 2015). This example suggests that, no
matter how far we have come in the practice of competitions, they still carry inherent
controversy, and while it is still unclear whether this criticism came from weaknesses in
the winning design itself or was sourced in the rivalry of other architects, this is a very
clear example of how problematic the competition practice can be. If dubious architectural
competitions are investigated, the controversy is normally related not only to one issue but
rather a multiplicity of issues. However, these issues can be seen as a result of the lack of a
proper programming phase, which can result in a loose or poorly thought-out brief, and the
lack of proper communication between the stakeholders involved in the process.
Alternatively, it could be the result of a procedure that is not embedded properly in the
specific context of the competition, resulting in the necessity for the social, political, and/or spatial contexts of the project being overlooked, underestimated, or misinterpreted.

On a separate account, as a result of the confidentiality associated with the judgement process in architectural competitions, most of the competitions have not been properly documented (Volker, 2010a), and most of what was reported has only reached us through the press and non-formal publications. This has led to it being difficult to trace the reasons and drivers of these failures. However, lately this issue has been improved through the establishment of a number of online archives by some architectural organisations. For example, the German database Wettberbe, the Canadian Competition Catalogue CCC, and the American database at Competition.org, among others (Chupin et al., 2015). Despite all these attempts, these catalogues and archives only document what is published of the competitions, because the judgement process within those competitions still very often happens behind closed doors.

In addition, judging architectural competitions is difficult not only because of the nature of architecture itself but also because of the people involved in the judgment process and the diversity of their intentions, understanding, tastes, etc.; people here include judges, clients, organisers, and contestants. Each individual of those different stakeholders carries his or her own opinions, views, thoughts, and prejudices, in addition to those of the party he or she belongs to, and whether these views or intentions are objective or subjective they are going to inform any judgment these people are going to make.

The problems and failures associated with architectural competitions could be the result of different factors, but mostly they are related to the nature of the people involved in the process, whose drivers consist of rivalry and even sometimes envy (Younés, 2012). Such controversies can also be related to two main factors: the first is influence, which here means that the people involved in the process of judgment (clients, judges) can influence or be influenced by others, what might affect the judgment deliberately or non-deliberately. The second is bias, which means that the judges deliberately bias their judgment in favour of a certain entry or contestant.

Influence is defined by Word reference Dictionary as “the capacity or power of persons or things to be a compelling force on or produce effects on the actions, behaviours, opinions, etc., of others”. Social influence arises when one’s emotions, opinions, or behaviours are affected by others (Kelman, 1958). Social influence takes many forms and can be seen in conformity, socialization, peer pressure, obedience, leadership, persuasion, sales, and
marketing. In 1958, Harvard psychologist Herbert Kelman identified three broad varieties of social influence (Kelman, 1958, p. 53):

- Compliance happens when people appear to agree with others while keeping their nonconforming opinions private.
- Identification happens when people are influenced by the opinions of someone who is favoured or respected for some reason, such as a celebrity.
- Internalization happen when people agree to take a certain belief or behaviour and adopt it both publicly and privately.

If this is applied to the judgment process, there is a group of people (judges) who meet to communicate their thoughts and opinions regarding the best entries in the decision-making process, where discussions (dialogue/critique) are conducted after viewing the entries. In this session, influence seems to play a vital role in deciding the winner. This influence comes disguised in different shapes, and mostly cannot be acknowledged as a deliberate action. There are several factors that play an influential role in the decision-making process in architectural competitions:

- The brand name effect (“starchitect”): in both judges and contestants, which can be realised in terms of social influence as a form of identification.
- The expertise of the judges: which can be realised as a form of internalisation.
- Personal taste of the judges: which can be realised in terms of social influence as a form of internalisation.
- Peer pressure: which can be realised in terms of social influence, as a form of compliance.
- Trends: which can be realised as a form of internalisation, in terms of social influence.

Furthermore, one of the reasons identified as a source of controversy in judgements is bias, which is defined by CDO (2014) as “The action of supporting or opposing a particular person or thing in an unfair way, because of allowing personal opinions to influence your judgment”. Being biased also means:

One-sided, lacking a neutral viewpoint, not having an open mind. Bias can come in many forms and is often considered to be synonymous with prejudice or bigotry. (Steinbock, 1978, p.247)
Thus, bias can be understood as a deliberate influence in the judgment process in architectural competitions. As for any decision-making process where certain people (judges) have to choose the best alternative (design) for certain settings (competition), bias is often unavoidable. Bias might manifest itself in three different forms: prejudice, cross interest, and lobbying.

To sum up, all these recorded failures are part of the inherited legacy of the competition tradition. When it comes to competition, people often reach extremes: they can employ the highest creativity, experience, and talent, or they can reach their lowest forms of deceit, betrayal, and fraud. And between those extremes, there lies the ordinary. This research looks at the process itself and how it could be enhanced, while accepting the presence of the human factor as a vital part of the process, even with its inevitable flaws.

2.5 Summary

This chapter explored architectural competitions as a background and main context for judging architectural design. The chapter first looked at the concept of architectural competitions in contemporary settings and how they are considered, utilised and applied as a tool to choose the best design entries in a competition setting regardless of type, scope and purpose of the competition itself. It then observed the evolution of the concept in its historical context, in addition to what was recognised by this study to have contributed to shaping it as it is today. This chapter also focused on some significant reported failures associated with the practice of architectural competitions, and some controversies they have caused. These controversies and failures can be rooted back into the subjective nature of the judgment process itself determined by the nature, personality, background, education, field of expertise and the interest of the people involved in the process. It appears that most of the failures can be traced back to two main aspects that are: influence and bias, each of which manifests in different shapes and forms and has different consequences and aftereffects. It was concluded that for the abovementioned reasons as well the diversity of the stakeholders and most often than not their conflict of interest prior, during or post this process, the process of judgment of architectural quality is problematic, both complicated and complex. Thus, the next chapter will focus on mapping the field of research in architectural competitions most specifically with reference to the judgement process.
CHAPTER THREE

MAPPING RESEARCH ON

ARCHITECTURAL JUDGEMENT
3 Mapping Research on Architectural Judgement

3.1 Introduction
Building upon the findings of the previous chapter, this chapter aims to map the field of research on and around the judgement process in architectural competitions. Firstly, it explores the literature on judgment in architectural competitions in general, identifying the main trends that have formed the general directions of previous research in this area. Then it focuses on the areas that displayed some evidence of emerging gaps in the knowledge, namely decision making, communication, and the role of judgement criteria in the judgement process. Using this, then one of the research gaps which was deemed to have higher potentials, has been framed and research questions and aims and objectives has been formulated accordingly. This will then pave the way to investigate the most relevant and proportionate research design, methodology and methods to carry out this study; what will be contemplated on in Chapter 4, later on.

3.2 Mapping previous studies on judgement in architectural competitions
Several studies have looked at the process of judgement in architectural competitions; it appears that there are several research approaches on judgement in the field of architectural competitions. These approaches come from focusing on one or more aspects related to the process of judgement. Several of these approaches resonate with the features concluded from the definitions of the term “judgement”. These approaches are:

- Studies which have looked at judgement in terms of decision making.
- Studies which have focused on the role of dialogue, critique, and rhetoric as judgement strategies.
- Theoretical modelling of the judgement process.
- Studies focusing on the role of the people involved in the process: juries, clients, and architects.
- Studies concentrating on the design product itself and quality measures.
- Studies which have looked at judging architecture in academia.

3.2.1 Judgement as decision making
A considerable number of studies have looked at judgement in terms of decision making; studies such as Svensson (2010), where the researcher looked at the jury’s assessment in an invited competition in the Nordic countries and concluded that the jury evaluation process
evolves as the members gradually increase their understanding of the entries In another study, Svensson (2013) concludes that non-architects in a jury panel use the rational decision-making model as a strategy to reach their judgement, especially because most of those juries are experienced decision makers and managers, while architects on a panel used critique as their strategy, as they are used to it as part of their training in architecture schools and in practice.

Another distinctive approach was made by Van Wezemael (2010); in this study, the researchers adopt a “qualulative” approach, a combination of in-depth qualitative analysis and a quantitative analysis of large numbers of completed competitions. The study concludes with a framework for the decision-making process in the jury sessions in urban design competitions, using aspects of actor-network theory and assemblage theory (both are social theories). Later, another study Van Wezemael et al. (2011), an ethnographic study of jury meetings, looked at aspects of a collective decision-making approach to the assessment of quality in urban design competitions. They found that the most relevant assessment criteria emerged during the decision-making process as a result of the interaction between the diverse components of the judgement process (people and material). Also, they argue that the evaluation criteria change and evolve through discussions and arguments between jury members. The study was inspired methodologically by the work of Lature and Woolgar (1979) and Lature and Yaneva (2008), in addition to the framework created by Van Wezemael (2010), which combines the ontology of assemblage theory – an approach to systems analysis that emphasizes fluidity, exchangeability, and multiple functionalities – with concepts of complexity thinking.

In a study by Volker et al. (2008), the aim was to explore which aspects of architectural value feature in the judgements made when selecting an architect in the context of European tendering regulations. The study was based on single instrumental case study and found that the original criteria of choice were used as a frame of reference but were later rephrased and changed into judgement-based approach by the committee’s own interpretation and perception during the process. Another significant work on decision making by (Volker, 2010a) looked at the process of choosing an architect for procurement in terms of sense making in relation to the legal context of this choice, then concluded by suggesting five sensemaking processes contributing to an interplay of rationalities, these are; reading the decision task, searching for a match between aim, ambitions, needs and opportunities, writing the decision process, aggregating different kinds of value.
judgements, and justifying a decision against different rationalities. In another study by Volker (2012), answering the question of how commissioning clients make decisions, a competition and a tender were chosen as a data source; this study found that the incremental and iterative character of making sense of supply and demand, and the implicit ways of accumulating value judgements so as to make the final decision, were the main underlying decision processes in procuring architectural services. In a study in 2013, Volker focused on aspects of decision making and managerial challenges through the process of organising an ideas competition. Manzoni et al. (2014) also focused on the jury’s decision-making process and how jury members balance emotions and rationality, using a theoretical framework based on paradox theory to analyse and interpret the data. The study concluded that that the paradox was inevitable in the competition system and for those involved to be able to understand those interwoven contradictions, a paradoxical mindset is essential.

Thus, it can be seen that different studies have looked at different aspects related to decision making in the judgement process in architectural competitions, using different theoretical approaches; however, most of these studies found that the decision-making process forms a part of judgement in addition to a less formal strategy, that is based on dialogue or critique, and the final judgement emerges only as a result of balancing the two strategies or techniques throughout the whole process. Also, most of the studies have looked at the decision process in terms of a group decision, not taking into consideration that the process also involves aspects of individual and organisational aspects of decision making.

3.2.2 Dialogue, critique, rhetoric as judgement strategies

The discussions between jury members in the judgment process as one of the strategies of judgement have been the focus of a number of studies. Most of these studies used different terminology (critique, dialogue); despite this difference they all refer to the same procedure, the discussions or dialogues between the jury members throughout the judgement process. These discussions start from the first jury meeting, even before the viewing of the entries, where the jury members gather to discuss the task they have in hand, and sometimes it is in that meeting where the criteria are weighed and prioritised according to the design brief. Then there will be meetings and discussions after the viewing and through the shortlisting process, and it is then that the jury members will
continue the dialogue to discuss their preferred entries and why, using justifications that form a sort of their evidence for their decisions and opinions.

A lot of studies mention dialogue or critique as one of the techniques or procedures followed by juries to reach their judgement. For example, in an ethnographic study on the judgement process of one unique competition, Kreiner et al. (2011) looked at dialogues in the context of architectural competitions, where dialogue was designed and acted as supplementary social technology embedded within the architectural competitions. This study was meant to investigate the role of dialogue as a technique to improve the transparency between the client/juries on one side, and the architects on the other. The competing architects were to get feedback on their work from the experts and jury members, to then be able to improve their work in accordance with the feedback. However, the findings suggest that knowing does not mean better results, because despite the fact that architects received the same feedback, their responses were different. Here dialogue is looked at as a suggested technique to enhance communication between architects and expert jurors, meant to enhance the quality of the design work submitted by architects, though it did not prove to be an effective means of doing so.

A study by Rönn (2011b) looked at the role of dialogue between jury members in the assessment of the quality of design proposals. This was a comprehensive study of architectural competitions in the Nordic countries (2005-2008), and the study suggests that the open character of design criteria opens the way for dialogue, and that architect jurors have a great impact on the judgement even in cases where they form a minority in the jury, because they are perceived as experts in design, in addition to the fact that they are trained as professional critics as part of their architectural education and practice. In a study by Svensson (2013), the strategies of evaluation and quality assessment in architectural competitions were investigated and it was found that critique as a strategy used for judging quality in architecture is normally used by architects in the jury, which is similar to what was suggested by Rönn (2011b). In another study by Rönn (2010), he suggests that architects use critique as a method for judging the quality of architectural design. He also suggests that this can be done in a reliable manner and that architects use critique in design competitions in three different ways: as a design tool, as a work method by jury members, and in the jury statement to justify their choice.

In addition, there are studies that have looked at dialogue as a method to enhance communication between stakeholders. In a study by Danielsen (2010), he suggests that
dialogue is essential for the success of architectural competitions, and that the success of future competitions depends on fair communication in all aspects of the competition, i.e. the written form, the image, and the spoken. A study by White (2014) looked at the concept of extending dialogue to the end users of the building, based on a participatory urban design competition for the improvement of the Toronto waterfront. The paper illustrates the decision-making model utilised in the competition, which was organised around an iterative community participation process that was designed to spark local interest in the project. Public exhibitions, a public forum, and a stakeholder advisory committee were organised so that local people could influence the competition process, in addition to the traditional expert jury, which made the final selection of the winning design. The study concluded that urban design competitions should integrate more open and participatory decision-making. It also asserts that design expertise can and should remain a distinct element of any decision-making process in design competitions, but suggests that a constructive balance must be struck between professional expertise and the diverse opinions of lay people before, during, and after a design competition (White, 2014). The participation of end users contributed to the success of this competition. Extending the dialogue helped all the involved stakeholders to understand the needs and preferences in addition to the limitations of this particular project, which made it easier to make a knowledgeable and transparent decision. This study illustrates the importance of participation of all stakeholders in the dialogue, and how engaging those who are involved in the judgement process can contribute to a better understanding of the limitations and potentials of a certain project.

3.2.3 Theoretical modelling of the judgement process

Several studies have aimed to form a theoretical framework for the judgement process in architectural competitions, inspired by different but relevant fields of knowledge; these studies focus on analogy as a methodology for their approach. For instance, Collins (1971) presents an analogy between judgement in law and architectural judgement. He looked at jury sessions in architectural competitions as similar to the jury sessions in law courts. He claims that previous similar projects and the architectural heritage play the same role as the concept of precedent in law in judicial judgement. Based on this claim, he then suggests a new model for judgement that he calls the judicial model of judgement. He suggests that the discussions between jury members are meant to communicate each jury member’s individual attitude based on evidence from the entries. The evidence here would be the juror’s interpretation of the design entry and, in comparison, of previous similar projects.
This model has a lot to offer in terms of theoretical modelling of judgement, however, this comparison between judgement in law and in architectural competitions does not seem to be fair, because in the judgement process in architectural competitions the complexity and controversy have a different origin; the complexity comes from the multiple stakeholders involved, and the different agendas and interests they have, in addition to the nature of aesthetics and the relativity of priorities.

In a study conducted by Kazemian and Rönn (2009), the researchers looked at Finnish architectural competitions in a descriptive study focusing on the competition structure and judgement process and the use of criteria. The study concluded by describing the judgement as a process of peer review, where architects review each other's work. This study also focused only on how architects in the jury make their judgements.

Another significant study by Chupin (2011) suggests that there is a fundamental analogy between architectural design and architectural judgement. Based on this proposition the study presents a new model called judgement by design, which follows the characteristics of a reflective way of looking at design in a complex situation. However, what this model indicates is that jury members should be experienced designers, restricting jury participation to architects and designers only, which is similar to Collins (1971) and Younés (2012), who also offer a new model describing how architects judge architecture.

In addition, Nasar (2006), based on a qualitative case study of the design competition for the Wexner Centre won by Peter Eisenman for Ohio State University, offered a model for running “successful” architectural competitions. In this study Nasar also offers a very detailed set of judgement criteria that he claims would lead to a successful competition.

Other studies have looked at judgement in the academic context, how it is being done, what are the factors affecting it, and how to improve it by constructing a framework for judging architectural design in academia. For example, in a study by Utaberta and Hassanpour (2012), the researchers looked at the assessment and grading in architectural design studios, while focusing on the criteria of judgement as a key concept in the judgement process; the study suggests a new model for assessment based on course objectives. A study by Uzunoglu and Uzunoglu (2011) looked at evaluating architectural design in academia using classified objective criteria, based on participatory research in the faculty of architecture and design. The study attempted to address a number of problems associated with the critique model of assessment, i.e. the lack of common shared terminology between students and assessors and problems of expression during
information exchange between the two. The study offers a model of classified objective criteria derived from course objectives, meant to enhance communication between students and instructors/assessors in order to provide efficient dialogue between them (Uzunoglu and Uzunoglu, 2011). What these studies are offering is only a partial view of judgement, however, because even in the academic context, judgement is never only objective, and trying to ignore the subjective element in judgement only results in an incomplete image.

Similar to Rönn (2010), Svensson (2013) aims to present a theory of judging quality in architectural competitions in the context of Nordic countries. The hypothesis is that quality questions can be reliably tested using architectural critique methods. The study concludes that the existing model of judgement is based on two parallel strategies: one, a rational decision-making model based on the use of criteria, and two, the critique method which aims to clarify the design task before the eyes of the expert jurors. This study is very rich in detailed description of the competition process and the jury assessment sessions in Nordic countries. However, it is meant to theorise existing practice that is known to be controversial. It is the dialogue part that, despite its importance for the process, is where most of the controversy starts. This is because those who are experienced in critique can influence or sway the jury, which sometimes seems unfair for others that are not as experienced.

To sum up, in previous studies aimed at theoretical modelling of judgement, a few presented an analogical approach towards understanding judgement, such as Collins (1971), Chupin (2011), and there are other studies that have looked at how architects judge architecture (Younès, 2012, Kazemian and Rönn, 2009). Others have looked at judgement in an academic context, with the aim of forming a theoretical framework to describe and enhance the process (Utaberta and Hassanpour, 2012, Uzunoglu and Uzunoglu, 2011). Also there are studies that have looked at theorising the existing judgement practice (Svensson, 2013, Rönn, 2010), while a few others have offered an alternative model for running competitions (Nasar, 2006).

3.2.4 The role of the people involved in the judgement process: Juries, clients, architects, and end users

A number of studies have focused on the different stakeholders involved in the judgment process and their effect on how it is carried out. First, there are studies which focus on juries’ role in the process, and how aspects of jury formation and the expertise of members can affect their judgement. Cucuzzella (2014), for example, highlights the differences
between the expert evaluation of specific project criteria and the general qualitative judgement. She then suggests that the technical experts’ opinions should be separated from the judgement process and their role should be explicitly to give only technical advice before the judgement session. Rönn (2010) also looked at the role of jury members’ expertise in the judgement process in competitions and concluded by offering a theoretical model for the judgement process that proposes architectural critique as a reliable method used by architects in the jury. In another study, Rönn (2011a) states that the jury’s task in architectural competitions is to find the best solution for the competition task. The winner is nominated in a complex assessment process that must include choice, evaluation, ranking, negotiation, and consensus. This shows the complexity of the jury’s task and also the different aspects related to the judgement process, as a decision-making process and an evaluation process that is based on the competition criteria, in addition to the negotiation, critique, or dialogue, to enable the jury to reach consensus in the end.

An ethnographic study of the jury sessions in urban design competitions in Switzerland, focusing on the use of judgement criteria by the jury members, concluded that the most relevant decision criteria emerge during the decision process as a result of interaction between the diverse parties involved, and that these criteria evolve and change throughout the jury discussions (Van Wezemael et al., 2011). Svensson (2010) also suggests that the jury evaluation process is a creative process and that the jury’s understanding of the design task evolves gradually. Another significant study by Manzoni et al. (2014) also suggests that for a successful approach to improving the judgement process, one should look towards understanding how to assist actors in accepting and resolving the interwoven contradictions between the conflicted extremes.

Several other studies have looked at aspects related to the architects and how they are being chosen for competitions (Rönn, 2014). Others are related to how design teams deal with competition tasks and how they manage issues like the absence of direct dialogue with the client, with one study suggesting the term “shadow dancing” for this relationship between architects and clients in competitions (Kreiner, 2013). There are also studies that look at how architects judge architecture (Kazemian and Rönn, 2009, Younés, 2012). Other studies have looked at issues related to the prequalification concept and how it is used to select architects for competitions (Strong, 2013, Rönn, 2013).

Several studies have focused on the client regime in competitions, and the role of client organisations in setting the boundaries of the competition judgement process, and the
effect their decision plays on different phases of the competition (Volker, 2011, 2013). Other studies have shown how better communication between all the stakeholders involved in the judgement process is of key importance for a successful and transparent competition. For example, a study by Rönn (2014) presents a client regime theory based on case studies of six restricted competitions in Sweden. The study suggests that there are two main driving forces for clients, attractors and gatekeepers, which have a decisive impact on the selection of design teams for restricted competitions.

Several studies have focused on the effect of end users’ participation in the judgement process. A study by (Valand, 2010) investigates the implications of formalised end-user participation on the written brief that the competition is based upon: in a competition to design a municipality town hall the end users participated in writing the design brief, and the researcher claims that this resulted in better communication, where architects could know more about the design task from the expected end users. The study suggests that this formalisation of end-user participation makes up an organisational input that can be considered a potential resource for future competitions (Valand, 2010). White’s study of the competition model that was employed for the Toronto waterfront in 2006, a large public project, describes how it was structured around a public consultation process; the researcher argues that this public participation in the competition resulted in forming a balance between lay input and professional knowledge, and then suggests that this practice (end-user participation) could be integrated into design competitions (White, 2014). These two examples of the participation of end users in the formation of the brief and in the judgement process indicate the importance of having multiple attitudes from different stakeholders involved in the process, which leads to better communication, required for a successful competition and jury process.

3.2.5  Design product and quality measures

Other studies have focused on issues related to the quality of the design product itself (architectural design) and what qualities lead to a competition win. In an ethnographic study on the jury panel and design teams participating in competitions conducted in 2012 by Plowright and Cole, the aim was to introduce what they call a qualitative measure as an evaluation tool. The study suggests that there are five factors for judging architectural design success: thoroughness, informative-ness, organisation, synthesis, and evocativeness (TIOSE). The study concluded that qualitative measures of project success can be quantified reliably using the TIOSE measure (Plowright and Cole, 2012). This study shows
a unique viewpoint towards understanding judgement by focusing on the properties of the design of the final product itself and falls into the category of design studies which neglect architectural competitions as a unique context for judging design quality. A study by Kazemian (2010) aimed to analyse the essence of design and design methodology and the communicability of quality judgement process in urban design competitions; the study emphasises the role of clear communication for understanding quality judgement in urban design competitions, then concludes with some suggestions and recommendations for reforming the competition system towards more openness to judging design quality.

3.2.6 Judging architecture in academia

In architectural education, judgements are one of the most important practices, because appraisal and grading and assessment are based heavily on the judgement made by the instructors/jurors. Utaberta and Hassanpour (2012) aimed to reconstruct a framework for criteria-based assessment in architectural design studios. The model they suggest is based on the course objectives in addition to the instructors’ expectations. They argue that there are four main tasks the student should fulfil completely to gain the highest grades. These tasks are critical explanation, logical development, proposal and recommendation, and oral and graphic presentation. This study shows the importance of judgement criteria as a key concept in judging architecture, but the set of tasks they suggest is still very broad, and dependent on the instructor’s ability to make objective judgements.

Uzunoglu and Uzunoglu (2011) focus on the use of objective criteria in the assessment of architectural design students and conclude with a model of classified objective criteria in academia derived from the course objectives; they argue that this model is meant to enhance communication between students and instructors in order to provide an efficient dialogue between the two. This study points out the importance of clear communication between students and instructors in academic education; the same can be applied to competitions, where clear communication between all stakeholders involved in the process might be the way to enhance the judgement process and consequentially the design quality.

Lans and Volker (2008) also looked at judgement in the academic context; the aim of this study was to find similarities in the assessment process between assessment in architectural education and competitions. The most important findings of this study are that in academia the assessment criteria are hardly used by the assessors, and, in practice, the criteria and the assessment procedure are normally designed on the spot and not beforehand. Furthermore, the study suggests that preparing the procedure and criteria beforehand so they can be
communicated effectively to participants/students might fulfil the aim of transparency and contribute to a stimulating learning environment. These three studies suggest that there are substantial similarities between judgement in competitions and in academia. In addition, they focus on the importance of transparency in the judgement criteria, and the competition brief, in communicating the design task to all the stakeholders involved in the judgement process.

In short, what all these approaches and dimensions show is that the main aspects affecting judgement in architectural competitions are as follows:

- A process of decision making as an essential part of the judgement process.
- Dialogue/critiques or discussion are an essential method in the competition judgement process and are meant to enhance communication between all stakeholders involved.
- The judgement process gathers different stakeholders with different expertise, interests, preferences, and agendas, and this sometimes creates conflict. Also, there are stakeholders that are confused because of the multiple roles that was assigned to them within the process, especially, jury members.
- The role of the judgement criteria and the fact that those criteria evolve or change or get re-prioritised through the process of judgement indicates one of the most important aspects of the judgement sessions.

Overall, all these studies provide an overview of the field of research in architectural competitions as a practice and the process of judgement within the competition context. However, they all focus on partial aspects related to judgement, or to certain contexts, which means the bigger picture lacks clarity. Furthermore, most of these studies ignore the subjective nature of judgement and the people involved in it. Hence, there are still many ambiguities relating to the process of judgement in architectural competitions, and these ambiguities are mainly derived from the fact that there are different parties involved in the process, each with different priorities. As each one of those parties has to communicate their needs and requirements, effective communication is of central importance, and any failure in this regard is likely to act to the detriment of the overall evaluation process. In addition, the role of decision making in this process is a key to understanding the forces affecting judgement. Any attempt to understand or enhance judgement in architectural competitions has to take into consideration the role of judgement criteria as a key concept of any judgement process. Thus, in the next section, this study looks at three main aspects
related to judging architecture, decision making, judgement criteria, and communication. Figure 3-1 demonstrates how the three main areas of focus here were determined.

![Diagram showing the grouping of main research areas](image)

**Figure 3-1: Illustrates the grouping of the main research areas**

### 3.3 Main areas of focus

The use of dialogue in judgment has been linked to the diversity of the stakeholders involved in the process, and the need for better communication between them. Dealing with judgement in terms of decision making and the use of particular judgement criteria was linked with the use of judgement criteria in academia, which is considered a criteria-related issue. And finally, the decision-making element is embedded within judgement. These links resulted in the research focusing on three areas that are considered a sign of a potential gap in the field of research: decision making, communication, and judgement criteria.

#### 3.3.1 Decision making

The process of decision making in architectural competitions starts from the clients when they first decide to conduct a competition. Then this is followed by a series of decisions that will shape the future the practice. These decisions include the choice of an organiser, the advisors, and the jury committee. Each one of these people has their own choices to make, but the main concern of this research is the decision process by and within the jury committee as the main event at the centre of the architectural competition.
The field of decision making is one of the major research realms. It has roots in several research disciplines, such as psychology, administrative behaviour, economics, sociology, and anthropology (Volker, 2010a). Traditionally this field of research shows a diversity of research methods, such as experiments, surveys, observations, and interviews. And because of the multiple levels of the decision-making perspectives from individual decision making into group decision making, up to the organisational level (Volker, 2010a), it is important to investigate the limits and boundaries of this field regarding the process of decision making in architectural competitions.

The judgment process as a decision-making process

In the architectural tradition, experts assess the design proposals that are submitted by the contestants. Judging architecture is not an easy task; it is complex, and morally, ethically, and aesthetically challenging by nature, and only limited information is available for the experts to assist them in this task. In addition, there is time pressure, and social pressure, and sometimes even political pressure (Kazemian and Rönn, 2009). Therefore, decision makers need to be aware of their roles and the possible consequences of their actions. Experience and teamwork enhance the skills required for making decisions, and these kinds of skills can be understood in the tradition of sense making (Volker, 2010a). Architectural design is a professional skill based on education and experience gained through practice. It is what makes architects in the jury panel lead; their relevant experience enables them to make intuitive decisions based on their tacit knowledge and unconscious memory systems. Members of the same profession share this code, and will accept peer review from within their discipline (Rönn, 2010). According to Kreiner, 2013, the process of “architect” selection is actually a process of sense-making rather than managerial decision making.

In a traditional design competition, jury panels judge the quality of design anonymously. The designs could act in that situation as boundary objects: an artefact that serves as an intermediary in communication between two or more persons or groups who are collaborating in work (Boland and Collopy, 2004, cited in Volker, 2010a). In current practice, jury panels often consist mainly of architects and politicians and other stakeholder representatives. Although politicians are supposedly experienced decision makers, decisions about architectural quality require domain-specific skills in the area of the built environment. Therefore, architects in the jury committee normally lead the decision
process (Rönn, 2010). Not much research has been conducted on stakeholder participation and the role of external consultants within the limitations of the law (Volker, 2010a).

**Previous studies on decision making in architectural competitions**

Previous studies have used different models to explain or investigate the decision-making process in jury deliberation. For example, Volker (2010a) claims that the current practice of architect selections appears to be based on two conflicting models about decision making. The legal model assumes a rational and sequential decision process in which alternatives are compared based on pronounced criteria. The naturalistic decision model attributes an important role to the use of intuition and affect. The origin of the current problems in practice can consequently be found in these different rationalities, according to Volker (2010a). Volker (2012) also looked at judgement as a sense-making process, and concluded by suggesting that decision makers follow their intuition to reach an inter-subjective consensus decision using the indefinite character of the decision process. This has resulted in decisions that only made sense to those who are involved, but is hard to be justified “from a utilitarian perspective as held in procurement law” for others outside the selection group (Volker, 2012, p. 756).

In a study by Van Wezemael (2010) aiming to trace the topology of relations between the populations of competitions, the researchers adopt a qualitative approach. The study concludes with a framework for the decision-making process in jury sessions in urban design competitions, using aspects of actor-network theory and assemblage theory. Van Wezemael et al. (2011), in their ethnographic study of jury meetings, look at aspects of a collective decision-making approach to the assessment of quality in urban design competitions. They found that the most relevant assessment criteria emerged during the decision-making process as a result of the interaction between the diverse components of the judgement process (people and material).

According to Svensson (2010) and 2013, the jury’s evaluation of architectural projects may be seen as a meeting between rationality and architectural critique. This is a consequence of the jury’s composition, of members representing differing interests, knowledge, and professional backgrounds. Appointing a winner through a rational decision process or, alternatively, through an architectural critique method, represent two different ways of finding a winner. The jury embodies both methods. Politicians and officials are used to a basis for decision making that holds in it a quantification of qualities (Svensson, 2013, Andersson et al., 2013c).
In short, these studies individually look at different aspects of decision making using different theoretical lenses. However, they all agree on the complexity of the process and the dual nature associated with the models used in decision making. This duality between legal and intuitive, or rational and dialogue-based decisions appears to be a characteristic associated with the decision-making process in architectural competitions. It can also be noted that these models look at the process as a collective process, without taking into account the fact that it is not just a group process, because there are aspects of individual and organisational aspects that need to be considered when it comes to the decision-making process in architectural competitions.

**Levels of decision making involved in judging architectural design**

Decision-making theories recognise three different levels of decision making (Buchanan and Huczynski, 2010): individual decision making, group decision making, and organisational decision making. These levels are determined by several factors, including the nature of the task, the context in which the decision is made, the quality of solution required, characteristics of individuals, and time availability.

Each one of the three levels has its own deficiencies inherited in the process. It is believed that groups of people are more capable of achieving better decisions by sharing their knowledge, diverse skills, and experience (Hill, 1982). However, in real-life experience studies have shown that it is rare that the process goes as planned; several problems appear to be associated with decision making, most of which are related to the biases and heuristics that can be used by individuals to influence the decision making of others in the group. Cialdini et al. (2009) claim that the methods of influence are: contrast, reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity.

The process of decision and judgment in architectural competitions can be considered complex for several reasons:

- It can be seen as a collection of the three levels of decision making, the individual decision, group decision, and organisational decision, all at the same time, because the three levels of effect are present.
- In the process of decision making and judgment in architectural competitions, it is hard to distinguish or separate when each level the of the decision is being applied, which makes it very hard to apply a certain perspective or theory to it.
- Each level of decision making has its own challenges and factors affecting it (Figure 3-2). All these inherited factors affect the process of judgment in architectural competitions.

![Figure 3-2: Factors and challenges affecting decision-making at different levels](image)

The three levels of decision making, individual, group, and organisational, are all involved in the judgement process in competitions. Although jury members make their choice as a group, they still have already made an individual decision beforehand. Those decisions were made with reference to the organisational regulations and rules of the organisations or parties they represent individually, and also with reference to the client’s organisation. This might be the cause of confusion around the decision process in architectural competitions, because when these three levels share conflicted goals or priorities, juries may be confused, as they have to represent the three levels at the same time. Thus, better communication with more transparency might enhance the decision process, when the jury members realise how their values as individuals, as a group, and as an organisation, can be prioritised.

### 3.3.2 Communication

Previous studies on architectural judgement have pointed out the importance of clear communication between different parties involved in the process, for a better understanding (Kazemian, 2010, Lans and Volker, 2008) and eventually better results (better design quality). These parties are the client, the organiser, the contestants, and the jury panel (RIBA, 1986a, Rönn, 2011b, Kreiner et al., 2011). These studies have pointed out three main concepts that can be looked at as communication-related issues: dialogue, critique, and rhetoric.
The RIBA code of practice suggests that:

when writing the competition brief it is essential to communicate the aims and aspirations of the promoter, and to state clearly the product sought by the competition, because the easiest part of a competition to get wrong is the translation of subtle, emerging, changing client requirements into a sufficiently simple format to be the basis for comparative selection. And although the brief will be a fixed one for the competition, subsequently it may continue to be developed in detail by promoter and architect promoters must combine clarity in stating their overall objectives with flexibility on detailed. (RIBA, 1986a, p.13-14)

This shows how a certain level of clarity in communication is essential for a better translation later by the architects while preparing their design in response to the design task as they interpret it from the competition brief, and that any lack of clarity in the brief might lead to diffuse, disappointing results (RIBA, 1986a). It also suggests that the competition brief is in continuous development throughout all the competition phases because of new and changing client requirements. In addition, it addresses a very distinct phenomenon that studies of competitions have pointed out, which is that the brief continues to be developed not only as a response to changes in client needs but also by architects themselves, through adding their own interpretation of the design brief as described in the competition brief.

Kreiner (2013) looks at how architects need to construct their design as their interpretation of the design task as expressed in the brief, in addition to the client’s preferences and needs. His work is based on an ethnographic study of design teams participating in competitions, describing and analysing those teams’ behaviour as they prepare their design proposals, as well as the routines and heuristics involved, in relation to the mental and social construction of the client’s preferences, the design task, and the rules and conditions of the competition. The study also uses the metaphors of “shadow dancing” and “masquerades” to describe the way architects construct their own understanding of the client’s needs and preferences (Kreiner, 2013, p. 1). This process of constructing the client based on the architect’s interpretation of the competition brief suggests communication-related problems; this means that any incorrect interpretations and assumptions cannot be tested until it is too late, as a proposal based on the client’s needs and preferences cannot be corrected before the competition has already been lost (Kreiner, 2013).
Dialogue

Dialogues are intended and presented as social techniques embedded within the architectural competition, with the aim of improving communication between jury members on one hand and contestants on the other. Contesting architects are invited to submit their ideas and solutions in the form of a “prototype”, which receives criticism from assigned experts and members of the jury. According to Kreiner et al.:

The dialogues are believed to achieve the envisioned effects by enabling early clarification of the client’s needs and preferences, of the valid interpretations of the competition brief, and of the assessments of jury members. Oftentimes, such clarification emerges only retrospectively, i.e. in reviewing the final outcomes of the competition. By achieving clarification during the competition, changes and improvements may still be implemented by the competing architects before they commit themselves to specific designs and solutions. (Kreiner et al., 2011, p.161)

In addition, the study claims that dialogue between different parties involved in the competition process can clarify the most important issues related to a specific competition, like in academic critique. However, the study concludes by suggesting that knowing beforehand cannot always have an effect on the way people act afterwards, because it is not possible to envisage the adequate links between knowledge and action, between cause and effect, and between means and ends, as they are related only to the specific state in which they are constructed (Kreiner et al., 2011). In short, this attempt to clarify the design task is evidence that there is a communication problem associated with the process of judgment in architectural competitions. This problem comes from: 1- the anonymity concept – keeping the architects’ identity anonymous – where architects have to construct their design proposals based on their interpretation of the design task. 2- The lack of clear understanding of the specification or the speciality or uniqueness of this certain design task or brief. 3- The different parties involved in the process. 4- Issues embedded in the process of the interpretation of architectural images (representation).

Rönn (2011b) provides insight into how the concept of quality in architectural design is understood in practice, and how it is identified through design criteria in a dialogue-based assessment of architecture and urban design projects. He shows how dialogue between jury members is the way to explore and understand the competition criteria. Rönn suggests that architectural critique is a strategy used for enhancing communication between the jury.
members – architects and non-architects – on one hand, and the design entries and their interpretation on the other.

Another significant contribution on the use of dialogue as a tool or strategy to enhance communication between the different parties involved in the competition practice was made by White (2014). This research illustrates the decision-making model used in the competition for the development of the Toronto waterfront in 2006. The procedure used was structured around an iterative community participation process. While an expert jury chose the winning design, public exhibitions, a public forum, and a stakeholder advisory committee were organised to collect public opinions, which were taken into account by the expert jury. The paper concluded by suggesting that this exercise of engagement between experts and lay people helped establish a constituency of support for the project that fostered a middle ground between professional experts and lay input.

To sum up on the subject of using dialogue in competition practice, it appears that dialogue is an ever-present feature of architectural competitions, historically in the form of debates between jury members and recently as a strategy to enhance communication between different parties involved. Sometimes it is used by jury members as a way to explore the design task or the developing criteria or brief (Rönn, 2011b), sometimes it is used in dialogue-based competitions as a tool to clarify the design task’s ambiguities by setting a dialogue between the architects and experts and some jury members (Kreiner et al., 2011), and sometimes it is a method of enhancing the decision-making process by opening a dialogue between the jury and the end users or the public (White, 2014).

Overall, the use of dialogue at different stages of the competition process, as a tool, strategy, or method, presents one clear idea. It addresses recurring problems associated with the competition process that can be seen as communication-related issues, and to be precise, issues regarding mis-communication; this can be described in the context of architectural competitions as follows:

The anonymity issue creates a gap between the architects and the client; the architects have to construct the client’s needs, thoughts and preferences through their interpretation of the brief. This brief is supposed to represent the design task as clearly as possible; then architects presumably represent this understanding in their design in a second leap of representation. Then, after the first viewing, the judging panel have to re-interpret the brief into judgement criteria based on their newly-evolved understanding of the design task that has been reformed by the architects’ entries, plus the influence they have on each other’s...
views and attitudes in the critique or discussion phase. This continuous loop of representation and interpretation, and the changes in communication media from text to spoken to image, create a communication problem that appears to be problematic for the judgment process.

**Critique**

Critique is defined as “a critical essay or commentary, especially on artistic work, or the act or art of criticizing” (Merriam-Webster, 2014). This means that there is an element of criticality here; it is like a critical review of the subject of critique, in this case architectural design. In philosophical contexts, Kant uses the term critique as “a reflective examination of the validity and limits of a human capacity or of a set of philosophical claims” (Kant and Bernard, 2013). In modern philosophy, the use of the term has been stretched to mean “a systematic inquiry into the conditions and consequences of a concept, a theory, a discipline, or an approach and/or attempt to understand the limitations and validity of that” (Kant and Bernard, 2013). In other words, it is an attempt to understand/clarify, or an examination of validity. In the English language, criticism is used more frequently to denote literary criticism or art criticism, that is, the interpretation and evaluation of literature and art (Vattimo, 1990, cited in Wood (1990). Because architecture is considered a form of art, this definition can be applied to architecture, where critique is included in architectural education, in professional practice, in the architectural press, and as self-critique during the design process, as a reflective process. It is how architects create and mediate knowledge in their profession (Lundequist, 2002, cited in Svensson (2013, p. 3)

In architectural competitions, critique is used throughout the design phase, assessment phase, and in the jury discussions. There are three main methods of using critique in architectural competitions, as suggested by Rönn (2011b):

- **First:** as a design tool, when architects taking part in competitions use critique from colleagues in their design team as a way of developing their design entry in a peer-review process. Critique here is a basic element in ideas development at the design phase.
- **Second:** as a working method, when jury members use critique while examining design entries as an informative tool, where merits, uncertainties, and shortcomings are revealed. Critique offers a better understanding of the design task.
- **Third:** in the jury statement, when jury members present a written statement in which the results of the competition are commented upon in the form of an
architectural critique. This statement also serves as a justification for their choice of the winner.

Criticism is an important part of the jury’s evaluation discussions and also in their final statement. The jury’s criticism of the best entries becomes a reflective learning process, in which they express their thoughts on the nature of the design task, and this might result in changing or re-directing the way they understand the competition task, causing the criteria to evolve as a reflection of the new moderated collective understanding. Critique serves as a clarification and exploration method to enhance communication, similar to a review of a written work.

Svensson (2013) went inside the jury room to explore the strategies the jury used to reach their final decision. She recognised two main strategies: one rational, mostly used by non-architects, and one using critique, mostly used by architects. She claims that the jury embodies both methods; non-architects in the jury are mostly politicians and/or officials who are used to rationalised decision making, where they assign a score according to measurable criteria. However, architects on the jury, through a series of evaluations based on architectural critique, try to find the best complete solution. Svenson then concludes that it is only through co-balancing the aspects, forming a general picture, that the choice of a winner can be determined, stating that the work of the jury in competitions is a creative process that ends with the jury agreeing on a winner (Svensson, 2013).

In general, architects in the jury use criticism as a technique in judgment because they are used to it in the architectural education model, and it is their way of engaging others (non-architects) in the jury with their understanding or attitude. This might be their technique to influence the jury’s decision, so instead of the purpose of dialogue being to clarify ambiguity, it becomes a way to influence the jury’s decision, even if non-deliberately.

**Rhetoric**

Rhetoric is defined by the Dictionary (2014) as “the art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing, especially the exploitation of figures of speech and other compositional techniques”, or as “the language designed to have a persuasive or impressive effect, but which is often regarded as lacking in sincerity or meaningful content”. Another definition by (Corbett and Connors, 1999) is that rhetoric is “the art of discourse, an art that aims to improve the capability of writers or speakers to inform, persuade, or motivate particular audiences in specific situations”.
This shows that rhetoric is a technique used to “design language” to inform or to serve the purpose of persuasion. However, it may also be associated with lack of sincerity or clarity of meaning. If this is to be applied to architecture as a visual language that uses two-dimensional and three-dimensional media to transfer meaning, then it is related to how architecture reflects reality using architectural graphics and representation. The lack of clarity or the difficulty to fully represent their design in a sincere matter, might contribute to miss communication or confusion within the judgement process.

Rhetoric as a concept appears during the course of the competition process, in the competition program, the entries, and in the jury’s discussions and final statement.

Tostrup (2010) identifies a threefold element of rhetoric in competing for architecture: (1) the design by the winning architects, (2) the graphic and visual representation, and (3) the texts. In addition, Tostrup (2010) explores the use of architectural rhetoric to promote the prevailing social values at the time, taking for example Norwegian cases from the mid-twentieth century up until today. She investigates the idea of promoting architecture via visual and verbal means in architectural competitions, considering rhetoric as a core issue in architectural competitions, since the essence of competitions is to promote the best solution among a number of parallel proposals, thus reaching a consensus (Tostrup, 2010). This complies with the ideas presented in the definition of the term rhetoric in language and literature. In the context of architectural competitions, architects use graphic rhetoric to persuade their audience and to sell their design. She also suggests that changes in the community values of the time affect the way architects use rhetoric to promote their designs. And that the architectural rhetoric of today is preoccupied with landmarks, and that:

We need to enhance communication with more nuanced terms and expressions to describe and promote architectural quality… the challenge to architects now is to contribute to a far more nuanced rhetoric that can balance the extreme cult of the extraordinary and grandiose, that can provide sustainable, functional and beautiful everyday environment (Tostrup, 2013b, p. 34).

Sauge (2010) looks at architectural competitions as an exercise in rhetoric, and how architects, with the aid of graphic arguments, or by the exclusion of graphic elements, succeed in presenting a proposal that is chosen as the best. He demonstrates these thoughts through the competition for a new office building in Oslo for the Norwegian Shipowners
Association in 1930. In addition, he looks at how variations in, self-contradictions of, and breaches of convention can be explained as strategic expressions with rhetorical functions that have been used by architects participating in the competition. Sauge also argues that architects try to deliver their design concepts through written and graphic arguments using rhetoric. He suggests that it is worthwhile to look in more depth at the issues of conveyance of information, which appear in all genres of architectural drawings.

