

Counter-mapping citizenship bordering through domicide in Calais, France

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Abstract

Doctor of Philosophy

Counter-mapping citizenship: bordering through domicide in Calais, France

by Travis VAN ISACKER

This thesis analyses how anti-migrant domicide functions as a technology of citizenship in Calais, France. Evictions, destructions, and securitisations exclude 'noncitizen' migrants from this border city, defining those allowed to exist within it as citizens by contrast. They also destroy the physical infrastructures, social communities, and political solidarities facilitating migrants' irregular journeys to the UK. Thus, the erasure of irregular migrants' autonomous home-spaces reproduces citizenship while reasserting it as the determinant of who can freely exist in, or move beyond, Calais.

However, anti-migrant domicide also produces unconventional citizenships beyond nationality or status. The thesis analyses two examples—environmental and humanitarian citizenship—to show how citizen communities in Calais can reconfigure themselves around alternative, nominally more inclusive, sets of values while continuing to exclude irregular migrants. In these cases citizens define themselves either against migrants who are perceived as failing to fulfil citizenship's substantive criteria, or through migrants who are the object of citizen-defining humanitarian or environmentalist performances. While not immediately excluded by their status, migrants remain 'non-citizens' because of their racialisation in Calais' racist environment and how this has been compounded by the effects of domicide against them.

Counter-mapping in this project takes three different forms: cartographic, presenting a map of domicide between 2009-19; narrative, elaborating descriptions of select case studies in Calais' anti-migrant domicidal history; and conceptual, demonstrating how citizenship is produced by these exclusionary spatial interventions. These three modes are combined to map how migrants' spatial exclusion from Calais' 'spaces of citizenship' and their socio-political exclusion reciprocally reinforce one-another.

While countering progressive conceptions of citizenship by showing how all citizenship forms analysed in Calais are constituted through migrants' exclusion, the thesis raises questions for the continued invocation of citizenship politics in scholarly analyses of resistance to the border regime. It also argues for the need to (re)create spaces of anti-citizenship as part of struggles for free movement for all. These spaces prefigure coalitional relations beyond citizenship categories, and provide toe-holds from which to resist their institutionalisation in bordering technologies.

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*All photographs originally appear in colour.

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Travis VAN ISACKER, declare that the research contained in this thesis, unless otherwise formally indicated within the text, is the original work of the author. The thesis has not been previously submitted to this or any other university for a degree, and does not incorporate any material already submitted for a degree.

Signed:

Date:

Introduction



FIGURE 1: Buffed 'No one is illegal!' graffiti on Rue Eustache de Saint Pierre. Author's photograph January 2018.

0.1 Calais, City of Walls

The photograph above uniquely illustrates what this research project aims to capture: the layering of space in Calais; the struggles against the border and citizenship regimes producing certain people there as 'illegal'; and how, despite erasure, traces of these struggles remain visible. This wall is located in Calais-Nord, the historic city of Calais that was merged with Saint-Pierre in 1881 to create its contemporary city limits. Although dwarfed by the £2.3m 'Great Wall of Calais' (see Figure 30) enclosing the final stretch of the motorway ending in the ferry port (Broomfield, 2016), I nevertheless found this otherwise unremarkable wall to be a more compelling symbol of the spatial exclusion imposed upon irregular migrants in the city, as well as their struggles against it.

Visible on this wall, if just barely, are the words '*No one is illegal!*'. This slogan, created to oppose Operation Wetback in the United States in 1954, has become famous as a rallying cry heard on demonstrations of European No Borders groups (Anderson, Sharma, and C. Wright, 2009, p. 11), and as the name of a global migrant solidarity network formed during the 1997 *documenta* X exhibition (Thompson, 2012). But more

than a name or chant, '*No one is illegal!*' is a powerful statement. It denies humans can *be* illegal as they are alive, and instead points to the fact that only certain people are *produced* as such by institutionalised citizenship and other governmental regimes of mobility control (De Genova, 2002). However, '*No one is illegal!*' is more than a critique; it is a call to action. Exclaiming '*No one is illegal!*' creates an imperative for receivers of the message to make that emphatic denial a reality by opposing the institutions, actors, and interests that ascribe illegality to life. This demand, as it echoes, impels us to try and guarantee really *no one* is illegal through collective actions.

The provocations of this graffiti are all the more cogent considering its location. The wall on which it was written is just 50 metres from a church building where the charity Secours Catholique ran a monthly clothing distribution for Calais' migrants until 2016. The graffiti's proximity to this place means its message would have been seen by many of the illegalised migrants attending these distributions over the years. Perhaps beyond confronting all passers-by with a rejection of the arbitrariness of citizenship status categories, the writer wanted to communicate specifically to these people who had been produced as 'illegal' that their state mandated condition was not endorsed by everyone in Calais. The proximity to the distribution point may also have been intended to show that, in addition to humanitarians helping migrants based on charitable intent, there were others in Calais who had a political critique of the very border regime that produces illegality and who were motivated to do more than just alleviate its symptoms. The graffiti's writer may also have been an illegalised person directly contesting their relegation to illegality by refusing to accept the very terms of their exclusion. In reality the identity of the writer does not necessarily change the point being made, nor did I contemplate it much seeing this wall for the first time. What struck me, and what lead to the questions consuming this research, was the graffiti's visible *persistence* despite having been erased.

Looking with Google Street View, this 'ghost text' was already visible in 2016, meaning it was written and erased beforehand. Meanwhile, similar graffiti exists untouched throughout the city (e.g. Figure 11), making this erasure particularly curious. While we do not know exactly who (I'd guess a municipal employee), someone appears to have tried to remove the graffiti with a pressure washer. Although having succeeded in erasing the pigment, they did not eliminate the message. The washedout symbols can still be read and have even been amplified by the attention this attempt at erasure now calls to them.

Visible today, albeit in negative relief, is not only the text of the graffiti, but the evidence of its removal. In fact, the layering of these signs have turned the wall into a palimpsest; a visual record of the struggle against citizenship and its subsequent repression as it has played out in Calais' urban space. The faded, but not gone, '*No* one is illegal!' continues obstinately rejecting the primacy of citizenship in determining the right to inhabit Calais, while testifying to an act of erasure that reasserted the coherence of the city as a 'space of citizenship', off limits to illegalised 'non-citizens'.

Further elucidating this spatial struggle as the regime of citizenship is contested

and defended through interventions into the city's urban fabric became the task I set for myself in this research project. My theoretical point of departure was Foucault's (2002, p. 351) statement that 'space is fundamental in any exercise of power', but I was further motivated by María Lugones' (2003, pp. 8–10) insistence that we first 'see that people are organized and channelled spatially in ways that contain them in a systematic way from getting together against the grain of power' before being able to imagine possibilities for resistance. Following Lugones, I wanted to see how Calais is spatially organised to channel people in a way that prevents them from getting together against the border regime, by documenting the interventions of repression and erasure that reassert citizenship as determining the right to inhabit this city.



FIGURE 2: Wall surrounding Total Transmarck where migrants stowaway on UK bound lorries. Author's photograph September 2019.

There are, of course, other walls more immediately associated with Calais's border than the one in Figure 1. These are the security barriers—the concrete walls and layers of fencing surrounding the terminals of the ferry port to the north, the Eurotunnel in Coquelles, and the motorways leading to these terminals (Figure 30)—preventing irregular migrants from traversing the Channel without authorisation. Investment in these anti-intrusion barriers has increased dramatically over the last 20 years, particularly around the time of the Jungle.ⁱ These walls are not just located at 'the border', but have proliferated throughout the city and road networks of the surrounding region (Figure 2) to create an archipelago of fortified border spaces designed to deny migrants access to lorries bound for the United Kingdom (UK) (Aris Escarcena, 2019). With border walls being a familiar, if impotent, symbol of the anxious nation-state's defence of its waning sovereignty (Brown, 2010), in Calais these walls are combined with surveillance and remote-sensing technologies to detect clandestine migrants hidden in the logistical flows permitted to travel to the UK each day in the interests of circulating capital (Aradau, 2016; Vaughan-Williams, 2010).



FIGURE 3: An abandoned warehouse walled off after being evicted in September 2013 (CMS, 2013a). Author's photograph September 2019.

However, while spending time in Calais, I began noticing a number of other walls surrounding spaces not immediately relevant to the border or the logistical networks that penetrate it, but which were enclosed in similarly fortified ways. The intense securitisation of many derelict buildings or otherwise anonymous outdoor spaces (e.g. Figure 3 and Figure 22) piqued my interest, and in the end provided a novel angle for investigating spatial bordering practices in the city. While walking around Calais these walls seem unremarkable; however, they are in fact illustrative of the same defence of the UK border as the wall in Figure 2, as well as the erasure of struggles against the citizenship regime as Figure 1.

Reading the city as a 'palimpsest text' (Launchbury and Levey, 2014), I considered these walls not as ahistorical givens, but interventions that have 'written over' prior versions of spatial existence. Reading into these previous editions through further research revealed that behind these walls were histories of migrants' autonomous inhabitance. Most were erected around spaces immediately following the eviction or destruction of squats and jungles, and thus these walls indicate the erasure of migrants' occupations through what will be called *domicidal interventions*. Because migrants' autonomous occupations are spatial interventions rejecting the notion that only citizens can inhabit the city of Calais in a similar way to the statement made by writing '*No one is illegal!*' on its walls, the walls around the spaces where these occupations existed attempt to erase resistant spatial histories in a similar way to washing away paint. However, this erasure is not totally successful, and, if one knows how to look, actually draws attention to the very places and histories it is meant to obscure.

Colliding with these seemingly mundane walls reoriented my initial perspective on how to understand migrants' spatial contestations of citizenship in Calais. They made me realise the importance of autonomous living spaces as interventions which themselves rupture the normative geometries of citizenship in/and the city-space instead of focusing on the seductively legible challenges posed through overt expressions of protest like '*No one is illegal!*'. This shifted my research towards investigating how citizenship is re-established and re-asserted through state reprisals to migrants' autonomous spatial occupations which erase and reterritorialise them.

Before delving into analysis of Calais' exclusionary border geography (Section 0.3), or defining the thesis' operative terms and concepts (Section 0.5), there is a final and more abstract 'wall' existing here which coming to grips with also consumed this project; the wall of citizenship. Citizenship functions as a wall in a very straightforward manner as an administrative status category denying people who do not satisfy certain criteria (often arbitrary, like country of birth, and waivable for particularly wealthy individuals) the right to move and reside where they please. In fact, citizenship today is the primary way that people's movements are restricted throughout the world while the circulation of capital is simultaneously accelerated, thus perpetuating global wealth inequalities (Rygiel, 2010, p. 9). Not only a bureaucratic wall, citizenship also forms the boundaries of social and political 'communities of value' (Anderson, 2013) organised beyond the state. This means that, in addition to a legal status walling people off from entire national territories, citizenship works in less formalised ways to delineate the boundaries of communities beyond the nation, but which likewise exclude Others from the reciprocal rights and obligations existing between individuals and that community.

However, citizenship also revealed itself as a wall in a less obvious way as I contemplated the significance of the '*No one is illegal!*' graffiti from Figure 1. For Peter Nyers (2008, pp. 177–179), the cry '*No one is illegal!*', particularly when shouted by non-status migrants, should be understood as an 'act of citizenship'. Although this phrase and Nyers' argument will be explored at length in Section 2.4, briefly, he implies that irregular migrants contesting the very terms of their exclusion—in this hypothetical example by an illegalised person writing '*No one is illegal!*' in Calais' city centre—actually perform themselves as political despite being depoliticised through their 'non-citizen' status. Because citizenship is exalted as *the* form of 'being political' (Isin, 2002), non-citizens are by definition unable to be legitimate political actors. Not only are they excluded from the preliminary social and political community required to recognise political existence¹, but they are prevented from performing themselves as political in the ways associated with the citizenship's set of 'correct' of political practices like voting, appealing to democratic representatives, or petitioning. Thus 'non-citizen' migrants assert themselves as *more than* non-citizens by contesting the

¹ Citizenship understood as Hannah Arendt's 'right to rights' is premised upon a preliminary recognition of an Other as well as their incorporation into a political community able to validate that recognition and give meaning to, while ensuring, individual freedoms (Gündoğdu, 2015) (see Section 2.2).

terms of their exclusion. By making claims and taking rights in the citizen community excluding them, they demonstrate that they actually are political beings, despite having been dis-recognised as such.

The theoretical move at the centre of 'acts of citizenship' is that this political being who contests their disqualification from the social and political community of citizenship, in so doing, paradoxically demonstrates their qualification for the very citizenship they have been denied. This is because a person who breaks the mould of subjection to claim rights that are not theirs in an enactment of Rancière's (2010) 'politics of dissensus' creates an alternative subjectivity than the depoliticised one they have been ascribed. Because, according to Engin Isin (2008, p. 18), an 'act of citizenship' involves transforming oneself from subject into a claimant'—a transformation which generates new political subjectivities in the process—anyone making claims that are not theirs becomes, if only fleetingly and informally, a citizen.

While I am likewise concerned with investing irregular migrants' struggles with their full political significance, the issue I take with reading their struggles through citizenship is that it implies *all* political acts, particularly those of non-citizens excluded from the realm of politics, are necessarily acts of citizenship. This inscribes irregular migrants' into a form of citizenship which, despite being distinct from or even challenging it as a state dictated legal status or set of rights and obligations, may not accurately reflect their politics. At worst this can even smooth the ground for re-incorporating irregular migrants into hegemonic and exclusionary state citizenship forms by describing them and their political aspirations within a vocabulary which, although contested, remains thoroughly under the control of state institutions for governing human mobility.

These are dense arguments to be unpacked later in Section 2.4. However, the 'wall' that appeared as I tentatively considered the '*No one is illegal!*' graffiti as an 'act of citizenship', is one that has been famously identified by Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2013, p. 179) *as citizenship itself*, particularly 'when it represents the ultimate horizon of political practice and social analysis'. Here citizenship is an abstract wall sealing off our imaginations of how to do politics, and how to make sense of others' political struggles. It makes highly specific forms of struggle, with their endogenous motivations and desires, necessarily about citizenship even if what exactly is meant by the term has been reconfigured to do so. Furthermore, citizenship requires a constitutive, if deferred exclusion (Section 2.2), which means political acts of citizenship appears both when the concept is used as an analytical device to make sense of migrant struggles, and as a foundation for progressive political organising towards realising the freedom of movement for all.

Finally, it became clear during my research that not only does citizenship exist as a wall, and Calais' walls still display the evidence of struggles against the border and citizenship regimes if one knows how to read them, but the material walls of the city also prevent irregular migrants from accessing citizenship or contesting their exclusion from it. With most of the spaces irregular migrants could inhabit or did inhabit having been walled off, they are prevented from existing in the city alongside Calais' citizens. This denies them the opportunity to form solidarities or communities with citizens which might test the apparent naturalness of their separation, and leaves citizenship's primacy in determining whose presence in the city is tolerated unchallenged. Instead, a self-reinforcing reciprocal relationship exists between migrants' spatial exclusion and their socio-political exclusion. Their *a priori* non-citizenship status justifies physical segregation which, in turn, forecloses upon possibilities for undoing formal citizen/non-citizen social segregation. Understanding this reciprocal relationship of exclusion became my main research objective.

0.2 **Research questions**

All these preliminary reflections on the many walls I came up against in Calais yielded a number of research questions that will be answered over the course of this thesis. My initial question on the erasure of migrants' spatial struggles was revised to concentrate on their home-spaces and can now be formalised as:

RQ1: How are the spaces migrants inhabit throughout Calais 'erased' by exclusionary spatial interventions?

This question needs to be combined with another to adequately address how these spatial interventions not only exclude migrants and repress their struggles to move and stay freely, but, by doing so, come to produce citizenship. Therefore, my second research question is:

RQ2: How do these erasures produce and spatialise citizenship?

My primary research focus is on the way state domicidal interventions produce and spatialise the form of citizenship institutionalised by the nation-state, connected to legal status, and which prescribes normative social, political, and spatial distinctions between citizens and 'non-citizens'. However, during my research I also became aware of how these interventions produced other forms of citizenship beyond that defined by the nation-state, and which did not, by definition, exclude Calais' non-status migrants. But what then was the relationship between these citizenship forms and irregular migrants in city? This lead to a third research question:

RQ3: How do the citizenship forms produced by domicidal interventions relate to irregular migrants?

Finally, in answering these three questions I was confronted with the perpetual exclusion of irregular migrants from both Calais' city-space and the various citizenships produced there. This provoked a broader question on the applicability of citizenship politics to coalitional struggles for all to move and stay freely: *RQ4*: What problems arise from using citizenship as a conceptual foundation for struggles challenging its exclusions, and how might they be overcome?

While these questions are still quite broad, Section 0.4 describes how they are specifically addressed in the thesis. However, a brief introduction to Calais for readers unfamiliar with how a French port city became a territorial border of the UK is now necessary. While most of the history of state domicidal policies against irregular migrants unfolds across the empirical chapters, this section offers a first look at the city's exclusionary border geography and a primer on the international regulations trapping people on the move in Calais.

0.3 Bordering Calais

0.3.1 Legislative framework

Calais is situated approximately 50km from Britain's southern coast, across the Strait of Dover. It is the closest European port to the UK, and the main hub for transport logistics between these territorial bodies. The Calais–Dover ferry crossings are the most economical, and in 2018 nearly 2m freight units and 10m passengers crossed the Channel from Calais' port (Port Boulogne Calais, n.d.). In addition to the ferry port for water-borne crossings, an undersea railway shuttle operates through the Eurotunnel from its terminal in the neighbouring municipality of Coquelles, a few kilometres west. In 2019, 11m passengers and 1.6m trucks made use of this transport link between France and the UK (Getlink Group, n.d.). These connections between the two countries are vital to sustaining the flow of bodies and goods between them, and have always attracted people looking to make this journey regardless of what national citizenship or travel documents they hold.

Beginning in the 90s, with the fall of the Berlin wall and dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, many forcibly displaced people intent on claiming political asylum in the UK have journeyed through Calais (Calais Research, 2017). Since then the number of people in irregular migratory situations coming to the city to attempt this crossing has increased, and their countries of origin have shifted many times depending on the locations of geopolitical conflict. The reasons migrants choose to relocate to the UK are as numerous as they are, but can include community and kinship ties, language, perceptions of Britain's labour market and welfare provision, the UK's geopolitical stance in international conflicts, and its histories of colonial involvement in migrants' countries of origin. However, before reaching the UK migrants must first leave Calais, a place consistently proving itself to be one of the most inescapable bottlenecks on their flight routes through Europe.

This is because, despite being located on the European mainland, Calais has become an externalised territorial boundary of the UK. This 'off-shoring' (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 19) of the UK's border occurred by establishing 'juxtaposed immigration controls' which necessitate UK bound travellers clear immigration in France, and vice versa. Externalisation is an increasingly common feature of European borders (Casas, Cobarrubias, and Pickles, 2011), and the UK border's displacement from its shores onto French land is one way that it governs migration 'at a distance' (Morris, 1998), keeping populations of would-be immigrants contained beyond the territorial limits of British sovereign territory, and thus beyond its legal responsibilities.

The legal framework underpinning this externalised border has developed significantly over the years. It began with the 1991 Sangatte Protocol specifying forthcoming journeys through the Eurotunnel (opened in 1994) would be subject to juxtaposed controls. This agreement was augmented in 2000 with the 'Additional Protocol' requiring pre-embarkation immigration controls on Eurostar passenger journeys to close the socalled 'Lille loophole' in which travellers with a ticket to Lille could remain on the train without authorisation as it continued to the UK (see Zhang, 2019, pp. 732–734). The signing of the Le Touquet treaty in 2003 established the same juxtaposed immigration controls required for train journeys on cross-Channel ferry routes (Calais Research, 2017), and there have since been a number of other declarations on the basis of this treaty providing further cooperation, and further British spending, to manage Calais' border (Bescherer, 2017, p. 20).

The Le Touquet treaty has been criticised for 'making France responsible for all asylum seekers refused entry into the UK' (ECRE, 2018). This is, however, its main purpose, and something for which the French are handsomely compensated. The British government has given hundreds of millions of pounds over the years for border security and policing operations in France to prevent migrants from being able to travel to, and then claim asylum, in Britain. Coupled with the so-called Dublin regulations² dictating asylum claimants are the legal responsibility of the signatory country in which their claim is first registered, or which they can be proven to have transited through, irregular migrants, even those intending to apply for political asylum when reaching the UK, are effectively trapped in Calais. Without the citizenship privileges necessary to travel regularly, they must first clandestinely enter the UK's sovereign territory (whether it be in or under a lorry, on a train, in a small boat, in a car, or some other way) before being able to claim asylum.

Organising these clandestine attempts, and repeating them until successful, usually takes many months, sometimes years. During this time most irregular migrants live in destitution on the streets or in the overgrown outskirts of Calais. They avoid contact with French authorities as much as possible, as it usually results in detention, deportation (either within the EU to or to 'countries of origin'), and can mean the end of their chance to have an asylum claim considered in the UK following a successful crossing. Therefore, most of these people live in spaces in and around Calais which are autonomously organised outside of state or formalised NGO structures, usually occupied without permission, and which provide specific infrastructure necessary for them to live in the city and move beyond it autonomously. These spaces have been

² Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June (2013) is the most recent version of this law, commonly referred to as Dublin III.

constantly targeted by French police who raid, evict, and destroy them in the hopes of arresting their inhabitants, deterring them from remaining in Calais, and frustrating their onward journeys.³

0.3.2 Everyday bordering through domicide

There are a wide range of bordering technologies and practices that sort people for admission to a country or for extraterritorialisation. In today's modern nation-states these include passports, visas, borders policing, specialised agencies, private-sector contractors, laws, fences, scanners, biometrics databases, interviews, and supporting documentation for asylum requests among others. How one is measured by these technologies determines where one falls in the hierarchy of citizen, foreigner, shortterm resident, guest-worker, student, asylum seeker, or illegal entrant, and whether one is correspondingly allowed to remain in or becomes marked for expulsion from the territory.

As critical border studies scholars have shown, borders do not exist as fixed partitions corresponding to geopolitical boundaries which operate by themselves to include/exclude people from territorial spaces; instead borders 'are everywhere' (Balibar, 2004), multifarious, and 'in a constant state of becoming' (Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2012, p. 728). They are not only along countries' territorial edges, defending them with fortifications and surveillance technologies, but permeate them internally as 'non-citizens' are identified, sought after, captured, and marked for exclusion. Borders even enter people's homes and work places when immigration checks are conducted as part of employment or rent applications, or when immigration officers raid those spaces, hunting people suspected of not having the right to live or work there.

Thus borders, rather than 'existing' in a straightforward sense, are (*re*)produced through practices of bordering that consist of spatial and social practices of differentiation, themselves politically and ideologically imbued, and most often codified in legal instruments (van Houtum, Kramsch, and Zierhofer, 2010; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy, 2017a). Such bordering practices can be performed by a variety of state and non-state actors like the police, citizens, NGOs, private security companies, or even migrants themselves engaged in what Rumford (2012) calls 'borderwork'. Although typically imagined as being limited to state policies, bordering processes are also present in public discourse and are embodied in relational, affective, and intimate everyday social interactions (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy, 2017a). Borders can thus be defined as the forever contingent results of a process of continuous intervention by actors implementing politically determined, if contested, social and spatial distancing procedures that result in variegated mobilities and risks for people who cross them.

This is not to say 'borders don't really exist'. Abstracting the concept of the border in a way which denies its violent realities is not my intention here. Rather, this

³ See Section 6.1 for more on domicide against migrants as a deterrent strategy.

perspective on borders resulting from diverse bordering practices centres the fact that they always exist differently for different people. This is necessary to help make sense of why certain people pass smoothly from Calais to the UK, gliding underwater over rails at 100mph, while many others have lost their lives attempting a similar journey, but which included many more obstacles. However, a further implication of the concept of 'bordering' for nuancing understandings of Calais' border is that this border does not only exist through legal agreements between France, the UK, and other EU member-states; walls and fences at the city's ports; or the host of surveillance and identity verification technologies deployed there to ensure only humans with the correct citizenship status are allowed to make the journey. The border here is constructed in more regular, mundane, and personal ways; what have been called the *everyday practices* of ordinary people (Rumford, 2008; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy, 2017a), practices which inevitably engender everyday resistances (Anderson, Sharma, and C. Wright, 2009, 2012; King, 2019; Tyerman, 2019, forthcoming).

Everyday practices of bordering and resistance offer important avenues of investigation for research into the struggles around citizenship in Calais, and are necessary theories to understand the embodied, intimate, and affective ways borders enter into and control migrants' lives. However, while the 'border' is increasingly used as an analogy to describe proliferating immigration controls within society and interpersonal relations of differentiation, within this research I've chosen to focus instead on what kind of spaces are produced by everyday bordering practices in Calais. This displaces the border from the city's ports while retaining a focus on its decidedly spatial and material characteristics and consequences.

Provoked to understand what lay beyond the unsuspect walls encountered while walking Calais' streets, the everyday bordering practice in Calais I choose to study here is *domicide*. As will be shown throughout these pages, domicide is one of Calais' pre-eminent bordering practices, and is essential to an in-depth understanding of how this externalised UK border works. It will be defined later in Section 0.5, but is generally used to collectively refer to the eviction, destruction, and securitisation of spaces inhabited by the irregular migrants present in Calais. In working with the concept of domicide I'm indebted to Oli Mould (2017a,b) who has previously applied it in this context.

While domicide is a bordering practice in the ways described above, I have not retained the border as the primary analytical concept for my research. Calais is not only one of Britain's external territorial borders, and likewise domicide does not only 'border' the city by deterring or preventing irregular migrants from crossing into the UK's national territory. Domicide also operates at the level of the city to drive those produced as the out-of-place Other from it, and into segregated spaces on its outskirts, or further afield. In fact, domicide reproduces the racialised exclusions of this national border at the micro-scale of the city. While this could be likewise described as 'bordering' the city, I do not apply the concept in this way; leaving the border primarily as a label for the fortifications and technologies separating France and the UK which prevent unauthorised journeys between the two in various ways. Instead, a concept that more readily spans the scales of nation and city, and which is more accommodating to the complex interrelations of the social, political, and physical consequences of policing Britain's border across Calais' city-space is citizenship.

Citizenship is produced through bordering practices, but is invested with more significance. It not only defines the contours of communities of 'us' and 'them' (Anderson, 2013), but gives a blueprint for how individuals relate to society, access rights within it, and how they can be collectively governed through democratic processes. Citizenship also describes a 'way of being political' (Isin, 2002), influencing how people form political subjectivities and understand themselves as political agents through its associated concepts and institutions. However, despite these positive characteristics, citizenship is necessarily produced in opposition to an Other that is denied its recognition, rights, membership privileges, and political subjectivity. Focusing on the production of citizenship, instead of just borders, shows not only how inter-group distinctions form and then come to be embedded in spatial representations of that difference, but how such differentiations exist at the very core of who groups understand themselves to be.

Therefore, I describe domicide as a 'spatial technology of citizenship' (Section 4.4) producing citizenships at the spatial scales of the city, the region, the sovereign territory of the nation, and in Europe more broadly. This goes beyond the frame of an everyday practice of bordering to show how migrants' exclusion from particular spaces in Calais simultaneously produce different citizenship forms as the exclusive property of those allowed to remain present in the city. However, it also reveals how these citizen communities, once spatially defined against migrants, recognise other shared attributes within themselves to reinforce migrants' continued exclusion with justifications of social difference.

0.4 Overview of chapters and arguments

Having now introduced Calais' border, domicide, and citizenship, counter-mapping still remains a mystery. Chapter 1 describes this methodology in detail and is the linchpin of the thesis, showing how the empirical, spatial, and theoretical strands of the research are woven together. I was inspired to counter-map Calais by reading the city as a palimpsestic text; to see past its given spatial configuration and chart how it has evolved through the erasure of migrants' living spaces. Therefore, the first counter-map this research produces is a cartography of domicide against irregular migrants in Calais (see the demonstration video and Subsection 1.3.1). Complementing this cartographic counter-map is a narrative one, that unfolds across the empirical chapters (Chapters 3, 5, & 7) describing how shifts in migration control policy created particular domicidal patterns in Calais over different periods of time (Subsection 1.3.2).

However, domicide does not only spatially exclude migrants from the city, but also works powerfully to exclude them from citizenship in numerous ways. It performatively re-enacts the spectacle of border violence that reifies migrant 'illegality' (De Genova, 2013b), reinforcing their 'non-citizen' legal status. It also eliminates the spaces from which migrants and others in solidarity with them can challenge citizenships' exclusions. Furthermore, different forms of domicide produce different types of non-national citizenship which nevertheless remain defined by qualities held by European 'already-citizens'. These citizenships are produced through migrants' domicidal spatial exclusions, but then reciprocally replicate that exclusion socially and politically. In fact, the tendency of citizenship to require and produce the exclusion of migrants in the Calais context, despite shifting in step with changes to anti-migrant political rhetoric and the evolution of the city-space over the years, brings pressing questions about citizenship itself (like RQ4). Understanding how and why citizenship continually entails the exclusion of racialised irregular migrants in this specific border-zone necessitated not only counter-mapping the city, but also creating a third conceptual counter-map of citizenship.

Chapter 2 begins this conceptual counter-mapping and performs two countermoves against two different conceptions of citizenship. The first counters the idealised depiction of modern citizenship as a progressive institution, fundamental to liberal democratic governance, and entailing a set of rights within societies that have consistently expanded as social prejudices are abolished. The chapter's first two sections (2.2 and 2.3) show instead how citizenship only comes into existence through a constitutive act of exclusion, and how this exclusion was founded in a racist imaginary of Man against the majority of people in the world. Since then, citizenship has become institutionalised and spatialised in the global border regime in which predominately racialised migrants from the Global South are prevented from accessing the spoils of colonialism and empire which Europe has extracted from the rest of the world.

The second counter-move is made in Section 2.4. This offers a critique of critical citizenship studies' (CCS) theorisation of migrants, and their struggles, as examples of citizenship defined as a political subjectivity or set of practices accessible to everyone, including 'non-citizens'. I argue these theorisations have three weaknesses: one of validity, the language of citizenship may not accurately represent migrants, their actions, or their politics; one of implication, theorising irregular migrants' struggles through citizenship may facilitate their control by making them more 'legible' to regimes of governance; and one of efficacy, the very material inequalities produced by citizenship itself but may require a different politics altogether which is not so easily incorporated into a liberal politics of state recognition (Coulthard, 2014). Through critiquing 'migrant citizenships' (Nyers, 2015) literature influenced by the theory of 'acts of citizenship' (Isin and Nielsen, 2008), I argue these CCS perspectives fail to fully confront citizenship's 'conceptual imperialism' (Nyers, 2007, p. 2), and thus leave its epistemic violence unchallenged. The chapter ends in Section 2.5 by reiterating my justification

for retaining a focus on exclusionary citizenship forms in this research, despite understanding that this perspective is contested by 'inclusivist' citizenship scholarship (Lister, 2007).

The rest of the thesis presents the results of my research on Calais in three chapter pairs. Each pair describes a different type of domicidal intervention—eviction (Chapters 3 and 4), destruction (Chapters 5 and 6), and securitisation (Chapters 7 and 8)— how they produce three different types of citizenship—state-based citizenship (discussed in each chapter), humanitarian citizenship (Chapter 6), and environmental citizenship (Chapter 8)—and how these citizenships each are reciprocally produced by and reproduce irregular migrants' exclusion. The empirical chapters are oriented towards answering to *RQ1* in detail, while the analytical chapters address *RQ2* and *RQ3*.

Chapters 3 and 4 present how the forced eviction of migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance reinforce citizenship status as determining who can inhabit Calais, while further breaking apart social and political solidarities of resistance to the border regime. Section 3.2 gives a broad introduction to the occupation of autonomous squats and jungles by irregular migrants in Calais, and historicises today's anti-migrant domicide by charting its origins to the closure of the Red Cross run reception centre in Sangatte. Since then, migrants have autonomously occupied and inhabited spaces in the city which they have to take for themselves. While migrants' have mainly occupied and lived in their own squats in Calais, the rest of Chapter 3 primarily analyses some of the 'legal squats'ⁱⁱ created and lived in by both irregular migrants and those in solidarity with them. These came to be inhabited by broad coalitions of people across citizenship status distinctions, provided valuable spaces for facilitating migrants' autonomous mobilities outside the authority of the citizenship regime, and were therefore priorities for eviction by local authorities. Understanding the entanglement of legal squats with citizenship politics, and the evolution of authorities' tactics to evict them, are essential to understanding how eviction, and domicide more broadly, function to exclude migrants from citizenship and prevent them from contesting that exclusion.

Chapter 4 analyses the challenges Calais' squats and jungles pose for citizenship politics. It begins by engaging scholarship on citizenship as Lefebvre's 'right to the city' (Purcell, 2003), but argues that although migrant squatting practices fit the description of this active form of citizenship configured at the scale of the city, the politics of inhabitance and autonomy they enact requires instead thinking about them through the theoretical framework of the commons (Section 4.2). Based on analysis of the legal squats presented in Chapter 3 as autonomous spaces of migrants' inhabitance, I argue these spaces result from commoning practices, and are home to what have been called the *mobile commons* (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013) (Subsection 4.2.3). These commoning practices occur within, against, and beyond citizenship (De Angelis, 2019), and while other theoretical perspectives emphasise their existence within or beyond

citizenship, I instead theorise Calais' mobile commons as *spaces of anti-citizenship* (Section 4.3). Anti-citizenship is a prefigurative politics simultaneously challenging citizenship's micro and macro inequalities while refusing to re-enclose migrants' political subjectivity or struggles for free movement within citizenship.

After understanding Calais' squats and jungles as spaces of anti-citizenship (a necessary deviation to fully appreciate how and why domicide works against them) the chapter ends by describing how domicide functions as an exclusionary technology of citizenship in three ways (Section 4.4); (1) by enforcing spatial segregation, (2) by disciplining both citizens and non-citizens to inhabit spaces and conduct themselves along normative prescripts, and (3) by enclosing the anti-citizen solidarities and communities of resistance present in those spaces.

Chapters 5 and 6 present how the continual destruction of migrants' camps which defines post-Jungle Calais not only deter them from making irregular crossings to the UK, but forces them into relations of dependency with humanitarian actors in the city. In doing so these destructions not only produce state citizenship, but also post-national humanitarian citizenship. Section 5.2 details the current pattern of daily domicidal destruction of migrants' jungles, and how they have been re-presented through the euphemistic rhetoric of 'cleaning' in response to migrants' resistance and civil society criticism in the media. A case study of the jungles existing in *Verrotières* is then presented in Section 5.3. This offers just one example of the cycles of occupation, eviction, and destruction that occur in Calais over both the short and long term. The chapter ends by describing what I term *carrot-and-stick domicide* (Section 5.4) where destructions of migrants' autonomous camps are accompanied by an offer of state controlled temporary accommodation explicitly designed to assess and then regularise migrants' citizenship status.

Chapter 6 then analyses how these destructions not only deter migrants from coming to Calais to attempt unsanctioned crossings to the UK, but also force migrants into relationships of dependence on state and civil society humanitarian actors. The strategy behind these constant destructions is 'make life unlivable' (Tyerman, 2019, p. 13) in Calais so migrants enter into the state's 'humanitarian' temporary accommodation facilities. There they are channelled into claiming asylum in France to prevent the possibility of settling or regularising their citizenship status in the future in Britain.

Civil society humanitarian actors also intervene following these destructions to replace the clothes and shelters destroyed in police operations. These distributions produce a form of 'humanitarian citizenship' which includes a selective politics of hospitality towards migrants while distinguishing itself from exclusively nationalist or overtly racist European citizenship forms. However, not only are these distributions entangled with the continuation of state violence at the 'humanitarian border' (Walters, 2011), but, by privileging the jungles' materiality beyond the political solidarities or spaces of resistance to the border regime they are home to, such distributions can even facilitate the segregation of migrants outside Calais' city-centre and reproduce dehumanising relations of dependence. Although promoting welcoming migrants or

alleviating the suffering they endure at the hands of the border regime as core values of 'true' citizens, humanitarian citizenship can reproduce rather than undo migrants' exclusion by failing to challenge the premise of the citizen/non-citizen distinction and by fixing 'non-citizen' migrants in the depoliticised victim-receiver position in relation to the charitable citizen-giver.

Chapters 7 and 8 analyse how 'environmental citizenship' is produced through the securitisation of spaces previously inhabited by migrants as protected environmental conservation spaces designed to prevent their re-occupation. Two of these cases are presented in Chapter 7; the *Fort Vert* nature reserve built at *La Lande*, the site where the Jungle existed in 2015-16, and the nature park at Bois Chico Mendes occupied in the late 2000s and again in 2017. Section 7.2 briefly recounts the history of the Jungle prioritising how and why it was evicted, and how this precipitated the intensification of domicidal policies that have since redefined life for irregular migrants in Calais. Then the securitised nature reserve meant to 'renature' La Lande following the Jungle's eviction and destruction is described in Section 7.3. This section illustrates how environmental security—the protection of natural areas that are of ecological significance—converges with border security to provide multiple justifications for denying migrants inhabitable spaces in Calais. The similar case of *Bois Chico Mendes* is given in Section 7.4, but which allows further interrogation of anti-migrant environmentalist arguments. Sensationalised reporting on the damage migrants' inhabitance, particularly their production of waste, was causing to this woodland had two consequences; it facilitated the recasting of domicidal operations against their jungle as 'cleanings', and provided justification for the conversion of the wooded area into a securitised nature park. This park would be off limits to migrants but accessible for Calais' citizens to enjoy the area's natural beauty after it had been successfully 'reclaimed' from the migrants (Subsection 7.4.2).

Chapter 8 begins by analysing these environmentalist arguments justifying domicide as having two intended consequences: (1) making border security projects and infrastructure more appealing for Calais' citizens while (2) attempting to depoliticise anti-migrant interventions through the rhetoric of 'defending nature'. Migrants are blamed for environmental degradation in their spaces of inhabitance to obscure the daily violence of the police as acts of 'cleaning', 'reclaiming', or 'protecting' nature; causes that are more praiseworthy than enforcing segregation. Thus environmentalist discourses provide novel justifications for racialised exclusions of citizenship, antimigrant policies, and the continuation of domicidal practices in Calais during a time when local authorities are trying to rehabilitate Calais' image following the amount of international coverage the Jungle received. However, Section 8.3 interrogates the racist politics at the root of the Western concepts of nature and environmentalism, showing how nature conservation projects, and environmentalist rhetoric more broadly, have historically entailed racialised dispossession and been connected to anti-migrant policy and sentiment. This reveals that, rather than depoliticising them, the aegis of protecting or rehabilitating nature these two securitisation projects make use of, in fact,

betray them to be enacting a particularly racist politics of exclusion. The chapter ends in Section 8.5 by analysing how the securitisations of *Bois Chico Mendes* and *La Lande* create spaces in which Calais' citizens re-produce themselves as environmental citizens against the migrants construed as an environmental threat in addition to the threat they are presumed to pose to the broader national territory, the city of Calais, and its community of citizens. While Calais' environmental citizens clean the land and appreciate its nature, invasive and polluting irregular migrants are only ever the destructive Other against whom French environmental citizens can claim the virtue of environmental responsibility.

The conclusion revisits these empirical cases and theoretical analyses in light of the research questions, particularly RQ4, to understand their implications for citizenship politics more broadly. What this research shows is that not only does modern state citizenship become produced through the exclusionary interventions of domicide against irregular migrants' spaces of inhabitance, but other nominally diverse and inclusive citizenship forms do so as well. The common denominator is that migrants' racialisation—a product of skin colour, irregular mobilities, religion, language, and cultural habits among others-often precludes them, in various ways, from accessing both national and non-national citizenship forms. The fact that the hegemonic state-based, humanitarian, and environment citizenship forms all rest on a foundational racist exclusion leads to serious questions for the continued invocation of citizenship in freedom of movement struggles that are concerned with creating solidarities across citizenship statuses, as well as other interwoven lines of differentiation and categories of oppression. As a result, this research calls for creating more spaces of anti-citizenship from which to begin thinking and moving together in ways that are not limited by, but which break through citizenships' many walls, to prefigure a world where all can move and stay freely where they choose.

0.5 Terminology

Before commencing, some of the key terms used in the thesis must be defined. First is *domicide*, a term coined by Porteous and Smith for which they give a simple definition; the 'planned deliberate destruction of home causing suffering to the dweller' (2001, p. 19). I have conceptualised domicide at greater length elsewhere (Van Isacker, 2019, pp. 613–614), particularly addressing how migrants' acts of resistance to state domicide in Calais refuse the victim position in which the criterion of 'causing suffering to the dweller' places them. To overcome the victimising nature of Porteous and Smith's definition I define domicide as those interventions intentionally eliminating or preventing the formation of migrants' spaces of autonomous inhabitance. This definition continues framing attacks on migrants homes as intentional and violent acts committed by actors (mostly the police or representatives of local, regional, and national authorities in France) who 'stand to profit, implement their ideological positions, or consolidate political power while representing these consequences as being for "the

common good"' (Porteous and S. E. Smith, 2001, p. 184). However, this strictly spatial definition refrains from prescribing how migrants whose homes are being destroyed should experience or respond to the event.

I identified three types of domicidal intervention during my research in Calais; eviction, destruction, and securitisation. The thesis, and the accompanying digital cartography, use these types as organisational categories for both empirical and theoretical discussion. While eviction and destruction are readily understood as domicide, securitisation is less straightforward. I use this term to refer to the various ways migrants are spatially prevented from creating autonomous squats or jungles, building on Mould's (2017a, p. 13) work which asserts that denying 'non-citizens' homebuilding capacities, not just destroying homes already created, is itself a domicidal strategy.

The thesis refers to Calais' migrant camps and squats as *autonomous spaces of inhabitance*. This phrase is thoroughly defined in Section 4.2, but, to clarify for now, the use of 'inhabitance' refers to both a participative engagement in the urban city space that has been described as citizenship in the form of 'the right to the city' (Purcell, 2003), as well as more intimate practices of home-making that open the space for relational politics extending beyond citizenship (Dadusc, Grazioli, and M. A. Martínez, 2019). 'Autonomy' acknowledges the role of these spaces in facilitating migrants' autonomous mobilities, while recognising they result from squatting tactics; a selforganised practice of contentious occupation, autonomous from and in conflict with private property rights and, in Calais, state migration control policies. This terminology is perhaps cumbersome, but centring the politics of autonomy and inhabitance in these spaces is crucial to understand their relation to citizenship, and consequently, how domicide functions as a spatial technology of citizenship.

Autonomous spaces of inhabitance is developed as an alternate to 'home' (used by Porteous and Smith in their definition of domicide) because of the ambiguity of 'home' in the context of Calais. This is a particularly loaded term with many different uses and connotations. For some examples: Migrants may call jungles or squats home, but this is often a reluctant identification given the conditions of life in these places and the fact that Calais is decidedly *not* the UK or another desired destination. Although irregular migrants would prefer to travel and settle freely instead of inhabiting these precarious homes on their journeys, not to mention be able to continue living in their original homes rather than undertake migration as a survival strategy, they still make their homes in Calais' squats and jungles the best they can be. These are unwanted homes, yet homes nonetheless. Migrants also have 'home countries', which most have fled but to which many hope to return, although they are now making another home in Europe. Yet, this presumed pre-eminent connection with their 'homeland' makes them continually suspect candidates for inclusion into a new home or nation in Europe. Mirielle Rosello (2016) also observes how the state instrumentalises the concept of home to evict autonomous migrant camps and squats by defining an 'acceptable home' as a state managed shelter (e.g. the Jungle's container camp (Ticktin, 2016a)). These are then used to denigrate migrants' homes in autonomous squats and camps as

unfit for human habitation, and provide evictees 'humanitarian compensation' when their homes are destroyed. Discourses of home also fuel nationalism and create separations between 'natives' and 'migrants' (Sharma, 2020). In fact, some of the most vicious nationalist anti-migrant organising that has taken place in Calais (and throughout Europe for that matter) traffics in the discourse of home. For example, the group *Sauvon Calais* (page 79) held an anti-migrant street rally where demonstrators used 'slogans such as "Calais for its own people" and "This is our home"' (Agier, 2018). Autonomous spaces of inhabitance avoids such ambiguities while keeping a clear focus on the political qualities of these spaces most important for understanding their relationships to citizenship.

A similarly contested term I continue using is *jungle*. Despite its racist connotations today (Bhatia, 2018; Harker, 2019; Y. Ibrahim and Howarth, 2015), most Calais researchers agree that this name came from the word for forest—*dzhangal*—used by Calais' first generation of Afghan migrants to describe where they were camping (Agier, 2016; Bescherer, 2017; King, 2016; Sabéran, 2012). Mirielle Rosello (2016) tracks the colonial translation process through which *dzhangal* became anglicized to 'jungle', used since to degrade and dehumanise Calais' irregular migrants. However, she also describes how this word is strategically re-appropriated by jungle inhabitants despite its racist uses. This history is why I continue using the term; not only for its descriptive accuracy to name the camps I write about according to how they were called by those first living there, but also to draw attention to the contested nature of life in them as one of both autonomy and resistance, but also dehumanisation and alterity.

One last point on my use of the term jungle: I recognise many different jungles have existed in Calais, throughout north-west France, and across Europe's borderlands more broadly. However, 'The Jungle' existing between Spring 2015 and Fall 2016 exists as *the* image of Calais' jungles in public conscience as it held the most displaced migrants of any of Calais' camps and received exceptional amounts of international support and media coverage. Therefore, I use 'jungle' to refer to the generalised form of autonomous migrants camps, of which the capitalised 'Jungle'ⁱⁱⁱ is only one famous instance.

I use *irregular migrants* following Anne McNevin's (2011, pp. 18–25) justifications. According to her, 'irregular migrants are noncitizens who have crossed state borders or remain in state territory without the host state's explicit and ongoing sanction' and do not 'possess the status that fully legitimizes their presence or that makes certain rights associated with citizenship or legal residence available to them' (ibid., pp. 18–19). She distinguishes 'irregular migrants' from the terminology of: (a) 'nonstatus migrants' which defines them through their lack of citizenship status, implying that achieving this status is the goal of their struggles^{iv}; (b) 'undocumented migrants' (or the French *sans-papier*) as these migrants are documented in various ways, just not the ways needed to be able to move and live where they choose; and (c) 'illegal migrants' so as to not reproduce the state discourse of illegality which criminalises migrants and

their movements. I also avoid the terms 'refugee' or 'asylum seeker' despite recognising that most of Calais' irregular migrants have been forced to flee their countries of origin due to persecution, armed conflict, and political destabilisation, to not reinforce the hierarchical categorisations legitimising certain migrants and mobilities while condemning others. Such categories not only divide migrants from one another, but can reinforce the European public's expectations of deservingness preventing them from offering migrants' struggles for unconditional free movement widespread support.

Much of the thesis focuses on the particular role played by *racism* and *racialisa*tion in how domicide is enacted against Calais' migrants, and how citizenships are configured against them. I use racialisation to draw attention to the fact that race is a social construct institutionalised to the point of being taken for granted, and not a natural fact of essential biological difference within the human race that explains distinct and diverse behavioural patterns or cultural norms. Therefore, I mainly speak of racialised migrants who, by virtue of their skin colour, illicit mobilities, religion, language, or cultural markers etc., become racialised as other-than white/European, and most frequently as Black (Erel, Murji, and Nahaboo, 2016). However, in using racialisation I am wary of reproducing the concept as, identified by David Theo Goldberg (2006, p. 332), an 'ambiguous', or even 'vacuous', descriptor of 'race-inflected social situations, those informed or marked by racial characterization' that neglects engagement with deeper normative questions of the consequences of racism within them. Therefore, in addition to showing how irregular migrants are produced as racialised others against the presumed and idealised white European norm, and rather than just showing how the operations of domicide, citizenship, and borders are racialised (i.e. functioning differently for different 'racial groups'), I argue that Calais' border, the domicidal interventions sustaining it, and the citizenships produced while doing so are all, in fact, racist.

Here I draw on Ruth Wilson Gilmore's (2007, p. 28) definition of racism as 'the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death'. While Gilmore writes of the racism of the prison-industrial complex and racial-capitalism in the United States of America (US), key in her definition for my work is the identification of racism as a systematic, state-sanctioned, and sometimes extralegal^v overwhelmingly disproportionate exposure to death for racialised people. And it cannot be overstated that anti-migrant domicide in Calais kills. Most recently, on 1 November 2019, a 25 year old Nigerian man was found dead in his tent in one of the jungles from smoke inhalation and carbon monoxide poisoning after burning shrubbery to stay warm through the night (AFP, 2019).

This definition of racism extends far beyond racial prejudice or discrimination (the more readily recognised examples of racism in daily public life), by maintaining an analytical focus on the 'death-dealing displacement of difference into hierarchies that organize relations within and between the planet's sovereign political territories' (Gilmore, 2002, p. 16). This means that racism is not only a structural logic embedded within states, but, most importantly, racist interventions do not necessarily require overt invocations of racist rhetoric. This allows recognising Calais' borders and citizenships as racist even despite the supposedly 'post-racial' discursive context of contemporary Europe (Theo Goldberg, 2006) which means the city's authorities and citizens do not necessarily explicitly reference migrants' racialisation when justifying domicidal policies against them.

Finally, I prefer the term *struggles* to *movement* as there is not a formalised social movement of migrants organising against the border regime in Calais. Rather, there is a collection of various communities of migrants, often divided by language and ethnicity, who contest the border and fight for their freedom to move in highly organised ways, but not always through tactics that have become readily associated with social movements (e.g. claims-making, petitioning, organised marches, sit-ins, etc.) (Tyerman, forthcoming, Chapter 5). I include both migrants' attempts to move across borders, and those moments, whether fleeting or sustained, when they join together to make explicitly political protests or demands as ways of struggling against the border regime in Calais. I also acknowledge that these struggles often include others with citizenship privileges working and fighting together in solidarity with irregular migrants to achieve the freedom of movement for all.^{vi}

Notes

- i. In 2016 an additional 13km of fencing was installed around the Eurotunnel, and work was begun on the multi-million pound, four metre tall, 'Great Wall of Calais' or 'Great Wall of Shame' enclosing the approach to the ferry port (Bescherer, 2017, p. 56).
- ii. Calais Migrant Solidarity (2017b, pp. 56–57) provide a taxonomy of types of autonomous spaces of migrant inhabitance in Calais, and distinguish between (1) jungles, autonomous outdoor camps of makeshift or temporary shelters which, over time, can become quite large, durable, and well resourced homespaces; (2) *kharabas* which are an insecure type of housing squat, usually in disused and often dilapidated buildings that the police could easily enter and evict; and (3) 'legal squats' which the police and local authorities need to follow legal procedures before evicting.
- iii. The Jungle also had other names. The term favoured by humanitarian associations was 'bidonville d'État' or 'state slum' (Verdier, 2016) which highlighted the state's responsibility for creating the camp and sustaining its poor quality of life, while recognising its decidedly urban characteristics. The French gov-ernment exclusively referred to the Jungle as *La Lande* meaning moor or heath (Hicks and Mallet, 2019, p. 2). Curiously this label actually describes the natural environment rather than the camp itself, perhaps because the authorities did not want to acknowledge the camp's presence on that land.
- iv. I occasionally use 'non-citizen' in addition to or instead of irregular migrant, often with scare quotes to indicate that this is how irregular migrants are read by the state and its citizens. This is done without intending to reduce 'non-citizen' migrants to their non-status category or suggest that their personal or collective goal be transitioning to full citizenship.
- v. Discussion of *flagrant delit* in Subsection 3.3.1 and Subsection 5.2.2 reveals state-sanctioned domicide against Calais' irregular migrants is often conducted without legal justification.
- vi. Freedom of movement, not citizenship, is, according to Hagar Kotef's (Kotef, 2015) reading of Hannah Arendt, 'the substance and meaning of all things political'.

Chapter 1

Methodology: Counter-mapping citizenship

1.1 Introduction: militant research

My research employs a counter-mapping methodology as part of a militant¹ research practice. Militant research is 'where activism and academia meet' (Bookchin et al., 2013, p. 6). It is prefigurative knowledge production emerging *within* social struggles, where activist and academic work—doing and thinking—are not tasks divided from one another, but become complementary moments of revolutionary praxis (Herrera, 2018).

Two moves comprise militant research. One is directed inwards to facilitate the 'capacity for struggles to read themselves' by exploring their tensions and problematics (Colectivo Situaciones, 2003). The second is directed outward; amplifying struggles' knowledges, disseminating their critiques and reflections, and implementing social and political alternatives. Through a critical praxis of *movement*, alongside deep investigation of how formalised struggles work, fail, and even reproduce structural oppressions, knowledge is gained that contributes to struggle while forcing taken for granted understandings of how to do politics to be rethought. For Sandro Mezzadra (in Garelli and Tazzioli, 2013b, pp. 309–310), this means militant research must be open at both ends: 'toward the bottom, towards struggle', but also 'toward the production of concepts and theoretical innovation'.

As will become clear in this chapter, this research also straddles these theoretical and empirical levels, and asks questions across them. However, before describing connections of the research to the anti-border struggles in Calais which inform it (Sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2, and 1.5), or outlining the theoretical critique of citizenship developed through that engagement (Subsection 1.3.3), the decision to adopt a militant research ethic for this study must be clarified.

¹ 'Militant' in this sense comes from its typical usage in French or Italian social movements, akin to 'activist' in English (Sossi, 2013, p. 269)

Militant research within migration struggles unsettles the 'knowledge-base' of migration governance developed in the academy and government affiliated research institutions, and undermines forms of state mobility control resting upon that knowledge (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2013a, p. 247). The task of militantly researching migration is 'first of all to scrutinize and counteract the paradigm of an all-encompassing governance of mobility and to unpack the fantasies this paradigm entails and engenders' (ibid., p. 247). If one danger of 'objectively' studying constructs like 'migration', 'borders', 'illegal immigrants', and 'citizens' is that they become reified, even fetishised, as actual existing objects (De Genova, 2017, p. 22), a critical perspective embedded in the living struggles against, for example, borders or citizenship exposes such concepts as forever contingent, requiring continual reproduction (often through violence), and as therefore resistible. In this way militant research agitates against, even if failing to dethrone, the theoretical concepts and frameworks of knowledge which make sense of migration so as to control it, and thereby contributes to struggles against mobility control regimes.

Counter-mapping citizenship takes square aim at citizenship as a fundamental concept continually used to govern irregular migrants' autonomous mobilities in Calais. However, *how* counter-mapping is used to make this argument is, so far, less clear. An initial explanation is that I synthesise spatial data on anti-migrant domicide with analysis of its underlying governmental logic of border security to detail how these violent and exclusionary spatial interventions constitute citizenship, and how citizenship, in turn, perpetuates irregular migrants' exclusion. This analysis of citizenship's spatialisation is also combined with an understanding of how citizenship is fundamental to the continuous control and repression of autonomous mobility more broadly, premised upon the continual exclusion of racialised irregular migrants.

1.1.1 Chapter outline

Section 1.2 positions my counter-mapping methodology as a militant research practice in ethical relation to the struggles in which it lives. It presents the project's origins and the way this methodology evolved in conversation with other research militants in the field of migration, and particularly those working in Calais. Here I contrast countermapping to alternative militant research methods like (auto)ethnography to outline the ethical benefits of taking a spatial perspective in studying anti-migrant domicide.

Section 1.3 describes the three counter-maps² of citizenship my research produces. It begins by describing the digital counter-cartography mapping the violence of migrants' spatial exclusion as constitutive of Calais' urban landscape, despite attempts to erase or obscure its traces (Subsection 1.3.1). Cartography, despite its relationship to state power, can still be an important tool to orient struggle; identifying possible areas where capture occurs and controls coalesce so they might be subverted. This

² Only my digital cartography is a map in the traditional sense. The others are text-maps (Tazzioli, 2013, p. 208) and are maps in the sense of tools surveying an area (in this case of rhetoric, policy, and knowledge) to provide clear descriptions of its features and allow others to chart a path through it.

first Subsection looks at other examples of cartographic migration counter-mapping to see how they undermine representations of mobility tied to its governance. It also acknowledges some of these migration counter-maps' drawbacks before describing how the interactive digital cartography of domicide produced by this research addresses them.

In addition to this counter-cartography, the thesis presents two non-cartographic counter-maps; a narrative account of mapped events (Subsection 1.3.2), and the conceptual analysis of citizenship (Subsection 1.3.3). The narrative account fills out the mapped events from the cartography as more than just 'points on a map', describes their interconnections, and contextualises them in terms of their underlying governmental logics and strategies. However, the crux of the thesis is to understand how the mapped domicidal events produce and spatialise citizenship politics in Calais. This requires a conceptual counter-mapping practice with two parts. The first is to critically understand citizenship's genealogy and current usage in academic and lay understandings of migration (Chapter 2), while the second is to acknowledge how domicidal violence operates as a 'technology of citizenship' (Walters, 2010) by spatially excluding racialised irregular migrants in Calais (Section 4.4). These two 'textmaps' (Tazzioli, 2013, p. 208) aim to complement, while avoiding certain problems of, the cartographic digital counter-map.

Section 1.4 concludes the methodological discussion with a note on how my three counter-maps work together against the regime of (in)visibility of violence towards migrants at the border. This is by taking a 'disobedient gaze' (Pezzani and Heller, 2013) towards Calais' everyday anti-migrant spatial violence, and by avoiding the reproduction of spectacular images of violence and suffering which 'obscures the larger assemblages of violence that regulate the border' (Multiple Mobilities Research Cluster et al., 2017, p. 25).

The chapter ends in Section 1.5 with a description of my sources, data collection methods, and process through which the interactive digital map was created.

1.2 Ethics of militant research and producing knowledge of migration

My initial research proposal asked how 'non-citizen' migrants' actions expressing and fulfilling desires to move and stay freely—both visible (e.g. marches, occupations, protests) and invisible (e.g. unauthorised border crossings)—disturbed taken for granted understandings of key political concepts like activist or citizen. I anticipated doing ethnographic field-work in European border-zones to try and understand how migrants thought of their own journeys and struggles along the way. My interest was in how the historical and epistemic trajectories migrants draw upon in conceptualising their movements in spite of restrictions relate to the Eurocentric concepts through which migration studies so often frames them. I wanted to understand the 'coloniality of knowledge' (Mignolo, 2011) of academic *mis*understandings of autonomous migration, while arguing for the need to take notice of the ways migrants and their mobilities exceed and decolonise them.

