

Defending the Home(land):

Gendering Civil Defence from the First World War to the ‘War on Terror’

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In 1939, the *Handy War-Time Guide for the Woman at Home and the Man in the Street* offered the following bit of wisdom to its British audience:

[EXT]A nation’s safety and success in war now depend very much on the safety of the home and on the courage and co-operation of those who have to carry on with their daily round of common tasks. When enemy attacks can reach our very homes, ultimate victory is no longer only a matter of arms and of men. It is also a matter of women and even of children. Victory or defeat may depend ultimately on the steps we have taken to protect our homes and our families, on the way in which we tackle our domestic problems and discipline ourselves to face the perils that may beset us.¹

The development of new weaponry and techniques with which to wage war in the twentieth century brought about a new type of conflict. From the First World War onwards, the defence of the home in Britain became central, not only to the safety of those within that home, but also to national morale and ultimately, to victory. Civil defence became a central aspect of both preparations for warfare and of warfare itself. As the above quotation suggests, how a society ‘disciplined itself’ to face external threats that hit home would shape the outcome of wars. Civil defence became – and remains – a central means by which the citizen is addressed by the state. It restages the relationship between the individual, who undertakes to participate in civil defence, and the state, which undertakes to protect those living within its borders. As such, this chapter argues that civil defence implicitly entails a renegotiation of citizenship, a renegotiation that must be understood as gendered.

The new weaponry that threatened the civilian in wartime extended the war front to the home. For the first time in hundreds of years, British women and children found themselves the targets of warfare alongside male combatants, dying for their country in the homes and streets of Britain, not on the traditional battlefield. This extension of warfare was accompanied by the development of civil defence, a set of ideas, activities and organizations intended to prepare civilians to face annihilation, to give some protection to civilians in wartime, and to reassure both civilians and members of the military that the home was not being left undefended. As such, it can be understood as part of what Cynthia Enloe has termed the ‘militarization’ of society. Enloe points towards the wide-ranging and insidious means by which societies become militarized, a process that both shapes and strengthens patriarchy.² Drawing on Enloe’s work, this chapter begins to trace the complex relationship between discourses of civil defence and gender in twentieth and twenty-first century Britain, arguing that, throughout very different types of war and conflict, and very different conceptions of civil defence, the state has effectively militarized everyday life. Despite utilizing women’s labour for civil defence, the state has maintained, and at times strengthened, existing understandings of masculinity, femininity and citizenship.

Civil defence can be understood as the gendered militarization of citizenship; a process extending to women some of the duties of citizenship previously only associated with men – duties such as defending and perhaps dying for one’s country. However, civil defence altered such duties by placing them within the sphere of the home and the domestic. The need to organize non-combatants to defend the home(land) against attack necessitated an articulation of citizenship and its repositioning, as Sonya O. Rose has argued, as ‘active citizenship... linked to social responsibility and participation in civil society or in public affairs’.³ The good wartime citizen would have to be willing to not only put the needs of the collective before those of the individual, but must also be willing to risk their life in defence of their family, their community and their nation. Within the planning and organization of civil defence in the 1930s and 1940s for example, civilians were now addressed through policy and via the media as democratic citizens who had a duty to participate in ‘the ordinary duties of citizenship’, such

as civil defence. As the *Daily Telegraph* wondered: ‘what could be more democratic than making national defence the concern of every man and woman in a democratic state?’⁴

Sociologists and political philosophers have long debated the meanings of citizenship, and there is not one, agreed understanding of the concept.⁵ Citizenship can encompass a set of political values, usually associated with membership of a nation state, confer rights upon these citizens, and demand duties from them in return. This chapter, whilst grounded in the discipline of history, engages with recent work on citizenship in political science and sociology, most significantly the concept of ‘citizenship regimes’.⁶ In particular, it finds the concept of ‘citizenship regimes’ especially useful, because the term recognizes the complex and multifarious nature of citizenship in the modern world, revealing how discourses of citizenship ‘constitute and govern individuals, societies and institutions’.⁷