It seems that rhetoric is a technique used by architects to open the door for interpretation of their design (Sauge, 2010). This idea of open interpretation is meant to engage the spectators (lay people, architects, jury members, etc.), and by doing so each individual can resonate with what they see in this creation, opening the horizon of the interpretation and imagination of the audience (Tostrup, 2010). However, by doing so they compromise the clarity and the informative quality that architectural representation and graphics should have. And again, this creates a communication and interpretation problem that complicates the judgment and decision process, even more than they are already.

3.3.3 Judgement Criteria

Criteria is the plural of criterion, which “a principle or standard by which something may be judged or decided” (OLD, 2014). This definition suggests that criteria are the base on which a decision is built. And in judging architectural design, the judgement criteria are a key factor; they are the way in which both juries and competitors are bound together in the process of judgment. The RIBA code of practice 1986, while stating the scope of competition conditions, suggests that the criteria used in judgement should be included in the preliminary invitation for the competition, and it is important to do so because that will influence the type of effort that will be elicited from designers (RIBA, 1986b), p. 18).

The competition programme provides the criteria against which to evaluate the entries (AIA, 2010b), and the best entries are sorted through discussion, and then the quality assessment, based on the design criteria in the brief (programme), reflects the demands and goals of the design task (Rönn, 2009). Despite the evaluation criteria varying from competition to another, they should, however, be clear to both juries and competitors, because they indicate the design values and solutions the sponsor is seeking (AIA, 2010).

The competition criteria are not just different from one competition to another, they are also changeable across time, and for architects, knowing the design criteria is an essential part of their experience in architectural competitions. They need to know the criteria based on which their design entry will be evaluated (Kreiner et al., 2011). Rönn (2011b) suggests
that design criteria develop through dialogues in the assessment session, and their function is to help and guide the jurors through the evaluation process by answering the question of what is important and how to proceed. He also claims that juries acquire knowledge by posing questions about the proposals, and that these questions reflect the inquiring nature of the criteria.

**Criteria as a quality judgment tool**

Judgement in the context of architectural competitions has been the subject of several previous studies, starting from 1971, with Collins’ book *Architectural Judgment*, in which he compares architectural judgment to the juridical form of judgment, seeing the judgement criteria as a key to the fairness of the judgment process. Collins’ study suggests that there are three different sets of criteria that affect the judgment process: professional criteria, building performance, and aesthetic values (Collins, 1971). This study also offers a set of general quality assessment criteria, not taking into consideration the people involved in the process; it looks at architecture separately from the judgment context.

Rönn (2009) suggests that there are two main sets of criteria involved in the evaluation process, evaluation criteria and general criteria. Evaluation criteria are related to the programme for each specific project and are therefore unique to each project. General criteria are related to design qualities that every building should fulfil, and they are a combination of criteria derived from the experience of the architectural profession and tacit knowledge. This study also suggests that each design project is to be evaluated by six main general criteria: 1. Wholeness and fundamental idea. 2. Coherence and surroundings. 3. Entrance position: movement and circulation. 4. Suitability and functional set up: special organisation. 5. Economics and technical solutions, construction and sustainability. 6. Development possibility: further development. The study focused on the general criteria in detail leaving the other set of criteria (evaluation criteria) without sufficient definition. This is possibly due to the fact that criteria are changed, reprioritised, and evolve during the judgment process.

Nasar (2006) offers a full model for running architectural competitions, and in his version of criteria he claims that there are three main sets of criteria involved in the evaluation process: criteria related to the appearance of design, criteria related to convenience, and criteria related to durability. Then, he details each of these categories with further subdivisions of criteria. The study offers a set of performance criteria that can fit any architectural program, without taking into consideration the uniqueness of each project,
especially in relation to the context (site) and the time context of the project. Nevertheless, it offers a suitable base for further investigation.

A third model is offered by Younés (2012); this model is more concerned with how architects evaluate and judge buildings, and he claims that they do this through three main sets of criteria. The first are internal (intrinsic) criteria which are related to the design quality and the architectural character of the building. The second are external criteria that are influenced by history of architecture, trends, changes in philosophy, and politics. The third set of criteria is related to the psychology of mimetic rivalry. Younés’ book is concerned with how architects evaluate and judge architecture in general and the criteria they use. It is not concerned with the judgment process in architectural competitions specifically, and it also ignores the role of non-architects (other experts) in the process.

There are other studies that offer different approaches to the definition of criteria and how they affect the decision-making process, such as the study by Utaberta and Hassanpour (2012). The set of criteria in this study is more focused on the assessment system in architectural design education, and the authors claim that the criteria of each project should be derived from the course objectives and should be weighted and prioritised according to these objectives. If this is to be applied in the context of architectural competitions, the course objectives here represent the client’s and society’s objectives. This model is designed for academic purposes, which makes it lack the coherence it should have, because it is not designed for the complex nature of professional practice.

Previous studies have discussed the nature of criteria involved in the evaluation and decision-making process in architectural competitions. Most of those studies analyse the nature of the criteria used to judge architectural quality, and each one offers a different definition of the criteria. Rönn (2009) and Younés (2012) look at the judgement criteria as the factors affecting the evaluation process, taking into consideration criteria that come from outside architecture such as finance, politics, history, and the psychology of people involved in the evaluation process. On the other hand, Collins (1971), Nasar (2006), and Utaberta and Hassanpour (2012) are more focused on the criteria as values embedded in the design itself, without looking at factors from outside the design process, which means their models lack the depth and complexity they could have.

All previous studies on the criteria involved in the judgment process have something in common: the sets of criteria they suggest are all derived from the oldest known model of design quality, the Vitruvius trilogy (beauty, durability, firmness), which seems to be still
valid as a model describing the qualities that people are seeking in architecture in general. On the surface, all these studies seem different, but actually they are all made to simplify a complex problem; however, because of the complex nature of the criteria, these models do not offer solid ground for the evaluation process, they only describe part of a big and complex picture.

Generally, previous studies, taken together, focus on three sets of criteria:

- The criteria related to architectural design quality in general, inherited from architectural practice, and which can be described via the Vitruvian trilogy (beauty, firmness, durability) (Rönn, 2011b, Younés, 2012, Collins, 1971, Utaberta and Hassanpour, 2012, Nasar, 2006).
- The exclusive criteria that are unique to each different project; these are derived from the different contexts that come with different projects, and context here refers to the place context, time context, and social context that is unique to each building (Rönn, 2011b, Younés, 2012).
- The criteria derived from the nature of the people involved in the judgment process, the clients and assessors/jurors; these criteria are normally intangible, tacit, and personal, such as personal taste, personal preferences, previous experience, background knowledge, etc. This means they are often neglected by most scholars and researchers (Younés, 2012).

**The evolving criteria**

Although criteria vary in definition, they also share the fact that they can change and evolve during a discussion in the process of decision making, and even be reformed after the viewing of the design entries (Andersson et al., 2013c). In addition, Kreiner (2013) points out that jury members develop the competition criteria for assessment in retrospect as a response to the design submitted by contesting teams. And the client’s and the jury members’ attitudes evolve while they re-discover their needs and preferences by reviewing and evaluating the submitted design proposals. Kreiner’s study also concluded that architects take the competition brief as their source of information about the needs and preferences that will be used to evaluate design proposals (criteria). The AIA (2010b) also suggests that some of the judgment criteria will be stated in the competition brief. However, separate criteria may be developed during the course of a jury’s deliberations. Thus, there are too many intangibles inherent in assessing the quality of a design to warrant any strict use of a rigid scoring system.
Van Wezemael et al. (2011), in a study dealing with collective decision making in architectural competitions, point out that the most relevant evaluation criteria are not the ones given in advance but those that emerge during the decision-making process, and these criteria co-evolve after the viewing of the entries. This claim is similar to that of (Kreiner, 2010, AIA, 2010b). Similarly, in a study by (Crossman, 2015), in the observation of competition B, it was noted that the juries met to clarify or add new judgement criteria, then after the viewing and first round of judgment, the juries highlighted a new relevant judgement criteria, and finally there was another round of discussion around the lunch table where the way was made clear for more collective and transparent judgment. This observation shows that the discussions, dialogue, and debate are where the criteria are changed and re-prioritised, and new criteria are added. It can be noticed that this process of evolution and change happens after the submission; it is inspired by the design entries, which means these criteria have not been introduced to the participants at first, which contribute to them being surprised by the choices the jury make at the end of the judgement process.

This study argues that this evolving and changing in the judgement criteria is inevitable, and, in fact, necessary. It is part of the judges’ way of clarifying, understanding, and making sense of the task they have in hand. Also, this study suggests that the evolution of judgement criteria is the judge’s method of enhancing communication through dialogue. The criteria seem to be tweaked or changed or elaborated on, or seem to evolve, because of the nature of the judgement process; this is part of the judges’ effort to understand the limits and dimensions of the design task, and through this exploration process, new directions of thought are discovered, and new opportunities and new boundaries are set. It is the method or technique that the judges follow in clarifying the ambiguities of a design task, and no brief or set of preliminary criteria, no matter how sophisticated or detailed, can do it for them before the viewing of the design entries. Hence, it is a process of communication and re-interpretation of the design task in the light of and with insights from the design entries.

Assuming that the criteria change or that evolution is inevitable is not necessarily a bad thing; the criteria are meant to evolve and be re-prioritised to allow for clarification of the true boundaries (essence) of the project. It is part of the effort to enhance communication and interpretation. It is a collective effort, and that means it is the collection of the thought process of each individual in the jury (with their different expertise and backgrounds); if they have communicated well and effectively it will enhance the chances of a transparent
and effective judgement. This is why I will be looking at the role of communication in the judgment process, and how clearer communication can enhance or determine the quality of judgment.

3.4 Summary of literature review

After reviewing the literature, it appears that the field of research on architectural competitions still has lots of gaps in different areas; this might be due to its freshness as a field of study. Most previous studies are significant in the way they deal with their research problems, by trying to dig deep into these areas of study. However, the whole picture is yet to be made clear. This research attempts to step back and take a higher view in looking at the problems associated with the judgment process in architectural competitions. It appears that these problems are mostly related to issues of poor communication; this is evident in the new methods and strategies used by decision makers/judges and organisers: first, the fact that jury members have to re-set/re-weight/re-prioritise the judgement criteria as a method of enhancing communication between the designers (represented through their designs) and juries, as well as between jury members themselves, because each one of them represents different expertise, a different stakeholder, or even different personal preference. Second, the re-invention of dialogue-based competitions and the competitions that involve taking the public’s or end users’ opinions, as a method of making the process more transparent and allowing better communication between all the involved parties/stakeholders.

Similarly, when looking at the judgement process in architectural competitions in terms of a decision-making process, it appears that there are three levels of decision making involved in the process. First, the individual level: the jury members represent themselves, their expertise, and their tastes. Second, the group level: the jury members have to make their decision collectively, aiming to reach a consensus ideally, and it is also a process of group decision making. Third, the organisational level: the jury members might represent a certain party involved in the process – the client, a public body or authority, the end users, etc. – and these parties can sometimes be seen as organisations. Accordingly, this research claims that effective communication should enhance and clarify the role of each level involved in the decision process, by finding common ground between these three levels of values.

Hence, this research looks at the communication issues associated with the judgement process in architectural competitions, and the research hypothesis states that we could
enhance the transparency and fairness of the judgement process through establishing effective communication between all the stakeholders involved in the decision-making process.

3.5 Description of research gaps and questions

After reviewing the literature, it was apparent that most of the controversies around the judgment process partially result from the lack of clear communication that results in the lack of a common language, or the lack of a comprehensive understanding of the design task itself, between all the stakeholders involved in the process of judgment.

To describe the process, one should start from the first decision made, which is to conduct a design competition. This decision is made mainly by the client – an individual or organization – and is mostly based on the client’s intent to seek the best quality work, or a new way of thinking, sometimes as a publicity strategy for a future project or building, or for the organization itself. After the decision is made, normally the client will seek consultancy on how to conduct a competition. This consultancy might come from the organization itself or an independent body such as a competition consultancy professional or an architecture firm.

After that, the client/s normally recognize and communicate their needs, requirements, visions, and opinions to the organizers (spoken or written); the organizers then interpret those needs and requirements into a design task that comes in the shape of a brief of the competition task (in written form). This can be marked as the first leap of communication and interpretation, where any missing piece of information or misunderstanding can cause a different interpretation, which might affect the design brief. The second leap of communication follows when the brief is announced to the public; architects willing to participate in the competition will then start their own reading and interpretation of the brief, in which each individual will have their own interpretation and understanding based on their background knowledge, experience, and expertise. Then those thoughts/visions/needs and requirements are translated into and represented in a design proposal in the form of drawings, models, or 3D visualization, in a third leap of communication.

Next, the architects submit their work to the competition and the judgment process begins. The judges are normally assigned by the organizing body, while the formation of the judging panel may vary according to several factors, such as the recruitment regulations, the nature of the project, and the client’s/organizer’s vision. The jury members then have
their look at the brief; they sit together to discuss the design task and the judgment criteria, and then they weigh and prioritise the criteria according to their collective understanding (interpretation) of the task; this marks the fourth leap of communication and interpretation.

After that, the juries proceed with the first viewing; the unsuitable proposals are eliminated, and a process of shortlisting is conducted to separate the entries into smaller groups; then the jury panel meet again and discuss the shortlisted proposals in an attempt to reach consensus on the winning proposals. These discussions are where most of the influences and biases can appear. Each jury member has gone with the shortlisting process on their own or in small groups of two or three, then in the group meeting they will discuss and justify their decisions in the shape of critique/dialogue. At this stage, a new understanding of the design task inspired by the submitted work and also the personal differences between the judges’ expertise and background knowledge and experience appears to affect the criteria for the decision. This effect could come in the shape of new criteria, or new priorities that reflect on the weight of certain criteria, which in this study will be referred to as the evolving criteria.

These discussions between the jury members can be perceived as the most significant leap of communication; this is where misunderstanding and miscommunication can play a vital role in the decision process, and where biases and influences (deliberate and non-deliberate) start to appear. Even when there is a common understanding and shared terminology, the different backgrounds and expertise of different jury members can affect their judgment and their priorities, especially if their task was not clear enough in the brief. This stage of the competition plays a vital role in steering the judgment and decision process. It is where the criteria are shifted, re-weighed, or re-prioritized, and the thoughts and visions of different experts are merged, resulting in a new, evolved, comprehensive version of the design brief and criteria. This is the version that the contestants are unaware of and that is the cause of most of the controversy and distress associated with the judgment process in architectural competitions.

These leaps of communication and interpretation, plus the changes in communication medium from spoken to written to visualization to written and spoken and written again, create gaps of knowledge, and this causes the misunderstanding and the lack of clear communication.
Even though these leaps are inevitable, it is possible to enhance the situation through forming a framework to aid the communication process through the judgment of architectural competitions. Those leaps of communication are illustrated in Figure 3-3.

3.5.1 Research questions

1- How can the current practice of judgment in architectural competitions be improved to address controversies around public architectural competitions?

2- How can communication be improved in the judgment process in architectural competitions?

3- Can any social and/or information theories help address this problem? If yes, which one(s), and how?

4- As a result, what can be seen differently compared to the state-of-the-art research on architectural competitions? And how?

5- What changes and improvements can be proposed? And how?

3.5.2 Research aim

This research aimed to enhance effective communication between different stakeholders involved in the judgement process in architectural competitions, through forming a framework that works as a communication facilitator to ease the knowledge transfer.
between those parties. It also aimed to help improve current understanding of communication in current practice of architectural judgment, through relevant theories with the potential to contribute to this research’s findings, and to propose theoretical models and practical measures to ease and improve communication between all stakeholders.

3.5.3 Research objectives

1- To investigate how communication between all stakeholders in a competition affects their judgement.

2- To investigate how communication in the competition process could be improved and how to do so through exploring theories with the potential to contribute to solving the research problem.

3- To explore how theoretical insights from relative theories can help improve the current understanding of the judgment process, to be able then to suggest enhancements to current practice.

3.6 Summary

This chapter has focused on exploring the field of research around the judgment process in architectural competitions. A general review of the literature on judgement in architectural competitions resulted in identification of six areas as the main research approaches to judgement process in architectural competitions, although some such trends were also found to be a common core to the judgement process in any art-related competitions. These are: a) Judgement, as decision making process; b) Dialogue, critique, and rhetoric as judgement strategies; c) Theoretical modelling of the judgement process; d) People (or otherwise stakeholders) involved in the process including: juries, clients, and architects; e) The product (of design) itself and the quality measures; and last but equally importantly, f) Judging architectural design in academic contexts. These areas were then grouped into three focus areas that are indicated to be related to potential gaps in this field of research of which the most important ones as common denominators of many problems and issues involved were shown to be: communication, decision making, and judgement criteria. Further critical analysis into these three areas have resulted in identifying few research gaps. Those gaps were then linked to one problem related to the lack of transparency in the competition process and poor communication between the stakeholders involved in the judgement process. This gap then led to posing the research questions, aims and objectives of this inquiry. In the next chapter, the most suitable, relevant and appropriate research
design, the methods and the methodological approach for this study will be investigated to be able to best respond to the research questions, and fulfil aims, and objectives of this study.
CHAPTER FOUR

METHODS AND METHODOLOGY
4 Methods and Methodology

4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the research design methodology and methods adopted to address the research questions, and accomplish aims and objectives of this study. It starts with a review of the methods and methodologies applied within the field of research on architectural competitions, and the significant previous research while pointing out the difficulties associated with research in this field especially the ones associated with availability and accessibility of and data collection enquiry practicalities. After that the epistemological and theoretical assumptions underpinning the methodological approach adopted and the potential theoretical assumptions are explored and discussed. Then the research design is presented, in order for it to then be applied in the next chapter.

4.2 Research in the field of architectural competitions
The architectural competition as a field of research is considered to be in its infancy if compared to the existence of architectural competitions as a field of practice. Looking at the scholarly work on competitions, it is obvious that there are still a lot of under-researched and vague areas. Each one of the previous studies has a distinctive approach towards studying this phenomenon of architectural competitions, and these approaches can be classified as follows:

- Regarding each stakeholder involved in the process, i.e. clients/organisers (Rönn, 2014c, Volker, 2012, Volker 2013), participating architects (Rönn, 2014b, Kreiner, 2010, Kazemian and Rönn, 2009, Younés, 2012, Strong, 2013, Rönn, 2013), juries (Rönn, 2010, Rönn, 2011a, Van Wezemaal et al., 2011, Svensson, 2010, Svensson, 2013, Manzoni et al., 2014, Cucuzzella, 2014), and end users (White, 2014, Valand, 2010). These studies mostly use ethnographies or case studies as a research methodology, obviously because of the nature of the questions they are trying to answer, which are related to a certain group or party. These studies look at the problem from a single point of view, through the lenses of the stakeholder they are interested in, which results in them overlooking the comprehensive perspective.

- Regarding historical and biographic issues (Guilherm and Rocha, 2013, Beckman, 2013, Jong and Mattie, 1994, Haan and Haagsma, 1988, Tostrup, 2013a); these studies mostly rest on analysing archived material, exploring potential patterns that might lie in the works and lives of significant work on competitions through time.
Knowing the patterns hidden in previous work could form a significant contribution to future work; however, progress in any field needs a comprehensive overview from time to time to understand the mechanisms of the field, in order to be able then to correct and connect the missing parts or gaps. These studies mostly follow the qualitative methodology, and utilise methods like text/image analysis, content analysis, and discourse analysis.


- Regarding exploring the phenomena in different contexts, a few studies offer analysis of issues related to architectural competitions in different contexts, such as regarding different countries (Volker, 2010b, Kazemian and Rönn, 2009, kaipiainen, 2013) or different competition types or between practice and academia (Uzunoglu and Uzunoglu, 2011, Utaberta and Hassanpour, 2012).

Regardless of the significant work that has been done in the field, it is notable and understandable that each group of studies had taken a different path or approach to looking at the various problems associated with the judgement process in architectural competitions, leaving the whole picture foggy and pixelated in a lot of areas. This might be because of many factors related first to the subjectivity embedded within the judgment process itself and the tacit nature of human taste, and second to the confidentiality issues that have always kept the process behind closed doors.

Therefore, the present study, after realising that most of the controversy and problems associated with the field can be understood as communication deficiencies, looks from a broader perspective, aiming to form a framework that can clarify and ease communication.
between all the parties/stakeholders involved in the judgement process in architectural competitions.

4.2.1 Difficulties associated with collecting data in the field of architectural competitions

There are various difficulties associated with collecting data in this field. Foremost among these are:

- The confidential nature of the process: the judgment process has always been confidential, but in recent years, attempts are being made to make it more transparent through dialogue-based competitions or competitions that take into account the end users or the public in the process of judgement.
- The subjective factors contributing to the process of judgement in architectural competitions: people are heavily involved in the competition process, from clients to organisers, architects, and expert jurors. Therefore, the effects of the subjective nature of human beings are one of the main grey areas in the world of research in architectural competitions. And because of the different parties involved and the different agendas they follow, plus the difficulties associated with communicating with each other through different means of communication, there is a huge grey area for the outside spectator of this process, making the data collection process a very difficult one.
- The political and financial factors involved in the choice process: one of the main reasons for the secrecy and confidentiality associated with the judgement process in architectural competitions comes from the nature of the political and financial issues associated with this practice, especially when public funds are involved.

4.2.2 Distinctive work in the field

Key studies in this area are as follows:

- The Nordic study: (Rönn, 2009, Rönn, 2010, Rönn, 2011b); Svensson, 2010; (Kazemian and Rönn, 2009) Kazemian, 2010). All these studies were based on data collected through the Nordic studies that were carried out by the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm during the 2005 to 2007 (Kazemian, Rönn and Svensson, 2005, 2007). The analysis is based on interview data, competition documentation, and previous research. Eighteen experienced Nordic jury members were interviewed. The interviewees represent the three important parties in competitions,
seven members from organizing bodies (promoters, clients, developers), five competitors, and six members of architectural associations

- The Canadian team LEAP: Jean-Pierre Chupin, Carmela Cucuzzella, Bechara Helal (Chupin, 2011) (Chupin et al., 2015). The Laboratoire d’étude de architecture potentielle (LEAP or Research Laboratory of Potential Architecture) is devoted to the theory and practice of contemporary architecture. They concentrate on architectural competition theory and practice as one of their major research areas, considering competitions as a world of potential that forms the quality of contemporary and future architecture. The University of Montreal has a few ongoing PhD projects focusing on architectural competitions, especially issues related to judgment, quality, expertise, and innovation. In the beginning of 2015, this team published a book, *Architecture Competitions and The Production of Culture, Quality and Knowledge: An International Inquiry*; this book is meant to represent the contemporary views on architectural competitions as a field of practice and as a research paradigm. It consists of five main sections, each one concentrating on a different aspect: organising architectural competitions as a democratic practice; an index of the cited competitions in the book; judging architectural quality; archiving architectural competitions; and on publishing architectural ideas (Chupin et al., 2015).

- The work of Leentje Volker (Volker, 2010c, Volker, 2010a, Volker, 2011, Volker, 2012, Volker et al., 2008, Volker, 2010b, Volker, 2008, Volker 2013, Volker 2018), etc. Starting with a PhD on architectural competitions titled *Deciding About Design Quality: Value Judgements and Decision Making in the Selection of Architects by Public Clients Under European Tendering Regulations*, Volker has done significant work in the field of architectural competitions in general and especially on the process of choice in the European context. Most of the work she has done is related to managing architectural competitions. The research methods used in this work are mostly based on case studies (Volker, 2008, Volker, 2012, Volker et al., 2008, Volker, 2010a).

- Van Wezemael’s (Van Wezemael, 2010) study is unique in its methodological approach, using a qualitative methodology, i.e. a combination of qualitative in-depth analysis and quantitative analysis of large numbers of completed competitions. The study aimed to trace the topology of relations between the populations of competitions; it concludes with a framework for the decision-
making process in jury sessions in urban design competitions, using aspects of actor-network theory and assemblage theory. In another study, Van Wezemael et al. (2011), based on an ethnographic study of the jury assessment and the quality in architectural competitions, explore the jury meetings and consider them as a laboratory to understand the dynamics of decision making process. The study concluded by suggesting that the decision and sense making process involved in judgement provide a good learning opportunity of how to deal with complex situations.

- Kristian Kreiner’s work (Kreiner, 2013, Kreiner et al., 2011) is based on an ethnographic study of the participating teams in architectural competitions, and the role of dialogue as a technique to enhance communication between participating architects and the expert jury.

4.2.3 Mapping methods and methodology in architectural competition research

Research about judgement in architectural competitions is still new. One of the main issues that makes research in this field a bit challenging is the confidentiality associated with the phenomenon, and because of the sensitivity resulting from the political and financial issues associated with choosing to build a project or simply choosing a winner. This confidentiality has made gaining access to data a challenge for most of the researchers in this field. This may be the reason why some researchers choose to go about certain methods, such as fictional competitions and vignettes, or case stories. A quick review of the methodologies and methods utilised by other researchers in the field reveals the key issues.

Methodological approach

Most previous studies follow the qualitative approach in dealing with questions related to the judgement process in architectural competitions, apart from a single study by Van Wezemael (2010) that utilises a “qualculative” approach. This is related to the nature of the process itself and the interpretive element of both judgement and design, in addition to the nature of the available data.

Methods used

The methods used vary from ethnographies, case studies, case stories, theoretical modelling, and fictional competitions and vignettes:
• Studies that utilise ethnography are mainly the ones that deal with questions related to a certain group/party/stakeholder, i.e. jury members, participants, clients, end users.

• Case studies are normally utilised to investigate a certain concept’s effect in a certain setting or context.

• There are also studies that combined ethnography and case study approaches to deal with the research questions they have in hand, for example (Kreiner, 2013).

• Theoretical modelling is utilised by studies trying to form a holistic understanding of the design problem while prescribing enhancement in some cases. For instance, Chupin (2011) used an analogy with design thinking to produce his new model for judgement by design. Collins (1971) used an analogy with judicial judgement to produce a model for judging architecture.

• Fictional competitions were developed by one study (Crossman, 2015) which observed four competitions, and the constructed two fictional competitions; the researcher refers to the data collected in the field as ethnographies. There is also one study by (Van Wezemael et al., 2011) which used a vignette to construct observations into “moments” in the jury session, in order to be able to describe concepts related to the research.

Data sources

The data sources vary according to the nature of the data required, the methods and methodology used, and the availability and accessibility of data. Sources include:

• Observation of live competitions as a participating judge, as an observer, or as a contestant.

• Architectural archives, such as the Canadian and European archives, in addition to published documents and reports and certain specialised publications.

• Interviews with participants in competitions (juries, experts, organisers, clients, contestants).

Data analysis

The data analysis varies according to the methods used and data acquired, from comparative discourse analysis, content analysis, to hermeneutic discourse analysis, and qualitative analysis.
Most of the studies in the field were in the shape of group work. This is because of the difficulties associated with data collection. There are a few studies built on the same set of data (Rönn, 2009, Rönn, 2010, Rönn, 2011b), based on the data collected for the Nordic study between 2005 and 2008 by Svensson and Kaziemian. Lately, there have been attempts to keep an archive of the competition documents in Canada – The Canadian Competition Catalogue (CCC), Germany (Wettbewerbe), France, Switzerland, Brazil, Finland, Netherlands, and Denmark (Chupin et al., 2015).

4.3 The ontological perspective

Social ontology is concerned with the nature of social entities (Bryman, 2012). There are two main contradicting positions on the nature of social entities: objectivism and constructionism. The positivist position considers social entities as “objective entities that have a reality outside to the social actors” (Creswell, 2003), while constructionism see them as “social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors” (Bryman, 2012, p. 32).

Objectivism suggests that social phenomena and the categories that are used in everyday discourse exist independently from actors (Bryman, 2012). On the other end, constructivism or constructionism perceives the meanings of social phenomena as being carried out by social actors, not only produced through social interaction but in a constant state of modification (Bryman, 2012). In addition, the term constructivism has recently come to embrace the notion that social constructions are the result of one’s own interpretations of the social world. In other words, the researcher is continuously presenting his or her specific version of social reality, rather than one that can be viewed as absolute. Knowledge is regarded as unspecified; this position is related to postmodernism (Bryman, 2012, Creswell, 2003).

This research is taking the constructivist position, because of the nature of the research question and the nature of the judgement process itself, where the human perception and subjective interpretation of architectural design – as a representation of an imagined reality – play a significant role in the decision process. In addition, because of the nature of architecture itself and the representation tools used to reproduce reality, and how they allow the spectators to interpret what they see according to their personal background.

One of the most significant contributions of the constructivist perspective is its understanding of culture and its organisations. Culture here is seen as an emergent reality in a continuous state of construction and reconstruction, rather than an external reality that
acts on and constrains people (Bryman, 2012). This could be true for architectural competitions as a form of culture. Becker (1982, p. 521), for example, has suggested that:

People create culture continuously. ... No set of cultural understandings ... provides a perfectly applicable solution to any problem people have to solve in the course of their day, and they, therefore, must remake those solutions, adapt their understandings to the new situation in the light of what is different about it.

This understanding can also be applied to the architectural competition judgment process; the jury members are in a continuous process of building an understanding of the design task they have in hand and for the proposed solutions – in the shape of architectural design – this evolving understanding puts them in a continuous process of interpretation and construction. Becker (1982) cited in (Bryman, 2012, p. 34) asserts that in the constructionist position it is necessary to acknowledge that culture has a reality that “persists and antedates the participation of particular people” and forms their perspectives. It acts as a point of reference that is always in a continuous state of formation. This viewpoint shows a connection to the realistic perspective, as it admits the pre-existence of an object in addition to the interpretation offered by actors (Bryman, 2012). For this research, the nature of the research problem is embedded within the structure of the relationships and the communication between the actors involved, and the diverse nature of those actors puts this research approach in a middle position, where I take the constructivist perspective with an eye on critical realism.

4.4 Epistemology

Epistemology is about what is or what should be viewed as acceptable knowledge in a certain discipline (Creswell, 2003). It is also concerned with the question of whether the principles, procedures, and ethos of the natural sciences can be used or applied in the social world (Bryman, 2012, Creswell, 2003). There are two main epistemological positions regarding this issue, positivism and interpretivism. However, those positions sit at the extreme ends of the scale and in between those two, there are – the less extreme positions – realism and critical realism (Bryman, 2012).

Promoting the application of natural science methods to the study of social reality and beyond is the core of positivism, which is traditionally associated with natural science (Bryman, 2012). Yet positivism should not be considered as synonymous with science and the scientific. There was a shift from viewing science philosophy in positivist terms in the
early sixties, when the term realism (and critical realism) were introduced as another philosophical position that aims to provide an explanation of nature of scientific practice (Bryman, 2012, Creswell, 2003).

Realism is based on two beliefs. The first is that natural and social science can and should apply the same approach to data collection and explanation. The second is a commitment to the idea that there is an external reality that is separate from the description humans give to it. Both those beliefs are shared between realism and positivism (Bryman, 2012, Bhaskar, 2010). Two major forms of realism have been identified, empirical and critical.

Empirical realism relies on the assertion that reality can be completely understood using the proper methods. This version of realism, according to Bhaskar (2012) cited in Bryman (2012, p. 29), “fails to recognise that there are enduring structures and generative mechanisms underlying and producing observable phenomena and events”, and hence is seen as “ naïve realism”. Critical realism, on the other hand, recognizes the reality of the natural order and the events and discourses of the social world. Bhaskar (2010, p. 2) asserts that:

we will only be able to understand – and so change – the social world if we identify the structures at work that generate those events and discourses. ... These structures are not spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events; they can only be identified through the practical and theoretical work of the social sciences.

Interpretivism is a term that usually denotes this approach; for the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences to be respected, a strategy is needed to help the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action (Bryman, 2012). One of the main contributors to this intellectual tradition is Max Weber. He described sociology as a “science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects” (Weber, 1947, p.88) in (Bryman, 2012).

For this research, the epistemological position adopted is critical realism. This aimed to comprehend the generative mechanisms and actors’ relations within the practice of the judgement process in its natural setting, architectural competitions, to then be able to make the changes or enhancement that this study aims at. To do so, the mechanisms of judgement that have been identified through the review of the literature, in addition to the insights from relevant social theories, will be used to propose a framework that encapsulates the needed improvement, which will address the research problem.
4.5 Critical theory

According to Meredith et al. (1989), four generic perspectives to research structure can be identified by different degrees of formalism: axiomatic, logical positivist/empiricist, interpretive, and critical theory. This research follows the tradition of critical theory as one of the most influential contributions to post-positivist thought, especially the version presented through the work of Jürgen Habermas (1979a, 1979b).

Critical theorists are critical realists by nature; they take a middle position between positivism and interpretivism. They admit that the categories they employ to understand reality are likely to be temporary. In addition, they are perfectly comfortable to acknowledge that their explanations of theoretical terms are not directly observable (Bryman, 2012). Hence, the “generative mechanisms” of Bhaskar (2010), which can be defined as “hypothetical entities that account for regularities in the natural or social orders”, are perfectly acceptable for realists, but not for positivists. Those generative mechanisms involve the “entities and processes that are constitutive of the phenomenon of interest” (Bhaskar, 2010) cited in (Bryman, 2012, p. 29).

In addition, critical realists should necessarily understand and identify the context of a phenomenon in relation to the generative mechanism, and how this interaction can result in an observed regularity in the social world. This appreciation of context is crucial to critical realism because it contributes to highlighting the conditions that promote or hinder the operation of the causal mechanism (Bryman, 2012). The identification of generative mechanisms contributes to the formation of the changes required to the status quo of a practice, which makes critical realism critical. Identifying the generative mechanisms of a social phenomenon requires a distinctive form of reasoning that is neither inductive nor deductive. Blaikie (2004) refers to it as retroductive reasoning, which involves making an inference about the causal mechanism that causes and controls those regularities that are observed in the social world (Bryman, 2012).

4.6 Investigating Potential theoretical stands

Trying to explore around the social theories with the potential to contribute to answering this research questions, Communities of practice (CoP) – that was developed through the work of Wenger et al. (2015) – was first seen as a potential theoretical stand point on the endeavour to explain and improve the practice of judgement in architectural competitions. Because of the similarities both approaches share, as CoP provide a useful practice-based framework for constructing practice based collaborative learning and promoting
engagement with local and professional groups and communities (Andrew et al., 2008). However, CoP relies heavily on the role of a human convenor, which might contribute to maintaining the same inherited issues of bias and influence, as it puts a sort of authority in the hand of one person. This led to the dismissal of this theory and to looking for other theories with the potential to aid with this research investigation.

Architectural competitions can be perceived as a social democratic phenomenon. And because of the critical standpoint this research is adopting and the fact that the two main observed aspects involved in the judgement process are related to decision making and communication, in the next part, this study will focus on exploring the theory of communicative action. The theory of communicative action is one of the main contributions to the critical realism school of thought, which combines aspects of decision making and communication issues in the core of its structure.

![Figure 4-1: Positioning communicative action and deliberative democracy within the research boundaries](image)

### 4.7 Communicative action

First introduced by Jürgen Habermas in 1984, communicative action was his critique of the pessimism of his earlier position as a critic of Enlightenment rationality. Habermas distinguished between two main rationalities: normative and instrumental. While instrumental rationality is positivistic in its position and serves to impoverish cultural life,
normative rationality, on the other hand, may serve as a force for social change (Habermas 1984). Habermas’ theories have been adapted in various areas of public participation such as planning, democracy, and architectural discourse, because of the emphasis they place on the public sphere as the realm for communicative action (Leach and Dawsonera, 1997).

Communicative action theory is of a very broad nature, as it aims to explain or provide an understanding of a wide range of social conditions. This means that this theory, to some extent, has to compromise its precision. In the epistemological debate over rationality Habermas is critical for both positivism and interpretivism, as he believes that there is an alternative interpretation of these concepts, which is adequate in the epistemological as well as the in the political sense. To him rationality is viewed as a characteristic of an active, thinking subject, which receives information about the world, a world that consists of objects, then forms his/her individual attitude based on subjective and shared/social values (Eriksen and Weigard, 2003).

Habermas’s belief in rationality does not imply an assertive faith in any established set of substantial knowledge. On the contrary, all knowledge is in principle fallible and conclusions must, therefore, be regarded as revisable. Habermas’s perspective rather implies a procedural view of rationality, where it is not our conclusions but the manner in which we arrive at them which are permanent and in a way above criticism. The procedure involves maintaining a form of openness around the conclusions; they can always be challenged, criticised and tried again. (Eriksen and Weigard, 2003, p. 18)

Rational, in Habermas’ claims, is the position which is maintained by thorough argument. The procedural approach to rationality does not assure that the right answers will be achieved in all cases, but it guarantees that it can be tested continuously if there is a reason to doubt their correctness. This perspective forms the basis of communicative action (Eriksen and Weigard, 2003).

The main principle of communicative action theory is that any communication through language use can be regarded as a “speech act”. This implies that the medium of rationally binding character is human communication. This communication, performed by human agents, has the capacity to direct the action of those agents, which means that agents’ action will depend on how they evaluate the statements of other agents (Eriksen and Weigard, 2003). This, if applied to the judgement process, means that the discussions
between the jury members might be regarded as speech acts, where the jury members communicate as “agents” (through language) then redirect their actions based on their understanding and evaluation of others in the group. And for this discussion to be fruitful, the jury members should be able to let their attitudes be bent by others in the group, and they should then act accordingly. According to Habermas:

The proper rationality is the ability to let one’s action be guided by a common understanding of reality, a consensus established through linguistic dialogue. And that the term communicative action refers to an action which is oriented towards interaction on the basis of consensus about those claims. (Habermas 1984, p. 101)

Communicative action rests on the assumption of a continuing struggle between different rationalities that regulates social life (Walseth and Schei, 2011). Communicative rationality happens when a statement or decision is justified through reference either to factual empirical conditions (instrumental rationality), or to a culturally accepted norm, or to subjective emotions (normative rationality) (Habermas, 1984). In addition, communicative rationality aims to reach an understanding of the rationality problem by promoting inter-subjectivity, which is formed between the participants in a communicative relationship (Eriksen and Weigard, 2003). It is understood that communicative action represents an ambitious attempt to create a general social theory that integrates social and political aspects while embodying insights from a series of sociological and philosophical schools, such as Max Weber’s theory, the critical “Western” Marxist tradition, the analytical tradition of the philosophy of language, George Herbert Mead’s foundation of social-psychological theory, Emile Durkheim’s normative theory, Talcott Parson’s and Niklas Luhmann’s construction of a system of theoretical social science, philosophy of right in the tradition of Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Carl Schmitt, and finally John Rawls’ and Ronald Dworkin’s contribution to the interpretation of liberal political theory (Habermas, 1984). And because of all the diverse references and resources, this complexity within the theory of communicative action is inevitable; this is what makes communicative action widely applied in different social paradigms. Thus, similarly, because the judgment process in architectural competitions is a complex practice with different actors, agents, paradigms, and expertise involved, it requires a theory of a relevant complexity that resonates with the challenges that judgment presents for research.
The concept of communicative action refers to at least two subjects who are capable of speech and action, and who establish by (verbal and extra-verbal means) an interpersonal relation. They try to achieve a mutual understanding of a specific action situation, in order to be able to coordinate their action plans and thus their action. This is done by means of linguistic communication. In the course of the communicative process, both have the opportunity to present their respective interpretation of the situation, i.e. demonstration that they understand things in the same way. (Habermas 1984, p. 86)

The objects of this interpretation process, i.e. the issues which it negotiates, will always be conditions in the objective, social, or subjective world. The respective interpretation of things belonging to the three worlds will have to be presented as a criticisable utterance, an utterance which the other participants in the interaction can either accept as valid without reservation or deny the validity of. If the participants can establish that their starting points are different, i.e. that they do not have the same definition of the situation they are faced with, they will try to influence one another to adjust their interpretations by presenting new criticisable utterances. The goal is all the time to arrive at a definition of the situation which is shared by everyone and which they thus can answer for personally (Eriksen and Weigard, 2003).

According to Habermas (Habermas, 1984), for a certain normal conversation to be perceived as meaningful, the utterance must have built-in validity claims. These validity claims that are implicit in speech acts are: 1- the statement is true, 2- the speech act is right in relation to the current normative context, and 3- the speaker’s manifest intention is meant as it is expressed (Habermas, 1984, p. 99). These validity claims correspond to the three rationality criteria that are connected to the objective, the social, and the subjective world, or more precisely, objective truth, normative rightness, and subjective truthfulness. Also, Habermas claims that although these three criteria play a role in connection with some types of sentence, but one of them will be more prominent depending on which world the content is primarily related to (Habermas, 1984, p. 308).

Habermas distinguishes between two variations of communicative action, strong and weak, arguing that a strong sense of communicative action is that which is coordinated through the actors’ agreement about the basis of their cooperation, which means they allow their will to be bound or bent by inter-subjectively shared value orientations, which they accept
to be prior to private preferences in the choice process. Conversely, the weak sense of communicative action comes from the actors’ inability to recognise and understand each other’s respective, actor-relative reason for acting in a particular way (Eriksen and Weigard, 2003).

4.7.1 Communicative action, decision making, and language

Communicative action is constructed around the postulation that humans, using language, presenting arguments, justifying statements, asking and answering questions, can reach a better understanding of themselves and others in the world (Habermas, 1984). This description can be compared with the judgment process in architectural competitions, where jury members try to interpret and clarify the task they have in hand by arguments, negotiations, and justifications using language. Habermas (1984) argues that communicative rationality is extremely relevant to issues concerning human relationships, ethics, and personal decision making. He suggests that decisions have to be rooted in the participants’ life-world for communicative rationality to occur. Considering the life-world as the “frame of a human being’s lived life, a horizon of ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge, norms and expectations” (Habermas, 1984, p. 47). And it is only when people share the same “taken-for-granted” knowledge that cultures are shaped. In addition, a common life-world works as a connection between the individual and the social community one belongs to (Habermas, 1984). However, for the judgment process in architectural competitions a life-world is not completely formed for several reasons. First, because of the fact that not all stakeholders are represented in the jury committee – the architects are represented through their work and the jury’s interpretation. Second, the communication medium is not only spoken language but also written descriptions and visual representation. Third, the jury members come from different backgrounds, have different expertise, and sometimes even come from different countries. All this results in the process of judgement lacking “taken-for-granted” knowledge.

Furthermore, Habermas distinguishes three different actor-world dimensions that a human being adopts regarding understanding something in the world; these relations are then reflected in their action, oriented to mutual understanding. These dimensions are:

To something in the objective world as the totality of entities about which true statements are possible or; To something in the social world as the totality of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations or; To something in the subjective world as the totality of experiences to which the speaker
has privileged access and which he can express before a public.
(Habermas, 1984, p.20)

Habermas claims that in speech acts it is impossible to perform a pure type of action oriented to mutual understanding, and that communicative action relies on a cooperative process of interpretation in which the participants relate simultaneously to something in the objective, social, and subjective worlds, even when they thematically stress only on one of the three components in their utterances. He also claims that the speaker and hearer use the reference system of the three worlds as an interpretive framework within which they work out their common situation definitions (Habermas, 1984). The present research aims to form a framework that can act as a life-world (medium) to assist those involved in the judgment process to work out their common situation definitions and thus form their decision.

Habermas then discusses three further types of discourse that can be used to achieve valid results, in addition to verbal argument: the aesthetic, the therapeutic, and the explicative. He only recognises these types of discourse, without going into their details. It is verbal discourse that is prioritised in Habermas’ arguments (Habermas, 1989). Hence, it can be noted that to Habermas these three types are considered secondary forms of discourse. To explain them more fully:

1. Aesthetic discourse works by mediators’ arguments bringing us to consider a work or performance which itself demonstrates a value (Habermas, 1984, p. 20).
2. Therapeutic discourse is that which serves to clarify systematic self-deception (Habermas, 1984, p. 21).
3. Explicative discourse focuses on the very means of reaching understanding – the means of (linguistic) expression (Habermas, 1984, p. 21).

In general, the theory of communicative action could provide the theoretical backbone for this research project. First, because it falls in the middle of the contradicted epistemologies, positivism and interpretivism. Second, because the main issues this research aimed to explore fall within the range of this theory, regarding the role of communication in directing people’s understanding and then action, i.e. decision making. Third, because this theory asserts that humans build their speech acts with reference to three dimensions, what Habermas calls a life-world; these dimensions are the subjective, the objective, and the social. Fourth, it claims that there are two rationalities humans utilise as a reference to
justify decisions, the instrumental rationality, the reference of which is factual or empirical, and the normative rationality, which refers to a culturally accepted norm or to subjective emotion. Communicative rationality argues that both rationalities are essential for a decision, and this is what this research aimed to produce, a framework that accommodates both rationalities, and strikes a balance between them based on the specifics of any given competition context.

4.7.2 Deliberative democracy as communicative action

The theory of communicative action is a social theory. However, the most significant implications have been in politics, primarily as outlined by Habermas himself. The theory of communicative action suggests that reason cannot be generated from outside society, nor does it pre-exist in individuals’ subjective minds; rather it is produced by the social interactions called communicative action. Habermas asserts that rationality is a collective construction produced by social interaction, not a pre-given logical necessity. Communicative action itself is not necessarily rational. It is, however, the generator of public reason, because it is oriented to mutual understanding. Communicative action can be found in many discursive forms, or speech acts, including discussions, debates, argumentations, and deliberations (Habermas, 1984; Kim and Kim, 2008). Equally, it can be found in the judgement process in architectural competitions, and, as suggested by many scholars, the jury members’ reforming or reshaping their understanding of the design task and the brief, and re-prioritising the judgement criteria through the discussions and dialogues after the first viewing of the design entries. It is through these discussions that they reach a mutual understanding of the design task.