However, soon after beginning my research I began a process of questioning which Grappi (2013, p. 320) describes as the 'militant research conundrum'; how do we deal with ' the question of productivity or with the problem of how to make this particular kind of work useful for militant goals'? I questioned the ethics of occupying a researcher position in anti-border struggles in places like Calais, extracting knowledge and capital for myself and the institutions supporting me off the backs of migrants living there in unimaginable, though politically mandated, hardship. Given my positionality as a white-male EU/US dual-national possessing immense citizenship privileges, could I even understand, much less represent and re-articulate, the actions, subjectivities, and political implications of an everyday politics of resistance to the border-regime built to benefit me at others' expense? In researching migration, even from the critical and decolonial perspectives I've been trained in, would I not just reincorporate these struggles into another false interpretation?

Beyond these personal questions loomed a more abstract but equally serious one; is dissident knowledge production which unsettles, hopefully undoes, the epistemological foundations of regimes of control even possible? Following Barbagallo and Beuret (2008), is it not the ways that irregular migration *refuses* to make itself known to the state and its devolved knowledge workers what is most politically upsetting about it? Won't any scholarly research project, even if critical and pointing to something beyond the frameworks of intelligibility readily adopted in Western academia not, in the end, contribute to rendering that object of research 'knowable' to power, and thus be complicit in its governance? Furthermore, is epistemic violence not always at work in acts of translation (i.e. the research process by which something beyond our comprehension is made sense of) which both erases the Outside while reincorporating it into the familiar (Vázquez, 2011). Even activist ethnographers suffer 'epistemic gaps' in their understandings of the struggles they are embedded in, which can lead to the 'conceptual enclosure' of struggle practices into familiar categories already defined within structures of power and knowledge (Montesinos Coleman, 2015). In celebrating the potency and uniqueness of everyday resistances and subversions taking place at Europe's borders, and advocating for why we should take inspiration from them for liberatory decolonial and anti-racist politics in other contexts, would I not also contribute to undermining them at some level? While continuing to grapple with these questions, I also began searching for another angle to take in my research which I felt could avoid some of these problems and be more ethically sound.

When thinking through the ethics of my research methodology I found it immensely helpful to read other militant researchers who worked in Calais; scholaractivists like Kelly Bescherer, James Ellison, Claire English, Maria Hagan, Natasha King, and Thom Tyerman. Their writings offer deep reflections based on first-hand experience of the tensions of surviving and organising in Calais, in solidarity with, but not *as*, migrants. They refreshingly describe the authors' successes and failures, and resist reproducing objectifying or victimising meta-narratives of migration by treating migrants as active and autonomous militants in their own right. Amongst others working on migration struggles (e.g. Starodub, 2019), these scholar-activists mainly employed a participant observation or (auto)ethnographic method of militant research (see Apoifis, 2016, 2017; U. Gordon, 2012; Graeber, 2009; Halvorsen, 2015; Juris, 2007; Russell, 2015; Valenzuela-Fuentes, 2018). Dialoguing with their writing allowed me to pre-empt many of the difficulties facing this method in Calais.

Tyerman is brutally honest when stating his 'field research was a failure on a number of levels' and that his 'research plans quickly unravelled in Calais' (2016, p. 49). He describes being overwhelmed by the immediacy of the border crisis, the urgency of the situation, and the impossibility of taking 'observational distance' which researchers are told is necessary to achieve the desired objectivity. He further questions whether taking such distance could even be considered ethical given the daily reality of border violence he faced during his field-work. Tyerman reflects that 'academic work, despite its solipsism, is not and cannot be the sum total of our ethical political engagement in the world and its struggles' (ibid., p. 55). Thus, he became trapped in a dilemma between two counterposed definitions of ethics, one personal and one professional, in which an ethical failure seemed certain. Recognising the possibility, even certainty, of some form of failure I found a refreshingly brave position to take, but also one which prompted me to look for methods that would not bring my personal and scholarly ethical commitments into such strong opposition.

While not imagining to have succeeded in addressing all the ethical questions I have raised (they are, of course, sticky questions which cannot be resolved completely), I decided on another angle for my research to Tyerman, the other scholaractivists in Calais, and what was written in my original research plan. Rather than focusing on how the border is resisted in Calais, I have tried, instead, to conduct research exclusively on what those resisting are up against; i.e. the strategies and tactics used to try and control them.

Nick Clare (2017, p. 378) describes this ethical and methodological orientation as a militant research which 'studies up' rather than keeps the political struggles in which it begins as the research subject. 'Studying up' still emerges from within political struggle and retains the explicit desire to produce knowledge useful for that struggle over the researcher's career ambitions. However, it focuses attention on better understanding what that struggle opposes and, in turn, what opposes it. As researchers have institutional affiliations, funding, and other privileges, mobilising these resources to produce knowledge about and against the elites, policy makers, and structures of power creates 'potential to produce tangibly beneficial research for movements, uncovering information they may be unable to access' (ibid., p. 378). Studying up is one way militant researchers can avoid perpetuating structural privileges against those with whom they are in solidarity by putting privilege to use; hopefully contributing to the struggle's ability to understand, and thus intervene decisively, in its terrain.

Instead of explicating the strategies, theories, tactics, and internal dynamics of those struggling against the border, my three part counter-mapping method concentrates on how citizenship continuously works to materially and politically exclude migrants in the border-city of Calais and, vice-versa, how those exclusionary interventions produce and spatialise citizenship. However, while my research aims to not reveal more about autonomous mobilities by instead describing the ways they are spatially controlled through citizenship, assessing how successful I have been in this is not straightforward given the constant entanglements of knowledge and power (Foucault, 1980).

There were a number of benefits in taking the city-space of Calais, and its exclusions, as the object of my research, rather than focusing on the migrants or solidarity groups active there. Most important was the trust and cooperation I received from people 'on-the-ground' in Calais (see Section 1.5) who participated more readily knowing I was not researching them directly. As my research did not rely on firsthand interviews with migrantsⁱ, I avoided (a) extractive labour relations, (b) contributing to research fatigue amongst migrants (who since the 2015 'crisis' have been overresearched in Calais), and (c) misrepresenting migrants' lived experiences by retelling their personal stories through my limited interpretation. I also contributed to existing understandings of the daily evictions and destructions in the activist groups I worked with by contextualising them in the evolving state strategies of domicide, deterrence, segregation, and dispersal discovered through my archival research.

There is a danger in the spatial perspective I've taken that the domicidal violence experienced and endured daily by migrants in Calais becomes abstract; something of a conceptual consideration rather than a lived reality. However, the intention in my work is not to ignore the human cost and psychological toll of border violence, but to denounce the social and political conditions which allow its endless repetition. I am hesitant to write in a way which spectacularises violence or presents people merely as its victims, yet neither do I want to explicate the ways the border and its violence is resisted. By narrowing my focus to the spatialisation of citizenship I have tried to allow other histories, conceptions, and narratives of migrants' experience and resistance in Calais to emerge on their own terms, by those better able to tell those stories, and in better vehicles than a PhD thesis.ⁱⁱ What Counter-mapping citizenship does instead is pay close attention to the violent interventions producing citizenship in Calais' cityspace, understand how citizenship reciprocally reproduces racialised exclusions of the irregular migrants there, and thus challenges the validity and efficacy of citizenship as a conceptual framework through which to organise and narrate struggles for all to move and stay freely.

1.3 Three counter-maps of citizenship in Calais

Having given the ethical considerations which lead to adopting counter-mapping, I can now describe how exactly I apply this methodology. I must reiterate that my research is not on illegalised migration, but rather its governance. Although in solidarity with those resisting various forms of migration control in Calais, I do not map those practices of resistance nor the spaces they create. As we will see shortly, a number of other counter-maps do show the ways migrants, and the spaces created along their journeys, disturb the normative map of Europe and disobey its lines/borders, but this is not my project. Instead I take a 'disobedient gaze' which 'simultaneously refuses to disclose clandestine migration and reveals the violence of the border regime' (Pezzani and Heller, 2013, p. 296) when mapping how, why, and where the autonomous spaces migrants inhabit are evicted, destroyed, and securitised in Calais. Focusing on the spatiality of control rather than resistance refrains from revealing information about migrants squatting in the city, while analysing and denouncing how their homes are destroyed to limit autonomous mobility. Furthermore, after establishing a detailed understanding of domicide, I then draw connections between its violent interventions and the exclusionary citizenship forms which justify, while themselves being reproduced through, that violence.

My research then produces three distinct but complementary counter-maps. First, is the cartography of domicide against illegalised border crossers in Calais (see Figure 4 and the demonstration video accompanying the thesis). Second, is the narrative description of how different tactics—eviction (Chapter 3), destruction (Chapter 5), and securitisation (Chapter 7)—are used to dispossess irregular migrants in Calais of their homes to reassert citizenship as the determinant of who is allowed to inhabit the city. Last is the conceptual counter-map of citizenship as a fundamentally exclusionary concept taking various, even 'inclusionary', forms presented in the analytical Chapters 2, 4, 6, and 8. These three maps work together to provide spatial, theoretical, and descriptive accounts of how citizenship is a dominant force in the continual exclusion of irregular migrants in Calais. Based on this, I argue for a need to move away from methodological citizenship in analyses of migration and to rethink forms of migrant solidarity *against* citizenship so as to not (inadvertently) reproduce its spatial, social, and political exclusions (see Section 4.3).

1.3.1 Cartographic

Of the three counter-maps my counter-cartography is the least abstract, but requires the most justification. Critical cartography studies (Crampton, 2010; Harley, 1989; Pickles, 2004; Rose-Redwood, 2006; Wood, 2010; Wood and Krygier, 2009) show maps are always politically contested instruments of power, not objective and neutral documents. Maps provide a specific representation of space 'which facilitates its domination and control' by states (Lacoste, 1973, p. 1). Cartography as a way of 'seeing like a state' (Scott, 1998) facilitates governmental interventions by abstracting space from



FIGURE 4: Screenshot of the digital counter-cartography of domicide in Calais

historical, social, and environmental processes. The lines maps then inscribe upon this abstraction are able to be realised through (the threat of) force (Wood, 2010). In just one example, colonial projects used mapping to 'inscribe the territories Europeans wanted to settle with an emptiness upon which they could overlay their geographical imagination', imaginings then realised through violence and dispossession (Mitchell, 2012, p. 59).

However, Edward Said (1995, p. 27) states that geography, whilst an art of war, 'can also be the art of resistance if there is a counter-map and a counter-strategy'. Though cartography and state power are undeniably linked, it is possible to take advantage of the authority of maps to counter political domination if one controls their means of production (Crampton and Krygier, 2006). Cartographers who try to avoid the inherent structural problems in map-making, while advancing social struggle, can make maps which 'undermine dominant paradigms [and] have counter-hegemonic potential' (Craib, 2017, p. 54). Counter-mapping as an autonomous practice (Counter Cartographies Collective, Dalton, and Mason-Deese, 2012) produces maps as 'a vehicle of resistance' (Matless, 1990); and producing such a map as a vehicle of resistance to the border regime in Calais has been a main goal of this research project. However, despite the methodological and political orientation of counter-mapping, some caution against the use of the term 'counter' as it too readily implies that maps work as 'we' may intend; that they by default do not facilitate state violence but resistance to it (L. Lambert, 2018, p. 10). As power relationships still permeate processes of map creation and interpretation, the decision to produce cartographies, especially in the context of irregular migration, should never be taken lightly.

Migration maps serve an additional governmental function beyond reifying national borders or the other spatial divisions they depict. By displaying transborder

mobility, maps become tools through which migration is *conceived* as either legitimate or deviant, and accordingly managed (Tazzioli, 2013, p. 207). These maps are hermeneutic devices through which people come to *know* migration, but necessarily in an abstract sense and through the ideological framing reproduced by the map. To give one example, Henk van Houtum and Rodrigo Bueno Lacy (2019, p. 18) analysed how the Frontex³ map of 'illegal border-crossers' produces an image 'in which a threatening invasion of migrants is taking over a defenceless EU' through its cartographic iconography. They argue the use of disproportionately large red-arrows converging on a dwarfed Europe, coloured blue, is nowhere near an accurate representation of cross-border mobilities into and out of Europe, but instead bolsters nativist discourse on the 'threat' of non-European in-migration, influences public opinion, and provides self-evident justification for Frontex's border policing operations. Migration countermapsⁱⁱⁱ aim to disturb governmental maps of migration by pointing them out as reductive and politicised abstractions of mobility, and by showing the violent consequences of migration control policy which those caricatures reinforce. In the first case these maps work by visibilising the complexity of migration beyond its depiction through the governmental gaze, while in the second they visibilise the usually opaque, denied, or obscured violence of the border regime.

This latter type of migration counter-map employs the same 'cartographic gaze' (Specht and Feigenbaum, 2018), disembodied and surveillant, along with the remotesensing technologies and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) used by states, but repurposed towards resistant ends, to hold states accountable for the violence they inflict at their borders (Dodge and Perkins, 2007). Some examples are the 'Left-to-Die Boat' (Heller, Pezzani, and SITU Research, 2014) and 'Watch the Med' maps displaying the boundary lines of territorial waters and search-and-rescue zones of various countries in the Mediterranean Sea alongside locations where deaths at sea have been recorded (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, Heller, et al., 2017; Heller and Pezzani, n.d., pp. 23–27), a similar map of deaths in the region of Calais (N. Lambert and Galisson, 2017), a map of deaths of irregular migrants in the Sonoran desert to understand the human cost of the US' deterrence strategy (H. E. Stewart et al., 2016), and maps of migrant camps and deaths across Europe (Clochard, 2010). As violence, injury, and death at borders so often go unrecorded by states who either deny it outright or outsource it to foreign actors, security infrastructure, or environmental hazards, these projects visibilise and seek accountability for both acts of state violence, and their 'violent inactions' (Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi, 2017), responsible for killing migrants in border-zones.

However, instead of mapping acts of violence against persons during border crossings like those above, I instead visualise the spatial violence of domicide. My digital map functions not only as a form of 'cartographic critique' (*Mapping Safe Passages* 2019) to denounce the violence of Calais' exclusionary domicidal policies towards irregular

³ Frontex is the European Border and Coast Guard agency responsible for coordinating the policing of the EU's external borders.




FIGURE 5: *Calais : 20 ans d'(in)hospitalité* by Clochard and Pissoat. Published in Migreurop (2017). *Atlas Des Migrants En Europe. Approches Critiques Des Politiques Migratoires.* 3e. Paris: Armond Colin, p. 153.

migrants, but also as a way of 'keeping a memory archive of refugees' spaces that have been evicted, or "disappeared"' (Tazzioli and Garelli, 2019, p. 407). Doing so recentres spatial violence against migrants as constitutive of, rather than superfluous to, Calais' city-space, while keeping in frame the survival and resistance of migrants to the 'hostile environment' that domicide creates for them in the city (Aris Escarcena, 2019).

While there exist many (counter-)mappings of migrants in Calais, mostly of the 2016 Jungle (e.g. An Architektur, 2002; Haendeler, Ioannou, and Winterbottom, 2017; *MapFugees* n.d.; *Project FUEL- Life Lessons of Refugees from the Calais Jungle Refugee Camp* 2019; Shearman, 2019), the one closest to my work is Migreurope's 'Twenty years of (in)hospitality in Calais' published in their *Atlas des migrants en Europe* (2017) (Figure 5). This map displays some evicted and destroyed squats and camps in the city alongside the locations of state actors; the *Préfecture* where people had fingerprints taken after claiming asylum (now migrants have to leave Calais to claim asylum), the *L'Office français de l'immigration et de l'intégration* (OFII) (now closed so migrants at the hospital, and the BCMO cold-weather shelter (now moved to a warehouse several

kilometres east of the centre of town) (Figure 11). The distribution of these few 'hospitality' spaces (many of which do not function any longer) contrasts sharply with the overwhelming representation of inhospitable state activity on the map; the starbursts representing evictions. Thus, the map effectively communicates the state's role in constructing the city-space of Calais as primarily a destructive one, erasing irregular migrants' spaces of inhabitance.

However, the Migreurope map remains temporally flat, giving one snapshot of where evictions took place without providing further details. Were those spaces occupied and evicted multiple times? What has happened to them since? Can we tell they have been previously lived in, or has this evidence been erased? Depicting evictions as just points on a map like this removes them from the lived experience of the creation and loss of people's homes, and the historical context of migrants' decades long presence in Calais.

Digital cartographies on the other hand allow for an 'enrolment' of time into the stories maps tell, thereby opening up alternative futures (Gekker et al., 2018). This is why I chose to create a digital map as a living archive which locates evictions, destructions, and securitisations of migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance in both time and space. Layering multiple events in both these dimensions shows the existence of a broader *struggle* over irregular-migrants' exclusion in Calais. Assembling the spatially and temporally disparate cases of domicide reveals Calais' landscape of segregation while allowing certain patterns within it to be discerned.

The inspiration for creating this type of counter-map came from the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project which has produced hundreds of digital cartographic visualisations of displacement in the San Francisco Bay Area (Maharawal and McElroy, 2017; McElroy, 2016; McElroy and Opillard, 2016). I found my project resonating with the description of their work as an 'archive of loss [...] to assist and contribute to the rich terrain and history of activism' (Maharawal and McElroy, 2017, p. 2). Erasing the spatiality of resistance is an attempt to erase histories of resistance, as well as the imagination of its future possibility. Therefore, a map which archives erasure across time and space reveals the present as contingent rather than natural, a product of violence that has been, and can still be, consistently resisted and subverted. Beyond assembling a catalogue of events for posterity's sake, I show the constant repetition of domicidal violence perpetrated by the state to achieve the segregation of 'non-citizens' outside Calais. Even though only one-half of the struggle around migrants' inhabitance of the city is made visible here (the moves of the state, not migrants' counter-plays) I nevertheless hope this archive will remain a living source of information useful to those living in and moving beyond Calais without authorisation, as well as others in solidarity with them.

1.3.2 Narrative

A solely cartographic mapping project risks an abstracted and disembodied representation of events that are more rich in historical, social, and emotional complexity than can ever be charted. My work will have failed if all it does is reduce the violent destruction of people's home, what that means and feels like, and why it happens to dots overlaid on a sterile satellite photograph, indistinguishable from one another.

Various projects counter-mapping migration have addressed this drawback of conventional cartography through participative journey mapping with migrants, or what van Houtum and Bueno Lacy (2019, p. 15) refer to as 'deep mapping' which humanises space and places emotions. Rather than rely on cartographic technologies, making sacrifices to the constellations of power they are embedded in, artistic maps are another way of depicting the embodied experiences of people moving irregularly on their discontinuous journeys, including the push-backs, the periods of waiting, and feelings of limbo between moments of crossing. Some examples include migrant's self-made drawings of crossing the US-Mexico border (Campos-Delgado, 2018), Migreurope's La frontière Franco-italienne and Le Parcours de Mustafa (2017), and the 'Drawing our own Map of Routes' workshops (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, Heller, et al., 2017, pp. 15– 19). These vernacular and informal counter-maps reject depictions of migration as abstract and unidirectional 'flows' (e.g. Saarinen and Ojala, 2018), and reveal journeys to be more complex, non-linear, interrupted, dangerous, socially embedded, and emotional than those representations imply (Mainwaring and Brigden, 2016, p. 247). They are artistic rather than scientific cartographies, and fill-in the affective 'blank spaces' on the latter maps by narrating people's own experiences of their journey and its holdups. They disturb governmental maps by re-centring migrants as the primary agents of their journeys along creative and unpredictable routes, and as containing individual autonomous motivations other than the 'push and pull factors' they are so often claimed to respond to.

Mapping migration in a way which cannot be readily interpreted by control apparatuses or mapped directly onto a spatial grid is an important response to the ethical questions posed by formal cartographic counter-mapping. Furthermore, this type of 'deep mapping' (van Houtum and Bueno Lacy, 2019) privileges the affective space of movement in which physical geography is just one of many contributing factors. Spatial control mechanisms in border-spaces aim to not only physically disrupt unauthorised journeys, but have the added goal of demoralising and dissuading people from attempting them in the first place. Therefore, maps which provide a picture of the affective geographies migrants need to navigate on their journeys can equally contribute to orienting their escapes. Despite choosing to not directly map migration, this methodological gesture of 'deep mapping' is highly relevant to my work. And although I also avoid the use of oral history counter-mapping (see Maharawal and McElroy, 2017) or participative journey mapping (like the examples above) for reasons given on page 28, my work addresses the lack of emotional and affective texture present in standard cartographic representations in two ways.

First, my digital map includes archival videos, photographs, and written testimony of many domicidal events taken from activist and news media archives. The platform has an unlimited capacity to accommodate this material, and is ready to accept and spatially/temporally locate any additional content people share so long as their expressions can be digitally captured. I did not want to make this an imperative of the project, implying I would need to collect first-hand accounts during my field work, but nevertheless felt it was important to ensure the *possibility* of sharing these testimonies. Expanding this part of the map will be a large focus of my ongoing collaboration with migrant-activists and solidarity groups in Calais. Rather than completely solving the problems of the cartographic gaze, my 'hybrid grid and story map' (Caquard, 2013, p. 140) simultaneously spells out a complex spatial narrative, allowing other voices than mine to construct it. However, including media in the digital map itself is still an imperfect solution because of how it remains continually oriented, and also limited, by the satellite base map.

Therefore, my second attempt 'fill-out' the digital map is to narrate the history and evolution of domicide as a strategy of border control in Calais in non-cartographic forms. Augmenting the hybrid digital cartography with a 'text-map' (Tazzioli, 2013, p. 208) describing and analysing the mapped events, and how they relate to one another, is itself a narrative form of counter-mapping. Martina Tazzioli describes the power, even necessity, of countering governmental 'text-maps' alongside their cartographies. For her, 'a critical reading of the "text-map" is not equivalent to reading and sustaining the narrative on migrations produced by governmental agencies' (ibid., p. 208). Instead it is about seeing how 'migration governmentality' becomes discursively constructed and imagined.

This narrative counter-map primarily emerges across my empirical chapters, and their analytical companions. Much of the material presented here was taken from the archives of Calais Migrant Solidarity (CMS) and Calais Human Rights Observers (HRO), conversations with individuals involved in these two groups, and news media reports. These were then counter-posed with the statements of authorities published in French and English. The purpose of the empirical chapters is to sketch the governmental 'text-map' of domicide in Calais, and its logic. Although this narrative does sometimes include snapshots from the histories of resistance—unlike my visual cartography where they are only negatively present as the background of constant subversion from which erasure and repression of domicide become visible in relief—the *counter*- move is contained in offering a detailed presentation of the terrain of struggle. This is what Ursula Biemann (quoted in Walters, 2008, p. 195) describes as 'writing counter-geography', a mapping practice that makes 'visible the social relations inscribed in space that are invisible in normal maps'.

1.3.3 Conceptual

The final counter-map of this project is another text-map, but a theoretical rather than empirical one. It is an attempt at satisfying my initial project proposal (see page 25) to understand how migrants' struggles rupture the normative political concepts through which they are often conceived. Among a number of concepts that deserve full length studies, I have chosen citizenship because it is fundamental to the function of the border and mobility control regime, but curiously remains central to sympathetic theorisations of progressive and solidaristic politics towards the very migrants it excludes.

I take this conceptual counter-mapping method, best understood as an epistemological approach, from the work of Martina Tazzioli and Glenda Garelli.^{iv} To risk oversimplifying their theory, conceptual counter-mapping is an analytical move through which the lived experience of migrants, as well as their spatial *ruptures* (the contentious forms of inhabitance like Calais' squats and jungles), are brought to bear against forms of 'knowledge over' migration, and the strategies of governance making use of them. In other words, counter-mapping charts how the spaces migrants carve out to live in and move through European border-zones disrupt not only their immediate spatial exclusion, but the normative and state centred ways migration is typically thought about. Counter-mapping here is a way of seeing and thinking about migration which goes beyond the limits of how it is typically understood; showing this knowledge to be inadequate, ideologically driven, and damaging to how autonomous human mobilities could be theorised without the objective of control. Not unexpectedly, cartography is indicted as one form of representation, alongside other governmental discourses and concepts, which migration necessarily exceeds, justifying Garelli and Tazzioli's non-cartographic approach to counter-mapping.

However, Garelli and Tazzioli also indict citizenship (as do many other scholars from the autonomy of migration perspective, see Subsection 4.2.2) as a main governmental category through which autonomous migration is depoliticised and controlled. For them, one objective of counter-mapping migration is then to chart how thinking through its spaces of struggle can push analysis beyond the frame of 'citizenship politics' (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017, p. 11). While this thesis similarly presents some of the implications of migrants' spatial ruptures for citizenship politics, there is a slight difference in orientation between Garelli and Tazzioli's conceptualisation of migration counter-mapping and my implementation. For them, counter-mapping should centre the ephemeral spaces taken by migrants along their journeys in order to:

unearth the places and the moments of spatial disruption and spatial reshaping while simultaneously tracking down the ways in which the exclusionary access to spaces is challenged by migrants and then reconfigured by migration policies (Tazzioli, 2015, p. 5).

While not seeking to map migrant's routes otherwise, or shed light on their resistant strategies, this counter-mapping of migration nevertheless remains focused on explicating, visibilising, and charting the spatial and conceptual challenges of migrants' struggles. I instead focus on the final point in the above quotation; understanding how migrants' spatial exclusion becomes reconfigured in response to their spatial ruptures.

Although fully grasping how mobility governance has evolved will inevitably require *some* understanding of the politics of migrants' struggles (see Chapters 3 and 4 and Subsection 7.2.2), this thesis concentrates on the ways citizenship politics and domicide respond to the constant challenges of migrant struggles in Calais. *Countermapping citizenship* not only illuminates the reconfiguration of spatial exclusion, but describes how this is accompanied by reconfigurations of the conceptual foundation of citizenship underlying spatial exclusion. This leaves the map of how these spatial struggles play out in Calais somewhat incomplete, but contributes to what Tazzioli (2019a, p. 65) calls a 'minor cartography of vanishing refugees' spaces'. However, while not making migrants' spatial ruptures more visible than necessary, they are not absent from my work, but form its very substrate. In creating an archive of erasure that charts, in detail, the disappearance of migrant's squats and jungles, it becomes easier to find and take inspiration from their spatial and historical resonances to perhaps reanimate them in future.

Concretely, my conceptual counter-map begins in Chapter 2 with a critique of citizenship, highlighting how it is produced through constitutive exclusions of, often racialised and foreign, Others. In Chapters 4, 6, and 8 analysis turns to how citizenship in Calais is produced through the spatial exclusion of racialised irregular migrants in various forms of domicidal intervention. Based on the evidence presented in the two empirical counter-maps, I argue that domicide does not only produce citizenship's hegemonic form tied to legal status, but that it also produces more nuanced and even post-nationalist forms as well. By detailing the violence which produces various types of citizenship, this research delegitimises its idealised and progressive conceptions while encouraging a rethink of its applicability to migrant struggles and solidarity organising with them. This represents an epistemological intervention critiquing claims that citizenship harbours the seeds of a coalitional and liberatory politics through which irregular migrants and those in solidarity with them can struggle together towards free movement for all.

My conceptual counter-map thus counters citizenship in two ways; it inverts what are considered the acts, performances, or interventions of citizenship away from migrants' struggles against mobility control (see Ataç, Rygiel, and Stierl, 2016; Caraus, 2018; Lewicki, 2017; McNevin, 2012; Nyers, 2015; Nyers and Rygiel, 2012; V. Squire, 2017; Swerts, 2017b) to place this label firmly onto state repression, while at the same time sketching a different political approach to migrant solidarity based in a prefigurative method of *anti-citizenship*.

1.4 Notes on counter-mapping and the politics of visibility

Before finishing by outlining my data collection methods, I'll conclude the methodological discussion with a note on counter-mapping's relationship to the politics of (in)visibility of border violence and migrants' resistance. As should be clear by now, I am interested in mapping to make border violence visible while allowing spaces inhabited by migrants to remain invisible. But to what extent is making border violence visible necessary to resist and subvert it, and what tensions are involved by doing so? Unfortunately today, given the preponderance of sensationalised and emotive images, it seems increasingly difficult to ethically reflect upon that which cannot be seen. But, does reproducing violent images necessarily lead to reflexivity or create political imperatives for action? After all, today it is not the lack of knowledge or visibility of the systemic and gratuitous violence which states deploy against migrants, but rather how people position themselves in relation to this violence, that perpetuates it. Beyond depicting the harm and suffering borders cause in hopes of provoking compassion in the viewer, Miriam Ticktin (in Multiple Mobilities Research Cluster et al., 2017, p. 26) asks: 'can images serve as tools of mobilization against border walls — the kind of politically inclined artefacts that expose walls as exclusionary technologies?' These are not new questions (see Butler, 2010; Sontag, 2004, *inter alia*), but they are nevertheless crucial for an ethical assessment of counter-mapping, which includes visual methods.

Federica Sossi makes the point that the 'militant' use of images does not necessarily break circles of emotional distancing and political apathy, but can reinforce them (2013, p. 275). Nicholas De Genova (2015b) has also written about how the 'spectacle' of border policing and its performative violence works to overly determine migrants as either criminal or victim. Thus spectacular scenes of violence at the border, and I believe images of police brutality in particular, become the means through which the purported naturalness and putative necessity of exclusion may be demonstrated and verified, validated and legitimated, redundantly' (De Genova, 2013b, p. 181). Therefore, we must ask how the documentation and visualisation of border violence can contribute to political mobilisation and accountability for state perpetrators, without saturating the visual sphere in a way which 'makes [violence] invisible' (Winter, 2012, p. 202). Given the danger of contributing to the 'border spectacle' that reifies migrant illegality, criminalisation, victimisation, and overloads the economy of visibility to make police violence against migrants banal, I do not include spectacular images of this violence in my map or thesis. Instead, I have preferred to visualise and describe the mundane and less aestheticised 'routine' domicidal police work, and the spatial traces this leaves behind.

However, non-cartographic counter-mapping also makes an important intervention here. Rather than operating by a cumulative logic requiring *more* visibility and evidence of violence (Tazzioli and Garelli, 2019, p. 407), conceptual counter-mapping reconfigures our relationships to the political categories and concepts complicit in that violence. Such counter-mapping is needed to make visible the political function and violence of exclusionary concepts to delegitimise them at a theoretical level, rather than just scandalise the excessive violence of the agents put to work in their defence. Hence the goal of this thesis is to not only make visible the violence by which citizenship becomes spatialised, but to show how it reciprocally legitimises and reinforces anti-migrant violence.

In my research the images and histories of domicide in Calais are put to work beyond showing the violence of the border to demand accountability, and are used to re-conceptualise the application of citizenship politics for understanding migration. These two moves are not exclusive but complementary; the second pushes the first to its logical, if sometimes difficult to grasp, conclusions. So then, addressing Ticktin's questions above; while images may not be able to expose walls as exclusionary technologies and mobilise resistance to their politics, counter-mapping citizenship's walls in Calais across the three registers of the cartographic, the narrative, and the conceptual will hopefully be more effective.

1.5 Research methods

1.5.1 Sources

The research data comes primarily from the archives of two activist groups monitoring police violence at Calais' border; Calais Migrant Solidarity^v (CMS) and Human Rights Observers (HRO). These two groups have been active documenting evictions, destructions, and securitisations of migrant living spaces in Calais from a solidarity perspective for a number of years (CMS since 2009 and HRO since 2017), and have collected a wealth of material, much of which has remained inaccessible to the public. Both are independent, consist exclusively of volunteers, and subsist through donations. While there are notable organisational and political differences between them, both produce reports denouncing police violence towards migrants in Calais and have provided evidence to the French Ombudsman *Le Défenseur des droits* (DDD) as part of this office's investigation into border policing in Calais.

These sources are a potential limitation of my research because they do not have access to official government data on anti-migrant domicide, however, I worked with them instead of local news agencies^{vi}, the police, or authorities based on the militant research ethics of this project. I also wanted to contribute the digital counter-mapping platform as a useful way for these groups to organise and make publicly accessible the evidence of domicide they have been collecting. Also, as these groups have strong connections with the migrant population in Calais, they are better informed about the routine daily domicide central to this research than local news which is more likely to only cover larger events. I also did not make my research known to the local authorities or police as they have been particularly inhospitable to other militant researchers in Calais, and I was thus wary of their reaction. In Maria Hagan's case: 'Every official line of access I pursued resulted in a series of closed doors [...] with vague answers and invitations to write letters and emails requesting appointments which were then rejected' (2018, p. 38). She contextualises this treatment in Calais as part of general research conditions present in France where there is a 'ban on social science research on the police [where] secrecy and opacity are the rule' (Fassin, 2013, p. 14 quoted in ibid., p. 38).

Finally, in collecting data on how state actors rhetorical frame anti-migrant domicide in Calais I benefited from the generosity of Hanna Rullmann who shared transcripts of interviews with the French conservation agency *Conservatoire du littoral* and other stakeholders responsible for converting the site of the Jungle into a nature reserve (see Section 7.3), and Diego Jenowein, previously with HRO, who provided me transcripts of the neighbourhood meeting with Natacha Bouchart discussing the nature park at *Bois Chico Mendes* (see Section 7.4).

1.5.2 Data collection

My domicidal event data collection process was as follows. I contacted CMS and HRO, after obtaining University ethical approval, to explain my work and request their collaboration during a preliminary planning phase. We exchanged numerous emails and had face-to-face meetings discussing the project proposal and what I was requesting from their collectives. After establishing their boundaries—they would not act as gate-keepers nor introduce me to migrants in Calais, and all data they shared must be anonymised—I was allowed access to their archives to search for domicidal events they had recorded. While the mapped events are taken from these archival secondary sources, data collection took place in the context of frequent informal contact with HRO and CMS members via email, and attending meetings of associations working with irregular migrants in Calais to stay up to date with events on the ground. I limited my search to the 10 year period between Summer 2009 and 1 September 2019, when I began writing-up my findings. I chose 2009 as the start point for my research because this is when the exclusionary domicidal policies towards migrants began in earnest with the eviction of the Pashtun jungle, and because this is when CMS began their monitoring work (see Subsection 3.2.2). CMS was the main source of data before 2017 as HRO did not yet exist. Of course, domicide has been occurring both before and after my research period. However, this 10 year time-period is not only representative of Calais' contemporary history, but shows the most significant policy origins and evolutions relevant to understand the situation on the ground today.

The data collection process was different for each group. CMS is a more general 'cop-watch' group^{vii}, and so their reports of domicidal events were typically embedded in documentation of general police violence at the border. The main resources I used from CMS were their blog, the evidence sent to the DDD (CMS, 2011, 2014c), and their archive of cop-watch material from which blog posts and reports were drafted. I searched these for discussion of eviction, destruction, or securitisation events against migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance. Details of the events found were transferred into a spreadsheet, and then cross-referenced with other sources.

With HRO the process was less labour intensive. This group was already systematically recording domicidal events and working with a spreadsheet containing all documented cases since forming in 2017.^{viii} I was given access to this spreadsheet and combined its data with what I already collected from CMS. While the events in CMS' archive were accompanied by detailed descriptions and media, those shared by HRO had little information relevant to my research beyond date, time, and location. In total, I identified 1,281 separate incidents of evictions, destructions, and securitisation of migrant living spaces during the research period in the CMS and HRO data. I anticipate this to be much smaller than the real number because (a) most domicidal events were not recorded until HRO began its systematic work in 2017, (b) my 'data-driven' methodology meant only events documented in the archives I consulted were included (there are inevitably many which even these monitoring groups are unaware of), and (c) some events containing multiple stages of eviction, destruction, and securitisation were mapped as one event due to the digital mapping software's limitations.

1.5.3 Mapping

After documenting each event I geo-located them using of a variety of methods like online searches, photo verification, walks through the city, public digital mapping and image resources like Google Earth, and specific requests to CMS and HRO for further information. Some locations were easy to find (particularly the most recent), while others from years before required more investigative work (mainly because the spatial features in photographs were no longer visible in the city). After finding each location I took its GPS coordinates with a handheld GPS device and, if the spaces were currently uninhabited, photographs of the site and the features, if any, installed to prevent re-occupation (e.g. fencing, breeze blocks, or the outright destruction of space).

After collecting this geospatial data came the task of placing them in my interactive digital map. The software used to create this map is called 'Timemap', uses OpenStreetMaps for its base satellite map tiles, and is developed and maintained by the Forensic Architecture research agency at Goldsmiths, University of London. I divided my events into the three categories of eviction, destruction, and securitisation as the software requires each event to have only one category. These categories are not discrete (often in Calais evictions are accompanied by destructions of shelter materials, then immediately followed by securitisation in such a fluid manner that all these actions can together be considered to comprise a single event); however, I have endeavoured to maintain this three-part scheme and assign each event one label. The decision of how to categorise each event was based on what action best defined it in available descriptions and media representations over the long-term.

After categorising, I translated my first spreadsheet into a second specifically formatted to be read by the 'Timemap' software. Additionally, I wrote summaries for each event, created source files, and edited photographs and videos to remove migrants' identifying features. After configuring the software and uploading media I now have a working interactive digital map of all the domicidal events identified during my fieldwork.

Apart from presenting CMS' and HRO's archival material, the map functions as

an analytical tool for understanding trends in domicidal tactics, the geography of migrants' segregation in Calais, what these operations entail in detail, and their longterm spatial consequences. Reading this map facilitates identifying shifts in the frequency and location of domicide which form the basis of my analysis of how government policies have evolved towards eliminating all migrant spaces of inhabitance in Calais. On the other hand, seeing the multi-year cycles of re-occupation that occur points to the relative failure of even the most brutal domicidal campaign at achieving the purity of the city as a 'space of citizenship' despite the constant state interventions made to these ends. From the map I also selected a small number of events to present as case studies in Chapters 3, 5, and 7. These cases represent three different ways domicide is carried out, while also indicating other forms of citizenship produced by the exclusion of racialised irregular migrants in Calais.

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter began by discussing my research ethics before outlining the countermapping method I have applied. To recap; the research produces three counter-maps (one cartographic and two textual) that, when read together, provide a detailed account of how citizenship is produced and spatialised in Calais through anti-migrant domicide. There are many benefits to my three-part methodology, including: providing a 'cartographic critique' mobilising the gaze of the state against itself to denounce its violent interventions; folding this cartography back into itself over time to determine shifting patterns of domicidal violence; expanding on cartographic representations with fuller narratives account of the events depicted; avoiding the reproduction of sensationalising or fetishistic images of border violence; and relating these acts of state violence to the political functioning of the concept of citizenship to deconstruct it.

Having addressed the ethical dilemmas coming from my positionality as a researcher and holder of citizenship privileges, and how I have tried alleviating them through my spatial and archival research methods, I do not imagine to have been entirely successful. As De Genova (2013a, p. 252) poignantly notes, for militant researchers or scholars of migration there is no safe space 'outside' complicity with the state and its bordering regimes. However, this complicity is not necessarily an obstacle for my research. Instead my project in many ways hinges upon this personal and analytical entanglement with the very citizenship regime that I so roundly critique. It is, in De Genova's words, exactly *because* '[t]here is no neutral ground' that '[t]he momentum of the struggle itself compels us, one way or the other, to "take a side"'. While my research has provoked a number of reflections within me on how the very citizenship regime which I benefit from in so many ways is continually reproduced through border violence, by documenting, arranging, and disseminating the collected evidence of that violence I hope to provoke similar reflections in others who benefit in the same way, but for whom that violence continues to remain invisible. Furthermore, rather than just exposing the extreme violence of the border by showing how it is constitutive of citizenship and the city of Calais, I hope to communicate to others the inverse experiences of their (citizenship) privilege and provoke a call to take up an anti-citizenship politics to resolutely and collectively tackle these inequalities.

Notes

- i. This also facilitated my project receiving approval from the University's Research Ethics Committee as it did not include 'vulnerable participants' for whom extensive safeguards would need to be in place.
- ii. The Journal des Jungles (Platforme des Soutiens aux Migrant.e.s, n.d.) and Voices of the 'Jungle': Stories from the Calais Refugee Camp (Calais Writers, 2017) are just a couple examples of this type of work.
- iii. See Lucie Bacon et al. (Dec. 1, 2016). 'Cartographier les mouvements migratoires'. In: *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* 32.3-4, pp. 185–214 for an excellent review of counter-maps of migration which includes many examples I have not had the space to mention.
- iv. Their work on counter-mapping is presented in-full in Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017; Tazzioli, 2013, 2015, 2019a; Tazzioli and Garelli, 2019.
- v. More information on this group and their other activities in Calais beyond documenting police violence is presented on page 74.
- vi. However, the events activist groups documented were cross-referenced with news sources to verify them.
- vii. For an in-depth analysis of the politics of CMS, cop-watching, and representations of border violence in Calais see James Ellison (2019). 'Contested Evidence: Visual Representations of Border Violence in Calais, France'. PhD Thesis. Loughborough University.
- viii. This data was also used in HRO's reports on evictions; Human Rights Observers (June 19, 2019b). Forced Evictions in Calais and Grande-Synthe. The Human Rights Observers Project; L'Auberge des Migrants (Apr. 2018). Rapport Sur Les Expulsions Forcées: Confiscations et Destructions Des Abris Des Exilés.

Chapter 2

Defining citizenship: exclusion and imperialism

2.1 Introduction: the battleground of citizenship

This chapter reviews academic debates on citizenship and serves two purposes in the thesis: (1) it defines citizenship as a fundamentally exclusionary concept and preeminent tool for the control of human mobilities before the interventions producing it in Calais are mapped in the remaining chapters and digital cartography; and (2) it counters readings of migrant activism through the progressive conception of citizenship popular in critical citizenship studies (CCS) literature. Central to my analysis in both cases is what will be termed citizenship's *coloniality*; the constitutive, but often unacknowledged, epistemic and ontological violence through which modern citizenship has emerged on both geopolitical and personal scales. This builds on the work of decolonial scholars who argue that capitalist European modernity only emerged through the racialisation, denigration, and inferiorisation of the rest of the world, and the accompanying violence of colonial domination (Mignolo, 2000; Quijano, 2000, 2007). The 'coloniality of citizenship' thus refers to the fact that unequal, gendered, and racialised citizenship rights have been foundational to modernity (Boatcă and Roth, 2016, p. 192) and were formed in a process of colonial domination/exploitation of non-Western people (Grosfoguel, 2008, p. 8). These foundational exclusions continue to imbue contemporary theories of citizenship, and are replicated by the modern regime of migration governance in Europe (Carver, 2019; El-Enany, 2020; Mayblin, 2017; Mayblin, Wake, and Kazemi, 2020). Reading citizenship through its coloniality contextualises it within its specific modern intellectual tradition, connects the contemporary control of human mobility to its colonial history, and raises questions for the concept's utility for thinking through irregular migrants' struggles at and against Europe's borders today.

In referencing citizenship throughout previous chapters, I have actually been addressing two of its different types that James Tully (2014, pp. 8–9) helpfully differentiates as 'modern' and 'diverse' citizenship. Modern citizenship emerged during the period of modernisation and colonialism, and exists today as a legal status and institution of governance connected to states. Often idealised as the pinnacle of political subjectivity and cornerstone of liberal democracy, it has also, throughout its existence, functioned as a tool of imperialism to subjugate non-Western Others as well as 'undesirables' within the West (see Section 2.3). 'Diverse' citizenship on the other hand consists of localised political practices that are distinct from, and which arguably disturb, its hegemonic modern form. In other words, 'diverse citizenships' represent its *substance*—the political practices and ideals of community members—which can be enacted by anyone regardless of state citizenship status, and are even considered a useful resource to contest the formal exclusions of modern citizenship.

From glimpsing just two of its many differing conceptions, citizenship is clearly a fundamentally contested term, and Joe Turner (2016, p. 142) observes how citizenship scholars tend to place an almost deterministic emphasis on either its essentially inclusionary or exclusionary nature. For inclusivists, citizenship's empirical shortcomings can be overcome by committing to its universal ideals and fighting to expand the criteria of who state's officially recognise as citizens, or by radically redefining citizenship without reference to the 'real', and external, sources of exclusion like nationalism or state institutions (Lister, 2007). These proposals—extending citizenship as it stands to approved outsiders or challenging its assumed meaning—represent what Anne Mc-Nevin (2011, p. 7) describes as two of the three kinds of struggles existing around citizenship. The third kind of struggle she identifies is present in the argument made by exclusionists who insist citizenship is overdetermined by its existence as state technology of control, and therefore cannot be a useful measure of political belonging regardless of attempts to transform it. This type of study (e.g. Benhabib, 2004; De Genova, 2017; Tyler, 2010) often adopts a juridical perspective to show how legal forms of 'non-citizen' status (e.g. illegal migrant, criminal, or terrorist) excise people from political belonging, reduce them to a form of Agamben's (1998) 'bare-life' (Schinkel, 2010), and create spaces in which extraordinary violence can be enacted upon them without recourse.

Within this analytical scheme of inclusion/exclusion, my thesis is squarely located in the second camp; however, it contributes to this work by analysing the *continual co-production* of forms of (non)citizenship. It does not conceive citizenship as a fixed category to which irregular migrants exist as *a priori* opposites—non-citizens already excluded by virtue of their unsanctioned mobility and the un(der)-documented status it incurs. Instead, the thesis details how the normative social, political, and spatial relationships prescribed by modern citizenship are constantly *re-produced* to make both citizens and non-citizens in Calais. This means I do not accept irregular migrants' non-citizenship status as a given, but acknowledge from the beginning that their struggles resist and subvert it. However, because of these ruptures, citizenship must be *re-asserted* through the repression and reterritorialisation of migrants' struggles to insist that they are non-citizens.

Perhaps then, a better framework than inclusion/exclusion is to consider citizenship as *site of contest* where who can be a citizen and what citizenship means is produced through a constant struggle between groups as they act to expand or contract these definitions (see Balibar, 2009; McNevin, 2011; Rygiel, 2010; V. Squire, 2011; Turner, 2016, and much of Engin Isin's work). The state still plays an important role in these contests, but does not wholly determine citizenship's extent or contents, and neither are its categories absolute.

This thesis can then be understood as explicating the strategies and tactics of one side in this contest over citizenship. It illustrates how citizenship is used by the state (and its citizens) to control the mobilities of irregular migrants in Calais, and how its normative contours of exclusion, racialisation in particular, are reconfigured in alternative, 'post-national' forms (Soysal, 1995). This requires adopting an acknowledgedly particular understanding of citizenship that remains significantly, though not exclusively, tied to legal status and of which there have been a number of criticisms. Yet, it is nonetheless the most appropriate for this research because of how citizenship is most frequently brought to bear on migrants' lives at the Calais border.¹ Although this project is not primarily concerned with analysing how migrants' struggles, and those in solidarity with them, contest citizenship's exclusions-perhaps reconfiguring or disrupting citizenship's normativity in the process—it raises questions for inscribing these contestations back into citizenship. Not only does the thesis refuse to reenclose irregular migrants' struggles within citizenship, as this 'might inadvertently undermine struggles for another politics, by limiting these to struggles for and against citizenship' (Tambakaki, 2015, p. 929), it points to problems present when doing so.

A detailed positive and alternative conception of the politics of migrant struggles is beyond the scope of this project; however, I suggest one potential path as staying with the refusal of citizenship and developing it into a prefigurative politics of *anti-citizenship* (Section 4.3). This is one not only concerned with resisting and abolishing the most egregiously violent state technologies of citizenship and mobility control (e.g. borders, detention, or deportation), but goes further to address the ways citizenship continually produces social distinctions and privileges that undermine freedom of movement organising while developing political subjectivities that do not rely upon, nor can be as easily re-appropriated by, the nation-state.

2.1.1 Chapter outline

The chapter is divided into three sections, structured as follows. Section 2.2 begins by defining citizenship as a 'right to rights' following Arendt. I begin here, not only because CCS scholarship is often premised upon this theorisation, but to highlight that, even regardless of connections to the state, citizenship must always be produced via an excluded Other. Forms of exclusion are essential for citizenship to exist, and these exclusions persist and reappear, Hydra-like, even when citizenship is reconfigured or expanded to include other, previously excluded, groups.

After making conceptual refinements to my definition of 'exclusion' based in the Calais context, Section 2.3 presents modern citizenship's history in connection to the state as a tool of colonialism which has emerged through a distinctly racist exclusion. Recognising that citizenship has long been an imperial technology of subjugation and

mobility control, and still functions this way today (Hindess, 2004), this section offers a brief counter-history of modern citizenship, highlighting the racism that has defined it since at least the 18th century.

Section 2.4 engages with CCS' perspective on migrant struggles as examples of citizenship's 'diverse' form. This work is important to understand citizenship not only as a formal status or mode of mobility control, but also a political subjectivity accessible to all regardless of their status, and of which irregular migrants' struggles offer a great example. This shifts the frame of who are understood to be citizens, challenges citizenship's normative exclusions, and presents citizenship as the result of contests occurring through specific events and actions. However, I critique this theoretical strand as failing to adequately counter citizenship's 'conceptual imperialism' (Nyers, 2007, p. 2) and epistemic violence, while arguing instead for scholars to leave space for irregular migrants' struggles to define their own political terminology and aspirations outside citizenship politics.

Subsection 2.4.3 ends the chapter by defining the subject of my research interest as *citizenship's exclusionary interventions*, a conceptual formulation arrived at by rearranging elements of Isin and Neilsen's (2008) 'acts of citizenship' and Vicki Squire's (2017) 'interventions' with a clear focus on how citizenship is produced through constitutive exclusions. Studying these interventions reveals how citizenship recreates racist divisions, functions to control the mobilities of irregular migrants in Calais, and serves as an obstacle to radical coalitional politics between those with and without citizenship privileges.

2.2 Citizenship and exclusion

Before discussing citizenship in relation to migration governance, or analysing its production and spatialisation in Calais, some conceptual and historical background is necessary. Though mainly understood as a legal category or formalised set of rights, obligations, and practices existing within a territory and amongst a polity (typically the nation-state), Somers (2008, pp. 5–6, 25–29) defines citizenship following Arendt (2004, p. 376), as the 'right to have rights' premised upon a preliminary relational and ethical *recognition* of the Other. This conception of citizenship does not go through the nation-state, but still requires a shared political community which validates and gives meaning to individual freedoms (Gündoğdu, 2015, p. 22). Arendt famously observed the dangers of entrusting presumably universal human rights (which the Republican tradition equated with citizen rights) to states, noting the grave consequences this had for victims of the Nazi genocide stripped of citizenship.ⁱⁱ I begin with this expansive definition of citizenship as a right to rights for two reasons; (1) it highlights that citizenship is a social and political relationship first, though still premised upon recognition and inclusion, which only comes to be institutionalised as legal status later, and (2) because it is fundamental to understanding the inclusive conceptions of citizenship discussed in Section 2.4.

But if not determined by the nation-state, how does the community of citizenship define itself? Bridget Anderson argues that citizens exist within a *community of value* (2013, pp. 2–3) in which members are presumed to share common identities, values, and ideals beyond legal status, and which are expressed through performative behaviours, and cultural, ethnic, or linguistic markers. The state purports to represent and protect the interests of this community, construed as a 'nation', to derive its legitimacy to administer citizens along normative contours while disciplining or excluding those falling beyond them. However, a decidedly non-state social recognition and inclusion still precedes formalised legal and political inclusion, as well as the rights and obligations this entails. Relational recognition of an-Other, first of all as human and then as a member of a shared community, is thus the prerequisite to the host of mutual responsibilities which become formalised and codified as, for example, Marshall's (1992) civil, political or social citizenship rights after the fact.

However, a fundamental exclusion is required for citizenship's inclusion to be produced. Universal citizenship is impossible because the community of citizens 'lacks substance without a constitutive measure of alterity' (McNevin, 2011, p. 16). Engin Isin's work shows that citizenship, even in a preliminary conception as social recognition and inclusion prior to institutionalisation in state administration, does not exist as a given but must be *produced* through solidaristic (inclusive), agonistic (competitive), and alienating (exclusive) methods as groups solidify, shift, and distinguish themselves from one another (2008, p. 19). I stress citizenship's active production of inclusion and exclusion because, according to Isin (2002, pp. 3–4), citizens and their Others always emerge *simultaneously* and in contradistinction; they are not separate or pre-existing categories. One is not excluded because they *are already* a non-citizen, but rather their exclusion is immanent to the process of producing citizenship.

The thrust of RQ2 and RQ3 asks how Calais' citizen communities define themselves through the spatial exclusion of irregular migrant Others, recognising that spatial and social exclusion are fundamentally linked. However, while I focus on the case of migrant exclusion—perhaps the pre-eminent figure against whom modern citizenship is defined—citizenship emerges in relation to a variety of excluded Others depending on which particular category of differentiation is mobilised to distinguish the community of value. For example, biological markers like skin colour overdetermine one's presence within communities that try to define themselves along lines of racial or ethnic purity to immediately exclude them. Here, in addition to the dehumanisation which accompanies racism and which denies that person, now Other, the initial moment of recognition as human equal needed for Arendt's citizenship as a 'right to rights', the 'in-group' comes to identify and mobilise physical traits in defining themselves as a community against the outside Other. Even moments of including an Other, for example welcoming the 'good migrant' who prevails against racial or cultural prejudices to fulfil other normative requirements of citizenship, occurs against the backdrop of excluding those who do not. These Others can be both external noncitizens—'bad migrants' like the illegal immigrant or failed asylum seeker—as well as internal 'bad citizens' who exhibit deviant behaviour and fail to live up to the obligations incumbent upon them as citizens (Anderson, 2014, p. 6). Even within a community of full legal citizens, adherence to citizenship's presumed social and behavioural norms, as well as how they are read based on racial or cultural markers, differentiate between 'good' and 'bad' and leave the latter without access to certain 'rights' that are presumably theirs.

Although citizenship's exclusions are drawn along many lines, this research eschews its 'internal Others'. Instead, attention is maintained on the intersection and interlocking of citizenship's exclusions for migrants in Calais as 'external Others' who, beyond their status, fail to fulfil certain criteria of other 'communities of value' even when these are defined as non-national communities. Though migration (and especially irregular migration) is one of the main producers of non-citizenship (Honohan and Hovdal-Moan, 2014), the pre-existent non-citizen status of Calais' irregular migrant population is, in fact, not the primary object of my study. Rather, I am concerned with how the legal status resulting from irregular mobility resonates with social and spatial determinations of citizenship to multiply and repeatedly *re-exclude* migrants from the community of value and city-space of *Calaisien* citizenship. Specifically I investigate how migrants' racialisation, irregular forms of inhabitance (Chapter 4), presumed dependency on humanitarian interventions for survival (Chapter 6), and environmental irresponsibility (Chapter 8) are mobilised to prevent migrants from accessing even a preliminary form of citizenship as recognition within a shared political community of value.

Before finishing this conceptual discussion of citizenship's social constitution to look at its institutionalisation by the nation-state and its history as technology of colonial (mobility) governance, a final note on exclusion is necessary. Many scholars warn against using the concept of exclusion to think through citizenship because it implies an essential and categorical separation. For example, Bridget Anderson (2013, p. 2) argues it would be a mistake to read the relationship between inclusion and exclusion, and especially that between citizen and migrant, as a straightforward and binary opposition. Tonkiss and Bloom (2015) argue that non-citizenship cannot merely be treated as citizenship's negative—a condition of lack and the absence of its rights and obligations-but argue for conceiving it as a political category on its own to make sense of the experiences, politics, and practices of non-citizens in the real-world. Similarly, Mezzadra and Neilsen (2013, pp. 159–166) prefer to discuss 'differential inclusion' because, even though many groups of people are subordinated and exploited within society to varying degrees, there is not necessarily a clear or absolute distinction between its 'inside' and 'outside'. Likewise, Isin (2002, p. 4), writes in terms 'constituting immanent Others' to highlight that citizenship's exclusions are not given beforehand or exist externally to it, but are the very conditions of its emergence and must be kept in mind when thinking of 'the citizen'.

While heeding these reflections and conceiving citizenship as the simultaneous

co-production of inclusion and exclusion in a moment of social (dis)recognition, I continue using exclusion for two reasons: (1) citizenship in Calais is produced by *spatial exclusion*—a real, violent, and physical displacement which is effectively used to police migrants' mobilities in many ways—and, (2) while despite perhaps crumbling under critical scholarly reflection, the categories of citizenship's distinction are designed and intended to exclude migrants from accessing citizen rights and spaces in Calais. Both these forms of exclusion at the spatial and social levels are never complete, and *are* powerfully resisted by migrants everyday. However, they each contain an initial and emphatic exclusion—'go back to your country/the jungle!'—and often, a racist dehumanisation that precludes inclusion. They are ontologically and empirically, if not purely conceptually, exclusionary. Therefore, readers should read exclusion in this thesis, depending on the context, as referring either to the production of a spatial distance between Calais' 'spaces of citizen' and non-citizen irregular migrants, or as a category of alterity into which migrants are placed, and from which the citizen becomes defined.

2.3 Modern citizenship, racism, and global migration governance

2.3.1 History of citizenship and the state

Having understood how citizenship works conceptually, its institutionalisation as a form of governance in its historical context is necessary before discussion turns to how it functions in contemporary migration governance. This begins, in earnest, the description of citizenship's 'modern' form in Tully's (2014) parlance.

Citizenship's classic historical narrative posits it as a political institution that Western liberal democracies inherited from ancient Greece and Rome, and a fundament of democratic government allowing people to freely associate and organise beyond kinship ties. Over time the category of citizenship, and the rights it affords, have expanded as past prejudices excluding various categories of people (e.g slaves, women, unpropertied, colonial subjects, lower classes, etc.) were abolished. However, Engin Isin's genealogical study Being Political (2002, p. 2) argues that this history is, in fact, the narrative construction of 'those who were able to constitute themselves as a group' of citizens. It is a victor's history written by Renaissance and Enlightenment scholars who worked backwards, appropriating and reconfiguring tradition to construct themselves as the inheritors of a political identity rooted in antiquity. The alleged historical continuity between early modern and ancient forms of citizenship was used to naturalise the domination of elites, and, since that time, scholars have continued reinforcing this origin story while neglecting the social struggles playing a much larger role in actually determining citizenship's content and conditions of inclusion. These struggles were not always aimed at expanding citizenship—they often demanded autonomy on their own terms-however, whenever they were 'successful', they became 'redescribed retrospectively as stages in the development of modern citizenship and incorporated within its framework' (Tully, 2014, pp. 18–19).

Isin's genealogy focuses on how citizenship was constituted through membership in cities, and the city remains an important scale for citizenship's contemporary production (Section 4.1). However, citizenship has become almost exclusively associated with membership in nation-states today, although there are arguments for the waning relevance of this configuration in the face of globalisation (Bosniak, 2006; Ong, 2006; Sassen, 2003). In popular discourse, answers to the questions of what citizenship is, who citizens are, and where its reciprocal obligations apply are often taken for granted as a legal status with corresponding rights (e.g. residing in a territory or accessing state services) and practices (e.g. vote, pay taxes, serve in the military, contribute to the economy) held by people in relation to the state whose nationality they hold. Liberal democracies have a firm hold on determining what citizenship 'means', and despite continual efforts to redefine citizenship beyond the nation-state (Hoffman, 2004), the concept lacks potency outside this relationship (Hansen, 2009).