Wartime citizenship provides a compelling example of this model of citizenship in action. Such a version of the citizen emphasizes duties over rights, as individual citizens are asked to participate in a collective war effort, putting the needs of the collective above those of the individual, and perhaps giving their lives in defence of this collective. However, citizens do not experience the state in a unitary manner. Despite being an ‘equalizing word’, evocative of common privileges, rights and duties, citizenship is both felt and enacted in profoundly different ways by different members of the nation. While British women had been enfranchised first in a limited way in 1918 and on equal terms in 1928, they continued to experience many of the demands and duties of citizenship in a gendered manner. The 1918 legislation both directly and indirectly emphasized women’s roles as wives and mothers alongside their new role as voters. While debate about the franchise, together with legislation like the conscription of men in 1916 and 1939, and of women in 1941, make the gendered nature of wartime citizenship clearly visible, gendered discourses of citizenship also operate in more hidden ways in wartime. This emerged, for example, in the expectation during the First World War that women would undertake a ‘duty’ to the state as wives and mothers; those who appeared to fail that duty might be denounced. Similarly, during the current ‘War on Terror’, women who wore the Hijab were accused of prioritizing a ‘divisive’ cultural identity over a ‘truer’ version of unified Britishness.⁸

This analysis of civil defence as one of the duties of citizenship explores the ways in which it addressed male and female citizens in a gender-specific manner. Moreover, despite the ways in which new weaponry extended the dangers and duties of warfare from the military man to the civilian woman, the enactment of civil defence helped to reinforce normative gendered identities, with women and children largely imagined as victims and men as defenders of the home. As Matthew Stibbe and Ana Carden-Coyne demonstrate in this volume, under-researched aspects of war and conflict, such as internment, wounding and the targeting of civilians, illustrate the multiple ways in which war shapes gender, and gender shapes war.

This chapter provides a brief chronological narrative that traces the development of civil defence in twentieth-century Britain and draws on archival sources, both government and civil service papers, personal accounts, and representations in public media in order to examine the historically situated nature of gendered citizenship regimes in wartime. It makes use of feminist scholarship on gendered citizenship in order to analyse the gendered nature of civil defence, arguing that while civil defence emerged in the twentieth century as a dual social and state institution, it must be understood as gendered. The chapter first explores how the transformation of citizenship via civil defence began when air power made the home a military battleground. Second, it examines how civil defence became gendered in the interwar period and throughout the Second World War. Third, it discusses the relationship between gender and changing practices of civil defence in the Cold War period and finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the legacies of gendered citizenship and the gendered politics of twenty-first century global security.

[A]The Invention of Civil Defence

During the First World War, the first news of Britain's vulnerability to air attack came in a report in *The Times* detailing an aerial assault near Dover on Christmas 1914.⁹ By the end of January 1915, British civilians had died in Zeppelin raids on England. However, it was not until later in the spring that London first felt the impact of air raids, and it was both the nature and setting of these raids that

provoked an outpouring of responses. A raid on London in May 1915 provided the British public with victims that vividly illustrated how war had changed.

On the night of the raid, Elsie Legett and her sister Elizabeth were asleep in bed with three other siblings. A bomb fell directly upon their home; their father tried to rescue all the children, and failed, receiving severe burns in the process. Elsie Legett was three years old when she died that night; Elizabeth was eleven when she subsequently died from her injuries. As a newspaper headline explained, this was the ‘tragedy of the Zeppelins.’¹⁰ Her age and gender made Elsie Legett a visible and important symbol of the vulnerability of civilians in this new type of warfare. However, the women and children killed by air power in the First World War became something more than victims. Their behaviour was read as heroic, as worthy of public attention, recognition and validation. If Elsie Legett was the first celebrated child victim of this war, she was not the last. Just two years later, the tragedy of the Zeppelin was surpassed by the tragedy of the Gotha, a powerful new German plane.