Habermas (1984) also highlights that the origin of rationality is not the subject’s consciousness but the communicatively interconnected community, where non-purposive conversation is the basic form of interaction: “I shall speak of ‘conversation’ when the weight is shifted in this way from purposive activity to communication” (Habermas (1984), p. 327). As is the case for architectural competitions, the role of dialogue, arguments, and side talks is undeniable, their effect on the process is inevitable, and it is through these speech acts that juries reach mutual understanding, in a best-case scenario, or sometimes they are where prejudices and conflict are formed. It is through dialogue that the jury members construct their understanding of their preferences and of the design task, in a process of construction of self and context.
Kim and Kim (2008) claim that deliberative democracy is a self-regulating system that must produce its own rules and resources through deliberation. They use insights from Giddens’ theory of structuration to conceptualize democracy as a “structuration”, or as the “rules and resources, recursively drawn upon and reconstituted in processes of interaction” (Giddens 1991, p. 253). (Giddens, 1976)(p. 121) also states that “social structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution”. As rules and resources, structure enables as well as constrains social actions (Kim and Kim, 2008). In addition, Kim and Kim present an example of the duality of structure in language use. They argue that in order to speak English, for example, one need to (a) follow certain rules such as English grammar and (b) learn certain resources such as English vocabularies. However, a linguistic grammar (the rules) and vocabularies (the resources) can be produced only through recursive language-use behaviour. As suggested by Giddens (1984, p. 25) “Structural properties of social systems are both the medium as well as the outcome of the practices which they recursively organize”. Only language users can produce rules for language use. Similarly, the rules for deliberation are to be produced only through deliberation. Likewise, if one looks at the judgement process as a deliberative democratic practice, the preliminary brief is constituted by human agency, which then works as a medium of this constitution; this structure (brief) enables as well as constrains social action (judgement). For the current study, it is required that the framework should act as a structure that enables and constrains the judgement process at the same time, with the goal of improving the transparency, validity, and reliability of the judgement process in architectural competitions.

In the same way, and going back to the same example, Kim and Kim (2008) argue that English grammar is a set of rules that English speakers should follow, although there is no legislative body that creates the linguistic grammar. For them, linguistic grammar is a set of conventional rules produced by speakers’ actions themselves, which is why it is always in flux. A conventional rule may be retrospectively “discovered”, but it cannot be prospectively designed or planned. In this sense, deliberative democracy is a structure that simultaneously enables and constrains instrumental and dialogic deliberations (Kim and Kim, 2008). Similarly, in the competition judgement process, there are preliminary rules or conventions, expectations, and design criteria that were created previously, however these rules and expectations are re-constructed and reshaped for each unique competition in situ, through the deliberation process, dialogues, and discussions. The framework this research
proposes is able to describe and prescribe at the same time by allowing jury members to simultaneously understand and regulate the process of judgement.

Dialogue has been believed to foster open minds, encourage representative minds, offer opportunities to view the world from others’ standpoints, and help people liberate themselves from their own private interests (Button 2005). However, for this study a framework is needed to effectively communicate, understand, mediate, and interpret others’ speech or actions, in order to be able to reach a better understanding of their and our point of view or attitudes, to be then able to reach a better decision or consensus. “To promote dialogue, we must facilitate conversation; to promote a debate, we must moderate an argument; to promote a successful negotiation, we must mediate proposals for action” (Forester, 2009, p. 7) in King (2011). Thus, this research forms a framework that facilitates, moderates, and promotes clear communication between all the stakeholders involved in the judgement process.

Democracy is not only a way of reaching consensus but also about constructing the fundamental background on which we can collectively negotiate to achieve a consensus (Kim and Kim, 2008). This background would be the framework that this study aimed to form as a contribution to knowledge in the area of understanding the judgement process in architectural competitions as a deliberative democratic practice. Deliberative democracy requires two levels of deliberation: instrumental and dialogic. Instrumental deliberation can be seen as a procedural tool that helps in the negotiation of decision making. Dialogic deliberation, or dialogue, is where humans construct the concept of the self and the other, the sense of community, and public reason (Kim and Kim, 2008). In the case of judgement in architectural competitions, although there are specific goals or purposes for dialogue, it is inevitable that dialogue contributes even non-purposively to the construction of one’s understanding of the design task, and eventually affects one’s judgement. Hence, the judgement process in architectural competitions can be defined as a deliberative democratic process.

4.7.2.1 The judgment process as deliberative democracy

Most scholars define deliberative democracy as a collective decision-making system enacted through public deliberation (Asen, 2004; Bohman and Rehg, 1997; Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs, 2004; Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Hicks, 2002; Neblo, 2005, cited in (Kim and Kim, 2008, p. 51). As previously described, being a democratic practice (Chupin 2011), the judgement process in architectural competitions has lots of
similarities with the process of deliberative democracy. It is defined as a collective
decision-making process (Van Wezemael, Silberberger et al., 2011). However, the
deliberation in this case is not public but conducted through a group of representatives
(juries), each of whom represents a party, a profession, a stakeholder, or in most cases the
public.

Deliberative democracy involves public deliberation not only as a tool of using public
reason and making collective decisions but also as a process of producing public reason
and reaching a mutual understanding (Kim and Kim, 2008). Similarly, in the judgement
process in architectural competitions, jury members normally reach the final decision after
a process of dialogue/critique/discussion; in these discussions’ juries exchange opinions
and experiences in order to justify their preferences, hoping to reach a mutual
understanding that leads to consensus.

Previously, studies have recognised two functions of deliberation, instrumental and
dialogue; the instrumental function of deliberation focuses on the use of guidelines and
pre-set laws and tools of decision assuming that the ultimate goal of democracy is to make
legitimate and efficient political decisions. In addition, based on the instrumental view of
deliberative democracy, scholars have sought empirical as well as normative prescriptions
that may promote the “pure procedural justice” (Elster, 1998, cited in Kim and Kim, 2008,
p. 52). On the other hand, the dialogue function of deliberation advocates the view that
participants in a discussion-based decision process aim to cooperate, reach understanding
and perform justice, and that deliberation is less about informed, epistemic, instrumental,
or legitimate decision-making and more about the intrinsic standard of morality (Kim and
Kim, 2008). In the same way, in the judgement process in architectural competitions, as
suggested by Rönn (2011b) and (Svensson, 2013), two strategies of decision making are
used at the same time during the deliberation, the rational model of decision making,
normally used by non-architects, which can be compared to instrumental deliberation, and
the dialogue model, normally used by architects, which can be compared to dialogic
deliberation.

According to Kim and Kim (2008), the conditions of deliberation must be produced
through deliberation, and that in itself represents the paradox of deliberative democracy.
This is similar to the judgement process, where the jury members/decision makers re-
weight/prioritise the decision criteria in situ (Rönn, 2009; Kreiner, 2013). Although this
process of change/evolution in the decision criteria serves as a method to better
communicate or clarify the design task’s potentials and restrictions, it can be a source of controversy, because the new emerging criteria has evolved without the presence of one of the main stakeholders in this process, namely the contestants/designers. In addition, there is another similarity between judgement and deliberative democracy, which is that they both share the same criticism: that they both potentially allow those most skilled in rhetoric to sway the decision in their favour (Dryzek, 2010). This criticism has been made since deliberative democracy first arose in ancient Athens (Elster, 1998, cited in Dryzek, 2010, p. 326). As with deliberative democracy, in the judgement process, in the dialogue and critique sessions the jury members discuss and justify their opinions, which sometimes influence others allowing the most skilled in dialogue to sway the decision/influence the jury session.

Although the roots of deliberative democracy can be traced back to Aristotle and his notion of politics, the work of Habermas on communicative rationality and the public sphere is often identified as a major contribution in this area (Ercan, 2014). According to the theory of communicative action, Habermas argues that citizens produce communicative reasoning and achieve mutual understanding of the self and others through dialogue, and this is how they come to understand what their own interests are, what others want, and what fits the common good. Without this mutual understanding, citizens may not be able to participate in instrumental deliberations in a meaningful way or make rational decisions. Accordingly, dialogic deliberation is the prerequisite to purposive and rational deliberations (Habermas, 1984, Kim and Kim, 2008). Therefore, in order to reach a rational, mutual decision, dialogic deliberation is essential to the decision-making process in architectural competitions, and that is why it is important to communicate very clearly on the three levels of communication, to make it clear for others what is really important to oneself. By doing this we are allowing others to put themselves in our own position, to be able to reach a common understanding that allows everyone to share a common ground.

According to Kim and Kim (2008), the participants in any deliberative democratic process must understand to which group they belong, what would fit their own self-interests, what the community values and background consensus are, and what the public good is. Besides this, they should have communication skills and competencies, ideally backed up by argumentative reasoning. In the same way, in the judgement process in architectural competitions, the jury members represent themselves firstly as individuals in addition to the expertise they carry, secondly, they represent the values of the party/group/stakeholder.
they belong to, and, lastly, they ideally represent the public good. Furthermore, this comparison suggests that those juries have to have better communication skills, which will allow them to be able to pass their knowledge, thoughts, and preferences on to others in the jury, and to then be able to reach a mutual understanding and later consensus.

Based on all the previous, another research question has been added:

- How can insight from the theory of deliberative democracy enhance judgement between all stakeholders involved in the process?

Hence, two subsequent objectives were developed, and added to the existing preliminary objectives:

- To explore the relevance of the theory of deliberative democracy to the judgement process, and whether it can provide a base for the framework produced by this research.
- To use critical reality as a theoretical lens to investigate how features of deliberative democracy contribute to an improved understanding of the process of judgement in architectural competitions, and to add this to the framework produced by this research.

**The importance of a framework**

According to Schultz (2005), managers need frameworks to enable them to connect several stakeholders and related tasks. This means, in the context of architectural competitions, that frameworks should act as linkages between key stakeholders (clients, organisers, contestants, jury members, and end users), as well as between functions (judgement/decision process). Schultz also suggests that if people continue to associate higher levels of conceptual disaggregation with more thoughtful knowledge, they might face the risk of being irrelevant to practice. This is reflected in architectural competitions as the need for a conceptual framework that can be applied empirically in the field of practice. To do so, it is necessary to establish a dialogue between the diverse disciplines and experts, but the difficulties of doing so lie in the lack of common terminology, as shown by Schultz (2005) in a project he was working on – basic terms like identity or image seemed to have different definitions in different disciplines. Despite the fact that these disciplines overlapped, they still could not agree on a definition because each would cling to their own. He also argues that the meaning of each term depends on where in the conceptual landscape an observer stands, each discipline preferring a different position,
and they – in order to find a common language – have to exchange positions by communicating viewpoints. Thus, it is essential to develop frameworks that “bring together insights from different theoretical disciplines and accept the necessary loss of conceptual refinement this requires when seen from any single disciplinary perspective” (Schultz, 2005, p. 341).

This is similar to the case with jury meetings, and the fact that different disciplines have a different definition of each term, and how this can affect the decision process. In that case, it can be understood that judgement criteria evolution is necessary for the clarification of thoughts and priorities. However, it opens the way for influence and bias. Moreover, it is carried out without the client and architects, which means neither the client nor the participants are aware of this change/evolution/re-prioritising. This might be the cause of the famous amount of controversy associated with architectural competitions.

4.8 Theory building as a proposed methodology

Due to the comprehensive literature review and meta-theory standpoint of this research, it has been able to trace back many of the problems/issues which are addressed by previous studies to a common route which all of them share, which is communication. This research, therefore, trying to avoid compromising on the depth required for conducting doctoral research, decided to focus on this aspect (communication) in one of the most controversial bottlenecks of architectural competitions, namely the judgement process.

This research needed to look with a broader perspective to comprehend the problems associated with the judgement process. Most previous studies have focused on certain elements of the competition process by trying to dig deeper into this exact element and how it contributes to the competition and judgement process, leaving the whole picture blurry. What this research set out to do was to have an inclusive standpoint by trying to overarch the main issues and concepts highlighted by others into a more comprehensive understanding, which comes in the shape of a framework that captures the essence of the judgement process by revealing connections, filling gaps, and exposing judgement drivers, while utilising the theory of communicative action and deliberative democracy as means to interpret and improve the judgement process in architectural competitions, with an aim to make the whole process more transparent for all the stakeholders involved in it.

Several studies have previously looked at competitions in terms of managerial practice, where several stakeholders are involved in the process of reaching outcomes (Chupin, 2011, Volker, 2010a, Kreiner, 2013, Rönn, 2009). Guiding those stakeholders to produce
better and more reliable outcomes suggests that there is a dire need for a theoretical framework as a necessity for the success of architectural competitions as a managerial practice. Frameworks are meant to ease the transformation of general theoretical concepts into a more applicable form (Wacker, 1998). They act like a middle stage between theory and application. In architectural competitions, the need for a conceptual framework that can be applied empirically in the field of practice is essential. To be able create such frameworks, it is necessary to establish a dialogue between the several diverse disciplines and experts involved in the judgement process. But the difficulties of doing so lie in the lack of a common terminology, and the fact that different disciplines have a different definition of each term, and how that can affect the decision process. In that case, it can be understood that the criteria evolution is necessary for the clarification of thoughts and priorities.

The use of theory-building research depends on the nature and requirements of the theory-building method employed (Lynham, 2002). Three general modes of inquiry in the social or human sciences have been highlighted by Habermas: empirical-analytical, interpretive, and critical science research (Lynham, 2002). When each one of those three modes is applied to theory building, a framework is produced that can be used to provide a general, comparative overview of the contrasting empirical characteristics of three dominant modes of theory-building research (Lynham, 2002). According to the framework suggested by Lynham (2002), the critical view of theory building inquiry – which is the focus of this research – is described as follows:

- The area of human interest and application of critical theory-building research is: 1) power (reason); 2) emancipatory, that is, about policy and practice changed through critique and recovering self-reflection to unite theory and practice.
- The assumption about knowledge of critical theory-building research is described as: 1) constructed meanings of stakeholders are considered the foundation of knowledge; 2) the critique of ideologies believed to promote needed social change, which is open and ongoing.
- The empirical purposes of critical theory-building research are: to enlighten and emancipate through the process of critique and identifying potential.

According to Wacker (1998), theory building is important because it provides a framework for analysis, eases the necessary progress of the field, and is needed to be applicable to practical real-world problems. In addition, he argues that theory must have four basic
criteria to be considered “good” theory. These are conceptual definitions, domain limitations, relationship-building, and predictions (Wacker, 1998).

The field of architectural competitions needs such a framework to ease communication and the relationships between the several stakeholders involved in the process, a framework that is flexible, abstract, and applicable in practice and which can easily be modified and amended to suit the different types and contexts of architectural competitions as a practice. This is especially the case because architectural competitions as a practice – a rather controversial one – were there long before it turned into a field of research, hence the need for theoretical research, and theory building.

According to Lynham (2002), applied theory-building research in general contains two broad components: theorizing to practice and practice to theorizing. Each one of these components produces in-process outputs that are distinct and that guide the applied theory-building research and which, ultimately, result in a reliable, rigorous, and relevant theory for improved action (Lynham, 2002). A coherent and informed theoretical framework is an essential output from the theorizing component of theory building. Such a framework encapsulates and contains the explanation of the phenomenon, issue, or problem that is the focus of the theory. Likewise, the outputs from the practice components of theory building are carefully obtained data/findings and empirical knowledge that are used to confirm, or disconfirm, and further refine and develop the existing theory, as well to improve the effectiveness of the theory in a certain practice (Lynham, 2002).

4.9 Research design
A desk-based model-building approach was adopted in this study after pursuing the possibility of conducting new empirical work on the nature of decision making in the architectural judgement process. A review of the established literature on architectural judgements certainly suggested the need for such new empirical work, but it proved impossible to identify an institution or agency willing to provide access for appropriate forms of research, whether this was observation, interviews, or document analysis. The study was therefore developed as a critical theoretical overview of the relevant literature on the strengths and weaknesses of the judgement process, and of literature that might provide an understanding of an alternative model and process of judgement in the architectural world. This latter literature was drawn from philosophy and politics, comprising concepts and theories that have underpinned debates concerning the nature of deliberative democracy.
I am not a social scientist by training, and this thesis is not a study of the full works of key theorists such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Rather, I have drawn upon their works through the mediation of writers and scholars who have shown the relevance and centrality of such work to the understanding of the sphere of deliberative democracy.

In evaluating the work and sources that provide the alternative model for the architectural judgement process, I have used key texts at various stages of the development of the argument. At first sight this might appear to be repetitive. This has not been my intention, and in presenting the developing argument in such a way the objective has been to present an iterative process in which the case is strengthened at each stage of the argument.

The aim of this research was to produce a coherent theoretical framework, informed by the theory of deliberative democracy. This framework encapsulates an explanation of the judgement process in architectural competitions in terms of a deliberative democratic process. This framework will then need to be applied into the practice of judgement process to confirm, or disconfirm, or further refine the suggested theory; this needs to be further pursued upon completion of this PhD.

According to (Lynham, 2002), there is a recursive system of five distinct phases for conceptualizing a research method for applied theory building. These phases are: conceptual development, operationalization, application, confirmation or disconfirmation, and continuous refinement and development (of the theory) (Figure 4-2). For this research the first two phases were conducted, while the application phase was limited to a fictional account, where the framework was applied to a previous case of judgement to help explore how it could have improved the practice, had it been applied.

![Figure 4-2: The stages of theory building](image-url)
Hence, this research was designed as follows:

For the conceptual development phase, thematic analysis was selected for the investigation of the core themes, which formulate a deliberative democratic association, pursuing the following steps:

- To explore the potential deliberative democratic theory has to offer in political practice, a group of selected studies was chosen for thematic analysis. The choice was made because those studies focused on the application of deliberative democracy in practice and some of them offered alternative deliberative models.
- The analysis then produced some themes and categories that did not seem to offer a comprehensive explanation of the usability of deliberative democracy in practice because each one focused on a certain aspect which was considered more relevant to the specific context of a certain deliberative association.
- Hence, it was decided to further investigate deliberative democracy at the theoretical level. This time, four theoretical essays, that have been considered the most influential in forming the modern understanding of the theory of deliberative democracy, were chosen for thematic analysis.
- This stage of the analysis resulted in what can be called “an outline of the deliberative democratic procedure”, which was informed by the results of both stages of the analysis, on both practical and theoretical levels.

For the second phase of theory building, that is, operationalisation:

- The resulting procedure was contextualised and operationalised into the context of judgement in architectural competitions. This was done through interrogating each one of the themes of the deliberative procedure in comparison to similar concepts, in the context of judgement in architectural competitions, to be able then to produce a framework that paved the way for the application of the deliberative democratic procedure to the practice of judgement in architectural competitions. This contextualisation process then resulted in redefining each one of the themes of the framework with regard to the specifications of the context of judgement in architectural competitions.
- A framework that encapsulates the substantial characteristics of the deliberative democratic procedure was then formed. This framework consists of two parts: one
is given in advance for all participating agents and comes in the shape of recommendations. The second is formed through the discussions and after the viewing of the design entries. For both parts there are general outlines that define the limits and potential of judgement as a deliberative communicative process.

For the third phase of theory building, which is application, this study developed:

- A fictional account where an earlier example of a controversial case was utilised as the base for an imagined alternative scenario. The aim of this fictional application was to explore the applicability and usability of the framework in the actual setting of a competition. The case study that was selected for this fictional application was the case of the Cardiff Bay Opera House. The selection was based on three criteria: first, the case is very well known for being controversial; second, it has been well documented to some extent; third, it is a good example of poor communication that led to the competition’s failure.

### 4.10 Summary

This chapter started with an overview of how other researchers in the field have responded to the research problems in hand, the methods they have utilised, the nature of data they have acquired, the difficulties associated with conducting research in this area, and the most significant contributions in the field of research on architectural competitions. The chapter also presented the general perspectives pertaining to the ontological and the epistemological orientations of this research. Because of the nature of the research question and the judgement process itself, the constructivist position has been adopted as an ontological orientation. The epistemological orientation suggested then is a critical realistic approach to the conduct of this research, to be able to comprehend the generative mechanisms and actors’ relations within the practice of the judgement process in its natural setting - i.e. architectural competitions - to then be able to make the changes or enhancement in what this study aims to contribute to. This study adopts a theory building approach as its core method, due to its particulars and the collective effect of the nature of the research problem, aim, and the data availability. After that, the chapter went on to elaborate on how the study focused on exploring the potentials of the theories of communicative action and deliberative democracy as an alternative/emergent approach, which was expected to add more depth to the existing understanding of the process of judgement in architectural competitions. Then the research design has been developed as a critical theoretical approach to interrogate the relevant literature on the strengths and
weaknesses of the judgement process in-depth, and of literature that might provide an alternative understanding of model and process of judgement in the architectural competitions. The latter were drawn from philosophy and politics, including the theory of communicative action and deliberative democracy. The research design consists of five distinct phases for applied theory building; namely: conceptual development, operationalization, application, confirmation or disconfirmation, and continuous refinement and development (of the theory). The first two phases were conducted, while the application phase was limited to a fictional exercise that are discussed in chapter seven. In the next chapter, the research data content analysis is thoroughly discussed, and the results are presented.
CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH ANALYSIS
5 Research Analysis

5.1 Introduction
This chapter critically analyses and interrogates the phenomenon of deliberative democracy as it has been employed in political practice, to be able to then use the outcomes of this study as an example to aid building a theoretical framework that implements the deliberative democratic model into the context of judgement in architectural competitions. The epistemological standpoint of this research - i.e. critical realism - the methodology adopted in this research, and the research questions have suggested that thematic analysis is the suitable method for this investigation. For this purpose, eight studies were selected for analysis. These studies focus on the different models of deliberation in the context of political practice. Analysis was conducted to investigate the applicability of the deliberative models in practice, and how these models are implemented. However, this investigation proved that another stage of analysis was needed to examine, in more depth and details, the theoretical origin of deliberative democracy. For this purpose, four theoretical essays were pinpointed as the leading theoretical discourses in deliberative democracy for another round of thematic analysis. Those works are unanimously considered to have formed the theoretical bases of the current knowledge and understanding of deliberative democracy. The results of both rounds of analysis are then used to formulate a framework that describes the general outlines of a deliberative process in the political context.

5.2 Analysis
To explore the theory and practice of deliberative democracy in the political context, thematic analysis was selected as suitable for the nature of the data, research questions and aims at this stage of the research. Thematic analysis refer to the extraction of key themes concealed within data (Bryman, 2012). It is also a method that is used with qualitative data, and allows researchers to use a wide variety of types of information in a systematic manner that increases their accuracy or sensitivity in understanding and interpreting observations about people, events, situations, and organisations (Boyatzis, 1998). Essentially, thematic analysis is a way to extract more abstract themes that might exist in the data in a more detailed manner or in a different shape, such as image or audio.

At this stage this research aimed to answer the question of how deliberative democracy can be used as a model to improve the practice of architectural competitions. Hence, the objective at this stage was to explore the use of deliberative democratic models in political
practice. The judgement process is seen as a practice, hence why the research started with analysing the deliberative models on the practical level. For that purpose, eight studies were chosen for analysis; they were selected because they describe the use of different deliberative models in political practice:

1- Bächtiger et al. (2010), in their study “Disentangling diversity in deliberative democracy: Competing theories, their blind spots and complementarities”, investigate the use of deliberative models in practice, and after discussing their shortcomings and blind spots, they suggest an alternative model.

2- Bohman (1997), in his study “Deliberative democracy and effective social freedom”, suggests a deliberative model that focuses on the elaborative conception of equality in deliberation and the fundamental diversity of human beings regarding their public functioning.

3- Button and Mattson (1999), in their study “Deliberative democracy in practice: Challenges and prospects for civic deliberation”, closely observe the practice of seven accounts of civic deliberations; the aim of their investigation is to better understand how public deliberation is conducted and what the conditions are that support or hinder this process.

4- Fishkin (2009), in his book *When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation*, investigates the concept of deliberative democracy as a potential model to be followed on the constitutional level, then describes how deliberative poles can help make this possible.

5- Forrester (2009), in his book *Dealing with Differences: Dramas of Mediating Public Disputes*, advocates deliberation as a successful method of dealing with the problems associated with public planning. He investigates 14 cases where deliberation was used as the method to settle differences between conflicted parties in public planning.

6- Forst (2001), in his study “The rule of reasons: Three models of deliberative democracy”, after contrasting three models of deliberative democracy, concludes by claiming that the alternative model he is suggesting – based on the theory of moral and political justification – is the suitable one.

7- Neblo (2005), in his study “Thinking through democracy: Between the theory and practice of deliberative politics”, compares the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, then stresses the importance of more engagement between the two, and suggests a three-step technique for doing so.
8- Ryfe (2002), in his study “The practice of deliberative democracy: A study of 16 deliberative organizations”, explores the application of deliberative democracy in the 16 cases where organisations used designated models for special purposes. The study focuses on how these organisations have contributed to the continuous debate between rational and relational modes of deliberation.

5.2.1 Coding

For the themes hidden within the data to be extracted, a method for organising the data is needed; this method in qualitative analysis is coding (Boyatzis, 1998, Braun and Clarke, 2006). Coding is a method that allows the researcher to organize and group similarly coded data into categories or “families” because they share certain characteristics (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003, Bryman, 2012, Saldaña, 2013). A code in qualitative inquiry is mostly a word or short phrase that assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data. The nature of data that can be coded ranges from textual and visual, to audio. For example, interview transcripts, participant observation field notes, journals, documents, literature, artefacts, photographs, video, websites, e-mail correspondence, and so on (Saldaña, 2013).

Determining what is important in the data record and what is not, is of prime importance for the analysis. Auerbach and Silverstein (2003) use the term relevant text to label the chosen material to code in the data. Saldaña (2013) advises coding anything and everything in the data, especially for beginners to qualitative research. He also suggests that researchers will discover with time and from experience what matters and what does not in the data corpus.

5.2.2 Coding methods

Coding methods are determined by several factors, including research questions, objectives, research methodology, and the nature – size and type – of the data (Bryman, 2012). Researchers have different classifications for the types of qualitative coding. Saldaña (2013) classifies coding methods into two main stages, first-cycle coding methods and second-cycle coding methods:

- First-cycle methods are a process that happen during the initial coding of data. They can be sub-divided into seven subcategories: grammatical, elemental, affective, literary and language, exploratory, procedural, and a final profile entitled theming the data.
Second-cycle methods require analytic skills like classifying, prioritizing, integrating, synthesizing, abstracting, conceptualizing, and theory building (Saldaña, 2013).

For this research, the “initial coding” method was chosen as a tool for the analysis. Initial coding, as defined by Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 102), is “breaking down qualitative data into discrete parts, closely examining them, and comparing them for similarities and differences”. The goal of initial coding is “to remain open to all possible theoretical directions indicated by your readings of the data” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 46). This matches with the aim of this stage of analysis, which was to explore the models of deliberative democracy applied in political practice, then to be able to implement a suitable model into the practice of judgment in the context of architectural competitions. Initial coding is typically proposed as a starting point to provide the researcher with analytic leads for further exploration and “to see the direction in which to take [this] study” (Glaser, 1978, cited in (Saldaña, 2013).

The way to then advance the analysis is by grouping patterns in the data into categories. According to Saldaña (2013), categories are patterns in the data that are grouped together because they have something in common. Those patterns in the data can be characterized by similarity (the same way), difference (in predictably different ways), frequency (often or seldom), sequence (in a certain order), correspondence (in relation to other activities or events), and causation (one cause or another) (Hatch, 2002, cited in Saldaña (2013).

5.3 Analysis of deliberative political practice

The initial coding of the data was based on the procedure suggested by Auerbach and Silverstein (2003). This stage of coding was carried out manually by the researcher, as the size of data was reasonable enough to allow for manual coding. This was found particularly relevant and useful as it provided a first-hand opportunity to analyse the data and direct exposure to the coding process, and allowed for familiarization with the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In addition, most methodology scholars (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003, Saldaña, 2013, Bryman, 2012, Boyatzis, 1998, Creswell, 1998) suggest that researchers should start coding manually first before trying Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) tools, to be able to get a grasp of the data and to understand the interpretive nature of their research. The process is as follows:

- At first, a thorough explorative reading of the studies led to highlighting the general ideas and areas that those studies focus on (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003).
Then, a second round of in-depth reading started with identifying what is considered relevant to the research question. Relevance here refers to how the researcher understands the research questions, objectives, and focus (Saldaña, 2013). Since the research aim at this stage is to look for what characterizes a deliberative model, and its applicability in practice, the codes were mostly focused on the elements that form a model (Figure 5-1).

![Figure 5-1: Example screenshot of manual coding](image)

Then codes were then assigned to each chunk of text (Figure 5-2); and sometimes more than one code might be assigned to the same chunk of texts (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003); what highlighted the relations and overlaps in the concepts and codes.
After another in-depth reading and analysing of each code, the text then cleaned to be able to define each code separately (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003). At this stage thirty-four codes have been developed (Figure 5-3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Deliberation models</td>
<td>There were five different models in this code, later considered to be a category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Time and place context</td>
<td>Related to the non-human context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Face-to-face discussions</td>
<td>Human-related context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Social conditions</td>
<td>Conditions related to participants’ characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Willingness of participants</td>
<td>A characteristic required in participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Participants’ sets of values</td>
<td>Related to participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Equality</td>
<td>A condition that needed to be provided for participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Equality of effective social freedom</td>
<td>A condition that needed to be provided for participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Equal capability of public functioning</td>
<td>A condition that needed to be provided for participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Equality of access</td>
<td>A condition that needed to be provided for participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Equality of social recognition</td>
<td>A condition that needed to be provided for participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Equality of opportunity</td>
<td>A condition that needed to be provided for participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Continuity of debate</td>
<td>A condition for better deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Public exposure</td>
<td>A condition that needed to be provided for participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Transparency and clear communication</td>
<td>A condition for better deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Freedom and open participation</td>
<td>A condition that needed to be provided for participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Diversity and pluralism</td>
<td>A condition for better deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Justification and evidence giving</td>
<td>A condition for better deliberation that participants should be able to provide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Normative reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Instrumental reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Groups of participant formation and inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Groups of participants size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Experts vs lay people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Preferences and opinions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Goal of deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Conflict resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Activism/action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-3: Table of political practice codes

- Another in-depth reading and analysis of the cleaned codes was conducted, and patterns of repetition, causation, correspondence, and similarity were identified (Braun and Clarke, 2006).
- Repeating ideas were then cross-referenced (Bryman, 2012), which resulted in regrouping themes and sub-categories into six major categories. Those categories were then collected and gathered under six themes, as shown in Figure 5-4.
Deliberative practice categories and codes

- Deliberative models:
  1. Font (2001)
  2. Forster (2009)
  4. Buhman [1977]

- Context of deliberation:
  1. Time and place context
  2. Face to face discussions

- Conditions of deliberation:
  1. Social conditions:
     - Willingness of participants
     - Participants set of values
  2. Equality:
     - Equality of effective social freedom
     - Equal capability of public functioning
     - Equality of access
     - Equality of social recognition
     - Equality of opportunity
  3. Continuity of debate
  4. Public exposure
  5. Transparency and clear communication
  6. Freedom and open participation
  7. Diversity

- Participants characteristics:
  1. Group formation, and inclusion
  2. Group size
  3. Commitment
  4. Experts vs lay people
  5. Preferences and opinions

- Goals of deliberation:
  1. Consensus
  2. Education
  3. Conflict resolution
  4. Decision-making
  5. Policy making
  6. Cooperation
  7. Activist/Action

- Reasoning process:
  1. The act of reasoning
  2. Justification
  3. The two contesting rationalities
     - Normative reasoning
     - Instrumental reasoning

*Figure 5-4: Mind map of main themes and categories*
5.3.1 Political practice themes

This section presents the categories which resulted from the analysis of deliberative practice. The arguments are supported by extracts from the literature to illustrate the analytical points made about the data.

**Deliberation models**

This category started first as one code containing the five models; however, within that code are five separate models, each presented by a different researcher, thus it was decided to consider this code a distinct category. A few researchers who have worked on deliberative democracy, such as Bohman (1997), Bächtiger et al. (2010), and Forst (2001), after discussion and comparison, suggested an alternative model or procedure for the application of deliberative democracy to political practice, apart from two, Forster (2009), whose model was devised for planning settings, and Neblo (2015), whose model compares the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, then demands more engagement between the two. However, each has looked at it from a different perspective or using a different lens. Forst (2001), for example, contrasts three models of deliberative democracy, a liberal one, a communitarian one, and an alternative to both. The alternative one he suggests, namely “the rule of reasons”, is based on a theory of moral and political justification. He makes the comparison based on a discussion of seven components of an “ethos of democracy”, broadly referring to the character and the social setting of citizenship. These components are the cognitive capacities of citizens, political virtues, the cultural, institutional and material conditions of democracy, political legitimacy, and the “ground” of democracy. He considers these components as referring to the character and social settings of citizenship, which need to be spelled out in order to be able to compare the different accounts of the ideal notion of deliberative democracy. He then concludes with the suggestion that democracy as conceived by all deliberative models consists of:

> A political practice of argumentation and reason giving among free and equal citizens, a practice in which individual and collective perspectives and positions are subject to change through deliberation and in which only those norms, rules or decisions which result from some form of reason-based agreement among the citizens are accepted as legitimate (Forst, 2001, p. 346).

The ethos of democracy, he is suggesting, can be seen as the social settings that form the context and conditions of deliberation. He considers reason among equal and free citizens a
condition for the practice of argumentation and deliberation. Also, the rules, norms, and decisions as the result and subject of a reasoned agreement are the aim of deliberation.

Similarly, Bächtiger et al. (2010) distinguish between two main types of deliberation, which they names type I and type II. Type I deliberation focuses on rational discourse and on process, while type II deliberation includes alternative forms of communication and focuses mainly on deliberative institutions and outcomes. Then he suggests a model that is middle-ground, synthetic and sequential, with a clear tendency to re-establish the value of rational discourse procedures. The study concludes with a suggested model that is “sequential” but directed. In this model the alternative forms of communication can happen at earlier stages, before discussion, to reduce the effect of power inequalities and help with advancing the building of the deliberative capacities of participants. Then the input of this stage can be integrated into arguments in a more “canonical” manner, while involving a systematic weighing method for alternatives and with connection to more generalizable interests (Bächtiger et al., 2010). The aim of this research – as they put it – is to push the study of deliberation towards a middle ground approach, a ‘via media’ approach. This approach can best be described as:

not one of under-specification, where almost every communicative activity is considered ‘deliberative,’ but also not one of over-specification where the presuppositions of communicative action become so remote from deliberative practice as to lose empirical traction, or to move in an elitist direction, losing its democratic and emancipative character. (Bächtiger et al., 2010, p. 59)

In other words, the study advocates a balanced deliberation between the procedural and normative extremes, and suggests a sequential order for balancing communicative, normative rationality with the instrumental procedure.

On the other hand, Bohman (1997, p.322) argues that the most appropriate criterion for deliberative democracy is equality, and suggests an “ideal of effective freedom” that – he claims – best captures the demand of deliberative equality. This ideal emphasises the elaborative conception of equality in deliberation, and the fundamental diversity of human beings with regard to their public functioning (Bohman, 1997). He describes the capabilities required for the citizens who are participating in the deliberation, then argues that the deliberation cannot favour those who are most educated, who have access to special information, who have the greatest resources or privileged social positions. To him,
deliberative democratic procedures should not favour the reasons of advantaged persons or
groups. He suggests that the most important criterion relevant to equality in the
deliberation is capability equality, which refers to the minimal level of public functioning
necessary for the deliberative equality of all citizens. Such a form of decision making
requires equal capacities for active citizenship, and the absence of such capacities makes it
less likely that the outcomes of deliberation will be just or legitimate. His suggested ideal
encourages variances in opinions, tastes, preference, as well as differences in resources
such as knowledge. The only differences that are not welcome in deliberative democracy
are differences in social circumstances, and in basic public skills and abilities (such as
communication in public). Then he concludes by suggesting that it is only through the
development of public capacities that the primary measure of effective political freedom
can be improved. He also claims that the more there is interplay among diverse citizens,
each with a different range of effective freedom, the more they may be assured of influence
in deliberation (Bohman, 1997).

Bohman’s model can be seen as a refinement and detailing of the concept of equality in the
deliberative procedure. This approach to detailing the main concepts and themes of the
original theory, based on practical use, could be considered a direct reflection of the critical
nature derived from the original epistemology behind deliberative democracy.

Neblo (2015), in a slightly different approach, compares the theory and practice of
deliberative democracy, and claims that, whatever the distance to ideal deliberation,
deliberative democracy is an ideal worth embracing. He then calls for more engagement
between the theory and practice of political deliberation. He states that the major goal of
his work is to develop the outlines of a transformed relationship between deliberative
theory and empirical social science, and to show how doing so opens the door to a more
constructive interaction between the two, through responding to the challenges regarding
deliberation’s workability on their own terms, rather than avoiding them. In his suggested
account, deliberative “quality” is thought of as a property of the broader political system,
rather than of discrete moments of deliberation. Hence, three moves are suggested to
transform deliberative theory’s relationship to empirical social science: first,
conceptualizing deliberation as a set of normative criteria, rather than as a set of talk-based
political innovations; second, moving to a systemic view of deliberative democracy, which
can help one better integrate deliberative theory with existing democratic institutions, and
take normative pressure off any given deliberation; third, introducing an inferentialist
account of shared meaning, which he believes acts as a bridge between normative and
empirical meaning. Together, these three moves are presented with the aim of expanding the deliberative research agenda, to make the theory more flexible, but also more adjustable. Then he argues that scientific concerns over the flexibility of deliberative theory were previously misplaced, and drafts various measurement strategies for deliberative quality (Neblo, 2015). This approach can be seen as a valid approach to dealing with the relationship between the theory and practice of any context or profession. And in comparison to the work of Bohman (1997), the two approaches suggest that continuous revision and comparison between the theory and practice of deliberative democracy is vital for the advancement of the two.

Forester (2009), meanwhile, presents deliberative democracy as a successful technique to be used in dealing with public disputes over planning issues. He promotes the role of a human facilitator to mediate the discussions. He also emphasises the importance of participation of all willing parties. In addition, he gives examples of applicable techniques that help mediating public disputes with a number of examples from practice, and then suggests a practical agenda that comprises four practical steps that mediators should be able to apply for a successful deliberation in a conflict context:

1- Focus on the practical workable issues that can be agreed on, and not on the level of values where differences appear.

2- Include all the interested parties even if they are expected to disagree.

3- Recognise the modes of discussions involved as each requires a different skill; Forester argues that public deliberation is intertwined in at least three of these modes, which are: dialogue, which requires facilitation; debate, which requires moderation; and negotiation, which requires mediation. Human facilitators should be the moderators of those discussions. His suggested agenda relies completely on the expertise and knowledge of the moderator in maintaining the discussion’s quality and direction.

4- Recognise the current stages of deliberation, which are: assessment, convening, learning, negotiation, and monitoring implementation. This requires the moderator to act differently at each stage.

Forester also highlights that, in the context of public planning, the sources of conflict are mostly rooted in three main reasons, interest, values, and power, and emphasises the role of procedure, which he defines as the design and conduct of the process of deliberation itself.
This complies with the main principals of deliberative democracy and how it promotes the “procedural” and “dialogic” sides of the reality of any experience, practice, process, or phenomenon. He also encourages face-to-face conflict and differences, and suggests that mediators should embrace conflict because it is inevitable and is workable, and also it is possible to change attitudes. His approach can be seen as example of how deliberative democratic theory can be reshaped and moulded – in accordance with practice – to be used in different contexts, while keeping the key concepts intact.

**Reasoning process**

This category refers to the process of thinking and rationalising the issue, problem, or question in hand in order to be able to make a judgement or decision. This category resulted from grouping three codes: the act of reasoning, justification and evidence giving, and the two rationalities involved in reasoning.

*The act of reasoning*

Reasoning is referred to by all studies as the main action within deliberation (Bächtiger et al., 2010, Button and Mattson, 1999, Neblo, 2005, Bohman, 1997, Fishkin, 2009, Forester, 2009, Forst, 2001, Ryfe, 2002). Reasoning should be based on justification and evidence giving (Forst, 2001, Bächtiger et al., 2010, Button and Mattson, 1999, Neblo, 2015). The level of justification and evidence given in a deliberative association affects the quality of the outcomes expected from that deliberation. Also, in a proper deliberative association, these reasons and evidence must be offered and open to the criticism of all other participants in the deliberation (Bächtiger et al., 2010).

In the deliberative democratic conception, reasoning is the only way to achieve legitimate outcomes (Button and Mattson, 1999, Neblo, 2015, Bohman, 1997). As Neblo (2015) argues, if people have an equal chance to influence a decision, then they have that one reason to regard that decision as legitimate. In the deliberative conception, political decisions are made by systematically connecting those decisions to the reasons that equal citizens offer to each other for and against those decisions (Button and Mattson, 1999).

Reasons given in a deliberative association must not be narrowed to only admissible forms of speech; rather any form of communication is welcomed, as long as it serves to clarify and give a more comprehensive account of the problem in hand (Bächtiger et al., 2010). In addition, Bächtiger et al. (2010), while comparing two types of deliberative models in political practice, a procedural one and a normative one, argue that reasoning in the
procedural models of deliberative democracy involves reflecting on the issues in hand from a shared perspective and articulating good reasons to the other participants. Reasoning from the standpoint of all involved parties collectively produces a more coherent view of the problem in hand, more so than a single standpoint can do; such coherence is embodied in outcomes as an intersubjective rationality. The normative models of deliberative democracy as democratic communication crucially require that participants receive reasons of one another and critically gauge them.

The diversity of participants is also seen as a necessity for a successful deliberative reasoning process, as it allows average citizens to participate in the decision-making process side-by-side with the political “elites”, which creates a closer relationship between those citizens and political outcomes. They also thus see themselves as an effective part of the decision-making process. In addition, bringing more people to the deliberation means that more kinds of information are brought into the discussion, contributing to a more coherent understanding of the issues in hand. Information here refers to any factual information, reasons for and against proposals, relevant life experiences, and so on. Furthermore, it is more likely that convincing justifications and relevant information used in the reasoning process will gain more traction (Neblo, 2015). In short, these arguments link the quality of the reasoning process to the types of justification and evidence required, the rationalities involved, and the quality of communication involved in reasoning.

*Justification*

The acts of justification and evidence giving are seen by deliberative democracy researchers as a must for better deliberation (Bächtiger et al., 2010, Button and Mattson, 1999, Neblo, 2015). Justification is the core of the reasoning process (Bächtiger et al., 2010, Bohman, 1997, Button and Mattson, 1999, Neblo, 2015), and the level and content of justification is one of the most important measures of the quality of deliberation. The level of justification is related to how speakers put forward their justifications: do they just direct demands, or do they give proper reasons for their positions, and how robust are such justifications. It is also related to the content of justifications: do speakers forward their justifications with regard to the common good or only regarding their narrow group or constituency interests (Bächtiger et al., 2010). In addition, it is only up to the participants themselves to judge whether the arguments or reasons given are sufficient to advance a proposal, and only throughout the deliberation. This is because, in the deliberative model, no justification can claim force before the actual deliberation, as reasoning and evidence
must be submitted to the criticism of all participants first, and then they decide if they accept it or not. But empirical investigations can be conducted before the deliberation to make sure that the evidence used is liable to be able to assess the content of justification (Bächtiger et al., 2010). Moreover, Neblo (2015, p. 6) suggests that “by asking each other to justify our information as relevant and our reasons as compelling, we make it more likely that ‘good’ information and ‘good’ reasons will gain more traction”. This statement links the quality of justification to how well it is perceived by the participants in the deliberation.

Reasoning rationalities

Two of the studies that focus on the application of deliberative democracy in practice (Bächtiger et al., 2010, Ryfe, 2002) have distinguished between two broad ideal types. Each named them differently, however these types both represent how the balance has been made between the two sides of any deliberation; they are the procedural type and the normative type.

For Bächtiger et al. (2010), the two types of deliberation are type I deliberation, which focuses on rational discourse and on process, which can be seen as more procedural, and type II, which includes alternative forms of communication and takes a prime focus on deliberative institutions and outcomes, which can be considered somewhat normative in nature. Then the researchers suggest another one that takes a middle ground, with a propensity to re-establish the value of rational discourse procedures.

On the other hand, Ryfe (2002), while investigating the practice of 16 organizations attempting to foster better public deliberation in local and national communities, recognizes two types of deliberation, rational and relational. Rational deliberation can be seen as more procedural, while relational deliberation can be described as more normative. Ryfe then discusses this observation with reference to two main aspects, or rather factors, that he perceives as contributors to the design of a deliberative model. These aspects are the group of deliberants’ size and formation, and the goal of deliberation. Regarding group size and formation, Ryfe recognises that when the group size is small, deliberation tend to be more normative/relational. When the group size is large, the deliberation tends to become rather procedural/rational. In addition, regarding the goal of deliberation, Ryfe (2002) recognises that there are five main goals for deliberation: education, conflict resolution, cooperation, action, and policy making. Ryfe suggests that when there is a need
for action, deliberation tends to be rational/procedural, but when there is no need for action or policy making, deliberation tends to be relational.