The modern, state based, citizenship form which is hegemonic today only emerged during the mid to late 18th century when modern ideas of nation developed that connected people to territories wider than the city. Famously in France, the idea of nation comprising the classes in the provinces emerged in contrast to the monarchy and developed particular potency during the French Revolution. This culminated in the birth of the modern nation-state with 'The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen' which firmly connected the body of the citizenry with that of the nation (Heater, 1999, pp. 95–99). The rights outlined in that document established the foundations of modern citizenship as a set of rights and duties shared amongst individuals bound through free association into a nation that was democratically governed by a state territorially defined by its borders. Yet, at the same time, the Declaration betrayed the Enlightenment ideals of 'universal Man' supposedly encapsulated in citizenship by making it dependent upon nationality, and introduced exclusionary distinctions between citizen/national and non-citizen/non-national (Silverman, 1992, p. 27). Brubaker (1998, p. 46) argues then that one of the legacies of the French Revolution, beyond the romanticised portrayal of inventing modern republican democracy, was creating the distinction between an internal inclusion for the national-citizen while inventing and excluding the foreigner.

Before turning to the nation-state's relationship to the foreigner, the preconditioning of citizenship on the Enlightenment's universal conception of 'Man' must be noted. Balibar (1989) describes the concept of the universal as a form of racism in itself, and indeed much literature exists on how the Enlightenment's universal standard of 'Man' was based on particular normative characteristics that became established in Europe in contrast to the world's racialised and gendered Others (Lugones, 2007; Wynter, 2003). The presumed universality of 'Man' put forth by European scholars in fact produced a racist hierarchy of humanity with the qualities they attributed to themselves becoming the standard against which the rest of the world's population of non-European, illiterate, non-white, non-males, was measured, and who then became ontologically and temporally discriminated against as the not-quite human and the backward of history. Walter Mignolo (2006, p. 312) argues that modern citizenship is the inheritance of the specifically genderedⁱⁱⁱ, racialised, heteronormative, and Christian ideals of the 'human' established during the Renaissance as it emerged alongside Western imperial expansion. Being 'human'—in practice a property-owning literate white man—was made a precondition for citizenship by Enlightenment philosophers as they rewrote the fundamental basis for the distribution of global communities from faith to birth (ibid., p. 314). However, again, a constitutive exclusion was needed. The presumed universality of the Man-Citizen had to imagine the non-human/citizen, its Other, whose elevation to the status of full-man/citizen then became a goal of the colonial missionary project (Taylor, 2013, p. 599).

2.3.2 Citizenship, imperialism, and migration governance

Given these historical considerations, modern citizenship and the nation-state emerged as distinctly racist concepts, mutually reinforcing one-another, during the Enlightenment and as a result of European colonialism. Étienne Balibar argues that colonialism was essential for European nations to recognise themselves as a community of equals based upon their conquest and division of the rest of the world amongst themselves, 'to which they gave the name "White"' (1991, p. 62). Whiteness then became the presumed national identity within Europe as ideas about racial difference were considered naturally distributed across the world based on blood relation and family lineage. This fiction of racial homogeneity within geographic areas thus spawns specifically racialised ideas of nationality through the affective sense of belonging to one's 'home' territory developed by Europeans through the colonial encounter.

This racial/spatial global distribution of national territories likewise produced their implied outsides and foreign Others (Sharma, 2015, p. 101). Upholding this naturalised, though unnatural, distribution and structurally entrenching colonialism's inequality along racial lines, has become one of the main tasks of the nation-state, and here immigration control is one of the most powerful tools (besides warfare) at its disposal. Having established the exclusionary trinity of citizenship, racism, and nation-state we can now to turn to how this nexus operates in relation to migration.

Nation-states divide the global population from one another based on the arbitrary criteria of birth location or parental lineage into smaller populations, confined to their territorial homes, and presented as essentially different from one another based on how they have been racialised. The imagined racial and ideological homogeneity of national communities within their territories is one that has always been perceived as under threat from 'migrants' traversing national boundaries and introducing nonconforming bodies, languages, and cultural practices (Sharma, 2019, p. 77). This leads democracies to introduce decidedly undemocratic exclusionary borders in both physical and administrative forms to 'secure' their national communities (Soguk, 2007, p. 297). Thus immigration controls are put at the borders of the nation-state to enforce the spatial separation between nationals and migrants, citizens and non-citizens, and thereby 'protect' the threatened national community from the influence and subversion of foreigners (Sharma in De Genova, 2015a, pp. 198–199). These controls not only restrict mobility based on racialised, gendered, and classed exclusionary ideals of nationality, but establish these categories as conversely determining mobility rights, more accurately mobility *privileges* (Bhambra, 2017b, p. 404), for national citizens.

As citizenship is produced through borders and other forms of immigration control (see Subsection 2.3.3), it is implicated in maintaining what Reece Jones (2016) describes as a system of global apartheid serving to protect colonial wealth accumulated in the Global North. Given the previous centuries of extraction, exploitation, and genocide which consolidated much of the world's wealth in Europe, restricting the rest of its populations from territorially accessing the land to which their wealth was transported sustains global racial hierarchies of prosperity and privilege founded in European colonialism and imperial expansion (Hindess, 2000). The arbitrary criteria of one's country of birth, and what citizenship you therefore hold, strongly determine life chances as the ability to travel to rich countries is often solely restricted to citizens of other rich countries (Shachar, 2009). This disparity in possibilities for human mobility based on racial and geographic determinations, and taken alongside the history of wealth extraction and capital circulation, means that borders must be understood as a form of imperialism in and of themselves (Walia, 2013). Specifically discussing the British case, Nadine El-Enany (2020, p. 2) argues that immigration law and policies must be understood 'as ongoing expressions of empire... part of an attempt to control access to the spoils of empire which are located in Britain'.

While today's borders, immigration controls, and citizenship criteria do not nominally appear to distinguish based upon race, they are nonetheless engaged in maintaining and reproducing Europe's racialised-as-white national community (Anderson, 2013, p. 47). In this way, despite recent reconfigurations of race around ideas of essentialised cultures, borders can still be read as racist. Racial markers are used to read people as migrants against the national body regardless of whether or not they have even crossed a border (Sharma, 2015, p. 110). Even if they are formal citizens, they are not the 'real' national-citizens; defined not only by possessing citizenship status, but also the positive racial characteristics of the nation which the state reflects (ibid., p. 110). One noteworthy example is the recent 'Windrush scandal' in the UK. Here, the 'Hostile Environment' for migrants which proliferated and intensified internal immigration controls on social sectors, and saw an aggressive stance taken by the Home Office towards the removal of those without the 'right to remain', also resulted in the deportation of a number of racialised people with the legal right to British citizenship, who had travelled here as citizens of the Commonwealth, and lived in Britain for most of their lives fulfilling other substantive citizenship qualifications (Goodfellow, 2019; Quille, 2018). Thus immigration law does not only exclude racialised external others at the border of the nation-state who fail to fulfil entry criteria, but also sorts people within territories based on their presumed (non)citizenship status; often racially inferred through comparison to how the nation imagines itself.

The deportation of 'Windrush citizens' exemplifies how Britain continues to be 'deeply structured by race such that the state itself—and all associated concepts, such as citizenship—are racialised' (Shilliam (2016) in Bhambra, 2017a, p. 97). This is elaborated upon by Gurminder Bhambra (2017b) and Nadine El-Enany (2020) who observe that when ideas of citizenship first emerged in Europe in the 18th century, most of its states were imperial states, not nation-states in the ideal of the French Republic which Brubaker describes as immediately excluding the foreigner. In fact, these imperial states initially *included* their colonial subjects as citizens. Citizenship in the first instance was granted to Europe's Outside and its Others because these were subjugated within its Empires, and there was not much restriction on circulation within the European empires. Bhambra and El-Enany argue that contemporary configurations of European citizenship, and its migrant Others, emerged as a reaction to later immigration to Europe from its colonial outposts in the post-WWII period. This is when previously imperial subjects, now (in Britain) citizens of the Commonwealth, began exercising their citizenship privileges to move to Europe where they expected to be granted the full rights this status entailed. However, this racialised immigration created panic within the European 'nations' who thought themselves white, and sparked a contraction in citizenship eligibility criteria to prevent more racialised citizens from moving freely. Here the category 'migrant' developed and became applied to Commonwealth citizens as a marker of their race, and not because they had crossed any national border to arrive in Britain.^{iv} '[T]he issue was never simply mobility, but rather the colour of those who moved and the direction in which they moved' (Bhambra, 2017b, p. 403). Thus citizenship became reconfigured to facilitate the mobility of white Europeans throughout parts of 'their' Empires while ham-stringing the mobility of those considered its subjects as they travelled back to its centre.

The imperial distributions of citizenship in which there was some positive connection between colonised countries and their colonisers have since been completely severed and replaced by geographically contiguous European countries (Rigo, 2005). Today, inter-state mobilities amongst European Union (EU) members are facilitated while the mobilities of citizens from post-colonial countries outside the EU remain restricted (Hindess, 2004, p. 311). This was formalised under the Schengen agreements which simultaneous eased mobility restrictions for EU citizens within Europe while tightening immigration controls for non-EU migrants to produce what has been called 'Fortress Europe' (Garner, 2007).

This hardening of Europe's external borders and softening of internal borders also facilitated the emergence of a pan-national European citizenship that is itself defined by free-movement amongst the EU's member-states in contrast to the 'third country' nationals kept immobile on the outside (Aradau, Huysmans, and V. Squire, 2010, p. 946). Modern citizenship in Europe is thus defined by free movement—mobility which is actually necessary to produce the European nation—but which depends on the hindrance and control of the mobility of Others' who are seen to be unfit for inclusion in ideal European nation (Cresswell, 2006). These contemporary ideals of nation and citizenship continue to be racially defined. While there remains a degree of internal racialised difference within Europe, certain normative racial, cultural, and religious traits became easily assumed to define Europeanness as white, Christian, socialist, and liberal through restricting non-European racialised mobilities.

The expansions and contractions described above show citizenship to be strategically deployed by European states to increase the mobility of the white, wealthy, and economically productive, whilst limiting that of the poor, racialised, or otherwise undesirable foreign Other. These examples show the contingent distribution of mobility privileges in Europe as depending upon the economic advantage to be gained through them, rather than reflecting a more generous stance towards the gradual removal of state borders and development of parity in global citizenship rights. Citizenship's distinctions have thus been essential for maintaining the segregation of people across the world to the distinct advantage of Europe, perpetuating border imperialism while maintaining global inequality, leading some to describe citizenship as 'a conspiracy against the rest of the world' (Hindess, 2000, p. 1488).

2.3.3 Borders as technologies of citizenship

Given the broad brush recounting of how immigration controls sustain the white racial imaginary of the European nation and its citizens, it must be recognised that these overarching policies and strategies are enacted at the micro-scale through what can be called 'technologies of citizenship' (Walters, 2010); tools which create 'migrants', and, by doing so, simultaneously produce citizenship, both as racialised categories (Anderson, 2015, p. 41). Before presenting the border as the pre-eminent spatial technology of the exclusionary and racialised modern citizenship form, some conceptual background is required.

Perhaps already clear to the reader, 'technology of citizenship' is a distinctly Foucauldian concept emerging from his theory of 'technologies of the self'. Foucault (1988, p. 18) describes these as the processes by which individuals act 'to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality'. 'Technologies of the self' function alongside 'technologies of power and domination' to manage populations and govern subjects in what Foucault terms governmentality (ibid., p. 19). Barbara Cruikshank (1999, p. 4) defines technologies of citizenship as the practices and discourses through which subjects in neo-liberal democratic societies become agents of (self)governance—autonomous, self-sufficient, and politically engaged while aligned with normative social conventions and political ideals—as they strive towards an idealised form of the 'active citizen'. By embedding governmental interests in citizens' aspirations and conducts, technologies of citizenship facilitate the strategic governance of populations by obscuring and dispersing the operation of domination throughout everyday activities that citizens choose to participate in so as to improve themselves. Defining technologies of citizenship as the positive practices which mould normative political subjects to create ideal citizens for the state is useful to understand their (self)disciplining effects as connected with strategies of domination. However, the importance of citizenship's constitutive exclusions, which also shape how citizens understand, act upon, and transform themselves, is still lacking in Cruikshank's conceptualisation.

Therefore, this research investigates what I consider *exclusionary technologies of citi*zenship; processes which produce citizens by distinguishing and separating them from their Others. This acknowledges that ideal citizenship forms are not just expressed positively, but need to be differentiated from non-, failed, and deviant citizenships. There are a variety of these specific technologies; e.g. citizenship tests (Löwenheim and Gazit, 2009), legal instruments governing immigration, or even citizenship discourse as it circulates in the public sphere. However, as this research is concerned with exclusionary spaces of citizenship in Calais, I focus predominately on the spatial technologies of citizenship that distinguish citizens from irregular migrants in the city, recognising that spatial, social, and political exclusion are intimately interwoven and mutually reinforcing. While other scholars analyse how technologies of citizenship following Cruikshank's description function across borders (e.g. how extending voting rights to diasporic national citizens disrupts the commonly held notion that nation-state borders are also the borders of citizenship (Kalm, 2013)), I conceive the border itself as an exclusionary spatial technology of citizenship. My point of departure here is De Genova's (2013a, 2017) observation that without states and borders there would be neither citizens nor migrants, just the movement of humans across the surface of the planet. Before these categories are impregnated with qualities, norms, and ideals, their very existence is owed to manufactured spatial distinctions between people and their governmental re-enforcement.

As we've seen (Section 0.3), borders are not simply a line in the sand at the geographic frontier of the nation-state, but 'symbolise a *social practice* of spatial differentiation' (emphasis mine, van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002, p. 126). While spatialising differentiation by mapping admission or rejection from a community onto admission or rejection from its territory, purportedly to protect its internal integrity, borders ultimately enforce social distinctions. Connections can thus be drawn between the opening conception of citizenship as preliminary form of social recognition, and the spatial technologies which fix the boundaries to whom recognition extends.

As shown, borders mainly work at the national level to exclude (usually racialised) groups construed as non-citizens. Yet they also function at smaller scales, in fact appearing wherever social differentiations are made and inscribed into space. While not wanting to expand the concept of the border in a way that dilutes the significance and violence of state borders, understanding how micro processes of bordering also produce social differentiation and citizenship is crucial to later understand how domicide works as an exclusionary spatial technology (Section 4.4).

However, ending this section here, which mainly focused on the historical lineage

of citizenship and how it perpetuates global inequality, implicates borders and other spatial technologies of citizenship in reproducing this unjust arrangement. The rest of the thesis will continue reading citizenship backwards and forwards, drawing connections between the technologies and interventions that produce it, and the racialised and colonial histories reanimated in the process. This counter-maps citizenship by not only countering its historical representations as an idealised form of individual participation within liberal democracy or a progressive institution of governance, but by referring the violent interventions sustaining it onto citizenship itself.

2.4 Citizenships of and against migrants' struggles

Until now citizenship has mainly been discussed in exclusionary terms; first as a process through which political identities and communities form through differentiation from alterity, then how these distinctions have been historically institutionalised by states and mapped onto racialised foreign Others, and finally how citizenship is produced at the micro-scale through exclusionary spatial technologies. However, discussion now turns to citizenship in its 'diverse' form (Tully, 2014), particularly in relation to migration, through engaging CCS literature which presents an alternative narrative on citizenship to the one given thus far. This is one where citizenship itself, despite retaining the historical baggage and dominant power relations through which it has been forged (Kofman, 1995, p. 126), holds the key to overturning the global racial hierarchy of mobility privileges that its modern form is so heavily implicated in.

Although taking the reflections that irregular migrants' struggles 'disrupt received assumptions about who has the power to do what citizens do and where the work of citizenship gets done' (McNevin, 2011, p. 32), and that citizenship is a social and spatial relation that must be actively constituted (i.e. it does not simply exist as a stateprescribed status but must be created through contingent acts and interventions) from CCS, I ultimately refuse the conclusions of this strand of theorising which read contemporary migrant struggles into citizenship politics. This is for two interrelated reasons. The first, discussed further in Subsection 4.2.3, is because I agree with scholars from the autonomy of migration perspective that the spatial politics of migrant struggles at Calais' border fundamentally exceed citizenship (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, 2008; Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013; Tazzioli, 2017a). Migrants not only make, at best, a tactical use of familiar forms of citizenship politics (e.g. claiming rights, forming representational bodies, or organising demonstrations and protests) in their struggles for free movement (Rigby and Schlembach, 2013; Tyerman, forthcoming); but they further challenge citizenship—by performing politics as unfamiliar actors or by contesting the citizenship regime outright—while making demands beyond what can be expressed by a liberal politics of recognition or accommodated through state institutions. My second reason is to reject what has been termed citizenship's 'conceptual imperialism' (Nyers, 2007, p. 2). This refers to the tendency of citizenship scholarship in theorisations of its 'diverse' (Tully, 2014), activist (Isin, 2009), and

performative (Isin, 2017) forms to subsume all political struggles within citizenship. Despite having shed the Enlightenment Universal of the Man-Citizen as the epitome of social and political being, citizenship today has a softer, critical, and more sympathetic universalism which nevertheless similarly discriminates against other ways of 'being political'.

This section enters these debates not only to recognise a main criticism of the perspective on citizenship taken by this thesis, while offering some rebuttals, but to counter-map the 'wall' of citizenship politics in the analysis of the struggles of irregular migrants. It also addresses *RQ4* by articulating some of the pitfalls of using citizenship as a conceptual foundation for struggling against its institutionalised inequalities.

2.4.1 Migrant struggles as 'acts of citizenship'

It is not surprising that citizenship is so central to the analysis of migrant struggles. The concept goes to the core of how mobility is governed, how political action and subjectivity is understood, and how communities of people constitute themselves and contest exclusion. According to Martina Tazzioli (2017a, pp. 72–73), there exists a tendency towards 'methodological citizenship' in migration studies that reads 'migrants' movements and struggles through the lens of the citizen-subject [particularly when] they struggle using political modes and political claims that are easily readable within the codes of citizenship politics'. Although citizenship does allow for 'making sense' of migrants and their struggles, albeit in a way that neatly dovetails with migration governmentality, alternatively, many scholars have reversed the methodological viewpoint to study the ways that irregular migrants' struggles are a better lens through which to understand citizenship today (Andrijasevic and Anderson, 2009; McNevin, 2011; Nyers, 2015; Nyers and Rygiel, 2012; Tyler and Marciniak, 2013). These studies attest to the ways irregular migrants' struggles for free movement, including their unsanctioned mobilities despite state attempts to restrict them, upset commonly held assumptions about who citizens are, how they behave, and how they relate to nationstates. By decoupling citizenship from its state-based juridical form and celebrating it as a space of political subjectivity accessible to everyone regardless of their status, these studies show how migrants behave as if they are already citizens and the implications this carries for citizenship itself.

In two related veins of inquiry these studies show how 'non-citizen' migrants *practise* or *perform* citizenship in contesting exclusion—thus bringing the very differentiation of non/citizen into crisis—and how the experiences of autonomous mobility in the face of technologies of mobility control are productive of new forms of political subjectivity and citizenship (Nyers and Rygiel, 2012, pp. 1–2). Examples of the various articulations of the 'new' citizenship forms produced by migrant struggles are 'cosmopolitan citizenship' (Caraus, 2018), 'citizenship from below' (Nyers and Rygiel, 2012, p. 9), 'migrant citizenships' (Nyers, 2015), and 'illegal citizenship' (Rigo, 2011) among others. These studies convincingly argue that migrant struggles 'demonstrate citizenship is not only a technology of governance, exclusion, and differentiation...but are illustrative of how citizenship involves a creative processes [*sic*] that is generative of new worlds, identities, and modes of belonging' (Nyers, 2015, p. 34). While analysing situations common to irregular migrants across the globe, they often develop their novel and alternative conceptualisations of citizenship through examples of migrants' struggles in specific spatial contexts. However, these studies typically progress through the work of Engin Isin to arrive at their argument for how migrants are *de facto*, if not *de jure*, citizens. Having previously referenced his earlier work which argues citizenship is constituted by exclusion while becoming defined by *the struggle over it*, Isin's work on 'acts of citizenship' (AoC) (Isin and Nielsen, 2008) has proven highly productive to theorising migrant citizenships.

AoC describes citizenship as the result of a series of performative and contingent acts that disrupt its previously held boundaries, contest the legitimacy of its existing exclusions, and reconstitute new forms of political subjectivity in the process. Those formally excluded from citizenship (e.g. irregular migrants) become its main, if unfamiliar (Ní Mhurchú, 2016), actors because, by claiming the citizenship rights they have been denied and performing citizenship despite their exclusion, they break from habitus and rupture the normative schematics of what citizenship means and to whom it applies (Isin, 2008, p. 36). These acts produce 'activist' citizens who claim rights and write scripts of new ways of being political, and who are differentiated from Cruikshank's 'active' citizens who merely rehearse those scripts while pursuing an already given ideal citizen form.^v

Acts produce citizenship as a form of political subjectivity that comes into being through Rancière's conception of democratic politics described as 'creating forms of subjectification in the interval between two identities' (2010, p. 65). In migrant activism, citizenship as subjectivity emerges from non-citizens contesting that very status which excludes them. There is an existential chasm between state enforced noncitizenship, its accompanying active dis-recognition of migrants' humanity and existing political subjectivities, and their own self-understanding of being human/political subjects. This gap between subjection and self-acknowledgement is overcome once that denied political subjectivity, having dis-identified from the abjected position, becomes animated to contest its dismissal. In doing so the 'non-citizen' shatters the normative framework of citizenship previously excluding them while claiming, performing, and reconfiguring citizenship in the process. This leaves both the subject and citizenship forever changed because the latter's exclusion no longer applies to the former who behaved as they 'could not'. However, the point of this process I want to criticise in Subsection 2.4.2 is that 'precisely this moment of disconnection [between practising citizenship while having a non-citizen status] seems to provide the impetus to reinstate the citizen as the political subject par excellence' (emphasis mine, Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013, p. 257).

If, so far, I discuss acts only as creating new political subjectivities for individuals this is not its limit. One of the principles that Isin (2008, pp. 35–37) ascribes to 'acts of citizenship' is that they make the actor answerable to Levinasian justice. That is; they

bring the actor into ethical relation with the Other through the judgement of a third party, and, in so doing, produce 'a terrain common to me and the others where I am counted among them' (Levinas in Isin, 2008, p. 36). This relationality of the act, not only the ethical treatment of the Other but also the involvement of others as judges of the 'scene' that the act has created, make acts of citizenship social and political phenomena generative of 'communities of justice'. This is how acts of citizenship transcend the boundaries of subjectivity and constitute a communal form of citizenship. By creating political communities based on mutual recognition and reciprocal relation they constitute citizenship as Arendt's 'right to rights' (ibid., p. 18) which is entirely separate from how citizenship has been institutionalised by the nation-state.

The strength of AoC's intervention, and its application to migration struggles, is that it demands we recognise migrants and their struggles as political, even after they have been excluded from the realm of 'proper' politics rendering them politically invisible. Furthermore, it challenges observers to take those contestations seriously and think through their implications for citizenship as a clear demarcation between 'us' and 'them' (Anderson, 2013). It also allows space for surprising solidarities to emerge between communities otherwise scripted to oppose one-another by displacing modern citizenship as a determinant of interactive social possibilities, and ultimately aims to de-emphasise, even dismiss, citizenship as criterion for distributing legal rights (Nyers and Rygiel, 2012, p. 10).

However, one of the main criticisms of AoC is that it fails to seriously tackle the hegemonic form of citizenship as state legal status as the 'practices identified as *practices of citizenship*' appear unable 'to secure or hold in place any kind of *citizenship status*' (emphasis in original, Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013, p. 257). Therefore, while containing the promise of emancipatory politics, AoC seems unable to provide a rigorous account of how the always contingent acts of rupture, and the 'fluid subject positions and actors' they create, impact, transform, or undo hegemonic citizenship (Rees, 2019, pp. 72–73). Instead, it demands a certain 'leap of faith' that the hegemonic citizen oppositional binary will collapse under the weight of its contradiction once the non-citizen demonstrates an ability to resist and 'enact citizenship' in ways they were not supposed to be able to. Only after the contingency of the citizenship distinction is exposed can the real work begin on attacking the institutionalised privileges and persistent exclusions of citizenship's modern form from the collective positions of something like 'citizens-beyond-states' (Rygiel et al., 2015, p. 5) or 'migrant citizenships' (Nyers, 2015).

These are valid critiques, and I am doubly wary about entrusting citizenship to overthrow itself given the historical reflections by Isin and Tully (page 51) on how citizenship reterritorialises its ruptures to sustain hegemony, as well as its need for constitutive exclusions. In my theorisation of anti-citizenship (Section 4.3) I stress the need for instead taking constant aim at citizenship through a prefigurative practice of refusal across institutional, communal, and subjective levels, even if interpreters reinscribe the acts and actors that do so within citizenship. However, I will suspend this discussion for the moment to instead present a critique from a slightly different angle: that AoC and migrant citizenship literature reintroduce citizenship as a form of universal political subjectivity—as 'the political subject par excellence' (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013, p. 257)—and, in doing so, fail to counter the epistemic violence lingering within the concept throughout citizenship's modern existence (see Subsection 2.3.2).

2.4.2 Citizenship's conceptual imperialism

As shown in Section 2.2, the genealogy of citizenship lies within racialised and gendered ideals of the human that developed amongst European thinkers during the Enlightenment, but which made claims to universal validity. Not only did these universality claims exclude, first from humanity then from the political identity of the citizen, the entire non-Western world, but they also ignored their local situatedness in excluding all other 'epistemic perspectives' (Mignolo, 2006, p. 324). Given these considerations, Lucy Taylor (2013, p. 598) describes citizenship as 'a powerful colonizing agent at the most fundamental ontological and espistemological level'.

CCS scholars are well aware of this history and are keen to avoid reproducing citizenship's most egregious form of epistemic violence. They rightly ask whether they impose citizenship subjectivities on people, and whether that 'eclipse[s] other ways of being political'; answering both 'yes and no' (Nyers and Rygiel, 2012, p. 11). After this partial acknowledgement, Nyers and Rygiel continue by insisting on continuing to use citizenship because the concept 'best evokes the notion of political subjectivity' as it invites a deep reflection on the relationship between the self and the other (ibid., p. 11). Although the kind of discriminatory normativity of modern citizenship has been dispersed, there is still a universalising of citizenship in this justification as the privileged, even ultimate, form of political subjectivity that denigrates the endogenous thinking and/or actions of irregular migrants.

Nyers^{vi} and Isin^{vii} have both argued that acts of citizenship performed by migrants do not necessarily need to take up the language of citizenship and can even refuse it outright so long as they can be interpreted as rupturing political forms and generating new subjectivities, identities, ways of being together, and worlds. It appears then that, for them, *all* ways of 'being political' are examples of citizenship. This, judging by the expansive literature acts of citizenship has spawned, has proven a highly productive theoretical move and greatly expanded citizenship's conceptual reach. However, while I do agree that thinking migrant struggles through citizenship provokes important reflections on our understandings of politics, questions about the relationship between the self and the Other, as well as how disjunctures between subjection and subjectivity can be productive of new subjective and political forms, I ultimately disagree that the conclusion of this reflective process be to reinstate citizenship, even in a 'diverse' or contingent form, for a number of reasons outlined now.

Citizenship as the privileged form of thinking through political subjectivity in its highly nuanced contemporary formulations remains indebted to its colonial history of epistemic and ontological violence despite the lengthy debate and numerous correctives that have appeared as citizenship comes to grips with this past. It has always remained one particular way of 'being political', which has been continually privileged as universal horizon for political subjecthood. Therefore, even though Nyers counters the charge of conceptualism imperialism by pointing to the fact 'that the *debate* over citizenship is alive and well in countries both inside and outside the West' (emphasis in original, Nyers, 2007, p. 2), the concept has been formed, coloured, and debated through a geopolitics of knowledge production that privileges European thought against that of the rest of the world (Mignolo, 2002).

Furthermore, decolonial scholars argue citizenship not only fails to grasp the full political significance of migrants' struggles at and against Europe's borders, but it fundamentally *cannot* because it is wholly confined to modernity's epistemic territory. According to Rolando Vázquez, citizenship fails to account for its *coloniality*; the underside of dehumanisation and othering allowing certain people to emerge as citizens which continues imbuing the concept today. By theorising migrant struggles through citizenship, they become 'vacuated from their trajectories and thus from the entanglement of their migration with their histories and their embodiment of coloniality' (Vázquez in Ansems-de Vries et al., 2017, pp. 8–9). Rather than interpreting the politics of migrants through the language and concepts that have historically disdained and subjugated them, especially when they refuse to make use of these themselves, it is imperative to 'recognize that the political acts of those migrating are politics of the colonial difference' and therefore require an alternative theoretical framework founded in other cosmologies than the European Enlightenment to understand (ibid., p. 9).

Beyond this epistemic discrimination that fails to account for the significance of the colonial difference in irregular migrants' politics, there is also the danger of temporal discrimination (both material and subjective) in some of the migrant citizenship literatures. On the one hand, people on the move are emptied of autonomous agency or will extending beyond full participation within the modern European nation-state despite the fact these struggles can and do make appeals beyond what even full citizenship inclusion can offer (Shilliam, 2016a). They and their struggles remain measured along the trajectory of normative citizenship ending in full inclusion (Brandzel, 2011, p. 518). On the other hand, re-establishing citizenship as the best form of political subjectivity reduces all other distinct forms of being political, particularly those ambivalent towards or which reject citizenship, as part of a 'journey to citizenship' (Tambakaki, 2015, p. 923). Even when held up as *already* being examples of citizens, this doesn't bring migrants any closer to countering modern citizenship's exclusions or accessing the material benefits citizenship status would offer. In both cases irregular migrants remain 'not-yet-citizens', if by different measures, and citizenships' primacy for determining political subjectivity and community is re-established.

Finally, Gurminder Bhambra (2015, p. 105) points out that citizenship, as a form of politics which excluded groups can use to become included, not only assumes those groups are non-political before engaging in performances of citizenship, but that this

paradoxically 'creates the necessity for struggles that draw upon the very categories that "perform" the initial exclusion'. This is what Amy Brandzel (2016, p. 15) refers to as citizenship's 'anti-intersectional' and 'anti-coalitional' logic in which the use of citizenship by marginalised and disdained groups, 'reproduces and extends the violent subjugations of exclusion'. Even when fighting for the widest possible inclusion, the logic of citizenship and its constitutive exclusions require breaking apart wider solidarities. Therefore, according to Brandzel (ibid., p. x), 'there is no such thing as a movement of citizenship and inclusion for some that does not further the vulnerability and disenfranchisement of others'. This directly counters Nyers and Rygiel's argument that citizenship is key 'to inspire movement forward in the aspirations of greater social justice, rights, and equity' (2012, p. 11) by showing that, in fact, citizenship fails to provide a stable foundation from which to form coalitions *across* existing social and citizenship distinctions. It instead fosters competition amongst intersecting and intertwined oppressions such as 'sexism, racism, classism, heteronormativity, settler colonialism, and imperialism' (Brandzel, 2016, p. 8). Particularly regarding immigration, citizenship policies have continued to produce hierarchies between migrants that correspond to identity categories like 'gender, race/ethnicity, nationality, religion, and class' (Ellermann, 2019).

Therefore, to avoid reproducing citizenship's conceptual imperialism I choose not to investigate how migrant struggles taking place in Calais—which *do* rupture normative citizenship forms and offer spaces through which to rethink political solidarity with Others against citizenship—can be read through citizenship to recover and reconfigure it as others have done.^{viii} And, while this type of work is important, and further decolonial critiques of the concept of citizenship are urgently needed from a plurality of geographical and epistemological perspectives, I remain sceptical about the possibility to arrive, through a decolonial critique of citizenship at a 'decolonial citizenship' as others have suggested (Mignolo, 2006; B. Smith and P. Rogers, 2016; Taylor, 2013).^{ix} I instead agree with De Genova (2017, p. 20) that it is 'impossible to separate citizenship from state governance or juridical status, no matter how much one uses it as an analogy for a different type of political relation'.

Therefore, this research predominately settles on using the state's own restrictive, though hegemonic, definition of citizenship to investigate how it is produced by the spatial exclusion of irregular migrants rather than trying to redefine citizenship or discover the substantive qualities attributed to it at work in Calais migrants' struggles. Critically understanding the ways citizenship is used to govern migration shows how and by whom citizenship becomes restricted, raises further questions on the techniques of capture present within citizenship itself, and suggests ways to subvert them. However, while my initial research focused almost entirely on the production of state citizenship through domicide, the results of my investigations also revealed that other forms of 'diverse' citizenship not strictly tied to the nation-state are also produced through the exclusion of irregular migrants in the city.

2.4.3 Exclusionary interventions of citizenship

Before presenting this empirical research in the coming chapters one final note must be made on how I conceive of the domicidal actions I investigate based on preceding discussions of citizenship emerging through 'acts'. Remember that, for Isin, moments in which citizenship is enacted are also moments where groups become differentiated from one another (although for him these are fluid subject positions rather than fixed categories) (Isin, 2008). Therefore, acts of citizenship are also acts of exclusion. While most of the migrant citizenships literature influenced by AoC celebrates migrant activism as the motor of a progressive drive towards egalitarian citizenship (perhaps even an unbordered future), it bears keeping in mind that citizenship continues to be a primary tool for producing difference and controlling human mobility to the distinct advantage of European and settler-colonial states. Therefore, further studies explicating 'techniques of governmentality deployed by states' which re-establish a normative and exclusionary definition of citizenship (Fortier, 2016, p. 1040), as well as those 'spaces formed around exclusionary acts of citizenship' which 'are actively destructive of other ways of being' (emphasis in original, Darling, 2017, p. 734) are urgently needed, and are where this thesis makes contributions to the literature.

However, while this study retains a focus on the specific events through which citizenship is reproduced, I do not refer to domicidal events as 'acts of citizenship', reversing its orientation, but instead term them *citizenship's exclusionary interventions*. These are events through which citizenship's normativity is defended by citizen actions and the implementation of exclusionary technologies. Vicki Squire (2017, p. 268) argues that those actions akin to acts of citizenship but which 'fall short of constituting new subjects and scripts' should be called interventions, and she proposes this term as a corrective to the ease with which migration citizenship scholars make use of 'acts of citizenship' without recognising the very specific definition Isin gives them. Squire develops interventions through questioning whether the example of irregular migrants traversing national borders in Europe on foot in 2015 actually disrupted bordering practices, constituted new realities, or transformed conditions of irregular migration (ibid., pp. 267–268). If not, she claims they remained interventions that potentially, but not definitively, disrupted political forms. Because Squire is responding to CCS scholars theorising migrant activism she describes interventions in terms of actions taken by migrants struggling for free movement. However, I wish to repurpose 'interventions' to describe actions of repression that likewise do not create new subjects or realities, but rather violently reproduce citizenship's given scripts and its normativity by producing and excluding its Others.

If Isin and Nielsen (2008, pp. 2 & 39) describe acts of citizenship as 'rupturing sociohistorical patterns' and 'breaking with repetition of the same' to produce subjects who 'constitute themselves as citizens', are imbued with an ethics requiring subjects to become 'answerable to justice against injustice', and take place without the guarantee of an authoritative institution, the domicidal interventions I present in this research fail on all of these counts. They are directly instigated by the French state and take place under its authority, *sometimes*^x enforcing its laws. They repeat historical patterns of racist segregation. They deny recognition to irregular migrant Others as inhabiting a shared community of 'humanity' or 'fraternity' with citizens (Rigby and Schlembach, 2013, p. 164). They do not produce new subjectivities, but are rather the actions of self-identifying citizens and state agents defending citizenship's normative exclusions. Rather than expanding who or what can be considered within citizenship's purview, these interventions enclose it, restricting it to a property of the privileged few.

However, the benefit in thinking about domicidal actions as exclusionary interventions of citizenship is that, like acts, it brings into focus how citizenship is produced through a series of specific actions taking place between people; mediated by spaces, technologies, and materials; and which implement ideological and political positions. This has two important consequences: (1) it reveals how the border and citizenship regimes in Calais only exist because of the constant repetition of repressive bordering interventions by individuals and state institutions, and (2) it shows that these interventions are necessary only because migrants continually disrupt the city and resist the normative and disciplinary frameworks imposed upon them. Breaking the strategies, policies, technologies, and concepts which together form the regime of citizenship and mobility governance down to their discrete actions and interventions, it becomes easier to see spaces in which they can be resisted, not to mention the multitude of ways in which they already are.

2.5 Conclusion: spatialising modern citizenship

This chapter described how citizenship is conceptualised in this research, historicising it as a tool for the control of mobility originating in European colonialism and still perpetuating the global inequality created during that period today. Citizenship emerges by producing an excluded Other against which it defines itself at all levels. Modern citizenship produces this Other as gendered, racialised, and spatially displaced. However, CCS scholars argue that citizenship is not necessarily limited to how it is institutionalised by states, but is a useful resource to challenge these exclusions and organise for broader equalities. Given the historical and conceptual background presented above, I disagree that contemporary migrant activism should be conceived through the language and politics of citizenship so as to not further its conceptual imperialism. Instead, this thesis illustrates how citizenship controls migration and how it is produced and spatialised through the exclusion of racialised irregular migrants in Calais. Therefore, the conceptualisations of citizenship employed in this work centre its normativity and exclusionary nature. The research is concerned with the citizenship of the police, in real and Rancièrian terms, but also how the normative contours of citizenship are socially reproduced by the wider citizen public in the cases of environmental (Chapter 8) and humanitarian (Chapter 6) citizenship. This represents a recognisably limited understanding of citizenship; however, as my focus is not on its

content (the rights and responsibilities citizenship entails), nor how it can be expanded to encompass the political actions of its Others, it is nonetheless appropriate for this research project.

The final point of theoretical specification for this work is that citizenship is mainly analysed *spatially*, at the level of the city, from now on. The coming chapters detail citizenship's production through the state interventions erasing migrants' spaces of autonomous inhabitance, and how citizenship itself functions as a tool of migration control within the context of Calais. A spatial perspective refrains from speculating on migrants' political subjectivities, while highlighting the role of space and materiality in how citizenship is constituted, maintained, and mobilised in migration control strategies. Both object and tool of non-citizen exclusion, citizenship becomes spatialised and written into the city to prescribe which spaces (non)citizens are differentially allowed to inhabit, reinforces its distinctions, and prevents their disruption. Rather than tracing citizenship's field of struggle in Calais over space, this research hopes to illuminate the geographies of exclusion. Carefully charting the violent spatial interventions through which citizenship becomes produced allows for questioning the givenness of its exclusions, weakens the apparent totality of migration governance, and opens spaces in which to imagine further possibilities for resistance.

Notes

- i. My research concentrates on citizenship's function during the moment of irregularity for migrants at Calais' border. Therefore, citizenship's role in their regularisation, integration, labour market access, or long-term, multi-generational, 'role in society' is omitted. Nor is there discussion of racialisation and non-normative citizenships *within* Calais' citizen population, although these are interesting avenues for further research.
- ii. The contingency of supposedly universal human rights as dependent upon the political rights of state recognised citizens appearing for Europeans as a result of 20th century totalitarianism (Balibar, 2004, p. 119), was already well known to the rest of world where people had been subject to other ways of being made disposable for centuries; in particular with enslavement where, through skin colour, humanity was transformed into commodity (Mignolo, 2009, p. 81). Aime Césaire (2000, p. 36) argues that the real offence committed by Hitler and the Nazis, for which they could not be forgiven by the European bourgeoisie, was not the crime against humanity as such—'they tolerated that Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples'. Instead it was the fact that these crimes were committed against European 'Humanity'—the white man—and, in particular, 'the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the "coolies" of India, and the "niggers" of Africa.'

This moral comparison between those suffering under the Holocaust versus under coloniality persists into how today's asylum-seekers are imagined (Mayblin, 2017). While human rights legislation was created to protect those suffering recognisably 'legitimate' persecution under Europe's totalitarian regimes, those fleeing today from Europe's post-colonies, and who are racialised as Black by comparison to the white European national ideal (Ellermann, 2019), are often portrayed as 'economic migrants' abusing the asylum system.

- iii. See Boatcă and Roth, 2016 for an in-depth study of how the coloniality of gender is central to the constitution of modern citizenship.
- iv. The use of the term migrant as a marker of racial difference rather than indicator of having migrated across a border continues to be applied to 'second' and 'third-generation migrants' today even if they were born in Britain, to British parents, and whose parents, in the first instance, were Commonwealth citizens (Bhambra, 2020).
- v. Although Isin does differentiate the 'activist' from the 'active' citizen, Tyerman (forthcoming) observes how 'the form of political subjectivity repeatedly highlighted in these encounters [the examples of migrant activism analysed in migrant citizenship literature] is a distinctly "regular" liberal one. It is the active, vocal, self-constituting rights-claimant' performing actions such as 'protesting, demonstrating, petitioning, claiming rights'.
- vi. Nyers states both that '[s]ubjects can enact themselves as political without articulating directly their reasons for acting as citizens' (2008, p. 177) and 'reading citizenship through migrant agency also works to *create citizen subjectivities* that might be antithetical, or at least ambivalent, to the notion of citizenship as a desirable subject position (emphasis mine, 2012, p. 10).' Thus, for Nyers even those subjects who 'opt out' of citizenship (McNevin, 2012 cited in ibid., p. 10), refuse it (Walters, 2008), or even take up non-citizenship as a potent and productive political subjectivity in and of itself (Johnson, 2015) create citizen subjectivities by doing so.

- vii. In 'Theorizing acts of citizenship' Isin (2008, p. 36) specifies: 'Acts can have other, even opposite, effects than those which are intended and therefore an act of citizenship can only be identified after the fact based on its consequences.' While he makes this point to specify that a claim invoking citizenship discourse does not immediately become granted the status of an 'act of citizenship' (it could merely be a practice, or intervention), I also read the inverse into this statement: acts of non-citizenship or acts that refuse citizenship can also be 'acts of citizenship' if they are interpretable as fulfilling its other criteria.
- viii. For example, Hall, Lounasmaa, and C. Squire (2019) interpret the politics in Calais' Jungle through citizenship, albeit a 'new' coalitional, even decolonised, European citizenship.
- ix. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this project to offer a thorough critique of 'decolonial citizenship' or an alternative decolonial theoretical framework for migrants' struggles (see Section 1.2). However, this would require first thinking *with* those who have participated in those struggles, working from their experiences of the colonial difference, and using other concepts with a different genealogy than those founded in the Enlightenment and which are less closely tied to the current global regime of mobility governance. One theoretical point of departure here may be Fanon's (1952) 'zone of non-being' (Grosfoguel, Oso, and Christou, 2015) which points to a similar 'gap' between the objectification and depoliticisation of the Other and her own self-recognition as a thinking, feeling, and dreaming being from which AoC describes subjectivity emerging through Rancière's (2010) politics of *dissensus*. However, the 'zone of non-being' centres this dis-recognition as primarily a function of anti-Black racism (L. R. Gordon, 2007, 2015) which cannot be overcome through 'claiming the rights they had not to show they actually have them' (Rancière, 2010, p. 77). Rather the assertion of this racialised subjectivity within situations marked by its denial begins in Fanon's 'the cry' (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 256), proceeds, if necessary, through violent conflict (Ciccariello-Maher, 2010), and results in something fundamentally other than citizenship.

There are also other concepts distinct from citizenship, subjectivity (which Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos (2008) argue only serves to restrict our understandings of irregular migrants' politics), and the political—a concept which Vázquez (in Ansems-de Vries et al., 2017, p. 9) argues preliminarily negates the politics of the marginalised at the border-which deserve to be more central to scholarly analysis of the struggles of racialised irregular migrants. For example, there is the term *hrig* used by Maghrebians to describe the experience of clandestine migrations to Europe across the Mediterranean. It can be simplistically translated as 'to burn', and connotates both the burning of 'identification documents before undertaking the sea crossing in order to avoid repatriation, and the figurative act of "burning the road" (in this case the sea), and of illegally "burning up" kilometers' (Abderrezak, 2009, p. 463). It has a very different epistemic genealogy to, for example, 'illegal immigration' and within hrig 'Islamic eschatology and political theology provide the conceptual framework and ethical horizon within which subjectivity and despair, the de facto exclusion from citizenship, the existential stakes of life and death, are understood and creatively reconfigured' (Pandolfo, 2007). Such concepts refer back to the epistemologies and cosmologies of those migrating and must be considered on their own terms rather than be linguistically and epistemically translated, as such translation violently severs those connections and erases their cosmologies as beyond the territory of modern thought (Vázquez, 2011).

x. See discussion of illegal evictions in Subsection 3.3.3.

Chapter 3

Eviction and 'legal' squatting

3.1 Introduction

The spectacularised images of migrants' homes burning in the Jungle amidst scores of riot police represent evictions in Calais for most. Less widely known is the long history of eviction, destruction, and re-occupation punctuated, but not defined, by those events in October 2016. This chapter re-maps the narrative of how migrants' spaces of inhabitance are erased away from the Jungle, centring the occupation and eviction of squatted buildings. While the evictions throughout the city that created the Jungle are outlined in Subsection 7.2.1, this chapter recounts prior years, in which migrants and activists struggled to create and inhabit autonomous spaces in Calais despite the city's 'hostile environment' (Aris Escarcena, 2019; Tyerman, 2019).

This chapter illustrates 'Eviction' on the digital map-archive of domicide. Domicide goes beyond eviction in many ways, but almost always includes it. Although not entirely interchangeable terms, the analysis in Chapter 4 accompanying this chapter focuses more generically on how eviction/domicide functions as an exclusionary spatial technology of citizenship, and disrupts anti-citizen solidarities in Calais' squats and jungles.

While this chapter discusses the eviction of squatted buildings, land occupations are also a part of this same story. However, squatted buildings are concentrated on here because they are key to understanding the relationship between domicide and citizenship in Calais, are neglected in camp centred descriptions of migrant inhabitance in the city (e.g. Hagan, 2018; Katz, 2017; Mattei, 2016; Mould, 2017a; Rigby and Schlembach, 2013; Rygiel, 2011), and because the other chapters deal exclusively with (the domicide of) encampments. Squatted buildings, 'legal squats' in particular, have typically seen involvement from a wider range of people across citizenship status categories than jungles. Therefore, these spaces, and the heterogeneous coalitions of people with and without citizenship privileges inhabiting them, provide rich examples for analysing the complexities of citizenship politics in Calais by highlighting those social and political implications of evictions found to a lesser degree in securitisations or destructions. Although my research is not primarily concerned with describing spaces of migrants' inhabitance in detail, this chapter more than others, *does* offer a glimpse at life in Calais' squats and jungles because understanding the daily resistances to the

border these spaces facilitate is crucial to Chapter 4's argument of how and why they are evicted, and how those evictions produce and spatialise citizenship.

3.1.1 Chapter outline

This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 3.2, gives historical context to irregular migrants' inhabitance in Calais, beginning in 1999 with the Red Cross operated warehouse in Sangatte. It describes not only why this place was created to bring migrants out of Calais' centre, but also how its closure has defined policy on accommodation for irregular migrants ever since. From there, Subsection 3.2.2 skips ahead to 2009; a year which saw two events in Calais' history key to this research; the eviction and destruction of the Pashtun jungle, and a No Border Camp.

Section 3.3 turns to how solidarity squatters, often affiliated with CMS, mobilised certain citizenship privileges to create 'legal squats'. These spaces not only provided a more secure and durable space of autonomous inhabitance than informal squats and jungles, but had a large impact on the spatial contests of citizenship in Calais. This story of CMS' tactics to create legal squats, but also those developed by authorities to evict them, is told through the writings of CMS activists and highlights the back-and-forth that took place over the 48 hour eviction window and *flagrant delit* law. This section ends by outlining how legal squats motivated local authorities to pursue a policy of 'zero squats in Calais', since reflected at the highest levels of France's national government.

Section 3.4 presents a detailed case history of one legal squat, the 'women and children's house' on *Boulevard Victor Hugo*. This case is not only an example of the transnational communities of solidarity found inside Calais' squats, but is an illustration of the various nuanced tactics authorities have used to carry out evictions. It shows how, even if police do not violently evict squats, there are other ways that the 'mobile commons' (Subsection 4.2.3), anti-citizen politics (Section 4.3), and communities of resistance living within them are broken apart to re-assert citizenship as determining the right to inhabit the city.

3.2 1999-2013: Calais pre-'legal squat'

3.2.1 1999-2009: From Sangatte to the hostile environment

My research data is from 2009-19; however, the pre-history of accommodation for migrants in Calais, especially those avoiding claiming asylum whilst in France to continue attempting clandestine crossings to the UK, is necessary to fully understand how domicide functions as part of this border. This begins 10 years beforehand, on 14 August 1999, with the opening of the Red Cross managed warehouse in Sangatte.

In the late 90s people fleeing conflict due to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia arrived in Calais but were to unable continue their journeys to the UK due to immigration regulations and thus became stuck in the city without shelter while searching for other ways to cross the Channel. While there was initially a night shelter set-up to accommodate them, this was closed without warning (Schuster, 2003, p. 507) and so the, then mainly Kosovar, refugees began sleeping rough in the city's parks and streets. According to Didier Fassin (2005), there was a tension between treating these irregular migrants as either a humanitarian or security concern which lead to alternating moments of eviction or accommodation provision. He claims the opening of the Sangatte Red Cross reception centre was a form of humanitarian compensation for the eviction of a city park during which 200 migrants were arrested (ibid., p. 362). To create this centre the French state requisitioned a warehouse in Sangatte, several kilometres west of Calais, previously storing equipment used to construct the Eurotunnel. It became a space of transit to the UK, and over the first 2.5 years of the centre's existence only 350 of the approximately 50,000 people who passed through claimed asylum in France (ibid., p. 363).

In the beginning there was little opposition to the Sangatte centre, and it did not receive much media attention for the first 18 months of operation (Schuster, 2003, p. 508). However, as its population grew, conditions for residents worsened, attempts to breach the Eurotunnel increased, violent incidents inside became more common, and especially because these incidents were so sensationally reported within the British press (S. Buchanan and Grillo, 2004), Sangatte increasingly became viewed by the public and authorities as something to be rid of. While a recognisable problem from many perspectives, the centre was viewed differently by various actors (Schuster, 2003). For the French it represented a public security risk and was policed as such with a constant police presence in its later months and the use of *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité* (CRS) (riot police) in case of disturbances. For the British, this centre so close to their border was considered a threat to national security and state sovereignty, making its outright closure their priority (Zhang, 2019, pp. 741–742). The Eurotunnel also lobbied for Sangatte's closure, citing the economic losses resulting from security spending and disruptions to service during migrants' intrusions into the train depots and terminals. Finally, following intense inter-governmental debate and after more than two years of existence, the British and French agreed Sangatte's closure with a deal that saw the 1,200 people currently inside able to travel to the UK, while France became responsible for the asylum claims of the other 400 (Fassin, 2005; Schuster, 2003; Walters, 2008, p. 519).

On 5 November 2002 Sangatte registered its current residents, and stopped accepting new arrivals; thus closing its doors. The closure immediately forced irregular migrants back onto Calais' streets. Many began sleeping rough at the railway station, local associations hosted some in a school, and others occupied a church with local association support (Schuster, 2003, p. 519). Within three days Calais' Mayor was requesting the national government to re-open the Sangatte camp (ibid.). This closure marked the beginning of Calais' 'hostile environment' (Aris Escarcena, 2019; Tyerman, 2019) in which irregular migrants have been forced to self-organise accommodation outside of state sanction and, as much as possible, out of sight of the police who hunt,

evict, and arrest them whenever possible.

Closed almost 20 years ago now, Sangatte continues to define Calais' unaccommodating policy towards irregular migrants' in the city (Reinisch, 2015). Due to the sensationalised reporting widely taken up by the British public, Sangatte developed into a kind of bogeyman rhetorical device; the worst-case-scenario whose avoidance at all costs has dictated policy for years. The spectre of a 'New Sangatte' became a repeated justification from UK and French media and politicians for the lack of any stable accommodation solution for irregular migrants in Calais (e.g. Samuel, 2015). Even in 2015, when French authorities proposed creating the *Centre d'accueil Jules Ferry* (see Subsection 7.2.1) to segregate Calais' migrant population, they had to constantly refute that it would be a 'New Sangatte' to not scare off public or political support (Vincent, 2014). Yet, as we will see in Subsection 7.2.1, the *Centre Jules-Ferry* in some ways *was* a 'New Sangatte' because it was also a space of segregation many kilometres away from Calais' centre established at a moment when migrants' autonomous presence within the city was considered untenable.

The closure of the Sangatte Red Cross centre did not stop people from travelling to Calais to try and cross to the UK, but rather pushed them to inhabit less visible and more precarious spaces during the time they spent there. Increased securitisation at the ports meant that, over the coming years, people were spending more time in Calais before successfully crossing. Without being provided somewhere to live, they took that space themselves and began living in autonomously established and controlled squats and camps inside the city, under bridges, in parks, occupying beach cabins, old Atlantic Wall artillery bunkers, and in the woods in the industrial zone to the east of town (*Calais, Face à La Frontière* 2017, p. 25). These occupations were created out of necessity and urgency, and squatting was one of the few means through which migrants could sustain their autonomous presence in Calais. Irregular migrants took and lived in these spaces in Calais by themselves long before the involvement of any organised solidarity efforts from Europeans, though these groups would later come to change the nature of squatting in the city (see Section 3.3).

However, while squatted spaces proliferated throughout Calais, they were constantly targeted by police in raidsⁱ and evictions, events that took place in the context of generalised police harassment and miserable living conditions for migrants (Bescherer, 2017, p. 21). The only state offered sleeping space for irregular migrants for many years (in fact, until the eviction of the women and children's squat on *Boulevard Victor Hugo* in 2014, see Section 3.4) was the cold weather shelter (see Figure 11). It was only open for a few nights a year when temperatures were well below freezing, and only able to accommodate around 100 people.

3.2.2 2009-13: Inhabiting precarious spaces

The next moment in this history of anti-migrant domicide comes in 2009, when two important events took place: the Pashtun jungle was evicted and destroyed, instantiating the aggressively domicidal policies recently elected right-wing Mayor Natacha Bouchart would be taking towards irregular migrants living in Calais in the future; and a No Border Campⁱⁱ was held in the city, during which CMS was formed (CMS, 2010). The domicide of the Pashtun jungle is described in Subsection 5.3.1 due to its categorisation in the digital map as an event of 'Destruction' and is located in the spatial history of the *Verrotières* site where it occurred. However, the origins of CMS are more relevant to discussions in this chapter on the occupation and eviction of squatted buildings.

CMS 'is an international network of autonomous people involved in practical solidarity work with the migrant communities of Calais' and is active in police monitoring, supporting the autonomous protests and political actions of migrants, distributing food and materials, writing reports and analysis of the ongoing situation at the Calais border, providing information to migrants on navigating the asylum bureaucracy in various countries, squatting buildings along with migrants, and supporting their other autonomous living spaces (2017b, p. 64). CMS mostly appear in this thesis as a source of archival information on the history of domicide; however, this chapter discusses the network's role in creating and supporting legal squats for irregular migrants to live. Its involvement redefined the squatting landscape in the city, and forced local authorities to change their tactics of eviction. The histories recounted here are taken from posts on the network's blog (CMS, 2020), the chapter 'Trapped on the border: a brief history of solidarity squatting practices in Calais' published in the edited volume Squatting, Migration and Radical Autonomy (2017b, pp. 54-64), and the work of activist-scholars affiliated with CMS, Natasha King (2016, 2019), Thomas Tyerman (2016, 2019, forthcoming) and Claire English (2017a). These texts offer not just rich descriptions of life in some of Calais' squats and jungles, but deep critical reflection on the researchers' positionalities inhabiting these spaces with irregular migrants. Their reflexivity (particularly on questions of citizenship, privilege, and solidarity) is essential to Chapter 4's analysis of the dynamics of citizenship within practices of squatting and eviction.

Since becoming active in Calais, CMS (2011) describe constant police attacks against migrants' squats and jungles as a fact of daily life. Raids were performed regularly (14 times over 31 days at one squat (ibid., p. 16)), and there was a constant cycle of eviction, destruction, and re-occupation in the jungles. Unfortunately, during these early years CMS did not keep systematic records of the daily evictions and destructions so not all are displayed on the map. However, this failure to record each separate event in itself attests to their routine nature. CMS mainly supported these squats and jungles by doing 'morning watch' for police raids (alerting residents who may be sleeping when police arrived so they could escape) and documenting often obscene and violent police behaviour.

The spaces irregular migrants inhabited in these years were highly precarious squatted buildings were mostly dilapidated, disused factories, while outdoor areas were exposed to the elements—and were easily entered by police (CMS, 2017b). Shown in Figure 6, evictions were mostly concentrated in central Calais with few exceptions.



FIGURE 6: Map of domicide between 27 February 2009 and 1 February 2014. Note the concentration of evictions in the city centre.

Following evictions these spaces were either immediately re-squatted or evictees would move on and find somewhere else to live. If the space was not secured or demolished, it was usually just a matter of time before people moved back and the cycle continued.

Before 2013 squats were typically evicted without warning or justification despite the legal right to home, or *droit du domicile*, guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights which applies to all domiciles, even squatted ones, in France (Slingenberg and Bonneau, 2017). Because most of Calais' squatters were irregular migrants without legal status in France, there were no 'legal persons' to claim the squats as their official domicile, receive the legal protection this entailed, nor file complaints following illegal evictions. Furthermore, migrant squatters did not want to have any contact with the French police or governmental administration given their irregular situationⁱⁱⁱ, were not necessarily aware of the existence of the droit du domicile, nor felt in a position to claim it given their expectations of imminently leaving Calais. All of these factors were exploited by authorities to evict and destroy irregular migrant's homes spontaneously and with impunity despite inhabitants' resistance. Some of the larger occupations were evicted following court decisions, but these were the exception. However, beginning in 2013, a number of CMS affiliated people with citizenship privileges decided to create a squatted feminist safe space and resting/working space (email exchange February, 2018).^{iv} This squat was also an opportunity to force police and local authorities to finally respect squatters' rights in Calais, previously ignored due to migrant squatters' status, and to create spaces that were secure from the threat of spontaneous police raids and evictions.

3.3 2013-15: Legal squatting

The involvement of solidarity squatters with citizenship privileges and squatting experience in other European cities was crucial to creating many of Calais' longest lasting 'legal' squats that were inhabited by irregular migrants, local *Calaisiens*, and other transient individuals. This section describes the ways legal squats were created and evicted, and a few significant cases in greater detail. It shows how, over time, local authorities grew more proficient at evicting this type of squat, and developed tactics to prevent their formation; tactics which continue to be applied to dictate the exhaustive pace of domicide today (see Subsection 5.2.2). However, before narrating the history of legal squats a brief explanation of their legal situation is necessary.