On 13 June 1917, a daylight Gotha raid on London hit an infants’ school in Poplar. Eighteen children, most five years old, were killed. At the public inquest for the victims, the Coroner, the Mayor of the borough, and the local MP all spoke of the tragic and inexcusable nature of the attack. Strikingly, the borough’s Mayor compared the dead children with those who had died for Britain in far more traditional battle zones: ‘these boys and girls have died as truly for their country... as any of our men at the front or on the high seas’.¹¹ To claim that these small children had ‘truly died for their country’, suggests a genuinely new understanding of warfare and of those who could be called upon to sacrifice for the nation. These stories of children at war *at home* reveal a shifting landscape of warfare itself. For during the First World War, nothing had been done in advance to prepare civilians for attacks that might affect them in England rather than some foreign field. The loss of life in the air raids of the First World War carried a great symbolic weight; *who* was killed and *where* had a profound impact that forced the British state to take action. The result was the creation of interwar civil defence.

[A]The Gendering of Interwar Civil Defence

The air raids of the First World War were Britain's first taste of one of the defining features of twentieth-century warfare: attacks on civilians from the air. This tactic was intended to destroy morale, both civilian and, significantly, among combatant men who were powerless to defend their families at home. Popular culture in the interwar years reflected a growing pre-occupation with the horrors that any future war would bring, with novels and films providing lurid imagery of the destruction of cities and their inhabitants by incendiary explosives and poison gas. These imaginings were grounded in the experiences of the civilians of Iraq (1920–1932), Abyssinia (1935–1936), China (1937–1945) and Spain (1936–1939), all of whom suffered at the hands of politicians, policy makers and military leaders who were determined to use aerial bombardment as a tactic of war.

They were also grounded in the experiences of British civilians, and within a decade of the First World War, the British government had created a secret sub-committee of the Committee on Imperial Defence to examine what would become the basis of civil defence. Convened in 1924, the sub-committee on Air Raids Precautions began both to collect data and to develop concrete plans to address the threat of aerial attacks. Throughout these discussions, the new reality that civilians, and not just soldiers, would need to risk their lives in a nation at war shaped policy.¹²

As global conflict loomed again in the late 1930s, the secret plans became public, first with a circular on Air Raids Precautions in the summer of 1935. Publicity opened up space for British politicians to debate more openly the best means of protecting citizens against the worst effects of aerial bombardment. In 1937, the government passed the Air Raids Precautions (ARP) Act, the first of a number of measures designed to provide an organizational structure for civil defence. Civilians now had a formal defensive role in wartime; alongside the military, they were to undertake the defence of the nation. Significantly, women would take part in this defence alongside men, reflecting the ways in which the threat of aerial warfare broke down the gendered distinction between combatant, who could die for his nation, and civilian, who remained 'behind the lines'. As a *Times* leader argued in 1938:

[EXT]The development of the bomber has brought the front line of war to the very doors of a nation which for centuries has been safe from enemies. And the object of the

bomber is not to defeat the rival air force but to terrify into submission populations whose women and children and homes are attacked and destroyed by fire, explosive and gas.¹³

As well as being the targets of aerial warfare, women would be intimately involved in the nation's defence. However, although this new form of warfare blurred previous distinctions between war front and home front, divisions between the combatant man and the civilian woman were largely maintained through the careful management of the nature of women's civil defence work.