**The context of deliberation**

Some researchers have looked at deliberation as inherently rooted in context, with different contexts requiring different kinds of conversation (Ryfe, 2002), which echoes Forester (2009) suggestions. The context of deliberation can be seen as the collective, time, space, and social settings of the deliberation (Fishkin, 2009, Forester, 2009, Ryfe, 2002). This can be linked to Habermas’ idea of the life-world (Habermas, 1984), where a certain setting and the collection of time and place and people’s thoughts can be considered unique and cannot be repeated, only represented. Fishkin (2009), for example, specifies the importance of several context-related requirements for ideal deliberation: the time and place contexts, face-to-face discussions, the social settings. The social settings here refer to the formation of the group of deliberants, and their set of values (Bächinger et al., 2010, Fishkin, 2009). Those context-related issues, time, place, and social settings of participants can be considered an inseparable part of the set of conditions for conducting the ideal deliberation.

Fishkin (2009) also argues that time and place contexts can affect opinions, so providing a positive and encouraging atmosphere can help the deliberants form a reasonable opinion. He also asserts that the representation element comes from taking a snapshot in time – under a set of conditions – as a representation of what those deliberants really think at that moment as a result of the deliberation and not prior to it.

In addition, he suggest that people can best speak for themselves when they gather together in some way to hear the arguments of various sides of an issue, after face-to-face discussions, and then come to a collective decision. Face-to-face discussions allow other forms of communication – i.e. visual– and allow participants to react to each other’s facial expressions, as well as giving more space to compassion (Fishkin, 2009).

**The conditions of deliberation**

Studies have shown that there are several conditions which are needed for the deliberation to proceed successfully. Each one of the studies focused on one or more of the conditions collected under this category, each with accordance to the specific purpose and context of their own investigation. Some of the conditions collected here may overlap with conditions that have been discussed earlier as context-related, i.e. the social conditions. The conditions required for conducting a deliberative reasoning process are: 1- the social
conditions, i.e. willingness, and participants’ sets of values; 2- equality – equality of effective social freedom, equal capability of public functioning, equality of access, equality of social recognition, equality of opportunity; 3- continuity of debate; 4- public exposure; 5- transparency and clear communication; 6- freedom and open participation; 7- diversity.

For a successful deliberation it is important that the social conditions of deliberation facilitate everyone’s thinking through the issues of collective choice together. Social conditions refer to the willingness of participants (Forester, 2009, Button and Mattson, 1999, Neblo, 2015), and their known sets of values (Fishkin, 2009), or their political virtues (Forst, 2001). Equality is also considered one of the main conditions for conducting a fruitful deliberation (Bächtiger et al., 2010, Bohman, 1997, Button and Mattson, 1999, Neblo, 2015, Ryfe, 2002). For example, Bohman (1997) elaborates on this condition in a detailed manner as he considers the equality of effective social freedom as the proper condition required for a properly conducted deliberation, that can be understood as the equal capability for public functioning. This ideal of effective social freedom has two main advantages to deliberation, as Bohman suggests: firstly, it emphasises the fundamental concept of equal standing in deliberation; secondly, it emphasises the fundamental diversity of human beings with regard to their public functioning.

In addition, the public nature of the deliberative process is believed – by most supporters of deliberative democracy – to make the reasons for decision more rational and the outcomes more just (Bohman, 1997). Hence, public exposure is considered a vital condition in political deliberation, as it allows public scrutiny and creates a sense of self-censorship within the participants themselves (Fishkin, 2009).

Most defenders of deliberative democracy rely on the procedures of debate and discussion to ensure the rationality and legitimacy of decisions (Bächtiger et al., 2010, Bohman, 1997, Fishkin, 2009, Forester, 2009). These procedures necessarily embody ideal conditions that make it more likely that reasons and outcomes will be more rational; they give every citizen the equal opportunity to voice his or her reasons and to reject those offered by others; and they ensure that dialogue is free, open, and guided only by the power of the better argument .(Bohman, 1997). Better argument here refers to the more reasonable, justifiable, and evidence-based discussions, and not the better rhetoric (Bächtiger et al., 2010, Bohman, 1997, Fishkin, 2009, Forst, 2001, Neblo, 2005). In addition, ideal proceduralism is the standard criterion of deliberative legitimacy since it gives everyone equal standing to use their reason in the give-and-take of reasons in dialogue. Such ideal
conditions form an independent standard, in light of which we can judge whether the outcome of actual democratic deliberation is legitimate (Bohman, 1997). Equality of access and social recognition is considered the minimum requirement for effective political participation, or for adequate public functioning, which can be described as the capability for full and effective use of political opportunities and liberties in deliberation. Furthermore, citizens must be able to function adequately in the public arena, to then be able to influence the deliberation and achieve their goals, referring here to the capability of public functioning (Bohman 1997).

Many scholars (Bohman, 1997, Fishkin, 2009, Bächtiger et al., 2010) have referred to the importance of transparency and open access to all the available information related to the issues under discussion, as well as the importance of sharing attitudes and feelings, which allows people to react to or sympathise with each other’s points of view. Fishkin (2009), for example, suggests that more information can help re-examine prejudices and preconceptions, and redirect judgement. He asserts that the transparency and full information is vital for a successful deliberation:

> voting in general elections based on a ‘sound bite’ of information or an impression culled from newspaper headlines, voting based on nothing more than name recognition or party label, or not voting at all, is very different from voting in a small group after extensive face-to-face discussion, as a means of better communication or as a way to enhance transparency. (Fishkin, 2009, p. 5)

Fishkin (2009) also suggests that transparency allows the public to get more engaged with issues that matters to themselves, and helps to keep manipulations and biases away by allowing exposure and public scrutiny. He also argues that full access to information required for participants in the deliberation can affect their judgement and distance them from the public, as the public normally gets only partial information and from mostly biased resources such as the media or casual everyday conversations. By this argument he suggests how the expert’s opinion can be diverted from public opinion, as they are more informed – about the issue under discussion – than the public.

Button and Mattson (1999) argue that the transparency required for the reasoning process can result in a successful judgement process, especially in an education-oriented deliberation, and that in current practice, this emphasis on the educational side of deliberation has had its successes, because transparency contributes to widening the
spectrum of information required for a more comprehensive and coherent reasoning process. They suggest that, while observing how deliberation can inform specific policy questions, it is clear that many of the participants of deliberation come to their opinions about the issues being discussed as a result of the process of talking and listening to others in discussions, not from their original state of opinion prior to deliberation. They also observe that citizens felt a distinct lack of knowledge about whatever topic the deliberative session confronted. The deliberation allowed citizens to talk about the issue at hand with fellow citizens and politicians and to gradually build their knowledge about the issues (Button and Mattson, 1999).

**Groups of deliberant characteristics**

One of the most important factors contributing to the process of designing any deliberative practice is the group characteristics, which include the size and formation of the group (Fishkin, 2009, Ryfe, 2002, Neblo, 2015), as well as the inclusion issues and the willingness of participants (Fishkin, 2009, Bächtiger et al., 2010, Button and Mattson, 1999, Forst, 2001), the commitment and awareness of the participants (Forester, 2009, Ryfe, 2002), and the role of experts and lay people in the deliberation (Button and Mattson, 1999, Fishkin, 2009). These researchers have discussed these issues separately or within the context of their studies; however, each focused on just one or two of these aspects and the way they contribute to the quality of the deliberation practice.

**Group formation, size, and inclusion**

Deliberant group formation and selection are vital to a deliberation. Homogeneous groups might mean that the decision has been made in advance, or is influenced by choosing a certain group of representatives or by manipulating the population of the group of deliberants (Ryfe, 2002, Forester, 2009). It is important to diversify participation as it improves the decision quality, according to Neblo (2015). He argues that the reason deliberants might produce better decisions with robust deliberation is that bringing more people into the process brings more information to the table. Information here should be understood very broadly to include factual information, reasons for and against proposals, perspectives, relevant life experiences, etc. This argument shows that diversity improves deliberation, as more diversity and broader participation opens up the dialogue to more dimensions, allowing for a better and more comprehensive understanding of the problem or question in hand.
The inclusion and choice of the participants/jury members is one of the most effective issues in regard to the quality of the decision; quality here refers to the fairness and transparency expected at the end of the process (Bächtiger et al., 2010, Fishkin, 2009). Ryfe (2002) suggests that diversity is essential when it comes to group formation and who should be included in any deliberative process. He also suggests that the inclusion of all stakeholders is essential for a more informed decision, as a variety of points of view contributes to a more comprehensive knowledge about the subject or issues of deliberation (Ryfe, 2002).

**Willingness of participants**

The deliberants or the group of participants of the deliberation need to be willing to participate in the deliberation, as suggested by (Ryfe, 2002, Forester, 2009). The deliberants’ motivation for participating should be interrogated, and why they are interested in joining in the deliberation should be probed. This is because when their participation is motivated by their willingness to divert the deliberation into fulfilling their own interests, knowing this will give the organisers the opportunity to maintain the diversity and plurality of the group of deliberants (Fishkin, 2009).

**Awareness/commitment**

Some studies (Button and Mattson, 1999, Fishkin, 2009) have discussed the qualities required in the people who are participating in deliberation, qualities like awareness and integrity. Fishkin (2009) argues that when people are fully aware of their responsibility and think their opinions actually matter – and after they have had a chance to re-examine their prejudices and preconceptions – their judgements might be diverted from those of the majority, because the majority have not had the same chance to examine and assess their opinions with the same level of availability of information about the questions as their representatives have. In addition, when people understand the responsibility they bear, they can make sure that they had something worth saying, and will normally request to be fully informed about the issues at stake regarding the subject of deliberation (Button and Mattson, 1999).

**Experts versus lay people**

Two studies (Button and Mattson, 1999, Fishkin, 2009) have highlighted the issue of experts’ opinions versus lay people’s opinions in the deliberation process. These studies have noted that when people are more informed regarding a certain issue or subject their
decision might diverge from that of the majority or the public, and that the public normally do not agree with the elite because the jury are supposed to be better informed about an issue (Fishkin, 2009). This has been referred to by scholars as the reason for the need for a wide and diverse range of participation, as both expert and public opinions are equally important for a well-rounded or comprehensive understanding of the problems or questions in hand.

Button and Mattson (1999) consider the deference of “lay people” to experts as one of the problematic dynamics that are often hard to anticipate or to manage in deliberation. In an ideal setting, this relation should add to the quality of deliberation, when each party considers the other’s point of view without prejudice, and when the difference is used to form a more coherent understanding of the problem in hand. However, failing to approach the discussion with this type of mentality might only produce a conflictual setting which contributes to building up rivalry, and which might cause the failure of the whole deliberation process (Button and Mattson, 1999).

The goal of deliberation

A couple of studies (Ryfe, 2002, Button and Mattson, 1999) have pointed out the importance of the goal of deliberation as a key factor in choosing a certain model of deliberation for certain settings. Button and Mattson (1999) point out four goals and Ryfe (2002) suggests five. However, these goals are similar in many ways, and can sometimes overlap. Also, more than one goal can be present in any deliberative process. These goals can also change and evolve throughout the deliberation process.

Ryfe (2002) distinguishes five main goals for the deliberation process in the current practice of deliberative democracy: education, conflict resolution, cooperation, action, and policy making. Button and Mattson (1999) point out four different goals of democratic deliberation: educative, consensual, activist/instrumental, and conflictual. These can be explained in more detail as follows:

1) Educatve: this perspective views civic deliberation as a way of encouraging political learning about an issue or problem. The goal of public discussion according to this perspective is to provide participants with more information and knowledge, then through this educative public exchange, citizens can make collective political judgments and participate in decision making (Button and Mattson, 1999).
(2) Consensual: this approach stresses that participants should reach a common agreement on an issue, values, or the direction of a future course of action. The desire to find “common ground” through the expression of different points of view utilising language as a tool is the core of this orientation. Citizens and organizers within this mode reach for the most extensive understanding of a common purpose (full transparency and disclosure) that seems available to them (Button and Mattson, 1999).

(3) Activist/instrumental: This approach to deliberation stresses direct political or legislative results (or receipts) as the purpose and end of public discussion. This approach has very little relevance to the context of architectural competitions, as it is rooted within the political context, and related to the constitutional role of elected representatives (Button and Mattson, 1999).

(4) Conflictual: this approach emphasizes giving the widest possible space to the expression and development of individual points of view without being constrained by other demands on public talk, contrary to the second and third approaches. This conception stresses conflict and difference over resolution and agreement. The results of such an orientation to deliberation may be educative, and they may also serve as the basis for future decision making (Button and Mattson, 1999).

These types of goals, which might be imbedded within the deliberation, differ according to the context of deliberation, and according to the nature of the deliberants. To be able to find the right procedure or model for a certain context, these elements need to be explored and identified on-site to then be able to devise or guide the orientation of any deliberation.

5.3.2 Summary of the analysis of deliberative political practice

After analysing the studies on deliberative political practice, it has become clear that there is not enough ground to form a complete understanding of the use of deliberative models in political practice, because these models are varied, with fundamental differences between them. And to be able to fully understand this there is a question that needs to be answered: why is there a need for so many different models? The answer to this question comes in several points:

First: the choice of model is related to the context and goal of deliberation. Hence, it has to be designed for each different setting.
Second: there are gaps between the theory and practice of deliberative democracy that need to be addressed, as shown by Neblo (2015).

Third: the issue of the balance between the two contesting reasoning rationalities, instrumental and normative, and how it is affected by the size of the group of deliberants and the goal of deliberation.

These reasons show that different contexts, participants, and goals require different models. In other words, the procedure needs to be re-designed for each setting separately. Hence, it was decided to investigate the theoretical premises of deliberative democracy in order to be able to understand the basics that this ideal of deliberative democracy has been built on. I will then be able – after comparing it with practice in the political context – to produce or suggest a deliberative model that fits into the context of architectural competitions. This comparison is intended to provide proportionate balance for the comparison, i.e. theory level to practice level, meaning I will then be able to devise a procedure that can be applied on the practical level.

5.4 Analysis of theoretical statements
To be able to investigate the theoretical origin of deliberative democracy, four theoretical essays were chosen for analysis; they are considered seminal in the modern theory of deliberative democracy, because they are considered the main theoretical statements that clearly define the modern concept of deliberative democracy as a democratic procedure (Held, 2006, Chambers, 2003, Backstrand, 2010, Hans et al., 2014). Those four statements – among others – were collated by Bohman and Rehg (1997) in their book Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, and these essays are those by:

- Rawls (1997), who in his essay “The idea of public reason” outlines his conception of the ideal of a public reasoning process that operates on a constitutional level. He also outlines the limits of public reasoning through comparing it to non-public reasoning processes.
- Habermas (1997), who in his essay “Popular sovereignty as procedure” outlines a procedure for the proper conduct of an ideal deliberation. His procedure focuses on the collective reasoning process that contributes to opinion and will formation of the participants in public deliberation on a constitutional level.
- Elster (1997), who in his essay “The market and the forum: Three varieties of political theory” compares two – as he claims – extremes in democratic theory,
referring to them as the market and the forum. He then suggests a middle ground approach based on an earlier work by Habermas.

- Cohen (1997), who in his essay “Deliberation and democratic legitimacy” outlines the limits of “the ideal deliberative procedure” (Cohen, 1997, p.67), while focusing on defining the conditions, aspects, and characterizations of the ideal public deliberation. His procedure was developed based on his interpretation of earlier work by Rawls and Habermas.

The analysis for this part was carried out using NVivo, because of the complexity of the texts, the overlapping of concepts, and the theoretical nature of the analysis, all which contributed to the need for an organizational tool that can maintain the separation and unity of the data at the same time (Silver and Lewins, 2014). NVivo is a CAQDAS tool, which can make many if not most of the clerical tasks associated with the manual coding and retrieving of data easier and faster (Bryman, 2012). Krippendorff (2004) suggests that CAQDAS helps with qualitative research analysis in three ways:

- It offers user the ability to handle, organize, file, and keep track of text through manipulation routines, especially when the texts are more extensive than unaided analysts can handle.
- It offers an organizational tool that aids users in systematically reading text, by encouraging analysts to go through all available texts, to highlight relevant sections, and remain aware of the coding choices they made previously.
- It records and makes accessible for examination some of the analytical distinctions that analysts introduce during analyses, presenting these distinctions in several ways.

Analysing theoretical statements on deliberative democracy was done through two cycles of coding. The first is initial coding, to extensively explore what the data has to offer without constraints. The second is elaborative coding, using the codes that were formed through the first study of political deliberative practice. All these analyses will be further explained in the next sections.

5.4.1 The coding procedure

The procedure utilized for conducting thematic analysis in this study was based on the one suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006). Hence, the analysis procedure of this part of the study is presented following the six phases of analysis suggested by them. However, those
phases cannot be strictly separated from each other, they might overlap, or might be repeated over and over until the researcher reaches a satisfactory outcome that contributes to answering the research questions.

The six phases are as follows:

1: Familiarisation with the data

Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest that it is of a prime importance that researchers should immerse themselves in the data to be able to be familiar with the depth and breadth of it. They suggest that this immersion involves repeated reading of the data, but reading in an active way, which includes searching for meanings, patterns, and relations (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Hence, a thorough read through the entire data before beginning coding was performed. This reading resulted in identifying the complex nature of the text, and suggested potential overlap in the themes; in addition, it showed some level of similarity to the practice studies, which is understandable. Then, the four theoretical essays were imported to the “internals” file in NVivo in the form of a Word document, each one treated as a “case classification”; this provides a way to record descriptive information about the sources, nodes, and relationships in the project (Silver and Lewins, 2014). This was done to give the researcher the ability to classify the data, retrieve the data needed for each case separately, and to aid the cross referencing of themes in the analysis phase.

2: Generating initial codes

At this phase of the coding process, initial coding was chosen as the method, because of wanting to code all the data without leaving anything out – to be able to explore all and see what it can offer – thus no text was considered irrelevant. Initial coding was found to be the most suitable for the first cycle of the coding of the theoretical statements, as it offers the freedom and openness that was needed for this stage, to be able to fully explore the potentials in the data. This was decided after scrutinizing different methods of coding introduced by Saldaña (2013), Auerbach and Silverstein (2003).

The coding at this phase was theory-driven; this meant that the data was approached with specific questions in mind (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The codes that were identified reflected a feature of the data that carried some meaning for the researcher with regard to the deliberative democratic phenomena in general, and specifically to the research questions regarding communication between the different stakeholders (Boyatzis, 1998). This first round of coding resulted in 318 codes, as shown in Appendix A. At this phase all
data was initially coded and grouped into 201 “parent nodes”. Then another in-depth reading of the codes resulted in organizing the codes according to the level of relevance to the research questions and objectives. Three levels were initiated, and colour coded: the most relevant ones were coloured green; somewhat relevant ones were coloured orange; and irrelevant ones were coloured yellow. This colour coding was only meant to help the researcher visually with the analysis (Figure 5-5). The criteria for excluding the non-relevant codes (yellow ones) were very basic: those that do not have relevance to the research questions and objectives, and that appeared in one source with only one coding reference, which reflects their triviality to the analysis. The orange codes, however, went into another round of in-depth reading before either deciding to keep those found to have relevance to the research question, or discard those found to be irrelevant. This round resulted in the selection of 136 nodes (green colour) considered to be the most relevant for the objective of this stage of the study, which was to find the key concepts contributing to forming a deliberative model, as shown in Appendix B.

3: Searching for themes

At this point the analysis was re-focused at the broader level of themes, which involved sorting the different codes into potential themes, and collating all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This stage resulted in 55 “parent nodes” or themes. Different codes were combined to form overarching themes, and some of the resulting categories echoed the codes and categories that resulted from the study of political deliberative practice. Mind maps and tables were used to visually aid the researcher in making sense of the relations between the codes and categories. Then, based on the similarities between the patterns that started to appear, and the theoretical constructs that were formed in the study of political deliberative practice (Figure 5-7), it was decided to advance the analysis by going for another cycle of coding. The coding this time was based on the theoretical constructs of the previous part of the study (political deliberative practice), hence elaborative coding was used as a coding method.
At this stage – and at almost every stage of the analysis – the analytical tools offered by NVivo were used to verify and identify the connections and patterns within the text. These tools have been proven to offer a quick and sufficient way to visualize analytical aspects like connections and relations between codes and concepts; those tools like the tree view of a text search (Figure 5-15), and the connection maps of a group query that illustrate the nodes coded within a certain node, showing the overlapping in the data (Figure 5-6).

Figure 5-5: Screenshot from NVivo showing the second stage of coding

Figure 5-6: Group query of the theme framework: connections map
The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice  
N. Al-Qaysi

Practice codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliberation models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context of deliberation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time and place context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face to face discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness of participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants set of values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of effective social freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal capability of public functioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of social recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity of debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicity and public exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and clear communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom and open participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity and pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification and evidence giving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reasoning</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group of participants characteristics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of participants formation, and inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of participants size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts vs lay people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferences and opinions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal of deliberation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activist/Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Theory codes

- Reasoned agreement
- Argument
- Authority
- Autonomy
- The market and forum
- Choice
- Citizenship
- Commitment
- Common good
- Communication
- Conditions
- Context
- Criteria
- Decision making
- Deliberative democracy
- Democracy
- Discussion
- Equality
- Evidence
- Expression
- Fairness
- Framework
- Freedom
- Goal of politics
- Guidelines of public inquiry
- Ideal Deliberation
- Instrumentalism
- Interpretation
- Judgement
- Justice
- Justification
- Legitimacy
- Liberty
- Majority
- Normativity
- Opinions
- Participants
- Pluralism
- Preferences
- Procedure
- Public argument
- Public debate
- Public deliberation
- Public discourse
- Public good
- Public politics
- Rational
- Reason
- Reasonableness
- Representation
- Requirements
- Sovereignty
- Voting
- Will
- Willingness

Figure 5-7: Similarities between the practice codes and categories and the theory codes
After going through the first cycle of coding of the theory statements, patterns of similarities and relations started to form. Those patterns echoed the categories constructed in the first study, hence it was decided to go further with the analysis for a second cycle of coding based on the theoretical constructs that resulted from the review of political deliberative practice. It was chosen to utilize elaborative coding methods for this purpose. Elaborative coding builds on a previous study’s codes, categories, and themes while a current and related study is underway (Saldaña, 2013). In elaborative coding, the goal is to refine theoretical constructs from a previous study, hence relevant text is selected with those constructs in mind. Theoretical constructs emerge from the themes found in coded data, and are then grouped together into categories or “meaningful units” (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003, p. 105). At this stage, the grouping of 80 codes (Appendix C) was based on similarities, sequence, causation, and correspondence. This stage produced six categories that were the result of elaborating on the categories derived from the political practice studies, and another number of codes that at this stage did not seem to fit into one of those categories, as seen in (Figure 5-7).

4: Reviewing themes
At this phase, the collated extracts for each theme were carefully re-read and re-considered, in order to determine whether they appear to form a coherent pattern. The researcher at this point felt that having the codes written manually contributed to forming a closer relation with the data and aided a more thorough interpretation of the complex text, as the overlap in the coding was a recurrent phenomenon (Figure 5-8). Hence, each “coding reference” was rewritten within each node, and carefully analysed, to determine what it is, and how it contributes to defining the theme, and then a short excerpt of each reference was produced. After that, these short excerpts were classified according to their “sources”, which in this case represent each one of the four theoretical statements (Figure 5-9). Then, after cross referencing each of them between the four authors, a short description of each node was produced (Figure 5-10).
“The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text extract</th>
<th>Coded for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| “The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument.” | Deliberative democracy  
Democratic association  
Justification  
Conditions of association  
Public argument |

Figure 5-8: Diagram that shows an example of overlapping in the codes

Figure 5-9: Scanned example of manual work
5: Defining and naming themes

A detailed analysis of each theme was conducted, through collecting all the categories, sub-categories, and codes. This was done through writing the text extracted from each node that contributed to defining how each theme expresses its nature (Figure 5-10), then subsequently defining the overall story of relationships between the themes as a whole. In addition, the relationships between each theme were analysed in order to determine how each one of them fits within the expected outcome of the analysis in relation to the research question at this stage, i.e. the general outlines of the aspects of the theory of deliberative democracy.

At this stage, the themes were already grouped into six main categories, but there were still several free-standing themes that did not seem to belong to any of those categories. However, having in mind that judgement in architectural competitions is referred to in most studies as a process, a comparison to the notion of a process showed similarities to
the resulting categories (see section 5.4.3). The comparison showed that a business process includes inputs, processing (which should be performed by a group of stakeholders), and outputs, in achieving a certain goal in a certain context under certain conditions. This resulted in identifying two more categories, the input to the deliberation, and the outcomes of deliberation, which were added to the previous six, forming eight themes in total. These themes reflect the main aspects that form the general outlines of the deliberative democratic procedure:

- The deliberative procedure
- The input to the deliberation
- The goals of the deliberation
- The conditions for conducting a deliberation
- Reasoning
- The context of the deliberation
- The participants in the deliberation
- The outcomes of the deliberation

However, while comparing the deliberative political practice categories to the political practice ones, it was realised that, on the political practice level, what is referred to as a model of deliberation is actually the result of the contextualising and adaptation of the “procedure” on the theoretical level to the context of a certain practice. This contributed to considering the theme “procedure” – on the theoretical level – as the umbrella term that the rest of the seven categories can be collected under (Figure 5-11)
The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice

N. Al-Qaysi

Figure 5-11 Mind map of theory themes

The deliberative process
- The input to the deliberation
  - Preferences
  - Comprehensive doctrines
- The context of deliberation
  - The socio-political settings
  - Non-public reason
- The conditions for deliberation
  - Conditions for conducting the deliberation
    - Autonomy
    - Equality
    - Freedom and Liberty
    - Fairness
    - Diversity and inclusion
  - Conditions required from participants
    - Commitment
    - Deliberative capacities
    - Reasonableness
    - Willingness
    - Reasoned agreement
- Reasoning
  - Reasoning method
    - Shaping preferences
    - Opinion and will formation
  - Communication involved
    - Communicative acts
      - Representation
      - Interpretation
      - Expression
      - Speech acts as tools of communication
    - Subject of reasoning
      - Common good
      - Public good
    - Rationalities involved in the process
      - Instrumental
      - Normative
- Agents of actions
  - Participants in deliberation
- Outcomes of deliberation
  - Decision, Choice, Judgement
  - Legitimacy
Example of the coding procedure

To clarify the coding procedure that was followed at this stage of the research, a detailed example will be described in this section. One of the coding nodes is selected as an example. The node chosen for this purpose is “Reasoned agreement”.

- A thorough reading of the text in the node (Reasoned agreement) resulted in cleaning the text in every “reference”, which represents each coded chunk of text from a certain source, as shown in Figure 5-12.

![Figure 5-12: Screenshot from NVivo for the node “Reasoned agreement”](image)

- The cleaned node is then read carefully, and analysed thoroughly to be able to interrogate and interpret it with regard to the research questions.
- After that, each reference in the node is collected under a “case classification”; each case is represented one of the four theory statements. This shows each researcher’s point of view regarding the theme (Reasoned agreement) separately, to help cross-referencing when forming the description of this theme (Figure 5-13).
• This cross-referencing then results in forming a description and understanding of the theme reasoned agreement as a requirement for an ideal deliberation, although some researchers consider it one of the aims that should be achieved through deliberation. However, this research considered reasoned agreement as a requirement because the ultimate aim of deliberation is consensus, while agreement and consensus might be considered synonyms in the conventional language, in this context reasoned agreement is a prerequisite for achieving consensus.

• Then, a recurrent overlapping between the concepts of conditions and requirements is identified; this overlapping between the two is then resolved – after a thorough investigation of the definitions of the two – by considering a requirement as part of the conditions for conducting an ideal deliberation (see section 5.4.2: Conditions for conducting an ideal deliberation).

• Finally, the Reasoned agreement theme is then defined as one of the conditions required for an ideal deliberative procedure. It is required to be achieved by the participants in the deliberation. This definition then leads to grouping this theme under the sub-category “conditions required from participants”, which is then placed within the category “conditions of ideal deliberation”.

5.4.2 Political theory themes

This section presents the results of analysis of the theoretical statements. This includes eight themes, each of which have several categories and sub-categories:

i) The deliberative procedure

ii) The input to the deliberation
The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice

N. Al-Qaysi

iii) The goals of the deliberation
iv) The conditions for conducting a deliberation
v) Reasoning
vi) The context of the deliberation
vii) The participants in the deliberation
viii) The outcomes of the deliberation

The deliberative procedure

Each one of the authors of the four main statements (Habermas, Rawls, Cohen, and Elster) proposes their own version of what each claim to be the ideal democratic procedure. Cohen (1997, p. 67) names it “the ideal deliberative procedure”, while for Habermas (1997, p.35) it is the procedure of “popular sovereignty”; for Rawls (1997, p.119) it is “the public reason”, and for Elster (1997, p. 3) it is between the market and forum.

Cohen (1997) defines the ideal deliberative procedure as the free reasoned argument between equals. By this definition Cohen specifies the method as reasoning, and the requirements as freedom and equality, where the participants are the agents of action, and the tool for reasoning is argument.

Similarly, Habermas (1997) sets the boundaries for the procedure of popular sovereignty by defining it as a collective reasoning process anchored in a procedure of opinion and will formation. This means that for him the procedure is related to the collective opinion and will formation of the participants or “agents”, where the method is “reasoning”, and the tools are “arguments”. This procedure is meant to operate on the constitutional level, where people get to choose or decide what laws they want to follow.

Rawls (1997) has his own addition to discursive democratic procedure, namely public reason, which he suggests is the reason of equal citizens who collectively exercise their political and coercive power over one another in endorsing laws and in amending the constitution. To Rawls the level of effect of public reason is on the constitutional level. However, he suggests that non-political bodies also have their own reasoning processes, which he call non-public reasons.

Elster (1997), on the other hand, suggests that in apolitical debate on the constitutional level, there should be a balance of reasoning rationalities between the market/instrumental approach (politics is only concerned with the private choices of consumers) and the
forum/normative approach (an orientation towards the common good when considering political issues). He suggests that the forum should differ from the market in its mode of functioning yet be concerned with decisions that ultimately deal with economic matters, and that constitutional arguments about how laws can be made and changed invoke the impact of legal stability and change on economic affairs. In addition, he asserts that arguments form the core of the political process and believes that politics occupies its proper place in society only if defined as public in nature and instrumental in purpose.

In the next step, each one of those four procedures is presented individually, and critically analysed with the aim of finding the common denominators or factors that contribute to forming a discursive democratic procedure.

*Popular sovereignty as a procedure (Habermas)*

As defined by Habermas, popular sovereignty is a collective reasoning process anchored in the procedure of opinion and will formation. For him popular sovereignty should only express itself under the discursive condition of opinion and will formation (Habermas, 1997). The core of the process of opinion and will formation is reasoning through deliberation, and within this deliberation is where the exchange of reason between the participants happens, what Habermas calls the discursive condition of opinion and will formation. Also, he argues that a proceduralised “popular sovereignty” cannot operate without the support of an accommodating political culture. Establishing procedural institutions is necessary for the production of popular sovereignty, and rational political will formation cannot occur unless a rationalized life-world meets it halfway.

In addition, he advocates Fröbel’s assumption of seeing the public no longer as a body; rather, it is only the medium for a multi-vocal process of opinion formation that substitutes a mutual understanding for power and rationally-motivated majoritarian decisions. Thus, freedom of expression is one of the requirements for the discursive formation of will, as the free exchange of reason through discussion contributes to the opinion formation of the participants and allows mutual understanding.

Habermas (1997) also claims that popular sovereignty procedure only happens when there is a balance between formally structured political will formation and the surrounding environment of unstructured processes of opinion formation. To him subject-less forms of communication regulate the flow of discursive opinion and will formation in such a way that their imperfect outcomes have the presumption of practical reason on their side. Popular sovereignty, which is subject-less, anonymous, and intersubjective, dissolves and
withdraws into democratic procedures, and the demanding communicative presuppositions of their implementation. This procedure is then redirected into the indefinable interactions between culturally organized public spheres and a will formation institutionalized according to the rule of law. To Habermas, public sovereignty is the result of moulding these subject-less forms of communication into an institutionally accepted form through reasoning under the condition of opinion and will formation.

The idea of public reason (Rawls)

Public reason, according to Rawls (1997), is liberal in nature and is concerned with constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice, hence it operates on a constitutional level.

In a democratic society, public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution. The first point is that the limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all political questions but only to those involving what we may call ‘constitutional essentials’ and questions of basic justice. (Rawls, 1997, p.94)

He sees public reason as the reason of equal citizens; the subject of their reason is the good of the public, what the political conception of justice requires of society’s basic structure of institutions, and of the purposes and ends they are to serve.

To Rawls the context of public reason is formulated by what he calls “the political conception of justice” (Rawls, p. 93), which is liberal in character, and includes, besides its principles of justice, guidelines of inquiry that specify ways of reasoning and criteria for the kinds of information relevant to political questions. That conception has two parts: a) the substantive principles of justice for the basic structure; and b) the guidelines of inquiry, principles of reasoning and rules of evidence that citizens are to decide upon, determining whether substantive principles properly apply and to identify laws and policies that best satisfy them. One of the main conditions of public reasoning is justification and evidence-based discussions, and this is one of the bases for legitimacy in the liberal conception of justice. The evidence required in public reason, according to Rawls, should come from “appealing only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and to the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial” (Rawls, 1997, p. 102).
While trying to define the limits of public reason, Rawls (1997) suggest that not all reasons are public reasons, as there are the non-public reasons of non-political associations in civil society, like churches, universities, scientific associations and professional groups, etc. He argues that corporate bodies and individuals need a way of reasoning about what is to be done, and ways to act reasonably and responsibly. To those associations, this way of reasoning is public with respect to their members, but non-public with respect to political society and to citizens generally. Non-public reasons include all the many reasons of civil society that are social, and certainly not private. He also suggests that all methods of reasoning – whether individual, associational, or political – must acknowledge common elements: the concept of judgment, principles of inference, and rules of evidence, and much else, otherwise they would not be ways of reasoning but possibly rhetoric or means of persuasion. He argues that different procedures and methods are appropriate to different contexts of association held by individuals and corporate bodies, given the different conditions under which their reasoning is carried out, as well as the different limitations to which their reasoning is subject. Also, in non-public reason, the criteria and methods of reasoning depend in part on how the nature, aim, and point of each association is understood, and the conditions of association (Rawls, 1997).

*The ideal deliberative procedure (Cohen)*

The ideal deliberative procedure, according to Cohen (1997), captures the notion of justification through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens, and serves as a model for deliberative institutions. It is based on his explicit account of the formal conception of deliberative democracy, that he has developed based on the discussion of democracy by Rawls and Habermas.

Cohen outlines deliberative democracy as a pluralistic association, where members have diverse preferences, convictions, and ideals; while sharing a commitment to the deliberative resolution of problems of collective choice, they also have divergent aims, and do not think that some particular set of preferences, convictions, or ideals is obligatory (Cohen, 1997). Also, the members of the deliberative association recognize one another as having deliberative capacities, that are required for entering a public exchange of reasons and for acting on the result of such public reasoning. In his version of the ideal deliberative procedure, Cohen gives an explicit statement of the conditions for deliberative decision-making and highlights the properties that democratic institutions should embody so far as possible. He emphasizes that his account of the ideal procedure is meant for institutions of
collective choice to mirror. Thus, it is not meant to be used on the constitutional level exclusively, like Rawls’ or Habermas’ ideals.

There are three general aspects of the ideal deliberation, according to Cohen: 1- to decide on an agenda; 2- to propose alternative solutions to the problems on the agenda; 3- to support those solutions with reasons, and to conclude by settling on an alternative. Cohen (1997) also sets out the characterizations of the ideal deliberative procedure as follows:

1- Ideal deliberation is free
2- Deliberation is reasoned
3- Ideal deliberation maintains equality
4- Ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally-motivated consensus.

He also suggests that participants’ commitment to the deliberation requires a willingness to revise their understanding of their own preferences and convictions. He then indicates the ways that this commitment carries with it a commitment to advance the common good and to respect individual autonomy. The ideal deliberative scheme also indicates the importance of autonomy in a deliberative democracy. And as regards the phenomenon of adaptive and accommodating preferences as threats to autonomy, he claims that both of these threats disappear when collective decision making is moulded into the ideal deliberative procedure (Cohen, 1997).

Between the market and the forum (Elster)

This statement is less exclusive than the previous ones. It does not give a clear procedure but rather a suggestion of how political decisions should be made. Elster (1997) compares three different views of politics in general, and of democratic systems specifically, concerning the relation between economics and politics, using the analogy of the market and the forum.

His claim considers preferences as the driving act behind political action, or the decisive factor in situations that require decision making. He also asserts that the formation of preferences is at the core of political association, where the reasoning process through deliberation is meant to form, change, or direct preferences of participants, hence guiding decision making.

After considering two extreme views on politics generally, and of the democratic system (the social choice theory on one hand, and the participatory democratic theory on the other), Elster then suggests his own preferred view, which is based on a formalised version
of Habermas’ work on “the ethics of discourse” and “the ideal speech situation”. The core of the theory is that rather than aggregating or filtering preferences, the political system should be set up with a view to changing them by public debate and confrontation.

According to Habermas’ theory, the goal of politics should be rational agreement rather than compromise, and the decisive political act is that of engaging in public debate with a view to the emergence of a consensus. The first of the two main premises underlying this theory is that, in a political debate, it is pragmatically impossible to express individual preferences in a debate about public good. The second premise states that over time one will in fact come to be swayed by considerations about the common good. People will end up obtaining these preferences even if they have initially started with different preferences that are not based on consideration of the common good. These two main premises endorse the idea that public discussion tends to promote the common good (Elster, 1997).

Elster (1997) then suggests that, for a balanced approach to democracy, it can be argued that the forum should differ from the market in its mode of functioning (public debate that is normative in nature), yet be concerned with decisions that ultimately deal with economic matters (decision making that is instrumental in nature), which means that for a democratic political association to be in its proper state of action it should be perceived as public in nature and instrumental in purpose.

To sum up, the four statements are different in details, however they all share common general features:

- At the core of all four procedures is reasoning as the main method for shaping preferences, through justification and evidence-based discussion.
- All could operationalise on the constitutional level, apart from Cohen’s, as it can be utilized for any public political question, constitutional or not.
- Participants are the agents of action.
- There should be a balance between the two reasoning rationalities, instrumental and normative.
- There are a preferred set of conditions and requirements that need to be present for deliberative reasoning to be ideal.
- The goal and context of deliberation contributes to shaping the procedure itself.
- The tool of deliberation is discourse, dialogue, or argumentation, and the medium is language or speech.
**Inputs to the deliberation process**

There are several themes and concepts that can be seen as the initial input to the process of deliberation in the political contexts:

- The initial preferences of participants.
- The comprehensive doctrines of participants.

**Preferences**

Preferences are considered the drivers of any choice. Participants in a deliberative association in a pluralistic society come at first with their initial preferences, convictions, and ideals; however, those preferences will be or should be changed and re-formed by the process of deliberation and the use of reasoning and justifications by others in the deliberation. When it comes to “choice”, participants’ commitment to the deliberative resolution of problems of collective choice should help them maintain a neutral attitude towards their own preferences (Cohen, 1997).

Re-shaping preferences is an essential part of deliberation, and for it to happen commitment is an essential condition, as it is supposed to make the participants come to deliberation while realising that there are no particular set of preferences, convictions, or ideals that are mandatory. This commitment requires the willingness to revise one’s understanding of one’s owns preferences and convictions (Cohen, 1997). In public reasoning, the only way to advance one’s preferences is by finding the reasons that can make a proposal accepted for all, and to gain others’ agreement (Rawls, 1997). Also, giving that commitment, the likelihood of sincere representation of preferences and convictions should increase, because the practice of presenting reason contributes to the formation of commitment, in addition to shaping the content of one’s own preferences (Rawls, 1997).

**Comprehensive doctrines**

The participants’ comprehensive doctrines play a significant role in shaping their views, preferences, ideas, and understandings (Rawls, 1997). When a political conception is supported by an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, this contributes to the quality of the outcome of deliberation, because citizens affirm the ideal of public reason as a result of their own reasonable doctrines (Rawls, 1997). Political liberalism relies on the inference that the limits of public reason should be justified by the overall assessment of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, once those doctrines have
adapted to the conception of justice itself as a higher value, which represents the basic values that public reason endorses (Rawls, 1997). The concept of political legitimacy requires that the justification used should be understandable to all participants. Thus, overlapping consensus is the result of overlapping justifications that are embedded in the diverse comprehensive doctrines of the parties involved in the reasoning process. However, these justifications should be presented by appealing to generally accepted beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science (Rawls, 1997). There is no reason that any person or association of citizens should have the right to use their state of power to decide constitutional essentials as that person’s, or that associations’ comprehensive doctrine directs, as for other citizens, those directions are not understandable, thus they are coercive (Rawls, 1997). In the conception of ideal public reasoning, the plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is welcomed and perceived to provide further and often transcendent backing for participants’ values. The plurality of comprehensive doctrines contributes to more coherent understanding of the problems – of collective choice – in hand, and can contribute to the formation of overlapping consensus, which is the goal of any deliberative decision-making process (Rawls, 1997).

**Goals of deliberation**

The goal of politics in general, and of a democratic association in particular, has been one of the main points shaping the political dialect for a long time (Habermas, 1997). Elster (1997) discusses three political views that each look at the goal of politics differently. For example, Habermas’ theory understands the goal of politics as rational agreement that forms through public debate with a view to the emergence of consensus (Habermas, 1994). Participatory democracy recognizes the goal of politics as the transformation and education of participants. On the other hand, social choice theories claim that the goal of politics is the optimal compromise between given, and irreducibly opposed, private interests. Elster (1997) sums the debate up by adopting the view that the goal of politics should be unanimous agreement rather than compromise.

The way these differences shape the democratic political procedure is what has contributed to shaping the general outlines of the deliberative democratic conception. As suggested by Rawls (1997), in any reasoning process the procedure should be shaped with respect to the goal and methods of reasoning in a certain context. Hence, the criteria and methods of non-public reasoning depend in part on how the nature (the aim and point) of each association is understood and the conditions under which it pursues its ends (Rawls, 1997). There are
different goals for political deliberation, but consensus is the one that can be considered most essential. Other goals of politics, which can be seen as secondary to consensus, include problems of collective choice resolution, as suggested by Cohen (1997), and education, as suggested by the participatory democracy theorists (Elster, 1997). These goals that are seen as secondary echo the ones that resulted from the political practice analyses. This might be because on the constitutional level the goal is consensus, while on the political practice level, other goals appear, which could be seen as secondary to consensus.

**Consensus**

The aim of the ideal deliberation, according to Cohen (1997), is rationally-motivated consensus, that is, to find reasons that are convincing to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals. In addition, while assessing the compatibility of consensus and majority rule, Habermas (1997) suggests that they are comparable only if the latter has an internal relation to the search for truth. He also adopts Fröbel’s interpretation of the majority decision as a conditional consensus, as the consent of the minority to a practice that conforms to the will of the majority (Habermas, 1997). This shows that the concept of consensus can be expanded to have less exact edges. In addition, Rawls (1997) argues that an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines would be the perfect support for the public reasoning process. This means that when the reasoning is supported by arguments and justifications based on various comprehensive doctrines, better outcomes are to be expected.

**Conditions for conducting an ideal deliberation**

The four theoretical statements have highlighted the importance of the conditions and requirements for conducting the ideal deliberation. However, there is an overlap in the use of the terms conditions and requirements. This overlap comes from language originally, and to solve this dispute, the two terms are here investigated in language in an attempt to solve this overlap.

**Conditions and/or requirements**

The definition of “condition” in Merriam-Webster (2018) is “A premise upon which the fulfilment of an agreement depends”, or “Something essential to the appearance or occurrence of something else; prerequisite”, while “requirement” is defined as “something required; something essential to the existence or occurrence of something else: condition”.
This shows the overlap originally stems from language itself, hence, it can be understood that conditions and requirements can be used alternately. However, for this research, requirements are treated as the conditions that need to be provided by the deliberative bodies for conducting the ideal deliberation.

The aim of a deliberative procedure, according to Cohen (1997), is to give an explicit statement of the conditions for deliberative decision making and to highlight the properties that democratic institutions should embody, so far as possible. He claims that there is a need for conditions that permit and encourage the deliberative exchange of reasoning, and for a deliberative formation of preferences, and these conditions are: free deliberation among equals, commitment, pluralism, and autonomy. Because, to him, the aim of ideal deliberation is to secure agreement among all who are committed to free deliberation among equals (Cohen, 1997). Similarly, Elster (1997) suggests that the conditions of a deliberative association play a vital role in maintaining the quality of the outcomes of that association. He argues that arriving at decision is one of the main conditions for a democratic association to be fruitful, or else all we get is a narcissistic view of politics.