3.3.1 The '48 hour' window and flagrant delit

CMS (2017b, p. 57) describe a legal squat as one undergoing a court process to determine ownership and possession before being evicted in contrast to informal squats and jungles not recognised as official residences, and therefore able to be evicted without such a judgement. These evictions without a court ruling are termed 'illegal evictions' by CMS; however, so far, no judge has upheld squatters' complaints against the police following such an eviction in Calais. Although it seems counter-intuitive for squatters to actively try to instigate a court case *against* their occupation, this was a tactic to force authorities to legally recognise migrants' squats as domiciles which, in the end, allowed them to be maintained for a longer, and pre-determined, period of time. After the legal process for eviction was initiated, the squat could then be opened to irregular migrants and people in more vulnerable positions without worry that police would raid at any time (which would violate the inhabitants' right to domicile). This effectively disrupted one of the main tactics used by police to arrest and control migrants in Calais, and the relative security of legal squats meant that they became some of the most well resourced autonomous spaces in Calais, with toilets, running water, kitchens, electricity, and other infrastructure developing inside.

The critical legal principle under which legal squats existed was the *droit du domicile* providing a person cannot be evicted from their primary residence without a decision from the civil court. However, to claim this right requires someone claiming the squat as their primary residence, usually by placing their name on the mailbox or providing some other evidence they live there. In practice this person usually had citizenship privileges, but this is not necessarily a requirement of the law. Exactly when an occupation qualifies as a domicile and becomes entitled to the legal protection this entails would become a point of contest between the squatters and authorities, and continues to play a large role in Calais' evictions today. In the beginning, squatters claimed that a court judgement was needed to evict them after they had been living in a building for more than two days. In some ways this worked, and a 48 hour window was established after which authorities conceded that the occupation required a court judgement to evict (evidenced by Mayor Bouchart's quote on page 79). However, at the same time, the authorities became more proficient at evicting squats *within* 48 hours. This was accomplished through using the principle of *flagrant delit* from Article 53 of the *Code de procédure pénale* which allows police intervention in a flagrant crime 'in a time very close to the action' (my translation).

To be clear, *flagrant delit* is a mechanism of criminal law, and *not* the civil law which governs property rights in France. Evictions occurring through *flagrant delit* are not, in fact, evictions in the legal sense (to be evicted one must first be recognised as residing somewhere). Instead, with *flagrant delit*, inhabitants are arrested under the auspices of a criminal investigation, usually for charges of illegal occupation or criminal damage, and while they are held in the police station, workers are sent to 'barricade the building; materially, if not legally, evicting them' (CMS, 2018b). When the arrestees are brought to trial (sometimes years later) hardly any evidence is presented to substantiate the charges they were arrested for (field notes from a squat eviction trial, December, 2018). This illustrates that, rather than actually pursuing prosecutions, these criminal investigations are used as a pretext for *de facto*, if not *de jure*, evictions and allow 'the city hall and police [to] abuse the criminal law to circumvent the legal procedures required to evict squatted buildings in Calais' (CMS, 2018b).^v As the 48 hour window of *flagrant delit* has become the main legal instrument used to *immediately* evict Calais' squats and jungles, squatters since have revised their legal argument to claim more recently that a domicile is not defined by this arbitrary 48 hour period of time, but rather by the fact of *living there* which can be proven with other evidence (CMS, 2018d). Given the use of the 48 hour window to dictate the schedule of migrant camp destructions today (Subsection 5.2.1), it is ironic to recognise that this time-frame was at first fought for to defend Calais' migrant squats from police incursion and spontaneous eviction.

Finally, despite the effective manipulation of the *flagrant delit* law to achieve immediate evictions, Mayor Bouchart has also tried to change the law itself to ensure that squats can be evicted as soon as possible. She sponsored a bill in the Senate in 2015 to change Article 322-4-1 of the Code de procédure pénale to allow for police to intervene at any point during an occupation in an attempt to extend the presumed 48 hour window indefinitely (Le Figaro, 2015). However, this law change did not necessarily succeed. The language of the law which was amended again pertained to the *crimi*nal occupation of others' homes. These occupations were already illegal under French law and Article 322-4-1 does not apply to kinds of vacant properties most often squatted in Calais (or in the rest of France for that matter). While this change did serve a symbolic purpose, emphasising Bouchart's commitment to achieving 'zero squats in Calais' (Subsection 3.3.3), it has not drastically altered the legal landscape of squatting or evictions. Despite this failed attempt to create a new legal mechanism to allow police in Calais to evict migrant squats whenever they please, and assure authorities these occupations could not become even temporarily unevictable, the continued abuse of *flagrant delit* remains their most successful eviction tool.



FIGURE 7: First legal squat on *Rue Caillette* bricked up since its eviction in 2013. Author's photograph taken December, 2018.

3.3.2 Creating legal squats

The feminist safe space CMS occupied at the beginning of 2013, and which became Calais' first legal squat, was located on *Rue Caillette* just behind the *Grand Theatre* in a property owned by the *Mairie* (Calais' municipal government). It was squatted for almost a month before being discovered by a municipal worker who called the police when unable to enter the building. The door was barricaded shut with a notice posted on it explaining French squatting law; in particular the requirement of a court judgement for eviction. After a number of failed attempts to enter, the police and owner finally gave up and called a bailiff who registered the occupation; a necessary first step to initiate the civil court procedure (CMS, 2013i).

In the case of *Rue Caillette* getting the bailiff to register a formal legal complaint against the occupation occurred relatively easily. Perhaps this was because it was first time that the municipality or police were confronted with this type of squat, and did not consider the legal consequences of formalising a complaint against it. Nevertheless, once under this legal process *Rue Caillette* became safe from spontaneous eviction. While it still functioned for a few months as a safe space primarily for people involved with CMS to rest and work, the end of the rental contract on a space in which around 40 irregular migrants were staying, and then the illegal eviction of another legal squat attempt on 24 July 2013 where they were to be rehoused (CMS, 2013j), meant that *Rue Caillette* was soon opened as a full-time living space Calais' irregular migrants with otherwise no where else to stay.

Not without its problems^{vi}, and home to upwards of 60 people who shared seven

rooms and one toilet, *Rue Caillette* 'became people's home and provided them a place they felt was their own in such a hostile city' (CMS, 2017b, p. 59). The outside pressures on the squat from police, local authorities, and the increasing number of irregular migrants directed there given the absence of alternative accommodation, galvanised its residents and encouraged them to cooperate in sustaining the occupation. Furthermore, the municipality was having difficulty arguing their case in court. Their first request for eviction made in July 2013 was thrown out by the judge after being declared 'unreceivable' due to procedural faults in the *Mairie's* paperwork (CMS, 2013f). Not only was this a significant set-back for the eviction, it was illustrative of the local authority's unfamiliarity with the necessary legal process required to evict squats.

Local authorities became wary of registering formal complaints against future occupations after *Rue Caillette* showed them the time and durability the protracted court process for eviction would bring. Rather than face the complications and costs of more legal complaints, authorities began making concerted efforts to evict squats without having to go through the requisite court process. This meant more work had to be done by CMS to prove squats were lived in for more than two days (at this point still the measure of the occupations' legitimacy). A number of different tactics were tried, including: collecting evidence of when the occupation began with photographs, ordering a pizza to be delivered to the address, or receiving post (CMS, 2013k); resisting eviction throughout the two day period (CMS, 2013i); and eventually squatting as many buildings as possible in one night to overwhelm police resources so that not all could be evicted within 48 hours (CMS, 2017b, p. 61).

Sometimes these tactics worked, but most often they did not. Police would either ignore the law or squatters' evidence to immediately evict the squats once they were discovered (Calais Migrant Solidarity 2013c,e,g,h,j, 2014a,b,d, 2018d). Between Autumn and Winter 2013 CMS made eight legal squat attempts, none of which were successful. Despite providing lawyers, owners, police, and sometimes the public prosecutor, with evidence of the duration of the occupation, owners or neighbours would make contradictory statements which police used to justify evictions regardless (CMS, 2017b, p. 60).

Enlisting Calais' citizenry to help authorities evict squats under *flagrant delit* was an important part of their anti-squat strategy, and in October 2013 Mayor Bouchart announced the creation of a new email address especially for this purpose on her Facebook account. Her message to Calais' citizens read:

Do not hesitate to leave an email on this address...when you see No Borders or migrants illegally settling in a house. Thus, the police will be able to intervene, using a specific procedure only valid for a period of 48 hours from the time of the intrusion, in order to evict the premises. The city services will then arrive to clean up what is possible and seal off the building (my translation, Bouchart quoted in Tranchant, 2013)

Her statement clearly recognises the 48 hour time limit (later disputed by Calais' squatters as it was used more exclusively to the authorities' advantage), the strategy

of evicting squats using the *flagrant delit* law, but also her desire for Calais' citizens to denounce migrant squats in the city. This call was vigorously taken up by many of them, and immediately following the Facebook message the vigilante group *Sauvons Calais* formed and began holding anti-migrant demonstrations attended by hundreds of people, to which extreme-right speakers were invited (Gardenier, 2018, p. 89).^{vii}

Recruiting local citizens to denounce migrant squats and allow police to immediately evict them not only facilitated the city's goals of spatial segregation, but further encouraged racist stereotyping and populist anti-migrant sentiment. The denouncements encouraged locals to reproduce for themselves distinctions between residents and aliens, citizens and non-citizens, those with a right to inhabit the city and those who it needed to be cleansed of. Bouchart's specification of 'No Borders' *and* migrants shows it was not merely 'non-citizen' migrants targeted, but also solidarity activists who refused to be complicit in excluding migrants from the city and worked to facilitate their presence within it.^{viii}

The city's, and its citizens', eagerness to evict migrant squats meant that negotiating a squat's (in)visibility in its first days proved increasingly difficult. Squatters would be living inside, collecting evidence of residing there, all the while trying not to be discovered by owners or neighbours until 48 hours had passed. However, even if they managed to remain undiscovered and collect evidence for this entire time, authorities would refuse to acknowledge the occupation's existence prior to when it was publicly announced by relying on the 'evidence' of neighbours or owners who claimed they were previously unaware of it. Although CMS has made a couple legal complaints for these illegal evictions (one in 2014 and another in 2018, neither successful), authorities continued operating under the assumption they had two days to evict *after* a squat's 'discovery' under *flagrant delit* before a civil procedure for eviction would be needed.

Despite the numerous evictions taking place in denial of the rights of squatters in Calais, and the 'hostile environment' CMS and migrant squatters were facing, there were still a number of successful legal squats taken. In addition to the squat on *Boule-vard Victor Hugo* (Section 3.4), 'Fort Galloo', a disused metal recycling facility, and the squatted social centre in an old lace factory on *Rue Massena* (Figure 8) are worth not-ing because of the creative tactics used to secure them despite the systemic denial of evidence from authorities. These squats, and many more, deserve detailed case histories, but unfortunately there is not enough space, nor is it necessarily my objective, to present those stories here.

In light of the difficulty that 'invisible' squats had in existing for two days after the authorities became away of their occupation, CMS sought other ways for new squats to become legally recognised. One idea, which proved successful, was to squat as many buildings as possible at once to overwhelm police so that not all could be evicted within 48 hours. The social centre on *Rue Massena* was squatted as part of this action in which nearly 100 squatters, mainly Europeans, arrived in Calais and squatted five empty buildings around the city, of which three successfully became legal squats



FIGURE 8: The social centre on *Rue Massena* squatted in February 2014 and boarded up following its eviction that June. Author's photograph taken December 2018.

(CMS, 2017b, p. 61).

Following the initiation of a legal process, *Rue Massena* went on to be lived in by dozens of people (predominantly Sudanese who moved in following the destruction of their jungle close to the Eurotunnel, but also migrants of ethnicities, not to mention European activists, and some Calais locals) and be a crucial space for organising against the border in Calais. Hunger strikes were organised and supported, evictions resisted, future squatting actions organised, locals politicised on border issues, and information spread on navigating the British asylum system all from inside the walls of this one derelict property (ibid., pp. 62–63).

'Fort Galloo' was a massive 12,000 square metre complex surrounded by a high wall squatted during a demonstration of 500 people protesting a previous eviction of a jungle close to the port (ibid., p. 63). This demonstration ended at the old recycling factory which was then publicly declared to have already been occupied for the last two days. A reporter published CMS' evidence of the occupation in the *Nord Littoral* (2014), a local newspaper, so that it could be not be refuted by the authorities or the owner. The large number of demonstrators present to defend the squat from immediate eviction, the public nature of the evidence, and the support the occupation received from local associations meant Fort Galloo could not immediately be evicted and became a legal squat. It then became home to around 300 migrants for 11 months before being evicted on 2 June 2015 as the Jungle was forming (CMS, 2017b, p. 63).

3.3.3 Zero squats in Calais

As legal squat attempts went, these were exceptional cases. Fort Galloo was the last legal squat of this kind, although court processes have been used since to evict the Jungle and some other recent encampments (see Subsection 5.3.3). There was another attempt to squat the Moulin Blanc in Calais-Nord on Sunday 26 March 2016 but this was immediately evicted by CRS (CMS, 2016d). Again, the eviction and arrests of those inside was done under the presumption of criminal damage; however, it was written in the press that the request for eviction was made by Mayor Bouchart directly to the Minister of Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, to ensure 'there would be no squat in Calais' (AFP, 2016). More recently, two squats were evicted in one week in January 2018 (CMS, 2018d). The second of these, on 17 January, coincided with President Macron's visit to Calais in which he declared migrants needed to understand living in jungles or squats in Calais was a 'dead end', and that they instead needed to enter into state controlled accommodation where their 'situations' could be assessed (Willsher, 2018). Those arrested during these occupations have been involved in punitive court cases for years on charges of criminal damage for which hardly any evidence has been shown to the courts. These examples highlight how authorities denying squatting possibilities in Calais is part of anti-migrant strategies at some of the highest levels of government in France, and are the stated policies of its President and Minister of Interior.

The picture emerging of evictions today (described in detail in Chapter 5), is a product of the legal squats that existed for the years prior to the Jungle, and authorities' desire to prevent them from returning to Calais at all costs. I've focused on legal squats inhabited by people with and without citizenship privileges because they present a particularly salient case for analysing the spatial politics of citizenship in Calais. However, alongside legal squats has been the constant eviction and destruction of many informal squats inhabited only by migrants who are also arrested and charged as a result of the same 'zero squats in Calais' policy, but which do not receive any media attention. Nevertheless, authorities have not been successful in completely eliminating squatting in buildings from Calais, although they have again forced it underground. Squats are now taken and lived in 'silently' like before 2013, although in fewer numbers than in previous years.

This section illustrated how legals squats presented a particular challenge to the city government, as well as the broader citizenship regime in Calais, due to the autonomy they allowed irregular migrants inhabiting the city to have and the diversity of people active within them; not only Calais' irregular migrants but also its locals, association workers, and self-declared activists. The wide range of activities and participants from across the spectrum of citizenship privileges who organised together within these space contributed to what I describe in Chapter 4 as their anti-citizen politics. However, before turning to that analysis, it is necessary to understand a bit more of why the eviction of legal squats became such a priority for authorities, not to mention some of the different tactics that have been used to achieve them beyond just the police forcing entry and arresting those inside. As will now be shown in the case



FIGURE 9: Police and bailiff register the occupation of the squat on *Boulevard Victor Hugo*. Photograph from CMS (2013k).

of *Victor Hugo*, it was possible for the French state to evict and destroy the resistant communities and political solidarities inside legal squats, while actually allowing the spatial occupation itself to persist.

3.4 The long eviction of the *Victor Hugo* women and children's squat

The evictions discussed so far could all be easily recognised as domicidal evictions. They usually took place at dawn, involved large numbers of police in riot gear, employed battering rams and other devices to break barricades and cut through fences, and resulted in arrests and sensational headlines in the local press. Most evictions in Calais, not just legal squats but all squats and camps, happen through such obvious police violence. However, domicide and eviction can also take place through subtler means and nuanced tactics (like coercion or incentive) to get migrants to 'willingly' leave their homes (discussed further in as 'carrot-and-stick' domicide in Sections 5.4 and 6.3). This is more often the case with large occupations whose eviction will be covered widely by the press, and undoubtedly provoke strong collective resistance. Usually, residents will be encouraged to leave these places beforehand and thereby reduce the number of people present to resist the eviction on the day. However, evictions also occur which do not necessarily target the space itself, but rather expel communities of solidarity found within it. Protracted evictions target inhabitants' communities and solidarities by dispersing them, encouraging them to vacate the space of their own accord, and by producing internal divisions through forcing them to decide whether to accept the state's ultimatums, face the force of its police, or try and respond in other ways. An example of this is the case of the women and children's squat on *Boulevard* Victor Hugo.

Victor Hugo was originally squatted by CMS activists in the Summer of 2013 and was intended to be 'a shared space for organizing and a sleeping space for vulnerable people and people active in CMS', similar to the beginnings of *Rue Caillette* (King, 2019, p. 220). After being lived in for around a month and a half, police and a bailiff showed up to begin the legal proceedings for eviction, thus making it Calais' second legal squat (see Figure 9). This was one week after Deputy Mayor Philippe Mignonet passed by and threatened the occupants, saying 'I will make your life hell. It's not a threat, it's a promise!' (CMS, 2013k). There was a lot of pressure on this squat as one of the only spaces in the city where migrants (around 400 at this time) could access water, electricity, toilets, and a shower. It was often crowded and a difficult place to live. Over time the residents decided to restrict access to the inside of the house exclusively to the growing population of migrant women and children, as well as CMS affiliated people involved in its daily running. Victor Hugo was maintained as an autonomous space for most of its existence, in conflict with local and regional authorities, and with no budget except for donations collected to pay for water, electricity, and gas. Its main purpose was to give the women and children attempting to cross clandestinely to the UK a better place to live than the outdoor jungles whilst doing so.

Victor Hugo was managed collectively by its residents. This included the migrant women and their families as well as Europeans and others with regular citizenship status. Natasha King (2019, p. 221) writes that within *Victor Hugo* 'decisions were largely made collectively, and tasks were taken on mindful of the different capabilities of its residents'. King further describes how this meant the migrant women took care of many aspects of daily life, whilst CMS tried to keep the space secure from police and interacted with other migrants who were now kept outside. In the beginning most of the European people active in the squat were not native to Calais (or France for that matter), but many locals became involved through the group *Calais Ouverture* & Humanité established as a response to the anti-migrant *Sauvons Calais*.

The residents lost their legal right to occupy the building with a court decision on 19 November 2013 (CMS, 2013d). However, the *Prefect* stated that he would not act with police to forcefully evict them and that 'these women and children will not find themselves on the street' until an alternative housing solution was found (*Nord Littoral*, 2013). This marked a major shift in the way that the authorities dealt with migrant occupations in Calais, which since Sangatte had been evicted without any comprehensive consultation or alternative housing arrangements being made beforehand. The different response Victor Hugo received was likely because its migrant inhabitants were predominantly women and children, and the government thought it undesirable for police to be shown forcing entry against the will of residents to put them on the street just weeks before Christmas given the local support the squat was receiving. Instead, the *Préfecture* began to negotiate with the *Victor Hugo* squatters to end the occupation.

While the ensuing discussions represented a significant change in how authorities approached evicting a migrant occupation, the threat of violent eviction nevertheless

loomed over them (King, 2016, p. 114). It was the default option on the table during the negotiations if residents refused the governments' conditions. The main nonnegotiable condition from the *Préfecture* was that only migrant women were allowed to remain living inside. CMS and other Europeans not working with *Solid'R* (the association contracted to manage the squat once it was under state control) would no longer be allowed to enter or live there. If CMS refused this condition, there would be a police eviction that would be blamed on those who initiated the housing project for not cooperating. This proved a powerful threat on which many residents had divided opinions, undermining the solidarity between them.

The eventual decision for CMS to leave was not made easily (ibid., pp. 114–115). Many were exhausted and were hopeful that a well-resourced association could improve quality of life for the migrant families that would stay. Others did not want to surrender the project, nor deliver its remaining inhabitants into the hands of the state who would undoubtedly attempt to curtail their ability to make clandestine crossings to the UK. Furthermore, most of the women residents did not want CMS to leave either. Throughout the previous months a strong community had been built within the house, and to suddenly break that community apart would affect all residents regardless of whether they would be allowed to continue living in the squat.

Ultimately however, in March 2014, the non-migrant squatters left Victor Hugo and association workers moved in. Overnight this changed the lives of remaining residents and took away the social and communal (if not physical) space which had been shared and struggled for together. More than just an eviction of the CMS squatters, who suddenly found themselves thrown out of the house they had been living in for the better part of a year, it marked the elimination of a self-organised community of solidarity that was effectively organising to support the autonomous attempts of irregular migrants to clandestinely cross the UK's border. In this case the target for eviction was less the occupation or the migrant residents themselves, but rather the relationships and solidarities between the various types of residents and visitors inside Victor Hugo. These not only existed across the distinctions of citizenship status, but were aimed at undermining the basis of those differences, and the inequality of mobility privileges they produced. The French government thus showed it was willing to accommodate irregular migrants in an illegally occupied squat so long as they were segregated from solidarity activists in Calais, and could be managed and controlled through a state contracted association.

Although within Calais' city centre, *Victor Hugo* refused to reproduce citizen/noncitizen distinctions within its walls and sought to create, as much as possible, equality amongst its residents, attentive to their different needs and privileges around movement (ibid., pp. 110–115). The women were free to come, go, and stay as they pleased, while continuing to try and cross at night. While the state was forced to concede not registering or fingerprinting the migrant inhabitants (had they done so most likely none of the women would have continued living in the house after CMS left), it did see introducing a contracted association as an opportunity to filter the residents into the citizenship regime which they were, to a large extent, harboured from whilst living alongside CMS. Workers with *Solid'R* became charged with registering and establishing the 'situation' of everyone living inside and then reporting it to the authorities (*La Voix du Nord*, 2014b). Furthermore, Bouchart proposed women and children should only be able to stay for two months before being directed to 'more appropriate solutions' (*La Voix du Nord*, 2014a), no doubt outside of Calais and where they were would be less able to attempt clandestine crossings.

After taking physical control of the building and introducing a contracted association to manage it, the government still had to remove the remaining migrant inhabitants and end the, now state endorsed, occupation. It was a glaring contradiction for authorities to be paying an association to work inside a space which had been autonomously occupied and since deemed illegal by the courts. The first building^{ix} slated to legally rehouse *Victor Hugo's* migrant inhabitants was located in Calais-Nord, the historic city centre. Mayor Bouchart intervened to prevent this; specifically citing the close proximity of this replacement building to food and clothing distribution areas, and because it was in the middle of Calais-Nord 'where there are already many problems with the migrants' (my translation, ibid.). In her eyes, the proximity of this space to the existing services available to migrants not to mention 'being in the middle' of the city proper were reasons why it would be unfit for the migrant women and children.

Instead of a space in Calais, she requisitioned one belonging to another association, *Secours Catholique*, five kilometres south-east from the centre to which the women and children were forced to move (ibid.). There they were excluded from the city and from the social networks and services it contained. The residents would again be forced to move into the *Centre d'accueil Jules Ferry* in late March 2015 when the Jungle was being created around it after nearly another year in this second location. Again, this was not what the women wanted, but they were forced to move again under threat of police violence (CMS, 2015b). The association workers managing the project also encouraged them to go at each point, ensuring the evictions would proceed smoothly and go unnoticed.

These repeated and invisible evictions against the migrant women continually made use of the threat of police violence, even if it was not directly enacted. However, they did not take place without violence but were violent in and of themselves, even if not physically. They broke apart communities of solidarity and interpersonal relationships (initially between both migrant and non-migrant squatters), they continued to uproot families and thrust them into unknown locations further and further from the city centre and the social networks they relied upon and supported in Calais, and allowed for the citizenship regime to encroach upon their lives by imposing conditions and time-limits on their access to a sleeping place. While the *Victor Hugo* eviction, and the subsequent evictions its residents endured, may differ optically from those mentioned in Subsection 3.3.3, they illustrate how the target of domicidal interventions is not necessarily the squats and jungles themselves. Instead, the goal can be to

eliminate the autonomous modes of *inhabitance* these spaces allow, and the solidarities found inside; something achievable through other means than overt force.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter reframed evictions of migrant spaces of inhabitance within a longer history extending back to the Red Cross centre in Sangatte, and provides a detailed impression of how and why these evictions have taken place, and continue today. In doing so, it has partially addressed *RQ1*. The discussion was mainly restricted to legal squats, and CMS' involvement in creating these spaces, but this provides important context for understanding the domicide of jungles in the coming chapters. The final case study of *Victor Hugo*, but also descriptions of *Rue Caillette*, *Rue Massena*, and Fort Galloo, provided a glimpse of life inside these legal squats, and particularly how they facilitated solidarities and co-operation amongst those with and without citizenship privileges against the border regime in Calais. Although the discussion of the solidarity politics found within Calais' squats and jungles could occupy an entire book in itself, and many of the sources given at the beginning of Subsection 3.2.2 have already done a lot of this work, relaying that story is not my research project, which instead focuses on how domicide and citizenship work against such solidarities.

Chapter 4 finally begins this task and starts to address RQ2 by working from the material presented here to understand how the social and political solidarities built within migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance function in opposition to the migration control regime and disrupt citizenship's distinctions. It first engages with theoretical understandings of migrant squatting practices vis-à-vis citizenship and then moves to theorising them as spaces of 'anti-citizenship' through the concepts of autonomy and inhabitance. Anti-citizenship is developed to highlight that these spaces not only refuse to reproduce citizenship's distinctions in who can access them, but highlights how they further allow for occupants to challenge the foundation of citizenship's privileges while also acknowledging that citizenship distinctions and privileges are still very much present within them. With a clearer understanding of the relationship between autonomous spaces of inhabitance and citizenship, the role of evictions and domicide as spatial technologies of citizenship will then be unpacked. Not only do evictions reterritorialise the squats' irregular migrant inhabitants within the citizenship regime while depriving them of infrastructural resources necessary to facilitate irregular crossings, they also eliminate the social communities and political solidarities in resistance to that regime.

Notes

- i. I have not analysed raids in this research, focusing instead on the domicidal spatial interventions made by police which eliminate migrants' spaces of inhabitance. However, before the Jungle, the raiding of migrant squats and camps to capture and arrest their inhabitants occurred more frequently than evictions and destructions. While at that time Calais' squats and jungles were viewed by police as containers of the population of irregular migrants that could be raided to fill spaces in the detention centre, today they are regarded as material threats *in and of themselves*. To illustrate this discrepancy; in the year between November 2017-18 HRO recorded only 26 arrests over the course of 393 domicidal operations (*L'Auberge des Migrants* et al., 2018, p. 18). By contrast, in 2013 CMS (2013b) was reporting up to 20 arrests in a single police raid.
- ii. The Calais No Border camp was organised by No Border activist network groups in France, Belgium, and the UK to highlight the situation of irregular migrants on the UK's border in Northern France, create links between migrant communities and support groups, and to protest for an end to all borders and migration controls (CNT, 2009).
- iii. The lack of formal complaints by irregular migrants regarding police violence is frequently used by the *Préfecture* to deny accusations of police brutality against them (Rubin, 2017).
- iv. For further discussions on CMS, feminism, and the politics of 'safer spaces' in Calais see Claire English (2017b). 'Security Is No Accident: Considering Safe(r) Spaces in the Transnational Migrant Solidarity Camps of Calais'. In: *Protest Camps in International Context: Spaces, Infrastructures and Media of Resistance*. Ed. by G. Brown, A. Feigenbaum, and F. Frenzel. Bristol, UK: Policy Press.
- v. This claim is also echoed by the DDD in the context of more the recent eviction of jungles. See Subsection 5.2.2 and the report *Défenseur des droits* (Dec. 14, 2018). *Exilés et Droits Fondamentaux, Trois Ans Après Le Rapport Calais*.
- vi. CMS (2017b, pp. 58–60) describe sexism, racism, and exploitation taking place in the squat, harassment from racist neighbours and police, and continuous attempts from the city to disconnect the buildings' water and electricity supply. Also, *Rue Caillette* was finally evicted and sealed following the death of a young Afghan man, stabbed in a reprisal attack, inside and not because of court-ordered eviction.
- vii. While this research concentrates on how state interventions produce and spatialise exclusionary citizenship, more research is needed into how citizen groups' exclusionary spatial interventions against irregular migrants produce exclusionary—sometimes overtly racist and nationalist—citizenship forms (Darling, 2017, p. 735). In Calais, domicidal attacks on migrant living spaces have very much been part of their tactics; for example, by setting tents on fire in jungles (CMS, 2011) or throwing Molotov cocktails at squats (Gardenier, 2018, pp. 90–91).
- viii. According to CMS, Bouchart's' rhetoric constructed them as 'outside agitators' equally, if not more, threatening to the city as a space of citizenship than the irregular migrants instrumentalised in an anarchist plot to destroy national borders. For an in-depth analysis of this accusation, and its racist underpinnings, see CMS, 2018a.
- ix. This building was the *Moulin Blanc* squatted and evicted in March 2016 as an action against the segregation of migrants in the Jungle.

Chapter 4

Anti-citizenship and domicide as a technology of citizenship

4.1 Introduction: citizenship, space, and the city

This chapter continues discussions on citizenship and space from Chapter 2, but narrows the frame from global and national scales to the preliminary scale of the city. It describes how citizenship is produced in Calais by establishing spatial distances against 'them here' ('non-citizen' irregular migrants present in the city) rather than 'them there' (foreign aliens at the national frontier) (Painter and Philo, 1995, p. 112). For Isin (2002, p. 50), the city is the 'battleground' where citizenship becomes configured, contested, and maintained. According to him, the control and production of space in the city-the arrangement of buildings and objects within it; the creation of districts, and the borders defining them; the proximities between places—all produce the collective identities of citizens and their Others (ibid., p. 49). These spatial distributions are created through 'interventions' (Subsection 2.4.3) which enact, enclose, and reproduce citizenship, not only because of the social solidarities that emerge amongst those intervening, but through the reconfiguration of space to create an oppositional distance to those groups they exclude. Although supplanted by the nation-state in the 18th century, citizenship originally signified a privileged affiliation to the city, and since globalisation, the city has re-emerged as an important site for producing citizenship (Baubock, 2003; Božilovi, 2012; Holston and Appadurai, 1996; Isin, 1999).

While this research investigates the mutual production of exclusion and citizenship through spatial interventions in the city, other perspectives argue that cities, rather than reproducing exclusionary citizenship, offer marginalised groups a space for accessing a substantive form of 'diverse' citizenship (Tully, 2014) from which they can begin challenging wider 'non-citizen' exclusion at the national scale (Douglass and Friedmann, 1998; Hintjens and Kurian, 2019; McCann, 2002; Purcell, 2003). This work often makes use of Lefebvre's (1996) 'right to the city' as a non-normative and performative right to citizenship (an urban take on Arendt's 'right to rights', Section 2.2) which exceeds and challenges the state's hegemony in determining citizenship. This writing on the more generic relationship between citizenship and the city is presented in Subsection 4.2.1; however, there has also been a proliferation of studies specifically interrogating the spatiality of irregular migrants' activism at the level of the city, and how their appropriation of city-spaces reconfigure citizenship (Ataç, Rygiel, and Stierl, 2016; Bhimji, 2016; Dadusc, Grazioli, and M. A. Martínez, 2019; Maestri and Hughes, 2017; McNevin, 2006, 2011, 2012; Nordling, Sager, and Söderman, 2017; Nyers, 2008; Rygiel, 2011; Swerts, 2017a; Vrasti and Dayal, 2016).

The interest in analysing the spatial and urban dimensions of citizenship through examples of migrant activism is not surprising given the power of these movements, and how non-citizen migrants as 'unfamiliar' political actors provoke reconsiderations of this basic form of 'being political' (see Subsection 2.4.1). Furthermore, space plays a crucial role at so many different levels in migrants' struggles; from the choice of protest locations and the visibility they afford, to how struggles interact with and reconfigure the spaces in which they take place, not to mention migrant struggles challenge and subvert decidedly *spatial* strategies of governance (e.g. controlling migrants' movements or excluding them outright from cities and national territories) (Ataç, Rygiel, and Stierl, 2016). Because technologies and strategies of exclusion against non-citizens manifest spatially, and because *taking* and *inhabiting* space is a fundamental way non-citizens contest exclusion or demand (citizenship) rights, citizenship *is always spatial* regardless of whether it is conceived as a form of governance or resistance (Maestri and Hughes, 2017, p. 628).

Most of this literature on migrant struggles, space, and citizenship show how migrants 'rupture', spatially and politically, normative configurations of the city and citizenship thereby creating 'new relations and connections' (Dikeç, 2012, p. 670). However, my research inverts this perspective to illustrate how citizenship and the city work together to continually and reciprocally re-exclude irregular migrants in Calais. Towards this end this chapter makes two interrelated arguments. First, autonomous spaces of migrant inhabitance in Calais challenge, disrupt, but also exceed, citizenship politics even if they remain entangled with it. They pose a threat both to the city itself, but also British and French national territories as 'spaces of citizenship'. The chapter's second argument is that domicidal interventions against those spaces, and the social communities of resistance to the citizenship and border regime that they contain, thus aim to defend and re-assert citizenship as normative spatial, social, and political relation. These arguments again resist re-incorporating irregular migrants' political actions into the discourse of citizenship while mapping its effective use to police Calais' border.

This chapter addresses *RQ2* by illustrating how evictions as exclusionary interventions eliminating irregular migrants' homes produce and spatialise citizenship in Calais. Here I imagine citizenship as a tangible web distributed over Calais that imposes upon it a normative geometry of interactive possibilities between citizens and migrants, sustaining divisions between them by dictating how irregular migrants and citizens are arranged within the city, the distances between them, and the spaces they are either differentially allowed to inhabit or are removed from. However, the chapter also shows how citizenship being written into the city's space in this way reproduces

and sustains migrants' exclusion and systemic racialised domination at a micro-scale.

4.1.1 Chapter outline

Understanding how domicide functions as a spatial technology of citizenship requires first identifying the traits of autonomous spaces of inhabitance and unpacking their relationship to citizenship. This discussion is divided into two parts in the first section. Subsection 4.2.1 presents *inhabitance* as both a form of active participation in the production of the city described as akin to citizenship (albeit a diverse form configured at the level of the city), and an intimate practice of home-making exceeding citizenship politics. Subsection 4.2.2 discusses autonomy, and argues that these spaces have an antagonistic relation to citizenship because they facilitate autonomous mobilities and, as self-created and self-organised squatted occupations, they exist in spite of and in conflict with the governing principles limiting access to the city purely to its citizens. While these two attributes of autonomous spaces of inhabitance converge in what has been called the 'mobile commons', which is argued exceeds citizenship politics entirely, I prefer to describe them as spaces of *anti-citizenship* (Section 4.3). This term emphasises the necessity to continually resist the multiple ways citizenship produces spatial, social, and political exclusions, and better frames how and why evictions, and other domicidal interventions, must be understood as *producing* exclusionary citizenship forms.

The final part of the chapter returns to theorisations of interventions and technologies of citizenship to show how evictions (and domicide more broadly) function in Calais. Building on descriptions of detention and deportation, Section 4.4 illustrates how evictions of migrants' spaces of autonomous inhabitance function as *an exclusionary spatial technology of citizenship* in three inter-related ways; physically expelling 'non-citizen' migrants from the city centre, reproducing normative forms of citizenship and modes of inhabitance within the city, and socially and politically enclosing upon the mobile commons and anti-citizen politics found in squats and jungles.

4.2 Spaces of autonomous inhabitance and citizenship

4.2.1 Inhabitance, the 'right to the city', and citizenship

Inhabitance is often defined in relation to Lefebvre's (1996) 'right to the city', a concept expanded upon by critical urban geographers David Harvey (2008), Edward Soja (2010), and Mark Purcell (2002, 2003, 2013) as a practice of actively and creatively producing the city-space in contrast to passive forms of 'living-in it'. The right to the city implies all inhabitants of the city can participate in determining its political life (Dikeç and Gilbert, 2002, p. 71). It is not a right that is distributed from above, but comes into being through inhabitants themselves engaging in place-making practices. By doing so, they claim the right to continue remaining and participating in the city, making the politics of inhabitance one that also entails social and political rights (Darcy and D. Rogers, 2014, p. 248).

Although Lefevbre used the term *citadin* to differentiate the city's active inhabitants from modern citizenship's hegemonic relationship to a national community, many have unsurprisingly written of the rights conferred through inhabitance as citizenship rights (Rolnik, 2014). This is an urban citizenship configured at the scale of the city which 'directly confronts national citizenship as the dominant basis for political membership', because cities are multi-national spaces that inhabitants contribute to regardless of their nationality (Purcell, 2003, p. 578). Here citizenship as a legal category is supplanted by the substantive acts of place-making in the city; something democratically extended to *all* inhabitants. Citizenship as the 'right to the city' is an active, even 'activist' (Isin, 2009), citizenship produced by the direct participation of inhabitants, and *not* one which defers to the state to grant participative rights in urban space. The 'right to the city' not only proffers a right to participation in cities but also a right to *appropriation*—the right 'to produce urban space so that it meets the needs of inhabitants' (Purcell, 2002, p. 102)—which has lead to squatting itself being written about as a 'practice of citizenship' (Parisi, 2017).

No doubt the struggles to create and sustain Calais' squats and jungles enact the politics of inhabitance and 'the right to the city' by the definition above, and thus encompass claims to its particular form of urban citizenship despite the fact that inhabitants are usually in an 'irregular' immigration situation (Dikeç and Gilbert, 2002, p. 64). They clearly appropriate, intervene within, and produce spaces in the city in accordance with migrants' real and existing needs *as inhabitants* of Calais, despite being disdained as such. Created through squatting practices (of both land and buildings) they powerfully exemplify the 'right to appropriation' that extends beyond just using already existing or abandoned spaces by *crafting* them in order to satisfy the needs of migrant inhabitants (Grazioli, 2017, p. 405).

However, caution must be exercised when applying the Lefevbrian concept of inhabitance wholesale to Calais' migrant squats to then read them as examples of urban citizenship through the 'right to the city'. Elaborated upon in Subsection 4.2.2, applications of Lefevbre's inhabitance have often neglected to engage with the specific struggles and complexities of non-citizen migrants' forms of urban activism, while also entrusting urban society to transcend the nation-state and offer migrants a space of inclusion (Varsanyi, 2008, p. 47). My research shows that Calais' migrants are, in fact, overwhelming excluded at both national *and* urban levels despite continuously re-asserting their presence and re-appropriating the city's spaces as best as they are able. Therefore, despite constantly fighting for and sustaining their presence in Calais for more than 20 years, irregular migrants are persistently prevented from transforming this continual presence into substantive social and political rights or from having their place-making practices recognised as valuable contributions to Calais' cityspace. Furthermore, much of the 'right to the city' literature has a decidedly Marxist bent, focusing on subversion and resistance to capitalist speculation, gentrification, and private-property rights from marginalised, but still 'included', groups such as the working class. As such, these theories do not fully appreciate the role of citizenship as a mechanism of border control, nor the dehumanisation that results from Calais decidedly racist exclusions.

Given these criticisms when applying the 'right to the city' based on inhabitance to irregular migrants' spatial practices, other scholars reconfigure it from a rights claim in urban space to an *experience* already embedded in the micro-politics of irregular migrants' everyday existences and resistances (Trimikliniotis, Parsanoglou, and Tsianos, 2016). Here inhabitance moves from signifying presence and participation at the urban scale to describing the intimate spaces where migrants make their homes, and the profoundly personal ways they do so. Building on feminist observations that the micro-politics of interpersonal relations within home-spaces *are* political (Federici, 2012; Honig, 1994), this conceptualisation of inhabitance as a practice of home-making shifts it from being synonymous with citizenship (although one reconfigured away from the nation-state and nominally challenging it) to a politics capable of *opposing* it.

According to Deanna Dadusc (2019), home-making practices within squatted housing for irregular migrants build affective relations and communities of care amongst inhabitants which are not constrained by the identity categories in the realm of 'proper' politics, but which are no less political. When these communities are comprised of people positioned differently among the distribution of citizenship status and privileges (the case for Calais' legal squats in particular) such interpersonal bonds inevitably develop between those with and without existing citizenship privileges. It is these intimate relations across, not confined by, citizenship categories which 'provides the grounds for new forms of solidarity that dismantle existing host-guest hierarchies between those who hold citizenship and those who desire citizenship' (ibid., p. 2). These new forms of solidarity then not only emerge in spite of citizenship distinctions, but can even come to oppose citizenship when it is recognised as an obstacle to that solidarity, and the new shared world being struggled for. However, although this is a deeply social process, it is one which is catalysed by, even requires, shared spaces autonomous from citizenship which allow for these intimacies across its status categories to develop.

Illustrating this, Dadusc, Grazioli, and Martínez (2019) distinguish the creation of home-spaces in migrant squats from the basic state provision of housing. Providing housing, although offering a right to presence in the city and perhaps some limited ability to engage in place-making there, remains, in their assessment, primarily a humanitarian concern easily incorporated into strategies of migration governance.ⁱ Rosello (2016, p. 99) echoes this, observing that, in Calais, home defined as housing which satisfies a 'minimum standard of living' has been cynically instrumentalised by the state to justify its domicidal interventions, and segregate migrants in state controlled spaces. However, on the other hand, autonomous home-spaces like squats allow for solidarities and intimacies to emerge between migrants and others based on the fact of their *cohabitation* (Mudu and Chattopadhyay, 2017). These solidarities are part of a politics of relational affect with potential to subvert citizenship's structural inequality and intergroup distinctions, and to further contribute to building solidarity based on a *common struggle* against them (Dadusc, Grazioli, and M. A. Martínez, 2019). Therefore, autonomous spaces of inhabitance produce and *spatialise* an alternative social order beyond citizenship and provide an incubator for re-imagined social relations to be persistently lived-out within them in spite of differences between residents based on citizenship status and the privileges it affords (Dadusc and Mudu, 2020, p. 15).

Calais' legal squats (but also its other spaces of autonomous inhabitance) must therefore also be read through this concept of inhabitance as creating intimate selforganised home spaces to fully grasp how they challenge citizenship itself, and not just its nationalism. This is elaborated upon in Subsection 4.2.3, though for now I highlight the fact that these are spaces of shared inhabitance in which residents occupying a variety of citizenship statuses engage in home-making practices together to address, even if they do not completely overcome, the myriad differences existing amongst them. These spaces, besides focusing on resisting and subverting the mobility restrictions of its 'non-citizen' residents, additionally reverse experiences of exclusion from the city for irregular migrants who find a welcoming space in an otherwise hostile environment, and further 'produce ungovernable resources, alliances and subjectivities that prefigure *more livable spaces for everyone*' (emphasis mine, Dadusc, Grazioli, and M. A. Martínez, 2019, p. 4).

4.2.2 Autonomy, migration, and the commons

Latent in the discussion so far is the concept of autonomy which captures three characteristics of Calais' squats and jungles: (1) these spaces exist to facilitate the autonomous, and often unauthorised, mobilities of their inhabitants; (2) they are examples of occupation taking place in defiance of private property claims and authorities' goal of having 'zero squats' in Calais; and (3), they are self-organised prefigurative spaces not managed by state contractors.

The first connotation highlights Calais' jungles and squats as spaces *of* and *for* autonomous migration. These are mobilities pursued based on 'the subjective practices, the desires, the expectations, and the behaviours of migrants' which are impacted, but not wholly determined, by the structural contexts in which they take place (Mezzadra in Cobarrubias, Cortes, and Pickles, 2011, p. 587). They are spaces *of* movement because they are populated by transient people focused on facilitating collective autonomous 'escape routes' (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, 2008) despite British and European migration control policy.ⁱⁱ This is movement based on the desire to move freely in accordance with endogenous motivations and aimed at the goals and expectations migrants have for their own lives (even if they were initially forced into movement), and does not pay credence to principles of mobility governance; for example, that migrants claim asylum and seek regularisation within the citizenship regime of the first country where they are able to do so under the Dublin regulations.

Given the conflation of the threat migrant living spaces pose to the UK's national territory and Calais as pure 'spaces of citizenship', and considering that attacks on migrant living spaces are an important everyday bordering practice, mobility *beyond* and inhabitance *in* the city are inseparable. Furthermore, state managed accommodation for irregular migrants is typically offered as a technique to capture and re-direct them into claiming asylum in France to prevent further irregular mobility. Autonomous living spaces which isolate irregular migrants from technologies aimed to control their movements and which provide staging areas for the next step of their irregular journeys, are thus essential infrastructure for autonomous mobility. Therefore, spaces allowing for migrants to live autonomous movement. Thus, the nature of these spaces as emerging endogenously from, while being oriented to, the free movements of migrant inhabitants is the first defining characteristic of 'autonomy'.

The second is that Calais' squats and jungles are practices of *occupation*. These spaces are almost always taken by migrants and those in solidarity with them, and are not offered by authorities. These spaces of autonomy necessarily remain *outside of* (King, 2016, p. 100), or at least are in constant tension with, state forces to avoid the introduction of migratory control mechanisms into the lives of irregular migrant inhabitants (Mudu and Chattopadhyay, 2017). While migrant squats may enter into more complex relationships with state actors, evidenced by the case of *Victor Hugo*, these spaces almost always emerge from autonomous actions which do not ask for permission and therefore 'boldly assert [the migrant-squatter's] existence as a human being whose needs take precedence over the needs of private profit and state control' (Grohman, 2017, p. 127).

Yet, occupations do not just autonomously appropriate space, they also create communities of residents who self-organise their inhabitance in resistance to many state imposed challenges. Vasudevan (2015) describes occupations as prefigurative direct actions containing the potential to re-work social relations by establishing infrastructures for the circulation of common resources for political action. Enacting forms of movement and inhabitance beyond state sanction has the potential to reconfigure political and social relations because it redraws the relationship of participants to the state and citizenship politics. Self-organisation in Calais is oriented towards eliminating injustice at both micro and macro levels, and prefiguring spaces from which to fight against the citizenship regime and the racialised distribution of privileges it sustains (English, 2017a).

This understanding of autonomy links back to the second reading of inhabitance as home-making which together can comprise what is referred to as commoning; active practices of cooperation that do not produce 'walls' and divisions, but which 'assemble more inclusive, just and sustainable spaces' (Jeffrey, McFarlane, and A. Vasudevan, 2012, p. 1248). Commoning and inhabitance become *praxis* within migrants' autonomous spaces that not only challenge borders and defy the governmental control of migrant bodies, but go beyond the formal subjective positioning and behavioural

codes of (non)citizenship by enacting a relational and affective politics transcending them (Dadusc, 2019, p. 7). Commons and commoning then provide key concepts for further investigating the relationship between citizenship and autonomous spaces of inhabitance in a way that incorporates both inhabitance *and* autonomy in all the ways discussed previously.

The commons and commoning are concepts emerging from Autonomist Marxist economic thought, notably the work of Peter Linebaugh (2008, 2014) and Massimo De Angelis (2017), describing the pool of resources commonly held within a community, the practices by which they relate to those resources, and, in doing so, to one another. Anderson, Sharma, and Wright (2012, pp. 85–86) propose the commons as a useful alternative framework for the configuration and distribution of social rights which does not reproduce the global inequalities of national citizenship as it does not regard rights and wealth as the property of territorially bounded communities and nations, but as resources to which all are entitled. Furthermore, the *relational* nature of commoning does not rely on the reproduction of exclusion to form social groups, but rather encourages collective political actions requiring 'a profound re-imaging of our relation to the world, a relation that is created even as it is imagined' based on the recognition of mutual equality (ibid., p. 86). While their analysis centres the commons and commoning as a fundamental tenet of a No Borders political platform capable of challenging the global inequality created by the citizenship regime and nation-state institutions, this research's focus on autonomous spaces of migrant inhabitance requires narrowing the understanding of the commons to its examples in Calais. Here, the concept of the *mobile commons* provides a more precise point of entry.

The mobile commons is defined as the 'ontology of transmigration' (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013); the worlds, in a constant state of becoming, that migrants and others are creating through the experiences of movement and which exist to facilitate continued autonomous mobilities. This is 'the real world of moving people... assembled and materialised... in everyday life' that is being changed 'in a way that allows people to move when they want or need to and to maintain a liveable life when they reside in a certain place' (ibid., p. 192). The elements comprising this mobile commons are: the circulating knowledge and information useful for autonomous mobility but also settlement; infrastructures connecting people on the move, circulating their knowledge, and maintaining their mobility; *informal economies* specific to the needs and demands of 'unauthorised' mobility; communities of justice existing outside the state police and judiciary, often the most harmful actors in the lives of those moving irregularly; and interrelations of care and support nurtured amongst commoners (ibid., pp. 191-192). The mobile commons, though it may seem comprised of relatively unremarkable everyday practices of transmigrants (and others with whom they engage in commoning) pooling common resources, in fact represents an 'imperceptible politics' beyond citizenship which holds the potential to create new existences (English, Grazioli, and Martingnoni, 2019). While space is not directly acknowledged as one of the mobile commons' constitutive elements, those that Papadopoulos and Tsianos do describe require the existence of a network of spaces of and for movement to flow through, not to mention a praxis of inhabiting them *in common*. Thus, understanding how the mobile commons creates alternative spatialities, politics, and subjectivities in Calais' squats and jungles will now be explained before finally turning to how this relates to citizenship. This discussion is necessary to fully grasp how exclusionary domicidal spatial interventions function to re-assert citizenship by enclosing mobile commons by erasing the spaces they exist in.

4.2.3 Calais' mobile commons

The importance of autonomous spaces of migrant inhabitance to create and sustain mobile commons has been highlighted in recent research (Dadusc, Grazioli, and M. A. Martínez, 2019; Grazioli, 2017; Nordling, Sager, and Söderman, 2017), and the concept has already been productively applied to Calais' squats and jungles (English, Grazioli, and Martingnoni, 2019; Hall, Lounasmaa, and C. Squire, 2019; Ifekwunigwe, 2016; King, 2016, 2019; Müller and Zinflou, 2019). As organising spaces and home spaces (e.g. the *Rue Massena* social centre from page 81), they 'nourish and encourage' the struggle for free movement and are 'where mobile commons are nurtured and anticipatory politics imagined' (English, Grazioli, and Martingnoni, 2019, p. 201). Natasha King (2016, p. 107) observes that Calais' squats and jungles function as nodes within the larger network of the mobile commons and exist as places of orientation for those moving irregularly throughout Europe where they are able to meet and share the experiences necessary for their collective onward journeys. Importantly, and evidenced by the Victor Hugo squat, these are not just utilitarian spaces existing exclusively for facilitating movement, though this is undoubtedly a priority, but are homes which nurture co-relations of care and support amongst all those inhabiting them regardless of where they come from or where they are going.

Calais' squatted spaces created, visited, and lived-in by broad coalitions of irregular migrants crossing to the UK, asylum seekers in France, European passport holders, and local *Calaisiens* went beyond providing material support to migrants in precarious living situations and created links of solidarity and mutual aid 'as people struggled together against police brutality and repressive border control mechanisms' (CMS, 2017b, pp. 62–63). In King's words, they 'built bridges between people with and without papers...[and] amounted to an experiment in equality that was also another way of being outside the state' (2016, p. 100). These were open spaces that existed in a constant state of becoming as residents came and went, the challenges facing the space shifted, and the needs and desires for it fluctuated. They were collaboratively created by residents living together in ways that addressed, even if they were unable to completely overcome, the myriad differences existing amongst them.

Although the mobile commons is created, first and foremost, by people on the move, it is not limited to them. The commons is distinctly a product of *a community of commoners in free association* collectivising, or commoning, what resources they have (De Angelis, 2019). Migrants, activists, and citizens are all involved in commoning

practices and, in some cases, 'the power of these practices increases with the presence of citizens as part of the inhabitance network' (De Angelis, 2019, p. 5). Many of the activities of CMS activists listed in the beginning of Subsection 3.2.2 can thus be understood as contributing to, even 'increasing', the power of the Calais' mobile commons. Through cop-watchingⁱⁱⁱ they contributed to building an alternative community of justice outside of state institutions (even if engaging with some of them like the DDD) to hold police accountable for violence against migrants. Also, their legal information sharing sessions, often taking place in squatted spaces, communicated necessary information for irregular migrants to move and stay freely where they chose. However, arguably CMS' most significant contribution to Calais' mobile commons was mobilising citizenship privileges to create durable legal squats for migrants in the city. These not only provided infrastructures of support for those on the move, and spaces in which the other elements of the mobile commons could circulate, but facilitated shared home-making premised upon a politics of care amongst all residents. Before seeing how evictions enclose upon these autonomous spaces of inhabitance and the mobile commons running through them (Section 4.4), one final remark is needed on the relationship of these spaces to citizenship.

In the literature on the autonomy of migration and mobile commons there is an insistence on breaking with methodological citizenship in analyses of migration politics (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013; Tazzioli, 2017a). There is a pronounced scepticism in these thinkers that citizenship can adequately conceive the politics of migrants' movements, instead asserting that they fundamentally 'challenge the given structures of inclusion and create new situations which cannot be conceived within the existing framework of citizenship' (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, 2008, p. 14). For them, emphasising citizenship as the 'ultimate horizon of political practice and social analysis' turns it into the 'wall' mentioned in Section 0.1 that prevents us from seeing beyond or understanding what comes after citizenship (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013, p. 179). This is an important criticism which I have tried to develop through the decolonial critique of citizenship's conceptual imperialism in Section 2.4. However, when narrowing the focus from the general autonomous mobilities of irregular migrants on to the autonomous spaces they inhabit along their journeys, as I have done, the question arises whether these spaces also exist beyond, or 'escape', citizenship politics entirely because they generate 'alternative modes of livelihoods' (Trimikliniotis, Parsanoglou, and Tsianos, 2015, p. 16).

While it seems apparent that migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance go beyond conceptions of modern citizenship as status or prescriptive set of rights and obligations in relation to the nation-state (Raimondi, 2019, p. 560), whether they also go beyond citizenship in its 'diverse' forms (Tully, 2014) like 'citizenship from below' or 'activist citizenship' is contestable. Peter Nyers (2015, p. 32) argues that the world of the mobile commons, while admittedly fundamentally different to that of the rightsbearing citizen, is still coeval and immanent to that of citizenship, and Nordling, Sager, and Söderman (2017, p. 723) argue that theorisations of the mobile commons must be nuanced to account for the fact that commoning and strategies to achieve citizenship/inclusion are often performed by migrants simultaneously. Commoners are still subjected to citizenship assessments and hold its statuses and privileges which, while producing inequality between them, can also become tools and collective resources pooled to further the mobile commons. Therefore, De Angelis (2019, p. 628) states that commoning occurs *within, against, and beyond* citizenship depending on; who the subjects of commoning are, the contexts and spaces in which commoning takes place, and one's point of observation. While literature on the radical autonomy of migration despite state efforts to control it emphasises the mobile commons as going 'beyond citizenship', perhaps this emphasis is too hastily posited given the severe entanglement of, at least Calais', mobile commons with citizenship.^{iv} The hasty celebration of the mobile commons as transcending citizen subjectivities may, in fact, pose a stumbling block for solidarity politics if it allows for this very entanglement with citizenship to be overlooked, and perhaps (unknowingly) reproduced.^v

4.3 Spaces of anti-citizenship

As De Angelis writes, the commoning practices creating mobile commons occur 'within, against, and beyond citizenship'. Taking this formulation as an analytical framework, the migrant citizenship perspective can be understood as placing commoning practices within citizenship while the autonomy of migration perspective emphasises their capacity to go beyond citizenship. My argument is that the mobile commons' position against citizenship—what I call a *politics of anti-citizenship*—must be placed front and centre in research practices that seek to understand, and solidarity practices that aim to nurture, it. Theorising Calais' autonomous spaces of migrant inhabitance as spaces of anti-citizenship, does three things: (1) it acknowledges they do not necessarily supersede citizenship politics simply by virtue of their existence, but remain cut-through with citizenship's inequalities; (2) it highlights that they do present a challenge for the citizenship regime by facilitating unauthorised mobilities, and the continued presence in the city, of irregular migrants in spite of continual attempts to exclude them; and (3) it provides strategic orientation for the prefigurative commoning practices that take place within them as the continued resistance to, and ultimate destruction¹ of, the citizenship regime.

Anti-citizenship proceeds in two different ways depending one's position in relation citizenship's Janus face of inclusion and exclusion (Lister, 2000), but which are both oriented towards prefiguring a world without citizenship. It is performed when those excluded from citizenship act in defiance of their exclusions (familiar as the 'acts' of migrant citizenship) and when those holding citizenship privileges mobilise them against the border regime and its underlying citizenship logic.

¹ It must be noted that this is a *creative destruction;* one which by refusing citizenship and removing the state from the foundation of the political relationship also produces alternative relations and forms of political subjectivity in the process (King, 2016, p. 28).

The politics of prefiguration is crucial to understand Calais' squats and jungles, and has already been identified as one of their most potent and defining qualities, as well as the fundamental organising principle of CMS and No Borders more generally (English, 2017a; English, Grazioli, and Martingnoni, 2019; King, 2016, 2019; Tyerman, forthcoming). Prefiguration is a praxis which removes 'the temporal distinction between the struggle in the present and a goal in the future; instead, the struggle and the goal, the real and the ideal, become one in the present' (Maeckelbergh, 2011, p. 4). As part of a no borders politics (the political and ethical orientation of many creating and inhabiting Calais' autonomous migrant squats and jungles at least since the 2009 No Border Camp) it demands constant action to resist and undermine borders even if they are wholly incomplete and inadequate to deal with the sheer scale of violence borders produce (King, 2019, p. 217). In this way, no borders does not remain a utopian ideal, action towards which is deferred to a to-be-determined point in the future when it might be successful, but remains practically oriented to changing everyday behaviours (Anderson, Sharma, and C. Wright, 2012) and insists 'that the work of dismantling borders must start here and now in our everyday lives' (Tyerman, forthcoming). Opposition to and autonomy from the border do not remain merely structural positions but aim for a 'continuous intervention against the roots of power relations' in interpersonal relations and in no borders movements' organising (Mudu and Chattopadhyay, 2017, p. 8).

What this has meant in Calais' squats and jungles is that these spaces are not only oriented towards resisting the borders of fences and police 'out there', but that 'part of this deconstruction of border controls requires paying close attention to the internal cultural politics of borders and bordering articulated through micro-acts of othering' (Millner, 2011, p. 325). Therefore, they are spaces which also address the interpersonal inequalities and failures of recognition that have become written across lines of intersecting structural oppressions through decades of socialisation, the constitutive violence of racism, and citizenship status categories. According to Bauder (2014, p. 87), the *practical rejection* of imposed categories of identity, and the oppressions accompanying them, at this intimately personal scale keeps no border politics grounded in the material conditions of inequality in daily life.