Most strikingly, civil defence was divided into 'active' and 'passive' branches, with women confined to passive civil defence until 1941. Passive defence encompassed police, air raid wardens, the fire service, first aid and ambulance work, heavy rescue and gas detection. Within these fields, women were not to be employed in heavy rescue, front line fire services or gas protection and were instead primarily employed as first aid workers, where it was estimated that 362,500 women would be needed in a future war.¹⁴ Concerns were raised almost immediately about both the numbers and suitability of women who would be willing to volunteer for ARP. The Home Office was uncomfortable with the large numbers of women expected to be employed in civil defence, arguing that the nature of the work meant that it could only be undertaken by 'young and active men'.¹⁵ Yet while the Home Office presumed the masculinity of defending the home front, men saw it differently. As war approached, young men proved reluctant to join the civil defence services, not just constrained by paid work but more eager to participate in military service. Indeed, the *Daily Telegraph* noted in April 1938 that many London boroughs had 'a disproportionate number of women' in their ranks of ARP volunteers.¹⁶ ARP's links with the defence of the home, the family and domesticity, its position as the passive branch of civil defence and its employment of women also contributed to the reluctance of young men to enrol, one man complaining that he 'felt a fool' because he had been 'put in with a lot of old boys and women'.¹⁷ Recruitment for the ARP services attempted to tackle this by emphasizing the 'masculine' nature of civil defence.

Posters such as Frank Gardner's 'Serve to Save' emphasized the manly nature of civil defence in its depiction of a civilian man sheltering a cowering woman and child behind a shield engraved ARP¹⁸

This emphasis on the ‘manly’ nature of ARP work demonstrates the problematic relationship between civil defence and gender: defending the home was regarded as passive rather than active service, was easily associated with the domestic and the feminine, and thus separate from the masculine, active military services. This may also have been strengthened in the public mind by the creation of the Women’s Voluntary Services (WVS) in 1938, initially created to mobilize women in defence of the home and the nation. Press coverage of the WVS contrasts with the recruitment campaign for ARP, with newspapers such as *The Times* emphasizing the feminine nature of civil defence as ‘care of casualties or of patients in hospital wards is peculiarly the woman’s gift’.¹⁹ During the crisis of September 1938, when civil defence had its first dry run, the media extolled the work of female ARP workers under trying conditions. An article in *The Star*, for example, praised their moral influence in lessening panic, noting that ‘no woman warden has shown the slightest signs of nerves, hysterics or fainting’, as if to suggest that such traits might both be expected of women and yet under the exceptional circumstances of wartime could be overcome.²⁰ The end result was that while citizenship duties expanded to include women in the defence of home and nation, this citizenship was deeply inscribed with traditional notions of gender.

Well before the summer of 1939, there was a new sense of urgency in the air. Public air raid shelters began to appear in the streets, blackouts were practised and evacuation plans finalized. Nevertheless, the numbers enrolled for civil defence were still well below Home Office requirements. By the end of March 1939, the Home Office estimated that 1, 118,582 people were enrolled for ARP work against the 1,600,000 it required. Of these, 411,301 were women, mainly enrolled as volunteers in first aid, as ambulance drivers, clerical and communications workers with 104,729 female wardens.²¹ In a series of secret meetings, the Cabinet considered introducing male conscription for civil defence, deciding against this as it would make ARP too ‘military in appearance’, undermining the concept of civil defence as ‘organized help by the civilian body’ in which the ‘risks accepted by soldiers, sailors and airmen’ would be extended to civilians who might ‘give their lives for the help and protection of others’.²² When war broke out in September 1939, ARP was firmly established as a civilian

organization, calling on male and female citizens to participate in the defence of their homes, their communities and, ultimately, their nation against the threat of war from the air.