Habermas (1997), on the other hand, claims that the most important condition for a democratic deliberative procedure is the continuity of discourse, which will eventually maintain the balance between administrative power and communicatively generated power. In other words, a balance between the instrumental and normative rationalities in the reasoning process. He claims that the imperative conditions for autonomous opinion and will formation are their discursive production, in addition to active and broad participation.

Rawls (1997) suggests that the conditions of a public reasoning process – at the centre of deliberation – differ according to the context, as different procedures and methods are suited to different contexts of associations held by individuals or corporate bodies. He gives example of how the rules of weighing evidence (for the reasoning process) in the law courts are different from those required in scientific society or a church council. He argues that the criteria and methods of this non-public reasoning depends on how the aim or goal of each association is understood and the conditions under which it pursues its ends. He emphasises the importance of reasonableness as the main condition for public reasoning, and the rule of evidence as one of the requirements (Rawls, 1997).

**Requirements**

Requirements can be described as the conditions required for institutionalising the ideal deliberative procedure. According to Cohen (1997), deliberative institutions are required to
provide a framework for the formation of will; they determine if there is equality, autonomy, freedom, reasonableness, etc. These requirements are based on the basic needs for establishing a democratic deliberation that can fulfil its goals and reach its outcomes successfully. They are meant to ensure that democratic politics proceeds under fair conditions, to encourage just legislation, to ensure that the equality of citizens is manifest, and to declare a commitment to that equality “as the public intention” (Rawls, 1971, cited in Cohen, 1997). In addition, Rawls (1997) claims that one of the main requirements for deliberation is reasonableness, especially under conditions of pluralism, which requires that one should find reasons that make the proposal acceptable to others who cannot be expected to regard one’s preferences as sufficient reasons for agreeing. Cohen (1997) also suggests that the ideal deliberative procedure is a procedure that captures the principle that outcomes are democratically legitimate only if they can be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals. Hence, he connects the legitimacy of outcomes to the fulfilment of the requirements for conducting the ideal deliberation.

To sum up, the four theoretical statements highlight the importance of the conditions under which deliberation is held; however, several of them see that characterizing the conditions contributes to the formation of the substance of the ideal deliberative procedure (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Habermas, 1997). Rawls (1997), on the other hand, points out the importance of the context of deliberation to determining the suitable conditions and methods required for the reasoning process.

Each of the statements has a set of conditions based on their standpoint, which can be summed up as follows: reasoned agreement, autonomy, commitment, equality, freedom, fairness, liberty, plurality, diversity, reasonableness, and willingness. Thus, the conditions required for the ideal deliberative procedure can be classified into two categories: a) the requirements that need to be provided – by deliberative institutions – for conducting the deliberation, normally context-related; and b) the conditions that are required from the participants in the deliberation. In addition, it is the responsibility of deliberative institutions and bodies to make sure these conditions are met for the outcomes to be considered fair and legitimate (Figure 5-14).
a) The conditions that are required to be provided by deliberative institutions

These conditions can be seen as essential requirements that need to be sustained by the deliberative institutions, or the organisers of a deliberative association. These are:

1- Autonomy

Autonomy is one of the conditions required for an ideal deliberation, as suggested by Habermas (1997), Elster (1997), and (Cohen, 1997). It characterizes the way in which preferences are shaped rather than their actual content (Elster, 1997). The theoretical statements have shown three types of autonomy related to deliberative democracy: autonomous judgement, autonomous preferences, and an autonomous public sphere.

Autonomy, according to the (Dictionary, 2017a), is “The right or condition of self-government, or the freedom from external control or influence; independence”.

Participants in a deliberative association need their autonomy to be able to freely express their preferences, convictions, and criticism. The ideal deliberative procedure also indicates the importance of autonomy in a deliberative democracy (Cohen, 1997). Cohen also argues that preferences that are shaped through deliberation are only consistent with autonomy, when they are not given by external circumstances, but the result of the power of reason as applied through public discussion. The autonomy of opinions should be produced discursively under the conditions of deliberation (Habermas, 1997).
Autonomous preferences can only be generated through the power of reason to break down prejudice and selfishness. By speaking with the voice of reason, one is also exposing oneself to reason. And these autonomous preferences are the way to reduce conformism and to achieve autonomous judgements (Elster, 1997). Habermas (1997) suggests that democratic procedures should produce rational outcomes insofar as opinion formation inside parliamentary bodies remains sensitive to the results of a surrounding informal opinion formation in autonomous public spheres. Discourse helps build up the autonomous public sphere by innovatively unleashing and critically filtering the elements of discourse that have been channelled by the mass media, unions, associations, and political parties, according to the dictates of power. This helps to reduce influence and biases and the effects of conformism and adaptive preferences. In addition, discourse helps dismantle the illusion of autonomy as self-ownership (Habermas, 1997).

Achieving autonomy also requires freedom of expression, as determining what is the common good, and how to advance it, can only be reached through public deliberation, and not prior to it. It is fixed by informed and autonomous judgments, involving the exercise of deliberative capacities (Habermas, 1997). Moreover, it is the deliberative institution’s responsibility to make sure that the condition of autonomy is present during the deliberative association (Cohen, 1997).

2- Equality

Equality is one of the requirements of an ideal deliberation (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). There are different dimensions for equality in deliberation: equal representation, equal participation, equal citizens, and equal liberties.

Equality of participation and representation is vital for ideal deliberation, as one of the requirements for a just and fair association (Cohen, 1997). This is because when everyone is well represented, the definition of the common good can be reached easily, and this will preserve fair arrangements and help achieve fair outcomes. This will be achieved only by justification through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens. In addition, equality is a required condition for a legitimate outcome of deliberation (Cohen, 1997), and the ideal deliberative procedure captures this principle. Hence, in the ideal deliberation;

- parties are both formally and substantively equal. They are formally equal in that the rules regulating the procedure do not single out individuals …
- and each has an equal voice in the decision. The participants are substantively equal in that the existing distribution of power and resources
does not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, nor does that distribution play an authoritative role in their deliberation. (Cohen, 1997, p. 74)

For liberals, equal liberties are the rights held by individual subjects, while egalitarians conceive the collective practice of free and equal persons as the sovereign will formation. On the other hand, Rousseau understands liberty as the autonomy of the people, as the equal participation of each person in the practice of self-legislation. Fröbel’s constitutional principles define the procedure of opinion and will formation that secures equal liberties via general rights of communication and participation (Habermas, 1997). Then Habermas suggests that the united will formation of citizens must admit only to regulations that secure equal liberties for all (Habermas, 1997).

Rawls (1997) also points out the importance of the equality of citizens as one of the conditions for a collective public reasoning. To him, the limits of public reason do not apply to all political questions, but only to those involving what he calls “constitutional essentials” (Rawls, 1997, p. 102), and questions of basic justice. Otherwise, questions that are not on a constitutional level can be considered through a non-public reasoning process. He argues that liberal political values are of two kinds. First, the values of political justice: equal political and civil liberty; equality of opportunity; the values of social equality and economic reciprocity; values of the common good; as well as the various essential conditions for all these values. Second, the values of public reason, which fall under the guidelines of public inquiry, and attempt to make that inquiry free and public (Rawls, 1997).

3- Freedom

Freedom is one of the conditions required in any deliberation, and a characteristic of an ideal deliberation (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). Freedom is also a condition for the legitimacy of a public reasoning process. This is because, in a public reasoning process, people share a commitment to the resolution of problems of collective choice, and regard their institutions as legitimate only if they establish a framework of free and public deliberation. The outcomes of deliberation are legitimate if only they are the object of free, reasoned agreement among equals (Cohen, 1997).

The ideal deliberation is free when it satisfies two conditions: first, participants are free from any pre-conditions, pre-norms or requirements. Second, participants suppose that they can act upon the results, based on the fact that they arrived at the decision through
their deliberation and that they agree to comply with it (Cohen, 1997). Hence, free deliberation is a requirement of an ideal deliberation. And the deliberative institutions are responsible for making sure that freedom is present in the deliberation.

The concept of freedom in the deliberation process includes freedom of expression, freedom of choice, freedom of participation, and the concept of freedom as a basic human right, which is considered irrelevant to our context, architectural competitions.

Freedom of expression ensures that the all information required for the will formation of participants is present (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). Any restrictions on expression restrict the autonomous power of the people (Habermas, 1997). People are invited to express their preferences and convictions, and to determine what is common good – which can only be achieved by informed and autonomous judgements – through the exercise of deliberative capacities (Cohen, 1997). The protection of freedom of expression will thus maximize public power. Any restriction on expression is a clear violation of the core of the ideal of deliberative democracy and is a form of injustice.

Politics is the expression and confirmation of the freedom that springs simultaneously from the subjectivity of the individual and the sovereignty of the people (Habermas, 1997). The freedom of any political system stems from the freedom of its subjects, and by securing their right to freedom, they in turn participate in creating the free system. This freedom manifests itself through free discussions and free expression that help form future laws and systems on the right bases, via the sovereign will of the people (Habermas, 1997).

Freedom of citizens is one of the conditions required for the public reasoning process, and it is only for the public as a collective body to which coercive political power should relate (Rawls, 1997). And this power can only be obtained under the condition that its actions are justifiable to others, regardless of how diverse their reasonable religious and philosophical doctrines are. Trying to meet this condition is one of the tasks that the ideal of democratic public reasoning is all about (Rawls, 1997). This justification requires that citizens should be free to express their ideas and convictions without fear of being blamed, shamed, or prosecuted, hence the importance of freedom of expression.

To sum up, freedom of expression is regarded as a pivotal condition for any deliberative reasoning process, and participants are encouraged to use any sort of clarification or information they find useful to express their thoughts, ideas, and convictions.
Liberty is a condition of ideal deliberation (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997). Cohen (1997) argues that power is diminished when people lack the information required to exercise their will, and liberty of expression provides that information. He considers liberty not as a subject of deliberation; rather it comprises the framework that makes it possible. Hence, liberty is one of the conditions of an ideal deliberation. In the liberal view, equal liberties are conceived as rights held by individual subjects; they view those human rights as having a normative priority over democracy. Rousseau, on the other hand understands liberty as the autonomy of the people (Habermas, 1997).

4- Fairness

Fairness is one of the fundamental conditions required for any democratic procedure (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997). On the constitutional level, fairness might be expressed in two ways: fair representation and fair distribution of resources. Fair distribution of resources is the way to ensure the equality and autonomy of citizens, and it represents a commitment to the principle of equality as a public intention (Cohen, 1997).

Fair representation is also related to equality, and the ideal of fairness is achieved through fair representation of all citizens; this is manifest through fair procedure, which leads to fair outcomes. As fair system is the combination of fair procedures that are derived through fair conditions of representation and distribution, and leads to fair outcomes (Rawls, 1997).

5- Pluralism, diversity, and inclusion

Pluralism is considered another of the conditions of ideal deliberation (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997). Deliberative democracy, according to Cohen (1997), is a pluralistic association in which members have diverse preferences, convictions, and ideals. However, this plurality must be accompanied by a commitment to the deliberation, and a full awareness of the diversity of aims of the others, as well as openness to change. In modern societies, pluralism of opinions is inevitable, but it has to be brought into normative consensus, for a deliberation to be fruitful (Habermas, 1997). In addition, according to Rawls (1997), the ideal of public reason is an appropriate complement of constitutional democracy, the culture of which is bound to be marked by plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This means that a plurality of comprehensive doctrines is encouraged in a public reasoning process.

Habermas (1997) also suggests an open structure of communication, and argues that this open structure can prevent the domination of avant-garde parties. When the discussion is
open to all parties involved, it allows for multi-faceted views of the problems in hand. It allows for opinions to be reshaped by new information gained from all participants, even those who are outside the circle of the elite (Habermas, 1997) – in the context of this research, architects, jury members, big names, trademarks, influencers, etc.

b) **The conditions that are required from participants in the deliberation**

These conditions can be seen as characteristics that need to be present in or maintained by the participants in a deliberative association.

1- **Commitment**

Commitment is one of the characteristics required of participants in an ideal deliberation (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997). Participants should share a commitment to coordinating their activities according to norms that they arrive at through their deliberation, within institutions that make deliberation possible. Free deliberation among equals is the basis of legitimacy (Cohen, 1997). This commitment requires willingness to revise one’s understanding of one’s own preferences and convictions. Commitment carries with it an obligation to advance the common good and to respect individual autonomy (Habermas, 1997). In addition, participants are committed to resolving their differences through deliberation by providing reasons that are persuasive to others. Proper ordering by institutions can help obtain a commitment to deliberation. In addition, as suggest by Elster (1997), to engage in discussion is a kind of self-censorship, or a pre-commitment to the idea of rational decision. This indicates the importance of the willingness of participants in maintaining their commitment to the deliberation and its outcomes.

2- **Deliberative capacities**

Deliberative capacities are required characteristic of the participants in a deliberation (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997). This refers to the capacity for entering a public exchange of reason and for acting on the results of that reasoning. Exercising those capacities is a fundamental component of a good human life – as the aim of democracy – thus, those capacities need to be encouraged by political associations for political practice to be healthy and complete (Cohen, 1997).

In short, deliberative capacities should be embodied in the participants’ ability to balance between their own comprehensive doctrines or field of expertise, and sensitivity to others. It is mostly about being open to being changed by others’ concerns or thoughts while being aware of one’s own standpoint and background knowledge.
3- Reasonableness

Reasonableness is a condition of ideal deliberation (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997). Reasonableness together with the condition of pluralism contributes to shaping preferences and convictions (Cohen, 1997). Reasonableness implies that one must find reasons that will make others agree with one’s preferences. Then this same act of presenting reason will contribute to the formation of commitment, and that commitment will in turn increase the likelihood of a sincere representation of preferences, and aids shaping the content of those preferences (Cohen, 1997).

Reasonableness also discourages adaptive preferences. While preferences are “formed” by the deliberation, adaptive preference formation is consistent with autonomy, because preferences that are shaped by public deliberation are not given by external circumstances; on the contrary, they are the outcome of reasoning through public discussion.

On the other hand, Rawls (1997) considers reasonableness a political virtue that falls under the values of public reason. To him, values such as reasonableness and readiness to honour the (moral) duty of civility, which are virtues of citizens, help to make reasoned public discussion of political questions possible. Hence, he is suggesting that it is a virtue required of citizens who are participating in the deliberation or public reasoning process. In short, reasonableness is a characteristic needed in participants for them to be able to contribute effectively to a deliberation.

4- Willingness

Participants in a deliberative process need to be willing to participate (Cohen, 1997). For citizens to be committed to the deliberation, willingness is essential, the willingness to revise one’s own preferences and convictions (Cohen, 1997). This involves the willingness to listen to others in the deliberation and being ready to accept reasonable accommodations or alterations in one’s own views regarding problems of collective choice (Rawls, 1997).

There are two aspects of willingness that are related to the political context: 1) participants need to have the willingness to solve the problems of collective choice, and to coordinate their actions through mutual understanding of those problems (Habermas, 1997). 2) Citizens should be willing to devote some fair amount of their time for that deliberation (Elster, 1997).
5- Reasoned agreement

Reasoned agreement is one of the requirements of the legitimate procedure of an ideal deliberation, especially under the condition of pluralism (Cohen, 1997). The ideal deliberative procedure captures the idea that outcomes of deliberation are democratically legitimate only if they are the object of a reasoned agreement among equals (Cohen, 1997).

Elster (1997), on the other hand, and based on his reading of Habermas’ theory of discursive democracy, argues that rational agreement is the goal of politics, and that the decisive political act is that of engaging in public debate with a view to the emergence of a consensus. This claim suggests that reasoned agreement can be considered as a pre-consensus state, or as a condition for the final consensus. He also claims that rational discussions concerning the public good tend to produce unanimous preferences and those then produce unanimous agreement, which forms the ultimate goal of politics in Habermas’ view. For Rawls (1997), it is vital that citizens reach practical agreement in judgment about constitutional essentials. However, when full agreement is hard to achieve, voting might be the solution, especially when the alternatives are close in content. To sum up, whether it is practical, reasoned, or rational, agreement is one of the required conditions for achieving consensus in a deliberative democratic association. It is the state of pre-consensus, and consensus is the ultimate goal of deliberation.

Reasoning

This category includes four sub-categories that have been collected according to their relevance to the reasoning process. These sub-categories are:

- Method of reasoning: shaping preferences and the formation of opinion and will
- The subject of the reasoning process: common and public good
- The rationalities of reasoning: instrumental and normative
- Communication involved in the reasoning process: communicative and speech acts.

Reason is defined as a method of formulating plans, putting them into order of priority and making a decision accordingly (Rawls, 1997). Reasoning is the core of the deliberative democratic process: the notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens (Cohen, 1997). The reasoning process contributes to shaping preferences (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997).
One of the main three aspects of deliberative democracy is supporting choice for a certain proposed alternative with reason (Cohen, 1997). The ultimate aim of the reasoning process is to reach agreement between all who are committed to deliberation. Reasons are offered in order to bring others to agree or decide on an alternative. A free and reasoned agreement among equals is the only way for the outcomes of a deliberative procedure to be democratically legitimate (Cohen, 1997).

Reasoning requires that participants in a deliberative process have deliberative capacities for an effective exchange of reasons (Cohen, 1997). Participants share – discursively – their preferences, justify and support them with evidence if necessary, and can also give their reasons for not supporting other proposals by criticizing them, all with regard for the common good. Thus, there is a need for communicative capacities that allow proper communication, and a necessity for freedom of expression for a reasoned argument to be fruitful. In addition, according to (Habermas, 1997), providing justification is crucial for reasoning as it is the way to bring others to adopt or agree with our choices; however, those justifications should only be given using the tools of post-metaphysical theorizing.

Similarly, (Rawls, 1997) argues that justification given should be based on basic and widely accepted knowledge, i.e. common sense. He also argues that the comprehensive doctrines that do not accord with public reason cannot support a reasonable balance of political issues.

Generally, any reasoning process requires evidence (Rawls, 1997, Elster, 2003). According to (Rawls, 1997), all methods of reasoning, individual, associational, or political, must admit certain common elements, i.e. the concept of judgment, principles of inference, and rules of evidence. Failing to do so, the reasoning process turns into mere rhetoric or means of persuasion. Evidence required in a reasoning process is context-dependent, as are the rules of weighing evidence. What is accepted as evidence in the courts of law might not be sufficient in a scientific association or a church council (Rawls, 1997). This is because in each one of those contexts what is accepted as true and correct is different; for example, in a church council a verse from the Bible could be sufficient as a reasonable justification, but in a scientific association, the evidence given must be based on scientific methods and or previously proven fact.

According to Rawls (1997), in a non-public reasoning process, the criteria of justification and methods of reasoning and weighing evidence depend on the aim or point of each association, and the conditions under which it pursues its ends (context). Also, people
accept evidence from the same doctrine that the association is happening within, which can also be seen as context-related (Rawls, 1997). To sum up, reasoning is at the core of any discursive democratic procedure; it is where all the exchange of reason and justifications happens, and where preferences are shaped (changed, redirected, or evolved) (Habermas, 1997). This exchange requires deliberative capacities, freedom of expression, and justification by appealing to widely accepted facts and post-metaphysical theories only.

**Justification and evidence giving**

Deliberative reasoning should necessarily involve justification and evidence giving (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). The ideal deliberative procedure captures the notion of justification through public argument and reasoning, and justification is the way to ensure agreement between participating parties (Cohen, 1997). According to (Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997), politics should be justifiable on the basis of reason, and laws require justification in order to assist others in agreeing on a certain question or decision. As (Rawls, 1997) asserts, judges have to justify their decision based on their understanding of the constitution’s relevant statutes and precedents. Rawls (1997) suggests that it is required for the participants in a democratic reasoning process, first, to be aware of the content and limits of that process, and second, to do that while being reasonable and rational, and while considering the diversity of others’ beliefs and convictions. Then to be able then to work with others effectively on solving the problems in hand.

The justification accepted in a public reasoning has to be based on only presently accepted beliefs and common sense and the methods and conclusions of non-controversial science (Habermas, 1997). And it is preferable that those justifications rest on widely accepted plain truths that are available to citizens generally; this is in a public reasoning process. On the other hand, in a non-public reasoning context, it is acceptable if the justifications used are based on truths or facts that are agreed on within the same context (Rawls, 1997). To reach a reasonable agreement, the justification given must be understandable to all participants (Cohen, 1997), hence the importance of clear communication and transparency in the discussion, also the diversity of point of views that helps in looking at the problem in hand from multiple angles.

**Shaping preferences and the formation of opinion and will**

There is a clear similarity between the concepts of shaping preferences and the formation of opinion and will. It was decided to differentiate between the two concepts, an opinion and a preference. A preference is normally defined as “A greater liking for one alternative
over another or others” (Dictionary, 2017c). It can be seen as pre-made or fixed judgement about something or someone. While, in general, an opinion is “A view or judgement formed about something, not necessarily based on fact or knowledge. An estimation of the quality or worth of someone or something”. In law an opinion is “a formal statement of reasons for a judgement given” (Dictionary, 2017b). That means it should be formed based on some sort of justification or reason.

The obvious overlap between preferences and opinions can also be seen in political theory in general, and in our subject of analysis, i.e. deliberative theory. This issue can be solved by acknowledging that the two concepts can overlap, or even sometimes be used interchangeably. However, in this research it is believed that although there is an undeniable overlap between the two, preferences come before opinions as preferences normally exist without reason or justifications, while opinions need to be reasoned or justified, especially in public life.

**Shaping preferences**

The main aim of the reasoning process is to form participants’ opinions and consequentially their will as a result of reasoned arguments. To do so, participants’ preferences are re-shaped collectively – through discussion – with regard to the common good (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Habermas, 1997). Thus, shaping preferences is considered the way to opinion and will formation.

Changing preferences by public debate and confrontation rather than aggregating or filtering them should be the aim of a political system (Habermas, 1997). Discussions throughout the reasoning process contribute to shaping “unanimous preferences” which consequentially contribute to forming a unanimous agreement (Habermas, 1997). Then those informed new preferences can be used as input to the voting process if final agreement fails (Elster, 1997).

The act of expressing preferences is seen by Elster (1997) as an action guided by participants’ exact preferences, and those preferences should be formed by concern for the common good. This can be linked to the importance of freedom of expression as one of the conditions required for a successful deliberation, and to the importance of the participants’ deliberative capacities, and their ability to express their views while being able to listen to and consider other views.
For Cohen (1997), preferences that are shaped by public deliberation are the relevant ones, and they represent the power of reason as applied through public discussion, and those that could be expressed in a free deliberation and not prior to it. Therefore, free expression is an important requirement for the formation of relevant preferences and convictions, because they are confirmed through a reasoned consideration of alternatives that comprises deliberation.

**Opinion and will formation**

According to Habermas (1997), popular sovereignty relies on a procedure of opinion and will formation. “Such sovereignty should express itself only under the discursive conditions of an internally differentiated process of opinion and will-formation” (Habermas, 1997). He describes opinion and will formation as a communicative practice that should occur guided by arguments (Habermas, 1997). In addition, he asserts that the internal relation between political will formation and opinion formation can ensure the expected rationality of decision making only if deliberation continues without pre-given assumptions. Habermas (1997) also argues that rational political will formation cannot happen unless a rationalised life-world meets it halfway. By that he emphasises the importance of political culture that can accommodate such a procedure. Thus, the importance of the social context of deliberation.

He also emphasises the normative nature of the procedure of popular sovereignty by stating that the aim of his project, namely “the popular sovereignty procedure”, is “the gradual improvement of institutionalized procedures of rational collective will-formation, procedures that cannot prejudge the participants’ concrete goals. Each step along this path has repercussions on the political culture and forms of life” (Habermas, 1997).

In short, people come to deliberation at first with their pre-set preferences, and those preferences are then re-shaped throughout the reasoning process. Then those newly shaped preferences form the base for a shift of opinion and consequentially will formation. For these two activities to happen and because of the communicative nature of both, freedom of expression is necessary. Also, an accommodating political culture is necessary to establish a successful deliberation. In addition, it is important to maintain the normative element throughout the discussions, to help keep the procedure in a rationally balanced state.
**Subject of deliberation**

The common good should be the focus of any democratic association (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997). Public political debate should be conducted in terms of consideration of the common good because as defined by the difference principle, the common good can only be realised after deliberation, when participants share what they regard as “good” for themselves and for others, giving their reasoning and justification for it (Cohen, 1997). Hence, free expression is required to determine what is good and how to advance it for everybody, and informed and autonomous judgements are the only way to realise it through public discussions and deliberation (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997). In addition, in deliberation the public nature of the discussions promotes the common good (Elster, 1997), as one cannot express individual preferences in a public debate about common good (Habermas, 1997). This means that the public exposure of the discussions fosters guiding the debate towards considering the common good.

On the political level, the common good is related to the public good, as on that level most associations would be with regard to the public good, especially on the constitutional level. Public good is the main subject in a political debate on a constitutional level (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). In a well-ordered democracy, political debate is organized around alternative conceptions of the public good. These alternatives come from the difference in interests of different individuals or groups of people, and can also be seen as the opposite of individual or group interest (Cohen, 1997).

The arenas focused on promoting the public good should be funded with public money, as this expresses the basic commitment of a democratic order to the resolution of political questions through free deliberation among equals, and to eliminate any manipulation or corruption that might be caused by funding resources that are not public (Cohen, 1997)

Dialogue or discussion in a public deliberation, oriented towards decision making, helps shape people’s preferences (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997). And when those discussions are shaped around the public good, private preferences will be purged and changed and a uniquely determined rational decision will emerge (Elster, 1997). Similarly, (Rawls, 1997) argues that public reason when shaped around the public good as the subject of reasoning and among citizens that are free and equal will result in an ideal democratic association that contributes to better outcomes of the deliberation.
Rationalities involved in the reasoning process

The word rational – in the political context – is used to express a way of thinking and reasoning that contributes to forming judgements and making decisions (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997). Rational discussions are the core of the reasoning process (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Habermas, 1997), and rational discussion is the only way to effect the transformation of preferences in a deliberative association (Habermas, 1997). Those rational discussions tend to produce unanimous preferences, as engaging in discussion is considered a kind of self-censorship, and a pre-commitment to the idea of rational decision (Elster, 1997). For a democratic procedure to produce rational outcomes, it should only be by responding to the surrounding informed opinions of the autonomous public sphere (Habermas, 1997). Also, in a parliamentary deliberation, the expected rationality of decision making can only be secured when the assumed internal relation between political will formation and opinion formation does not proceed according to ideologically pre-given assumptions, but is only based on the assumptions produced through public reasoning (Habermas, 1997).

In any reasoning process there are two main contesting rationalities, instrumental and normative, and it is only through a balanced interplay between those two rationalises that rational outcomes are to be expected. As Habermas (1997) states, in a political deliberation, the normative expectation of rational outcomes happens only in the balanced interplay between the spontaneous unsubverted circuits of communication in the public sphere, and institutionally structured political will formation (Habermas, 1997).

Instrumental rationality

In a deliberative reasoning process, instrumental rationality is one of the two main classifications of the rationalities involved in the process. To (Habermas, 1997), politics is concerned with substantive decision making, and is to that extent instrumental. On a similar account, (Elster, 1997) claims that when arguments in the political process are public in nature and instrumental in purpose, politics will achieve its purpose. On the other hand, non-instrumental political views like participatory democracy consider participation in a political argument as an end in itself, and its aim as exclusively educating participants, without considering the final decision as substantive (Elster, 1997). This links instrumental rationality to the necessity of reaching outcomes.

Trying to understand the relationship between power and law and the role they play in the administrative system, Habermas (1997) argues that law requires a normative perspective
and power requires an instrumental one. From the perspective of law, laws and policies require a normative justification, while from the perspective of power, laws and policies have the function as means for and constraints upon the reproduction of power (Habermas, 1997). The perspective of legislation and adjudication yields a normative approach to law. The perspective of preserving power yields a corresponding instrumental approach (Habermas, 1997). Hence, for the political system to effectively function, both instrumental and political rationalities have to be present in the discussion, as any failure in this regard would create a malfunctioned reason, which fails to fulfil the task of the reasoning process. Habermas then proposes that there should be a distinction in the concept of the political itself consonant with the duality of the normative and instrumental perspectives (Habermas, 1997).

Normative rationality

In an ideal deliberation, Cohen (1997) claims that norms can only be reached through the deliberation itself and not prior to it. The interpretation of norms can change through time and according to context, even if the wording is still the same, thus norms should be re-defined for each single association or deliberation (Habermas, 1997). Normative rationality is the other half of the rationalities involved in any reasoning process. Normative justification is required for laws and decrees to be established (Rawls, 1997). Liberals consider that human rights should have a normative priority over democracy and normative reason constitutes the means by which communicative power makes itself felt (Habermas, 1997). Also, normative reason can achieve an indirect steering effect only to the extent that the political system does not, for its part, steer the very production of these reasons (Habermas, 1997). In addition, the normative expectation of rational outcomes of a deliberation is grounded in the interplay between institutional structured political will formation, and the unsubverted circuits of communication in a public sphere that is not programmed to reach a decision (Habermas, 1997).

The role of communication in the reasoning process

Communication plays a significant role in the reasoning process, because of the fact that the deliberative reasoning process relies mainly on discursive arguments and discussions. This is especially the case when the participants in the reasoning process come from different backgrounds, expertise, and comprehensive doctrines, which makes finding common terminology challenging, which might affect the quality of communication and subsequently the quality of deliberation. There are two main sub-categories that have been
identified as relevant to this theme: the communicative acts involved in reasoning and the tools of communication.

**Communicative acts**

This theme collects the communicative acts involved in the reasoning process. Those acts contribute to the quality of reasoning and deliberation as they play a crucial role in communication between all participants in a deliberative association. Those acts are: expression, interpretation, and representation.

**Expression**

The deliberative view encourages all sorts of expression that contribute to reasoning as long as these forms of expression contribute to the formation of the interests, aims, and ideals of citizens. Thus, deliberative conception supports the protection of freedom of expression regardless of the content of that expression (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997). Preferences must be clearly expressed and justified to allow others in the deliberation to assess and weigh their own preferences accordingly, as those preferences should never be considered constant in advance, as they should be produced throughout the deliberation process (Cohen, 1997). Thus, clear and truthful expression will lead to better outcomes (Elster, 1997).

**Interpretation**

To be able to understand others in a deliberation, participants need to interpret the meaning behind other participants’ arguments. This is especially the case because participants in a deliberative association might come from different backgrounds, expertise, and have diverse comprehensive doctrines. This might make it hard for them to find a common ground for agreement. Hence the importance of the ability to interpret others’ points, and justifications.

(Rawls, 1997) use the example of the Supreme Court to show the role of public reasoning in providing the basis for interpretation of the constitution. He argues that in the Supreme Court it is the judges’ task to try to develop and express – in their reasoned opinions – their best interpretation of the constitution by means of their knowledge of what the constitution and constitutional precedents require. For them, the best interpretation is one that best suits the relevant body of those constitutional materials and justifies it in terms of the public conception of justice or a reasonable variation thereof (Rawls, 1997). What can be understood from this is that the jury use their own interpretation and understanding of the
constitution to try and convince others to agree with them. Their interpretation is normally based on their knowledge, expertise, backgrounds, and comprehensive doctrines.

**Representation**

Representation is giving consent to a person or an association to speak on one’s behalf in a certain setting or for a certain matter. In the political context it usually refers to representative democracies, where elected officials nominally speak for their constituents in political assemblies, i.e. parliaments or legislative assemblies. In deliberative democracy sincere representation of one’s own preferences is important, as it helps others understand the real motivations, concern, and reasons for a certain choice, which then might give them reason to agree with you. According to Cohen (1997), the practice of presenting reasons also contribute to the formation of a commitment to the deliberative resolution of political questions; this commitment then contributes to the sincere representation of preferences and convictions by the citizens themselves or by their representatives, while the likelihood of strategic misrepresentation declines.

Linking representation to the concept of authority, representatives attain the authority to decide on behalf of the people or organisation that delegated them to do so, which in the ideal deliberative conception requires that all authority should be derived from the people (Cohen, 1997). In addition, legitimate political authority should stem only from the sovereignty of the people (Habermas, 1997), as legislative authority can be attributed only to the united will of the people, which highlight the importance of the united will of the representatives in deciding for essential matters of the public (Habermas, 1997). Those representatives should be chosen while keeping in mind their capability to fulfil their task within the deliberation, and that they can participate effectively in the deliberative exchange of reason.

While discussing normative rationality and how it should affect the reasoning process, Habermas (1997) argues against the elitist interpretation of the principle of representation. In the latter interpretation, organized politics should be shielded from a forever-gullible popular opinion. For Habermas, however, in normative terms, this way of defending rationality against popular sovereignty is contradictory: if the voters’ opinion is irrational, then the election of representatives is no less so (Habermas, 1997). It seems like this interpretation questions the credibility of public opinion while relying on the opinions of only the well-trained experts in politics, which would – according to Habermas – isolate the deliberation from its context and affect the decision quality accordingly. This argument
shows that for a successful deliberation, the representation of all parties or stakeholders has to be insured for a proper representation of their preferences, ideas, and interests, which can be linked to the concept of diversity and broad participation that is one of the conditions of an ideal deliberation.

*Speech acts as tools of communication*

Discussions, arguments, and debates are the main tool of communication in the political context, and the fact that these speech acts are public expands their range of effect (Habermas, 1997), as being in public means more exposure. This exposure helps maintain the discussion’s main focus towards the public or common good. According to (Habermas, 1997), you cannot express individual wants or preferences in a public debate aimed at public good – it is psychologically impossible.

Public argument is the method for exchanging justification and reasoning between participants in a democratic association (Cohen, 1997). Argument according to the liberal approach guides the communicative practice of opinion and will formation. Hence, argument is the tool of communicatively practicing opinion and will formation in a political debate aimed at action or consensus (Habermas, 1997). In an ideal deliberation, justification of the terms and conditions of the democratic association should come discursively through public argument and reasoning (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997).

Public debate should be conducted in terms of considerations of the common good, as the only way to define common good is through public debate, where all are welcome to participate (Habermas, 1997). Broad and active participation is a key condition for an ideal deliberation, beside pluralism and diversity (Habermas, 1997). Public debate aims at finding a common ground regarding the conduct and the appropriateness of the means to arrive at a collective decision (Rawls, 1997). In order to embody the deliberative procedure in political institutions, they need to be prepared to accommodate the debate culture in their common practice, and to focus the debate on the common good (Cohen, 1997).

According to Habermas’ discursive democratic theory, the decisive political act is to engage in a public debate that aims at consensus (Habermas, 1997). Public discourse, in a political association, must mediate between reason and will, between the opinion formation of all and the majoritarian will formation of representatives, and it must be kept alive to continuously refine and reshape the terms of conduct and the common good (Habermas, 1997). In addition, public discourse finds a good response only in proportion to its
dispersal, and thus only under the condition of broad and active participation (Habermas, 1997). Broad and active participation brings to the discussion more information and more viewpoints that contribute to having a comprehensive view of the problems in hand.

Political and public discourse should not be guided by individual views of truth; rather, it should come collectively through reasoning and justification to find a common ground for laws and policies to be set (Rawls, 1997). Also, discussion allows convictions as they have developed in the minds of different human beings to influence one another; it clarifies them and enlarges the circle in which they find recognition (Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). It aids the knowledge transfer between participants and allows convictions and preferences to be reformed and developed. In addition, it is within these discussions that normative arguments can be expressed and discussed, and where sovereignty expresses itself under the discursive conditions of opinion and will formation (Habermas, 1997).

**Context**

The context of a deliberation has been highlighted as one of the factors affecting the design of the deliberative procedure (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). Context is defined as the combination of the socio-political settings at the certain time and place at which the deliberation is conducted (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997). However, another concept has been identified as relevant to the context of deliberation, especially in non-political settings, which is “non-public” reason, as suggested by (Rawls, 1997).

Aiming to define the limits of public reason, Rawls (1997) suggests that not all reasons are public in nature, as non-political associations in civil society, like churches, universities, or scientific associations and professional groups, have their own “non-public reasons”. He argues that corporate bodies and individuals need a way of reasoning about what is to be done, and ways to act reasonably and responsibly; they consider this way of reasoning as public with respect to their members, but non-public with respect to political society and to citizens generally (Rawls, 1997). He argues that different procedures and methods are appropriate to different contexts of association held by individuals and corporate bodies, given the different conditions under which their reasoning is carried out, as well as the different limitations to which their reasoning is subject. Also, in non-public reasoning, the criteria and methods of reasoning depend in part on how the nature, aim, and point of each association is understood, and the conditions of association (Rawls, 1997).
**Participants or the agents of action**

People participating in a democratic association play a significant role in determining the direction, quality, and outcomes of that association (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). They are referred to in the literature as people, citizens, participants, or the public. Also, depending on the purpose and context of that association, participants consist of citizens, representatives (politicians), or political parties (Rawls, 1997, Habermas, 1997). Participants are the agents of action; they perform the act of reasoning, they bring to the process their preferences, convictions, and aims, and they are responsible for delivering the outcomes of deliberation (Cohen, 1997). They prefer associations when the connection between deliberation and outcomes is clear (Elster, 1997), they prefer obvious ends, and consider the deliberation successful when the outcomes are clear. Also, participants regard the system itself as an object of their deliberation (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997).

Participants in a deliberative exchange of reason are required to maintain some characteristics for the proper conduct of a deliberation. These characteristics are: commitment (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Habermas, 1997), deliberative capacities (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997), reasonableness (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997), and willingness (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Habermas, 1997). Hence, the deliberative procedure encourages that participants in the deliberation should be made aware of those requirements, and it is the deliberative institution’s responsibility to make sure that participants meet those requirements (Cohen, 1997).

**Outcomes of deliberation**

A deliberation and reasoning process is meant to end up with a choice, decision, or judgement. These outcomes are the primary reason for deliberation in the first place. In the deliberative political view, for those outcomes to be legitimate deliberation and reasoning is a must (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). Thus, legitimacy can be considered the quality of the outcomes of deliberation.

**Choice**

It is only through reasoning that equal citizens share the commitment to the resolution of problems of collective choice (Cohen, 1997). Hence, collective choice is the outcome of deliberation, reasoning is the method, deliberation is the process, while equality and commitment are the conditions required for arriving at the outcomes and the fulfilment of
the goals. Preferences are the main drivers of choice (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997), and those preferences that are relevant to collective choice are only the ones that are formed or confirmed through deliberation (Cohen, 1997). Accordingly, a framework of free expression is required for the reasoned consideration of alternatives that comprises deliberation (Cohen, 1997). Here, free expression can result in clarifying the most relevant aspects or criteria for the choice, which can be seen as a form of transparency. Elster (1997) points out that political choice should be made through collective choice mechanisms, suggesting deliberation as a form of collective choice, and argues that by doing so, the problems of market behaviour – private choice or consumer sovereignty – could be solved.

Decision

The central aim in the deliberative process is to specify the institutional preconditions for deliberative decision making (Cohen, 1997). One of the three general features of an ideal deliberative procedure is that it aims to assert how collective decision making ought to be different from bargaining, contracting, and market-type interactions in two ways: first, in its explicit attention to considerations of the common good; and second, in a way that support forming the aims of the participants. This consideration of the common good aims to lessen the effect of individual preferences on their decisions (Cohen, 1997).

Discussing the work of Habermas, Elster (1997) argues that the decisive political act should be that of engaging in a public debate with the view of forming a consensus, and that politics is concerned with substantive decision making and is to that extent instrumental. No matter how normative the discussions are, they should end up with an objective decision, which is the aim of deliberation according to (Habermas, 1997).

For Habermas (1997), legislative authority can be attributed only to the united will of the people, because all right and justice is supposed to proceed from this authority. And the formation of this united will can only be achieved by deliberation with the aim of forming a consensus. And when consensus is hard to achieve, he suggests that voting can be the go-to method as a form of majoritarian decision making. However, this should be done only after thorough discussion and deliberation. He also asserts that deliberation’s rational outcomes are imbedded in the interplay between the institutionally structured political will formation, and the spontaneous, unstructured circuits of communication that are not programmed to reach decisions (Habermas, 1997).
In a parliamentary democracy, representatives should base their decisions on correct and discursively formed judgements, because institutions are designed in a way that means representatives normally do not want to expose themselves to criticism. Hence, exposure and transparency in a public reasoning process aids the justification of choice, and clarifications are required by the public. Also, the accountability of decision making in the public domain increases when the power of reasoning is the result of a pluralistic and diverse association, rather than the result of a group of intellectuals deliberating in an isolation from the needs of the public.

According to Rawls (1997), the way society formulates its plans, putting them in order of priority and making decisions accordingly, is through reason. For a political decision to be made lawfully, a discursive reasoning process should be the method. In addition, this reasoning process should incorporate the basic preliminary criteria for choice, methods of reasoning and justification, and the information relevant for the questions in hand. And this form the outline of deliberative public reasoning (Rawls, 1997).

**Judgement**

Elster (1997) asserts that there are certain people that have the quality of judgment to a higher degree than others; those people can take account of vast and diffuse evidence that clearly bears on the problem at hand, in such a way that no element is given unnecessary importance. They have the ability to prioritise the urgencies of the problem in hand based on experience, expertise, and general knowledge.

Judgement and decision making are affected by communicative power (Habermas, 1997), because in each interaction with others, either verbal, visual, or audio, a new piece of information is added or emphasized to or in the background knowledge of the people who are involved in that exchange of discourse (communication). This added experience or piece of information will shift, alter, or advance the understanding, attention or focus of those people, and eventually contribute to the way they assess or judge any issue they have in hand. Hence, the quality of communication has a major effect on judgment and decision making and is of paramount importance.

Habermas (1997) also justifies his advocacy for discursively or deliberatively formed judgements by claiming that the institutions are normally designed in a way that representatives do not want to expose themselves to the criticism of their voters or the public. It is their way to show that they have done their best to avoid individual and subjective judgments by sharing and exchanging their preferences, experiences, and
expertise with the aim of having a more comprehensive or better-informed judgment. Thus, by adhering to transparently formed discourse, jury members will be able to form their attitudes without being prone to criticism by their constituencies or the organisations they represent.

Rawls (1997), on the other hand, argues that all ways of reasoning, either individual, associational, or political, must acknowledge three common elements: the concept of judgment, the principle of inference, and the rule of evidence. Recognising or admitting those three elements (judgment, inference, evidence) is a key to any reasoning process. Hence, since the judgment process in competitions is being understood in this research as a reasoning process, these three elements must be recognised and admitted.

**Legitimacy**

Legitimacy results from the deliberative procedure; the members of a democratic association regard deliberative procedures as the source of legitimacy. Hence, it is important to them that the terms of this association be apparent to them as such. Those participants or members prefer institutions in which the connections between deliberation and outcomes are obvious, to ones in which the connections are less clear (Cohen, 1997).

Legitimacy can be seen as the state or quality of the outcomes of deliberation, as – in an ideal deliberative association – it is believed that the outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they can be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals (Cohen, 1997).

On the other hand, (Habermas, 1997) suggests that the new revolutionary consciousness has produced a new notion of legitimacy, which understands political practice in terms of self-determination and self-realization, and emphasizes trust in rational discourse, through which all political authority is supposed to legitimate itself. In addition, this new notion of legitimacy asserts that the only source of it should be the result of a reasoning process where justifications are supposed to be based on reason, using the tools of post-metaphysical theorizing (Habermas, 1997).

Rawls (1997) argues that the principle of political legitimacy requires – on matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice – that the basic structure and its public policies are justifiable to all citizens. In the liberal view, the principle of legitimacy has the same basis as the substantive principles of justice. The argument for the principle of legitimacy is as imperative as the argument for the principles of justice. In securing the interests of
their representees, political parties insist that the application of substantive principles be guided by judgment and inference, reasons, and evidence that their representees can reasonably be expected to endorse. Should the parties fail to achieve this, they would not be considered trustees. By accepting the idea of public reason and its principle of legitimacy, people agree that citizens share in political power as free and equal, and that as reasonable and rational they have a duty of civility to appeal to public reason. The only things they are allowed to be different in are which principles are the most reasonable basis of public justification (Rawls, 1997).

5.4.3 A procedure or a process, a model or a framework

Researchers in political contexts have different terms to describe deliberation. For some of them on the theory level it is called a procedure, while on the political practice level it is referred to as a model.

In the theory of deliberative democracy, the term used to describe a suggested design for deliberation is “procedure”, while the term “process” is used to refer to phenomena that are happening within the deliberation, such as the process of opinion and will formation, of legitimation, of rational discussion, and much else, as shown in Figure 5-15. The term “process” is also sometimes used in more general matters to refer to political process in general. This shows that the term process is used as a part of the procedure (Figure 5-16).

On the deliberative practice level, the term “model” is used in two different capacities: 1- to describe the matter in which the deliberation is being conducted on the practical level, for example models that are already used by deliberative organisations in the political context; 2- to refer to a suggested alternative constructed for others to follow when deciding to conduct a deliberation, for example the models suggested by Bächtiger et al. (2010), Bohman (1997), and Button and Mattson (1999). Hence, it can be noticed that the term model is used in the literature on practice to describe the application of a suggested procedure in a certain context, while the term procedure is used in the theoretical literature as an umbrella term that contains within it a process or several processes. Thus, this research will continue using the term procedure to describe the collection of the reasoning process in addition to the input and outcomes of that process (Figure 5-16).
This research suggests a deliberative theoretical procedure that has yet to be applied to the practice of judgement in architectural competitions. This has made using the proper term to
describe this model/procedure a bit of a challenge. Thus, the term “framework” is proposed as an alternative.