A prefigurative politics of *anti-citizenship* is therefore oriented towards overturning everyday border segregation and citizenship's exclusion; however, I disagree with Millner (2011, p. 326) that it is a politics which attempts to 'completely flatten' the relationship between activist and migrant, implying there is no difference between the two; that they are both equally non-citizens as they are citizens. Rather, it makes the fact of real and existing differences of papers and privilege as productive as possible for the struggle against the inequality that, at the same time, papers and privileges reproduce. Recognising privilege and understanding the implications of citizenship within the global system of apartheid which continually benefits 'us' in the North serves as an impetus for a no borders politics of migrant solidarity (Tyerman, forthcoming), as well as anti-citizen politics, which aims to convert that privilege, as much as possible, into a common resource for the struggle against citizenship and borders.

Autonomous spaces like Calais' (legal) squats are crucial because they allow for, in fact are directly oriented towards, 'productively working through the conflicts produced by this global system of inequalities' (Gauditz, 2017, p. 55). They provide space for inhabitants to deeply engage the lived realities of inequality produced by citizenship's exclusions and differential inclusions whilst working towards their dismantlement. This is a task that is never guaranteed to be successful, but in which failure is not a negative end, but an important and integral part of the creative process of solidarity (Halberstam, 2011). Remembering King's (2016, p. 100) words, these spaces are 'experiments in equality' that remain *in confrontation with* rather than disavow the constitutive violent exclusions of citizenship. Residents' various positionalities and their differential needs are acknowledged and addressed, and while not always done perfectly^{vi}, the micro-political inequalities stemming from intersecting structural inequalities like gender, race, and citizenship status were always being *engaged with* even though they could not be permanently resolved.^{vii}

Creating, sustaining, and inhabiting migrants' spaces of anti-citizenship in Calais is a prefigurative action that creates imperfect and contingent, but nevertheless living examples of another *world* not defined by the citizenship regime and in direct conflict with it. They are spaces where a praxis of commoning in coalition across citizenship's distinctions prioritises continually 'working through them *together*' (Tyerman, forthcoming), and in which the alternative non-bordered world has not already arrived, nor does it remain distantly utopian and out of reach, but exists in the here and now, even if only in a constant state of becoming.

If anti-citizen politics has, until now, mostly been described as a politics of solidarity on the part of those with citizenship privileges, this is not the case. Irregular migrants and other 'non-citizens' also enact this politics through moving and settling autonomously, and even (paradoxically) in claiming citizenship rights. While the prefix 'anti-' may imply a superficial opposition and hasty dismissal of citizenship, I agree that citizenship can still be powerfully mobilised in struggles by irregular migrants to contest exclusion and win significant material gains (McNevin, 2013; Nyers, 2015). I also recognise these actions fundamentally disturb citizenship's hegemonic formulation, although we must constantly be wary of how reformulated citizenships appropriate these struggles and produce the deferred exclusion of other groups. There is a powerful challenge to the citizenship regime contained in migrants' daily resistances to spatial, political, and social exclusions, their unsanctioned mobilities, and their more often remarked upon forms of activism. I believe both the migrant citizenships literature and autonomy of migration perspective are right to highlight a breakdown of the regime of modern citizenship when faced with these actions despite their incommensurable readings of how this actually takes place.

However, the crucial difference between anti-citizenship politics and 'acts of citizenship' (Isin and Nielsen, 2008) or 'citizenship from below' (Nyers and Rygiel, 2012, p. 9) is, whilst similarly breaking from citizenship's primacy in determining who or what actions are allowed to count as political, anti-citizen politics actively seeks to direct them towards undoing citizenship as well as encourages (as many migrants already do) 'opting out' (McNevin, 2012) of citizenship by creating alternative spaces, infrastructures, and worlds where possible. It focuses on collectively subverting and challenging citizenship's political and material technologies (e.g. borders, detention, deportation, enforced destitution) while refusing to reproduce its categories in the struggle's organising and aims.

Thus, anti-citizenship is not a superficial opposition to citizenship, but rather regards the mantle of citizenship as one that can be picked up and cast aside again as is deemed suitable (Tyerman, forthcoming), so long as its undoing, rather than citizenship itself, remains the strategic horizon for political action. This requires what Simon Critchley (2007) calls an 'infinitely demanding' ethical commitment and politics of resistance where appropriations and acts of citizenship may be useful *tactics*, but which must constantly strive to create a shared world of belonging that makes no reference to citizenship nor reinforces it as a privileged form of being political. Rather than seeking inclusion within or expansion of existing forms of citizenship, it is aimed at eliminating citizenship's arbitrary juridical distinctions and the privileges stemming from them, though sometimes mobilising these as tools when it would be disruptive to do so. It is a prefigurative politics that at the same time attacks the physical manifestations of our bordered world, but wholly 'rejects the specter of citizenship and belonging [which] haunts many of our conceptions of liberation' (Leif J, 2019).

However, there is a danger here of falling into the same trap I suggest CCS does, which is imposing a particular reading of migrants' contentious politics in line with my idealised understanding of 'being political', again appropriating the lives and experiences of others to narrate the implications of struggles which are not my own. This is an all-too-familiar tendency in migration studies literature, not only of CCS. Thom Tyerman (forthcoming, Chapter 5) convincingly argues that both acts of citizenship and the autonomy of migration perspectives over-determine migrant's activism and subjectivity in accordance with their idealised form of a properly radical politics. The former, as shown in Subsection 2.4.2, reproduces citizenship's conceptual imperialism by positing it as a universal form of 'being political' which, although remade many times over, has been one of its defining features since the Enlightenment. The autonomy of migration perspective has, on the other hand, been criticised for romanticising the role of 'the migrant' in unsettling global capitalism and for producing it as an abstract category that ignores the embodied experiences and understanding of all those people who have been produced 'as "migrants" due to interlocking practices of capitalism, nationalism, racism and sexism' (Sharma, 2009, p. 475). I am wary of likewise over-determining irregular migrants' politics as anti-citizen, and so stop short in a number of ways.

First, anti-citizenship is not intended to be a complete theory of irregular migrants' political subjectivity or ideology, but is instead an initial and resounding refusal to interpret these activities and politics through citizenship. Rather than *define* them as

an anti-citizen, I've tried to create a space in which migrants are able to define themselves on their own terms, and without reference to hegemonic Eurocentric concepts, by insisting citizenship *not* be the result of this process. It is an acknowledgement that these contentious politics *do* escape our understandings from, and I include myself here, the modern epistemological tradition that is reproduced in the Western academy (Vázquez in Ansems-de Vries et al., 2017, pp. 8–9) and does not seek to re-enclose them within familiar categories, committing the epistemic violence of 'translation' (Vázquez, 2011). Anti-citizenship is thus more a critique of citizenship scholarship than it is a positive theorisation of migration struggles.

With this disclaimer, anti-citizenship is aligned with critical citizenship studies and autonomy of migration scholars in their understandings that irregular migrants do rupture citizenship in a number of ways, which the prefix 'anti-' draws attention to. Even despite eventual reappropriation or the superficial paradox of non-citizen migrants claiming or desiring citizenship as part of their struggles, they are initially recognised, responded to, and intervened against as a *threat* to citizenship's primacy. This threat is eloquently expressed by Stephania Grohman (2017, p. 128) as:

the fear—held consciously or unconsciously—that those excluded from the 'community of value' could one day cease to take their status lying down and decide to rise from the grave of social and moral abjection that the good citizens have dug for them, and thus bring about the apocalypse of the very value system that denied them their humanity.

Therefore, even though I do not strictly define struggles for free movement as anticitizen, this is nevertheless how they become *interpreted* by state actors and other citizens who insist upon constantly re-establishing modern citizenship's hegemony as a necessary system of social organisation. Reading migrants' struggles and the spaces they create through anti-citizenship allows us to understand how and why they are so violently opposed by citizenship's defenders, and encourages manifesting their fears through further anti-citizen actions.

Finally, this research primarily treats anti-citizenship as a *spatial quality* rather than political subjectivity or ideology. Even if specific anti-citizen actions, a more detailed strategy, or the end result of this politics remains necessarily undefined, a first step is to create more spaces outside of and in contest with the citizenship regime. Calais' squats and jungles offer inspiring illustrations of what these spaces and worlds can look like in the future, especially when we consider the extremely hostile environment these spaces existed in which meant they were always under-threat, under-resourced, and quickly eliminated. If provided more room to grow and flourish what might have become of them? However, for other potential anti-citizen spaces to emerge, resist enclosure, and continue to thrive, thorough counter-maps of how domicidal strategies and tactics seek to erase them, and thereby re-assert the citizenship regime, are necessary.

4.4 Domicide as spatial technology of citizenship

Having understood how autonomous spaces of inhabitance inhabited by transnational coalitions striving for free movement for all *spatialise* anti-citizenship politics in Calais, this section finally turns to describe how they are eliminated and enclosed by domicidal actions re-asserting citizenship as the foundation for determining who has the right to inhabit Calais. This takes place through many tactics including the use of rights and laws, enforced mobility, humanitarian intervention, micro-political denials of access to the commons, and through erasure (Dadusc, Grazioli, and M. A. Martínez, 2019, p. 12). Many of these technologies are addressed in other chapters, but the focus here is on the final technique of erasure through domicidal eviction. While Subsection 2.3.3 gave a broader reading of the border as a spatial technology of citizenship simultaneously producing migrants and citizens on the national scale, this section elaborates on and refines that discussion to show how evictions, and domicide more generally, work at the micro-scales of the city and home-space. Here, thinking domicide through theorisations of detention and deportation² as technologies of citizenship is a useful point of departure. While domicide does not function independently of detention and deportation, and police often arrest many migrant evictees with the intention of detaining and deporting them, it does have a number of specific characteristics mapped in this thesis. Domicide is under-theorised when compared to deportation and detention as a spatial technology of citizenship by critical migration scholars, but is perhaps most important to understand the maintenance of 'modern' citizenship (Tully, 2014) in Calais.

William Walters (2010), and others discussing his writings on deportation (Anderson, Gibney, and Paoletti, 2011), have already paved much of the way for the concept of spatial technology of citizenship I apply to domicidal evictions. In its simplest formulation, deportation (the physical removal of the non-citizen from the sovereign territory of the nation-state) is a constitutive technology of citizenship because it, like the border, produces and reifies distinctions between the citizen and foreign migrant. But, not only does the removal of the 'non-citizen' reassert the citizen's implicit right to remain (ibid., p. 548), the spatial distance created between them re-establishes the 'natural' distribution of the world's population amongst distinct nation-states and their territories. Furthermore, deportation reinforces normative social and legal characteristics of the citizen in-line with 'the public good'. Not only does it serve as a visceral and violent demonstration of what qualities non-citizens have (e.g. lack of documentation, criminality, non-integration, non-productivity, drain on common resources, etc.), it by contrast shows the positive qualities citizens are presumed to hold (ibid., pp. 554–555). This contrast serves as an implicit threat to discipline other foreigners (and citizens to a lesser extent) into behaving and presenting appropriately lest they face deportation at a later point. This is what Nicholas De Genova (2017) describes as 'deportability';

² These terms are considered in this section in broader ways—more as conceptual analogies for displacement and enclosure—than the specific definitions they hold in immigration law.

the disciplining *potential* of deportation. For him, non-citizens' heightened deportability 'is the decisive and defining predicate, albeit in the negative, of citizenship itself' (2017, p. 19). Deportation then functions as a technology of citizenship in three related ways: (1) removing non-citizens reifies and 'gives teeth' to legal citizenship status, re-establishing it as prime determinant of the right to reside within a territory; (2) it reproduces normative imaginaries of the nation by removing those 'polluting' its territory, from which the state derives further legitimacy for performing immigration controls; and (3), it further entrenches citizenship's social norms.

Like deportation, migrant detention is another spatial technology through which citizenship becomes produced, again in the negative. While deportation forcefully expels the non-citizen, an undesired movement, detention enforces stasis, immobility, confinement, and imprisonment by contrast. Similar to deportability, whether or not detainment is translated into deportation is irrelevant despite this being its raison *d'être*. Detention has its own punitive methods that violently disrupt the daily life of the 'non-citizen', freezing their movements for an undetermined period of time, leaving them uncertain about their prospects, and without agency to effect their conditions (Turnbull, 2016). However, detention also operates 'along the same continuum as deportation' to produce non-citizenship as a *legal status* (De Genova, 2007). Even if detainees have social, affective, or substantive claims to citizenship from spending time in a country (studying, working, paying taxes, being involved in the community, perhaps were even born there (Bosworth, 2012)) they are nevertheless reduced to noncitizen status entailing a 'de facto juridical non-personhood' and extra-judicial process of imprisonment where they have *fewer* rights than citizens incarcerated in the criminal system (De Genova, 2016, p. 6). Furthermore, detention does not claim any lofty ambitions of offender rehabilitation or social reintegration; it does not 'teach citizenship' to non-citizens. 'The [detention] centres can only produce what has already been made: non-citizens' (Bosworth, 2012, p. 130). Detention then is a very different technology of citizenship than what Cruikshank described in Subsection 2.3.3. It is one which does not work on citizens to produce them along normative lines, encouraging them to participate in their own domination through self-actualising as successful neoliberal subjects, but rather is a technology of exclusion based on a legal categorisation that, although treated as absolute, is highly contingent and contested.

However, Kim Rygiel (2011) describes detention as a spatial technology of citizenship rather differently than the scholars above who centre its production of non-citizen legal status, and which is more useful for understanding domicidal evictions. For her, detention produces citizenship through the 'regulation of outsiders such as noncitizens', denying access to the social and political life of the city, while also allowing for violence against the detained to occur with impunity (ibid., p. 16). In her words:

As a technology of citizenship, detention operates through exactly this same logic of presence in the city [citizenship as 'right to the city'] albeit through its suspension. As spaces of exclusion, migrant camps try to deny and interrupt 'presence' to people by hindering the visibility, association, recognition, status, and rights that come with being of the city. (2011, p. 14)

Rygiel applies the concept of detention in Calais outside of the walls of the total closed institution that is the Centre Administratif De Rétention (CRA) in Coquelles to the city's 'camp' spaces^{viii} (Agamben, 1998). For her, detention more broadly signifies the displacement of the non-citizen Other from the space of citizenship (e.g. the national territory and the city) to an abject and segregated space where they are subjected to the 'slow violence' of abandonment (Davies, 2015), environmental hardship (Schindel, 2019), and the direct and brutal attacks of police. Although Rygiel works from the conception of citizenship as the 'right to the city' which has already been shown to be inadequate for understanding how Calais' migrants relate to citizenship in the city (Subsection 4.2.1), her theory of detention makes an important point for conceiving exclusionary spatial technologies of citizenship: suspending, denying or revoking irregular migrants' presence in the city simultaneously produces citizenship and the city's normative spatiality. This provides a useful point of departure for our understanding domicidal evictions as a spatial technology of citizenship. However, conceiving of autonomous spaces of inhabitance through the mobile commons highlights that domicide, which also push non-citizens out of the city like detention, entails social and political consequences that go far beyond just facilitating migrants' spatial segregation.

Building on these discussions of detention and deportation, domicidal evictions can be seen to produce citizenship in three main ways: (1) they enforce the spatial segregation of irregular migrants and produce the city as a 'pure' space inhabited by formal citizens, (2) their performative violence against non-citizens reinforces normative citizenship identities and ways of inhabiting space, and (3) they enclose spaces which the mobile commons run through to disrupt solidarity relations between groups across citizenship status and eliminate their anti-citizen politics. In addition, evictions enforce hardship, forcing irregular migrants to live outside in the mud, rain, wind, and cold, to deter them attempting clandestine border crossings from Calais, and eventually give up on the prospect of it altogether.^{ix}

As Rygiel has already shown, removing 'non-citizens' from the city also excludes them from citizenship, even in its substantive form existing beyond state prescribed status. In this way, evictions are first and foremost the means by which local authorities try to maintain Calais' city as a space of citizenship through spatially removing autonomous forms of migrant inhabitance from it. Despite the practices of migrants who already are and will continue inhabiting Calais (and who actively participate in the production of the city, appropriating its spaces to fit their needs), evictions directly and violently deny these realities and the participative claims to continue inhabiting the city that arise from them. With citizenship, according to McNevin (2012, p. 167), being about '*being there*, legitimately, in the public space, and *being seen* to be there', removing the presence of racialised irregular migrants limits who is seen to legitimately possess public space purely to its 'proper' white European citizens. Because evictions produce a distance between the citizen and its Other they foreclose opportunities for relational recognition and engagement between the two, which is the foundation of all citizen relationships (Section 2.2). Spatial segregation prevents any form of encounter between non/citizens, leaving the discursive distinctions between them unchallenge-able, and thereby reinforced.

Even if evictions in Calais do not completely remove all autonomous forms of migrants' inhabitance, they nevertheless serve to demarcate the city's boundaries as off-limits to migrants. However, they not only deny the city-space and push migrant occupations into its less visible perimeters, but they also render hyper-visible (Tyler, 2006, p. 193) people deemed to inhabit the squats and jungles when they enter and move about the city. The continuous performance of daily evictions re-affirms that 'irregular migrants' do not belong in the city, and produce migrants' bodies as 'out of place' when they become visible there. This way they can be easily spotted, intercepted, and expelled again by police.

Evictions then facilitate the spatial purity of the city in two ways. They remove what appear as the threatening presence of autonomous forms of migrant inhabitance, while maintaining a lack of migrant living spaces in the city that makes each irregular migrant, squat, or jungle that does appear deserving of suspicion and a target for elimination. Remembering the Mayor's Facebook call to urgently denounce all potential squats that citizens observe, as well as the overzealous response of citizen anti-migrant groups (page 79), it is apparent just how powerful the local authority's drive for spatial purity is, as well as the centrality of evictions to producing it.

Beyond their material and spatial consequences, evictions symbolically and affectively institute structural policies of migrant exclusion in the broader population via tactics of intimidation and fear (Brickell, Fernández Arrigoitia, and A. Vasudevan, 2017, p. 10). Remembering when Calais' Deputy Mayor passed by *Victor Hugo* to tell the 'deviant citizens' of CMS that he would 'make their lives hell' for opening the squat (page 84) and the threat of violent eviction that hung over the negotiations of the occupation of *Victor Hugo*, this intimidation and fear is a result of the 'hostile environment' of swift, violent, and repeated evictions in Calais. There exists a rhetorical conflation and feedback loop between migrants, squatting, and illegality—squatting is considered an illegal form of inhabitance while 'illegal' migrants reside in the squats (van Houtum and Aparna, 2017)—which becomes reproduced during the performative violence of evictions. The use of force by police, not to mention the punitive arrests and court cases under *flagrant delit* squatters in Calais face following eviction, can be traumatising events and entail risks that not all citizens are willing to take in order to show solidarity with irregular migrants.

The state violence and criminalisation visited upon residents of the squats and jungles then socio-symbolically prescribe normative forms of inhabitance and citizenship in addition to eliminating 'non-citizen' spatialities of home (Nowicki, 2017). They further reinforce conceptions of the 'good' citizen (those that adhere to normative forms of inhabitance, do not support migrant squats, and denounce them when they see them appear) against 'dissident' or 'degenerate' citizenships (i.e. citizens who help create legal squats or the migrant squatters themselves) (Nowicki, 2017, p. 127).

Finally, we come to perhaps the most important function of domicidal evictions as a technology of citizenship; the fact that they 'do not simply speak to an undoing of the very conditions of liveability, but of the destruction of conditions of collectivity' (Aradau, 2017, p. 74). Given the preceding discussion of anti-citizen politics and the mobile commons, evictions must be understood not only as taking away a living space, but also as breaking apart communities and friendships of solidarity in resistance to the border regime (Mould, 2017b, p. 7). This is a social and political implication rather than strictly spatial one, but is nevertheless a fundamental and intended consequence of the physical eviction of migrants' home-spaces. This was particularly illustrated in the case of Victor Hugo in which the eviction of the space itself was less a priority for the state than was the enclosure of the mobile commons and disruption of the anti-citizen solidarities between irregular migrants and CMS activists existing within it. While moving *Solid*'*R*, the newly contracted association, into the squat after CMS was evicted could perhaps be seen as allowing for continuation of the mobile commons to flow through the space, it was no longer one that was autonomous from, while directed against, the citizenship regime enforced by the state. On the contrary, Victor Hugo, once CMS was forced out, became a space in which its remaining migrant residents were subjected to *more* scrutiny regarding their movements and faced added pressure to regularise their citizenship status within France. A relationship to the state was imposed through CMS' eviction whilst previously Victor Hugo had been 'a resource... for getting by outside [and I would add *in spite*] of the state' (King, 2016, p. 35).

Victor Hugo also shows how evictions are not necessarily performed in a way that is spectacularly violent. In fact, the evictions of the women and children from *Victor Hugo* began a trend in which state-controlled housing alternatives were offered prior to and during evictions.^x Only after a protracted period of pressure and coercion against migrants to leave of their own accord does a visibly violent eviction with police occur, but one for which the remaining residents can be blamed as it was their own fault for refusing the state's previous offers of relocation and accommodation. However, it is also clear how the following repeated, and often invisible, evictions of the women and families after they had left the squatted building on *Boulevard Victor Hugo* were facilitated through the initial eviction of CMS activists. Once the resistant solidarities in the space were removed, it was easier to carry out subsequent evictions which eventually lead to the segregation of the entire Calais population of irregular migrants in the Jungle (see Subsection 7.2.1). This illustrates how evictions, particularly when targeting communities of solidarity, can multiply and reinforce one another as well as Calais as a space of citizenship.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter established eviction as a spatial technology of citizenship that not only produces Calais as a space of citizenship, but eliminates the anti-citizen politics of autonomous spaces of inhabitance while reinforcing citizenship's norms in the process. It built upon the empirical material presented in Chapter 3 which offered a longer history of evictions in Calais, and particularly explained how legal squatting created durable and persistent autonomous occupations giving space and time for the mobile commons to develop within them. The first sections defined Calais' squats and jungles as autonomous spaces of inhabitance by focusing on the relation of inhabitance and autonomy to the politics of citizenship. It showed how they created spaces outside of the citizenship regime that facilitated irregular mobilities while asserting migrants' presence to continue autonomously living in Calais. While these spaces disrupt the primacy of citizenship from determining who inhabits Calais, facilitate interpersonal relationships without reference to citizenship status categories, and are structural prefigurations of a world *beyond* citizenship, they are still entangled with it in many ways. Therefore, the concept of anti-citizenship was developed in Section 4.3 to recognise this fact but to also insist that, while difficult, the task of opposing and moving beyond citizenship remains an ethical guideline in the struggle for all to move and stay freely where they chose. The discussion in this chapter significantly skewed towards the description of Calais' autonomous spaces of inhabitance for a thesis that is primarily concerned with their erasure, yet this was warranted to understand how evictions function and the connection between space and the politics of resistance in Calais.

This chapter provides part of the answer to RQ2 by describing how the exclusionary intervention of eviction produces and spatialises citizenship, however evictions do not occur by themselves, but are often a precondition for the other domicidal interventions to take place. While destruction and securitisation have the purpose of making evictions permanent, they also function in particular ways beyond those presented in Section 4.4. These will be elaborated on in the coming empirical and analytical chapters to continue answering RQ1 and RQ2. Yet, by looking at destructions (Chapter 5) and securitisations (Chapter 7), it will also be shown how citizenship itself is being reconfigured in Calais outside the hegemonic modern form linked to nation-state status (with its associated norms) that has, until now, been the focus of discussion. The analytical chapters accompanying those will thus also contribute to answering RQ2 and RQ3 by illustrating how emergent forms of humanitarian (Chapter 6) and environmental (Chapter 8) citizenship produced by destructions and securitisations are likewise premised upon the racialised exclusions of citizenship in Calais, and therefore ultimately fail to provide alternative foundation for a community of solidarity between citizens in Calais and the city's population of 'non-citizen' irregular migrants (RQ4).

Notes

- i. This is discussed further in Section 6.3 but a few examples include the registration of *Victor Hugo's* former residents to 'establish their situation' before directing them 'towards more appropriate solutions' from page 85, and the residents of the container camp built in the Jungle who were required to submit their hand-prints to access it (Chrisafis, 2016; Rosello, 2016; Ticktin, 2016a).
- ii. However, there have been criticisms, notably by Stephan Scheel (2013, 2019), of the tendency to overemphasise migration's ability to escape technologies of control and capture, insisting that mobility remains entangled with control in many ways.
- iii. For analysis of CMS' cop-watch activities producing and circulating evidence of police violence in the public sphere see James Ellison (2019). 'Contested Evidence: Visual Representations of Border Violence in Calais, France'. PhD Thesis. Loughborough University.
- iv. Emphasising migrations' autonomy as well as the mobile commons are undeniably important interventions into positivist migration studies approaches, but could be greatly strengthened through incorporating decolonial readings of the experiences of migration. One example here centring the important of race and irregular migrants' generational experiences of coloniality to complicate the concept of the mobile commons in Calais is Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe (Apr. 26, 2016). When Commoning Strategies Travel: (In)Visible Cities, Clandestine Migrations and Mobile Commons. URL: https://www.eurozine.com/when-common ning-strategies-travel/ (visited on May 9, 2020).
- v. In a particularly salient example, Rigby and Schlembach (2013, p. 158) show how even during the 2009 No Border Camp citizenship remained 'a way of defining and policing the borders of who and what could count as political'. The 'proper' political actions organised during the camp (e.g. a large public demonstration, symbolic actions like an activist gluing himself the Mairie, or spreading leaflets in the city centre) were limited to European 'activist' citizens. This was in many ways the result state of efforts to restrict migrants from protesting in the actions organised by the No Border Camp, enforced by police ID control checkpoints around the camp and at the demonstrations. Not presenting a passport in these instances resulted in not being able to participate in the action and possible arrest which restricted the possibility of protest to citizens able to produce their papers. Yet, these 'political' protest actions that performed a spectacular and visible opposition to the border were further contrasted against the actions of migrants clandestinely traversing the border. Despite No Border activists' politics of solidarity, the privileging of their actions as political because they reproduced familiar forms of 'political activism' excluded migrants who were unable to engage in them, while framing their actions as apolitical. In this way Tyerman (forthcoming) states that the activists not only reproduced the 'legitimacy of the citizenship order' but further 'ended up policing the borders of political participation to the exclusion of those they sought to stand in solidarity with'.
- vi. Undoubtedly these spaces *are* focused on resisting and subverting the mobility restrictions of many of their residents, and this priority means that other forms of oppression can be reproduced within them (English, 2017a). For example, King (2016, p. 113) remarks that there were still gendered and racialised divisions of labour in terms of who performed the cleaning versus security roles in *Victor Hugo*, and throughout the period of legal squats these spaces were almost always occupied by people who had the citizenship privileges (though not always exclusively) that were being used to defend the occupation in formal legal procedures.

- vii. As an example, one of *Victor Hugo's* CMS residents describes holding organisational meetings amongst inhabitants where conflicting views about how the space should be run, and particularly how gendered violence should be dealt with, were discussed and disagreements had which went in to shaping the rules for the house (Anonymous quoted in King, 2016, p. 113).
- viii. Calais' autonomous spaces of inhabitance, and jungles in particular, are often described as 'camps' beginning with, though sometimes moving beyond, Agamben's (1998) theory of the camp and the state of exception (Hagan, 2018; Katz, 2017; Mattei, 2016; Mould, 2017a; Rigby and Schlembach, 2013; Rygiel, 2011). According to William Walters (2008, p. 184) (who cites many other authors in this vein), Agamben's aim in theorising the camp with regards to migration was to 'map the ways in which contemporary programmes of immigration control, and the regimes of citizenship which underpin them, ensnare "irregular migrants" in an indeterminate space (the camp) that is neither fully inside nor outside the social and legal order'. The camp provides a useful spatial metaphor for understanding the function of sovereign power which performs exclusion by relegating the inhabitants of that space to a depoliticised form of life in a similar way to what can be seen in detention. This depoliticisation, and reduction to 'bare life', is done through the sovereign's withdrawal of responsibility towards a space by enacting a state of exception within it, rather than enacting total control over it. Positioning people as within a territory but politically outside it, beyond the obligations of the state, produces them as vulnerable and allows for biopolitical (or perhaps more accurately necropolitical (Mbembe, 2019)) interventions of domination into their lives without recourse. The camp is thus not a pure space of exclusion, but rather an ambiguous inside/outside space not fully incorporated nor cast out. Though a very productive theoretical lens for thinking through the politics of Calais' squats and jungles, theories of 'the camp' do not feature much in this thesis due my preference for 'autonomous spaces of inhabitance' to better describe the politics of these spaces in relation to citizenship, and because I focus on the erasure of camp spaces through active domicidal state interventions as opposed to state abandonment as a political technology of citizenship.
- ix. While this is also undoubtedly a part of evictions, this aspect of domicide is better encapsulated by 'Destructions', and therefore presented in Chapter 5.
- x. This development is extensively discussed in Chapter 5 as 'carrot-and-stick domicide' and is clearly observable in both the eviction of the Jungle (see Subsection 7.2.3) as well as the constant hyperactive campaign of destruction the jungles face today.

Chapter 5

Post-Jungle hyper-cycles of destruction

5.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an account of the daily systematic destruction of migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance which emerged following the destruction of the Jungle in late 2016. While the data analysed here remains incomplete, what numbers are available are startling. An internal police report shows that, between May and August 2017, 80 'anti-squat'¹ operations took place destroying 195 migrant occupations total (Diaz et al., 2017, p. 32). Then there is a gap between this report and when HRO began to systematically record evictions; however, their numbers show that between 2 November 2017 and 1 September 2019 (the end date of my research period) there were at least 1,071 separate domicidal operations carried out by police.ⁱ The overwhelming majority of these were destructions of jungles, and *not* of squatted buildings.

The digital counter-map (Figure 10) shows how these post-Jungle domicidal operations shifted exclusively to the outskirts of the city and take place across just a handful of separate locations. Some of these have been evicted dozens of times while others, such as *Zone du Virval* and *Verrotières* (discussed in Section 5.3), have been evicted hundreds of times. By comparison, between 2009-17, CMS only recorded 220 acts of eviction, destruction, *and* securitisation spread over more than 60 separate locations, with many in Calais' city centre.

This notable increase in the frequency of domicide reflects the French state's efforts to prevent another large migrant occupation like the Jungle from ever recurring. Following its 2016 eviction, *Ministère de l'Intèrieur* Gerard Collomb stated he 'did not want a jungle to happen in Calais again' and that there would be no *points de fixation* (spaces where migrants could congregate, settle, or access services) in Calais (France 24, 2017). This policy of no *points de fixation* combines the previous policies of 'no New Sangatte' (Section 3.2) and 'zero squats in Calais' (Subsection 3.3.3) to deny migrants fixed areas for the distribution of food or other provisions (like showers) as well as accommodation infrastructure necessary to live in the city (*lieux de vie*), whether they

¹ Their term 'anti-squat' refers to operations against all types of autonomous occupation, and is slightly confusing considering these operations exclusively targeted small encampments, and not squatted buildings.

be autonomous, like squats and jungles, or state sanctioned, like the *Centre Jules Ferry* (Aradau and Tazzioli, 2020, p. 218). Yet, this fear of a new Jungle also means that the *materiality* of migrant camps has come to be considered a serious threat in and of itself. While irregular migrants still remain present in Calais despite constant attempts to definitively expel them, authorities' attention has shifted to eradicating the autonomous infrastructures which sustain their presence.

The constant destructions of the comparatively tiny encampments after the Jungle (which usually consist of, at most, a few dozen tents) is meant to be a continual 'pre-emptive strike' against another large and visibly spectacular jungle materially, symbolically, and affectively. In fact, given how frequently these jungles are attacked and destroyed, it is difficult to even speak of them as camps. Instead Maria Hagan (2020) conceives of them as 'contingent camps' trapped 'in a constant state of becoming and unbecoming'; spaces which, although inhabited, are denied the kind of thick material existence which allow them to be recognised as camps or provide their inhabitants with proper shelter or a home. The durability and thickness in migrants' spaces of inhabitance, shown in Chapter 3 to be a feature of previous squats and jungles, has today become the worst case scenario for authorities in Calais. Although the purported 'migrant crisis' of 2014-16 has died off, avoiding another Jungle today comes at any cost, and is the preferred justification for the previously unprecedented campaign of domicidal erasure facing migrants in the city over recent years.

5.1.1 Chapter outline

This chapter is divided into three main sections. Section 5.2 describes the post-Jungle landscape of destruction for migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance which, at the end of the research period, were being evicted every 48 hours. Referencing Subsection 3.3.1 on *flagrant delit*, it shows how the 48 hour time period went from being a legal strategy originally used by CMS squatters to prevent evictions, to now dictating the exhaustive pace of domicide facing Calais' migrants today. With local authorities constantly fearing the establishment of a 'new Jungle', today's camps are destroyed as quickly as possible to prevent them from growing and providing durable homes and infrastructure to illegalised migrants or allowing for anti-citizen political solidarities to emerge within them. Following this description of current destruction patterns, one site, Verrotières, is discussed in detail. Section 5.3 presents the repetitive history of destruction in this location, beginning with the Pashtun jungle destruction in 2009 and ending with its final eviction in March 2019. The chapter ends in Section 5.4 with a description of the offer of temporary accommodation that has recently begun accompanying destructions. Together, this accommodation offer and the hyper-cycles of destruction that migrants face today are and example of what I describe as 'carrot-andstick' domicide. This, not only, prevents jungles from forming into durable homes, but directs migrants into state controlled accommodation designed to bring them within the citizenship regime.

5.2 Anatomy and development of post-Jungle domicide

5.2.1 Patterns of destruction

Recent domicidal operations in Calais follow consistent patterns both in how they are carried out and in their scheduling. To paraphrase HRO's (2019b) detailed description from the report Forced evictions in Calais and Grand-Synthe, the evictions and destructions of migrants' jungles today proceed like this: A convoy of riot police (either CRS or Gendarmerie Mobile) arrive with the Police aux frontières (PAF), forensic police from the Commissariat de police à Calais, representatives from the Préfecture, and members of the city of Calais' 'cleaning team'² (although sometimes one or more of these latter groups do not attend). Residents of the camp are then moved outside a 'security perimeter' riot police create around the camp, and are often asked to identify themselves to the PAF (which can lead to arrest, detention, and deportation). The Préfecture representatives are supposedly there to give information about claiming asylum in France and direct migrants into the state hosting circuits (see Sections 5.4 and 6.3), but HRO volunteers and the migrants themselves state these representatives often just observe the police operations (L'Auberge des Migrants, 2018, p. 5). Since August 2018 evictees are often allowed to take their tents, clothes, and bedding with them as they leave the area, but any items left within the police cordon are confiscated by the 'cleaning team', who wear boiler-suits and masks, to be taken away to the *déchèterie* (dump). The frequency of these destructions mean that people are often prepared for them, pre-emptively moving themselves and their belongings beyond where police will establish the perimeter. However, this is not always the case. HRO's report further details how, many times, belongings are lost and destroyed when someone forgets it is an eviction day, is incapable of moving their belongings, or not present to do so. Once the police and other workers have left, migrants re-occupy the site and re-establish their camps, sometimes within minutes.

Before this pattern was formalised, HRO's report from April 2018 (ibid.) state that there were two types of domicidal operation which would occur on a weekly basis; one of coordinated eviction and destruction and another more spontaneous and punitive. The coordinated operations proceeded in roughly the way as described above except without the possibility for migrants' to take things with them. On occasion migrants would be allowed to collect some belongings, but never tents, tarps, or other materials used to construct shelters. These coordinated operations were larger, more formal, and often coincided with when migrants would be away attending morning food distributions. The spontaneous and punitive destructions on the other hand were carried out in the middle of the night or before dawn by just a handful of CRS. In

² A rhetorical shift took place in late 2017 in which 'anti-squat' operations—the destruction of the camp, and the confiscation and disposal by city workers of the migrants' tents and shelters—became described as 'cleanings'. The police on the ground have also echoed this shift. For example, a policeman told an HRO volunteer that their sole purpose was to 'protect the cleaning agents' during a domicidal operation on 5 February 2019. The racist underpinning of cleaning as a euphemism for domicide is the subject of Section 8.4.

these cases, the CRS entered into the camps while inhabitants were asleep, and went about destroying shelters, blankets, clothes, and other belongings with sharp objects, truncheons, and CS gas (*L'Auberge des Migrants*, 2018, p. 5). The way both of these types of destruction operation were carried out (not only were they incredibly violent, but migrants could not recover any of their belongings or save any of their shelter material) were well-documented, and created flash-points of resistance (see Subsection 5.3.2), sedimented resentment towards the police amongst the migrants, and led to denunciations in the media by human rights organisations (Human Rights Watch, 2017; *L'Auberge des Migrants* et al., 2018, pp. 20–24).

Based on these strong reactions from inhabitants and the condemnation of confiscations, destructions, and repression by associations in the media (Boussemart, 2019b), authorities reacted by allowing migrants to keep their personal belongings during camp destructions *so long as those items could be taken with them* (field notes, HRO interview 17 January 2019).ⁱⁱ While not confiscating or destroying evictee's belongings can be seen as a positive development in how police carry out their domicidal operations, HRO (2019b, p. 3) points out that this tactical shift was, in fact, defined by 'a clear surge in the frequency of evictions since August 2018, after which evictions have started occurring on a 48 hour basis'. Although now allowing migrants to retain some of their belongings, the schedule of destructions has become merciless and does not pause for weekends, holidays, or even dangerous weather. HRO describe them as:

[occurring] every day and follow[ing] a precise programme. Four living sites are targeted by these evictions; two on one morning, and the second two the following morning, after which the cycle returns to the first two sites. Each site is thus evicted every 48 hours (ibid., p. 3).

Together, the increased frequency and the rhetorical framing of 'cleanings'³ seen since August 2018 have effectively normalised these domicidal operations, removed the contentious blanket destruction of belongings provoking the strongest resistances, and overall kept migrants in the most precarious state of existence Calais has ever seen. This accomplishes two goals simultaneously. The increased frequency ensures the continued hardship of migrants inhabiting Calais' jungles and pre-empts larger, more durable, jungles from re-emerging which would better sustain inhabitants, while the routine and slightly more 'reasonable' appearance of these destructions prevent larger conflicts from emerging around them which could lead to overt violence from the police (see page 126) and further denunciations from NGOs in the press.

However, this shift also represents a certain admission of failure from the authorities that domicide effectively prevents irregular migrants from coming to and staying in Calais. In previous years, particularly before the Jungle, domicide was intended to be the definitive 'end-point' of a particular occupation, after which evictees would disperse and establish other places to live. Even if this was often not the case, and

³ The state claims to only confiscate and destroy those items which are not claimed and removed from the site by the migrants themselves (thus able to be considered waste); however, in Sections 7.4.1 and 8.4 this is shown to not necessarily be true.

the same spaces were eventually re-occupied and evicted again, these cycles were much slower. Now destructions have become violent rituals defining daily life within Calais' jungles. They are performed as an end in themselves without aspiring to terminate the occupations or presume any lasting effects.ⁱⁱⁱ Today less emphasis is placed on ending the occupations outright (i.e. migrants are able to re-occupy their evicted spaces within minutes of police having left, and the same locations are being evicted hundreds of times), nor with arresting all inhabitants like before. Rather the objective has become *containing* these camps, keeping them outside of the city centre, limiting their growth, and denying inhabitants the autonomous infrastructures needed to survive and create mobile commons within them.

Destroying anything that cannot be moved every two days prevents any more durable, permanent, or fixed structures from being built. Massimo De Angelis (2019, pp. 7–8) terms this the 'hyper-cycle' of state enclosure in which the state temporally accelerates its processes of decomposition in response to migrants' perpetual return so as to maintain their camps in conditions of material precarity. The political implications of this enforced precarity are elaborated upon in Chapter 6; however, for now, it is enough to contextualise the acceleration of today's destructions as a strategy to limit the camps' growth, normalise destructions so as to prevent negative mediatisation or consolidations of resistance, while 'making life unlivable' for irregular migrant inhabitants in Calais (Tyerman, 2016, pp. 84–86).

Despite authorities' hopes that daily destructions will have a deterrent effect, this is not necessarily the case, and has even been shown to back-fire. Many irregular migrants subjected to the systematic daily violence of the destructive hyper-cycles have become even more resolute in their desires to leave France and cross to the UK. Their treatment in Calais becomes representative for them of France and French people, and they come to believe that their freedom depends upon leaving the country. Paradoxically, the repetitive domicide designed as a deterrent can in fact mean migrants end up *staying* in Calais to continue trying to cross rather than enter into a process of settling, and regularising their citizenship status, in France (Hagan, 2019, p. 65).

5.2.2 Legal justifications and the temporality of hyper-cycles

HRO (2019b, p. 3) state these daily domicidal operations lack clear legal justification, and that both the police and *Préfecture* refuse to effectively communicate their justification to evictees and association volunteers if one exists. Their logs show that when police are asked to provide a legal explanation for their actions, the response is often simply 'comme d'habitude (as usual)', or they refer to the existence of a *requisition* (warrant) for the operation but decline to show it. Other responses recorded by HRO include 'opération de police' (police operation), 'propriété privée' (private property), and 'flagrance' (being 'caught in the act'). Individual police officers also frequently direct HRO's interrogator to another authority like the *Procurer* or *Préfecture* for answers. While the explanations of habit or 'police operation' amount to tautological descriptions rather than legal justifications, the other responses require more attention and are

important to consider in reference to the discussion of legal squat evictions presented in Subsection 3.3.1.

HRO's affiliated association, *L'Auberge des Migrants*, analysed French property law on evictions and compared it to police practice in Calais. As a reminder, evictions cannot be performed without a court decision based on the owner's complaint in cases of occupied private property. However, in the occupation of public land *L'Auberge des Migrants* (2018, p. 7) point out a number of complexities. These cases are dealt with by the administrative courts which must decide if the proposed expulsion meets the criteria of *urgency* or *utility*, except when the occupation poses a risk to public security, public order, or the public health of a city (Slingenberg and Bonneau, 2017, p. 342). In those cases, the mayor or the regional *Préfet*) can authorise an eviction without going through the judiciary. However, the administration cannot use force to evict the occupation unless authorisation is given by the court or it is an 'emergency situation'. In all cases expulsion measures must be proportionate.

L'Auberge des Migrants and HRO state that for all the domicidal operations they witnessed following the destruction of the Jungle there was never a judge's decision, municipal, nor prefectoral decree presented. The one time they do record police providing a legal document in justification of their actions, it was in fact a *requisition* from the public prosecutor allowing for ID controls to be conducted at a number of locations in Calais, but which did *not* permit evictions, destructions, nor confiscations.

The French ombudsman *le Défenseur des Droits* (DDD) (2018, p. 56) has also denounced recent domicidal operations in Calais for taking place under a 'vague legal framework'. However, this office, due to its position within French government, got further than HRO volunteers in ascertaining how the *Préfecture* was actually justifying them. During interviews the DDD performed in June and July 2018, the *Préfecture* specified the domicidal operations were being carried out under the authority of the *Procurer de la République* (public prosecutor) based on *flagrant delit* (ibid., p. 58).

Flagrant delit has already been discussed extensively in Subsection 3.3.1 as an article of criminal law used to evict legal squats in Calais before a case against the occupation could be heard in court. However, according to the DDD, *flagrant delit* is also being misapplied to justify the routine evictions and destructions of migrants' camps today, again circumventing the civil courts. While the charge of criminal damage is used to evict and arrest squatters and wall-off the house while they are in police custody (see Subsection 3.3.1), the camp evictions discussed above are instead justified through owner complaints or the criminalisation of 'establishing a dwelling on municipal land'. Citing case law, the DDD in the December 2018 report states 'the criminal law cannot be used, unless it is diverted from its objective, to constitute exclusively a mode of expulsion' (ibid., p. 58). The text continues by pointing out that by using *flagrant delit*, the public authorities in Calais deprive the evictees of accommodation support while foregoing their obligations to provide that support. Without a clear legal explanation, evictions and destructions can also not be legally contested nor redressed.

Also similar to the illegal eviction of legal squats, HRO volunteers state that during most destruction operations (even when attended by forensics police) there is usually no attempt from authorities to gather evidence of the occupation or how long it existed despite using *flagrant delit* to justify evictions. Also, arrests and charges for the criminal acts under which *flagrant delit* comes into effect as the justification for domicide are rare. Only in cases where people try to squat buildings are there charges following eviction and arrest in post-Jungle Calais. This lack of effort expended to collect evidence with which to prosecute the 'crimes' that lead to eviction through *flagrant delit* reiterates that local authorities are abusing the criminal code to accomplish evictions and destructions when they want. Thus, the 48 hour window attached to *flagrant delit* in cases of squatting has come to determine the exhaustive pace of destructions today, and is no longer a tool to resist evictions and facilitate durable occupations as when CMS first used it to create a legal squats.

The idea held by authorities that they have 48 hours to intervene under *flagrant delit* is why current evictions and destructions take place at the frequency they do, and why these operations never stop, not even for holidays or blizzards (Human Rights Observers, 2019b). They fear if occupations continue for longer than 48 hours the legal framework for immediate intervention would disappear (remember Bouchart's quote from page 79) and the legality of the occupation could become a matter for the civil courts to decide. The time before the case would be heard would be time where the occupation is legally protected from domicide, and could thus grow, both materially and in terms of population. Today's 48 hour 'hyper-cycle' (De Angelis, 2019) ensures not only the material precarity of jungles and exhaustion of their inhabitants, but also pre-empts access to a legal framework under which occupations might be defended in court.

This shows how in some ways the camp's materiality is the actual the target of these destructions. Authorities' desire to prevent the growth of the camp, and the need for large scale spectacularised evictions which could gather more resistance, is their primary concern. The current domicidal routine, recently made more palatable by migrants' keeping their tents if they move them themselves, serves the authorities' aim of no *points de fixation* as well as denying migrants' durable autonomous spaces of inhabitance regardless of the huge amount of money and police resources these daily operations require.

5.2.3 Locating destruction

In addition to the spike in the frequency of destructions, there has also been a notable shift in the location where these domicidal operations take place. Looking at the counter-map in Figure 10, before 2015 evictions predominantly occurred within the city centre as well as two jungles on its outskirts (one in the south-west by the Eurotunnel terminal and one in the north-east by the old hover-port). On the other hand, post-Jungle domicide is almost exclusively located on the eastern outskirts of town, with a few exceptions in the city. While *La Lande* itself has not been reoccupied



FIGURE 10: Map of domicide between 16 August 2016 and 21 July 2021. Note the frequency of destructions on the timeline at the bottom, and the dispersion of domicidal events to Calais' outskirts.

due to its securitisation as a nature reserve (see Chapters 7 and 8), many of the places along *Rue des Garennes* have. Ironically, these are the same locations evicted in April 2015 that concentrated all migrants into *La Lande* when creating the Jungle (see Subsection 7.2.1). There is a cyclical nature to these occupations, not only in the short-term with evictions, destructions, and reoccupations occurring daily, but also over numbers of years as spaces fall in and out of use due to popularity or securitisation.

Furthermore, almost all of the over 1,000 destructions since 2017 have been of outdoor camps with the exception of one house and a couple of warehouses. This shows how squatting houses in Calais has fallen out of practice despite its prevalence before 2015. This is likely a result of the hard line taken by local authorities towards migrant squats, as well as the illegal evictions of legally squatted dwellings discussed in Chapter 3. However, this is also because, in addition to the immediate eviction of migrant squats once they became public, open air fields became the only spaces left for migrants to inhabit. Even though most squatted buildings in the city were derelict and in states of disrepair, they nevertheless represented a space in the city that belonged to its 'proper' citizens. Migrants' appropriation of these buildings committed a symbolic trespass on the city as a 'space of citizenship', and additionally disturbed the victimising and dehumanising image of the vulnerable refugee living in a squalid camp used to justify the state's 'humanitarian interventions' (see Section 6.3). Therefore, most vacant buildings that migrants have squatted in the past, or could squat again, have been secured with their entrances becoming walled off with wood or breeze blocks (Figure 7, Figure 11, & Passeurs d'hospitalités, 2014a,b,c). Securitisation is further discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8; however, for the moment it is necessary to understand



FIGURE 11: Author's photo of the BCMO, former cold weather shelter, after the eviction and securitisation of its awning. The graffiti reads 'ACAB' and 'Les frontières tuent. Nos morts vous hanterant. (Borders kill. Our deaths will haunt you.)'

that the relatively small number of camp-spaces which have seen the vast majority of repeated destructions since 2017 are due to the dwindling number of other spaces available in Calais for migrants to occupy.

These domicidal operations which result, not only in the destruction of a camp, but the inability of migrants to re-inhabit evicted spaces are described by HRO (2019b) as *permanent* evictions and are distinguished from the *recurrent* evictions of the 48 hour hyper-cycles discussed so far. Between August 2018 and June 2019 HRO counted eight total 'permanent evictions' that occurred either as interventions of securitisation or destruction. One was the demolition of a squatted house, another four consisted of the installation of barbed wire and fencing, there was the boarding up (again) of the BCMO in the city centre (see Figure 11), and finally there was the removal of trees and shrubs across from the associations' warehouse in Marck where migrants often took shelter. One of those four fenced off sites was the motorway bridge seen in Figure 23, another was the Bois Chico Mendes seen in Figure 29, while another was the site between Rue des Verrotières and Chemin du Pont-Trouille discussed in Section 5.3. Since the release of HRO's reports there have been more of these 'permanent evictions' taking away more spaces that migrants can inhabit, particularly in the eastern industrial area surrounding Rue des Verrotières, which has the result of concentrating them in even fewer locations.iv

5.3 Destroying Verrotières' jungles

Having given a general impression of the current daily hyper-cycle of eviction and destruction, this section describes one site that has been repeatedly involved in this cycle since 2009. *Verrotières* is a small field between *Rue des Verrotières* and *Chemin du*



FIGURE 12: Police operation to evict the Pashtun jungle on 22 September 2009. Photo credit Remy de la Mauviniere/Associated Press.

Pont-Trouille located on the eastern outskirts of Calais, slightly less than two kilometres west of where the *La Lande* Jungle was. Just to the north is the Tioxide chemical factory while to the west, on the other side of *Chemin du Pont-Trouille*, is *Bois Dubrulle*. Throughout its history, occupations occurred closer to one or the other end of this area, but this section will treat the whole space as one location. The case of *Verrotières* not only illustrates an example of the site-specific cyclical histories of occupation and erasure this research has sought to uncover, but also other elements, including; how large evictions attempt to cleanse Calais of migrants entirely; how securitisations prevent re-occupations; how landscaping is used to deny migrants' potential natural shelters; and why humanitarian accommodation now accompanies domicide in Calais.

5.3.1 2009 Pashtun jungle

Following the closure of Sangatte in 2002, migrants who had dispersed throughout Calais began exclusively living autonomously in squats and jungles (Subsection 3.2.1). By 2009 there were more than 1,000 migrants from many different countries, and al-though they inhabited a number of different squats and jungles then, the largest was the 'Pashtun jungle' in the east of the city close to *Rue des Verrotières*. Prefacing the racist and euphemistic rhetoric that would come to define domicidal operations a decade later, France's then Minister of Immigration, Éric Besson, visited Calais to declare his plan to 'clean Calais' beginning with the highly mediatised destruction of this jungle, after which he would evict the rest of the city's migrant squats (*Calais, Face à La Frontière* 2017, p. 60). *Verrotières* was again one of the primary sites inhabited by migrants following the Jungle's 2016 eviction, and the cycles of occupation and eviction that it has seen over the last decade are representative of many other spaces in Calais, for example the BCMO or the 'Sudanese jungle' close to the Eurotunnel.

The initial police operation to evict *Verrotières* began on 22 September 2009 just before 7:30 in the morning. The jungle's inhabitants, mostly Afghan Pashtuns, went to the perimeter and stood behind signs and banners they had made. One read 'The jungle is our house. Plz don't destroy it. If you do so then where is the place to go?' With helicopters overhead, more than 300 French police broke through the perimeter established by the residents and solidarity activists and began making arrests (CMS, 2009). 'They beat their way into the crowd, snatched, grabbing, and pulled people to the ground while migrants and solidarity activists tried to stop them' (Tyerman, 2016, p. 89). In addition to the solidarity activists there were also journalists surrounding the scene and covering events. A total of 278 arrests happened that morning, and arrestees were loaded onto police buses and taken out of the city to police stations and detention centres across the region (Rossignol, 2009).

After the eviction, bulldozers began destroying all the structures that had been built up over the course of the jungle's life. In statements given after the eviction Besson admitted: 'This operation is not aimed at the migrants themselves. It's aimed at the logistical infrastructure and mafia-style networks of the people traffickers' (ibid.). People smugglers are often scapegoated in police operations against illegalised migrants (De Genova, 2015b), but Besson's description of the jungle's 'logistical infrastructure' as an equally serious threat is particularly notable.

At the time this destruction was just one of many domicidal operations to 'clean' Calais, although it was the most spectacular. To quote Besson again: 'today is an extremely important operation: it is the main camp, but there will be more dismantling today and in the days to come' (*Le Monde*, 2009). These events in 2009 foreshadowed those of 2016 in which the Jungle's destruction was again followed by an attempt to eliminate all migrant spaces of inhabitance throughout Calais (see Subsection 7.2.3). The next time *Verrotières* would be evicted it was not as the main jungle, as it was that day, but rather as one of a patchwork of squatted spaces to which the migrants dispersed from the Jungle returned in 2017.

5.3.2 The post-Jungle hyper-cycle

Again I am discussing two sites (*Rue des Verrotières* and *Chemin du Pont-Trouille*) on my digital counter-map essentially as one here because the land between them is contiguous and the final eviction and securitisation of these spaces took place together. *Chemin du Pont-Trouille* borders this parcel of land to the west, and is closer to where the 2009 Pashtun jungle was. *Rue des Verrotières* is on the eastern side and became one of the association's main food distribution locations after the Jungle's eviction in 2016 when distributions in the city centre were banned (Gentleman, 2018). During this time people slept in the fields, sometimes with tents and sometimes without, in between distributions, and police destroying their shelters were a fixture of many mornings.

Figures 13-16 show the Google Street View images from *Chemin du Pont-Trouille* facing the area which migrants lived. These snapshots from July 2008, June 2009, August 2013, and October 2014 show a number of interesting geographical developments



FIGURE 13: 2008 Google Street View image. *Chemin du Pont-Trouille* facing east.



FIGURE 14: 2009 Google Street View image. *Chemin du Pont-Trouille* Facing east.

over time. In Figure 13, from 2008, there are still many trees and bushes on the site and the path leading in to the forested area is quite narrow. Figure 14 from 2009 gives us the first glimpse of the jungle that exists within. Here five people are gathered around a fountain washing and collecting water. The path leading to the jungle has expanded and is clearly defined, implying lots of foot traffic in and out. This image was taken three months before the 2009 eviction. Figure 15 from 2013 is most notable due to the absence of trees and water fountain on the site. The woods have been destroyed following the eviction in 2009 and there are only smaller shrubs on the land. Figure 16, from 2014, shows the same starkness as 2013 but with a person sitting on the curb watching Google's car drive past. Behind the camera's perspective is *Bois Dubrulle*, where one of the main jungles is at this time that was destroyed in April 2015 as the *La Lande* Jungle formed.

These photos make clear how, over time, the area's inhabitance by migrants ebbed



FIGURE 15: 2013 Google Street View image. *Chemin du Pont-Trouille* facing east.



FIGURE 16: 2014 Google Street View image. *Chemin du Pont-Trouille* facing east.

and flowed. It culminated in Summer 2009 and then, following the domicide and landscaping to take away the possibility of future encampments, drifts off. My digital counter-cartography shows *Verrotières* has been evicted more than 100 times: once in 2009 and then the rest between December 2017 and 12 March 2019. My photograph from Spring 2019 (Figure 22) also shows this same space following its 'permanent eviction', and offers a better view of the recent landscaping that has taken place. The shrubs have once again been cut down, and now just to the right of the bus station is a big sand dune made as bulldozers moved the soil around following destructions and landscaping. In the distance are the two electricity towers marking the eastern site of *Rue des Verrotières*.

Figures 17-20 show the other side of this field which was only inhabited after the eviction of the Jungle from the perspective of *Rue des Verrotières*. The images from 2017 and 2018 provide a first impression of the camp's materiality. In the right of



FIGURE 17: 2008 Google Street View image. *Rue des Verrotières* facing west.



FIGURE 18: 2013 Google Street View image. *Rue des Verrotières* facing west.

the frame of Figure 19, behind the pylon, one can see blankets and tarps lining the black fence. There are no tents. Figure 20 not only shows how *Verrotières* became an important place for distributions by associations (different charities came throughout the day giving food, clothing, access to WiFi, information, healthcare etc.), but what the site looked like at its peak. There are many more people, and all along the black fence are relatively large tents, not just piles of tarps and blankets. My photograph from Spring 2019 (Figure 21), shows how the space has been securitised following the final eviction. The fence that was set many metres from the road has been moved forward. The space in which distributions used to be carried out, and where people slept through the nights has been blocked off.

The more than 150 recorded police operations across this single field (141 on the *Rue des Verrotières* side and 32 on the *Chemin du Pont-Trouille* side) are an astounding number. The rate of eviction and destruction here is not only brutally exhausting to



FIGURE 19: 2017 Google Street View image. *Rue des Verrotières* facing west.



FIGURE 20: 2018 Google Street View image. *Rue des Verrotières* facing west.

the migrants it targets, but denies them the ability to construct shelters against Calais' rain, wind, and cold, not to mention build proper homes. These operations are violent in and of themselves, though sometimes they are particularly violent (usually as a result of resistance to the domicide being put up by the inhabitants). In *Verrotières*, a particular example of the gratuitous police violence often accompanying these evictions and destructions took place on 25 January 2018.

Based on first-hand accounts published in HRO reports (2019b; 2018), a protest began in response to an eviction when police refused to let evictees collect their belongings that quickly escalated. According to one eyewitness, the police line was out in the field and behind them were city workers clearing the tents from the woods and putting them into a truck. All the evicted migrants were gathering by the electricity pylons. The CRS began to fire tear gas grenades at the group to disperse it. One person climbed up the pylon and threatened to jump if police came any closer.^v The



FIGURE 21: Author's photograph from 2019. *Rue des Verrotières* facing west after final eviction and installation of fencing.

police continued firing tear gas and rubber bullets as the air filled with smoke. One eyewitness recalled:

I saw through the smoke a boy being carried by his friends, covered in blood. He had been hit in the eye and they had no way of getting him to hospital. A vehicle drove through and they got him to hospital but I found out later that he lost his eye. His friends were crying; it was a group of minors and the boy himself was 16. (*L'Auberge des Migrants*, 2018, p. 16)

In this case it was a 16 year old minor from Eritrea who lost his eye, sense of smell, and hearing in one ear after being shot in the face with a rubber bullet by a policeman at a distance of 10-15 metres (*L'Auberge des Migrants* et al., 2018, p. 15). By the end of the police operation that day he was only one of four people injured and taken to hospital (*L'Auberge des Migrants*, 2018, p. 24). As these resistances, and the repressive police violence they incurred, became mediatised, authorities routinised destructions; making them more frequent but allowing evictees a short period of time to recover their belongings (Subsection 5.2.1). This routine persisted until the *Verrotières* site was finally evicted, destroyed, and securitised so that it could not be re-inhabited.