[A] Civil Defence in the Second World War

In at least one, fundamental, way, civil defence appeared to be gender blind: 2,379 civil defence workers died and 4,459 were seriously injured by the end of the Second World War. However, closer examination of these figures reveals that, of the total killed and seriously injured, the majority (6,220) were men.²³ When women worked alongside men, as in the Warden's Service, they were just as likely to be killed and injured as their male colleagues. However, the majority of female civil defence workers were employed outside the line of fire, staffing control centres and providing clerical support for the police and fire services, which only employed men in 'active' service. Some aspects of civil defence continued to be seen as particularly suited to women: one warden arguing that 'women are better (as wardens) than men in most cases... They can see in a moment who is in a house because they know what to look for'.²⁴ The WVS gradually extended their civil defence role to encompass providing refreshments for rescue workers and victims of bombing, taking those who had lost their homes to rescue centres and helping them negotiate the subsequent bureaucracy, and breaking the news of injury or death to relatives. In its formation of the Housewives Service, a street based organization which encouraged women to participate in civil defence by providing information, refreshments and shelter to neighbours in the event of a bombing raid, the WVS successfully extended civil defence to the home, arguing that 'a woman can offer to the community all the gifts, experience, common sense which she has hitherto expended upon her home and family'. Domesticity, femininity and civil defence were explicitly linked in the service where the good housewife became the good citizen as 'the life of the nation is distinctly the housewife's province'.²⁵

Yet, some women wanted to take a more active role in the defence of the nation. From 1941, work on Anti-Aircraft (AA) sites offered them the opportunity to do so, albeit in a limited, gender specific form. Since the late 1930s, Sir Frederick Pile, Commander-in-Chief of Air Defence, had been

challenging the exclusion of women from the 'active' arm of civil defence, of which AA was a vital part. Pile had identified the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS), the women's branch of the Army, as potential AA workers as early as 1938, when he had invited the pioneering female engineer Caroline Haslett to inspect air defence emplacements with a view to assessing the potential for women's employment. The gap of three years between Pile's initial plans and the decision to invite members of the ATS into Air Defence indicates the organizational and ideological complexities of employing women on AA sites. Air Defence was particularly vulnerable to being 'combed out' for servicemen by the Army, with 30,000 searchlight operators seconded from Air Defence in the middle of 1941.²⁶

The first mixed batteries became operational five months later in Richmond Park, London, and quickly became a public attraction, with crowds often gathering to 'stand and gaze in fascination'.²⁷ The sight of women working alongside men on these sites soon became commonplace. By 1942 more women were working on AA sites than men, and approximately 50% of new ATS recruits were choosing to work in Air Defence.²⁸ However, although women working on these batteries assisted in the targeting and shooting down of aircraft, they remained officially 'non combatants', unlike their male colleagues. Women worked as radar operators, height finders, spotters, predictors and locators on the sites, but men alone fired the guns. Thus although women worked with, and sometimes died alongside, men on the batteries, they remained lower status members of a separate organization, on lower pay and, defined as non-combatant, unable to be awarded combat medals. While male and female citizens worked and died alongside one another in the defence of the home, this militarization of citizenship was one in which divisions and hierarchies of gender remained closely guarded.

The Second World War witnessed the expansion of aerial bombardment of civilians as a weapon of warfare and the establishment of participation in civil defence as a duty of male and female citizens. New weaponry, and responses to this, effectively saw the expansion of the militarization of civil society, and concurrently of civil defence as both a right and a duty of the good citizen. However, this wartime citizenship was shaped by, and in turn reinforced, established gender identities. A variety of discourses constructed female civil defence workers separately from their male colleagues. Although they may have been united by a shared *active* citizenship, civil defence workers were organized and

imagined in such a way as to preserve the gender hierarchy of military service as an absolutely masculine performance of (male) citizenry.

[A]Civil Defence in the Cold War

The gendered politics of civil defence did not end with the conclusion of the war. The use of atomic weapons against Japan in August 1945 conjured up the prospect of a whole new type of warfare: nuclear war. As the Cold War intensified, a rapidly escalating arms race took place and Britain was the third country to test its own independent nuclear 'deterrent' in 1952. The new threat of nuclear war led to shifts in British plans for civil defence and the establishment of a voluntary Civil Defence Corps (CDC). Founded in 1949 and eventually disbanded in 1968, the CDC once again drew on notions of active citizenship to recruit male and female volunteers who would undergo training in measures of civil defence in the event of a nuclear war. By 1953, over 300,000 people had signed up as members of the Corps.²⁹