The outcome of the application of a procedure to a real context results in creating a model within that context. Locating a procedure within a specific context or practice results in a model being applied to this context. For applying the procedure into a certain context to create a model, a framework is needed to show how to deal with this context specifically. Proposing a framework that hosts the specifications of the procedure imbedded within it when it is applied to a conditional context results in a context-specific model. Then this research needed to propose a framework that contextualises the procedure from the theory of deliberative democracy in the practice of judgement in architectural competitions to create a model for application, while using insights from the practice of deliberative democracy to guide the application of the procedure into this research’s specific context, namely the judgement process in architectural competitions.

In the political theory of deliberative democracy, one of the features of the formal conception of deliberative democracy is that a framework is the terms of association (conditions) and the result or outcome of that association; this is the view that the members of the association (participants) should share (Cohen, 1997). Hence, the framework of any deliberative association should be the conditions that ease and encourage conducting the ideal deliberation in a certain context, and that are carried within the reviewing mechanism that maintains that those terms of association or conditions are continuously revised and contextualised according to the goal of that association. Cohen (1997) also suggests that it is the institution’s responsibility to provide the framework for the formation of will, and to determine if the conditions or terms of association are in place. This framework – provided by the institutions – should offer the arrangements that are not “exogenous constraints” (Cohen, 1997, p. 82) of the aggregation of preferences, but instead help to shape their content the way citizens choose to advance it (Cohen, 1997). By this Cohen is emphasising the normative reasoning that should be incorporated within reasoning. Rawls (1997, p.104), on the other hand, suggests that the main point of an ideal public reasoning process is that:

citizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regard as a political conception of justice based on values that the others can reasonably be expected to endorse, and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend that conception so understood.
Here we can see that the framework is meant to house the discussions on political issues based on the participants’ values – regardless of how divergent they are – and to provide the non-physical infrastructure for the discussion with regards to the political conception of justice for all involved. Thus, the participants should be ready to explain their preferences or choice to other citizens in the deliberation, with an aim to bring them to agree with them. And for that, freedom of expression is a vital part of the framework that makes the deliberation possible (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997). To sum up, the framework of deliberation must provide the designated procedure that is required for deliberative reasoning, within a certain context. This procedure in turn should house the conditions and the methods of the reasoning process in a way that helps the agents achieve the deliberation goals, and arrive at the desired outcomes, in the best possible way.

In addition, as a general term, a conceptual framework can be seen as a network, or a “plane” of interlinked concepts that together provides a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena (Jabareen, 2009). As Frodeman et al. (2012) suggest, “building theoretical frameworks on the bases of the claims and hypotheses developed in other disciplinary contexts can be both enlightening and an effective way to be fully engaged in the research topic”. Thus, the framework of this study was set to focus on establishing the conditions for operationalizing the deliberative democratic procedure into our special context, namely the judgement process in architectural competitions, while considering context requirements, and the characteristics of the participating agents or stakeholders. Within that procedure, seven themes were identified as determining the way that the procedure would be formulated: the input to the process, the goal, reasoning method, the context of deliberation, the agents of action, the outcomes of the reasoning process, and the conditions of the deliberation. The conditions can be separated into two main categories, requirements related to the contexts of deliberation and characteristics related to the participating agents.

5.5 Summary
Since the aim of this stage of this research was to investigate and interrogate the phenomenon of deliberative democracy in the political context, a thematic analysis of selected literature on the models of deliberation as used in political practice was conducted. These analyses resulted in several concerns regarding their relevance to different contexts, as they proved to be context-dependent if not context-specific. Those concerns then drove the research to seek further clarification on the real, seminal and decisive core of the phenomenon of deliberative democracy in its context of origin that is political theory. This
stage of analysis resulted in the production of a theoretical framework that describes the outlines of the deliberative democratic procedure in its political context. This framework comprises seven major themes that were collected under one umbrella concept which is the procedure of deliberative democracy. Those themes include: the input to deliberation, reasoning process, participating agents, the context of deliberation, the conditions of deliberation, the goal of deliberation, and finally, the outcomes of deliberation. Each of those themes have several categories and concepts which have been discussed thoroughly in the political context.

Then a framework was devised and presented (Figure 5-17) that shows the connections and hierarchy of themes and categories. In the next chapter this framework will be contextualised into the judgement process in architectural competitions, and then reformed to be used at practice level for architectural competitions.
The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice

N. Al-Qaysi

Figure 5-17: Diagram of the deliberative procedure
CHAPTER SIX

CONTEXTUALISING THE FRAMEWORK INTO ARCHITECTURAL COMPETITIONS
6 Contextualising the framework into architectural Competitions

6.1 Introduction
Following onto the next step of theory building, this chapter aims to implement and reconceptualise the themes and categories that resulted from the analysis of the literature on the deliberative political context, both in practice and theory. To do that, every concept will be discussed and interrogated in accordance to the specifications of the context, then redefined and/or refined to fit the requirements and limitations of the intended context of destination, which is the judgement process in architectural competitions. It will then conclude with presenting the deliberative judgement procedure in architectural design competitions which can get customised or personalised for and implemented into any design competition once such adjustments are made.

6.2 Contextualising themes in architectural competitions
Each one of the themes resulting from the analysis of deliberative democratic theory and practice in the previous chapter is discussed thoroughly, in comparison to the judgement process in architectural competitions (Figure 6-1). The aim was for them to be contextualised then to be able to be implemented into the context of architectural competitions. Those themes have been grouped to form a framework that describes the main factors contributing to a proper conduct of the deliberative process in the context of architectural competitions.

Figure 6-1: The context of judgement in architectural competitions in comparison with the political context
The analysis in the previous chapter was done on two levels, theory and practice, in regard to deliberative democracy in the political context. These two levels contributed to the breadth and depth required for the analysis (Figure 6-2).

Because the judgement process in architectural competitions can be seen as a practice, the first round of thematic analysis focused on a selected literature regarding the practical level. However, for several reasons – detailed in section 5.3.2 – another round of analysis was required on the political theory level. And because of the inherited similarities between the theory and practice of deliberative democracy in the political context, there has been an element of unavoidable repetition. In addition, the same structure that was used to present the results of the analysis of both the theory and practice of deliberative democracy in the political context is used again as the structure for contextualising the resulted themes; this have resulted in a feeling of repetition that continues in this chapter.

6.2.1 The procedure

In the political context many if not all the researchers under analysis – on both the theoretical and practical levels – have presented some sort of deliberative procedure. Each one of them formed their procedure based on what they regard as more relevant to their
view of democracy and based on their readings of the work of others in the field of political science. However, through the analysis conducted in the previous chapter it has been identified that the deliberative procedure mainly consists of seven components that form the main themes that contribute to conducting an ideal deliberative procedure. Those themes are: the input to the deliberation, the reasoning process, the goals of the deliberation, the conditions for conducting a deliberation, the context of the deliberation, the agents of action, and the outcomes expected of the deliberation.

In this section a procedure for the deliberative judgement process is discussed and each one of the themes that resulted from the analysis phase in the previous chapter is interrogated thoroughly with comparison to the context of the judgement process in architecture competitions. The procedure in the context of architectural competitions must be designed according to the specific context, goal, and conditions, and with respect to the nature of the participants or stakeholders of the process (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997). Hence, the general outlines of the procedure should be decided early in the process, as a result of the collaboration between the client and the organizer. Then jury members need to be informed and educated about those outlines at the brief.

6.2.2 The context of deliberation

In architectural competitions, the context is the when, where, what, why, and who (Benedikt, 2007). And while time and place can be an effective factor in the process, as suggested by Fishkin (2009), the latter three are the most important. The “what” here represents the competition setting itself, the competition element inherited within the context, the nature of the proposals (design entries), the rules and regulations, and the procedure of choosing the winner. The “why” here represents the goal of the process, which is the choice or decision. And the “who” is who is involved directly or indirectly; those involved directly are the jury members, organisers, and clients, those who are involved indirectly are the end users, and the public; the contestants (designers or architects) occupy a middle state between the two positions: they are directly involved in the judgement process through their design entries, and indirectly because they are excluded from the judgement due to the anonymity condition.

In architectural competitions, the context of judgement can be considered similar to Rawls (1997) idea of a non-public reasoning process, for two reasons. First, architectural competitions can be seen as an associational practice, that involves several stakeholders each with a different aim or priority (AIA, 2010a). Second, they involve some sort of
reasoning within the decision-making process, comprising three levels of reasoning, individual, group, and organisational. Hence, for the reasoning process within judgement to be more deliberative, jury members should be encouraged to justify their preferences using evidence that is imbedded in the architectural practice itself – design entries, similar examples, precedents, etc., as the evidence required in each context must come from the exact same context (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997).

Different contexts of association – held by individuals or corporate bodies – require different procedures and methods, given the different conditions under which their reasoning is carried out (Figure 6-3), as well as the different limitations to which their reasoning is subject (Rawls, 1997). This implies that, for architectural competitions’ judgement processes, the conditions and aims of the whole process contribute to shaping the procedure and reasoning methods and the criteria of judgment. For that reason, the criteria of choice, and sometimes the methods, can evolve during the discussions and dialogue between the jury members (Volker, 2010a, Kreiner et al., 2011, Rönn, 2009).

There are some obvious similarities between the judgement process and deliberative democratic procedure.

In summary, the context of each competition is different, hence each requires different conditions and procedures. However, there are general elements that are common and need to be addressed and defined for each competition. Those general elements are related to the broader context of architectural competitions as a distinct phenomenon, and to the general notion of quality of architecture design. These general elements are to be addressed in the next chapter.

Figure 6-3: The levels of public reasoning compared to judgement in architectural competitions
6.2.3 The input to the deliberation

The input to the judgement process in architectural competitions consists of three main elements: the competition brief, the jury members’ input into the process, and the contesting architects’ input. The brief contains and embodies the laws and regulations, the requirements of the client in the design project, and sometimes the site characteristics. The jury members’ inputs are their sets of values and expertise, their comprehensive doctrines, and their preferences and opinions, in addition to their interpretation of the brief. The contesting designers’ inputs are their interpretation of the brief and their collective expertise, represented in the design entries. In the political context the input to deliberation comes from the deliberants themselves in the shape of preferences, opinions, goals, and comprehensive doctrines.

The jury members’ input

Each participant in the jury comes with their own preferences, and a different definition of what they regard as “good”, or their own definition of the concept of quality in architecture. This could include preference for a certain architectural style, or a certain trend, which may impact their decisions and choices in the judgement process. Also, they come to the process with previous experience, convictions about what they regard as good or aesthetically appealing, and with background knowledge that shapes the way they form their understandings at first and, consequently, their judgments (Rönn, 2009, Rönn, 2010, Cucuzzella, 2014). However – as has been seen in the political context – the willingness to revise one’s understanding of one’s own preferences requires commitment to the idea of deliberation (Cohen, 1997); which means participants need to be open and receptive to others, and fully aware of the limits and requirements of their tasks.

Those preferences that are the input of the deliberation, or what can be called “initial preferences”, are formed based on collective life experience, knowledge, sets of values, and beliefs (Volker, 2010a, Svensson, 2013). The point here is that jury members should participate in the deliberation process keeping in mind that those initial preferences are going to be reshaped or redefined during the reasoning process. They should also be willing to accept this revision of convictions and accept the results accordingly. In addition, each participant should be aware that the only way to convince others in the group to agree with their own preference or choice is by finding the reasons and justifications that convince others to agree with them. This same act of having to present reasons and justification, then, contributes to the formation of the commitment of that
person to the outcomes of the deliberation (Cohen, 1997). In a simple way, it contributes to the person’s full trust in their choice, and their willingness to back it up and to advance it further.

In architectural competitions, the participants in the judgement process come from different backgrounds and have different types of expertise. These initial life experiences and types of knowledge play a vital role in shaping and steering those peoples’ choices and decisions (Svensson, 2013, Rönn, 2010). This experience, background knowledge, and expertise make up their comprehensive doctrines. Hence, it is important to know how they affect the reasoning and judgement process.

The different stakeholders involved in the judgment process each have their own comprehensive doctrines. The justifications they offer in the reasoning process normally come from these doctrines. However, those justifications should be presented with an aim to make others understand, to then reach the state of an overlapping consensus (Rawls, 1997). And the critical balance between one’s comprehensive doctrines, and what they perceive as true after the deliberation (collective opinion formation), is what forms the core of the deliberation process (Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). It is about using one’s own knowledge to help others appreciate what is at stake, fill the gaps in knowledge, and let yourself be influenced by others, without prejudices or biases. The fact that the evidence and justifications they use come from those various doctrines, actually, should be seen as a necessity to the reasoning process. This is because the layers of meaning and justification contribute to the comprehensive understanding of the design task and contribute to a better decision eventually.

In architectural design competitions, architects are normally in a majority (Rönn, 2010). Other participants in the judgement process might come in a variety of roles: clients, organisers, engineers, environmental experts, managers, politicians, etc. (Rönn, 2010, Cucuzzella, 2014, White, 2014). They have such diverse backgrounds that sometimes this means them have very little in common. They might not agree on the definition of simple concepts because they do not have a common terminology (White, 2014). Hence, dialogue in the reasoning process and the act of justification contribute to finding a common terminology or common ground. But this requires that jury members themselves make sure to question each other’s choices, justifications, and preferences, to then be able to base their judgement on the newly-developed collective understanding for the design task as the problem they have in hand.
The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice

N. Al-Qaysi

Other inputs that are not directly related to the participants’ characteristics consist of: the design entries, the competition brief, the rules and regulations, and most importantly – as will be argued – the procedure of judgement or choice.

**The contestants’ input**

The contesting architects or designers contribute to the competition process massively, however their contribution to the judgment process is only indirect, due to the anonymity regulation and the fact that they are not present during the judgment process. Their input is reflected in their design entries or proposals; this is also where their expertise and convictions are reflected.

*Expertise and convictions*

In the practice of architecture, in addition to expertise, there are many inherited convictions that form the landscape of knowledge in this practice. Architects are trained to be designers, with multiple skills and knowledge that are derived from different realms, such as social and behavioural sciences, art, culture, history, and to some extent construction engineering (Rönn, 2014a, Kreiner et al., 2011). This complexity lingers through the design process first, then to judgement in architecture competitions consequentially (Kreiner et al., 2011).

Their convictions are the result of intangible knowledge that is inherited within the practice. Notions like aesthetics, quality, and a lot more have no single definition, they are rather normative in nature. These notions change and evolve according to different factors, and they are transferred and shared communicatively through generations of architects. Architectural education plays a significant role in this process of knowledge transfer between generations of architects and designers (Cucuzzella, 2014, Lans and Volker, 2008). In competitions, the judgement process is the arena where all this expertise and knowledge is tested, analysed and assessed. The contestants input is conveyed through their design entries. Hence the importance of the clarity and efficiency of the presentation of design entries.

*Design entries*

The design entries are a collection of the visualisations of the design proposal submitted to the competition by the contestants. They can come in the shape of 2D or 3D visualisations, or a physical 3D scale model (Plowright and Cole, 2012). They represent a designed setting for a given site of a project. In addition, they represent their creators’
(architects/designers) visualisation of the future of a certain site; this visualisation embodies the requirements of the competition brief, the architects’ interpretation of the design task, and their use of their expertise to produce this (Plowright and Cole, 2012, Kreiner et al., 2011, Utaberta and Hassanpour, 2012). Therefore, they are not completely material, they are the physical embodiment of the design task shaped or interpreted by the architect or designer’s expertise and knowledge, with respect to the physical context of the project (the site), and the time context (now/near future).

The determination of what is considered “the best quality” between design entries in an architectural competition is the core of the judgement process (Rönn, 2011b, Volker, 2010a). This cycle of representation and interpretation requires some very distinct communicative capacities in the participants. Those capacities in the political context are related to speech and argument or debate, however in the context of the judgement process in architectural design competitions, it is the ability to understand and interpret architectural work, as the medium of communication here is not only speech, but visualisations and drawings, which are forms of communication that are not familiar or common in other disciplines (Svensson, 2013, Van Wezemaal et al., 2011). Architecture – like many other practices – has context-specific terminologies that lay people from outside the profession might not be able to relate to. This means that participants should at least understand the basic terminologies, and be able to interpret visualisations. It also requires that design entries should be clear and understandable for most participants in the jury. In addition, the presentation methods used by designers should aid the communicative process, without compromising either the aesthetic quality nor the clarity.

The brief

The brief is the document that embodies the client’s and organiser’s vision of what they want and expect from the contestants, and the limitations and regulations of the competition. It consists of the project description, the design requirements, the site characteristics, their aims for the project, and the initial criteria of judgement (Ir. M. Prins et al., 2006, Nasar, 2006, AIA, 2010a, RIBA, 1986b, RIBA, 1986a). The rules and regulations of the competition are the two main categories; the first is the rules and regulations of commissioning architectural work, these are set and designed by the public legislator on a national level. The second is the rules or limitations set for a specific competition, which are sometimes derived from the specifications of the project itself or the site (AIA, 2010a, RIBA, 1986a). The initial criteria are those which are decided by the
The client/organiser and are mentioned in the brief. They represent the client’s priorities and aims for the project, but not necessarily the public’s or the end user’s priorities and aims. These initial criteria – as has been discussed in previous chapters – tend to change and evolve during the deliberation into a more specific set of criteria that are informed by the collective discussions of jury members.

6.2.4 The conditions

This section discusses which of the conditions of deliberation could still be valid and useful for the judgement process. Those conditions are separated into two main categories. The first are the conditions required for the participants in deliberation, which should be provided and maintained by the organising body. The second are the conditions that are required from or are related to the participants in the deliberation, or the jury members in this case.

The conditions required for the deliberation process

Starting with the conditions required for the deliberation process to be legitimate, or to get close to the ideal, these conditions are:

- Autonomy
- Equality
- Freedom/liberty
- Fairness
- Plurality and diversity

Autonomy

In the context of architectural competitions, autonomy is guaranteed formally. However, there are several issues that can affect autonomy in competitions, and some of them are rooted in human perception and nature. Issues like conformity, adaptive preferences, and accommodationist preferences – that are considered ingenuine preferences – can affect the autonomy of the participants (Elster, 1997). It is expected that jury participants will affect each other. However, this effect is not preferred when it is the result of those ingenuine preferences, and not a result of a healthy procedure of reasoning that is based on a well-structured process of opinion and will formation. Thus, to reduce the effects of those ingenuine preferences the conditions that aid and allow the deliberative formation of preferences are encouraged. These are conditions that allow the exercise of deliberative capacities, or in short when all the rest of the conditions for an ideal deliberation are
fulfilled. And most precisely the condition of reasonableness, as reasonableness will ensure that participants do not accept any preference without proper justification. Also, it is the institution’s – in this case the organisers’ – responsibility to provide the framework for the deliberative formation of will under the ideal conditions required for autonomous preferences and, consequently, autonomous judgement.

Equality

Equal participation is one of the essential conditions for ideal deliberation, as it is considered as one of the basic requirements for a just association, because each one of the participating stakeholders needs to be represented equally in the deliberation (Bohman, 1997, Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Neblo, 2015, Rawls, 1997). This equal representation maintains that every party’s needs, requirements, and concerns are represented, which contributes to maintaining a proper prioritising of the most relevant design and judgement criteria (Kreiner et al., 2011, Rönn, 2010, Svensson, 2013).

The parties or stakeholders that are not represented directly in the jury are the contesting architects, and – in most cases – the end users (Rönn, 2009). However, the design entries can be seen as a non-human representative of the contesting architects (Kreiner et al., 2011). Those entries, instead of using spoken language, utilise drawings and visualisations as communication media (Van Wezemael et al., 2011), which requires the jury members to be able to interpret those drawings and visualisations, thereby communicating with the designers’ intents, meanings, and aims (Rönn, 2010). End users are sometimes represented in the jury, and sometimes not. In a case where they are, this representative should be able to effectively communicate and express their actual needs and requirements to others in the group so that they are equally and fairly represented.

One of the most important points that a deliberative procedure in any context should highlight is that all participants are formally equal (Bohman, 1997, Cohen, 1997); the procedure does not single out individuals or recognise any party as superior to others. In addition, it should be clear that everyone has equal right to participate and to vote, if required. Also, the procedure should ensure equal distribution of resources, which in this case is information.

Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression is regarded – in the political context – as a fundamental condition for any deliberative reasoning process (Bohman, 1997, Button and Mattson, 1999, Cohen,
Participants are encouraged to use any sort of clarification or information they find useful to express their thoughts, ideas, and convictions. Freedom of expression allows the free flow of information required for a proper formation of will (Habermas, 1997, Cohen, 1997). In the judgement process in architectural competitions, the participants in the jury session are encouraged to express their opinions and choices freely. This is because, without sharing freely, they would lack the proper information required for a comprehensive understanding of the task. Also, they are expected to express their reasons and justifications for the choices they make, then to be able to convince others to agree with them to advance their choice or what they think the better-quality entry. Freedom of expression is meant to ensure that participants freely share their comments and concerns regarding what they see as a priority, or the weighing of the criteria of decision. Determining what is considered better quality can only be fixed by informed, autonomous judgements, that are the result of a proper reasoning process, where participants exercise their deliberative capacities freely with consideration of the common good.

One of the conditions for the deliberative procedure to be complete is that the participants have the liberty to express their preferences and concerns freely without getting or being encouraged not to do so from any other party or participant. Liberty of expression is a right that needs to be maintained for all the participants. Any hindrance to liberty of expression would affect the autonomy of choice, and eventually the power balance in the group of jury members, which might lead to steering the judgement process into a non-balanced outcome.

**Fairness**

For a democratic procedure to be ideal, fairness has been pointed out as a substantial condition (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997). Fairness in architectural judgement in the competition context can be translated in two ways. First, it is required from the organisers to be fair in providing all the participants in the jury session with an equal share of resources. In this context the resources are the access to all the information available for the competition; documents, entries, and regulations need to be accessible to all jury members. Second, fair representation of all parties involved in the judgement process; this requires the participation of all stakeholders, including the end users, contesting architects, and the public. Fair representation of all can be achieved through fair procedure that leads to fair outcomes (White, 2014). Assuming that contesting architects are represented
through their design entries, the other two stakeholders – end users and the public – need also to be involved in the judgement process – directly or indirectly through their representatives – for a fair representation of all.

In judgment, fair representation can maintain a comprehensive view on the problem in hand – without risking the loss of a valid insight – where all the stakeholders are represented equally and fairly in the jury sessions; this will ensure holistic and comprehensive insight on the issues on stake.

*Plurality, diversity, and inclusion*

Plurality is a condition required for the deliberative procedure to be ideal, because in the ideal deliberative procedure, plurality and diversity are welcomed and encouraged as it represents the pluralistic nature of modern societies (Bächtiger et al., 2010, Bohman, 1997, Button and Mattson, 1999, Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Fishkin, 2009, Habermas, 1997, Ryfe, 2002). Plurality of deliberation needs to be maintained by allowing more broad and diverse participation (Habermas, 1997). In the context of architectural competitions, plurality comes from the diverse stakeholders involved in the process of judgement, and the fact that clients, end users, and local authorities’ representatives come from all kinds of expertise and practices (Cucuzzella, 2014, Rönn, 2010). The inclusion of all varied parties is a necessity for the coherence of discussions, as each one of the diverse participants represents a certain profession or expertise, which contribute to comprehensiveness of reasoning. Even when all those involved in the judgement process come with an architectural background – architects and allied professions – still, a plurality of preferences, convictions, and ideals will be present. It is important to encourage plurality and diversity as it contributes to maintaining the comprehensiveness of the debate and the plurality of the resources of information, which results in having a more comprehensive understanding of the design task and multiple points of view.

*The conditions required from participants*

The conditions that are required from the participating stakeholders are:

- Reasoned agreement
- Commitment
- Deliberative capacities
- Reasonableness
- Willingness
Rational and reasoned agreement is an essential condition for an ideal deliberation (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Rawls, 1997). It is basically the condition before consensus is realised; it has to be achieved through deliberation for the deliberation to be ideal and the outcomes to be legitimate. Reasoned agreement is especially important under the condition of pluralism. In the context of architectural competitions, the plurality of stakeholders involved, and the diversity of their preferences and convictions (Svensson, 2013), makes reasoned agreement more of a priority. Achieving reasoned agreement will ensure that all the stakeholders are convinced by the results of deliberation, which consequently leads to less controversy.

The way to achieve reasoned agreement is through the reasoning process, by means of justification and evidence-based discussion and argumentation. In the judgement process in architectural competitions, the matters that are at a stake are relatively less pressing than the ones on constitutional level. In political contexts the debate might be regarding a constitutional right for a group of people against the will of another group, thus the common good might not be easy to identify for everyone in the deliberation. But in the context of an architectural competition, the subject of the deliberation would be prioritising the relevant criteria for the specific competition (Kreiner et al., 2011), the aesthetic appeal of an alternative (Van Wezemael et al., 2011), or a certain alternative order in the shortlist (Volker, 2010a), which can be seen as relatively easier to agree on, especially under the condition of reasonableness. However, when full agreement is hard to achieve, voting might be the solution, especially when the alternatives are close in content. In this case it can be seen as practical agreement where participants do not necessarily agree with one another, but they choose to set their differences aside for the common good. Voting is not a new procedure to architectural competitions as it has been used throughout the discussions in some cases (Svensson, 2013). However, in the deliberative process voting is only welcomed after a properly conducted reasoning process, where all the conditions for an ideal deliberation are met in the first place.

Commitment

Commitment is an essential condition for deliberative practice in the political context (Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Habermas, 1997). However, in the context of architectural competitions, the jury members are mostly experts in their field and have been handpicked based on their past experience and expertise (Rönn, 2010). They are supposedly committed
and willing to participate. They regard their participation as a privilege or an honour, as it implies recognition of them as experts in their field (Rönn, 2009). This commitment means that they should be willing to revise their own preferences and convictions, and to coordinate their efforts to resolve their differences, towards reaching the deliberation’s intended aim, which is consensus (Cohen, 1997). Also, this commitment implies an obligation to advancing the common good and respecting the individual autonomy of other participants (Habermas, 1997). Their commitment should also be to the deliberative practice itself, exchanging reasons and justification, and to the rational, normative, communicative formation of preferences and collective will, utilising means of dialogue and discussion to revise their own norms and reforming them on site.

Maintaining that commitment is the responsibility of participants in the deliberation, however it is up to the deliberative institution to monitor and promote such commitment. In the case of architectural competitions, it should be part of the general procedure, as suggested by this research. This procedure should introduce the condition of commitment, what is required from the jury members to maintain this commitment, and how it can improve their task.

Deliberative capacities

Deliberative capacities in the context of architectural competitions are related partly to the expertise of the jury members. However, it is not just expertise, it is also the capacity to express and accept reason. It requires jury members to effectively be able to share and express their preferences, opinions, and justifications, with the others in the group (Bohman, 1997), and to do their best to persuade others to agree with what they see as true or good, without prejudice. This sharing and exchange of knowledge might involve using a practice-based special terminology that might not have the same meaning in other practices, hence part of deliberative capacities is the ability to ask for clarification, and to offer clarification when required (Bohman, 1997). It is part of the collective efforts of jury members to comprehend the design task they have in hand and to determine the most relevant criteria and how to prioritise them. Thus, jury members are required to have the ability to balance their own knowledge, which is the result of expertise, comprehensive doctrines with regards to others’ views, and the ability to be open to change and being changed throughout the reasoning process.
Reasonableness

Reasonableness is required for any deliberative procedure; it is the ability to understand one’s own reasons for preferences, first to be able to convince others (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997), and secondly to consider others’ reasons and allow them to reshape one’s own if convinced. This act of presenting reason contributes to the formation of commitment to the deliberation and contributes to sincere representation of one’s own preferences with consideration of the common good of all stakeholders (Cohen, 1997). In architectural competitions, reasonableness requires openness and sensitivity to both the nature of the design task itself and to the diverse stakeholders involved. Balancing the most relevant priorities and needs contributes to the evolution of the judgement criteria. These evolved criteria are conceived as positive and welcomed adjustments because they are the result of the collective reasoning of jury members.

Willingness

Willingness is a condition that is required from the participants in deliberation in the political context; it is meant to maintain effective participation (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). Willingness is related to forming commitment to the deliberation, and it can be seen as the participants’ willingness to listen to others’ reasons and share reasons with others in the group. It also involves the willingness to revise or revisit their own values, preferences, and convictions throughout the deliberation (Cohen, 1997).

In the context of the judgement process in architectural competitions, the participants or jury members are mostly experienced decision makers (Svensson, 2013). Their willingness to participate is supposed to be guaranteed as their participation is not obligatory. However, their willingness to share their opinions, listen, and allow themselves to be affected by others’ opinions should be promoted in the deliberative procedure. Hence, they need to be reminded of their tasks, duties, and rights as part of the efforts to establish more transparent procedure or practice. Also, to allow those new to the practice, or those who are not so experienced or lay people, to be familiar with the procedure and what it requires, and what is at stake.

6.2.5 The agents

In architectural competitions the agents can be seen as all those who participate directly or indirectly in the judgement process. In architectural competitions, the participants and stakeholders are not always the same group, as the direct participants are the clients,
organisers, contestants, and jury members (Svensson, 2013, Chupin et al., 2015), while the stakeholders can be more than those, as end users and the public (Wendelien Lans, 2008, Valand, 2010) may be added to the list as indirect stakeholders. In most cases, the end users are not the clients, especially in public and government projects. People who live or work in the neighbouring area can also be considered indirect stakeholders, as they – whether they want to or not – have to deal with the consequences of the existence of a certain building in the neighbourhood or the city in which they live (Valand, 2010). Whether good or bad, big or minor, these consequences still render them as valid stakeholders. They should thus be represented in the jury sessions, as their opinions, concerns, and criticism are worth considering in the debate.

Although the contestants and end users are vital agents in the competition process, they – apart from in very rare cases – do not participate in the judgement process (Valand, 2010). This forms a gap in the communication loop in that process. However, the contestants’ participation in the judgement process takes the shape of being represented by their design entries, as discussed above (Kreiner et al., 2011). This representation consequentially requires interpretation by jury members, hence the importance of juries’ ability to read and interpret architectural drawings and visualisations (Rönn, 2009). In the case of end users, a selected representative can be assigned to represent them in the jury to make sure their opinions and concerns are heard. Those participating agents are required to sustain the same conditions for the deliberation to be ideal as any other participants, i.e. reasoned agreement, commitment, deliberative capacities, reasonableness, and willingness. Each one of these has been talked through in the conditions section.

6.2.6 The goals of deliberation

The initial aim of the competition process in general is to find the best design quality (Rönn, 2011b, Volker, 2010c). However, there are several other goals for the competition, such as innovation, education, or pushing the boundaries of the practice (Rönn, 2009, Spencer et al., 2002). Although secondary to the competition, they can be seen as essential for architectural practice in general. Also, in some cases, publicity is one of the goals of the competition, as suggested by some scholars (Spencer et al., 2002, Nasar, 2006, Younés, 2012). Publicity here is meant to attract attention to the project, or to the client organisation, for example, for a certain goal that the client has (Spencer et al., 2002).

According to the deliberative procedure, the goal of a competition should be consensus, which is produced through reasoned agreement after thorough consideration of all issues
that are discussed or raised by the participants in the jury process and that are related to the design quality for the project in hand. However, when consensus cannot be achieved, there should be a backup method; in this case voting might be the go-to method, but only after a full reasoning process.

Justice to all stakeholders is also an important goal for the judgement process, because failure to establish a just procedure will affect the legitimacy of the outcomes, and end up being a source of controversy. A just procedure means allowing all stakeholders to achieve a full, comprehensive understanding of the design task from all the diverse viewpoints, and this allow all the participants to consider what is at a stake regarding the project in hand. This well-rounded consideration then contributes to the consensus, which will then reduce any controversy related to the judgement in the future. Another important goal of a deliberative procedure might be conflict resolution, which might be considered secondary to consensus, as conflict resolution is only needed when conflict arises, although this is sometimes inevitable. However, it is a partial goal, as it is not the main goal in competition settings.

6.2.7 The reasoning process

At the core of judgement process in architectural competitions at least two levels of reasoning can be identified, one individual and one at the group level. In the common practice of competitions, after the jury members have been through the design entries, there will be a meeting where every one of them presents their choice of preference in the shape of a shortlist (Crossman, 2015). At that meeting, jury members normally discuss those choices and give their reasons as to why they have made their choice. Those reasons ideally should be derived from the judgment criteria (Crossman, 2015). However, using the deliberative procedure as the base for comparison, those preferences can be seen as the result of several layers of reasoning on the individual level, as each juror has gone through their own reasoning process to justify their choice for themselves at first, and then found the reasons that are persuasive to others in the group to agree with. Those justification are based on their understanding for the competition criteria and presented with the aim of making their choice sound legitimate or reasonable to the others in the jury panel.

Every judgement process should start with defining or at least acknowledging three elements, which are required for any reasoning process: the rule of evidence, the principle of inference, and the concept of judgement. To do so the jury members themselves, organizers, and clients are required to review, amend, or define those elements for every
competition. They must address the questions of what the aim of the competition is, and how to prioritize criteria. Also, they must address what is accepted of the jury members as a justification for their preferences, and what are the measures and rules for the evidence required.

In non-public reasoning, in the political context, the criteria and methods of reasoning depends in part on how the nature, aim, and point, of each association is understood, and the conditions of association (Rawls, 1997). In architectural competitions, the criteria are normally derived from the nature of the project or design required, and from the nature of the client, end users, and the building site (Rönn, 2011b, Saunders, 2007, Svensson, 2013, Ir. M. Prins et al., 2006, Volker, 2010a). In addition, in the current practice of architectural competitions, jury members are not required to justify or give proper evidence for their preferences, apart from in some rare cases.

This research suggests a procedure that emphasizes the importance of the reasoning process involved via the suggestion of making it more transparent and deliberate. Jury members should be informed and made aware of the specifications and limits of the reasoning process, and the type of justifications required within it. The main aspects contributing to the reasoning process in this procedure are: 1- method of reasoning, i.e. shaping preferences and the formation of opinion and will; 2- the subject of the reasoning process, i.e. the common or public good; 3- the rationalities of reasoning, instrumental and normative; and 4- the communication involved in the reasoning process, i.e. communicative and speech acts.

**Justification and evidence giving**

According to the ideal deliberative procedure, justification through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens is the core of the reasoning process. It contributes to the formation of opinion and will and is the way to ensure agreement between participating parties (Bächtiger et al., 2010, Bohman, 1997, Cohen, 1997, Elster, 1997, Habermas, 1997, Rawls, 1997). In architectural competitions, justification can be argued for based on what is offered by/in design entries, or available in precedents, the history of architecture, facts related to the nature of the building site, or scientific facts from other fields of knowledge that are related to the specific competition. The jury members participating in the reasoning process need to be provided with the content and limits of the deliberative procedure at the beginning of the process. Part of this procedure should be the criteria for justification, that is, the type of information accepted as evidence in the context of architectural
competitions, which could be scientific reports, information relevant to the nature of site, or regulations that have not been considered, and much more.

In a non-public reasoning process, the criteria of justification and methods of reasoning and weighing evidence depend on the aim or point of each association, and the conditions under which it pursues its ends (context) (Rawls, 1997). Hence, considering architectural judgement as a reasoning process, the aim is to find the best design proposal for a certain project within certain time and place contexts. The justification accepted in the reasoning process in architectural competitions, should be based on: 1- the quality of the design entries in response to the competition brief and the solutions for the design problem they offer within the exact time and place context; 2- examples from the history of architecture that have similarities to the current project; 3- facts that are agreed on within the context of architecture and construction practice, or allied professions. In addition, to reach a reasonable agreement, justification given must understandable to all participants. And given the diversity of participating agents, and their professions, it is of a paramount importance to find common terminology, by asking for clarification when needed. Hence, jury members are encouraged to share and express their concerns, questions, and critiques, freely, for others to be able to answer those concerns for the sake of the clarification and comprehensiveness of their task.

Because of the condition of anonymity in the competition context, one of the most important groups of contributors, the contesting designers, are excluded from the judgement process. This exclusion means that they must be represented only by their design entries. Hence, the justifications and evidence given must be presented by jury members, based on their interpretation of those entries. This creates the need for the design visualisations to be clearly represented and for jury members to be able to effectively interpret those design entries.

**Shaping preferences, opinion and will formation, the evolution of the judgement criteria**

In the judgement process, the jury members – through discussions and dialogue – start changing the judgment criteria based on their newly evolved understanding of the design task. Their new understanding is the result of sharing thoughts and insights between all the stakeholders involved (Kreiner et al., 2011, Crossman, 2015).

Shaping preferences in the deliberative procedure can be compared to the criteria evolution in the jury discussions in competitions. Many researchers (Andersson et al., 2013c, Kreiner, 2013, Van Wezemael et al., 2011, Crossman, 2015) looking at the judgment
process have reported that during the jury discussions the judgement criteria are normally reshaped or reprioritised according to the evolved understanding of the design task. This evolution is based on the input given by two main sources: the design entries, representing the designers input, and the exchange of knowledge and expertise between the jury members (Svensson, 2013), which can be linked to the concept of comprehensive doctrine. This evolution can be considered not only a reshaping of the judgement criteria, it is actually a reshaping and reformation of the jury’s priorities and preferences. These newly shaped preferences can then be seen as not belonging to a certain jury member or party, but a unanimous preference that should result in unanimous consensus. Those newly evolved preferences then – if the jury members failed to reach reasoned agreement – can be used as input to a voting process to reach a decision.

For shaping preferences and opinions in the jury session, communicative acts play a major role. Without a proper expression, interpretation, and representation, the whole process of sharing and exchanging knowledge between all parties involved cannot be complete or effective. Hence, the jury members’ awareness of the limits and potentials of the task in hand can contribute to them being vigilant and conscious about their actions. Those limits and potentials are imbedded in the deliberative reasoning procedure, which specifies reasoning with regards to common good as the method for reaching reasoned agreement between all who are involved. This will eventually contribute to better outcomes of the reasoning process and deliberation.

The subject of the reasoning process

The subject of the judgement process is normally the quality of the entries, or to be precise, choosing the design entry considered to be the best (Rönn, 2011b). In the deliberative procedure, choosing the best alternative can only be reached through properly conducted deliberation focused on mutual understanding of the common good. In the competition context, what is considered good for the client might not be the same for the end user, or the public, especially when the client is not the end user. This might also be because determining what is good can be different for many reasons, including but not limited to the differences between the participants in expertise, occupation, background knowledge, and comprehensive doctrines. Hence, determining what is best quality can only be done through dialogue and debate, where all the parties involved share what they see as the best, and by justification and evidence-based discussions, when it is possible to provide evidence for their arguments. Then, as a result, an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines will occur, which means better outcomes are to be expected.
Then, based on those reasoned arguments, the criteria of judgement evolve, and priorities change accordingly, this change is the result of normative arguments, that re-shape and re-define the design task to fit the current context. It is based on the new collective understanding of the design task within the here and now of the specific context.

**Rationalities**

In a political deliberation, only the balanced interplay between the spontaneous unsubverted circuits of communication in the public sphere and the institutionally structured political will formation would ensure the normative expectation of rational outcomes (Cohen, 1997, Habermas, 1997). In a closer look at the judgment process as a political democratic system, the two perspectives – instrumental and normative – are both present. The instrumental part is represented in the regulations and initial rules and conditions, including the initial decision criteria, while the normative perspective occurs during the discussions, arguments and even while viewing the entries. Acknowledging the validity of both perspectives and the importance of having them in balance will ensure that better outcomes can be expected.

For a democratic procedure to produce rational outcomes – according to Habermas (1997) – the rational outcomes should only be in response to the surrounding informed opinions of the autonomous public sphere. This is for constitutional issues at the public level. In the case of architectural competitions, as a non-public reasoning process, the autonomous opinion is achieved through discussions and as a result of the overlapping of different and the diverse comprehensive doctrines (expertise, knowledge, and preferences) of the jury members and the contesting designers represented in their design proposals, and it is only within deliberation that these autonomous preferences can be developed.

For politics to achieve its purpose, (Elster, 1997) argues that the arguments in the political process should be public in nature and instrumental in purpose. This means no matter how normative the discussions can get, they should always be oriented towards making a choice or decision.

This research suggests that for the deliberative procedure to be implemented into the context of judgement in architectural competitions, instrumental rationality should be represented in the brief, as the collection of the rules and regulations for conducting the competition, the initial criteria, the specification of the chosen building site, and the requirements and needs of the client. The normative part is when the criteria evolve through and by reasoning, which occurs during the discussions and dialogue between the
jury members. However, those normative discussions need to be oriented towards a decision for them to achieve their purpose. Hence, the importance of informing the jury members of the nature of the deliberative procedure requirements and limits, for them to be able to direct and guide their attention and actions in that way. That said, normative reason should be present in any judgement and decision-making process that involves the public good, and the way to do that is through discussion and deliberation. Those discussions are not only the pre-arranged and designated ones, but also the free chats and side talk between all participants, as they have a steering effect that can lead and influence the judgment process.

Hence, the suggested deliberative procedure for judgement should be the combination of two parts, one preliminary, outlining the rules, methods, and goals of the deliberation, which provides and describes the instrumental part, and the second should result from the discussions and arguments after the viewing of the entries, which comprises the normative part. The overlapping consensus that is the result of the two rationalities is what the deliberation is all about.

*Communication in the deliberative reasoning process: The leaps of communication*

Language is the medium of communication in political settings, and in the arguments and discussions between jury members in judgement. However, in architectural competitions, visual communication is as important as verbal communication, if not more so (Rönn, 2009, Plowright and Cole, 2012, Chupin, 2011). In fact, the representation of thoughts into visualisations, and the interpretation of the visual into the linguistic, create loops of communication. These loops of interpretation, representation, and visualisation form the main acts of communication that are involved in the reasoning process in architectural competitions. If those acts of communication fail in their purpose a gap in communication is created that might lead to misunderstandings, which might then result in flawed decisions.

Jury members normally meet with each other for the first time just before the first viewing of the competition entries. In this meeting, jury members agree on the judgement criteria, based on the initial criteria in the brief. They might sometimes even decide the weight of each criterion and prioritise their relevance in general (Svensson, 2013, Crossman, 2015, Rönn, 2009). The medium of communication in this meeting is language, and the communicative action involved is interpretation of the written text (the brief), discussions, and argumentation. The second stage is the first viewing of the entries; in this stage jury
members take tours around the design entries, while assessing their quality individually. This stage can be seen as an individual reasoning process, where each member of the jury interprets the visual representations based on their background knowledge, and reasons their preferences, supposedly according to the initial criteria previously agreed on. The reasoning here involves justifying to one’s self. As jury members, internally and individually, go through a shortlisting process, they give themselves the justifications for their order or choice. Then they end up with a shortlist of their selected entries, which they consider the best quality design (Crossman, 2015, Rönn, 2009, Svensson, 2013). The communicative acts involved at this stage are interpretation and justification. Next, the jury’s main meeting is conducted. In this meeting, jury members express their initial preferences or shortlists, then they engage in discussion and debate about their choices and justify them for each other. These meetings and discussions are where the opinion and will formation happen. They are where the actual non-public reasoning process starts. Here, jury members have to express their reasons, and justify their choice to others in the group; the justification has to be convincing to others. However, because those jury members come from diverse backgrounds and expertise (comprehensive doctrines), the justifications they give normally come from their comprehensive doctrines. Others in the group should be able to understand and compare those reasons with their own, to be able then to agree, or not; if they agree with a choice that they did not make originally, this means that their opinion has changed. And if they do not agree, then they must give their reasons for advancing their choice, to convince others to agree with them. The collection of those layers of reasoning and justification that comes from diverse approaches and viewpoints contributes to forming a new, mutual, comprehensive understanding of the collective choice of the solution for the problem in hand. This understanding then contributes to forming an overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines of all the participants, which would then contribute to better outcomes of that reasoning process. The communicative acts involved in this meeting are expression, justification, and interpretation.

**Communicative acts**

The communicative acts involved in the competition process generally are interpretation, expression, and representation. However, if the judgement process is to be moulded as a deliberative procedure, after the viewing of entries, jury members are the agents of action. These actions require that the participants have a certain level of expertise to be able to exercise their role or to fulfil their tasks. This expertise is considered the deliberative
capacities that they should have in order to accomplish the goals of the association (Bohman, 1997).

**Interpretation**

In the competition process in general, the agents of action are the stakeholders involved in the process. Each one of those stakeholders interprets some form of information on a different level. Starting from the brief phase, each jury member and contesting designer interprets the brief on their own and based on their own expertise (Rönn, 2010) or comprehensive doctrine. The contesting designers or architects, as suggested by Kreiner et al. (2011) and by Kreiner (2013), interpret the brief, looking for clues or guidelines to understand and comprehend not only the design task itself, but also the client’s preferences and priorities, and the design criteria. Ir. M. Prins et al. (2006) suggest that the jury members interpret the brief aiming at understanding the client’s needs and priorities, the judgement criteria, and the rules of choice. This phase of interpretation consists of interpreting textual information, and the medium of communication is language.