5.3.3 Final eviction

The final eviction of *Rue des Verrotières* and *Chemin du Pont-Trouille* took place on Tuesday 12 March 2019. Only a few days prior, notices had been put up on the site informing residents of a court decision authorising the eviction. Described previously, the daily and routine evictions usually occurred without these administrative decisions; however, in this case the authorities went through proper channels to get the legal authorisation for the operation. The eviction notice was only written in French and declared the primary reason for eviction as the land being private property. Yet, it also cited the migrant occupations on the terrain as posing 'serious problems for security, salubrity, and tranquillity and undermining human dignity' (my translation). This was justified by stating that migrants stayed in the open air or in tents without sanitary facilities or facilities for the disposal of used water and waste, and further mentioned that the site was strewn with litter (points of further analysis in Chapter 8).

There is a certain cynicism in the authorities' instrumentalisation of the material conditions in which irregular migrants are forced to live in Calais against them to make the case for eliminating their autonomous spaces of inhabitance, thus worsening those very conditions. Having forced them to live in indignity^{vi} the authorities cite the 'undermining of human dignity' for which they are directly responsible to justify further 'undignified' domicidal actions.^{vii} Rather than contribute to more dignified living circumstances, defined on their own terms, for *Verrotières*' inhabitants, authorities cite the lack of basic amenities which they themselves have continually denied Calais' migrant population to prove the occupation unfit and dangerous (a strategy not particular to *Verrotières* as Chapters 6 and 8 will show).

The final eviction of *Verrotières* took place relatively calmly without much press coverage, many witnesses, nor resistance (InfoMigrants, 2019). Most inhabitants had already moved away in the preceding days as the eviction was expected, and just under 50 of the total 200 people who had lived there were expelled in the operation. When the eviction occurred, *Verrotières* was once again the largest occupation existing in Calais, yet with significantly fewer people and less infrastructure than in 2009. Those who were on site were sent by bus to the state run temporary accommodation centres in northern France outside of Calais (see Section 5.4). HRO (2019b) volunteers stated that those people who did not want get onto the buses were arrested and taken to the detention centre in Coquelles.

After everyone evicted was loaded on to buses to be driven out of Calais, one *Gendarme* declared 'There are no more migrants on the site' (Human Rights Observers, 2019a). This signalled the end of the eviction and the beginning of its destruction, followed by further efforts to securitise the property against re-occupation. Once completely evicted, workers set about cleaning the site, picking up all the trash by hand and placing it into garbage bags. Fencing was then installed all the way around the site's perimeter (Figures 21 and 22). Perhaps this act of securitisation has sealed *Verrotières* for good. For the moment it appears people have been dispersed to other sites rather than try to return to *Verrotières* as HRO have not recorded any evictions on *Verrotières* or *Pont-Trouille* since March 2019. But perhaps in the future the fences will again be cut into or taken down, or for any other multitude of other reasons this space will be re-inhabited due to lack of other options for Calais' migrants to live while attempting their irregular journeys to the UK.



FIGURE 22: Author's photograph from 2019. *Chemin du Pont-Trouille* facing east after final eviction and installation of security fencing.

5.4 The carrot of accommodation

Having offered a glimpse of the patterns of destruction facing irregular migrants' autonomous jungles in post-Jungle Calais, I must finish by pointing out how accommodation offers have recently began accompanying these destructions. Glossed over above but crucial to understand the full picture of how domicide is working in Calais today is the fact that the evictees from *Verrotières* were given a choice the morning of the final eviction; to either enter the bus and be driven to a regional *Centre d'Accueil et d'Examen des Situations* (CAES - Centre for Reception and Examination of the Situation) or, if they refused, be arrested by the PAF and taken to the CRA in Coquelles. In fact, signs had been placed around *Verrotières* prior to the operation stating that 'migrants must be directed to the appropriate reception and orientation centres set up by the State' (my translation, InfoMigrants, 2019). This offer of accommodation alongside the brutal campaign of evictions and destructions is what I term *carrot-and-stick domicide*, and is the focus of analysis in Section 6.3.

This policy first appeared during the domicide of the Jungle where its residents were taken by bus to the 450 newly created *Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation* (CAO - Reception and Orientation Centres) throughout France. These were temporary accommodation centres far away from Calais created with the intention of 'orienting migrants based on their individual situation' into an asylum claim and then further towards the accommodation options for hosting asylum seekers (*Ministère de l'intérieur*, 2016). Migrants in the CAOs were given one month to either apply for asylum or leave the country (Slingenberg and Bonneau, 2017, p. 346). Hundreds refused this false choice, choosing instead to escape the centres and return to Calais to continue

their attempts at entering the UK clandestinely (Aradau and Tazzioli, 2020, p. 214). The CAESes operating today are an updated and permanent version of the CAOs (which were deployed on a temporary basis to combat the migration 'crisis' in 2016), but are limited to northern France and are intended to avoid *points de fixation* in Calais.

According to the website of *La Vie Active*^{viii} (2020), which manages the centres, the CAES is offered to each migrant in Calais. Aside from temporary accommodation (the stay is limited to eight days) these centres offer food, water, and sanitation facilities (InfoMigrants, 2017). During those eight days, 'an accelerated assessment of the administrative situation of migrants' takes place from 'a team made up of agents from the *Préfecture* and the OFII' (my translation, *La vie active*, 2020). This 'accelerated assessment' then results in migrants being 'oriented' towards a course of action—transfer to another EU country under Dublin, claim asylum in France, or return to their country of origin—based on the judgement of the *Préfecture* and OFII. The former is responsible for assessing asylum claims while the latter is responsible for the reception of asylum seekers, as well as assisted 'voluntary' return.^{ix}

The provision of state accommodation far away from Calais is an important part of the strategy for controlling irregular mobility. In January 2018, the British and French governments agreed to renew their commitment in the repression of unauthorised crossings, and 'to work together to reduce migratory pressure at the shared border and on the French side' (Collomb and Rudd, 2018, p. 3). The first article of the agreement explaining how they intend to accomplish this reads, rather long-windedly:

the United Kingdom shall support France in its provision of accommodation in facilities located outside the Calais and Dunkirk areas, such as Reception and Assessment Centres (CAES), to be carried out by the Parties with the aim of ensuring that third country nationals with no lawful basis of stay on the territory of France and who are in Nord and Pas-de-Calais have clarity on their legal options and that for those seeking asylum there is access to the asylum system in France and access to accommodation whilst an asylum claim is considered (ibid., p. 3)

This UK 'support' constituted an additional £44.5m payment (bringing Britain's total expense commitment after 2016 up to £150m) to the French for increased 'security infrastructure and to house non-citizen migrants' in the CAES far from Calais (Travis and H. Stewart, 2018). This quote clearly describes, albeit in euphemistic language, the intended spatial relationship between citizenship and accommodation in Calais. Those not wishing to claim asylum need to be given 'clarity on their legal options' all the while the carrot of temporary and 'dignified' accommodation is accessible through submitting to the scrutiny of the citizenship regime. French President Macron put this very bluntly when he stated that migrants should understand '[t]o stay in Calais and build makeshift shelters or squats is a dead end. The alternative is clear; people can get to the reception centres where everyone's case will be examined and those who have the right, given asylum in our country' (in Willsher, 2018).

What Macron calls a 'dead end' is actually the daily repetitions of domicidal violence described throughout this chapter. Against this backdrop of daily destructions, HRO state that buses now wait everyday to bring migrants to the CAES around the time of the evening meal distribution. These buses are for those surrendering to a 'life made unlivable' in Calais (Tyerman, 2019, p. 13); migrants who are forced to accept the state's 'humanitarianism' (after it has finished destroying their autonomous home-spaces) which will filter them into the citizenship assessment system. Yet, even for those who persevere and do not attend CAESes by themselves, the State tries to fill the hundreds of spaces through *maraudes* in which employees of the OFII attend the camps (often as participants in the destruction operations mentioned on page 114) to inform residents of the existence of the CAES, and to try and get them to agree to move there by themselves (Louarn, 2017). This increasingly blurs the boundaries between migrants voluntarily entering the CAESes or being forced into these facilities through the combination of domicidal destructions and the threat of detention and deportation; all of which are technologies of citizenship.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter further answered *RQ1* by providing a detailed illustration of the patterns of destruction facing migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance in post-Jungle Calais. Motivated by the fear of a 'new Jungle', state domicide has become hyperactive in its attempts to keep the material durability of migrant camps to the absolute minimum. This means routinely evicting and destroying inhabited spaces every 48 hours, despite misapplying criminal law to do so, and walling off many sites with fences so that they cannot be re-occupied.

After illustrating the repetitive patterns of this hyper-cycle, an in-depth case history of destruction at the site of *Verrotières* was given. This space was initially evicted in 2009 and then again as it was inhabited following the Jungle's destruction in 2016. Undergoing more than 150 separate destructions, many of which were met with resistance by residents, the site was finally evicted in March 2019 and then surrounded with high fencing to prevent it from being re-inhabited in the future. In an exceptional case, this final eviction was accompanied by a civil court order authorising the eviction but which cynically mobilised the poor conditions in which residents of the site's camps were maintained by the state to justify their eviction. This tendency of authorities to enforce indignity upon the migrants in Calais before instrumentalising it to further attack their autonomous spaces of inhabitance will be discussed more in Chapter 8.

The final Section 5.4 recognised that this hyper-cycle of domicidal destruction has recently been accompanied by the offer of alternative temporary accommodation outside the city of Calais; what I refer to as 'carrot-and-stick' domicide. In the following analytical chapter discussion will again return to citizenship, and in particular show how carrot-and-stick domicide functions as a technology of citizenship in the ways described in Section 4.4. However, not only functioning to incorporate irregular migrants into the state's citizenship regime, destructions work to place migrants into a state of dependency on both state and civil society humanitarianism, and thus create the conditions for the latter to enact a form of humanitarian citizenship.

Before beginning this discussion in Chapter 6, the counter-mapping moves this chapter has made should be highlighted. Its main contribution comes in the form of filling out the category of 'Destructions' in my digital counter-map with specific examples, most of all Verrotières, and in showing how and why these occupations and destructions are cyclical in nature. However, it has also provided empirical analysis of how these events relate to one another and are located in the broader evolution of anti-migrant domicide in Calais. Thus, the chapter has also performed a narrative counter-mapping role, connecting the eviction of legal squats prior to 2015 (Chapter 3) to today's domicidal hyper-cycles via the destruction of the Jungle (Chapter 7) which re-invigorated anti-migrant domicidal policy by providing authorities and the public a new 'worst case scenario' for how irregular migrants could inhabit the city. Furthermore, it highlights just how important domicide is to the border control strategy in Calais given the significant investment required to carry out these daily police operations, usually involving dozens of agents from multiple organisations. This spotlight on post-Jungle domicide is also meant to reinvigorate discussions on the situation of irregular migrants in Calais given that the burst of (scholarly) attention the topic received during the Jungle has dropped off significantly despite data collected during that time only recently finding its way into print (e.g. Ansaloni, 2020). Finally, the chapter analysed the novel techniques by which this domicide occurs and has adapted to resistances and criticism, particularly the rhetorical framework of 'cleaning'which is the subject of much of Chapters 7 and 8.

Notes

- i. This data includes a two week gap in reporting at the beginning of June 2019 and some days for which no information was recorded due to HRO's lack of capacity.
- ii. The *Préfecture* also created a system for migrants to collect confiscated belongings but, in practice, this has not been widely used as these items are often badly soiled and damaged during destructions (Boussemart, 2019b). HRO (2019b) also describe the system as fundamentally flawed because it requires migrants be with someone from an association when they go to reclaim their belongings (enforcing relations of dependence), does not allow enough time for items to be properly sorted before the eight day dead-line (after which they are discarded), and the phones and wallets that do appear are mostly broken and empty.
- iii. However, there are still a number of larger scale 'permanent evictions', see page 120, followed by securitisations which are intended to make re-occupation impossible.
- iv. For example, the wooded area along *Route de Gravelines* to the south of *Verrotières* had 'anti-migrant fencing' installed in December 2019 (Lengronne, 2019).
- v. These two electrical pylons were fitted with anti-climb spikes in March 2018 to prevent the recurrence of such actions (CMS, 2018c).
- vi. This is from a combination of historical and contemporary policies such as the denial of formal accommodation after Sangatte's closure, the destruction of the Jungle (which despite the indignities its residents endured did provide an autonomous space in which they inhabited the homes they created and organised the space communally and according to their needs (Mould, 2017b)), and the hyperactive and continual erasure of any camp which appears in post-Jungle Calais.
- vii. This was particularly evident in the eviction of the Jungle where the Administrative Court of Lille acknowledged the migrant inhabitants' 'right to home' under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights but then dismissed the appeal against the eviction arguing that migrants continuing to live in the Jungle would violate their human rights 'not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment' under Article 5 (Slingenberg and Bonneau, 2017, p. 349).
- viii. La Vie Active, an association that previously offered services to the elderly and people with disabilities in the Nord–Pas-de-Calais region, won the bid to service the Centre d'accueil Jules Ferry when it was tendered in 2015 (Katz, 2017, p. 3). They had no prior experience working in Calais nor on migrant related issues which lead existing associations in Calais to interpret their contract as 'a clear sign of the government's wish to maintain control over the new camp by creating an essentially new charity completely dependent on its funding and without a pre-existing agenda in Calais' (Bescherer, 2017, p. 28). Since the end of the Jungle La Vie Active continued to run the CAESes under contract from the French state.
- ix. Since the eviction of the Jungle it is no longer possible to claim asylum at the *Pas-de-Calais Préfecture*, neither in Calais nor its capital of Arras. Those wanting to claim asylum must go to Lille in Nord (Préfet du Nord, 2019). OFII's office in Calais has also been closed for a number of years. Removing asylum seeker services from Calais further indicts the migrants who remain as 'illegal' in the public's eye because if they were actually 'genuine refugees' seeking international protection, they would not be in the city to begin with.

Chapter 6

Destruction, deterrence, dependency, and humanitarian citizenship

6.1 Introduction: destructions and deterrence

Following Chapter 5's description of the domicidal 'hyper-cycles' (De Angelis, 2019) recently facing Calais' jungles, this chapter continues answering *RQ2* by analysing how such destructions produce citizenship through spatially, politically, and socially excluding irregular migrants. In the broadest sense, destructions are micro-scale spatial interventions that further displace the UK's already externalised border, bringing it into the homes of irregular migrants autonomously inhabiting the Calais area. They enact the basic spatial exclusion from the sovereign territory of Britain to continue maintaining its 'non-citizens' at a distance, and form a component part (alongside increased border security infrastructure, state abandonment, police violence, arrest, administrative detention, and other domicidal techniques) of the deterrent strategy that has been the cornerstone of Franco-British border policy in Calais for the last decades.

Chapters 3 and 5 have shown how domicidal policies against migrants' in and around Calais have escalated over the years. After the closure of Sangatte, and the aggressive media campaign which described the centre as a 'magnet' for illegalised migrants (BBC, 2002), authorities refused to provide formal accommodation or even a basic shelter for them to stay in Calais. Then, following the prevalence of (legal) squatting in the city, attention turned to (illegally) evicting their autonomous spaces of inhabitance to ensure 'zero squats in Calais'. Finally, after the eviction of the Jungle (Section 5.1), the fear of a 'New Jungle' replaced that of a 'New Sangatte' to justify the intensified campaign of destruction against the proto-camps, or 'contingent camps' as Hagan (2020) refers to them, today. Today's hyper-cycles of destruction reflect the no *points de fixation* policy which combines the refusal of state sanctioned space for accommodation or service provision like Sangatte or *Centre d'accueil Jules Ferry* with the doctrine of 'zero squats', while extending it *any* space where migrants could congregate, settle, or access services; *fixate* in the language of the state.ⁱ Rather than enclosing the mobile commons present in squats and jungles through their eviction (Chapter 4),

current domicidal hyper-cycles *prevent* these spaces from developing in the first place. Thus, over time, the threshold of durability and permanence migrants' spaces of inhabitance are allowed, and beyond which they become deemed a threat deserving of elimination, has been constantly lowered.

However, the intensity of destructions today goes far beyond previous forms of deterrence or the reduction of 'pull-factors', and has been described by critical border scholars as intentionally 'making life unliveable' (Tyerman, 2016, pp. 84–86) for Calais' migrants and as part of a 'politics of exhaustion' (Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016; Welander, 2020). Here the relentless pace of domicidal operations (not to mention the fact they take place in the early morning, waking people up to be ID controlled and move their tents) combines with constant exposure to the elements, the physical and psychological toll of making attempts at clandestine border crossings, and the routine violence of the police to break migrants' bodies and spirits. This making life unlivable in the autonomous camps aims to deter more migrants from arriving in Calais to try and cross to the UK while persuading those already present to abandon their attempts.

However, one of this chapter's main arguments is that, in addition to discouraging irregular migrants from coming to Calais or impeding them from reaching the UK, destructions ultimately function to bring them within the spatial circuits of citizenship and submit themselves to the scrutinizing gaze of France's citizenship regime. The camps, which allow migrants to live autonomously and which facilitate their attempts to clandestinely cross the border (see Subsection 4.2.2), are repeatedly and violently destroyed so as to capture and redirect migrants into state sanctioned spaces specifically designed to assess their individual 'situation' and 'deportability' (De Genova, 2017). From there, if they are even allowed to stay, they will become 'trapped' in France, prevented from further autonomous travel or settlement in other Dublin signatory countries with the high chance of being returned to France or 'countries of origin'.

Destructions are then clearly an exclusionary spatial technology of citizenship in many of the same ways described in Section 4.4. They exclude 'non-citizen' foreigners from the UK and, in that way, uphold the global hierarchy of mobility rights based upon the privileged status of citizens from European and settler-colonial nation-states. They also function at the level of the city to violently relegate irregular migrants to miserable and dangerous spaces on its outskirts while denying them the spatial infrastructures needed to live and move autonomously which would disrupt normative spatial distributions of presence based on (non)citizen status. Furthermore, denying migrants sufficient and recognisable home-spaces produces visible distinctions between them and the house-dwelling *Calaisien* citizens based on their respective forms and areas of inhabitance. Also like evictions, they enclose upon the mobile commons running through the squats and jungles and break-apart the communities of solidarity living within them.

The direct function of domicidal destruction as a spatial technology of citizenship,

also shared with eviction and securitisation, is sufficiently addressed in the other conceptual counter-mapping chapters. However, this chapter will instead concentrate on the secondary consequences of destruction, and how they interact with and reproduce the racialised exclusions of 'non-citizens' in Calais. These secondary consequences are (1) *dehumanising* migrants and (2) forcing them into relations of *dependence* on humanitarian interventions. The main argument of the chapter is that both state *and* citizen humanitarian interventions reproduce the exclusion of racialised migrants in both Tully's (2014) 'modern' (state citizenship tied to juridical status) and 'diverse' (specifically what is discussed here as *humanitarian*) citizenship forms. Although 'humanitarian citizenship' has been discussed by Heath Cabot (2019) as a condition shared by both citizens and migrants who have been cast into increasingly precarious existences in Greece through the dual 'economic and refugee crises', and are thus equally recipients of non-state humanitarian care, I use the term in the opposite way to refer to the 'community of value' (Anderson, 2013) arising through citizens' aid giving practices towards migrants forced into a hyper-precarious existence in Calais.

6.1.1 Chapter outline

Section 6.2 describes some of the ways hyper-cycles of destruction go beyond the elimination of migrants' home-spaces to further dehumanise them, how that interacts with irregular migrants' racialisation, and how it creates relationships of dependence for them on humanitarian actors in Calais. After highlighting this dependency as an important additional consequence that remains neglected by much of the literature on anti-migrant domicidal destructions in Calais, the rest of the chapter analyses how dependency becomes mobilised to reproduce migrants' exclusion from citizenship.

Section 6.3 begins by showing how state humanitarianism is actually a contingent part of the violent destruction of migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance. This builds on Section 5.4 which presented 'carrot-and-stick' domicide as a state offer of temporary accommodation alongside the continuation of its daily campaign of violent domicidal destructions. While life in the city's autonomous jungles is made unlivable, hosting centres are promoted by the French state as a humanitarian alternative. Martina Tazzioli (2017d) describes such spaces as 'traps of humanitarianism', because they are, in fact, designed to capture migrants and assess their citizenship status to direct them into a process either of regularisation in France (which through the Dublin agreements also forecloses the possibility of regularising in another country) or removal.

Although the integration of state humanitarianism into mobility policing strategies and practices that securitise against irregular migration has been widely acknowledged (Bendixsen, 2019; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015), citizen humanitarianism is also implicated in reproducing citizenship's exclusions. Although this argument may be counter-intuitive, Section 6.4 shows how the distributions of volunteer humanitarian associations in Calais which replenish the materials destroyed by daily police destructions can also re-establish, rather than subvert, citizen/non-citizen distinctions, despite opposing state domicide. To the extent that 'volunteer-humanitarians' (Sandri, 2018) exclusively privilege the materiality of migrant camps, as opposed to the political solidarities and the autonomy of movement these spaces facilitate, their actions to endlessly *re-produce* camp-spaces in the wake of destructions can end up sustaining rather than challenging state violence towards 'non-citizen' migrants, while *reproducing* dehumanising relations of dependence that prevent already-citizens from recognising irregular migrants as equals.

6.2 Dependence and dehumanisation

In Chapters 3 and 4 the spatial, social, and political implications of the domicidal eviction of squatted spaces were presented. While many of these same implications apply to destructions, scholars researching Calais' jungles (Ansaloni, 2020; Hagan, 2018; Katz, 2017; Mould, 2017b) point to the importance of the specific *materiality* of the camp which is distinct from squatted spaces. This means that destructions cannot be thought of in exactly the same way as evictions, and that to make full sense of these interventions, which, after all, aim at achieving a decidedly material erasure, we must first understand the camp's specific materiality.

One of the defining characteristics of Calais' jungles is their *precarity*; a contingent existence due to the weakness of the improvised structures which comprise them and which is maintained by the state's repetitive domicidal interventions. While acknowledging that precarity is a domicidal strategy intended to destabilise migrant communities by ensuring their homes remain temporary and can be easily destroyed, Oli Mould considers the politics of the material precarity of migrants' homes to be more ambiguous; at the same time, 'a source of "richness and conflict" (2017b, p. 3). For him, precarity represents not only the result of the state's domicidal techniques, but also the self-organised and autonomous practices of home-making that occur as migrants appropriate and inhabit space. He celebrates the flimsy construction materials used to build homes in the Jungle for allowing quick construction by migrants and humanitarians, and because they are able to 'swiftly and efficiently react to the needs to the inhabitants' (ibid., p. 10). For Mould, who spent his research period in the Jungle working with humanitarian associations building these shelters himself, the benefits of material precarity were that it allowed for 'new home-making process[es] that were democratic and humanitarian' despite the constant threat of domicide (ibid., p. 4). While I am sympathetic to his acknowledgement of the self-organised nature of constructing autonomous spaces of inhabitance, what is striking in Mould's analysis is how he refers its positive qualities first and foremost to the Jungle's *materiality* rather than the ingenuity and social solidarities of inhabitants.

Before continuing, there are important differences that must be pointed out between what Mould observed in the Jungle and the post-Jungle camps facing the domicidal hyper-cycles of the no *points de fixation* policy today. And while I would argue that the politics of precarious shelters during the time of the Jungle was less ambiguous than Mould impliesⁱⁱ, the 'benefits' of precarity have since entirely disappeared. First of all, the only shelters that can survive today from destruction to destruction are tents, or anything similarly lightweight and transportable, which migrants can pick up and carry outside the police's perimeter. Anything more substantial, like the wooden houses Mould helped to build throughout the Jungle, would take too long to assemble, disassemble, and rebuild, and thus would be destroyed once police and city 'cleaners' arrive. This leaves migrants in Calais' jungles today in the worst possible conditions with nothing more than (and sometimes without) a tent, tarp, or blanket as a matter of state policy, and it should also be questioned whether setting up a tent constitutes a substantive 'home-making' process.

Furthermore, what Mould (2017b, p. 2) describes as a cycle of 'home-making, unmaking and re-making' in the Jungle has been short-circuited. According to one volunteer:

It is no longer relevant to speak of the camp because people cannot settle. If they could settle here or there and the police would leave them be for a few weeks or a few months, we could speak of a camp. Today they are just homeless people from whom the police confiscate everything that might make it possible to settle, to take shelter... The situation now is worse than at the time of [the Jungle] because before, people could set up squats or shacks and it would take the police weeks or even months to expulse [*sic*] them. 'No point of fixation' politics mean that we are in a constant state of expulsion. (Jacques quoted in Hagan, 2018, p. 62).

What Jacques describes as being forced to live in a 'constant state of expulsion' is very different from being engaged in a process of home-making and re-making. In the Jungle, and in previous years, domicide occurred consistently but much less frequently than it does today (visible on the timeline of the digital counter-map in Figure 10), leaving migrants some breathing room to 'home-make' and inhabit their spaces even if temporarily. Now, the hyper-cycles of destruction ensure that the constant denial of any semblance of a home-space, rather than the insecure existence of Mould's precarious homes, defines people's lives in the jungles.

Finally, the very benefits of precarity Mould describes—shelters being transportable and able to be constructed quickly—have been turned against migrants. As documented by HRO (2019b), every morning people have to move their tents, sometimes up to 350 metres, outside the police's perimeter so they won't be destroyed. Thus, the transportability of the camp is weaponised in today's' hyper-cycles of destruction to further exhaust migrants who have to pack up, move, and then re-establish their camps at least every 48 hours.

Post-jungle destructions and material precarity then function quite differently to what Mould describes. Section 6.3 argues that their primary role is to force migrants into the accommodation facilities that the state provides as a form of humanitarian relief to these domicidal hyper-cycles, but which function as a means of capture and bring migrants within the scrutinising gaze of the citizenship regime. However, here I will first quickly outline how destructions *dehumanise* irregular migrants and force them into relations of dependency, not only on state humanitarianism, but other humanitarian actors in the city. This discussion of dehumanisation and dependence is returned to in Section 6.4 to understand how even non-state humanitarianism reproduces citizen/non-citizen distinctions, and the continued exclusion of racialised irregular migrants.

Some scholars argue that the material destruction of Calais jungles dehumanise the migrants who inhabit them. For example, Maria Hagan who has researched camp destructions in Calais more recently than Mould, and who builds upon his work, remarks:

The act of disassembling the informal camp was powerful because it obliterated the material space which humanised the exile and legitimised her/his presence on humanitarian grounds (Hagan, 2018, p. 18)

Moments of service-provision punctuate exiles' days. These short instances humanise a group whose humanity is attacked through the denial of a material living space. (ibid., p. 20)

Similarly to Mould, for Hagan the camp's materiality takes centre stage and, beyond providing a certain 'richness of place' despite precarity, humanises its inhabitants. Although jungles are home-spaces consisting of social, affective, and political relations—the mobile commons—both Hagan and Mould attribute special significance to its physical form. This seems to be because camps are material manifestations of spatial appropriation and home-making which produce stable and recognisable spaces of inhabitance for migrants, and because they create spaces for humanitarian interventions which also re-affirm migrants' humanity (a point returned to in Section 6.4). Here, destructions appear to dehumanise Calais' irregular migrants because they produce them as homeless and drive them away from the city and other spaces where they can access humanitarian aid. While agreeing that the destruction and denial of home-spaces dehumanise migrants, this section argues that this is not the primary, nor only, way dehumanisation takes place, and that understanding how destructions relate to racism and a politics of dependence, which are both dehumanising in themselves, is crucial for solidaristic Europeans to avoid reproducing dehumanisation when challenging domicidal destructions.

Today's hyper-cycles of destruction produce migrants as specifically homeless migrants. Hagan, through the work of other homelessness scholars, comments that this functions in one way to enforce mobility on migrants.ⁱⁱⁱ With migrants' home-spaces being constantly obliterated so that they literally cannot become 'fixed' in any particular space, their agency and response becomes reduced to reaction through mobility (ibid., p. 20). Staying mobile allows migrants to avoid capture by police and prevent the theft and destruction of their belongings and shelters by the city's 'cleaning teams'. However, according to Hagan, it also makes migrants *invisible* and exacerbates their situation (Hagan, 2018, p. 20). Likewise, Aradau and Tazzioli (2020, p. 219) argue through Achilles Mbembe's work, that migrants' 'forced hyper-mobility', which is a consequence of their reaction to the daily hyper-cycles of destruction, end up trapping migrants 'in a "lesser form of being"'.

Homelessness dehumanises and exacerbates migrants' exclusion because it combines two groups that are already individually dehumanised and disdained in society to produce a synthesised category to which further maltreatment, harsher policies, and dehumanisation is justifiable (Ciulinaru, 2017, p. 248). Stephania Grohman therefore describes homeless migrants as 'prime candidates for a diagnosis of "social death"' (Grohman, 2017, p. 126); a concept which through Orlando Patterson's (1982) seminal study on slavery can be understood as the condition of people who have been depersonalised and construed as fungible objects, reduced to their exploitability, and then reintegrated into the social order as without life or worth; socially dead to others. They are thus made expendable, dehumanised, and cast beyond the limit of where society's moral responsibilities to fellow citizens lie. However, Grohman argues that homeless migrants (as opposed to slaves who she claims still hold a certain value based on their exploitable labour power) are in fact entirely worthless. Therefore, in addition to being 'things', they are '"things" that must be disposed of^{iv} outside the space of the "socially alive"' (Grohman, 2017, p. 126), thus perpetuating the dehumanising violence of exclusion and destruction.

Now, through the work of these previously mentioned scholars, we can understand that destructions dehumanise Calais' migrants by constantly making them homeless, forcing them to be in constant movement, invisibilising them, depriving them of a space to receive humanitarian aid premised upon the recognition of the migrants' (otherwise denied) humanity, and by perpetuating further dehumanising violence against them as disposable objects, without inherent worth, and 'socially dead'. However, amongst these analyses there has so far been a curious absence of the recognition of race and how it contributes to migrants' dehumanisation and relegation to the condition of social death.

Monish Bhatia (2018) argues that Calais' migrants are primarily produced as socially dead through the racialised (and also criminalised) frames of representation in the UK media which are *in themselves* dehumanising. Therefore, migrants' racialisation, and the dehumanisation accompanying racism since its invention (see Section 2.3), provide the theatre in which dehumanising domicidal destructions occur. As migrants in Calais do not appear for citizens outside of a racist framing, they have already been determined to be 'less than human' even before their homes are destroyed. This all encompassing environment of racism for migrants thus enables and compounds their dehumanisation through material destructions in all the ways described above, but still exists before they are enacted.

This can be illustrated with the bad-faith reinterpretation of Calais' migrant camps as 'jungles', the racism of which is elaborated on in Section 8.1. This rhetorical framing animalises the migrants inhabiting these spaces; producing them as 'less-than human' even *before* any domicidal interventions have occurred. The result is that jungles are not even recognised as homes (a space of inhabitance created by humans) to begin with. This not only provides destructions an *a priori* justification, but makes them easier to repeat again, thus further compounding migrants' dehumanisation.

Destructions then are not just instances of dehumanising violence, but are specifically instances of *racist* violence that are legitimised through, while themselves reproducing, the dehumanisation of racialised migrants. In this way they easily fit into the regime of racist violence characterising the modern and anti-Black world order in, for example, the work of Achilles Mbembe (cited in Hicks and Mallet, 2019, p. 29) who argues that the continual destruction of lived environments is a necropolitical practice of neocolonialism. Therefore, the prior dehumanisation through racialisation of Calais' irregular, and ostensibly non-citizen, migrants which ontologically, socially, and politically excludes them from being recognised as human/equal to European citizens must be acknowledged as then allowing further dehumanising destructions of their homes to take place with impunity.^v Migrants' dehumanisation and relegation to social death through racialisation and criminalisation (Bhatia, 2018) thus exists *first*, before the focus on the poor living conditions for jungle inhabitants reinforces them (Y. Ibrahim, Mary, and Howarth, 2016) or the enforcement of homelessness and hyper-mobility exacerbates those conditions.

However, in all the analysis above, one final point on the dehumanisation of destructions has still been neglected; that they produce migrants as dependent upon humanitarian interventions. By constantly confiscating or destroying migrants' belongings needed to endure life made unlivable in Calais, destructions create a material lack of resources requiring migrants to become dependent on humanitarian interventions to continue surviving in the city.^{vi} This material lack and the dependency it creates furthers dehumanises migrants who must queue en masse for food, water, clothes, shelter materials, and other services during set times under the watch of riot police in order to satisfy the needs that daily destructions create. Hereby migrants are not just kept living on the street, in the woods, or in open fields, but *visibly* impoverished and reliant on aid while in Calais, dehumanising them further in the eyes of the public.

The rest of the chapter thus explains how this dependency created by destructions reproduces the exclusion of irregular migrants from the category of citizenship in ways that interact with their prior racialisation and dehumanisation. Bringing racialisation and the dehumanisation of racism into the picture has important implications for understanding not only destructions, but the humanitarian politics proposed to ameliorate domicidal violence. However, it must first be made clear from the outset that both state and civil society actors recognise the 'problem' of the 'indignity' and 'inhumanity' of the life which Calais' migrants are forced to live in the jungles, although their 'solutions' to this problem differ greatly and also conflict with one another.

There is a fundamental difference in analysis between these two actors, leading to different 'humanitarian interventions' which then produce and spatialise citizenship

in different ways. On the one hand the state instrumentalises the 'undignified' conditions in migrants' spaces of inhabitance to justify further domicidal operations or takes the opportunity to propose 'dignified alternatives' that will bring them within spaces designed to assess their citizenship status. On the other hand, humanitarians work to materially sustain the occupations themselves, and in doing so perform a type of humanitarian citizenship that can, somewhat counter-intuitively and almost certainly inadvertently, reproduce the exclusion of racialised non-citizen migrants as it distinguishes itself from vulgar and explicitly nationalist and racist citizenship forms. What the following sections show is how the state uses humanitarianism to introduce the regime of modern hegemonic citizenship into the lives of migrants who otherwise strive for autonomy, while volunteer-humanitarians take the opportunity to produce themselves as 'humanitarian citizens' or 'citizen humanitarians' in a way which does not in fact effectively challenge the excluded 'non-citizen' position to which racialised migrants are ascribed.

6.3 State humanitarianism and the citizenship trap

Discussed already in Section 5.4, destructions in Calais today form one half of the 'carrot-and-stick' domicidal approach which produces and spatialises citizenship in the city. While destructions may create the context in which humanitarian associations intervene and, perhaps unintentionally, re-establish citizenship exclusions (Section 6.4), destructions are primarily intended to bring migrants into the special temporary accommodation centres around northern France established to 'reduce migratory pressure' (Collomb and Rudd, 2018, p. 3). Thus, the same governmental authorities responsible for the violence of domicidal destructions offer the 'humanitarian alternative' of accommodation, but which is explicitly designed to bring irregular migrants within the citizenship regime, to spatially and socially exclude them from the city, and prevent the possibility of an onward journey to the UK. However, before outlining this argument, a note on the relationship between state 'humanitarianism' and border violence is necessary.

While state humanitarianism and state violence may superficially appear to contradict one another, they, in fact, form an internally coherent policy that is the mainstay of what William Walters (2011) has termed the 'humanitarian border'. The humanitarian border comes into existence through the often tense interactions and exchanges between the violence of repression and control at the border, and the interventions which ameliorate or even contest them. This concept sophisticatedly captures the nature of Calais' border not only as a space of securitisation, militarisation, and state violence committed with impunity, but how the border incorporates mitigations of its own violence through a variety of actors. Much of the academic discussion on humanitarian borders analyses the incorporation of humanitarianism into contemporary border policing, showing that, rather than opposing one another, humanitarianism and policing work together to 'care for' while controlling simultaneously 'risky' and 'at-risk' populations of migrants at the border (Aas and Gundhus, 2015; Bendixsen, 2019; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015). These studies point to state migration control policy as increasingly one of biopolitical governance of migrants via a care/control paradigm as opposed to one merely concerned with the defence of national territories which ignores its externalities. In this paradigm, border policing is framed as a humanitarian operation to protect 'at-risk' migrants despite being directly responsible for the conditions which forced them to risk their lives in the first place. Thus the humanitarian border exists (at least in theory if not practice) to 'secure' the bodies and lives of irregular migrants in a double sense; secured against to protect national territories and their populations, while provided some security when their lives are threatened in the dangerous traversals of border-zones. Luca Mavelli (2017, p. 811) argues that this humanitarian policing of mobility is not only about governing, while ostensibly 'caring for', migrants, but actually has the biopolitical governance of host-country citizens as an additional objective. It makes sure that the 'defence' of the territory, labour market, and welfare-state resources is conducted in a way that allows citizens to continue understanding themselves, and their government as 'just, moral, and compassionate', in the face of human tragedy.

The clearest examples of 'humanitarian borderlands' are the deserts that comprise much of the US-Mexico border or the Mediterranean Sea where people are exposed for days to the death dealing elements and almost entirely dependent on some sort of outside assistance (rescue at sea or evacuation in the desert, or otherwise food or water that has been left there for them to find, see page 200) to survive the journey. Calais' border likewise consists of state border violence *and* moments of its humanitarian curtailment. While the emerging trend, since 2018, of irregular Channel crossings taking place by small boat where there is a present and sustained risk of death by drowning or hypothermia (not to mention the ramping up of border patrol/sea rescue operations by the French and British in response) is an obvious point of comparison, given the fact that much of the border policing in Calais occurs when migrants are 'at home', not just while they are on the move, the 'humanitarian border' can also be applied here to make sense of how the 'stick' of domicide and 'carrot' of accommodation provision work together in bordering the city.

Oscillations and combinations of state humanitarianism and securitisation have produced contradictory housing policy for irregular migrants in Calais, and alternating moments of eviction or provision, since the late 90s (Fassin, 2005, pp. 262–265). Mentioned on page 71, Sangatte emerged as a 'humanitarian solution' to the many migrants living on Calais' streets and who, initially treated as predominantly a security concern, were being evicted from its public spaces. After Sangatte, humanitarianism was mostly used as a justification for further domicide in itself *without* necessarily translating into the offer of alternative accommodation. Poor living conditions and health risks for migrants were often the preferred justifications for evictions and destructions.^{vii} However, the creation of the Jungle (Subsection 7.2.1) again showed how

the provision of humanitarian services and some, at least state 'tolerated', accommodation could be effectively combined with violent evictions to segregate migrants outside of Calais.

If previously (after Sangatte but pre-Jungle) the stick of domicide and carrot of alternative accommodation were mostly wielded separately, during the Jungle, and particularly since its destruction, they almost always appear together with their concurrent humanitarian and securitarian logics on full display. For example, the domicide of a significant part of the Jungle to build a 'humanitarian camp' of stacked shipping containers was inaugurated with the following words from *Préfète* Fabienne Buccio: 'It is time to tell the migrants of Calais who live in undignified conditions and give Calais an image that isn't dignified either, that we have a solution for each of you' (quoted in Rosello, 2016, p. 99). This 'solution' designed to elevate the migrants and the city of Calais from their shared condition of state mandated indignity was a designated humanitarian enclosure intended to not only 'protect' its inhabitants from the inhumanity of the Jungle proper, but to contain and register those who were convinced to exchange their biometric data for access to a shipping container to sleep in (see Subsection 7.2.3 and Katz, 2017; Ticktin, 2016a). Later, in perhaps the most famous example of carrot-and-stick domicide, Buccio characterised the 2016 total destruction of the Jungle as a 'humanitarian dismantling operation' (Salomez, 2016). This was notably due to the unprecedented efforts made to transfer all inhabitants to the CAOs while their homes were destroyed, and thus provide a comprehensive accommodation solution alongside the domicidal eviction (Freedman, 2018, p. 413). This accommodation, while having a humanitarian legitimation, satisfied the border security goals of excluding migrants from Calais, preventing their onwards journeys to the UK, and assessing their migratory situation. After recognising these CAOs to be 'spatial traps' which would foreclose possibilities for future autonomous movement, hundreds fled them and returned to Calais to continue their autonomous crossing attempts (Aradau and Tazzioli, 2020, pp. 213-214).

These two examples of domicide in the Jungle illustrate what Rosello describes as the usurpation of migrants' 'homes' by the state's conception of 'adequate housing' equated with the 'minimum standard of living'. The different social and political relations these spaces alternatively facilitate were presented in Subsection 4.2.1; however, the contribution Rosello makes here is identifying how the right to home, when combined with the measure of a humanitarian minimum for housing, is a doubleedged sword for migrants and can be used to justify the destruction of their homes. She points out that not only does the right to housing provide a legal grounds for migrants to demand an improvement in the material conditions of their home-life, but it can also be cynically interpreted by the state to eliminate autonomous home spaces due to their 'undignified' conditions, and further bring migrants within state controlled accommodation forms (Rosello, 2016, p. 99). Chapter 4's argument emphasises the use of housing provision to eliminate the anti-citizen politics and the mobile commons that run through migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance with the case of *Victor Hugo*. However, we must also acknowledge how such enclosure is additionally accomplished through the state positioning itself as a humanitarian actor despite being responsible for producing the very humanitarian crisis it then appoints itself to resolve.

Whilst previously entirely absent, or only appearing when it was tactically useful to justify an eviction in the short-term, today the offer of state controlled accommodation exists permanently in Calais alongside the hyper-cycles of daily destruction. Life in the autonomous camps and squats (which allows for attempts to be made at clandestine crossings) is made 'unlivable' while hosting in the CAESes outside of Calais is offered as a humanitarian alternative to those who want it. This is starkly illustrated in a comment made by Mayor Bouchart during a neighbourhood meeting about the occupation of *Bois Chico Mendes*, analysed further in Section 7.4. The quotation below is Bouchart's response to a question from a member of public on what solution would be made available to migrants living in a wooded area of the city that was slated to be evicted, securitised, and then developed into an urban park in the following years. Bouchart states:

I would like to remind them that there are legal mechanisms that can welcome them with dignity in several places that are not in Calais. And for the moment that they don't ask anything from the *Calaisiens* or France, it's a little complicated...What I understand is that we're not going to offer anything to those people who don't ask for anything, who just want to go through to the UK, that's all they want to do. They want nothing from us and nothing from France...we can have extra places for anyone that requires something from France. And those that ask for nothing, well they will unfortunately continue to wander. (my translation)

By 'asking' for something from *Calaisiens* and France she means both that migrants ask for state managed accommodation outside the city *and* for asylum. In fact the quote gives a concise illustration of how these exclusionary processes at local and national scales come together in the CAES. Seen in Section 5.4, the 'several places where migrants can be welcomed with dignity that are not Calais' are expressly designed to establish the citizenship 'situation' of those who enter, and direct them into either claiming asylum or being removed from France. Although she places the 'dignity' which they afford migrants front and centre, she also acknowledges that they are not suited for people who do not want to abandon their autonomous encampments, the possibility of autonomous mobility, leave Calais, or enter into the spatial circuits of citizenship.

However, what Bouchart fails to acknowledge is how domicidal violence works to create the material conditions which, she hopes, drives people to 'want something' from her, from Calais, and from France. The reality is that those migrants who 'ask for nothing' will not 'continue to wander'; instead they will be targeted by a massive policing operation to keep them homeless, sleeping in the fields without proper shelter, physically and emotionally exhausted, and dehumanised so that they are forced to 'ask for something'. To take the moral high ground and present state humanitarianism as something migrants should be grateful for instead of suspicious of^{viii} requires that she disconnect the hosting offer from the violence of domicide. In doing so she victim-blames migrants who choose to live in autonomous spaces, and thus continue attempts to leave France, as ungrateful for the state's humanitarian gesture, stubborn, and responsible for their own hardship as opposed to recognising and resisting the conflation of state humanitarianism and border security. Not only does this justify both the punitive daily hyper-cycles of destruction for 'stubborn' migrants, but allows for a reframing of domicide as what Martina Tazzioli (2017c) calls 'expulsions of humanitarianism'. These are 'conducted for the benefit of the migrants, that is for transferring them into the circuits of the hosting system' (ibid.), and indicate the complete collapse of the violent/caring interventions characteristic of the 'humanitarian border' into a single action.

Finally now, all of the elements of carrot-and-stick state domicide have emerged. Migrants inhabiting autonomous camps and squats are able, to some extent, to remain outside of the state's care/control governance framework and the humanitarian politics of dependence (see Chapter 4; Dadusc, 2019; Dadusc and Mudu, 2020). Therefore, first of all, the stick of material destruction is intended to create misery, hardship, exhaustion, and dependency in order for migrants to continue surviving. However, this domicide is not only about producing a base condition of material dependence or discouraging migrants from remaining in Calais, it is also about creating occasions to transfer evictees into the circuits of citizenship. These evictions, performed for the migrant's 'own good', based on how that is paternalistically defined by authorities and other humanitarian actors (Tazzioli, 2017b), offer the false choice between temporary accommodation in the CAES or the detention centre; both of which maintain the purity of Calais as a 'space of citizenship' and defend the UK's sovereign territory though they comprise different but complementary elements of the care/control matrix of the humanitarian border. However, despite the humanitarian veneer of carrot-and-stick domicide, it is important to still recognise these domicidal evictions and destructions as implicated within the wider border and citizenship regimes, and as fundamentally violent tactics in the system of mobility control as it operates in Calais.

6.4 Distributions and humanitarian citizenship

In addition to state humanitarianism, non-governmental humanitarian associations are also an important part of how Calais' humanitarian border functions. As literal tons of the shelters and belongings migrants need to survive Calais' life made unlivable are collected and hauled off to be thrown away, one of the main tasks of the volunteer-humanitarian associations in the city is to replace these materials as quickly as possible. No doubt distributions do 'make life *more* liveable' for Calais' migrants, and help them to remain outside of the CAES a little bit longer. However, the relation of these distributions to Calais' spatial segregation based on a racialised citizen/noncitizen distinction is neither straightforward nor necessarily disruptive.

Distributions of materials helping migrants survive on Calais' streets have been a constant fixture in the city for the past decades, and have been performed by a combination of professionalised NGOs, CMS and other No Borders activists, volunteerhumanitarians, and unaffiliated individuals. Today they are almost entirely performed by volunteer-humanitarian groups that can be contrasted to other NGOs like La Vie Active or Solid'R who operate under contract with the state to provide services to migrants. Volunteer-humanitarian associations like Help Refugees, Care4Calais, or L'Auberge des Migrants are independent, supported mostly through personal donations, and position themselves in opposition to actions of state governance towards Calais' migrant population (Martens, 2019), particularly its most visibly violent forms.^{ix} Furthermore, the lack of formal boundaries for citizen volunteers working with these associations allow for relational engagements between them and the migrant community that politicise volunteer-humanitarians. According to Elisa Sandri (2018, p. 7), due to their positioning within migrant camps, volunteer-humanitarian organisations more readily challenged anti-migrant state policy and practices while attempting to avoid complicity with the border regime. This is echoed by McGee and Pelham (2018, p. 32) who state that the informality and proximity of these associations 'blurred responsibilities between humanitarianism and activism, thus, reaching beyond apolitical principles in their opposition to state authorities, and in the making of rightsclaims on behalf of refugees'.

However, despite the fact that many volunteers became politicised and that the organisations themselves typically opposed state domicide, the humanitarian politics at the root of many of these groups was often paternalistic and depoliticising towards migrants. Many volunteers felt strongly about distinguishing their 'humanitarian' actions from political ones that could be construed as 'activism', and particularly felt that activism should *not* take place 'in the camp, in order not to put refugees at risk of violence from the police' (Sandri, 2018, p. 11). Beyond not wanting to provoke confrontations themselves, James Ellison (2019) observes how volunteer-humanitarians even *opposed* migrants' resistance to police evictions. He argues their condemnation of migrants' protest indicates a conflation in humanitarian associations' ideology between migrants' autonomous resistance and violent criminality. On the one hand this depoliticises migrants—presents them 'as unthinking subjects, unable to resist or challenge the conditions they face because they are too vulnerable' (ibid., p. 117)—while it reproduces the frame of migrant criminality which reinforces border policing, and is one of the main ways that Bhatia (2018) describes racialised migrants as being dehumanised and considered 'socially dead'.

The humanitarian desire to prevent conflict and alleviate suffering at all costs instead chooses to frame the realm of appropriate political intervention in terms of the provision of material—the tents, blankets, clothes destroyed daily—which, in and of itself, is powerless to challenge the police or disturb the operation of the humanitarian border. According to Francesca Ansaloni (2017, p. 36), the volunteer-humanitarians' narrative of '*refugees* as first and foremost human beings...classified their needs as corporeal and material...to depoliticise migrants and reterritorialise their political stances on a struggle of subsistence' (emphasis in original). In this struggle for subsistence, the mere persistence of the jungles becomes the primary goal of the humanitarians' interventions.

While I would agree with Sandri, McGee and Pelham, and others (e.g. Gerbier-Aublanc, 2018) that volunteer-humanitarian interventions may be 'political' in that they challenge state authorities and contribute to fostering friendships and alliances between volunteers and migrants—and I also admit that volunteer-humanitarians can be understood as performing commoning practices in Calais' mobile commons—I ultimately argue that their humanitarian distributions in response to the continual destruction of migrants' homes appear more reproductive of existing racialised (non)citizen binaries than disruptive of them. There are three reasons for this argument: (1) these distributions facilitate irregular migrants segregation outside the city of Calais; (2) they reproduce relations of dependency, in which non-citizen migrants are reliant on those with full citizenship status, rather than encourage and facilitate autonomy and coalitional solidarities across this divide; and (3) they remain entangled with the reproduction of domicidal border violence, rather than directly confronting or undermining it.

Following the Jungle's destruction and the ban on distributions in the city centre as part of the no *points de fixation* doctrine, association distributions have become mobile whereas prior to the Jungle they had been done from fixed locations in the city which migrants would attend (e.g. the *Secours Catholique* building mentioned on page 2). The associations now do not allow migrants to come to the warehouse where donations are stockpiled, but instead drive vans of goods to the locations where they live. The primary role of these mobile distributions is the material *re*-building of shelters and camps after they are evicted and destroyed by police in those same locations (Hagan, 2018). These mobile distributions have been criticised for unintentionally reproducing segregation within Calais by sustaining the presence of migrants in its periphery:

While it's no doubt unwitting, the associations running these van distributions help the authorities' policy of keeping migrants segregated outside the town. In the past, the town hall hated that migrants came into the town for the food distribution, or to get clothes from the church 'vestiaire', or medical treatment from the main clinics. Having all these services delivered away in the woods certainly helps whitewash the migrants out of Calais. (CMS in Corporate Watch, 2019)

There is no doubt a benefit for migrants to receive food, clothes, or shelter materials in close proximity to where they live as this resists their enforced hyper-mobility, its accompanying exhaustion, and allows them to conserve energy for other activities such as crossing attempts. However, at the same time, distributions become implicated in the production of the border as even non-state humanitarian borderwork is not just an inert reaction to state actions of bordering, but is a constitutive part of the humanitarian border itself (Pallister-Wilkins, 2017, p. 89). According to Gerbier-Aublanc (2018, p. 4), citizen humanitarianism in Calais becomes exploited by state authorities to shirk their own humanitarian responsibilities 'without fearing that migrants would die in the camps', despite the fact that they still do. Yet furthermore, the particular spatiality of these mobile distributions works to sustain jungles in certain places, outside of the city of Calais, readily known to police, and which are routinely targeted by domicidal operations. In this way, 'humanitarianism may in-fact impede NGOs' efforts to be transformative while enabling securitisation to thrive' and thereby be co-opted to participate in and legitimise border policing activities (Gerard and Weber, 2019, p. 271). The fact that distributions have now become mobile, with migrants no longer accessing services they may need in the city, chimes with the state's desire to keep the 'non-citizen' migrant population outside Calais' city centre and limit access to its 'proper' citizens.

However, there is a more basic way that mobile distributions re-produce exclusion. According to Naomi Millner, who conducted research with CMS activists in 2011, the moment of humanitarian distribution, contrary to how the humanitarian associations describe it, is not one of humanisation, but is itself dehumanising because of how they 'sediment a "victim identity" against the benevolent actions of generous citizens' (Millner, 2011, p. 325). Without the space to rehearse the 'solidarity not charity' debate here, or for example the ways Millner describes CMS respondents' efforts to enact a different politics to one based in the ethos of compassion, it suffices to say that, by perpetuating dependence and producing irregular migrant as in need of humanitarian intervention, 'compassionate borderwork' secures 'dominant understandings of which populations count as "regular" citizen-subjects' (Little and Vaughan-Williams, 2017, p. 550). In Calais this plays out as a distinction between the 'full citizens' who provide aid and the victimised/depoliticised non-citizen irregular migrants who are 'made dependent upon these gifts for their own survival' (van Woensel Kooy, 2016, p. 8). These distributions then actually work to cement citizen/non-citizen subject positions rather than transform the relationship between givers and receivers or helpers and victims (Feldman and Ticktin (2010) in Pallister-Wilkins, 2017, p. 88). In fact, these categories of differentiation are central to the operation of humanitarianism, and can even *maintain* inequality through mobilising population distinctions between those with the desire and ability to act out of compassion and those who can merely be the passive recipient subjects of those acts (Ticktin, 2016b, p. 265).

There is another way that humanitarian associations and their mobile distributions are seemingly paradoxically implicated in border violence. The reciprocal negations between the governmental authorities and associations that occur legally (Ansaloni, 2020), symbolically, and materially (via the action and reaction of destruction and distribution) can contribute to determining the economy of violence towards Calais' migrant population. Furthermore, by mitigating the worst effects of domicide and reproducing the camps everyday, these distributions can even 'condemn violence to be drawn out and repeated' (Terry, 2002). I do not mean to shift blame for domicide onto the volunteer-associations; that would not only be a misrepresentation but play into Bouchart's discourse of migrants who refuse to 'ask for something' as responsible for their own continuing hardship. However, because the humanitarian associations privilege reconstituting the jungles' material existence due to its perceived 'humanising effect' (seen in Section 6.2) the perpetual (re)creation of the camp through material provision becomes the limited horizon of intervention.

According to Ansaloni (2020), the provision of 'stuff' has become a mode of action in and of itself for humanitarian efforts in Calais. It is not only the 'materialisation of compassion' (ibid., p. 11), but also the primary way volunteer-humanitarians socially and politically engage with the situation. Quoting Ansaloni (ibid., p. 12):

stuff itself was turned into action by compassion: collecting, sorting and calling other people into action...stuff called for more action: the more stuff that arrived in Calais, the more action was needed to sort it, work it and distribute it.

Providing migrants with more stuff has become at the same time the most and the least that can be done in response to domicidal state violence. However, one consequence of the provision of 'more stuff' is that it appears to provoke the further repetitions of border violence as police again have to destroy the camp. This then requires the further provision of stuff, in an act that depoliticises the situation and quells tensions, while reintroducing the migrant-receivers into relations of dependence with the citizen stuff providers. Thus, distributions are entangled with the reproduction of domicidal violence in at least three ways: (1) by recreating camps in the same spaces being constantly destroyed they provide a material justification for intensified hyper-cycles, (2) they make domicidal violence appear more palatable by mitigating the severity of its effects, and (3) they reproduce dehumanising frames of victimisation and dependency which contribute to the *a prior* justification of domicide while undermining migrants' own forms of autonomous resistance.

However, in addition to being entangled with domicidal violence, the main argument of this section is the 'citizen-humanitarian' politics underlying these distributions reifies existing citizenship distinctions between Europeans and non-citizen migrants despite being positioned *against* state violence and its hegemonic form of citizenship. According to Janina Pescinksi (2017) who researches *citoyennistes*^x, humanitarian citizenship is:

no longer a passive legal status that is bestowed on subjects, rather it becomes an active system of practice that citizens themselves enact through their participation... they are performing the role of the humanitarian citizen to uphold international human rights even when the law criminalises such actions.

Although clearly one of citizenship's 'diverse' forms incorporating hospitality towards non-citizen migrants as one of the core values of its 'community of value' (Anderson, 2013) to counter citizenship's hegemonic state-centred form, the performativity of humanitarian citizenship does not in fact succeed in contesting the violence of the humanitarian border or undoing the separations between citizens and non-citizens.

Fiorenza Picozza (2017) describes the hero(ine)isation of migrant supporters as more narcissistic than genuinely concerned with the Other's well-being or developing coalitional solidarities. She states that since 2015 'engaging in refugee support has become a kind of social status'. It is a way in which humanitarians not only recognise themselves as morally virtuous, but construct friendships and communities with other European citizens through collective humanitarian endeavours in which migrants figure only as the recipients of those interventions. Migrants, their stories, their experiences, their hardships, and their dreams become the objects through which the community of humanitarian citizens is allowed to fully realise itself. In a particularly egregious example, Doidge and Sandri (2019, p. 478), who participated in/researched volunteer-humanitarianism in the Jungle, state:

The fact that they shared the particular experience of going to the 'Jungle' has fostered relationships that have become central in the volunteers' lives...Having shared other people's suffering has meant that volunteers have formed strong bonds with each other.

In this account irregular migrants are a source of vicarious trauma for volunteerhumanitarians in the Jungle. However, despite being traumatised, these volunteers are able to support one another in managing their emotions and, in doing so, become 'friends that last a lifetime' (ibid.). Yet, this again seems to reinforce the depoliticising victimisation of migrants, or at worst demonises them for being a source of trauma for volunteer-humanitarians. Despite the fact that Europeans are able to find solidarity and community amongst one another from having spent time in the Jungle, this community is based on the fundamental social and political exclusion of migrants which forecloses the type of relational recognition as equal that a preliminary form of citizenship as 'right to rights' rests upon (see Section 2.2) even before addressing institutionalised citizenship inequalities.

However, the tragedy of humanitarian citizenship is that the performances which define it apparently depend upon the reproduction of border violence. In the case of the domicidal destruction of migrants' homes, the continual interventions of donation and distribution to maintain the camp in the hope of 'humanising' the migrants, while allowing citizen-humanitarians to claim virtue, serve to re-produce citizenship distinctions and the spatial exclusions they reciprocally cause and lead to. Unable to rupture, while inadvertently reinforcing, the economy of violence against illegalised migrants, the act of giving becomes more performative and self-referential, reduced to distinguishing the humanitarians' own sophisticated and hospitable form of European citizenship against other, more vulgar, xenophobic, and exclusionary citizenships. However, this all occurs without directly challenging the border or other technologies of citizenship. Instead citizen-humanitarians may actually need exclusionary violence against irregular migrants to create the conditions for their caring interventions to allow them to be distinguished from enthusiastically ethno-nationalist citizens; interventions which unfortunately do not necessarily bring them any closer to coalitional solidarities *across* the citizenship line. In the end migrants are left 'as objects of care and compassion rather than equal citizens' (Mavelli, 2017, p. 821).