Represented as 'a call to duty' which 'patriotic' citizens should not 'leave to someone else', civil defence in the nuclear age drew on the same discourse of active citizenship as ARP had in the earlier period.³⁰ Defence of one's nation and home, however apparently pointless in an age of nuclear destruction, was again not simply a military responsibility, but the duty of civilian men and women, reflecting the increased militarization of civil society during the Cold War. Civil defence in the event of nuclear war was organized into four sections: the CDC, the Auxiliary Fire Service, the National Hospital Service Reserve and the Special Constabulary. The CDC was divided into six sections: wardens, headquarters, welfare, ambulance, rescue and pioneer, of which women were eligible to join the first four.³¹ Advertising campaigns for the CDC demonstrate that, although nuclear weapons were gender blind, conceptions of civil defence were anything but. In the 1950s, when women were encouraged to 'return' to domesticity and femininity, rebuilding the family in a post-war idyll, recruitment posters emphasized the military experience of potential male recruits, many of whom

would have served in the Forces during the Second World War. Again, men were slower to join than women.

In an echo of earlier ARP posters, appeals to male citizens informed them that ‘this is a man’s job’, using images of rescue and bravery. In contrast, posters targeting women simply stated that ‘there’s a job for women too’, showing the various uniforms they could wear.³² Significantly, unlike the AA sites, where they had quasi-militarized and skilled roles, now women were primarily expected to volunteer for the Welfare section of the CDC, taking responsibility for evacuees or those made homeless by nuclear attack. Welfare was advertised as being ‘Where a woman’s help is needed’, and a recruitment poster echoed WVS posters in its depiction of a cheery, uniformed, middle-aged woman helping families in the aftermath of an apparently survivable nuclear attack.³³ Nuclear weapons might be new, these recruitment campaigns suggested, but the civil defence response to this threat was very much rooted in traditional conceptions of gender during wartime.

However, although the CDC had over 300,000 members at the height of its strength, many millions more did not join, and received no formal training in what to do in the event of nuclear war. Successive governments attempted to reach the mass of the civilian population through schemes of public education via films, pamphlets and the press. The information produced to inform citizens of their role in the event of nuclear war continued the gendered construction of civil defence. Films aimed at Civil Defence workers emphasized women’s caring role in the aftermath of a nuclear attack; *Care of the Homeless* (1965), for example, highlighted the work of the women’s welfare section following a fictitious attack on Bristol.³⁴ *The Warden and the Householder* (1961) represented the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ female citizen, embodied in the characters of Mrs Wells, who refused to organize the defence of her family because ‘my husband says there’s not going to be a war’, and Mrs Newson, who provided the necessary information to the nuclear warden and sought advice about how to best protect her home and family.³⁵ The WVS continued to play a role in civil defence in the nuclear age, planning to organize food, first aid and accommodation in the aftermath of nuclear war, and educating women in the protection of home and family. Nuclear involved a very new type of warfare, bringing in its wake levels of death, destruction and social breakdown unimaginable fifty years previously. However, gender roles

in civil defence, and in the imagined response of citizens to nuclear attack, continued to be highly differentiated. Women's linkage to the home and the domestic were strengthened in its very organization.

[A]Conclusion: Defending the Home(land) and the War on Terror

The gendered militarization of society has occupied an important history in the twentieth century and continues to resonate in the recent context of the 'War on Terror'. The attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, shifted the nature of attacks as well as resultant patterns of civil defence. Instead of aerial bombardment from military aircraft, domestic aeroplanes were used as weapons in suicide missions. Throughout Europe, the USA and the West security measures were quickly put in place to combat the apparent threat of expanded terrorism to Western citizens. This 'War on Terror' encompassed both the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 and a range of legislative and ideological responses at 'home'. In Britain, the government passed various counter-terrorism laws, including the controversial Terrorism Bill of 2005, which sought to allow detention of terrorist suspects for 90 days without trial on the basis of a 'state of exception'.³⁶ When four young British men strapped explosives to their bodies and detonated them on the London transport network in July 2005, killing 52 people, the 'War on Terror' definitively 'came home'. Britain had a history of civil conflict and terrorism in Northern Ireland, and the demonization of Britain's Muslim citizens repeated many of the fears about and injustices brought on Irish people during the 'Irish Troubles'. The citizens of post 9-11 Britain were thus expected to define themselves not just by nation and by gender, but also by religious and cultural practice.