The second round of interpretation happen when jury members view the design entries for the first time. This time it involves interpreting visual material, e.g. 2D graphic representations of the design schemes, 3D visualisations, and sometimes physical scale models of the suggested design (Van Wezemaal et al., 2011). This phase requires jury members to be able to translate and imagine those visualisations in the actual settings, i.e. the building site. They are required to be able to understand the visualisations used in the architectural representation language, which requires that they be familiar with the architectural language visual terminology. This explains why architects are the majority in jury sessions. Then those architects take on themselves the responsibility to express their interpretation to non-architects in the jury, or those who are not trained as architects (Rönn, 2009). This forms one of the major leaps of communication in the judgement sessions. However, the deliberative procedure this research is suggesting encourages open communication, which means that it encourages jury members to express their questions, concerns, and critique openly and transparently, for everybody then to be able to achieve collectively a better understanding of the design task and all the issues at a stake.

**Expression**

In architectural competitions, the concept of expression is one of the communicative acts, and is of vital importance. It comes in different stages, and is used by different agents. First, when clients express their visions, requirements, needs, and aspirations for the

204
project to the organisers (Kreiner, 2013). Second, when organisers interpret the client’s needs and aspirations, in addition to their own experience of what is required for conducting the competition, into a written brief for the competition (RIBA, 1986a). Third, when designers express their understanding of the design task, they express their thoughts in the form of visualisations (Kreiner et al., 2011). Fourth, when the jury members express their preferences, choices, reasons, and justifications to the other members in the jury (Svensson, 2013). Hence, expression is of paramount importance as it is involved at every stage of the competition, and affects the formation of the design task first, and later the preferences and choices of jury members, which will have a determining effect on the eventual decision.

Freedom of expression, clarity, and transparency are needed at every stage of the competition where expression is involved. Clients need to be as clear as possible about their needs, requirements, aspirations, and the goals of the project and the competition. Organisers also need to be clear about how they express the client’s needs, requirements, and goals in the competition brief, and how those needs fit within the regulations and laws of conducting a competition, and how they write a brief that keeps the balance between restricting and allowing for creative input from designers.

On the other hand, designers also must be able to express their design in a non-verbal format – drawings and models – and in a clear and transparent manner. This is the only way they get to communicate with the jury members, as per the anonymity issue. Hence, the way they express their vision of the design task has to reflect their interpretation of the design task as expressed in the brief, their creativity, their awareness of and care for the client’s needs, their way of thinking, and their competency as architects.

In the judgement process – the main concern of this research – jury members also need to express their preferences, concerns, critique, and choice. The more freely, transparently, and clearly, they express these, the more they contribute to the formation of opinion and will of others in the jury. The deliberative conception, as suggested by Habermas (1997) and by Cohen (1997), supports the protection of freedom of expression. Those preferences must be expressed through the discussions and not before them, as they evolve during the discussions according to the collective opinion formation. The clarity of expression will then contribute to the quality of the outcomes of deliberation, i.e. the decision or choice.
Representation

There are two forms of representation involved in the judgement process: first, the stakeholders’ representation of their party or expertise (Cucuzzella, 2014), and second, the design representation by architects (Kreiner, 2013). Representation as a communicative act in the first settings is related to how stakeholders represent their position and more, precisely, how they represent their individual and organisational identities. For example, an architect jury member, who represents a city council, has to take into consideration both positions – expertise and organisation – when expressing her or his opinions and preferences in the jury session. Sincere representation of preferences and convictions by representatives is a necessity for any deliberative association (Habermas, 1997), especially through the competition process and in the discussions for judgement. This is because when every member contributes their honest and sincere opinions and concerns, they contribute to the comprehensive understanding of the design task, and consequently contribute to a better outcome of the deliberation.

On the second account, the contesting architects/designers have to present their design in the form of a visual representation, namely drawings, maps, and 2D and 3D visualisations. This representation is meant to communicate a designed image of the competition project, the designers’ competence as architects, and the quality of their design (Younés, 2012). And for this communication to be successful, it needs to be clear and informative for the recipients, in this case the jury members. In addition, this representation needs to have some aesthetic character, which does not manipulate or compromise the clarity required for the communication (Merikoski, 2016).

6.2.8 The outcome of deliberation

The outcome that is expected from the judgement process is a choice of one design proposal, as the competition winner, and nominating at least second and third winners. If the judgement process is to be designed as a deliberative democratic procedure, the procedure should be reasoned, transparent, and justifiable for the outcomes to be fair, legitimate, just, or convincing to all the stakeholders.

Legitimacy is the state or quality of the outcome. For the decisions to be correct and legitimate they should be the result of a correct reasoning process; this can be achieved by employing the deliberative procedure (Cohen, 1997, Rawls, 1997). Then legitimate outcomes require that the procedure should have some general characteristics (which are
The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice  

N. Al-Qaysi

detailed in the next chapter) when proposing the deliberative procedure for judging architectural competitions:

- The choice should be the result of a deliberative reasoning process, where justification and evidence-giving are necessary to reach reasonable agreement and then consensus.
- This procedure should specify the conditions required for conducting a deliberation, including context-related requirements, and those that are required from participants.
- The procedure should also specify the goals of the reasoning process.

Hence, this research set out to define the deliberative procedure that fits the context, goal, and conditions of the judgement process in architectural competitions. This procedure is set to be normative in nature, which means that it encourages refinement and on-site amendments. It defines the general rules for deliberation without imposing strict specifications (Figure 6-4).

![Figure 6-4: The deliberative communicative judgement procedure](image-url)
6.3 Summary

In this chapter, each of the themes, concepts, and categories, which resulted from the analysis of the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, has been thoroughly discussed and interrogated in comparison to similar concepts within the judgment process in architectural competitions, for them to be contextualised in the context of the destination. This has resulted in forming a generic framework that has formed the basis for establishing the outline of a deliberative communicative procedure for judging architectural competitions, as will be presented in detail in the next chapter. This procedure is primarily formed of two stages: The first, is the general outline of the procedure which highlights the goals, conditions, and methods of the reasoning process, and is provided as a part of the brief, for the contestants, the organisers and the jury members. The second, is the detailed specifications, the criteria at the initiation stage, the revised criteria, and the revised decision methods that should be produced throughout the deliberation itself and after the viewing of the entries. These will define the project more specifically and allow for a comprehensive understanding of the design task but at the meantime will ensure that the highest level of transparency, fairness and clarity are adhered to and the whole process remains as valid and as reliable as it can be as an open deliberative exercise which can be observed, interrogated and vetted by any of the parties involved at any specific point in time.
CHAPTER SEVEN

FRAMING THE RESEARCH

CONTRIBUTION AND FICTIONAL

APPLICATION
7 Framing the Research Contribution and Fictional Application

7.1 Introduction
Taking up from where the previous chapter concluded, this chapter aims at framing the research contributions that come in form of a framework to describe the generic outlines of the deliberative communicative procedure in the context of judgement in architectural competitions. Each of the themes that were refined, redefined and contextualised in the previous chapter is transformed and developed into a set of recommendations and guidelines for each stakeholder in the judgement process, and broken down into their role and responsibilities in different stages of the competition. This is followed by an exercise of fictional application of the suggested framework that will be presented with an aim to explore the practicality and applicability of the framework.

7.2 Framing the research contribution
The research contributes mainly to the theory and subsequently the practice of architectural design competitions in general and to the judgement process within this specifically. This contribution comes in two parts. The first concentrates on the structure and construction of the framework. This framework describes how to implement the deliberative communicative procedure in the context of judgement in architectural competitions. The second part concentrates on the practical steps for implementing such a procedure. This procedure is meant to improve the judgement process through enhancing the communicative and normative qualities of the deliberation, improving communication, and encouraging transparency between all the stakeholders involved in the process, as well as adding to the validity and reliability of the outcomes of the judgement process. It does this by defining the roles and obligations required from each stakeholder participating in the judgement process throughout each stage of the competition and deliberation.

There are few factors that have not been taken into consideration while designing the deliberative procedure in the course of this study. Those are related to the effect of political conditions and decision-making authorities (both governmental and cultural), finance, and the media. The reason for that is that these factors are considered context-related emergent factors that are different for each competition. Moreover, as per the set boundaries as intended in this research, they fall out of the remit, the promise and intended deliverables of the current research. Although not within the scope of this doctorate research, responding to those emergent factors is of paramount importance so that the real-world
conditions can be taken into consideration to ensure that the theoretical contribution of this study can have its maximum positive impact on improving the status quo of the practice of architectural competitions in actual world. This is a procedure which needs separate research as to how exactly it should be put into practice. However, the twofold procedure will ensure that the current research has its ties to those real world conditions considered for it to be most realistically applicable and effective: first, the clients and organisers should identify and address those issues at the beginning of the planning process before even starting the brief. They should gauge the impact of the competition they are planning on all those dimensions (finance, politics, and media) and predict the best ways to address any concerns that might arise from each of those context related considerations. The second is to acknowledge the fact that those considerations should be one of the subjects discussed through the deliberative process itself by all participants. The current research advocates the idea that, by following the deliberative procedure recommendations and limits, all these issues would be properly addressed and considered through the deliberation process, should such anchors to the real world conditions, prerequisites and requirements are taken into consideration at the right time, the right place and by the right parties with relevant and proportionate responsibilities.

7.2.1 The outlines of the deliberative communicative framework

The framework consists of two main stages. The first is the general outline that specifies the boundaries of deliberation. This part highlights the goals, conditions, and methods of reasoning, in addition to the recommendations for both the contestants and jury members. This should be available for organisers first, and then they should make sure to include it in the brief. This part of the framework should highlight the duties and rights of each stakeholder involved in the deliberation through a set of recommendations in addition to highlighting the intended aims of the specific competition.

The second part must be the subject and result of the deliberation. The content of this part should be agreed on by the jury members themselves as a response to the changes and emergencies of the reasoning process within the deliberation itself, and it is normative in nature. This part should acknowledge the concept of inference imbedded within reasoning, the type of justification and evidence accepted in this deliberation, the new revised and/or evolved criteria, and any emerging priorities that resulted throughout the reasoning. Also, it must acknowledge the alternative decision-making methods or contingency plan(s) if consensus cannot be achieved. In addition, it should do all that while maintaining the common good of all stakeholders as the subject of reasoning and deliberation. This
The judgement process in architectural design competitions as a deliberative communicative practice

N. Al-Qaysi

common good can only be defined through the deliberation and after a thorough and correct reasoning process (Figure 7-1).

![Diagram showing the outline of the deliberative framework]

**Figure 7-1: Outline of the deliberative framework**

To be able to implement the deliberative procedure as an alternative model for the judgement process, the framework for that application must be introduced to all the stakeholders, starting with the client/s. Then if the clients agree to use it, it is the organiser’s role to arrange and outline the procedure to the rest of the stakeholders – the jury members and contestants – as they need to be introduced to the procedure at an early stage of the competition, the brief for example, to allow them to be aware of the specification of that procedure – what it is, why, and what is required from them as participants. This procedure, namely the normative procedure, works under the general rules of the reasoning process and is receptive of the communicatively generated normativity.

### 7.2.2 The framework

The first part of the framework highlights the outlines of the deliberative procedure organised in accordance with the main themes of the procedure. After that the recommendations for each party involved in the process are outlined to highlight the role of each stakeholder in the process.

**Regarding the nature of the reasoning process**
The procedure should:

- Specify the nature of the reasoning process and the justifications and evidence required. The justification accepted in the reasoning process in architectural competitions should be based on the quality of the design entries in response to the competition brief and the solutions for the design problem they offer, within the exact time and place contexts. This is in addition to the facts that are agreed upon within the context of architecture and construction practice or the allied professions, for example building performance simulations, construction reports, etc.

- Highlight the importance of acknowledging both perspectives – instrumental and normative – and the importance of having them in balance, which would ensure better outcomes of the deliberation.

- Specify the preliminary criteria for the decision; these criteria are defined for each competition separately, as they are context-related (the specific context of each competition project).

- Highlight and emphasise the normative part of the procedure, and how it might be altered and tweaked to suit the urgencies of the immediate situation. This comes after the first viewing of the entries, and the discussion between all participants, especially regarding the criteria and their expected change and evolution. Those urgencies include the political, financial, and media considerations that affect the competition project. Hence, clients, organizers, and jury members need – at different stages of the competition – to define, review, and amend their understanding of the concept of judgment, principles of inference, and rules of evidence, for every competition on-site. They need to address the questions of what the aim of the competition is, how it could be achieved, and what the priorities are, while considering the effects of the financial, political and media factors contributing to their decision and to the status-quo and progress of the competition. Also, those participants need to address what is acceptable as a justification for their preferences, and what measures and evidences are required.

- Encourage open communication, meaning that it encourages all stakeholders to express their questions, concerns, and critiques openly and transparently, for
everybody then to be able to achieve collectively a better understanding of the
design task and all the issues at stake.

Regarding the conditions of deliberation

The procedure should:

- Highlight the conditions and requirements for conducting a deliberative communicative
judgement, which consist of two parts: the first is the responsibility of the organisers,
the second outlines the role of participants.

- Highlight that all participants in the deliberation are formally equal; that the procedure
does not single out individuals or recognise any party as superior to others, and that
everyone has equal rights to participate and to vote, if required. Also, the fair
representation of all parties involved in the judgement process requires that all
stakeholders involved in the competition process are represented in the deliberation,
including end users, architects, and the public, especially when the competition project
is of national impact or of public scale.

- Ensure equal distribution of resources, in this case access to all the information and
documents related to the competition.

- Emphasise the importance of reasoned agreement, as it is especially required under the
condition of pluralism, because of the plurality of stakeholders involved, and the
diversity of their preferences and convictions. Reasoned agreement consequently
contributes to achieving consensus.

- Emphasise that freedom of expression, clarity, and transparency are required at every
stage of the competition where expression is involved. Clients need to be as clear as
possible about their needs, requirements, aspirations, and the goals of the project and
the competition. Organisers also need to be clear about how they interpret the client’s
needs, requirements, and goals in the competition brief, and how those needs fit within
the rules and regulations of the competition, and how they write the brief in a way that
keeps the balance between restricting and allowing the creative input from the
contesting designers. Contestants must also visually express their design as clear as
possible to convey their visions and aspirations of the design project. Jury members
also need to express their preferences, concerns, critiques, and choices. And the more
freely, transparently, and clearly, they express them, the more they contribute to the
formation of the opinions and wills of others in the jury.
- Highlight that jury members must have the capacity to understand and interpret architectural design visualisations, and to at least understand the basic practice terminologies. This should be one of the criteria of choice for the participants in the first place.

**Regarding the goals of deliberation**

The procedure should:

- Highlight that the goal of the deliberation is consensus. However, when consensus cannot be achieved, there should be an alternative method for choice, in this case voting might be the go to method, but only after a full reasoning process.

**Recommendations for the jury members**

- Jury members’ awareness of the limits and potentials of the task in hand can contribute to them being vigilant and conscious about their actions. This will lead to better outcomes of the deliberation and reasoning process.
- Jury members need to be open and receptive to others’ opinions, and have the willingness to listen and share reasons with others in the group, and to revise or revisit their own preferences and convictions through the deliberation.
- Commitment to the deliberative procedure means that jury members should be willing to revise their own preferences and convictions, and to coordinate their efforts to resolve their differences towards reaching the deliberation’s aim, which is unanimous agreement to advance the common good, and in addition they should respect the individual autonomy of other participants. They should also be committed to the deliberative practice itself, where exchanging reasons and justification are the bases for the normative communicative formation of opinion and will, while utilising means of dialogue and discussion to revise their own norms and reform them on-site.
- Jury members are required to have a reasonableness that allows them and others to reasonably reconsider their own preferences in accordance with the design task and with others in the group.
- Sincere representation of preferences and convictions by representatives is a must throughout the competition process and in the discussions for judgement. This is because when participants share their honest opinions and concerns, this accordingly
contributes to the comprehensive understanding of the design task, and eventually to a better outcome of the deliberation.

- The participants in the jury process need to present their justifications clearly, with the aim of helping others understand, and should be able to answer questions from others if asked for clarification, and should then be able to reach the collective comprehensive understanding that is required for a fully informed decision.

- Jury members are required – when presenting justifications – to strike a balance between their own comprehensive doctrines and expertise with what they perceive as true after the deliberation (collective opinion formation). They must have the competence to separate and distance themselves from their own personal preferences, and consent to give their opinion and consequently, their will, to the collective understanding that results from the deliberation.

- Jury members are required to make sure to question each other’s choices, justifications, and preferences, to then be able to base their judgement on the newly developed collective understanding for the design task as the problem they have in hand.

- Participants are encouraged to use any sort of clarification or information they find useful to express their thoughts, ideas, and convictions.

- Participants in the jury session are encouraged to express their opinions and choices freely, to prevent proper information required for the comprehensive understanding of the task from being missed or lost.

**Recommendations for the organising body**

- It is the deliberative institution’s – in this case the organisers’ – responsibility to provide the framework for the deliberative formation of will under the ideal conditions, and to make sure that the conditions that allow the exercise of deliberative capacities are present.

- The organisers should acknowledge and take into consideration a number of context-related factors that form a vital part of the whole settings. These factors include: political and financial factors, in addition to the effect of media. They should make sure that these considerations are taken into account by the participants in the deliberation as one of the subjects of discussions.
The plurality of deliberation needs to be maintained by allowing broader and more diverse participation, within reasonable boundaries. This plurality, then, will contribute to maintaining the comprehensiveness of the debate and the diversity of the resources of information, which should consequentially result in a more comprehensive understanding of the design task.

Organisers should be fair in providing all the participants in the jury session with equal access to all resources available, including information, visualisations, documents, etc.

The organisers must provide jury members with the content and limits of the deliberative procedure at the beginning of the process. Part of this procedure should be the criteria for justification and the type of information accepted as evidence in the context of the competition judgement process.

The organisers must support the participants’ liberty to express their preferences and concerns freely, without being discouraged from doing so by any other party inside or outside the competition, or by other participants on the jury panel.

Organisers should make sure that jury members are made aware of their tasks, duties, and rights as part of the efforts to establish more transparent procedure or practice, especially those participants who have no previous experience as jury members and lay people, so that they can fully comprehend the procedure, what it requires, and what is at stake.

Organisers should make sure that participants have a certain level of expertise to be able to exercise their role and fulfil their tasks. This expertise is considered the deliberative capacities that they should have to accomplish the goals of the deliberation.

Recommendations for the contestants

Contesting designers must understand the normative nature of the deliberation and must expect and accept the fact that the criteria might change and evolve within the course of deliberation. To avoid confusion or disappointment, they should understand that this change is a positive step and is the result of more comprehensive understanding of the design task, and should lead to a better decision.
• Design entries need to be made clear, and informative for the recipients, in this case the jury members. In addition, the aesthetic content of a design representation should not be made in a way that compromises the clarity needed for proper communication.

To sum up, this framework is meant to be a step forward in forming the deliberative communicative judgement procedure in architectural competitions. To be able to further investigate the applicability of such a framework into the context of architectural competitions, a fictional competition is presented in the next section. This fictional account is developed based on a critical reading of a case study of the controversial competition of Cardiff Bay Opera House.

7.3 The fictional application: What could have been improved?

This fictional account uses the case of Cardiff Bay Opera House as the background for exploring the applicability of the framework suggested by this study. The choice of this case was based on it being considered a controversial contemporary design competition.

7.3.1 The background to the project

The main reference used to portray the background of this competition is Crickhowell (1997b). As suggested by Croydon (2016), this account is the most accurate in terms of facts. However, it is subjective in terms of interpretation of those facts. Also, Croydon (2016) has highlighted the difficulties and controversies that accompanied this competition in light of his analysis of the aspects defining patronage in publicly-funded development projects.

The project need and rationale

The project started based on the need for a place to house the activities for the Welsh National Opera (WNO) that was established in 1948, in addition to other types of performing arts in Wales. The main objective of the project is acknowledged in a report that was published in 1986. This report was prepared based on the request of Nicholas Edwards, the Secretary of State for Wales, and Matthew Prichard, the chairman of the Welsh Arts Council, which suggested that there should be a popular entertainment centre suitable for music and other events with a mass appeal, and that only 16 weeks a year should be allocated to performances by the WNO. After that a site was suggested for the project in an area that was allocated for the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC). The landowners were Associated British Ports (ABP). At this time the project
was given its name, the Cardiff Bay Opera House. In 1990, a steering group was formed by the CBDC to initiate the research phase. The group consisted of representatives of the WNO, the Welsh Arts Council, Cardiff City Council, and South Glamorgan County Council. This steering group commissioned three different consultants for a feasibility study. Sponsorship from the National Lottery Fund emerged as a prospective investor for the project in 1992. In the same year it was decided to form a separate trust to carry out the project. The steering group’s architectural advisor, Paul Koralek, suggested conducting a competition as means of choice for the project architect. By the end of 1992, the trust was initiated as a company limited by guarantee under the name the Cardiff Bay Opera House Trust. The Welsh Office approved the competition as the method of choice. The CBDC was meant to fund the Trust on a short-term rolling basis (Crickhowell, 1997b).

Several points are highlighted by Crickhowell (1997b) and Croydon (2016) as an early source of confusion that might have contributed to the controversies associated with this project. The first is related to the ambiguity of the goal of the competition, and the confusion about choosing an architect or a design proposal (Crickhowell, 1997b). The second is related to the choice of name of the project, as the chosen name highlights the priority of “opera house” only, while ignoring the main objective, which was originally conceived as a popular entertainment centre for the performing arts (Crickhowell, 1997b); this later contributed to the project being portrayed by the media as “elitist”. The third is related to the confusion created by the lack of a clear client identity, which was the result of the separation of goals and priorities of the CBDC and the trust. According to Croydon (2016, p. 202), the trust did not have the autonomy of a traditional client, as its aspirations were governed and influenced by the wider priorities of the CBDC and other direct stakeholders, including the Welsh Office and the ABP.

The brief

In the subsequent few months, the preparation of the brief started, and a full brief was developed by 1993. The outline of the brief for the architectural requirement was developed by Comedia, one of the three consultant companies hired earlier by the steering group, assisted by quantity surveyors and the architect Paul Koralek (Crickhowell, 1997b). Although Crickhowell (1997b) describes the brief as being very well prepared, and the result of extremely thorough studies that the trust later worked with almost without alteration, Croydon (2016) considers the brief as being one of the reasons that later caused the project to be targeted by its opponents. The brief highlighted that well over 50 per cent of the programme would consist of musicals. Despite the project being named an opera
house, opera productions were planned to form only 20 per cent of the total programme, along with a balance of dance and other entertainment (Crickhowell, 1997b). This shows how the naming issue was misleading and might have been a source of confusion for both the architects and the assessors, as it was for the public afterwards. The other issue that Croydon (2016) highlights as a weakness in the brief was the provision of an integral car park that contributed to increasing the estimated cost, and a cause for continuing problem with the landowners (ABP). He also states that in later events this issue was used by opponents to question the integrity of the trust members, suggesting that the integral car park had been a requirement made especially for the trust members who wanted a reserved parking space (Croydon, 2016).

**The competition**

The competition was suggested as a choice method by the architectural advisor Paul Koralek. He suggested that competition is the only method that allows the client to select a design as the basis for selecting an architect for the project. And the competition system gives the client the possibility of a kind of preview, a foretaste of the building the client will get (Crickhowell, 1997b). In addition, he asserted that:

> The competition system allows the choice to be made on the basis of both the organization to be entrusted with the project and the design ideas which they would bring to it. With public projects it was particularly important that the appointment should be based on fair and thorough procedure, and that this could be seen to be both fair and thorough. (Crickhowell, 1997b, p.12)

Koralek proposed a two-stage competition, based on a procedure that was earlier used for the Royal Museum of Scotland. The procedure also held aspects used in a competition that was held shortly before for a convention centre in Nara in Japan. The first stage was an open competition requiring only a design outline. In the second stage, four invited architects were asked to join the four winners of the first stage in the competition. The eight teams would then be required to submit their work anonymously (Crickhowell, 1997b). This arrangement was meant to ensure the wide participation offered through the open competition phase, in addition to securing the participation of leading design practices. The procedure was meant to allow some level of engagement between the promoters and the contestants through dialogue during the second stage (Crickhowell, 1997b). After the CBDC board approved the proposed procedure, four invited architects
were nominated as Sir Norman Foster, Mario Botta, Rem Koolhaas, and Rafael Moneo. Frank Gehry and Tadao Ando were invited but declined (Crickhowell, 1997b).

The jury members as well as the invited architects were recommended by Paul Koralek, and it was announced by the chairman of the Trust, Mathew Pritchard, that he intended to exercise his prerogative to choose the assessors “in order to avoid argument among the Trustees” (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 18).

The jury panel consisted of:

- Lord Peter Palumbo, Chairman of the Arts Council of Great Britain
- Professor Richard Silverman, Head of the Welsh School of Architecture and Chairman of CBDC’s Design and Architecture Review Panel
- Michael Wilford, architect
- Professor Francesco Dal Co, Chair of Architectural History, University of Venice
- Paul Koralek, architectural adviser to the Trust
- Lord Jack Brooks, Deputy Chair of CBDC
- Lord David Davies, Chairman of the WNO
- Mathew Pritchard, chairman of the Trust
- Freddie Watson of Grosvenor Waterside, the property development subsidiary of ABP, who was a non-voting observer representing the owner of the proposed site of the opera house.

The panel was given the task of selecting the “best design” with reference to the brief, which included building requirements, acoustics, layout, and a primary assessment of feasibility. Also, the chairmanship of both the Trust and the jury panel was delegated to Mathew Pritchard; what is described by Crickhowell (1997b, p. 18) as being an “unfair burden of responsibility”. According to Croydon (2016), the chairman’s role was to make sure that members of both the Trust (as the client) and the assessor panel (the jury members) know what their role was and did not get their priorities confused, and also to make sure that no conflict between those two would affect their recommendations.

In addition, Croydon (2016) and Crickhowell (1997b) both see that leaving the selection of the jury members to the hands of only one person – Mathew Pritchard – could be seen as
concerning, because Pritchard selected a panel dominated by architectural academics and wealthy private patrons. This group was later seen as “unrepresentative” of all the stakeholders involved, especially the general public, who were expected to pay for the building (Croydon, 2016). The selection of jury members, according to Croydon (2016), has to be a subject of thorough investigation in such cases, as it has to be done transparently and with great integrity. Also, Croydon (2016) suggests that the Trust members appear to have confused their role as clients and primary users of the building rather than other stakeholders and the wider public. This is what resulted in the Trust limiting the role of public consultation to only after the judgement had already been made by the jury members.

Judgement process

In June 1993, the competition was launched, and the assessment of the entries took place throughout the year. At the first stage, 269 submissions were received. After the first three days of the judgement process, the jury members agreed that only twenty-five entries qualified for a detailed technical consideration. Over the next four days, all the twenty-five entries went through an extensive examination by the teams of technical advisors led by David Williams (a trustee) (Crickhowell, 1997b). After that, the jury members reconvened to consider the shortlist in the light of the technical report provided by the technical advisors regarding acoustics, layout, and cost. When the jury members reached consensus about the shortlisted four, their identities were revealed, and their professional competence then considered, and based on that they were informed of their success. The winners of the first stage were identified as: the office of Zaha Hadid, Itsuko Hasegawa, Neil Morton, and Manfredi Nicoletti. At the second stage, those winners were joined by the other invited four to submit their entries for a second round of judgement. The second colloquium was held in mid-June and all the eight contesting practices attended it. Crickhowell (1997b) asserts that this one face-to-face meeting with the contesting architects was not enough for a proper exchange of ideas with the jury members. He also asserts that the quality of the competition design outcome could have been improved if there had been more dialogue, and a better exchange of knowledge, and a more determined attempt to enthuse contestants about the importance of the project.

The third colloquium was held in the Coal Exchange in Cardiff, when the shortlisted designs were displayed for public commentary just before the announcement of the final judgement. At this stage the entries were still anonymous. Crickhowell (1997b) claims that it was hard for an amateur to make a judgement based on quick examination of small
models, and drawings. He continues to express his disappointment regarding the quality of the submissions, stating that “there did not seem to be an obvious outstanding winner” (Crickhowell, 1997b) p. 21). He also highlights that some of the entries seemed bizarre, especially Hadid’s drawings, and were difficult to interpret even for a professional eye.

According to Crickhowell (1997b), one of the fears shared by the assessors was the case of Sydney Opera house, used as an example of how a beautiful building ended up costing fifteen times the original estimate and, it has been claimed, did not work well as an opera house. This case fuelled the trustees’ willingness to not be committed to an architect before being reasonably assured of their ability to complete the work on time and on budget.

*The jury decision*

The final decision was made on majority vote bases, and the winners were announced as the office of Zaha Hadid, followed by Sir Norman Foster and the Japanese architect Itsuko Hasegawa. What we know about the actual judgment process is very little, because it was done in a “secret conclave”, according to (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 21), who makes a strong remark suggesting that if the jury panel and the trustees had managed to make their judgement collectively it might have been possible for them to come to an agreement. It was only after that when the trustees were joined by the jury members, and they examined the models and drawings of the chosen design and started recognizing the qualities, that the jury panel had seen the potential for its development. Crickhowell (1997b, p. 23-24) asserts that it was only at that stage when the actual communication between the architect and client begun. He continues to suggest that if the dialogue between the client/s (the Trust and the CBDC), the quantity surveyors, and the project engineer had continued, better outcomes would have been achieved for both parties – the Trust and CBDC – and in a shorter time (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 25). He also admits that the trustees were “proceeding with the uncomfortable knowledge that they lacked hard evidence about the structural soundness and cost, and did not have the resources to evaluate the design in detail” (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 27).

This competition exposed a polarisation between experts’ and lay opinions. Public opinion was against the chosen design, while the architectural community mostly defended the architect’s right to proceed with the project after having been selected as a winner. Crickhowell (1997b, p. 27) continues giving examples of both opponents and proponents of Hadid’s design, for example quoting Professor Geoffrey Broadbent in a letter sent to him and to the *Guardian* suggesting that “it was entirely scandalous that the trustees were
prepared to reconsider and perhaps even overturn the results of a competition which had selected the work of a genius”. However, using the media the opponents of Hadid – including a CBDC member – started attacking the design in an increasingly hostile manner, criticizing not only her design, her professional competence, but also questioning her eligibility as a competitor for not being a registered architect in the UK (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 29). The panel members produced an illustrated presentation which they sent to the CBDC. In this presentation the reasons behind the jury’s decision to choose the design by Zaha Hadid was detailed. They highlighted that the choice was based on the fact that the design:

scored higher than the other proposals in terms of excellent acoustics, natural ventilation within the accommodation buildings, parking strategy, the informal quality which could best encourage daytime activities within the building and finally a sense of presence and the ability to bring together the separate parts of building in a dynamic form. (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 30)

Croydon (2016) questions the exercise of public engagement in the competition, suggesting that the quality and amount of information released to the public was mainly photographs of the design submissions, which meant that public comment was asked for on the basis of very superficial visual information. He concludes by suggesting that wider public engagement should have been invited after a clear agreement between the Trust and the jury panel collectively, where the choice could then be explained and properly justified to the public. Another issue pointed out by Croydon (2016) – that is seen as a weakness of this competition – is that the unanimity of the jury decision might have been compromised, quoting Lord Brooks, who said that they “had been unduly influenced by the architect members, who had appeared to favour a particular school of architecture” (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 30). His exact feeling might have contributed to the increasing gap between the architects and the lay people in the jury and the Trust.

Croydon (2016, p. 207) goes on to criticize the chairmanship of Mathew Pritchard by stating that “Having taken the decision to appoint the assessment panel personally the Chair should have ensured agreement that its members publicly support the majority decision rather than voice their dissent publicly”. He continues to suggest that all the stakeholders and trustees should have been given the chance to express their views on the jury panel recommendations before voicing the final decision, and that better discipline among trustees – regarding voicing their criticism to the media – would have been less
damaging to their cause. He also highlights the role several CBDC members played in influencing the media and public by expressing their doubts regarding the cost estimations of the chosen design, and the comparison to the Sydney Opera House with reference to the similarities between its architect and Hadid as regards their lack of experience in managing a project of that scale (Croydon, 2016).

The public exhibition

In October 1994, an exhibition of the shortlisted designs was held at the National Museum of Wales, on which the public were invited to comment. At this exhibition, the majority of the public voted for Foster’s design proposal, while Hadid’s design came second and Nicoletti’s third. This might be the result of the fact that Foster’s name was well known and well established as a practice, while Hadid, at that time, had not yet established her name as a practice. This might be connected to the “starchitect” effect. Additional criticism was raised during that exhibition regarding the height of Hadid’s proposal in comparison to the neighbouring context. This point was raised by Grosvenor Waterside on behalf of ABP. They expressed their concern regarding the effect a building of that scale might have on the value of their neighbouring properties (Crickhowell, 1997b). This specific criticism might have triggered another important turn of events that happened when the Cardiff Bay Business Forum was held. This forum was an organisation mostly representing the interests of small businesses within the bay area, who can be seen as one of the stakeholders in that project, who felt that they were left out of the equation. In this forum, the shortlisted architects were invited to present their work. Seen as a further form of public consultation, the forum generated further public dispute regarding the choice of the winning project.

After that, a meeting was held with Zaha Hadid’s office at the Architectural Association on the 21 of December. This meeting was attended by all her team and the trust advisors. The objective of that meeting was to examine the robustness of the proposal regarding the technical issues raised by WNO members. Despite the growing dispute and hostility against Hadid design, it remained the strongest candidate. Based on earlier comments made by the jury members, the designers had made significant changes to the proposal without compromising the aesthetic merit of it. The scheme had proven to be robust enough to meet the original brief and to encompass the new options that were being considered (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 39). That reflected the design’s flexibility to host the evolved criteria that happened through the continuous discussion and engagement between the architects, jury members, and the trustees as the client. The dispute within the CBDC, the
Trust, and the jury panel, accompanied by the media coverage, might have contributed to the later course of events. The Secretary of State for Wales, John Redwood, asked for a public referendum regarding the chosen design, distancing himself from promoting this project. After that, the chairman of the Trust, Mathew Pritchard, resigned on the basis of ill-health, and was substituted by Crickhowell.

**Presentation and decision**

After that, the first three winners – Hadid, Foster, and Nicoletti – were invited to present their revised work on 27 January 1995. Meanwhile, members of the CBDC kept sending messages of strong support to Foster, while clearly showing their refusal of Hadid’s scheme. Within the CBDC the opposition to Hadid’s appointment was increasing to the extent that Geoffrey Inkin wrote to Crickhowell on January saying that he very much hoped that this opposition would not lead to public conflict between the Trust and the Corporation, otherwise it would trigger similarly vigorous opposition from the local authorities, the Bay Business Forum, and other representative groups (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 47). Crickhowell goes on to express his astonishment regarding the CBDC’s overwhelming opposition to the appointment of Hadid at a time in the process when the trustees, whom he claims were far more informed about the project background, had not yet reached a conclusion about the merits of the proposal.

The presentation of the three teams – Hadid, Foster, and Nicoletti – took place, between 27 and 30 January. The designs were accompanied by a report from the competition scheme review that was prepared by Stanhope – who was an independent advisor hired to review the winning proposals – and presented to the trustees. This report praised the original competition brief and concluded that the office of Zaha Hadid, compared to the other two, were still the closest candidate to meeting the brief requirement and accommodating the new requirements that were being discussed. The report also included analysis on how the project might be advanced. Crickhowell (1997b) illustrates the presentation of each team in detail, highlighting their weaknesses and strengths according to his and other trustees’ opinions, concluding with the opinion that all the three proposals had their positive virtues. However, “none deserved the degree of hysterical hostility that the design of the unfortunate Zaha Hadid had received from otherwise sane and sober people” (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 52).

Crickhowell then presented his report to CBDC members, and local authority and forum members on 3 February. Members of the Trust accused him of trying to force through his
attitude in favour of Hadid, against the will of others. At that time, within the Trust, there was no agreement yet. The majority of CBDC board members were against Hadid and said they wanted a “world-class architect”. Trying to find a common ground between the Trust and the CBDC, Crickhowell suggested a short meeting with the CBDC before making the final decision. In that meeting he was shocked at the level of hostility against Hadid’s design, and that CBDC members gave little clarification about which design should be chosen other than Hadid’s (Crickhowell, 1997b, p. 57). In the meeting held to make the final decision, every stakeholder involved was invited to express their opinions, and each did, ending up choosing Hadid by majority and everyone – including the Business Forum representative – agreed with the choice made and firmly supported the decision of the majority (Crickhowell, 1997b, p.59). After that Hadid was confirmed as the winner and the preparations started to form the bid for funding from the Millennium Commission.

**New contest**

At that time, preparations were ongoing to submit another bid for funding of the National Stadium at Cardiff Arms Park from the same source. This project gained media support and consequently the support of the public. According to Croydon (2016, p. 219), the media started an unnecessary “contest” between the two bids; the stadium was presented with the positive assertion that “rugby is our great national game”, while the opera house was presented with two negativities: the first was, “we all hate modern architecture, don’t we”, and the second was, “opera is for toffs”. Croydon argues that this media coverage influenced public opinion drastically, using rhetorical appeals to public sentiment and prejudices. The opera house was portrayed as elite arrogance towards public opinion, while the stadium was portrayed as representative of the nation’s identity, and it was suggested that it would bring more profit to the city and the small businesses around it. Then straw polls conducted by the local media showed that the stadium had a three-to-one advantage over the opera house in public opinion (Croydon, 2016, p. 223). To cut a long story short, the Millennium Committee refused the bid for the opera house and accepted the bid for the stadium.

**7.3.2 Reflection on the faults in this competition**

Reflecting on all this, and using this research as a viewpoint, it can be envisaged that each group of the stakeholders provided – what they thought to be – their best effort – the CBDC, the Trust, the jury panel, and the contesting architects. However, the lack of proper collective reasoning created a communication gap. If they had had the chance to have joint
meetings, and had expressed their concerns freely and asked for justifications, they would have reached better agreement. To sum up, the faults that might have contributed to the troublesome outcome of this competition can be listed as follows:

- The vagueness of the goal of the competition: was it to choose an architect or a design proposal?

- The choice of name of the project, as the chosen name highlighted the priority of “opera house”, while overlooking other objectives to create a popular entertainment centre for the performing arts, which later caused the project to be depicted as elitist.

- The lack of a clear client identity, which was the result of the separation of goals and priorities of the CBDC and the Trust.

- The choice and formation of the jury panel, which was made exclusively by one person, Mathew Prichard, to “avoid arguments among the Trustees”. Despite the fact that he had chosen a very highly qualified group of jurors, most of them were architects. This caused some questions regarding how representative this panel was of the rest of stakeholders, including the Trust, the CBDC, the BBF, and the general public. And the point Prichard made regarding avoiding argument can be seen as patronising. By avoiding argument, he prohibited the trustees’ right to contribute to the panel choice, hence losing their input regarding this matter.

- The role of each stakeholder in the choice process was not specified in the competition procedure. The Trust especially was treated by the architects as client, but by the CBDC as an executive entity. This confusion was reflected in the trustees themselves and what they were really representing, the WNO, CBDC, themselves, or the public.

- The lack of proper dialogue and engagement between all the stakeholders involved; this issue is highlighted several times by Crickhowell (1997b) as one of the reason which contributed to the lack of proper understanding of the project.

- The clarity of submissions is also highlighted by Crickhowell (1997b) as one of the reasons that contributed to the lack of suitable comprehension of the design submissions, especially among the non-architect members.
• The trustees were not involved in the judgement process, which – after the anonymity was removed – contributed to them being concerned about the winning architect’s ability to manage the project to completion. They basically could not comprehend the reasoning behind the panel’s choice despite being provided with the panel’s report.

• The trustees’ lack of sufficient information regarding the structural soundness and cost. They were supposed to follow the advice given by the technical and financial advisors, which were not that decisive, as each one of the proposals had its own strengths and weaknesses.

• The polarisation of opinions between experts and lay people seem to have been a recurrent problem throughout the competition.

• Public and media exposure; the information released to the media was mainly photographs only. The public judged the proposals based on aesthetic values only, which can be seen as partial information. They did not get the chance to examine the other qualities of the proposals, like efficiency, durability, etc. Basically, they did not have the capacities to make a well-informed judgement, receiving only part of the information.

• The jury members were not unanimous due to the influence of the architect majority in the panel. This influence seems inevitable, because the architects were responsible – using their professional knowledge – for interpreting the proposals for the other non-architect members. However, their interpretation, if joined by the interpretation of other experts such as technical advisors, construction professionals, sound and acoustic engineers, etc, could contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the problems in hand.

• The discipline between Trust members, with the Trust members expressing their criticisms to the media before they made their final decision. This contributed to the growing media opposition to the architect and her winning design.

• The “starchitect” effect in Foster vs Hadid: the media and members of the Trust started treating the competition as a contest between the very well-known starchitect Foster on one hand, and on the other hand Hadid, who at that time was not very well-established in the practice, nor was she known to the public.
In the next part, a fictional account of this competition will be presented to illustrate how using the normative communicative framework suggested by this research could have improved this competition practice.

### 7.4 The fictional application

In this fictional account, an imagined version of Cardiff Bay Opera House is presented using the deliberative communicative procedure. The aim of this exercise is to show how the controversies which accompanied this competition could have been avoided by following the deliberative communicative procedure, and to show how the deliberative communicative framework can be applied and operationalised into a procedure for judging a certain competition. In this version, the process starts from the pre-brief preparations.

Each one of the framework’s themes are shaped into a set of recommendations for each stakeholder and within different stages of the competition, as shown in Figure 7-2.

![Figure 7-2: Implementing the framework themes into the competition context](image)

#### 7.4.1 Pre-brief

The Welsh Arts Council wanted a place to host the activities of the Welsh National Opera (WNO) and other types of musical and performing arts. A report was produced which
suggested that the objective of the project was to establish a “popular entertainment centre suitable for musicals and other events with mass appeal” in addition to hosting the WNO. This objective includes clues to the actual need of the project, which should be considered carefully by the competition organisers when forming the brief. The project was meant to be “popular”, which implies being used as a popular destination for all people who are interested in art and music performances. Then the site was suggested in the area allocated for the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC); the landowners are Associated British Ports (ABP).

Based on this the project could have been named “the Cardiff Bay Performing Arts Centre”, to indicate the variety of activities included with in the venue. The CBDC formed a steering group to start the research phase; this group consisted of representatives of all stakeholders involved at this stage, including the WNO, the Welsh Art Council, and the city and county councils. This group commissioned consultants to prepare a feasibility study. Then when the funding opportunity appeared through the National Lottery Commission, the steering group decided to prepare a bid for that fund. And because of the funding requirement and the fact that it involves public funding, it was decided to conduct a competition as means for selecting the design for building. Then it was decided to form the Trust, which was responsible for carrying on with the project. At this phase, the stakeholders identified here are the CBDC, the Trust, the Welsh Arts Council, and the BPA.

Also, at this stage – before writing the brief – public consultancy could have been a useful way to collect public opinions about their aspirations for this project and for this specific site. Public engagement at this level would contribute to having an insight about what people have in mind regarding the future of their city or neighbourhood, what their concerns, aspirations and hopes are, and might have even enquired about who they would want as their representatives in this project. Their representatives should keep in mind public opinion when representing them through the next stages of the project.

**Recommendations for organisers/pre-brief**

Now to remove the confusion regarding the client organisation, the CBDC should have been considered the client, the Trust the organising body, and the public and WNO the end users. The Trust as an organiser for this competition should have made sure that all parties interested (stakeholders) were included and well represented even at the stage of brief preparation. Those parties include representatives of the WNO, as one of the end users; the
Welsh Arts Council, as an end user and partially a client; Cardiff City Council and South Glamorgan County Council, representing the interests of their entities in addition to the public; the CBDC as the client organisation; ABP representing the landowners; and the public as an expected end user. Also, the Trust should be responsible for formulating, introducing, and promoting the competition deliberative procedure to the rest of the stakeholders. The Trust should make sure that all jury participants are made aware of their tasks, duties, and rights as part of the effort to establish a more transparent practice, especially for those who are participating in a deliberative exercise for the first time. In addition, when selecting the jury members, the Trust should have made sure that each one of those participants had the deliberative capacities required for a successful exchange of reason and knowledge. They might conduct training workshops, or some sort of training, to make sure that the jurors are ready to take on such a position and responsibility. The Trust members should also have understood and accepted their role as organisers only, not considering themselves as an alternative to the jury members. Besides this, the Trust should have made sure to provide the conditions that encourage a deliberative communicative exchange of reason. Those conditions are equality, freedom of expression, pluralism and diversity, autonomy, and fairness. Each one of those conditions are meant to contribute to better deliberation.

- **Equality:** ensuring equal representation of all the stakeholders could have contributed to reserving the interest of each stakeholder in the process. If the Trust made sure that each stakeholder was represented equally, they could have avoided the claims of being influenced by the architect majority in the jury.

- **Freedom of expression** could have allowed for the proper expression of all the stakeholders’ preferences, concerns, and reservations regarding the proposed submissions (design entries). If the jury members were inclusive of all the stakeholders, including members of the Trust, so that they could freely express their concerns and critique of the proposals, a lot of the controversy that followed would have been avoided.

- **Pluralism:** the Trust should have made sure that all the stakeholders involved in the process are included, this would have contributed to maintaining the comprehensiveness of the discussion and would have diversified the sources of knowledge brought up to the discussion, which would have covered all the sides of the problem. In this competition, the plurality of viewpoints was brought to the
competition through a variety of consultants and advisors about different aspects related to the project. However, those advisors were brought in at different stages, the first being before the actual judgement, and the second after the decision had already been made. This created a communication gap between them and the architects in the jury session.