6.5 Conclusion

Based on Chapter 5's description of domicidal destructions of migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance, analysis in this chapter turned to how they spatialise and reproduce exclusionary forms of citizenship to address both *RQ2* and *RQ3*. Straightforwardly, one of destruction's main functions is to spatially segregate the city, deter migrants from coming to Calais, and keep them in precarious and materially impoverished living spaces. However, in doing so, the continuous destructions of migrants' autonomous camps produce a material lack which creates a dependency on humanitarian interventions. The main argument of the chapter is that the dependency on the state and volunteer associations that destructions produce, although in different ways, reproduces exclusionary forms of citizenship, not to mention reinforces the violence of the humanitarian border.

On the one hand, the state offsets its daily domicidal destructions through the provision of temporary accommodation for irregular migrants in special centres away from Calais. These are described as offering dignified humanitarian accommodation compared to the 'inhumane' conditions in Calais' jungles, but are actually intended to bring migrants under the scrutinising gaze of the state's citizenship regime and deny them further opportunities for further autonomous mobility. The situation with the volunteer-humanitarian associations, however, is much more complex. Positioned against the state and its violent domicide, one of the main actions of these groups is to constantly provide materials for rebuilding migrant camps following their destruction. These are intended to resist migrants' dehumanisation by being made homeless and their general dispersal from the city of Calais. Yet, this chapter argues that these humanitarian distributions can, in fact, become implicated in the segregation of migrants from the city, the reproduction of dehumanising relations of dependence, and in some ways depend upon, while facilitating, continued domicidal violence at the border.

The thrust of humanitarian citizenship is that the performance of humanitarianism towards dehumanised, racialised, and non-citizen migrants will inspire the state and

civil society to shift their policies towards greater inclusion by providing an example of what a 'proper' citizen and national response should look like. However, given the functioning of the humanitarian border, the fact that the state is often willing to permit performances of humanitarianism if they allow autonomous and unruly mobilities to be captured and contained (Dadusc and Mudu, 2020), and the dehumanisation and reproduction of dependency present in acts of aid giving, such volunteer-humanitarian actions can become self-referential and performative displays requiring and reproducing ontological inequality between citizens and 'non-citizen' migrants to distinguish themselves from other more vulgar (e.g. racist or xenophobic) European citizen forms. This performance requires that migrant-victims continue to occupy their place of exclusion, and endure continuous domicidal violence to allow the 'humanitarian citizen' to reproduce 'humanising' performances of service-provision which also, ironically, have further dehumanising effects.

While the citizen humanitarian volunteer appears unable to escape its implication in the economy of border violence, nor the citizen/non-citizen distinction fundamental to it, another politics of coalition and, I argue, anti-citizenship is required. This is one that first and foremost seeks to encourage autonomy, rather than reproduce dependence, and which aims for complicity in the daily acts of migrants' resistance to the governmental regime of mobility control. It recognises the differential access to resources and seeks to mobilise citizens' resources to undo it, but takes a more humble approach to the procurement and distribution of materials necessary for facilitating resistance and autonomy of movement which does not make claims of humanisation. It also takes a more tactical view towards the question material provision, and aims to put it at the service of undoing mobility and citizenship restrictions rather than one that suggests to be an end in and of itself.

Notes

- i. Although this chapter highlights destructions as implementing the governments' no *points de fixation* policy, evictions and securitisations are also important interventions which carry it out. For example, fencing was installed underneath a motorway bridge where migrants often found shelter in January and February 2019 (one of the 'permanent evictions' mentioned on page Figure 5.2.3 and visible in Figure 23) intended to 'avoid the fixation points and the presence of migrants near the Total petrol station' (Boussemart, 2019a).
- ii. The precarious homes were primarily useful for keeping migrants in overcrowded and dangerous living conditions, exposed to the elements, for which the state could deny responsibility (Dhesi, Isakjee, and Davies, 2018). Their 'precarious materiality' only appeared as a benefit when more severe forms of domicide were threatened (e.g. evictions and razing of the buffer-zone or southern area (see Figure 24)) and people needed to move their homes to avoid destruction. Thus, precarity was not a boon in and of itself outside that context.
- iii. Keeping migrants on the move in secondary circuits of mobility has been described by Martina Tazzioli (2019b) as 'governing migrant mobility through mobility'. In this way, the 'movings on' and destructions seen in the city of Calais can be thought of alongside other undesired movements like deportations within a country or to other EU states under the Dublin agreements, around the border obstacles erected in migrants' paths, or dispersal throughout a territory's reception centres as 'trapping' them in a constant state of mobility. These enforced movements exhaust migrants and dissuade them from continuing their autonomous mobilities by poisoning their movements with futility, making them retrace their steps, or circumvent an increasing array of obstacles along their journeys.
- iv. For further discussion on social death and the production and disposal of migrants as 'waste' see Chapter 8.
- v. This is an argument made by Willie Wright (2018) regarding environmental racism which I present during the discussion of environmental citizenship, beginning on page 194.
- vi. This statement must be qualified by acknowledging that migrants are not entirely dependent but are rather resourceful, resilientPicozzaProducingEuropeGeographies2017, ingenuitive, and sustain one another through their own networks that have no relation to the humanitarian projects of Europeans. Nevertheless, and as will be shown in Section 6.3, destructions do aim to get migrants to 'ask for something'.
- vii. For example, 700 irregular migrants were evicted from a number of camps in Calais in May 2014 ostensibly due to an outbreak of scabies. However, Amnesty International (2014) criticised the state's domicidal 'solution' to this public health issue by pointing out that, without being combined with adequate housing alternatives—'only an unspecified number of minors among those evicted will be offered temporary alternative housing'—evictions would only disrupt treatment programmes. In response, a judge from the Administrative Tribunal in Lille argued that the 'general interest in protecting public safety' outweighed the rights of migrants who were being evicted without alternative housing being provided (Slingenberg and Bonneau, 2017, p. 344).
- viii. In another example of the general suspicion that migrants hold towards state humanitarian initiatives in Calais, they boycotted the meal distributions of *La Vie Active* after President Macron publicly stated France would bear the cost for the distribution of meals in Calais, not understanding why the state

would give them meals while continuing to destroy their shelters (CRS were also taking advantage of meal distribution times to destroy tents when no one was around to protect them) (Urbach, 2018).

- ix. Although these association do not operate under contract with the state and can therefore remain politically independent, this does not prevent the state from seeking their cooperation in enacting its domicidal policies. The eviction of the Jungle in particular was negotiated with many of these associations and was given some of their blessings to go ahead (further legitimising its framing as a particularly 'humanitarian' dismantling operation (Gerbier-Aublanc, 2018, p. 4)) and they were also encouraged to further legitimise more recent carrot-and-stick policies. For example, during the *Bois Chico Mendes* neighbourhood meeting, Bouchart urged the associations to 'tell [the irregular migrants] that there are additional devices, to welcome them, to be fed, to sleep, to shower in a place that can welcome them in much more humane conditions than what we see today'.
- x. These are French citizens who proudly take up the banner of citizenship to provide 'humanitarian assistance' to irregular migrants travelling clandestinely from Italy to France across the *Alpes-Maritime*. These are actions for which they have been prosecuted and even convicted in French courts (Chrisafis, 2017). However, although sometimes being on the wrong side of the state's repressive mechanisms, their politics remains one of citizenship. One of the most famous of these *citoyennistes* is Cedric Herrou who claims 'I am a Frenchman' (Nossiter, 2017), and bases his politics on being French and thus embodying the motto of *Liberté, égalité, fraternité*. Despite the criminal charges levied against him by the French state for assisting illegalised migrants, he defends his actions with the proclaimed values of France which for him necessitate civil disobedience. He appeals to his status as a citizen to justify going against the state which he considers fails on its own terms. In this way he points to the contradictions of French policy, simultaneously celebrating and violating human rights, while reconfiguring citizenship's relationship to the state. Furthermore, in doing so, he appeals to both the French state as well as other French citizens to further take up migrant solidarity practices so as to embody the nation's 'true' spirit.

Chapter 7

Securitisations of *La Lande* and *Bois Chico Mendes*

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents two case studies of domicidal securitisations against the inhabitants of the Jungle and Bois Chico Mendes to contribute to thesis' narrative counter-map and to finish answering RQ1. My digital cartography records just 17 securitisations compared to over 1,000 evictions and destructions because they occur less frequently and have not been as well documented by CMS and HRO. Reasons for this include: securitisations are less spectacular or 'newsworthy' as they generally do not entail confrontations with police; they can take place days, weeks, or months after the flashpoints of eviction when public attention has already gone from the site; or, inversely, they follow from (or are contained within) other domicidal interventions so fluidly that they are not recorded as separate events. In Section 8.2 the concept of securitisation is discussed further in the context of the securitisation of migration and environmental security literature. However, for this chapter, and in my digital map, I use this term to label exclusionary interventions that 'wall off' Calais' spaces to prevent them from becoming inhabited by irregular migrants. Although fortifications at the ports are the most commonly recognised examples of Calais' border security infrastructure, one assertion of this research is that the walls, fences, and engineered landscapes denying migrants inhabitable spaces must equally be acknowledged as constitutive elements of the city's border.

Securitisations occur following other domicidal events or are pre-emptively enacted to prevent migrants accessing spaces authorities and citizens feel they are likely to occupy. They can take place at both outdoor spaces or buildings. Various types of security infrastructure have been installed to deny migrants spaces to inhabit, but fences are the most common. In Calais one can spot fences surrounding anything from the smallest pitch of grass (Figure 25) to those inadvertent details of the built environment where migrants can nevertheless find shelter from the elements (Figure 23). There are different types of fencing with varying levels of durability. Temporary fencing usually goes up right after an eviction or destruction, with less permeable and more permanent options installed later (see Figure 29). They are often topped with concertina wire to prevent people climbing over (Figure 2). While fences secure areas of terrain (Figure 22), empty buildings, whether formerly squatted or not, have their windows and entrances walled off with wooden boards (Figure 8 and Figure 11) or masonry stones (see Figure 3, Figure 7, and 2014a,b,c). These two types of installations represent most 'Securitisation' events depicted on the digital map. They exclude migrants from the city by walling off its neglected spaces, which *Calaisiens* and tourists tend to ignore, but which migrants are constantly forced into, and back out of.

However, other securitisations target how migrants inhabit the city-space rather than directly denying access to it. Examples are the removal of benches in the city's shopping centre where migrants would gather, and the removal of low-lying shrubbery in *Parc Richelieu*, *Parc Saint-Pierre*, and elsewhere (see Figure 25) where migrants have sometimes slept rough.ⁱ Although landscaping as a form of securitisation occurs least often, it features prominently here because it was the main way *La Lande*, the space where the Jungle existed, was secured (the wooden fence surrounding it today is short, flimsy, and an ineffective deterrent, see Figure 28).

The two case studies presented in this chapter are in fact examples of a very specific type of securitisation intervention which only recently became prominent; the enclosure of outdoor spaces as environmental conservation areas.ⁱⁱ These combine classic border securitisation techniques of fencing and surveillance with the novel justification of defending the environment from damage by human activity (or, more truthfully, dehumanised migrants). Both the *Fort Vert* nature reserve at *La Lande*, where the Jungle existed until its eviction in 2016 (Section 7.3), and the *Bois Chico Mendes* park (Section 7.4) illustrate a novel shift in how domicide towards migrants is being enacted and framed in Calais through environmentalist discourse. This also has implications for how citizenship comes to be produced and spatialised in the city, and understanding recent reconfigurations of citizenship around an environmentalist 'community of value' (Anderson, 2013) which has been rhetorically separated from, despite emerging out of, explicitly anti-migrant domicidal violence.

7.1.1 Chapter Outline

The chapter begins with a history of the *La Lande* Jungle, showing how it was created via the 'carrot-and-stick' domicide of all other squats and jungles in Calais to contain and segregate the growing population of irregular migrants in 2015 (Subsection 7.2.1). While not my intention, nor am I able for reasons of space, to offer a complete history of the Jungle, some of the protests and resistant forms of daily life which led to the state's ultimate decision to evict and destroy it entirely are given in Subsection 7.2.2. After this brief summary of the Jungle's origins and ending, Section 7.3 turns to describing how *La Lande* was converted into the *Fort Vert* nature reserve. This section details the physical interventions made to achieve an environmentally valuable and physically impenetrable zone, as well as the ecological relations between human and non-human species politically mobilised to do so.



FIGURE 23: Fencing underneath N216 motorway bridge close to *Zone du Marcel-Doret*. Installed February, 2019 (Boussemart, 2019a). Author's photograph taken April 2019.

Section 7.4 then presents the case of *Bois Chico Mendes*, another site securitised based on environmentalist justifications. This section again begins with a brief presentation of the site's history, highlighting the cyclical nature of its inhabitance by migrants and solidarity activists, first in the mid to late 2000s and again after the Jungle's eviction and destruction in 2016. Subsection 7.4.1 shows how, following the wood's reoccupation in 2017, citizens' concerns about migrants' waste threatening the natural environment allowed for the city's daily acts of domicide there to become described as 'cleanings' (see Subsection 5.2.1), while motivating the mayor to permanently secure the wood from migrant occupation by turning it into a city park showcasing its biodiversity. After arguing that the production of 'migrants' waste' is in fact sustained by the very domicidal operations that are presented as 'cleanings', I turn to news reports, the rhetoric of Calais' mayor, and statements of French neighbours during a town-hall meeting in Subsection 7.4.2 to show how this new ecopark as securitised space is necessitated against, while rhetorically skirting, the erasure of migrants' inhabitance of the wood.

7.2 The Jungle

This section gives a summary of the life-course of the Jungle. Proceeding chronologically, its origins as state strategy to segregate the migrant population, the daily



FIGURE 24: Google Earth satellite photograph of the *La Lande* Jungle taken on 23 August 2016.

resistances that took place within and from it, and how the Jungle was eventually eliminated in a series of violent evictions are presented. This sets the stage for discussion of the *Fort Vert* nature reserve and other security measures implemented to prevent *La Lande's* re-occupation in Section 7.3. Understanding something of the ungovernable nature of the Jungle helps contextualise authorities' paranoia towards the re-emergence of a 'New Jungle' today, and the hyper-cycles of domicide it manifests as.

7.2.1 Origins of the Jungle

My thesis is dedicated, in part, to contextualising the Jungle in the longer term history of migrant inhabitance in Calais, and to compensate for the volume of Junglecentric research on Calais that has emerged in recent years, and which can sometimes neglect to position it appropriately within this history (e.g. Ansaloni, 2020; Davies, 2015; Davies and Isakjee, 2015; Dhesi, Isakjee, and Davies, 2018; Doidge and Sandri, 2019; Hall, Lounasmaa, and C. Squire, 2019; Hicks and Mallet, 2019; Koegler, 2017; Martens, 2019; McGee and Pelham, 2018; Mould, 2017a,b; Müller and Zinflou, 2019; Sandri, 2018; Sanyal, 2017; Ticktin, 2016a). Despite the widely held misconception that the Jungle 'was informally established by refugees' (Doidge and Sandri, 2019, p. 465) through autonomous acts of occupation like Calais' previous squats and jungles, in fact, the Jungle was created by the French state for the expressed purpose of containing the unprecedented number of irregular migrants coming to Calais during the 'long summer of migration' in 2014-15. At the beginning of this period, there were a number of long-term autonomous occupations already existing, some of which are mentioned in previous chapters (e.g. Victor Hugo, the Sudanese Jungle by the Eurotunnel, jungles in Bois Dubrulle and across the street at Tioxide, Rue Massena social centre, and Fort Galloo). This situation of irregular migrants and solidarity activists living together

in a number of autonomous spaces *in* the city was described by Mayor Bouchart in her testimony to the UK Parliament's Home Affairs Committee (2014, p. 3) as 'worse than Sangatte [because Sangatte] was a closed environment whereas now we have the immigrants throughout Calais city centre [*sic*]'. Fearing 'the problem is going to get

to set up this centre and have it as a Franco-British co-operation project' (Home Affairs Committee, 2015, p. 6).

The centre she refers to is the *Centre d'accueil Jules Ferry*ⁱⁱⁱ (mentioned before in Section 3.4) which would not only house the women and families evicted from the *Victor Hugo* squat, but additionally provide food, water, electricity, and some washing facilities for the rest of the migrant population. Specifically billed as a 'day-centre' (the spectre of Sangatte still looming large), *Jules Ferry* would *not* provide accommodation to irregular migrants, but instead consolidated a number of the humanitarian services previously available in the city to concentrate migrants outside Calais. For Bouchart, 'it [was] very important...that all the migrants can be in one place' (Home Affairs Committee, 2014, p. 2).

worse' she states that 'we need to do something to contain it. Perhaps the solution is

However, although not proposing to offer them accommodation, Bouchart recognised that the irregular migrants she wanted to use the *Centre's* services also needed a place to live, and she was particularly keen to ensure this would not continue to be the squats that had proliferated in the city centre since 2009. Therefore, alongside the daycentre she also proposed to 'allow squats but outside the city limits' (ibid., p. 10). For a mayor who has always been extremely hostile towards migrants in Calais, refusing to offer them basic services while prioritising evicting and destroying their homes ever since her election in 2008, these proposals, and particularly her stated tolerance of an informal migrant camp, were unprecedented. But, the return of a dedicated space for minimal humanitarian services for the first time since Sangatte and the policy shift towards tolerating a jungle outside the city centre must be understood in relation to her feelings of helplessness—'the problem is going to get worse'—and desire to exclude the migrant population from the city—'we need to do something to contain it'.

In Spring 2015 Bouchart's plans began to be enacted. Once the transformation of *Jules Ferry*, previously a children's camp, into a day-centre was complete, the process began of forcing all the migrants out of the city centre. Employees of the OFII and the police began harassing migrants who continued to stay in the autonomous squats and jungles, threatening them with a violent eviction if they did not move to *La Lande* by themselves. A municipal decree was also issued to prevent food distributions by associations in the city as meals began to be served in the day-centre (*La Voix du Nord*, 2015). Associations were also solicited to encourage migrants to move out of their current homes, and some helped them move their belongings and build shelters in *La Lande*. However, many migrants refused to leave and move to Bouchart's tolerated squatting zone; citing its distance from the city, its environmental conditions (discussed on the next page and in Section 8.3), and fear of police control (CMS, 2015g).



FIGURE 25: Composite image of the eviction and subsequent securitisation of a small pitch of grass along *Boulevard des Alliés* evicted during creation of the Jungle. Note the later removal of the bushes on either side of the grass. Eviction photo on left is from CMS, 2015d and right is the author's photograph taken January 2018.

Therefore, the next stage of clearing Calais' autonomous squats and jungles commenced on 5 April 2015 when riot police began the forcible evictions of jungles in Bois Dubrulle. Then, on 2 June, both the jungle by the Eurotunnel terminal and Fort Galloo, a squatted metal recycling facility home to around 400 people and occupied for almost one year (see page 80 and, CMS, 2017b, p. 63), were evicted by large numbers of police (CMS, 2015c). On 21 September, the final evictions and destructions took place of the predominately Syrian camps remaining in the city (Figure 25). During these evictions the migrants were told by police to go to the Jungle. One group, refused, sat in the middle of the road, and began chanting 'No Jungle! No Jungle!' (CMS, 2015d). The line of riot police reacted by tear-gassing the group and then frog-marching them to La Lande (Solla and Menendez, 2018). As they approached, the camps along Rue des Garennes west of the motorway bridge were also evicted and destroyed by the same police line, pushing their inhabitants into the dune-land past the highway access ramp. This marked the elimination of all visible autonomous migrant occupations in the city and their consolidation into a single location outside Calais where inhabitants were then left to self-organise in an increasingly shrinking space (Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi, 2017).

It is important to highlight where exactly the French authorities decided to contain Calais' migrant population given the upcoming discussions of environmental racism on page 194. The Jungle was located on the site of a former landfill around six kilometres to the east of Calais' centre, just beyond the city limits, and next to the motorway leading from the E40 motorway to the ferry port (Brimelow and Sane, 2016, p. 17). In the 80s, sand dredged up during the port's first expansion was deposited there as

'effectively industrial waste', and later mined out again to build some of the city's infrastructure projects (Alexander Driencourt, conservation manager at *Eden 62* quoted in Rullmann and Ahmad Khan, 2019, 3:35 min). *La Lande* was located next to an industrial zone of 'moderate toxic risk' due to the pollutants being released from the Tioxide and Graftech chemical plants visible in Figure 28 (Dhesi, Isakjee, and Davies, 2018). Additionally, Chrysotile (commonly known as white asbestos) was found throughout the site as people were being moved onto it (Channel 4, 2015). While an environmentally toxic and hazardous location, *La Lande*'s distance from the city, the existence of the disused *Camp Jules Ferry* repurposed as the day-centre, and the relative ease with which police could seal the two roads leading to and from the city all made it an attractive location for the authorities to segregate Calais' illegalised migrant population.

7.2.2 Life and resistance in the Jungle

While originally conceived by Mayor Bouchart to contain and segregate the migrant population, soon the autonomy of life in the Jungle outgrew the plans of its architects and 'defied state-authority' (Boyle, 2017). Not only did it become home to an unprecedented number of people, but authorities were decidedly unable to control *how* its residents lived there. Natasha King writes: 'Being effectively abandoned in a place that was seen as a ghetto and of no value, people were free to make it whatever they wanted' (2016, p. 120). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to give an extensive description of life and resistance inside the Jungle, but there are a number of works for interested readers which go into greater detail than I am able to here (e.g. Ansaloni, 2020; Calais Writers, 2017; Ellison, 2019; Freedman, 2018; Hall, Lounasmaa, and C. Squire, 2019; Hicks and Mallet, 2019; Katz, 2017; King, 2016; Koegler, 2017; Mould, 2017a,b; Müller and Schlüper, 2018; Müller and Zinflou, 2019; Rosello, 2016; Sanyal, 2017; Ticktin, 2016a; Tyerman, forthcoming). What is clear is that as the Jungle grew so too did informal social and economic infrastructure unmediated by, and in spite of, the state; what has been described in Subsection 4.2.3 as the 'mobile commons'. Stores, barbers, night-clubs, restaurants, places of worship, street systems, sanitation, healthcare facilities, etc. all emerged through the extremely hard work of inhabitants, visitors, and supporters, and it was the Jungle's persistent and autonomous quality of life—the mobile commons which flowed through it—in the face of exclusion and enforced destitution that perhaps proved its greatest threat to the city of Calais. The Jungle's increasingly urban qualities that developed in the face of state neglect and abuse (Koegler, 2017), coupled with the undying determination amongst its inhabitants to continually challenge and subvert the border and cross clandestinely to the UK, made the Jungle's existence increasingly untenable to authorities who sought to attack, and ultimately eliminate, it over a roughly eight month period of time.

The constant resistance of Jungle residents to their concentration and abandonment outside the city, as well as the denial of services (e.g. water, appropriate sanitation, or waste management (Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi, 2017)) accessible to them, took the form of both visible moments of protest as well as invisible attempts to cross the border or evade police controls. Thomas Tyerman (2016, pp. 199–201) offers an account of one of the protests that took place from the Jungle, illustrating how its physical geography, at first used to segregate migrant occupants, was subverted.

This protest occurred on 20 August 2015 in response to a meeting between UK Home Secretary Theresa May and French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve to discuss Calais' 'crisis'. Some Jungle residents managed to get into Calais and arrive close to the *Sous-Préfecture* building where they protested the meeting taking place without their input. But later police blocked Rue de Garennes and thus prevented most other Jungle inhabitants from joining the protests. Although La Lande was isolated from the city's urban areas and its main connection to the city could be easily closed off by police, the Jungle abutted the motorway leading directly to the ferry terminal. Unable to go to the city, Jungle residents instead took their protest on to that motorway, stopping traffic with their bodies, banners, signs, and slogans (CMS, 2015e). Occupying this road disrupted the normal functioning of the port, caused delays and losses for ferry and haulage companies, and also allowed other Jungle inhabitants to attempt to stowaway in the now stationary UK-bound lorries. The protest also had symbolic significance. Through occupying one of the largest pieces of logistical infrastructure connecting the UK to the rest of Europe, Jungle inhabitants refused to permit goods and capital to travel freely within the European economic union with the very bodies prohibited from making that same journey. They powerfully undid, if only for around an hour, one of the fundamental injustices in EU and British trade policy which allows the free flow of goods, and the circulation of capital, but limits that of people.

While that day the protest was cleared by the CRS using tear-gas, riot shields, and batons, afterwards the French state responded to this occupation, and other attacks on the motorway occurring when traffic was stopped or slowed (both due to naturally occurring congestion or when migrants placed obstacles in the middle of the road (BBC, 2016)), by bulldozing a 100 metre strip of earth between the motorway and the Jungle (CMS, 2016c). Achieving this 'buffer-zone'—a no-man's-land in which police stationed along the motorway could easily detect approaching migrants and target them with flash-lights, tear-gas grenades, and rubber bullets, or bring their vans and water cannons closer to the Jungle—required the eviction of around 1,500 people and the destruction of their homes (Mould, 2017a, p. 399). This was to be the first of a number of domicidal operations against the previously 'tolerated' Jungle.

The motorway protest was but one of many that took place, and moreover it was only one type of protest that Jungle residents engaged in. For a period of time in Summer 2015 there was a 'wave of sustained protests' in which Jungle residents were marching to the *Mairie* almost every day to hold sit-ins, make speeches denouncing EU and British migration policy, and shout demands to open the borders (CMS, 2015a). These demonstrations, while being migrant led, were attended and supported by a large and diverse group of people including solidarity activists, other Europeans visiting or living in the Jungle, Calais locals, and were often covered by international journalists. All these protests, the Jungle's highly visible location for passing British holiday-makers on their way to the port, as well as the resilience of its residents who continued to live their lives and attempt unauthorised border crossings made its continued existence untenable for French and British authorities.

7.2.3 Domicide of the Jungle

There were a number of state attacks 'aimed at destroying [the Jungles'] capacity to support people on the move and the autonomous forms of solidarity that had been established there' (Ellison, 2019, p. 3). These included police prohibiting durable materials from being brought in to prevent inhabitants from building stronger dwellings (Mould, 2017b), police patrols of the Jungle's streets throughout the day (CMS, 2015f), and attempts to destroy its shops, restaurants, and places of worship (Rosello, 2016, pp. 99–100). All these actions must be recognised as domicidal interventions in line with the definition provided in Section 0.5 (and as enclosing the mobile commons flowing through the Jungle) although they were not the spectacularly violent operations that later evictions and destructions would become.

Apart from the creation of the buffer-zone in January 2016, other domicidal events worthy of note are the creation of the container camp and the three day eviction and destruction of the 'Southern Zone' that began on 29 February. These operations happened despite the resistance of residents who took to the roofs of their homes and refused to move, made banners and protested, and went on hunger-strike, with some even sewing their mouths shut with string (CMS, 2016a). However, following these evictions, people did not leave the Jungle but instead moved into its northern portion.^{iv} Still unable to control the Jungle despite these efforts, French authorities decided to destroy it completely.

On 26 September 2016 President Francois Hollande announced the 'complete and definitive dismantling of the La Lande encampment... before the end of the year' (my translation, Le Parisien, 2016). His speech contrasted the poor health and environmental conditions in the Jungle to the dignity available in the reception centres which would be opening around France (the CAOs mentioned in Section 5.4), and to which residents would be forcibly removed. This allowed him to politically justify the domicide of thousands of people and, in the same breath, celebrate France as a country respecting human rights, even attempting to elevate the living conditions of Jungle residents. However, this was based upon the equation of home to 'acceptable standards of living' with which authorities cynically 'emphasised the urgency of putting an end to the deplorable conditions that prevailed in the Jungle' (Rosello, 2016, p. 99). Given the nature of the French government's interventions over the previous 18 months segregating all Calais' migrants in La Lande, enclosing it with more security infrastructures, and bringing more police to Calais to patrol it—the purpose of this eviction was to bring a definitive end to what was a persistent, unruly, and visible contradiction of France's humanitarian posture and Britain's border security more than it was a good faith attempt to improve the 'dignity' of Jungle inhabitants.

Having previously survived two evictions in 2016, as well as the construction of the container camp, the final eviction of the Jungle and the closing of the *Centre d'accueil Jules Ferry* began at dawn on 24 October 2016 in one of the first and largest examples of carrot-and-stick domicide. Hundreds of coaches were brought to carry thousands of people to different parts of France where regional *Préfectures* had converted empty buildings into the CAO reception centres (Baumard, 2016; Freedman, 2018). As the first groups left, women in *Centre Jules Ferry* began protesting to demand to be brought to the UK. Many former homes in the Jungle were lit on fire. Those evicted, as well as other Black residents visible on Calais' streets, were repeatedly harassed, arrested, and taken to detention or reception centres by police (CMS, 2016b). The viability of *Préfète* Fabienne Buccio's description of the domicide as a 'successful humanitarian dismantling operation' (Salomez, 2016) did not last long, and the minors promised transport to the UK were left sleeping in the now empty shipping containers or outdoors (England, 2016).

7.3 *Fort Vert*: a space of ecological and securitarian value

Having provided a detailed description of the domicidal campaign being waged since the Jungle's destruction on all forms of migrant inhabitance to prevent the development of another similarly large and durable autonomous jungle in Chapter 5, this section presents the story of La Lande's conversion into the Fort Vert securitised nature reserve. Despite the environmentalist justifications for the securitisation, it is first and foremost a border security project; a fact made clear by the UK Border Force (the law-enforcement branch of the Home Office responsible for front-line border control operations) being listed as an investment partner (Rullmann, 2020, p. 4). How seriously Fort Vert's border control role is taken by the Border Force is clearly illustrated by their refusal to release their spending figures for the project under a Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) request (ibid.). While Border Force acknowledged possessing the spending information, they refused to share it, citing exemptions 31(1)(a) and (e) of FoIA (Home Office, 2017). These clauses allow exemptions to be made for the public disclosure of information 'if its disclosure would or would be likely to prejudice (a) the prevention or detection of crime and (e) the operation of immigration controls'. In the public interest test justifying this refusal Border Force state:

This information could provide criminals and terrorists with an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the security measures we have in place in Calais and the surrounding area. Renewed attempts could then be made to penetrate security measures based on dedicated expenditure information.

During internal review, after the refusal was appealed, the Home Office did find the 31(1)(a) and (e) exemptions to have been used incorrectly, but it again refused to release the investment information citing articles 27(1)(a) and 43(2) exempting the

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release of information that would prejudice international relations and commercial interests. Although eventually revising the justifications, the initial exemptions illustrate the Home Office's attitude towards *Fort Vert* as, first and foremost, an essential piece of border security infrastructure.

However, this section focuses on how *Fort Vert* has been promoted as additionally offering environmental benefits to the area, and a space for Calais' citizens to 'connect with nature', alongside its border security role. These two qualities are often celebrated in one and the same breath by politicians. For example, during his visit to La Lande in March 2017, then Ministère de l'Intérieur Bruno Le Roux stated he came to Calais 'to see that the eviction and destruction of the Jungle had been successful', and to see that it is followed by 'an ambitious project to return this territory back to nature [to] ensure that it benefits the environment and *especially* to make sure that there will be no new encampments in Calais' (emphasis mine, quoted in Rullmann, 2018, p. 5). Then British Minister for Immigration Robert Goodwill also described the project as facilitating a 'return to nature' in addition to preventing the return of migrants. In his words, the goal of Fort Vert was to 'remove all former camp infrastructure and accommodation and to restore the site to its natural state... to prevent any re-establishment of squats or camps in the area' (in Hicks and Mallet, 2019, p. 31). Contrasting nature to migrants' inhabitance in this way constructs the Jungle as an aberration of nature, and migrants as an 'invasive species', to justify the previous domicide. While such rhetorical invocations of nature, and their multiple uses against Calais' migrants and jungles, are thoroughly addressed in Chapter 8, I just want to highlight for the moment how speaking of a 'return to nature' implies a pristine state of nature that migrants have somehow diminished, and which politicians then claim the right to speak on behalf of and protect. In so doing, they depoliticise migrant domicide as bringing about a 'return to nature'—an initiative enjoying wide support even amongst those who may sympathise with migrants or have disagreed with destroying the Jungle^v—while dehistoricising the occupation and environmental degradation at La Lande. For politicians to justify their anti-migrant policies in this way necessitates ignoring the years of state neglect at the site which turned *La Lande* into a wasteland in the first place (see page 161).

Placing this discussion on hold for the time being, the following section instead remains focused on how the conservation area was built with the purpose of border security and was suffused with 'anti-intrusion mechanisms' which also needed to satisfy a degree of environmental value to justify the site's status as nature reserve. This involved politicised negotiations by *Fort Vert's* architects when deciding the nonhuman species and habitats to curate which might legitimise the total exclusion of humans, actually dehumanised migrants, from *La Lande*. Aside from detailing the reserve's construction, particular attention is paid to the environmentalist discourses used to 'green wash'¹ the domicide of the Jungle and the subsequent securitisation of

¹ Highlighting its environmental benefits so as to distract from the violence out of which the nature reserve has emerged.

La Lande. In Chapter 8 this case is analysed to argue that domicide against migrants based on their supposed threat to the environmental health of the spaces they inhabit (particularly through alarmist portrayals of the waste found within them) is representative of a wider conflation of border, national, and environmental security and constitutes a form of environmental racism.



7.3.1 Securing *La Lande* against future migrant occupations

FIGURE 26: *Fort Vert* from the buffer-zone facing east. Author's photograph taken March 2018.

Before it was the Jungle, a plan existed to 'renature' a portion of *La Lande* to compensate for the environmental damage that would occur as part of the second expansion of Calais' ferry port in the *Calais Port 2015* project (Stevenoot et al., 2012, p. 4). This plan involved 'renaturing' the northern part of *La Lande*, which was already owned by *Conservatoire du littoral* (France's coastal environmental conservation agency) since 2014, and attaching it to the 300 hectares of the existing *Fort Vert* reserve just to the east. Although no work had begun, and the site remained full of waste and hazardous materials in 2015 when migrants were directed to begin camping there, enthusiasm for the 'renaturation' project at *La Lande* was reinvigorated following the Jungle's destruction. In its wake the *Conservatoire du littoral* wrote to the city of Calais and asked to receive ownership of the land which the *Centre Jules Ferry* was located on so that it could be destroyed, cleaned up, and incorporated into the *Fort Vert* expansion as well (Goudeseune, 2016). Thus the initial 'renaturing' proposal was greatly expanded and reorganised. Now it would not only compensate for the habitat loss resulting from the expansion of the city, but it would also be responsible for erasing the material remnants of the Jungle and 'day-centre', and fulfil a border security role with antiintrusion mechanisms built into the landscape to keep migrants out (Rullmann, 2018, p. 28).

While the work to construct the reserve would not commence until Spring 2017 (*La Voix du Nord*, 2017), signs (see Figure 26) were placed almost immediately following the eviction declaring the area closed to the public. These signs, citing the environment's fragility, describe all intrusions as detrimental to the 'naturation' of the site. The work is described on them as 'ecological restoration' and 'landscape reconquest' (translations mine), reanimating colonial imaginaries in which the 'savages' must be conquered and expelled to protect a pristine landscape (see page 188 for further discussion on this point). However, in the context of state neglect at *La Lande* throughout previous years, the question of who exactly was responsible for this ecological degradation to begin with seems pressing?



FIGURE 27: Police read signs on fence by what was the entrance to the *Centre Jules Ferry*. Author's photograph, December 2018.

The Jungle's Southern Zone, while not part of the conservation area and thus not having been landscaped to prevent intrusion like the area to the north, has been left barren although it remains heavily surveilled by police patrolling the buffer-zone, now a formalised road. When I returned to the site in May 2019, police were not only patrolling the roads around the perimeter of *Fort Vert*, but were actively checking for any migrants inside the blind constructed for bird watchers to observe water fowl against

the backdrop of the chemical industries (see Figure 28). On one of my previous trips, I encountered a police patrol who were carrying a flash-light as they walked back to their vehicles, presumably after checking for migrants living in the WWII German Oldenburg Battery bunkers in the dunes. Before entering their vehicles they stopped to notice the posters made by the *Conservatoire du littoral* which hung along the fences enclosing the former site of *Centre Jules Ferry* (Figure 27). The poster they were reading, dedicated to the *Centre's* life as a 'reception centre for the migrant population', gave the reasons for its demolition and the site's return to an 'original dune space' as 'salubrity and public security'. This sign thus neatly encapsulates the interconnected roles of *Fort Vert*; to present an example of a supposedly originary form of pristine nature, excluding migrants both physically and symbolically, and offer Calais' citizens an opportunity to develop a holistic connection to the local environment and landscape. However, the near constant presence of police, now more than three years after the destruction, starkly illustrates how the site has only been created and sustained through the violence of the state and remains defined by its role as a piece of border security infrastructure.

7.3.2 Converting a wasteland into a nature reserve

The hope we had to have different species was really compatible with security measures. In fact, the wish of the City of Calais was compatible with the project, and the wish of the [UK] Home Office and the French State also. Everything was compatible because when you try to build a reserve, you try to preserve it from degradation. (Loïc Obled in Rullmann and Ahmad Khan, 2019)

The value of a securitised *Fort Vert* for British migration control and national security interests is indisputable by their own admission. Yet, as we have seen, there was an additional desire for it to become a space of environmental value, for which a large financial and symbolic investment was needed. For its status as a nature reserve to be justified, La Lande—essentially a neglected waste dump for all its life: first receiving the port's dredgings; then the city's trash; and finally what Bauman (2004) would call 'human waste', the illegalised migrants who are undesired yet present, targeted in various strategies of 'disposal' like dispersal, containment, and recycling-had to be imbued with ecological significance. Otherwise, La Lande would remain another of Calais' securitised but neglected spaces, a fenced off site easily recognised by all as 'the place where the Jungle was', which would deny the city the ability to transcend its associations with the 'crisis' of irregular migration. This transformation was both a physical and rhetorical process involving a great act of cleaning to remove any material traces of the Jungle, then followed by landscaping La Lande to create the specific environments curated non-human species, waterfowl and a small orchid in particular, would exist in.

The first step taken to create the *Fort Vert* nature reserve was moving vast quantities of sand. Bulldozers passed back and forth across the terrain previously inhabited by Jungle's residents at first to destroy their homes, and then again to dig the lake-beds, moat, sandbanks, ditches, and dunes. In doing so, the bulldozers removed the top 20 centimetres of sand containing most of the Jungle's leftover trash, after extensive hand-picking (see Figure 32), and actually built it in to the reserve's geographical anti-intrusion features. The intended result was described by Alexandre Driencourt, former Conservation Manager at Eden62 (the conservation authority of Pas-de-Calais), as 'starting from scratch where nature will fend for itself' (Rullmann and Ahmad Khan, 2019, 2:00 min). Removing the top layer of soil would also benefit, perhaps even 'pave the way' for, Fort Vert's featured species, the fen orchid, as the settling of orchid seeds requires bare soil. By razing the land, the physical remnants of the Jungle, having now become trash, were removed at the same time that the soil was being prepared for *La Lande's* next incarnation as nature reserve after having been a wasteland for so long. In Section 8.5 the act of cleaning migrants' trash as both a euphemism for domicide as well as a ritual through which citizens can ideologically reterritorialise the spaces migrants inhabit are discussed, but for now the fundamental, but self-contradicting, role of the Liparis loeselii fen orchid as featured species providing Fort Vert with its ecological justification as a conservation area is important to recognise.



FIGURE 28: *Fort Vert* nature reserve facing west. The chemical industries, motorway leading to the port, and the fencing which encloses it are visible on the horizon. Author's photograph taken May 2019.

Liparis loeselii is a small and rare wetland plant with yellow flowers. The European Environment Agency (n.d.) lists it as a 'near threatened' species and its conservation status in the Atlantic region as 'Unfavourable-Bad'. Although 72 individual

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fen orchids had been observed in the shadow of the chemical factories at La Lande in 1997 (Dewalle and Terrasse, 1998), this specific area was not designated one of its Natura 2000 protected sites unlike the dunes just above Dunkirk (European Environment Agency, n.d.). However, the return of the fen orchid is explicitly desired in Fort Vert today so the site can become a designated environment in France's National Restoration Plan. As part of this process, areas of *La Lande* were deforested and invasive species of plants removed (including the onions discarded by Jungle inhabitants that began growing by themselves (Rullmann and Ahmad Khan, 2019)) to allow smaller plants, especially the fen orchid, to return. Furthermore, during discussions between plant and bird experts to decide upon which particular species and habitats should be curated in Fort Vert, those species of plants most favourable to birds were eschewed in favour of the Liparis loeselii (ibid., 2:00 min). Given these efforts to create an environment in which the fen orchid could thrive, Rullmann points out one glaring and ironic contradiction. The orchid requires human and large animal activity in its habitats to clear away and suppress other vegetation which blocks its sunlight. Because of this, the decline in numbers of fen orchids corresponds with the reduction in human activity in its habitats as traditional activities like digging for peat and grazing cattle became obsolete (Rullmann, 2018, pp. 17–18). The contradiction of creating an artificial conservation environment prohibiting human activity to protect a rare plant species depending on such activity highlights Fort Vert's ecological value as closely tied to providing political justification for, or 'green washing', the Jungle's eviction and destruction as well as ongoing efforts to fight its return in the name of conserving biodiversity.

In addition to the landscaping done to create the fen orchid's 'preferred habitat' were the features built into La Lande which, although constructed as security devices, also had to find ecologically significant roles. Alexandre Driencourt lists the 'antiintrusion' mechanisms built into the reserve as a fence, a ditch, and a dyke (these are visible in Figure 26 and Figure 28). He describes how the ditches were dug with the outsides to be very steep, difficult for people to traverse, which he says was not of ecological interest. To compensate, the interior sides were made at an extremely shallow slope so that, as water levels fluctuate, a number of different plant species could grow on them. The dykes, he describes, are important to obstruct the view from the nature reserve and create a quiet zone so that 'we can pass by and the birds inside will not be bothered by it'. The existing topography of dunes and artificial cliff was exaggerated to prevent the sand from being carried away by the winds as well as provide habitat for cliff dwelling birds. In Figure 28 the lake is visible, which is the main attraction for the waterfowl, but which has also been dug so that La Lande cannot be camped on again. Despite existing primarily as a nature reserve, the veneer of ecological conservation that Fort Vert exists under has been eroded by the decisions which determined its actual form often prioritising its border security role with the environmental value being a secondary concern incorporated after the fact.

7.4 Bois Chico Mendes

The story of *Bois Chico Mendes*, although not as well publicised as *La Lande* and the Jungle, is another case where ecological justifications for anti-migrant domicide and migrant spatial securitisation have appeared in Calais. This wood is located in the east of Calais, with one end abutting the motorway two kilometres south of *La Lande*. It was home to many migrants in the 2000s and was the site of the 2009 No Border Camp mentioned on page 73. In the 2010s *Bois Chico Mendes* was not continuously occupied, given the other squats and jungles present in the city, but after the Jungle's eviction migrants returning to Calais began to live in this location again along with a handful of other outdoor sites in industrial zone on the eastern outskirts of the city.

Between February and August 2018 HRO recorded 38 separate evictions of Bois Chico Mendes. The last eviction took place in late August, after which the Mairie installed fencing around the wood's perimeter, visible in Figure 29 (Dauchart, 2018c). This fencing was installed as the first step in a \in 1.5m conversion of the wood into an urban park, a process which Bouchart stated 'we know that it will be complicated but we are determined' (my translation, Bois Chico Mendes neighbourhood meeting 2018). This section argues that, similarly to Fort Vert, the development of this urban park comes to be discursively defined through its environmental benefits, although the project's main objective is to prevent the return of migrants' whose jungle in the wood was evicted and destroyed. The evidence for this comes primarily from discussion between Mayor Bouchart and citizens living around Bois Chico Mendes during a neighbourhood meeting and news articles covering migrants' occupation of and eviction from the wood. However, before discussing the park, it is important to analyse how an alarmist focus on migrants' waste was used to construct them as an environmental threat, polluting Bois Chico Mendes' ecosystem, so as to 'green wash' and depoliticise the domicide against them as 'cleaning operations' despite the racist logic of this framing (see Section 8.4).

7.4.1 Cleaning migrants' trash?

An article from *La Voix du Nord* (Boussemart, 2018) entitled 'the Chico Mendes wood, occupied by migrants, covered in trash' (my translation) describes neighbours' concerns of the environmental state of this wood due to its inhabitance by migrants. In the article their inhabitance is equated with filth and environmental degradation while the material infrastructure that makes up their jungle is construed as garbage. Furthermore, there is an anxious correlation on the part of those neighbours between the material existence of this small jungle in the wood and the development of another 'New Jungle' in Calais.

Since the Jungle's eviction, Calais' authorities and citizens have developed a particular concern with the materiality of migrants' encampments. In addition to the destructions which aim to keep them at the absolute minimum level of material subsistence (Chapter 5), efforts are being made to measure the size of jungles by calculating the weight of material which police and city workers confiscate during their operations (Hagan, 2019). For example, the internal report into police action in Calais and Dunkirk lists a total of 91,000kg of 'objets detruit (objects destroyed)' in 'anti-squat' operations between May and August 2017 (Diaz et al., 2017). La Voix du Nord also ran a headline announcing '750 kilos of waste and 23 tents removed from the Chico Mendes wood' in what is later described as the 'third cleaning in one month' (Dauchart, 2018a). These are, no doubt, large numbers which provide evidence of the scale of authorities' compulsion to deny autonomous migrant encampments any material durability. They are also intended to raise alarm at the scale of migrant camps while quantifying the efficacy of the police and city workers' hard work in destroying them; perhaps to 'show progress' in what otherwise appears to be a Sisyphean, not to mention punitive, repetition of domicide that has changed very little throughout the decades. However, of particular relevance to the case of Bois Chico Mendes is the correlative transformation of what was previously termed 91,000kg of 'objects destroyed' now becoming 750kg of 'waste' accompanying the reframing of 'anti-squat' domicidal interventions as 'cleanings' (Section 5.2). Not only does this obscure the agency of the police in destroying migrant camps, but posits those destructions as having the more reasonable, or even positive, goal of waste removal.

However, HRO (2019b) write in their June 2019 report that the attendance of a 'cleaning team' every 48 hours has not done anything to solve the 'waste problem' at *Bois Chico Mendes* that initially worried neighbours. Indeed, they state that 'cleaning staff are more concerned with the removal of tents, blankets, sleeping bags and firewood' than removing litter. Maria Hagan (2019) also describes how evictions and destructions are 'strategically timed to coincide with when the displaced were unlikely to be "home" to protect their possessions'. Historically, in Calais' jungles police would mostly just slash and destroy shelters without taking them away (CMS, 2011), but that was also long before the environmentalist rhetoric justifying these operations as 'cleanings' began to be used.^{vi} However, regardless of whether or not the waste is immediately collected, it nonetheless becomes attributed to the migrants despite having been created by police.

Apart from the police's direct production of waste just shown, Calais' authorities also contributed indirectly creating to 'migrants' waste' in *Bois Chico Mendes* by refusing to provide them with toilets, trash collection, or other ways to mitigate their own waste production and thus live in a cleaner, more dignified, space. During the neighbourhood meeting, a spokesperson for *L'Auberge d'Migrants* recognised how 'dirty' *Bois Chico Mendes* is, but says that the inhabitants 'don't have garbage cans, so we asked for help to collect garbage at the town hall so that we could collect this waste, but it wasn't possible' (my translation, *Bois Chico Mendes neighbourhood meeting* 2018). Neither were there appropriate accommodation facilities made available in Calais, just the CAES discussed in Section 5.4, so that perhaps those people would not have to live

and create waste in the woods to begin with. And, even though the Tribunal Admin*istratif de Lille* (2018) ruled that the lack of toilets available to migrants living in *Bois* Chico Mendes was likely to create serious and illegal harm to their dignity, and ordered the city to provide them, the lack of garbage collection points or access to showers or potable water did not require any improvement according to the court's judgement. During the meeting, when discussing the possibility of including toilets in the new park, Mayor Bouchart says that there *is* enough space for toilets and even that 'there are, nowadays, dry toilets that are well suited to this type of place...But we are not going to include toilet areas in the specifications' (my translation, Bois Chico Mendes neighbourhood meeting 2018). This shows how managing human waste and trash in *Bois Chico Mendes* was not, in itself, an insurmountable obstacle for the city of Calais, but rather that it was a political decision to refuse to do so. Without the provision of any sanitation facilities or trash collection points, the city ensured that migrants would continue to live in filth and hardship, while producing the unsightly waste about which the neighbours were complaining and which could be mobilised as a pretext for the campaign of domicide being waged against them.

In light of the evidence above, the discussion around waste production in *Bois Chico Mendes* must recentre the ways that the city government and police produce it both indirectly, through neglect and lack of services, as well as directly, through the material destruction of shelters and belongings. In this way, local authorities have been creating and reproducing the context for continual domicidal cleanings whilst shifting responsibility for the violence onto migrants' own purported wastefulness. This discussion is returned to in Chapter 8, in particular to understand how cleaning migrants' waste works to politically create an imagined community of 'environmental citizens' along with its racist underpinnings. However, for now it is important to see how the understanding of the waste in *Bois Chico Mendes* as 'migrants' waste', not only justified recurrent domicidal destructions as cleanings, but also the securitisation of the site through an environmental conservation project similar to *Fort Vert*.

7.4.2 The walled garden

Within a month of the Lille court's ruling that latrines need to be installed and maintained in *Bois Chico Mendes* by the city, the camp would be permanently destroyed and work on fences to surround the area begun. While 'environmental degradation' caused by migrants' waste was used to justify the evictions and destructions of people's homes, the urban park to be built there was intended to protect the wood's treasured environment by securing the space against re-occupation. Although the merits of the park were most often discussed in terms of its environmental benefits, the intentions behind the project were decidedly to remove migrants from the area.

This is first of all evidenced in the time-frame for works on the park. The fences began to be installed in August 2018 although Bouchart states the real work would



FIGURE 29: Fencing around *Bois Chico Mendes* along *Rue du Groupe Normandie Niemen*. Author's photograph taken January 2019.

only begin in 2020. Until that time the park will remain fenced off and closed. Additionally, at one point in the neighbourhood meeting, Bouchart herself admits to the project's goal of denying migrants the ability to inhabit the wood. To quote her:

So very clearly, how did this project come about? It came with the many phone calls, many complaints from the residents and the neighbourhood in general, which could no longer use this place. So from there we imagined a different projection on the wood.

The decision to evict the migrants and secure the wood had already been taken in response to neighbours complaints before there was even an attempt to 'imagine the wood differently'. Very clearly, removing the migrants was the impetus to construct a nature park for the area's citizen-residents. The environmental value of *Bois Chico Mendes*, in the same way as *La Lande*, was only prioritised after the site was spatially appropriated and inhabited by migrants. Despite the state's responsibility for continually degrading the environment throughout the time of the jungle's existence, it is the illegalised migrants and 'their' waste which becomes the degrading factor to the wood's environmental health. Only then can the wood's newly discovered environmental significance become appropriated and deployed to expel the migrants while allowing the Mayor to offer something to her citizen-constituents; a park that appreciates and celebrates the area's specific natural beauty which is considered the rightful property of the citizens rather than the migrants who have been living there.

Yet curiously, even though the park was so clearly tied to the erasure of the autonomous jungle, the neighbourhood meeting in which Bouchart proposes her 'different projection' mostly ignored this connection. Diego Jenowein, who wrote about the town hall meeting for the blog *Global Voices* and provided me the transcript, describes most of the conversation that night focusing on descriptions of the woods' environmental significance. To quote him directly:

There was a lot of discussion around the fact [of the] wood being the last reminder of the area's history as a 'beautiful marsh'... and one local resident reminded the audience that the woodland is home to a vast array of natural species, including salamanders that dwell close to the area's central pond.

But no mention had been made of the wood's human occupants until one resident timidly suggested, fifteen minutes into the meeting, that a solution should be found for 'the people who live there'. (Jenowein, 2018)

Even Calais' mayor, who, since 2008, has been vocally anti-migrant, tried to avoid discussing the migrant occupation. She consistently asserted, except in the one quotation from the previous page, that the park project was occurring independently of the occupation. At one point she even argue that the cameras attached to light poles were placed there for identifying the owners of dogs who did not pick up their pets' faeces.

Another citizen also separates the securitised park from its domicidal role, and, in her statements, appeals for the discussion to not become 'political':

In terms of the problem that I raised above concerning its residents, I don't want to politicise on it, it's not the object, it's the development of a piece of land that we're proposing and we have to find them another solution. There are legal solutions in any case that they are offered, you have to direct them towards that because seeing them suffering is not funny either; we think especially in winter, it is not easy. So I think we need to find a balanced solution. But as far as the layout is concerned, it is important that we keep this green lung that is a beauty to look at and because a ridge with a wood like this is not necessarily common. (my translation, *Bois Chico Mendes neighbourhood meeting* 2018)

The 'legal solution' the speaker mentions is also repeatedly emphasised by Bouchart in response to any questions pertaining to *Bois Chico Mendes*' migrant inhabitants in the meeting, and has been thoroughly discussed in Section 5.4 and Section 6.3. However, what is particularly interesting in the quotation above is how the speaker frames the park as an *apolitical* proposal. Successfully correlating migrant inhabitance with environmental degradation through media campaigns, photographs, rhetoric, and state waste production allows discussion on how to best protect that environment to implicitly necessitate removing the migrants, without explicitly acknowledging the domicidal violence this inevitably employs. *Bois Chico Mendes*' beauty and rarity, given the urban development in Calais since the 60s, must naturally be protected and accentuated no matter the costs. Appeals to nature and environmental security, issues that may be considered universally important including among those more sympathetic to the migrants' inhabitance of the area, depoliticise the park's construction. In this case the 'natural', not only the naturalness of the environment but the givenness that it must be protected, is used to reject any objections as *politicisations* that disingenuously instrumentalise discussions of the park to criticise Calais' overall treatment of its irregular migrant inhabitants.

Unlike *Fort Vert*, where the anti-migrant strategy contained in the conservation efforts was frequently and loudly repeated, in *Bois Chico Mendes* it remains, for the most part, unacknowledged despite the project's origins. Given the alarm surrounding migrant waste compared to the apparently apolitical environmental value the local citizens see in the park, it is the citizens' use of the space which takes obvious precedent. Their cultured appreciation of the area's ecology is contrasted to the migrants' destructive and disrespectful waste production habits. Their inability to appreciate the woods' nature can then be used to justify their eviction and deny their continued inhabitance of the site.

As shown by the rhetorical framing of the project in the local news, the timeline of works, and Bouchart's own stated decision-making process, it is clear the park exists specifically to deny migrants a space to inhabit in Calais, for which an environmental justification has to be applied and invested in (to the tune of \in 1.5m) *post-factum*. Although an infinite number of 'different imaginaries' for *Bois Chico Mendes* exist, *whose* imagination will become materialised is a political question which citizenship goes to the heart of. No doubt migrants, and others in solidarity with them, have their own imaginations about what life could be like in the wood, not to mention the entire city of Calais. But given the anti-migrant policies in Calais and the fear of a 'New Jungle', it is certain that, whatever comes to be found in the new park once it is complete, all efforts will be made to ensure it will not be those irregular inhabitants who had been consistently occupying the space despite the hyper-cycles of domicidal 'cleaning' targeting them over previous years.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has described two recent cases where migrant living spaces have been secured following their eviction and destruction. While securitisations are accomplished with a number of methods and can have varying justifications (e.g. the building is unfit for human habitation or is designated for destruction and re-development), I've concentrated here on *La Lande* and *Bois Chico Mendes* which have been secured through the construction of environmental conservation areas. Yet, as has been shown, in both cases the valuation, recognition, and then investment in cultivating and protecting the natural environment has primarily come *after* migrants began inhabiting them.

Although sharing this *raison d'être*, there are some notable differences between the two projects: (1) On the one hand there was an existing 'renaturation' plan for La Lande; however, it was significantly expanded and then reworked so as to build security infrastructures into the 'renatured' landscape after the Jungle's eviction. Bois *Chico Mendes* on the other-hand was fenced off long before the plans for the \in 1.5 million park were finalised. Despite claims about returning the space to the residents for use, it will remain off limits for years. (2) In descriptions of Fort Vert the environmental benefits of the project are presented as secondary to its function as border security infrastructure. The merits of the *Bois Chico Mendes* park, however, are mainly spoken about as environmental, with the removal of migrants being a latent and already accepted precondition. (3) It was 'migrants' waste' in *Bois Chico Mendes* which was centred in justifications to evict, destroy, and securitise it, whilst the Jungle was destroyed because it was a wider space of resistance to migration control policy and proved a serious threat to border security. Although waste featured less prominently in the justifications for evicting and destroying the Jungle, it became important in the creation of Fort Vert. La Lande first needed to be cleansed of migrants' waste (not only the material remains of their homes and belongings, but the 'invasive species' of plants like onions that began growing) to allow conservationists to say it had been successfully 'renatured' to its originary pristine state.

Both projects contrast migrants' inhabitance with what is described as 'nature'. However, this is an idealised representation of nature devoid of humanity, constructed through a particular racist imaginary, and which in fact does not exist prior to the political and rhetorical process through which it becomes defined as the opposite of migrants' presence. Nevertheless the 'naturalness' of this nature, once constructed, allows it to be used to successfully depoliticise and obscure the racist violence of domicide. Chapter 8 thus turns to analyse how this occurs through the implicit (and explicit) racism in the migrant/nature contrast. However, it will also show how the securitising conservation efforts premised upon protecting nature from migrants, their waste in particular, reassert racialised exclusions of citizenship around the quality of 'environmental responsibility' as a defining characteristic of the environmental citizens' 'community of value' (Anderson, 2013).