Susan Faludi has argued that following the attacks of 2001, traditional gender roles and values were reasserted in the United States, with men reconstructed as combatants, defending a nation represented as a domestic sanctuary inhabited by women and children in need of protection. The War on Terror, Faludi argues, demonized both the feminist woman and the 'feminized' man at home.³⁷ In contrast, in Britain any reassertion of traditional gender roles was filtered through overarching concerns

with religious and cultural practice, amplifying historical anxieties about multiculturalism and the end of Britain's empire. Responses to the 'Rushdie affair' of 1989 and the Bradford race riots of summer 2001 exaggerated existing concerns about the 'failure' of multiculturalism. This creation of a 'citizenship test' in 2005 alongside increasingly punitive immigration laws, paralleled widely circulating citizenship discourses which demonized Britain's Muslim population, positioning them as problematic citizens. Within this toxic atmosphere, Muslim women who wore the Hijab were subjected to particularly virulent, and state-sanctioned, criticism. In 2006 Jack Straw, previously Home Secretary and Labour MP for Blackburn, which has a large Muslim population, stated that he would ask female constituents to remove their veils when talking to him, going on to claim that he would like to see the veil abolished altogether, a highly-controversial public sector policy being pursued in France at the time, and subsequently passed into law.³⁸ Whilst Straw's comments signalled a radical shift in Labour party rhetoric, potentially inflammatory to some of its core constituents, they also showed political willingness to court a strand of thinking in contemporary Britain that associated citizenship with liberal, Christian-based religious and cultural practices.

This association was made even more visible in Prime Minister David Cameron's speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2011, where he linked national security with a unifying sense of nationhood. In Cameron's vision, Britishness explicitly excluded allegiance to religious and cultural identities increasingly being demonized, as he contrasted an 'active, muscular liberalism' to the beliefs and action of 'young men... who are prepared to blow themselves up and kill their fellow citizens'.³⁹ Muslims are thus increasingly perceived as prioritizing their religious and cultural values over unifying civic duties. In the war on terror, it has become ever more important to be easily identifiable as a 'good' citizen who embraces 'British' values over presumably oppositional religious or cultural identities. However, while this contemporary, wartime construction of citizenship is clearly racialized, it is also deeply gendered.

While, at present, only Muslim men are imagined as terrorists and thus a physical threat to British security, Muslim women who wear the Hijab are imagined as a symbolic threat, embodying and signifying a feminine failure to identify as 'good' citizens. The 'War on Terror' has produced an

ongoing gendered militarization of society in which men and women are considered to be 'good' or 'bad' citizens depending on their race, religion and beliefs. Crucially, this racialized citizenship is filtered through the lens of gender. Within this discursive construction of wartime citizenship, Hijab wearing women have 'failed' an imagined citizenship test based on visible assimilation to the signalled values of civic normativity. Civil defence in the age of the 'War on Terror' has moved away from organized bodies of civilians, in which women and men had specific gender roles to play in the defence of a gendered home, towards a citizenship in which cultural and religious identity defines and polarizes the good versus the potentially dangerous citizen. If war can be fought anywhere by anyone, civil defence has become an act to be embodied by all.