- The autonomy of the decision should be supported through maintaining diversity in the jury members. The diversity of viewpoints joined with proper expression could have contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of the problems and issues at stake, hence the decisions could have been based on a newly evolved autonomous understanding that was the result of justified reasoning. The inclusion of all stakeholders should provide this diversity; thus, the jury should preferably have consisted of people with diverse expertise and comprehensive doctrines.

- The Trust should have been fair in supporting equal access to information for the participants in the deliberation, such as all the necessary information required for a better understanding of the problem in hand.

- The Trust should have been as clear as possible about how they expressed the client’s needs, aspirations, and goals in the brief.

7.4.2 The brief

The brief should have been prepared to host the client’s needs, requirements, preferences, and aspirations for the project. In this case the client identity was confused. And if the Trust was appointed by the CBDC as an organiser, it should have been given that identity with full confidence. To make sure that the Trust included – in the deliberation – all the stakeholders (direct or indirect), all the bodies or organisations that have interest should have been represented in the Trust, including, in addition to the WNO, the Welsh Arts Council, the city and county councils, and representatives of the CBDC, ABP, and members of the public, as a direct stakeholder at this stage. This should secure the inclusion of all interested parties at this early stage, so they can contribute to the formation of a comprehensive brief. The aspirations and requirements of those parties should have been taken into account by the expert consultants, Comedia, who formed the brief. In addition, the brief should also have included the specifications of the architectural requirements prepared by the architectural consultants and the quantity surveyors. The brief should have outlined the competition procedure, the reasoning process, and specifications of the role of every stakeholder through a set of recommendations for each
one, including the clients and organisers, the jury members, and the contesting architects, and as follows:

7.4.3 Outline of the procedure

- The brief should include the aims and objectives of this specific project as a popular centre for performing arts, that in addition to hosting opera activities encourages public activities, and will be used as a popular attraction for music and art performances.

- Reasoning should be specified as the basis for a decision-making method that involves justification and, if possible, evidence giving, and all the jury members should be given it in the brief. Also, it should specify the common good of all the stakeholders as the subject of reasoning.

- The brief should also specify the conditions that permit and encourage that exchange of reason. Those conditions can be divided into two types: 1- the conditions needed for the proper conduct of deliberation, including autonomy, equality, freedom, fairness, plurality, and diversity. The organising body should make sure that these conditions are met. 2- The conditions required from the participants in the deliberation, including reasoned agreement, commitment, deliberative capacities, reasonableness, and willingness. The jury members should have or acquire these characteristics throughout the deliberation.

- Specify the initial criteria for the design, specifically formulated for this special project. These criteria are derived from the objectives of the project, and the priority of the needs and requirements of the client and end users, and should be specified by the organising body based on research that collects the needs and aspirations of all stakeholders.

- It should highlight the goals of reasoning as reaching consensus between all the participants in the jury session. Especially in public projects, consensus should be a must.

- The framework should highlight the normative nature within the deliberation, and participants should be encouraged to understand, adhere to, and support that.
7.4.4  Jury formation

The jury should have been formed based on reasoned agreement between all the stakeholders involved at that stage of the competition, i.e. before the jury formation. In this case the jury should include representatives of all the stakeholders, in addition to a team of experts in building and construction, architects, construction engineers, quantity surveyors, technical advisors, etc. In addition, there should have been experts relating to the specific function of the project, in this case musicians and performers. Hence, the jury members of this competition should be inclusive of representatives of the Trust, the architect jury members, and other experts from the building and construction profession.

Recommendations for all parties involved

- All participants should understand the normative nature of the procedure, meaning that they should be made aware that the design and decision criteria might change and evolve according to the newly evolved understanding of the design task, and as a result there should be an active exchange of knowledge between all participants.

- After the first viewing of proposals, participants should be required to redefine the aims and objectives of this competition, to be able to reorganise the priorities. Then they must acknowledge their duties and the role of each according to the deliberative procedure, which includes defining the sort of justifications and evidences accepted in this specific competition.

- Stakeholders are required to openly express their concerns, requirements, aspirations, and opinions about the future of the project. This should contribute to acknowledging and defining the limits and potentials of the task in hand.

- All participants are required to be reasonable when expressing their opinions, meaning they should offer justifications for their preferences and ask others for justifications, clarification, and even evidence when possible and if applicable.

- They should make sure they understand the limits and potentials of the task in hand, which contributes to them being vigilant and conscious about their actions; this should lead to better outcomes of the reasoning process.
7.4.5 Before design preparation

After every stakeholder participating in the jury session has been made aware of the nature and limits of the deliberative procedure, and their role, rights and obligations as participants, it is time to start the competition. After the brief is produced and announced, the architects willing to participate should start their design task, while bearing in mind, in addition to the general recommendations for all participants, other recommendations that should be provided for them as a part of the brief. These recommendations are meant to ensure that the contestants understand their task, their role and obligations, and the outlines of the deliberative procedure. These recommendations are:

- Contestants should visually express their designs as clearly as possible in order to convey their visions and aspirations for the design project. Their submissions need to be made clear and informative for all other participants in the judgement process.

- They should make sure to represent their interpretation of the competition brief, the client’s aspirations, and their professional competence as designers, and be able to express and address these as clear as possible.

Based on that and keeping in mind those recommendations, the submissions received should be clear and comprehensive in addressing the design requirements and as a response to the clear aims and objective of the competition, that were made available to contestants earlier in the brief.

7.4.6 The judgement process, deliberation, and reasoning

Once the jury members embark on the first viewing, while keeping in mind the outlines of the deliberative procedure as the framework for the judgement process, they should also make sure of the following:

- That they are willing to exchange reasons and justifications with other members, to revisit and revise their own preferences through deliberation, and to commit to the deliberation procedure and outcomes.

- That they are committed to the deliberative procedure, and to coordinating their efforts to resolve their differences towards achieving consensus, and to advancing the common good. They should also be committed to the deliberative formation of opinion and will through exchanging reasons while utilising dialogue as a means of communication.
• They will sincerely represent the preferences and concerns of the bodies or organisations they represent, including the public. Their representation should be based on their expertise and background knowledge, and not driven by personal preferences, opinions, or test.

• That they will share their reasons and justifications as clear as possible with an aim for others to understand them. They are also required to ask for clarification if needed. This should contribute to better comprehension of the problem they have in hand.

• That they have the ability to understand and interpret architectural design visualisations and to be familiar with practice-specific terminology.

• Finally, that they will reach – if possible – a reasoned agreement about what they regard as best for this project, while considering the common good of all stakeholders.

After the jury members have had their first chance to view the submissions, each member can supposedly form their individual preferences and shortlist a group of submissions. The submissions that are found unfit for the competition have already been excluded based on a set of criteria agreed upon previously at the briefing stage.

After that, the design proposals are presented for another viewing. Each of the jury members – having in mind their preliminary choices – should have prepared their justification for the choice they made. For example, the architects should give their preference using justifications based on their expertise, while construction engineers should offer justification based on their expertise, end-user representatives should offer their justification based on their experience in the use of such functions, and so on with every other stakeholder. This meeting should end up with a group of shortlisted proposals that are the result of the first round of viewing and deliberation. The jury members get to question each other’s choices and preferred proposals and to ask for clarifications or evidence if necessary or applicable. In this exercise of reasoning the jury members should make sure to keep in mind the deliberative procedure, meaning they should accept the fact that decision criteria need to be redefined based on the input provided through the design submission and the diverse expertise and interests involved in the process. They should redefine the concept of inference, the rules of evidence, and the criteria of choice. This should contribute to better understanding of the design task first, and consequentially to the deliberation outcome.
After that the jury members, based on their evolved and comprehensive understanding of the task, should revisit their preferences, and rearrange their priorities and their shortlists accordingly. Then the shortlisted entries are discussed one by one while each jury member offers their praise and critique, now based on their evolved understanding. If there is consensus regarding the selected winner, then the ultimate goal of reasoning is achieved, however, if consensus does not happen, another round of reasoning can be held and guided by the organisers. In this round the juries are required to offer further justifications or evidence if they can, otherwise a voting exercise is necessary to reach the final winner of the competition.

When the jury members are fully confident about the thoroughness and credibility of their decision, it is the right time to get the media involved. The decision can now be announced, accompanied by the diverse justifications that resulted from the overlapping consensus of a variety of comprehensive doctrines. This type of justification should guarantee the satisfaction of the public and the media because it has been built on a thorough understanding of what matters, or all the issues around this specific project, at this specific time, in this specific site, with the social conditions of all stakeholders considered. Also, jury members should be committed to the outcomes of the deliberation, and willing to support the collective decision based on that.

In summary, the aim of this procedure is to provide a framework for the discursive decision process in judgement. This framework is only meant to expose and consequently guide the formation of opinion and will of the participants in the judgement process. It is based on the assumption that when each one of the stakeholders knows their roles and obligations and has tried as much as they could to fulfil them, better decisions are to be expected from the reasoning process. Hence, the procedure, the result of the application of the framework into a certain competition context, is expected to enhance the credibility and transparency of this practice, which is the aim of this study. Figure 7-3 illustrates the role and recommendations for each stakeholder within different stages of the competition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Role and Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Client</td>
<td>Pre-brief</td>
<td>Clearly express their goals and needs. Ask for expert consultation and research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organiser (The Trust)</td>
<td>Pre-brief</td>
<td>Interpret the client’s goals, needs, into requirements with the help of other consultants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contestants</td>
<td>Brief</td>
<td>Using the input from the client, consultants, end-users, and public to form a comprehensive brief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juries</td>
<td>Jury formation</td>
<td>Delegated to the organisers, but should stay involved in decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End users</td>
<td>Submission</td>
<td>Represented in their submissions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>First viewing</td>
<td>Represented in the jury with the right to vote if needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reasoning</td>
<td>Represented in the jury, so their representative has all the responsibilities that any juror must do.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7-3: Illustrates the role and recommendations of each stakeholder at different stages of the competition.
7.5 Summary

This chapter started with framing the research contributions which encapsulate the outlines of the deliberative communicative procedure in the context of judgement in architectural competitions. The framework developed and proposed consists of two parts. The first part specifies the boundaries of deliberation, including the goals, conditions, and methods of reasoning, in addition to recommendations for the contestants, the organisers and the jury members. The second part is produced throughout the deliberation, and should be agreed upon by the jury members themselves as a response to the changes resulting from the reasoning process within the deliberation itself, and is normative in nature. Then an exercise of fictional application of the suggested framework was presented to explore the potential of applying the framework to a real context. To do that a well-known previous competition has been chosen for this exercise, which is the Cardiff Bay Opera House competition. This application has been done by first presenting a brief background of the original competition, followed by highlighting the areas where things are deemed to have gone wrong or out of control. Then an alternative fictional application of the deliberative communicative procedure that have been produced through this research was applied to the original competition to show how it could have been improved and how some of the controversies that accompanied this famous competition could have been avoided or eliminated. This fictional competition resulted in realising that the applicability of such a framework has to be done at different stages of the competition. In addition, an effective and successful application of the framework requires organisers’ awareness and continuous monitoring of the deliberation process, to safeguard other stakeholders’ commitments to the deliberative procedure.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS
8 Conclusions

8.1 Introduction
In this chapter a summary of the background of the research will be presented to highlight the main milestones that have contributed to shaping the research as it is. Then triangulating the results of this research with the state-of-the-art literature in the field of architectural competitions, a discussion of the research findings is presented following the same structure used to present the findings of the analysis in Chapter Five, first in the political context and second in the competition context. By positioning this research’s contribution into the latest field of research on architectural competitions judgement process, the chapter concludes the research by presenting its main contribution which is theoretical modelling of the judgement process. And lastly, the final conclusions are presented in addition to the research limitations, and suggestions for future work.

8.2 Summary of research milestones
Architectural design competitions have been a tool to choose the design of most of the significant buildings around the world. However, this practice has proved problematic on many levels, especially regarding the judgment process.

After investigating the background, history, and reported failures of the practice of architectural competitions, the judgement process – being the core of the competition practice – has been seen as the most controversial aspect of the practice. The complexity and trouble associated with judgement have proven to be the result of the subjectivity embedded within it and the diversity of stakeholders involved.

Mapping research in the field of architectural competitions regarding the judgement process showed that there are six main research focus areas that have dominated research on the judgment process in architectural competitions. Those are:

- Studies which have looked at judgement in terms of decision making.
- Studies which have focused on dialogue, critique, and rhetoric as judgement strategies.
- Theoretical modelling of the judgement process.
- Studies focusing on the role of the stakeholders involved in the process, e.g. juries, clients, architects, etc.
- Studies concentrating on the design product itself and quality measures.
• Studies focusing on the judgement process in the academic context.

After an extensive review of those six areas, they were clustered into three main areas, based on their relevance to a pattern – related to the appearance of a potential research gap – that started to appear at this stage. Those pattern links can be illustrated as follows:

- The use of dialogue in judgment has been linked to the diversity of stakeholders involved in the process, and their need for better communication between themselves, which has been a considered communication-related issue.

- Dealing with judgement in terms of decision making and the use of criteria has been linked with the use of judgement criteria in academia, which has been considered an issue related to judgement criteria.

- The three levels of decision making embedded within judgement.

A thorough critical interpretive review of those three research areas showed that the problems associated with the judgment process in architectural competitions are mostly related to issues of poor communication. This can be illustrated in the following categories:

First: the fact that the participating stakeholders in the process come from different and diverse backgrounds has resulted in the lack of a common terminology. This lack of a common terminology has created a gap in communication where they are required to use dialogue as a method to improve their understanding of the problem they have in hand. In addition, the problem of poor communication has led to the invention of new methods introduced to the competition process to foster better communication between all the involved parties/stakeholders. Examples of those methods are dialogue-based competitions and the competitions that involve taking the public’s or end users’ opinions.

Second: the evolution of criteria and the fact that jury members have to reinvent the judgment criteria on-site as a means to better understand the design task. These evolving criteria have been seen as a result of the communication between the designers represented through their design and juries, and between jury members themselves as each one of them represents a different expertise, or a different stakeholder.

Third: when looking at the judgement process in architectural competitions in terms of decision making, it appears that there are three levels of decision making involved in the process, individual level, group level, and organisational level. For the values behind the decision process to be in the right priority, those three levels need to be considered and
addressed properly, and any failure in this regard can cause misrepresentation of the relevant priorities within the decision-making process.

- On the individual level, the jury members’ decision represents their expertise, opinion, and convictions.

- On the group level, jury members need to make their decision collectively, ideally aiming to reach consensus.

- On the organisational level, the jury members might represent a certain party involved in the process, e.g. the client, a public body or authority, the end users, certain expertise, etc., and these parties can be seen as organisations.

The three levels are essential for the decision process and need to be addressed. However, it is the priority of each level that needs to be considered and clarified by each jury member within themselves or guided by the competition brief or regulations.

Description of the research gaps

There are several areas in the field of research on judgement in architectural competitions that need to be addressed. The one that forms the focus of this research is related to the lack of proper communication between the diverse stakeholders involved in the process, a result of the dialogic nature of the discussions and arguments during jury meetings, as well as the changes in the media of communication between stakeholders, from spoken to written to visualization to written and spoken and written again, which creates leaps of communication and interpretation; those leaps of communication create blind spots in the comprehensive understanding of the design task itself. They also prevent the diverse jury members from appreciating each other’s priorities. All the above have contributed to the presence of the problem of the lack of proper communication.

8.2.1 Research questions

1- How can the current practice of judgment in architectural competitions be improved to address controversies around architectural design competitions?

2- How can communication be improved in the judgment process in architectural competitions?

3- Can any social and/or information theories help address this problem? If yes, which one(s), how, and in which respect?
4- As a result, what can be seen/done differently compared to the state-of-the-art research in architectural competitions? And how?

5- What changes and improvements can be proposed? In which area and how?

8.2.2 Research aim

This research aimed to enhance effective communication between different stakeholders involved in the judgement process in architectural competitions, through forming a framework that works as a communication facilitator between those parties. Additionally, this research aimed to help improve communication in the current practice of architectural judgment through relevant theories with the potential to contribute to this study’s conclusions, and to propose theoretical models and practical measures to facilitate and improve communication between all stakeholders.

8.2.3 Research objectives

1- To investigate how communication between all stakeholders in a competition affects their judgement.

2- To investigate how communication in the competition process could be improved and how to do so through exploring theories with the potential to contribute to solving the research problem.

3- To explore how theoretical insights from relative theories can help improve the current understanding of the judgment process, to be able then to suggest enhancements to current practice.

8.2.4 Methodology summary

This research has taken a constructivist position, based on the research question, and the nature of the judgement process itself, where the human perception, communication, and subjective interpretation of architectural design play a significant role in the decision process. In addition, the nature of architecture itself and the representation tools used to reproduce reality, and how they allow the spectators to interpret design proposals according to their personal background, have also informed the contribution of this research at the methodological level.

The epistemological position adopted was critical realism. This is because it allows for investigating a phenomenon in its natural setting, to then be able to suggest improvements, after critically analysing the relevant studies in the field.
Positioning the research problem between communication-related issues and collective decision making, in addition to the epistemological position this study adopted, namely critical realism, suggested the theory of communicative action as a possible theoretical perspective in regard to understanding the judgment process in architectural competitions. In addition, considering the judgement process as a democratic practice, as was previously suggested by other researchers in the field of architectural competitions, led this research towards the theory of deliberative democracy, as a direct interpretation of communicative action theory in the political context. The theory of deliberative democracy has been considered as a potential solution for building the theoretical framework of this study, which suggested adding a new research question, which is:

- How can insight from the theory of deliberative democracy enhance judgement between all stakeholders involved in the process?

Hence, two subsequent objectives were developed, and added to the existing preliminary objectives:

- To explore the relevance of the theory of deliberative democracy to the judgement process, and whether it can provide a base for the framework produced by this research.
- To use critical reality as a theoretical lens to investigate how features of deliberative democracy contribute to an improved understanding of the process of judgement in architectural competitions, and to add this to the framework produced by this research.

The framework is meant to ease the transformation general theoretical concepts into a more applicable form. It acts like a mediatory stage between theory and application. Hence, the methodological approach that was adopted for this study is theory building. This is because theory building can produce coherent theoretical frameworks that encapsulate an explanation of the phenomenon that is the focus of the theory. The theory of deliberative democracy was suggested as a potential theoretical model to help in forming the intended framework. Thematic analysis was conducted to investigate the potentials and limitations of the theory of deliberative democracy as a suggested theoretical model for judgement in architectural competitions. The first stage of analysis concentrated on a group of studies that focus on the deployment of the theory of deliberative democracy in political practice, to investigate the usability of the theory in practice, and to be able to understand the practicality of using the theory in the context of architectural competitions. These analyses were carried out manually to allow the researcher to get to know the data more
closely. However, those studies did not offer the theoretical depth that was necessary for this investigation. Therefore, another stage of investigation on a more abstract level was added to enrich the theoretical foundation of this research. Four theoretical statements – considered seminal to the modern understanding of the theory of deliberative democracy – were chosen for the analysis. In this part of the study, the four theoretical statements were analysed utilising thematic analysis, using NVivo as a tool for the coding process. This choice was made because of the complexity and richness of the data, and the inevitable overlapping of concepts and themes at the theoretical level, which contributed to the need for a better organizational tool that can maintain the separation and unity of the data at the same time.

Both parts of the analysis, on the practical level and on the theoretical level, resulted in the formation of a network of constructed themes that represented the basic themes and relations that form a procedure of deliberative democratic association in the political context. The resulting procedure was then located in the context of judgement in architectural competitions through an in-depth interrogation of each one of the themes that resulted from the analysis, in comparison to the context of the judgement process in architecture competitions.

In a doctoral research students’ forum which was held on 18th of April 2018 in the University of Brighton, the researcher presented this research as a work in progress. In this forum, discussions with a group of art and design professionals and scholars have suggested that there is a potential for the deliberative judgment procedure to be deployed in other art and design related contexts such as photography, product design, and other. They have suggested that they can relate to the problems that have been highlighted by this study, and they can see how the deliberative procedure suggested by this research can really solve much of those problems. Because those contexts share similar characteristics with architectural design, where other forms of visual communication, beside dialogue, are involved in judging the quality of the product or artefact. The discussion showed that the suggested deliberative communicative procedure can be reformed and contextualised to fit the specifications of each context, which can be added to the potential future research

**8.3 Discussion of findings in the political context**

The results of both parts of the analysis – the practice-based studies and the theoretical based studies – were formed into a framework that captures the core, or the fundamental
The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice

N. Al-Qaysi

building blocks of any deliberative democratic procedure in the political context. This procedure consists of seven major categories:

**The input to the deliberation**

The input of the process in the political context, which consists of the participants’ preferences and comprehensive doctrines.

**The goals of the deliberation**

The goal of the deliberation forms one of the most important factors contributing to shaping the deliberative procedure itself. In the political context, the goal of deliberation is consensus and the ultimate aim is justice for all stakeholders. However, there are other secondary goals that can be achieved through deliberation itself, such as education, conflict resolution, and policy making.

**The conditions for the deliberation**

The conditions required for the conduct of an ideal deliberation in the political context can be separated into two main categories: the first is concerned with conditions required for the deliberation process, which should be provided and maintained by the organising body. These are autonomy, equality, freedom/liberty, fairness, and plurality and diversity. The second is concerned with the conditions that are required from or are related to the participants in the deliberation, agreement, commitment, deliberative capacities, reasonableness, and willingness.

**Reasoning process**

The reasoning process is the core activity within deliberation. In fact, it is where the actual discussions and dialogic encounters between all the participants happen. It is where the opinions and wills of the participants take shape, via communicative acts as a means of knowledge exchange using discursive acts and language. The subject of reasoning is the common good of participants, or the public good, which in addition to the criteria of reasoning are envisaged through the deliberation itself, while keeping a balanced relation between the instrumental and normative sides of rationality.

**The context of the deliberation**

In the political context, the context of deliberation can be seen as the collective circumstances that form the background or the settings for conducting a deliberation. The deliberation context is related to the time and place of the deliberation, and the social
conditions of the participants. In the political practice, there are two types of deliberation: public and non-public. When the deliberation is on a constitutional or similar level, the deliberation should be public to ensure wide and inclusive participation. Non-public reason, on the other hand, is used by non-public bodies where deliberative reasoning is utilized as a means to make decisions about internal matters. Context plays a significant role in shaping the procedure and the nature of justification required for the reasoning process.

The agents of action in the deliberation

The agents of action in the political context are the participants in the deliberation; they contribute to forming the deliberation and the outcomes expected from it. These participants are required to have certain qualities for the deliberation to be ideal. Those requirements are the same conditions required from deliberants, and these are: reasoned agreement, commitment, deliberative capacities, reasonableness, and willingness. The ideal deliberation requires the participants to have full awareness and understanding of the urgency and necessity of those requirements. Without this awareness, the deliberation might not reach its intended aims. Also, the participants have to be provided with a few conditions – related to the context of deliberation – that can improve their experience as participants. This offers them the best circumstances for them to practice a free deliberation and express themselves in the best possible way.

The outcomes of the deliberation process

The outcomes of deliberation in the political context are the final decision, choice, or judgement. And for the outcome of deliberation to be legitimate, it has to be the result of an ideal procedure, where all the conditions are met, to produce a successful reasoning.

8.4 Discussion of findings in the context of architectural competitions

The framework that resulted from the first round of analysis of deliberative democracy in political theory and practice was contextualised into the context of architectural competitions with to the aim of operationalising and implementing it. Each one of the themes was thoroughly interrogated and compared to similar concepts within the context of architectural competitions. As a result, a framework of the structure and relationships between the themes and categories was shaped. This framework describes each concept and theme separately, but within the structural hierarchy that defines its position and relation within the framework as a whole.
The main categories of this framework echo those resulting from the political context, because those are already being formed with accordance to the research questions and aims, while keeping in mind the expected outcome of this research. However, each theme was re-defined and contextualised according to the context of the destination, i.e. the judgement process in architectural competitions.

The deliberative procedure in the context of architectural competitions must be designed according to the specific context, goal, and conditions associated with it, and with respect to the nature of the participants or stakeholders of the process. The core of this procedure is the reasoning process, which requires justification and evidence-giving. The core of reasoning is shaping preference and the formation of the opinion and the will of participants. The deliberative procedure does not address a few very important factors that are related to the effect of political conditions and decision-making authorities (both governmental, political and cultural), finance, and the media. The reason for that is that these factors are considered as context-related and are emergent factors that are different for each competition. Hence, these factors have to be taken into account through the process of contextualising the deliberative procedure for a certain competition. It is part of the organisers’ role to make sure that these factors are addressed, understood and acknowledged by the participants in the deliberation. It should be noted that although these factors are outside the set limits and boundaries of this doctorate, their role in making sure that the findings and propositions of this study are valid, reliable and most importantly applicable to any given competition and maximising their envisaged benefits is absolutely crucial.

The subject of reasoning is the quality of the design entries and weighing judgement priorities with consideration to the common good of all stakeholders, while balancing the two rationalities – instrumental and normative – involved in such reasoning. In addition, communication plays a prime role within reasoning, hence the need for better communication. And for the procedure to be ideal a few conditions need to be provided; some of these conditions should be provided by the organisers or the body managing the competition, whoever they are. And some conditions are required from the participating stakeholders, each according to their designated role in the process. Hence, the framework consists of seven main categories, which are similar to the political context categories, but they differ in their definition and detail, these are:
The context

In architectural competitions, the context of judgement should be considered a non-public reasoning process. Hence the judgement process – as in the political context – should start with defining or at least acknowledging the three elements of any reasoning process, the concept of judgment, principles of inference, and rules of evidence, to avoid rhetorical persuasion, among many other problems. The criteria of justification vary according to the context of deliberation in addition to the criteria and evidence required for the justification; all change in accordance with the context of that deliberation.

The input to the judgement process

The input to the judgement process in architectural competitions is a combination of three main categories: the competition brief, the jury members’ input into the process, and the contesting architects’ input. The jury members’ input into the process is their preferences and convictions, their knowledge background, their expertise, and their comprehensive doctrines. The contestants’/designers’ input is represented by their design entries or proposals; it is also where their expertise and convictions are reflected. In addition, the brief consists of: project description, design requirements, site characteristics, aims for the project, and the initial criteria of the judgement process in addition to the general outlines of the deliberative procedure.

The conditions required for an ideal deliberation

The conditions required for an ideal deliberation in the context of architectural competitions can be separated into two types or categories:

First, the context-related conditions that are required for conducting a deliberation, and these should be provided and maintained by the organisers of the competition. Those conditions are autonomy, equality, freedom/liberty, fairness, and plurality and diversity.

Second, the conditions that are required from or that are related to the participants in the deliberation, or the jury members in this case. Those conditions are reasoned agreement, commitment, deliberative capacities, reasonableness, and willingness.

The agents/participants

In architectural competitions, agents of action can be separated into two types: first, the direct participating agents, who are the client, the organisers, the contestants, and the jury members. Second, the indirect agents, i.e. the end users, and the general public. The direct agents are required to sustain certain conditions for the deliberation to be ideal. These
conditions are required to be realised throughout the reasoning process. Also, the indirect agents are required to be at least represented in the jury, to make sure their opinions and needs are considered in the reasoning process.

**Goal of the deliberation**

The ultimate goal of deliberation in competitions is consensus. According to the deliberative procedure, consensus should be produced through reasoned agreement, after thorough consideration of all issues that are discussed or raised by the participants in the jury process, and which are related to design quality of the immediate project in hand. However, when consensus cannot be reached, there should be a backup method for choice; in this case voting might be the alternative method, but only after a full reasoning process.

Justice to all stakeholders is also an important goal for the judgement process, because failure to establish a just procedure will affect the legitimacy of the outcomes, and may end up as a source for controversy.

**Reasoning**

At the core of the judgement process in architectural competitions there are at least two levels of reasoning involved, one at the individual and one at the group level. Justification and evidence giving are at the core of reasoning in architectural competitions. Justification could come from the design entries, precedents or previous examples, history of architecture, facts related to the nature of the building site and context, scientific facts from other fields of knowledge that are related to the same specific competition, etc. Other justifications that are normative in nature could also be used, for example, experts’ knowledge about design processes, aesthetics, basic principles of competition, or tacit knowledge related to design quality.

**Opinion and will formation/the evolution of judgement criteria**

In the reasoning process, the main event of this process is when the jury members – through discussions and dialogue – start changing the judgment criteria based on their newly evolved understanding of the design task. Their new understanding is the result of sharing thoughts and insights between all stakeholders involved, and the more transparent, clear, and relevant those reasons are, the more other participants can agree with or relate to them, and the closer they come to consensus. However, those reasons should always be related to the general aim, which is the common good of all stakeholders.
The subject of reasoning

The subject of the reasoning process is normally the quality of the entries, and what is to be considered the most relevant criteria for a specific project. Determining what is best quality can only be done through dialogue and debate, where all the parties involved share what they see as the best for themselves and others – i.e. the common good – through justification and evidence-based discussions.

The communication involved in the reasoning process

In architectural competitions, visual communication is as important as language, if not more so. In fact, the representation of thoughts into visualisations, and the interpretation of visual information into linguistic, is the main means of communication within the reasoning process in judgement. And for the reasoning process to be successful, clarity and transparency are essential for ease of interpretation and representation.

Communicative acts

The communicative acts involved in the competition process generally include interpretation, expression, representation, and justification. However, in the reasoning process, not all of these acts are involved; for instance, representation only happens when designers (agents of action) express their own interpretation of the design task and represent it into a visualisation that forms their design entry.

Rationalities

In the judgment process as a political democratic system, the two perspectives, instrumental and normative, are both essential for the judgement process. The instrumental part is represented in the regulations and initial rules and conditions, including the initial decision criteria, while the normative perspective is mainly preserved and used during the discussions, arguments, and even while viewing the entries. Acknowledging the validity of both perspectives – instrumental and normative – and the importance of having them in balance, will ensure that better outcomes can be expected.

The outcome of the deliberation

The outcome that is expected from the judgement process is the decision to choose a winner. What makes this choice legitimate, just, and convincing is the procedure of achieving that choice. If the procedure is correct, transparent, and justifiable, then the choice should be as such.
8.5 Positioning this research’s contribution

Within the field of research on judgement in architectural competitions, the contribution of this research falls under the category of theoretical modelling of the judgement process. Previous studies aimed at theoretical modelling of judgement – as seen in section 3.2.3 – vary in their approach. However, this research’s contribution can be compared to two of them, Collins (1971) and Chupin (2011). Both studies use an analogy of theoretical constructs from different discipline as a frame of reference to help describe and then suggest improvements of the current practice of judgment in architectural competitions. Similarly, this research uses the analogy of deliberative democracy as a frame of reference to form an alternative procedure for judging architectural design in competitions. Both Collins (1971) and Chupin (2011) models imply that the jury members should be experienced designers, restricting the jury participation to architects and designers only, which is not always the case in current practice. They ignore the fact that jury members normally come from different and various disciplines, which contributes to creating the problem of poor communication in the first place. However, my suggested framework, “the deliberative judgement procedure”, provides a healthy platform for the exchange of reason and justification where the collective interests of all stakeholders are equally represented with the aim of reaching consensus.

Looking back at the findings of this research it has been envisaged that the problems that was identified within the course of this research – poor communication – can be seen as a result of the fact that jury members come from different disciplines. As previous studies such as Danielsen (2010), Rönn (2011), Kreiner et al. (2011), highlighted that fact, and suggested that as part of their trial to comprehend the choice problem they have in hand, jury members use dialogue as their method. This have triggered a new direction of thought that led to investigating the concept of disciplinarity and how in the light of it this research contribution can be understood. According to the work done by Jensenius (2012) – which was based on a previous study by Stember (1991) – when “people from different disciplines work together, each drawing on their disciplinary knowledge”, this can be considered a multidisciplinary approach. And when a group of people are “integrating knowledge and methods from different disciplines, using a real synthesis of approaches”, then their approach is interdisciplinary. Transdisciplinary happens when people are “creating a unity of intellectual frameworks beyond the disciplinary perspectives”. The current practice of judgement in architectural competitions can be seen a multidisciplinary one. Because, each one of the jury members use their own discipline knowledge as a frame
of reference to comprehend the merits of the design entries then to be able to judge their quality. However, with the help of the deliberative judgement procedure – proposed by this research – and through their deliberation, jury members should be able to form a new intellectual frame of reference beyond the disciplinary perspectives that act as the base for their judgement, and that can be seen as transdisciplinary. Hence, this research can be seen as trying to transform the practice of judgment process from the state of multi-disciplinary practice into a transdisciplinary one, where stakeholders are supposed to co-produce a collective understanding first and subsequently a collective agreement about the best design quality for a certain competition project (Figure 8-1).

8.6 Final conclusions

In this section, the final conclusions are presented to highlight the significance of this study’s contribution to knowledge in the field of research on the judgement process in architectural design competitions.

Deliberative democracy is the primary source for the thesis’ challenge to accepted practices of decision making in architectural judgement processes. Other frameworks that were considered as the study took shape included the communities of practice (CoP) framework, that has been widely adopted and adapted from the work of Etienne Wenger and his colleagues. The decision was taken to use the deliberative democracy framework for the core of the thesis, though the CoP approach has a seductive practicality to it, in that it offers a fit for many and varied forms of professional practice. It also emphasises the role of the “convenor” in effective forms of collaborative professional practice. In the practice of deliberative democracy, a form of convening is required for effective functioning. This form of convening is the responsibility of the deliberative body/organiser. Identifying a single convenor would be challenging the core characteristics and principles of the

Figure 8-1 The levels of disciplinarity; developed by the researcher base on the work of Jensenius (2012)
The deliberative democratic process itself, because one of the main principles of deliberative democracy is that everyone in the deliberation has an equal standing, they all share the same rights and responsibilities. The role of the organiser/s as a form of convenor should be limited to ensuring that all participants in the deliberation clearly understand their roles and responsibilities, in addition to the characteristics and limits of the deliberative procedure. This research aims to contribute to the theory and practice of the judgement process in architectural design competitions. In this research the framework that has been produced describes how to implement a deliberative communicative procedure – this was the result of the analysis phase – into the context of judgement in architectural competitions. This procedure, through enhancing the communicative and normative qualities of the deliberation, improving communication, and encouraging transparency between all the stakeholders involved in the process, will help improve the judgement process and add to the validity and reliability of the outcomes of the judgement process in architectural competitions.

- The deliberative procedure in architectural competitions must be designed according to the specific contexts, the goal, and the conditions associated with the competition, as well as with respect to the nature of the participants or stakeholders of that competition and the final intended outcome of the competition process as well as its end product of architecture. The core of this procedure is the reasoning process. This reasoning requires justification, evidence and proper communication, all with respect to the common good.

- Within the specific context of a competition, the political, financial, and media related considerations – although have not been addressed within this research – should be considered when the deliberative procedure is being devised for a certain competition. The competition organisers should also make sure that these considerations are accordingly included and accounted for in all discussions throughout the reasoning process in the deliberation.

- For the procedure to be ideal, a few conditions need to be provided. Some of these conditions should be provided by the organisers or the body managing the competition. Some conditions are required from the participating stakeholders, each according to their designated role in the process.

- For the proper conduct of a communicative deliberative judgement process, each one of the agents of action or stakeholders has a certain role to fulfil, hence the
procedure provides, in addition to the outlines of the deliberative procedure, recommendations for each stakeholder through the competition phases, starting from pre-brief stage, until the declaration of the final decision.

- The fictional application has resulted in adding new insight regarding the applicability of the deliberative procedure. It has contributed to the realisation that the application of the deliberative procedure needs to be done at different stages of the competition. And it is the organiser’s responsibility to guide and monitor this application. Also, it is the organisers who are required to safeguard the correct application of the deliberative procedure by constantly making sure that all participants and stakeholders are committed to it.

- In light of the findings of this doctorate research and looking back deep into evidence from previous research on the architectural competitions (both the ones which used case study research and the ones which attempted to take a more theoretical standpoint), it is evident that the problems associated with the communication between the jury members has its root deep into the problems of barriers between the disciplines of those involved as the jury panel members. This means that coming from the different disciplines, which in fact is a positive characteristic of a jury and adds to its diversity and can enrich the discussion and exchange of ideas, may as well have its detriment in form of introducing barriers between those members and how they communicate with each other and how willing they are to lend themselves to other members’ expertise, standpoints, worldviews, professional concerns, personal preferences and institutional mandates and requirements. Having an eye on the research on disciplinarity suggests that at best the interactions between the parties within a jury panel is of multi-disciplinary and at best cross-disciplinary nature. The findings of this research suggest that to overcome the barriers associated with the communication between different parties – as proposed within the framework composed for this research – the nature of interaction between the parties involved need to be promoted to interdisciplinary and ideally transdisciplinary nature in essence.

- As was suggested through discussions with a group of art and design professionals and scholars in a student forum held in the University of Brighton. There is a potential for the deliberative judgment procedure to be deployed in other art and design related contexts such as photography, product design, and other, where other
forms of visual communication, beside dialogue, are involved in judging the quality of the product or artefact.

8.7 Future work

In this section, future work that could proceed from this research is presented.

- Because of its theoretical nature, and the meta-level this study has been focusing on, future work is needed to focus on the implementation of this research into an actual competition and test the applicability of it in practice, to then be able to improve or amend it based on that, as the epistemological stand of this research – critical realism – suggests. The practical implementation of the findings of this research is going to be carried out in two directions: The first focuses on the implementation into the academic context, through conducting a student competition within the institution where the researcher is an academic member. This would give some insight into the applicability of the deliberative procedure and help identify ways to refine the procedure for different contexts. This implementation exercise might require a workshop for training, educating and upskilling instructors and participating students to raise their awareness and get them to appreciate, understand and learn about the procedure, its benefits, scopes and potential limitations. This phase could be achieved through conducting a workshop, focus groups, demonstrations, presentations, and mock-up settings to mimic the judgement process which can be tailored to and implemented in each stage of the competition. One step has already been taken in this direction by deciding to conduct a student competition in the higher education institution where the researcher works as a lecturer, in collaboration with other colleagues and an interested sponsor. The second would by offering the local councils and authorities an insight into the suggested procedure and how it can improve the quality of the process, and the outcome of any competition by increasing the transparency and credibility of such competitions in any context. This can be offered in the capacity of the professional consultancy services which the researcher’s university offers to the public and private sector clients in Iraq. This is expected to be widely welcomed due to readiness, enthusiasm and willingness to adopt and improve democratic processes and practices prevailing the political environment in Iraq nowadays. Using the findings of the academic experience, the authorities will be persuaded to consider the implementation of the deliberative democratic procedure into future competitions. Also, the deliberative procedure can be offered as a way to avoid criticism and controversy associated with alleged partiality, favouritism, nepotism and cronyism or corruption.
- Also, future work could focus on exploring how communicative acts, individually or altogether, contribute to the reasoning process within the judgement process in architectural competitions.

- In addition, it is recommended that future work focus on investigating the role of the client’s goals or agenda compared to the concept of the public good.

- The relationship between the public’s and expert opinions, and how to come closer to agreement, also need to be further investigated.

- The deployment of the deliberative procedure into academic contexts could be a further subject of future work.

- The Deliberative procedure applicability into other art and design related contexts, such as photography, product design, etc.

- Investigating how the deliberative procedure can contribute to the transformation of the judgment process in competitions as practice into a transdisciplinary one.

8.8 Research Limitations

This research has had its limitations and restrictions which were imposed mostly by the type of the data and the access to primary data for this research. As the access to primary data on architectural competitions in the UK through archival research was proven to be restricted due to confidentiality and lack of willingness of the professional bodies in charge of carrying major competitions in the UK, the methodology was deemed necessary to be looked into, reconsidered and adjusted accordingly. Although this is not considered strictly as a limitation, it has influenced the way in this this doctorate has taken shape and has triggered a strategic decision to shift the research design from using case study as it main methodology to a discourse analysis where theory building at meta-theory level has been intended.
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The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice

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APPENDICES
Appendices

In this part, the appendices, a few items are included to illustrate the different stages of the coding and analysis phases, and these items are as follows:

- Appendix A: Illustrates the initial codes of theory studies that have been done via N-Vivo.
- Appendix B: illustrates the relevant nodes only, or what was referred to in the analysis as the “green nodes”.
- Appendix C: illustrates the final nodes after grouping into the major themes, categories, and sub-categories.
- Appendix D: illustrates an example of the coded text within one node, in this case the node or theme of “Reasoned agreement”.
- Appendix E: Publications during the course of this PhD research.
Appendix A: all initial codes ‘nodes’

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The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice

N. Al-Qayssi

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Appendix C: The final list of themes

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The Judgement Process in Architectural Design Competitions as a Deliberative Communicative Practice  

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| citizenship | 3 | 15 | 10/20/2017 13:52 |
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| citizens values | 1 | 1 | 10/20/2017 13:52 |
| political parties | 4 | 14 | 3/31/2017 14:52 |
| goal of politics | 5 | 41 | 4/10/2017 12:01 |
| justice | 4 | 24 | 4/10/2017 15:39 |
| justice as fairness | 2 | 6 | 10/20/2017 12:38 |
| political conception of justice | 1 | 5 | 10/20/2017 12:38 |
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| education | 1 | 5 | 4/10/2017 12:09 |
| problem solving | 1 | 2 | 6/15/2017 12:00 |
| context | 4 | 12 | 5/26/2017 16:13 |
| Non- public reason | 1 | 4 | 10/23/2017 11:45 |
Appendix D: An example of the coded text within one node, in this case the node or theme of “Reasoned agreement”

<Internals\theory\Cohen> - § 2 references coded [1.10% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.49% Coverage

outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they
could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals.
The ideal deliberative procedure is a procedure that captures this
principle.15

Reference 2 - 0.61% Coverage

While I may take my preferences as a
sufficient reason for advancing a proposal, deliberation under conditions
of pluralism requires that I find reasons that make the proposal
acceptable to others who cannot be expected to regard my
preferences as sufficient reasons for agreeing.

<Internals\theory\Elster> - § 3 references coded [1.67% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.40% Coverage

According to the theory of Jürgen Habermas, the goal of
politics should be rational agreement rather than compromise, and

the decisive political act is that of engaging in public debate with a

view to the emergence of a consensus.

Reference 2 - 0.71% Coverage

According to the first view of politics, this task

is inherently one of interest struggle and compromise. The obstacle
to agreement is not only that most individuals want redistribution to

be in their favour, or at least not in their disfavor. More basically

consensus is blocked because there is no reason to expect that

individuals will converge in their views on what constitutes a just

redistribution.

Reference 3 - 0.56% Coverage

since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences.

When the private and idiosyncratic wants have been shaped

and purged in public discussion about the public good, uniquely
determined rational desires would emerge. Not optimal compromise,

but unanimous agreement is the goal of politics on this

view.
Reference 1 - 0.82% Coverage

To explain:
There is the greatest urgency for citizens to reach practical agreement in judgment about the constitutional essentials. These are of two kinds:

a. fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government and the political process: the powers of the legislature, executive, and the judiciary; the scope of majority rule; and

b. equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect: such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and of association, as well as the protections of the rule of law.

Reference 2 - 0.61% Coverage

Everyone appeals to political values, but agreement is lacking and more than marginal differences persist. Should this happen, as it often does, some may say that public reason fails to resolve the question, in which case citizens may legitimately invoke principles appealing to non-political values to resolve it in a way they find satisfactory.29 Not everyone would introduce the same non-political values but at least all would have an answer suitable to them.
The ideal of public reason urges us not to do this in cases of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Close agreement is rarely achieved, and abandoning public reason whenever disagreement occurs in balancing values is in effect to abandon it altogether. Moreover, as we said in section 4.5, public reason does not ask us to accept the very same principles of justice, but rather to conduct our fundamental discussions in terms of what we regard as a political conception. We should sincerely think that our view of the matter is based on political values everyone can reasonably be expected to endorse. For an electorate thus to conduct itself is a high ideal the following of which realizes fundamental democratic values not to be abandoned simply because full agreement does not obtain. A vote can be held on a fundamental question as on any other; and if the question is debated by appeal to political values and citizens vote their sincere opinion, the ideal is sustained.
Appendix E: Publications during the course of this PhD research


Official URL: http://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/icc2016/

Abstract

The judgment process in architectural competitions has long been considered as one of the most complex and controversial practices. This, on one hand, is because of architecture itself and the multi-faceted nature of the architectural design, and on the other, for the complexion of the judgment process and the diversity of stakeholders involved in the decision process. Framing the judgment process as a democratic practice, this paper aims to explore the nature of the judgment process in architectural competitions, utilizing deliberative democracy as a frame of reference, through comparative critical analysis approach to the existing body of knowledge. The communicative action theory is used as a model by which negotiations or communications leading to the decision in judgment process of an architectural competition can be integrated in the process and understood from a new angle. Laying foundation for future research, this paper argues that, in order to reach a rational mutual decision, dialogic and instrumental deliberation are both essential to a successful judgment process in architectural competitions. In addition, conducting an effective communication between all the stakeholders involved in the decision process to promote transparency, is vital to reach a common understanding that allows for sharing a common ground to reach consensus.

Keywords: Architectural competitions; judgement; communicative action; deliberative democracy