Endnotes

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- ² C. Enloe, *Maneuvers. The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
- ³ S.O. Rose, *Which People's War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain 1939-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2003), 19.
- ⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 3 December 1938.
- ⁵ For a survey of different positions see R. Beiner, (ed.) *Theorizing Citizenship*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).
- ⁶ J. Jenson and S.D. Philips, 'Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada', *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 3/3, 1996.
- ⁷ K. Hunt and K. Rygiel (eds), *(En)Gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged Politics*, (Ashgate: Hampshire, 2006), 5.
- ⁸ <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference-60293> [accessed 21 February 2012].
- ⁹ *The Times* 26 Dec. 1914.
- ¹⁰ *The Times*, 2 June 1915 and 10 June 1915. *The Daily Chronicle*, 3 June 1915.
- ¹¹ *The Times*, 16 June 1917.
- ¹² See T.H. O'Brien, *Civil Defence* (London: HMSO, 1955), Grayzel, *At Home and Under Fire* (forthcoming).
- ¹³ *The Times*, 12 January 1938.
- ¹⁴ *Daily Express*, 3 November, 1937.

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- ¹⁵ The National Archives (TNA), Home Office (HO) 45/17597, *Police, Fire Brigades and A.R.P. Services Manpower Requirements: Memo for Cabinet*, 14 December 1937.
- ¹⁶ *Daily Telegraph*, 12 April 1938.
- ¹⁷ Mass-Observation (M-O), File Report A24, *Report of A.R.P. Survey Carried Out in Fulham by Mass-Observation April-July 1939*, 84.
- ¹⁸ Imperial War Museum (IWM), catalogue number IWM PST0720.
- ¹⁹ *The Times*, 17 June 1938.
- ²⁰ *The Star*, 30 Sept. 1938.
- ²¹ TNA, HO186/371, *Civil Defence Preparedness*, A.R.P. Training State, March 1939, HO186/153, *Organisation of Civil Defence Personnel*, Home Office Estimate of Requirements, March 1939.
- ²² TNA, HO186/153, *Organization of Civil Defence Personnel*, Minutes of Secret Meeting of Cabinet, 24 March 1939, Sir John Anderson speech to A.R.P. volunteers at the Albert Hall, cited in *The Telegraph*, 25 January 1939.
- ²³ T.H. O'Brien, *Civil Defence Appendix II*, 678.
- ²⁴ Cited in J. Gardner, *The Blitz: The British Under Attack*, (London: Harper Collins, 2010), 105.
- ²⁵ Cited in J. Hinton, *Women, Social Leadership and the Second World War. Continuities of Class*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 79.
- ²⁶ Gen. Sir F. Pile, *Ack Ack: Britain's Defences Against Air Attack During the Second World War*, (London: George G. Harrap, 1949), 226.
- ²⁷ Pile, *Ack Ack*, 192.
- ²⁸ J. Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing*, (London: Granta, 1999), 328, V. Douie, *Daughters of Britain: An Account of the Work of British Women During the Second World War*, (Oxford: Vincent Baxter Press, 1949), 34.
- ²⁹ M. Grant, *After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Britain 1945-1968* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010) 4–5.

³⁰ TNA, Ministry of Information, (INF) INF2/118, Civil Defence Recruitment Campaigns', 1950 - 1957.

³¹ Grant, *After the Bomb*, 65.

³² TNA, INF2/118, Civil Defence Recruitment Campaigns.

³³ TNA, INF2/118, Civil Defence Recruitment Campaigns.

³⁴ *Care of the Homeless* (1965).

³⁵ *The Warden and the Householder* (1961).

³⁶ This aspect of the Bill was rejected by the House of Commons. On the 'state of exception' see G. Agamben, *State of Exception*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

³⁷ S. Faludi, *The Terror Dream: What 9/11 Revealed About America*, (London: Atlantic Books, 2007).

³⁸ *Lancashire Telegraph*, 6 October 2006. Also see M. D. Byng, 'Symbolically Muslim: Media, Hijab and the West', *Critical Sociology*, 36: 109, 2010.

³⁹ <http://www.number10.gov.uk> [accessed 21 February 2011].