Notes

- i. Landscaping has not only been used to deny migrants' spaces to inhabit, but was also used to secure against their clandestine crossing attempts at the Eurotunnel complex where many wooded areas were felled, and open plains flooded (Malm, 2018).
- ii. Other environmental projects in spaces previously inhabited by irregular migrants are the residential *écoquartier* built on the site of the 'Africa House Thelu' squat that was evicted and destroyed in 2012, and *Bois Dubrulle*, lived in by many people in 2014 and evicted and destroyed to create the Jungle (Subsection 7.2.1). *Bois Dubrulle* has also now been enclosed with security fencing, cleaned, and replanted with a thousand trees by high school students (*Nord Littoral*, 2017). Also notable here, the 'Great Wall of Calais' was supposed to have its insides 'vegetated' with plants and flowers to offer a more appealing view for passing vehicles (see Figure 30). These environmental projects, and others, have contributed to Calais being awarded a fourth flower from the *Villes et villages Fleuris* national jury, of which the *Mairie* is very proud (*Ville de Calais*, 2019).
- iii. Jules Ferry, as Bescherer (2017, p. 27) describes, was a 19th century politician who 'was a virulent supporter of colonialism throughout his career and known to make such remarks as "we must say openly that indeed the higher races have a right over the lower races"', and thus proved an appropriate mascot for this project of racist segregation and control.
- iv. In fact, after this eviction the number of Jungle residents dramatically increased. In August 2016, just two months before the final eviction, a census performed by one of the charities counted 9,106 Jungle residents (Steadman, 2016). This was almost double the 4,946 counted immediately following the eviction of the Southern Zone in March (E. Buchanan, 2016), and a far cry from the *Préfecture*'s stated desire to have no more than 2,000 migrants in Calais (which they first tried to achieve by opening the managed shipping container camp and evicting 1,500 people from the 100 metre buffer-zone in January (*La Voix du Nord*, 2016)). These numbers were a dramatic increase compared to the estimated 1,300 migrants spread amongst many occupations throughout Calais in September 2014 (AFP, 2014).
- v. For example, Stéphane Duval, Director of Refugee Services at *La Vie Active* who ran the *Centre Jules Ferry*, acknowledged the importance of securing *La Lande* against migrants to sustain its environmental health (Lamoureux, 2017).
- vi. In fact, this was still happening in *Bois Chico Mendes* as Hagan (2019) also describes instances where 'shelters are damaged but not "cleaned up": slashed or dissected they are left on site or thrown into puddles or ponds nearby'.

Chapter 8

Cleaning migrants/waste: environmental citizenship and racism

8.1 Introduction

The cases of *Bois Chico Mendes* and *Fort Vert* presented in Chapter 7 illustrate the use of environmental conservation projects to enact and legitimise anti-migrant domicide in Calais. This chapter now analyses these two cases in light of *RQ2* and *RQ3* to understand how they provide spaces for Calais' citizens to perform themselves as 'environmental citizens' (see Section 8.5), once again through the exclusion of the city's irregular migrant inhabitants. Furthermore, it investigates the historical and ideological connections these conservation/border security projects draw upon to argue that they in fact re-enact, while reconfiguring, particularly racist exclusions despite depoliticising domicide through the rhetoric of cleaning and environmental stewardship. Key to this discussion is the conceptualisation and mobilisation of 'nature' in relation to the racialised figure of the irregular migrant.

In Calais there are two ways that migrants and their spaces of inhabitance have been conceived in relation to nature: as threatening forms of nature themselves, or as presenting threats to nature. The term 'jungle' as a racist and derogatory way to describe migrants' camps clearly illustrates the first. Here the jungle is a 'wild' space, existing as Hobbes' 'state of nature', and its inhabitants are othered, dehumanised, and animalised (Bhatia, 2018; Davies and Isakjee, 2018, p. 2; Katz, 2017, p. 16; Rygiel, 2011, p. 7). It not only frames migrants as animals, but as 'dangerous predators whose natural habitat was cruel, chaotic, and lawless'; predisposed to violence through a crass interpretation of Darwin's survival of the fittest hypothesis (Rosello, 2016, p. 96). This racist imaginary of the jungle is contrasted to the 'civilised' world, for example by French Immigration Minister Éric Besson when he justified the 2009 eviction at *Verrotières* (Section 5.3) by declaring: 'On the territory of this nation, the law of the jungle cannot endure' (BBC, 2009). The implied 'law of the jungle' is a dog-eat-dog one unfit for coexistence with a European society ruled by legal and democratic institutions (Bhatia, 2018, p. 190). Therefore, for Besson, not only are the two spaces of the jungle

and the nation incompatible, the savage nature of the jungle is a threat to the civilised city-space of Calais, and French society more generally, which must be put-down (i.e. evicted and then destroyed).

The second conception of migrant jungles as something separate from, or an aberration of, an ecocentric conception of nature that harms and pollutes it is illustrated in the two case studies from Chapter 7, particularly in the debates around *Bois Chico Mendes*. Here nature is presented as beautiful, pristine, and to be set-apart from the (sub)humans who threaten it with their racialised bodies and polluting behaviours. Instead of appreciating the wood and its ecological heritage, while maintaining an appropriate distance from nature, they *live in it* in a disrespectful manner, destroying the environment through daily utilisation. Over a stated concern for the health of the natural environment suffering the consequences of this unsanctioned inhabitance, destroying the jungle and evicting its inhabitants is presented as the only viable solution. While these two preceding interrelated conceptualisations of nature may function slightly differently, they both oppose irregular migrants and the spaces they inhabit with civilisation, the city, and spaces of citizenship, and make persistent use of racist tropes to scapegoat irregular migrants and naturalise domicidal violence against them.

One explanation for the novel mobilisation of nature and environment to justify domicidal interventions, and anti-migrant policies more generally, has been put forward by John Hultgren (2015). He proposes that nature and the environment can be used rhetorically as a form of 'walling' which he describes as 'a subtle means of reinforcing "traditional" territorial borders and national identities without having to revert to racial and cultural logics that are no longer socially acceptable within mainstream political discourse' (ibid., pp. 1–2). This may be true in Calais, although antimigrant discourse has freely trafficked in vulgar racist stereotypes for years and, as we will see, the recently preferred rhetoric of 'cleaning' continues this legacy. Perhaps more true though is that promoting Calais' nature provides an opportunity for local authorities to try and rehabilitate the city's image, one of their main priorities since the destruction of the Jungle.ⁱ Here the anti-migrant function of Fort Vert and Bois Chico *Mendes* is de-emphasised and replaced with celebrations of the environmental value they bring to the city to demonstrate how Calais has moved-on since the 'migrant crisis', show Calais' citizens what the government is doing to compensate them for suffering the externalities of the UK/EU border regime for so many years, and offer tourists attractive nature conservation spaces to visit before/after crossing the Channel. Furthermore, Hultgren (ibid., p. 26) points out that the environment is typically perceived as a concern for the political Left who may also be more sympathetic to migrants' presence in Calais overall. Therefore, by shifting discourse on 'the problem' of migrants' inhabitance to the presumed environmental damage they cause, campaigns of anti-migrant domicide are made more palatable to the Mairie's traditional liberal opponents, and more difficult for them to challenge.

While there are many possible explanations for the deployment of environmentalist arguments which contrast migrant inhabitance with nature that must either be 'returned to' or 'protected' it is clear that such arguments attempt to depoliticise antimigrant domicide in Calais as 'natural'.¹ However, this chapter argues that the very nature and environment mobilised in these domicidal interventions is itself highly politicised. First and foremost, the actual forms of nature present in Fort Vert and Bois Chico Mendes have been artificially constructed to fulfil border security roles by (a) creating uninhabitable landscapes and (b) providing a threshold of environmental value that becomes worthy of protection through other security infrastructure (e.g. fences and cameras). The only 'nature' present in these spaces is preconditioned by its role as border infrastructure. Furthermore, as will be shown in Section 8.3, the very concept of nature as it has been formulated in the West contains an immanent racial hierarchy that becomes folded back into anti-migrant environmental rhetoric. Therefore, instead of depoliticising migration control as natural, introducing nature into discourses of migration security re-animate the colonial and racist logics present within it. This in fact betrays anti-migrant domicide as markedly racist, beyond the 'post-racial', neo-liberal, and technical discourses of security, risk management, mobility control, humanitarianism, and criminalisation they are typically justified through.

In Calais environmentalist justifications for anti-migrant domicide are quite novel compared to the securitarian or humanitarian concerns dominating the discourse since the 90s. However, there is precedent for using environmentalist arguments against migrants in other contexts. In fact, much of the analysis presented in this chapter takes place through the lens of existing scholarly debates from the borderlands between the US and Mexico. There are striking similarities between conservation and border security efforts there and what is being seen today in Calais. Some of these include; demonising migrants for creating trash and bodily waste, states exacerbating the conditions which force migrants to produce unsightly waste, weaponising the natural environment to deter migrant crossings, perceptions of territorial invasion, creating securitised 'Green' spaces at the border, and finally the existence of a type of 'environmental citizenship' which white Americans/Europeans come to inhabit in relation to the stereotyped and racialised image of the polluting migrant. There is a lack of literature on the connections between nature conservation, racism, migration control, waste, and citizenship specifically in Europe, and thus there are important lessons to be learned from bringing the insights from the matured research on this topic coming from North America to bear on the Calais context. The reflections developed there over decades of sustained migration and rhetorical fluctuation in environmentalist discourse provide sorely needed perspectives on the contemporary emergence of environmental citizenship, migration securitisation, and racism happening in Europe today despite regional specificities.

¹ Keep in mind the accusations of *politicisation* made against those at the *Bois Chico Mendes* neighbourhood meeting who dared pose questions regarding the fate of the woods' migrant inhabitants (page 176).

8.1.1 Chapter Outline

As this chapter analyses 'Securitisation' events on my digital counter-map, it begins in Section 8.2 with a brief overview of the securitisation of migration to locate Chapter 7's case studies in a wider discursive frame. Significant here is not just that these environmental conservation zones are emerging as a novel technique to securitise European borderscapes, but that they further introduce environmental security into existing migration security discourse. Given the orientation, and superficial depoliticisation, of the *Fort Vert* and *Bois Chico Mendes* conservation areas as environmental security projects, answering the questions, posed by Kelly and Ybarra (2016, p. 174), 'for whom does conservation provide security, under what circumstances, and at what cost' show these to be decisively anti-migrant securitisations satisfying local and international border security concerns while promoting their environmental value.

Section 8.3 takes a step back to establish a historical connection between environmentalism, nature conservation, racism, human mobility, and migration control. This is done through highlighting the importance of nature conservation projects in constructing settler/colonial nations as white in contrast to migrants' racialised and mobile bodies which are presumed to threaten them. Thus, border conservation zones specifically at borders doubly exclude foreign migrants in order to protect environmentally sensitive areas as well as the native populations that have been 'naturalised' to inhabit those spaces (Sharma, 2015).

Given this historical perspective, Section 8.4 turns to discuss 'migrant waste' as a contemporary criterion for environmentally justifying migrants' spatial exclusion. Alarmist discourses around migrants' unrestrained production of waste play off racist stereotypes of them as dirty and unhygienic, therefore polluting the conflated, national, social, and environmental body in the territories to which they move. In Calais' case this allows for the domicidal interventions against racialised migrants to be defined as 'cleanings'. While these 'cleanings' are stated to target migrants' waste, I argue that they instead are directed at eliminating the migrants considered as waste themselves.

Finally, discussion turns to environmental citizenship in Section 8.5. Here I argue that *Fort Vert* and *Bois Chico Mendes* spatialise existing racialised citizen and noncitizen distinctions through differentially distributing the quality of 'environmental responsibility' and offering Calais' already-citizens a space through which to 'connect to nature' and perform environmental stewardship; all elements of environmental citizenship's 'community of value' (Anderson, 2013). Characterisations of migrants as dirty, polluting, and environmentally irresponsible are contrasted with the French population as clean and conscious of environmental degradation, while further having a duty to redress it. In addition to providing a spatial manifestation of existing citizen distinctions reformulated around environmentalism, these border conservation zones further provide a conduit for those holding citizen status to become fully actualised as 'environmental citizens' in opposition to irregular migrants who only exist as an environmental threat. Through an active appreciation of the constructed



FIGURE 30: Composite of the architect's drawing for the 4m high 'Great Wall of Calais', with flowers and vegetation lining the interior, (top) compared to the actual wall (bottom). Images from *Société d'Exploitation des Ports du Détroit, Port de Calais* and Google Street View.

natures of *Fort Vert* and *Bois Chico Mendes*, as well as in the acts of cleaning which create and care for them, the native French citizen enters into a process of becoming an environmental citizen against irregular migrants, doubly precluded. Because of how they are made to produce unsightly waste with their homes neglected and destroyed daily, and how they are considered polluting and invasive due to their irregular mobilities and racialised bodies, migrants become the antithesis of environmental citizens' values. In this case the basic racial construction of citizenship outlined in Chapter 2 remains foundational to, though slightly reconfigured by, environmental citizenship. Although not formally excluding irregular migrants based on status or race, environmental citizenship in Calais can end up requiring/reproducing the same racist spatial and political exclusions of modern state citizenship by representing migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance as threatening to the very nature it aims to protect.

8.2 Entanglements of border and environmental security

To begin with, the *Fort Vert* and *Bois Chico Mendes* cases must be located within macro migration securitisation discourse and policy. These conservation areas do not just enclose space so as to universally 'secure it' from human intrusion, but make these spaces inaccessible for particular uses by particular people in accordance with pre-existing

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logics around citizenship, belonging, and the securitisation of migration. However, as we've seen, these two cases novelly combine environmental and border security objectives and are representative of a wider contemporary intertwining of the two. These border and environmental security concerns interlock to doubly exclude irregular migrants at both levels, however, they are not present in the projects in equal measure. Mostly it was the border security function that took precedence in the political negotiations on the projects' final forms, to which environmental concerns were secondary (although still heavily promoted).

There is extensive literature describing how migration within Europe has been increasingly securitised in recent decades, first with the dissolution of internal border controls in the late 80s and early 90s ushered in by the Schengen agreements, then after numerous terror attacks in the early 2000s, and more recently with the migration crisis' of the 2010s (see Bigo, 2002; Bourbeau, 2011; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Huysmans, 2000, 2006; Karyotis, 2007; Lazaridis, 2011; Léonard, 2010; van Munster, 2009). The securitisation of migration not only conceives of people on the move as a source of 'risk' for European labour markets, national or cultural identities, crime in society, welfare resources, state sovereignty, or national security which must be contained, managed, or kept at a distance, but entails the proliferation and deployment of a vast array of technologies; policies; risk assessments; and specialised agencies, industries, and roles to mitigate these presumed threats. These include the collection and retention of biometric data (Scheel, 2013, 2019; Sparke, 2006); detention and deportation; border externalisation (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, and Pickles, 2015; Zaiotti and Martin, 2016); surveillance technologies on land and at sea to detect illicit border crossing (Csernatoni, 2018); detection equipment like x-ray scanners, CO₂ measuring devices, and heart-beat sensors; and the construction of more traditional border fortifications like walls and fences. Calais, unto which the UK's border has been 'exported' (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, 2010), is a prioritised space for securitisation, and often a proving ground for novel security strategies and technologies, a number of which have been detailed by Bescherer (2017). However, one refrain of this thesis is that understanding how Calais' border operates requires centring the domicidal policies and interventions denying migrants space to autonomously inhabit the city. Thus securitisation does not only take place 'on the border', but suffuses the city in multiple ways and is continuously brought inside the homes of irregular migrants. However, the relationship between the security of the city of Calais and the border is one that is in constant tension.

Securitisation of the UK border somewhat paradoxically creates a 'security risk' for the city of Calais itself, often causing vocal disagreements between the local authorities and British and French national governments. As unauthorised border crossings have become more difficult over the decades, the entrapped population of migrants perceived as a risky group have remained in Calais for longer periods of time. This is an intentional policy to deter their arrival and encourage those present to leave; however, it has not proven very effective and even motivates migrants to stay in Calais and continue their attempts to cross (Hagan, 2018, p. 65).

Mayor Bouchart complained about the effects increased border security has on the city under questioning from the UK Parliament's Home Affairs Committee. She explained that she initially rejected a donation of mobile fencing from the UK used during the 2014 NATO summit in Walesⁱⁱ because, while it was perhaps useful for the port's security, it would not do anything to improve the safety of the city's population which she described as suffering more accidents, incidents, and attacks against women to the point where 'mothers in Calais don't want to let their children out' (quoted in, Home Affairs Committee, 2014, p. 10). As an alternative, which would address the city's security concerns, Bouchart proposed creating the Jules Ferry day centre to segregate the migrant population outside Calais (Subsection 7.2.1). However, this idea was resisted by the British parliamentarians worried about the risk to border security an increased migrant population, 'pulled' by the centre, would pose. These anxieties did manifest given the Jungle's proximity to the port and motorway (Subsection 7.2.2), and provoked the reactions of, at first, constructing a multi-million Euro security barrier—the 'Great Wall of Calais' (Figure 30)—and then eventually totally destroying the Jungle.

While there have been various conflicts between securitisations of the city and the border in Calais, what is significant with *Fort Vert* and *Bois Chico Mendes* is how they combine security priorities of the border and city.² This is achieved through denying migrants living space in relative close proximity to the logistical infrastructures (roads, ports, rest-stops, trains etc.) they need to attempt their journeys (Aris Escarcena, 2019, p. 223) *and* residential or touristic areas of Calais, while offering the *Calaisiens* environmental attractions in return for 'suffering' the externalities of juxtaposed border controls.

Aside from satisfying the multiple, often conflicting, security goals of local and national authorities, *Fort Vert* and *Bois Chico Mendes* further introduce questions of environmental security into the discourse on the securitisation of migration in Calais. Excluding migrants from these areas becomes defined not only as protecting the UK national territory and Calais' 'space of citizenship', but also an increasingly threat-ened natural environment. Although comparatively neglected in rationales for migration securitisation in relation to, for example, protecting labour markets, the welfare state, or countering crime and terrorism, environmental security is becoming an increasingly important justification given growing societal anxiety towards the effects of anthropogenic climate-change on the planet's ability to sustain life.

On the one hand are the emerging securitisations of 'climate-change induced migration' in which drought, desertification, and sea-level rise will force previously unprecedented numbers of people to move, thereby exacerbating existing migration risk factors (Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe, 2014; Bettini, 2013; Boas, 2015). However, the EU's environmental security, and its own 'climate-secure' future, has additionally

² Recall Obled's quotation on page 169 about *Fort Vert* being 'compatible' with the goals of *all* stake-holders.

become a security concern under threat from migration (Telford, 2018). Alarmist discourses not only describe a forthcoming 'flood' of human mobility that will destabilise regions of origin and transit, but present it as an existential threat to state security in 'destination countries', as well as those territories' ability to sustain and support the life of native populations, not to mention additional newly arrived foreign migrants. These environment specific anxieties towards migration are amplified by migrants' existing racialisation to buttress exclusionary EU migration policies (ibid.), which seek to contain migrants in external countries, ideally as close to countries of origin as possible. There they are 'governed from a distance' from Europe, while still being exposed to the environmental harms from which they are fleeing (Geddes, 2015).

With the general securitisation of migration reflecting existing established national citizenship distinctions (Diez and V. Squire, 2008), and considered to be a modern form of racism not only directed against racialised bodies but prejudicing opinion against people subject to migration security controls (Huysmans, 2000; M. Ibrahim, 2005; Moffette and Vadasaria, 2016; Togral, 2011), specific historical and ideological connections become animated once environment and nature enter into the migration security equation (unpacked in Section 8.3). Although descriptions of migrants in Calais do not yet predominantly include the 'climate-change migrant'—rather they mostly fall back into the tired and baseless bifurcation of economic migrant or political refugee (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018)—the case studies from Chapter 7 do provide examples of an emerging concern held by citizens regarding the environmental consequences of migration at a very local level. These concerns are mostly concentrated in the aesthetic and environmental impact of migrants' waste production rather than being generalised to nature's ability to support life in these sites. Yet, Section 8.5 argues that these projects nevertheless become symbolic stand-ins for local authorities and certain 'environmental-citizens' to address wider environmental anxieties and perform stewardship roles in pursuit of environmental security. This is nominally to counter migrants' polluting practices, but actually creates greater insecurity for Calais' migrant population by further exposing them to the natural elements which produce misery, exhaustion, and have caused deaths.

However, these domicidal stewardship interventions are always decontextualised from the structural violence against Calais' migrants that produces their spaces of inhabitance as visibly ecologically destructive in the first place. The French state positioning itself as nature's protector despite being responsible for damaging the very nature it claims to defend—by refusing to provide migrants adequate sanitation or waste disposal facilities, destroying their belongings and leaving them strewn through camp-sites, building fortifications that negatively impact environments as much as they do human mobility, or geoscaping strategic areas so as to enhance border security (see Subsection 7.4.1)—is highly hypocritical, and reveals its position as more anti-migrant than environmentalist. Yet, the presumed environmental threat of migrant encampments is nevertheless instrumentalised to perpetrate continued domicidal interventions, and irregular migrants' segregation and exclusion. This amounts to a feedback loop in which the enforced precarity of migrants in the spaces they transit justifies the intensification of that precarity.

8.3 Nature, racism, conservation, and migration control

The two conceptions of migrants and their spaces of inhabitance in relation to nature described on page 180—either a savage and threatening form itself or threatening a pristine and vulnerable nature—mobilise two different but interrelated racist logics. They have been historically formed while serving as the foundation of both exclusionary migration control policy, but also environmental conservation. This section briefly presents these histories to illustrate how the mobilisations of nature justifying the *Bois Chico Mendes* and *Fort Vert* border/environmental securitisations reanimate this racism despite attempting to depoliticise their function as anti-migrant domicidal interventions. This discussion builds on examples from both the US and Europe, as the former provides a lens through which to analyse the production of national whiteness through environmental conservation practices at the border, while the latter is where racist equations between savage nature and racialised humanity originated.

The first conceptions of 'savage nature' and 'the wild' were formed by Europeans during their initial colonial encounters, particularly in the Americas (Gasteyer and Butler Flora, 2000). They were founded in the differentiation of 'culture' or 'civilisation', the quality Europeans gave their own way of life, from 'nature', the state in which the rest of the world existed. This nature included both the land itself but also the racialised indigenous peoples to which it was home. These native inhabitants were considered as either the 'bad savage', threatening and potentially cannibalistic, or the romanticised 'noble savage' (Saenz cited in, Davidov, 2012, pp. 469–470). While the first was dangerous and devious, the second was more docile, embedded within, and existing in harmony with nature. However, both represented an animalised and inferior form of humanity that the European contrasted himself from. This nature was conceived as both dangerous and threatening but also holding promise if it could be cultivated, cultured, and civilised, resulting in an intertwining of violence against natural landscapes worked in systems of agriculture to become productive for settlers, and the native peoples, hostile to settlement and living on those lands, who were massacred, expelled, converted, and enslaved (Harvey, 1996).

While initially European colonials included racialised humans within their ideas of nature, later a more ecocentric concept of nature that was separate and exclusive to humanity developed during settler-colonial expansion. The 'discovery' of pristine wildernesses by settlers in the US, as well as depictions of a 'lost Eden' in colonial territories produced a romanticised and vulnerable conception of nature; one that became compounded by the anxieties of colonials towards the disappearance of idealised and vulnerable natures both within Europe and in its colonies abroad (Neumann, 1996). From these anxieties emerged the first nature conservation projects as initiatives of white settler-colonials who sought to protect and preserve nature, namely by dispossessing racialised native inhabitants from their land.

In the US, where the world's first national parks were created at the end of the 19th century, the 'virgin' wilderness was considered under threat and polluted by the natives living in it whose land utilisation practices—e.g. controlled burns to manage forests and fertilise soil—were considered to be destructive. Settlers attributed the native's utilitarianism to their innate inability, as uncivilised beings, to appreciate the natural splendour in which they lived (Kantor, 2007). This justified the ethnic cleansing of those First Nations people and dispossessing them of their lands to create the first national parks as enclosures for the exclusive use of white settlers (Banner, 2009; Spence, 1999).

Europe's first national parks, however, were not actually located in Europe, but were rather established overseas in their imperial territories a few decades later. These also reproduced the format of dispossession at the heart of the American national parks model. For example, Ford (2012) illustrates that the French justified their systematic expropriation of land and resources from the indigenous inhabitants of their colonial parks in Africa by vilifying and blaming them for environmental degradation while assigning themselves the role of nature's protector. The British also created their parks in colonial Africa by denying African people the ability to utilise their lands or hunt the game which roamed on them. In doing so, they drew upon their particular history of land enclosure for use as hunting grounds for the aristocracy, nominally 'protecting' nature but still rendering it exploitable for the recreation and pleasure of the colonial elites (Neumann, 1996).

There are also contemporary examples of how racialised violence, displacement, and dispossession continue to accompany environmental conservation: see for example; Dowie's (2009) Conservation Refugees; Gissibl et al.'s (2012) Civilizing Nature; and two recent academic journal special issues, 'Environmental displacement: the common ground of climate-change, extraction and conservation' (eds. Lunstrum, Bose, and Zalik, 2016), and 'Conservation and Security' (eds. Kelly and Ybarra, 2016). Lunstrum, Bose, and Zalik draw on empirical studies from mainly the African and North-American continents to argue conservation must be considered alongside resource extraction as denying communities the possibility to inhabit their land or access to natural resources in response to climate-change. Often-times these projects are initiated by environmentalists in the Global North for areas in the South to protect particularly at risk ecologies. Kelly and Ybarra's special issue offers a number of cases mainly from the Central and South-American and African continents on the use of conservation areas to produce 'green security'; what they describe as the increased militarisation and policing of environmentally protected territories. They show that, not only do these spaces perpetuate racialised economic inequality, but they also provide justifications for increased state violence towards those presumed an environmental threat; in fact producing *insecurity* in their lives without offering any clear benefits. All of these studies point to the fact that racialised dispossession continues to play a large role in environmental conservation projects although occurring through more complex mechanisms and relations than in the historical period of colonisation and settlement.

There are also a number of examples of protected conservation areas existing at, and acting as, national borders which, unlike 'internal' conservation areas, make national security a question of environmental security. Border/conservations zones produce an imaginary of bounded spaces and communities that have native species (be they human or non-human) to which others are presumed invasive and a threat to the health of the (social) ecosystem (Youatt, 2017, p. 169). However, they are still constituted through the forms of physical, structural, and symbolic violence that remain constitutive of all conservation practices. These forms of violence are mutually reinforcing as the epistemic violence of constructing undesirable populations as an environmental threat justifies the violence of eviction and dispossession (Bocarejo and Ojeda, 2016, p. 182). In turn, exclusion and separation reinforce positionings of those groups as invasive (if they continue to live in the conservation area), or destructive (as their use of the land and adapted survival strategies responding to dispossession are perceived as illegitimate and ecologically harmful). This process whereby eviction produces bodies out-of-place, which are then considered 'invasive', and which legitimises further exclusionary violence against them, will be described in the context of Calais at the end of Section 8.4.

The best example of how environmental conservation and border security can function together to exclude racialised irregular migrants is at the border between the US and Mexico where 40% of the borderlands on the US side are federally protected national forests, national parks, national monuments, and national wildlife refuges (Sundberg, 2011).ⁱⁱⁱ During the mid-90s, Border Patrol's 'prevention through deterrence' strategy 'funnelled' illegalised border crossers into these lands, which are predominately harsh and remote expanses of desert, as the borders' urban areas became increasingly militarised and difficult to cross without authorisation (Chambers et al., 2019; Krouse, 1997). Enlisting the dangers of the desert as border agents resulted in thousands of deaths and the endurance of indescribable hardship by all those making the journey (De León, 2015; Doty, 2011; D. E. Martínez et al., 2014). However, these unauthorised mobilities across the desert have also been blamed for the environmental degradation they produce in the borderlands' protected wildernesses in addition to their 'threats' posed to US society (Meierotto, 2012). Environmentalist arguments against immigration construct migrant bodies as threatening to and polluting of nature, a threat which is then transmuted to the perceived national body through societal investment in maintaining the 'purity' of its parks and wilderness conservation spaces (Sundberg and Kaserman, 2007, p. 740). The presumed dual threat posed to nature and nation then bolsters arguments for increased securitisation and militarisation of environmental/border security areas.

Finally, before returning to direct analysis of the case studies, it is important to

briefly acknowledge the ways that environmental arguments underpinning conservation projects on borders have been used to oppose immigration as such. While the historical lineages of violence and racialised dispossession in creating nature conservation zones have just been mentioned, nature has been more generally used in arguments for immigration restriction and border security. In the US, early environmental leaders like Muir, Pinchot, and Roosevelt 'all saw immigration restriction as vital to the protection of nature's purity' and considered wilderness preservation a fundamental element through which to continually secure the nation's environment which 'embodied white nationalism' (Kosek, 2006, pp. 142, 155). John Hultgren (2015, p. 25) argues that, since that time, environmentalists have 'always been restrictionists' with ecocentric conceptions of nature a constitutive part of immigration restriction policies that aimed to protect national/natural purity. Although particular conceptions of nature have been shifting over time (e.g. romantic, Darwinian, or Neo-Malthusian), each has been articulated within, and has been essential to substantiating, narratives of white supremacy in the US. Therefore, Hultgren (ibid., p. 27) argues that it would be incorrect to assume that certain conceptions of nature have been illegitimately instrumentalised towards anti-migrant ideological goals. Rather, he insists it is the very visions of nature, emerging in many cases from environmentalists, that themselves give rise to racial hierarchies and which in turn become the foundation of anti-migrant environmentalist policy.

This is not just true for the US, allusions to nature have also been fundamental to anti-immigration sentiment and policy in Europe. Although the use of environmental security arguments and conservation projects as border security infrastructures like the two from Calais I analyse here have emerged quite recently, 'blood and soil' nativism, eugenics, and racist comparisons of non-Europeans to an inferior form of nature threatening white European existence have existed since colonial times, although were extremely prominent during and after the Second World War.^{iv} Allusions to the natural inferiority of racialised people are replete throughout this history; however, a specific example from the French context is Jean Raspail's (1995) Les Camp des Saints which has recently returned to popularity and been influential amongst Marine Le Pen, Trump's former advisor Steve Bannon, the Alt-right, and other white supremacist groups today (S. Jones, 2018). The novel is full of dehumanising and racist descriptions of humans from Southern continents on the move as a 'flood', a 'deluge', 'hordes of them', 'swarming all over', 'worming their way', 'slithering in' in Raspail's (1995, p. 7) descriptions of an apocalyptic scenario in which mass migration to Europe (and particularly its governments' liberal policies in response) spell doom for Europe's native populations. This language can also be seen in the UK tabloid press, not to mention statements from its most senior politicians, in descriptions of contemporary migrants in Calais (Bhatia, 2018; H. J. Smith, 2016).

Another example worth mentioning is ecofascism, which connects racist, environmentalist, and totalitarian ideologies. Biehl's (1995) eponymous study looks at the

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connections between environmental ideas, ethno-national movements in Nazi Germany, and modern fascist organisations while highlighting their anti-immigration attitudes. Ecofascism has also served as an ideological foundation for recent antiimmigrant terrorist attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand and El Paso, Texas. This ideology considers racialised immigration not only as an ecological threat to nature itself, but threatening the 'natural' distribution of racial and ethnic groups throughout the world. Ignoring the fact of settler-colonialism, they believe in forcing groups of people to remain in the regions they have been 'naturalised' to inhabit.

This brings the discussion back to a final point on the relationship between nature, racialisation, and anti-immigrant nationalism; the role of mobility. The naturalisation of the spatial/racial distribution of the world sustains mythologies of ethnically homogenous nations of stagnant populations (discussed in Subsection 2.3.2 through the work of Nandita Sharma). Those who move amongst geographical nations and disrupt that distribution become produced as the foreign Outsider. However, at the same time they provide an opportunity for previous disparate ethnic groups to become assimilated into a single category; notably as 'white' in Europe (Silverstein, 2005, p. 365). While in many cases the skin colour of those who move suffices to racialise them in the destination country, for others it is the fact of their mobility which can alone produce them as the racialised Other and mark them for subjection to bordering practices (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy, 2017b). This has particularly been the case for Jewish and Roma people within Europe who, through their mobility, have constantly challenged the 'natural' mapping of nation onto regional territories and their idealised homogenous white populations (Silverstein, 2005, p. 366). Especially in the case of the Roma, exactly this cross-border mobility has (re-)racialised them as migrants (Yıldız and De Genova, 2017, p. 436). Therefore, Yıldız and De Genova, but also Balibar (cited in ibid., p. 428), argue that the racialisation of the Roma can only be understood through experiences of foreign, not just 'internal', migrants who together constitute the 'dark side' against which white European citizenship, or more aptly 'European apartheid', constitutes itself. Even when Roma do possess citizenship status, even if it is a 'second-class' or 'abject' European citizenship, their racialisation based on their illicit mobilities continues to justify their exclusion (ibid., p. 430). This is an important point of connection to understand that Calais' irregular migrants are likewise not only racialised through their skin colour, but also through their illicit mobilities. These qualities are in fact mutually re-enforcing and lead to exclusion even before the explicit environmental arguments outlined above become deployed against them.

This detour through the history of racialised dispossession and anti-migrant sentiment at the core of much environmentalist thinking and conservation efforts is necessary to unpack how the evocations of nature at the centre of the *La Lande* and *Bois Chico Mendes* environmental/border security projects do not depoliticise them, but rather betray racist politics to be at their very centre. However, while acknowledging that nature and environment are not apolitical concepts especially when used to justify the expulsion of racialised people, the configuration is slightly more complex. Some of the main arguments justifying the domicide of these jungles, foremost *Bois Chico Mendes*, deflected antagonism away from migrants themselves onto their *waste* and its purported threat to the natural environment. This move is again meant to depoliticise the argument for why anti-migrant domicide should take place, but which (following upcoming analysis on waste, race, and environment) also reveals racist politics as its foundation.

8.4 Migrants' waste and cleaning

Much of today's anti-migrant environmentalism makes particular reference to waste and trash as having deleterious effects on borderland ecologies and the aesthetics of their scenic landscapes. The clearest illustrations of this again come from the US, for example Fox News anchor Tucker Carlson's statement: 'I actually hate litter which is why I'm so against illegal immigration' (Media Matters, 2018).^v Upon a cursory first reading one assumes Carlson is testifying to having more of a problem with illegalised migrants' waste than with them, and seems an apparent attempt to deflect from his more typical white supremacist and anti-immigrant statements through environmentalist rhetoric (Marcotte, 2018). Another example is the following quotation from Colorado Congressman Tom Tancredo who lead the Caucus on Immigration Reform in 2003:

They stream across the border everyday day [*sic*] and every night. They dump tons of trash and human faeces in places that are set aside for their scenic beauty. (quoted in Sundberg, 2008, p. 875)

Here Tancredo contrasts the scenic beauty and implied natural purity of the border conservation area with his descriptions of migrants 'dumping' trash and faeces to provoke an affective disgust which Jaquette Ray (2010, p. 712) describes as serving to draw boundaries between the 'us' and 'them' of environmentally conscious citizens and irregular migrants. This affective provocation saliently divides people along the line of waste producers and sufferers. Not only does Tancredo's 'we' not treat nature in such a way, they are affronted by those that do. His rhetoric characterises migrants as dirty, unhygienic, and polluting while US citizens are clean, virtuous, and pure by contrast. Not only are these groups opposing one another but they are incompatible and share fundamentally different values. Furthermore, Tancredo plays on the additional anxieties of a stabilised population in the face of transient and unsanctioned mobility. The fluid 'stream' of migrants is not only uncaring towards the local environments through which it moves, but is furthermore unaccountable for any damage it causes (unlike the stable citizens who unfairly absorb those externalities). Finally, a feminist reading of Congressman Tancredo's statement would undoubtedly uncover the anxiety of an impotent patriarch in his description of night and day violations of the beautiful and 'set aside' landscape. Feminised depictions of nature and nation are a familiar trope used to rouse protectionist attitudes, even revanchism given a perceived violation, within the public.

While the two quotations above are particularly egregious examples of environmental anti-migrant rhetoric, similar statements have been made connecting migrants, filth, waste, and environmental damage in Calais which do the same work of deepening the divide between migrant polluters and environmentally conscious citizens. The rhetoric surrounding *Bois Chico Mendes* is the best example, although there are also newspaper articles decrying the amount of migrants' waste along the shoulders of the motorways where they attempt crossings (e.g. Blavignat, 2019). Due to migrants' racialisation and 'out-of-place' bodies, moving through and inhabiting space autonomously, they are demonised as dirty and uncaring polluters in contrast to the French citizens deprived of access to their park spaces and who endure the offensive overabundance of waste in areas of natural beauty and ecological value. Until now my discussion has mostly accepted the framing of 'the problem' as being about 'migrants' waste' to analyse how this intersects with histories of racism and migration control, as well as justifies current domicidal action. However, from Subsection 7.4.1, we know that migrants are not the only ones responsible for producing 'their' waste, and that authorities' 'cleaning' efforts do not effectively, nor do they necessarily intend to, solve the 'waste problem'. To then see what, or better who, is the real target of these 'cleaning' operations requires bringing the discussion of racism to bear on the analysis of migrant waste and domicide in Calais in a more fundamental way based on reflections from scholars of environmental racism.

Environmental racism literature describes how Black communities and communities of colour in the US are overwhelmingly targeted for the dumping of waste, location of waste processing facilities, placement of chemical or manufacturing industries that produce toxic pollutants, and incarceration in toxic prisons and detention centres (Bullard, 2000; Pellow, 2002; Pellow and Vazin, 2019; United Church of Christ, 1987, 2007; P. Vasudevan, 2019; Westra and Wenz, 1995). Environmental racism is not peculiar to the US although it does take specific forms there due to the country's histories of Black enslavement and settler-colonialism. Recent studies have also shown that racialised ethnic groups in Europe, most notably the Roma, are also disproportionately cut-off from basic environmental services, pushed to inhabit toxic spaces close to contaminated sites, and are targeted for waste dumping (Heidegger and Wiese, 2020). There is a 'double territorial stigmatisation' (Racles and Ivasiuc, 2019, p. 29) here in which racialised bodies, presumed inferior and unhygienic, are considered to pollute 'pristine' spaces while the spaces they do inhabit are systemically devalued and polluted. Thereby, racialised communities are 'naturalised' to inhabit wastelands (Brahinsky, Sasser, and Minkoff-Zern, 2014, p. 1142). There are a number of iterations of this relationship; during colonisation and since (e.g. with gentrification) there is an explicit denial of existing relationships between racialised communities and the land perceived as a blank slate for development or regeneration (Bledsoe and W. J. Wright, 2019, p. 4), societal waste is dumped onto the spaces already inhabited by racialised

communities, and those communities are driven from spaces of value and pushed to inhabit wastelands.

The segregation of Calais' migrant population to the toxic site and former waste dump of La Lande is the most obvious example of environmental racism understood in this way, although the occupation of Fort Galloo^{vi} also fits here. However, there is an important difference between the analysis of environmental racism that comes from the US which is often deeply historical; connected to histories of Black enslavement, the dispossession of Native's lands, or the intergenerational discrimination of other groups who have come to be commonly racialised as non-white (Merchant, 2003) and the situation in Calais. As we've seen, Calais' irregular migrants, while being similarly racialised as non-white or Black, are also produced as highly mobile (see Hagan, 2018 and Section 6.2). Constantly denied a home-place, and therefore without recognisable roots in the city, they are made to shift amongst the city's 'wastelands' and abandoned buildings. Thus, analysing the racialisation of Calais' migrants through the similar experiences of Roma are important to augment the analysis of environmental racism coming from Black geographies scholars. Calais' irregular migrants are not only confined to peripheral camp spaces often placed next to waste dumps and polluted industrial areas like the Roma, but they are also perpetually movedon from them through domicidal interventions (McGarry, 2017; Racles and Ivasiuc, 2019, p. 29). Conceived as already uprooted and displaced, they are thereby perceived as eminently dis-placeable and exist in a heightened state of 'evictability' (van Baar, 2017).

Migrants' additional racialisation through (enforced) mobility means that whenever they do settle they are always produced as out-of-place. Their inhabitance of space is both denied (ignored outright or existing only as a blank slate upon which Bouchart can project her 'different imagination'), or exists as a threat to the city of Calais to be attacked and erased. Due to their mobility they are always superfluous to and contaminating of the social body when in the city, yet are further considered to pollute nature, bring ecological destruction, and produce environmental insecurity; traits that Willie Wright (2018, p. 11) argues are attributed specifically to Black bodies. Thus, anti-migrant domicide in Calais targets racialised migrants because they have been produced *as waste themselves* by the authorities, and not to eliminate migrants' material waste in order to protect the environment.^{vii} This allows for, not only the removal of migrants' belongings, but police violence itself to be understood as an act of 'cleaning' the environment.

Willie Wright (ibid.) argues that the gratuitous and state-sanctioned violence of vigilantes and the police against Black bodies must also be included in conceptualisations of environmental racism. He argues that polluting Black communities (the term's usual definition) only occurs through the *a priori* devaluation of Black life to the condition of social death; a condition of inhumanity where human life is construed as disposable and without inherent worth (see Section 6.2). An all encompassing environment of anti-Black racism degrades Black communities' natural environment, life,



FIGURE 31: City workers and police 'clean' the *Bois Chico Mendes* jungle May 2018. Credit Johan Ben Azzouz for *La Voix du Nord* (2018a).

and land as a corollary to bodily violence against Black people. Aside from this sociopolitical environment, Wright points out how the natural environment is weaponised as an agent of violence against Black people^{viii} to argue that it must also be included in how how environmental racism is understood. Wright's broad conceptualisation of environmental racism is necessary to fully understand how the punitive and gratuitous violence of the police, the segregation of migrants, domicide of their homes, as well as the weaponisation of the natural environment (the wind, rain, mud, and cold) interact to form a completely 'hostile environment of racism' for migrants in Calais. However, to reach this understanding the narrow focus on migrants' waste as comprising the trash they leave along their spaces of transit must be broken to see more broadly how the state comes to target irregular migrants as out-of-place racialised bodies, made waste themselves.

At this point we can completely break from the frame of 'cleanings' as protecting the environment from 'migrants' waste' and fully realise them as political, and more specifically racist, anti-migrant domicidal interventions. Calais' squats and jungles, as spaces containing racialised and irregularly mobile bodies, are construed as polluting and threatening the French social, environmental, territorial, and national body. Migrants' bodies, first and foremost, perceived as waste—Bauman's (2004) 'wasted lives'; the superfluous, excess, outcast, and unwanted people of the world—in turn lend this quality to the spaces they inhabit as well as materials which make up their homes targeted by domicide. This domicide, now being referred to as 'cleaning', is firmly intended to remove the devalued and threatening migrants from the city.

Figure 31, published in the La Voix Du Nord article describing 'the third cleaning

of Bois Chico Mendes', clearly illustrates this. The frame is centred on the city workers hauling off sleeping bags, clothes, and a barbecue grill under the watchful eye of police. This presents an image of the occupation as somehow excessive and durable, threatening not only in its permanence but its perceived gratuitousness. The grill does not fit with the photographer's imagination of the squalor of the camp, delegitimising it in the same way that smartphones have been used against an idealised impoverished refugee worthy of international protection and humanitarian sympathy (Hicks and Mallet, 2019, p. 52). However, the image also clearly displays that these cleaning operations are about removing the capacity for people to live rather than 'cleaning up their waste'. Those items shown being confiscated are necessary for people forced to endure living rough in Calais to survive, and are not superfluous, cast off or rejected items; the definition of waste. They are removed to prevent the migrant-aswaste/wasteful-migrant from inhabiting the area through acts of domicide. Thus, in *Bois Chico Mendes* it is the migrants themselves that are targeted for removal while a rhetorical focus is kept on waste as the main problem. Once they have been evicted, their 'homes-cum-garbage' are then taken to frustrate their return and continued inhabitance of the area. However, they are not removed necessarily for their environmental impact and the migrants are not asked to dispose of what they consider *their* waste. It is the dehumanising rhetoric which construe the migrants themselves as waste which then allows the material leftovers of their inhabitance following an eviction to be perceived as already existing waste.

Having understood how the racialisation of Calais' irregular migrants and their unauthorised mobilities devalues their life and produces them as waste themselves, the instrumentalisation of waste to the achieve their elimination becomes clearer. Subsection 7.4.1 showed how domicidal policy—pushing irregular migrants to inhabit outdoor spaces through evicting squats, denying them sanitation or waste disposal facilities, destroying those autonomous camps and people everyday—*produces* the waste in the natural spaces which migrants inhabitant, soon to be spaces of environmental value. This reveals not only a deep hypocrisy in the state's use of environmental arguments to justify domicide while ignoring their role in creating it, or the other ecological harms of border security infrastructures^{ix}, but the intentional strategy to keep migrants' living in poor conditions to sustain their nominally depoliticised justification for hyper-cycles of destruction. However, as we will now see, 'cleaning' is not only a euphemistic phrasing for domicide, but also, by re-territorialising jungle sites following their eviction and destruction, becomes a spatial intervention through which environmental citizenship is produced in Calais.

8.5 Cleaning and environmental citizenship

White-supremacist logic creates a clean/dirty divide positing a clean/civilised Europe against a dirty/uncivilised rest of the world (Vergès, 2019). As discussed in Section 8.3, the historic racialisation of migrants through colonial narratives construes

them as dirty, unhygienic, contagious, and polluting of the clean Northern territory. This presents them as waste themselves while naturalising their inhabitance of wastelands. In this context it is the daily acts of domicide and racist police violence designed to remove migrant bodies which are first and foremost acts of 'cleaning'³ even though the state's use of this term is meant to legitimate them as neutral, even beneficial, acts of restoring the natural environment. This is the most direct way that cleaning comes to produce and spatialise citizenship in Calais; by physically expelling racialised noncitizens threatening and polluting the city-space.

However, the cleaning of migrants' trash, in addition to migrants themselves, also becomes operative in constituting racialised citizenship distinctions. Blaming migrants and their waste for the environmental degradation of *La Lande* and *Bois Chico Mendes* additionally implies its inverse; the figure of the French citizen-steward who takes responsibility for protecting, cleaning, and rehabilitating those sites. This section further sketches the distinction of the *environmental citizen* from irregular migrants along established racial lines, now re-articulated around the quality of environmental responsibility.

Before analysing the act of cleaning migrants' trash as a 'citizen operation' through which environmental citizens produce themselves against irregular migrants, the concept will first be briefly defined. Environmental citizenship is laudably concerned with achieving the greater environmental and planetary good, and works towards establishing sustainable, and 'climate secure', environmental futures (Dobson and Bell, 2006). It is generally theorised as a relation or set of practices which populations adopt based on state objectives to stall or retard global climate-change through democratic governance (e.g. amending consumer behaviours, limiting carbon production, and conserving natural resources) (Vihersalo, 2017), but has been criticised as a redistribution of responsibility for structural and industrial environmental impacts on to individuals who are given the imperative to compensate for them by amending their own lifestyles (MacGregor, 2006, p. 102). Environmental citizenship is differentiated from environmental consumerist practices because, although changes in consumption behaviour are a necessary aspect of environmental citizenship, the former hinges upon a psychological belief in a profound *connection* between humans and nature (spheres considered separate in modern society) (Harbo, De Young, and Guckian, 2017). This holistic understanding of humanity's place in the natural world provides compelling and deeply personal motivations for environmental citizens to take responsibility for offsetting their environmental impact which extend far beyond economic incentive. However, the racist hierarchy implicit in Anglo/European concepts of nature and environmentalism mean that the racial politics of environmental citizenship must be interrogated, especially when 'connection to nature' is used as a defining characteristic of its 'community of value' (Anderson, 2013).

³ Remember Éric Besson's declared intention to 'clean Calais' in 2009 beginning with the Pashto jungle eviction before targeting the other squats and camps in the city (*Calais, Face à La Frontière* 2017, p. 60)

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Before returning to analyse the racialised construction of environmental citizenship in Calais specifically, it is worth contextualising the discussion in a broader distinction between the environmental citizen and its migrant Other in relation to the environmental crisis occurring today. Citizenship requires the simultaneous production of its Other (Section 2.2), and the environmental citizen becomes constructed as a form of white European subjecthood against an Other that is racialised through the racist hierarchies readily contained within both the concepts of 'nature' and 'citizen' (Baldwin, 2012). Narratives of climate driven migration and environmental citizenship contrast the rich white Western environmental citizen with the poor brown Southerner 'on the front lines' of climate-change. While the former is sympathetic to, even resolved to deter, the human and environmental costs of climate-change, its Other is positioned as climate-change's victim without the necessary resources to mobilise in tackling it (Latta, 2007, pp. 384–385). Climate-change driven migration has thus been added to the stakes of the global climate crisis which predominantly Northern environmental citizens are responsible for mitigating in order to preserve their environmental security (see Section 8.2) while the agency ascribed to 'climate refugees' is reduced to their mobility; their ability to flee environmental devastation. Tragically this escape marks them ever after as invaders of the new territories to which they travel, out of place in their social, political, and environmental ecosystems.

This results in a double exclusion from citizenship. Firstly, climate migrants are excluded outright from the legal category of citizenship whilst travelling irregularly along their lines of flight. Yet, furthermore, their mobility also means they become interpreted as a threat to the natural order in the spaces to which they move, and their transience precludes them from being seen as valued partners in sustaining local environmental health. Thus they are denied the ability to demonstrate environmental responsibility and thereby make claims to its accompanying form of environmental citizenship through substantive practices. While these preclusions result from unsanctioned movement, in the spaces where migrants are made to wait between their journey's stages (e.g. Calais' jungles) this bind tightens completely. The precarious circumstances in which they are forced to live produce visible waste allowing migrants to be easily scapegoated as an environmental threat on top of the existing social and political threat posed by their invasive, racialised, and 'out of place' bodies. Having been forced to migrate away from their homes, they become an 'invasive species' doomed to only exacerbate the environmental problems of the other geographies to which they travel. Not only have they failed in their original environmental responsibilities to deal with the climate crisis by having left their 'proper' homes, they now have even fewer resources to address their environmental externalities or practice sustainable land use or consumption habits on the road.

Turning back to how environmental citizenship is produced in Calais; according to Kosek (2006, p. 177), '[a]n "environmental citizen" is formed when understandings and experience of nature become grounds for membership in a community, a basis for making claims and the legitimizing authority for an individual to speak for nature'.

Appreciation of nature thus becomes a central tenet of environmental citizenship's community of value, and how this political community was formed in Calais to the exclusion of the irregular migrants in the city is evident in the town-hall meeting regarding Bois Chico Mendes. Firstly, none of the migrants who lived in Bois Chico Mendes were present at that meeting which was instead attended by French neighbours, politicians, and concerned humanitarians. This highlights 'non-citizen' migrants' pre-existing social and political exclusion in terms of who is competent and rightful to take care of the environment, and who has the authority to 'speak for nature' in the wood. Performances of environmental consciousness and connection—showing concern for Bois Chico Mendes as being one of the last beautiful marsh spaces for the which Beau Marais neighbourhood was named, mentioning the various non-human species living there, or describing security measures against dog fowling (Subsection 7.4.2)—took precedence over discussions of how that space was currently being inhabited by people and what their needs were. Even when migrants were brought into the conversation later on, their existing presence in the wood was not engaged with. The statement: 'a solution should be found for them' (page 176) presumed their removal as part of the construction of the park. Previous media reports and letters to the *Mairie* scandalising the migrants' trash and bodily waste had already done the work to justify their removal as invaders and polluters. During the meeting the residents could then appear sympathetic—'seeing them suffering is not funny' (page 176)—more environmentalist than anti-migrant, though these positions have never been mutually exclusive (see Section 8.3).

However, it is in the case of constructing the *Fort Vert* conservation area at *La Lande* that the figure of Calais' environmental citizen most clearly emerges. On 1 April 2016, after the eviction and destruction of the Jungle and before work on the *Fort Vert* conservation area had begun, an '*Appel a citoyens*' was launched for citizen volunteers from Calais to clean up the land previously home to the Jungle (*France 3 Nord Pas-de-Calais*, 2017). Obled described the project as 'allowing the inhabitants to *reclaim* the place through a citizen operation. But *it will be a symbolic operation*' (translation and emphasis mine). This statement starkly encapsulates, in the Calais context, many of the relationships previously discussed between environmental citizenship and migrant waste. The environmental citizen develops a connection to nature and becomes subjectively invested in its health as *their* property through cleaning the land once it has been reconquered from the abusive and invasive migrant/occupier. However, before analysing Obled's call in full it is first useful to frame the cleaning of migrant trash and construction of environmental citizenship in Calais through reflections on the same situation in the US-Mexico borderlands.

Juanita Sundberg (2008) interviewed the founder of Humane Borders, an organisation that places water out in the desert along migrant trails, but that also organises trash pickups in those same areas. Placing food, water, and other resources in the desert for migrants to find and hopefully survive their multi-day journeys on foot is an activity for which other activists have recently received criminal convictions (Ingram, 2019). In this context of criminalisation, Humane Borders tries to offset the controversy of their water drops through their efforts to 'keep our fragile desert environment clean [and] continue good stewardship of fragile ecological areas in southern Arizona deserts' (Sundberg, 2008, p. 880). Although in this example the 'cleaning' of the spaces migrants pollute is done to protect the image of the Humane Borders group and allow them to continue their humanitarian work in support of migrants, rather than an action to exclude them (although as seen in Chapter 6 these humanitarian interventions can reproduce exclusionary relations), citizenship distinctions between volunteers and migrants are nonetheless reinforced.

Humane Borders' volunteers position themselves as taking care of *their* land—'We diligently take care of the water stations and we pick up trash. That just adds to who we are, our identity, who we are and that we want to be good citizens' (ibid., p. 880)—and, in doing so, position themselves as virtuous citizens who clean up after polluting non-citizen migrants. As Sundberg phrases it, 'because they are cleaning up after others, however, these spatial practices necessarily summon boundaries between those who clean and those who leave things behind' (ibid., p. 882).^x This is an odd, albeit temporary, inversion of the global politics of labour as it is racialised people with a history of migration who most often perform the cleaning tasks once employed in destination countries (Anderson, 2000; Vergès, 2019). Though, with this example in mind, how cleaning trash simultaneously produces the national territory as clean and those who perform the cleaning as citizens can now be returned to in Obled's call for volunteers to clean *La Lande* after the Jungle's destruction.

Obled's intention was for 'the inhabitants' to 'reclaim' the land through a 'citizen operation'. While he doesn't specify which inhabitants, we can assume he does not imply its recent evictees. He is almost certainly *not* proposing that the irregular migrants who were pushed off the site and had their homes destroyed return to reclaim *La Lande* and clean it as part of a citizen performance to produce them as environmental citizens and challenge their exclusion from French citizenship more broadly (not that such an operation would be desirable). Instead it is an operation for already-citizens to reterritorialise a spatial rupture in the relationship between the citizenship regime and the city of Calais.^{xi} Obled's use of the verb 'reclaim' implies not only that *La Lande* was somehow stolen by unauthorised occupiers and will now be returned to its rightful citizen-owners, but also that it will be rescued from the savage state of nature it was in during its incarnation as the Jungle. Both these tasks are accomplished through Calais' citizens cleaning the land that is presumed their rightful territory to remove the migrants' leftover trash; the final material trace of their presence as waste.

Furthermore, Obled's 'citizen operation' implies both that this cleaning is an activity for proper citizens as well as an act that will operate on them. By cleaning their environment Calais' citizens are given an opportunity to perform the type of care and stewardship roles required to become full environmental citizens. The operation also provides a preview of the nourishing 'connection to nature' that will be attainable



FIGURE 32: Workers from *Régie de Quartier de Calais* hand-picking litter at *Fort Vert* after destruction of the *Centre d'accueil Jules Ferry*. Photo credit Johan Ben Azzouz for *La Voix du Nord* (2018b).

in this same place once the *Fort Vert* conservation/border zone has been completed, and the native species of waterfowl and fauna for which the area was designed have been reinstated. The construction of the reserve by itself, hosting native species and cared for by native inhabitants, allows the white French citizenry to simultaneously construct themselves and their national image as natural, pure, and homogeneous against the racialised population of migrants. Furthermore, by revisiting the site in the future to appreciate the nature set-aside there and remember back to the period of the Jungle, now reintegrated into a triumphant narrative of pacification and reterritorialisation, the environmental citizen-subject will be regenerated. The Jungle's inhabitants are left out of all these processes (present only in their absence), not just because they are presumed to have disappeared following the final eviction, but because they have previously been cast out of the environmental political community for whom this 'citizen operation' as catharsis was designed.

Most notable though in Obled's call is his admission that this cleaning is just meant to be a symbolic operation. It is an exorcism rather than a substantive action. In reality the actual cleaning and restoration of the area was carried out by paid workers and heavy machinery operators under contract with the state, perhaps even the same ones who drove over people's homes and belongings a few months prior. In fact, much of the Jungle's leftover trash was not removed but rather built into the very anti-intrusion mechanisms designed to prevent a future re-occupation. Once the bulldozers had finished this process of 'cleaning', Alexandre Driencourt celebrates the fact that the land has now returned to how it was 10,000 years ago (Rullmann and Ahmad Khan, 2019); as if the histories of domicidal violence in this location disappear with the sand. Erasing the material trace of the Jungle's presence and attempting to dig past this history is a strange and rather futile attempt at time travel. Yet, by burying the Jungle's traces *within Fort Vert* the constitutive domicidal violence becomes embedded in the very materiality of the nature reserve. There is no original nature from a time before the Jungle to be found in this place which Driencourt, Obled, and other citizens can return to. Instead the only nature there was built from the remains Jungle, and has since become the border.

However, even if unable to turn back time and prevent the Jungle's formation to begin with, the symbolic cleaning process nevertheless is meant as a ritual through which Calais' citizens can symbolically recover their unblemished national territory, social body, and conscience. This ritual; however, is one that perpetuates a politics of erasure and exclusion against irregular migrants and their forms of inhabitance, and encourages cultural amnesia amongst citizens, instead of promoting their collective engagement with the city's anti-migrant history and violence considered in its colonial contexts. The fact is, Fort Vert has become the very history of 'environmental racism' at La Lande: the segregation of Calais' migrants on to this polluted site; the lack of sanitation or waste disposal provisions made available while they lived there; the gratuitous violence as police rained the camp with tear gas grenades, rubber bullets, and high-pressure water; and the constant exposure to the elements. Building the traces of anti-migrant domicide back into the very 'nature' which citizens are now meant to come and connect to, or asking them to contribute themselves to erasing migrants' struggles against Calais' border, indelibly marks the environmental citizens Fort Vert will produce as premised upon the racist exclusion of irregular migrants, even if they do not acknowledge it.

8.6 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the two case studies presented in Chapter 7 in relation to scholarship on the securitisation of migration, race, and environmental conservation to understand how domicidal cleanings of irregular migrants' homes produce environmental citizenship. These cases represent a novel shift in the justifications for domicide in Calais as creating areas of environmental or ecological value for French citizens beyond their typical border security objectives of migrant exclusion. This framing attempts to depoliticise anti-migrant domicide through focusing on its benefits for the natural environment, a growing concern shared by many who may perhaps otherwise be sympathetic to or even support Calais' migrant population. However, this chapter argues that the conceptions of nature and the environment at the heart of *Fort Vert* and *Bois Chico Mendes* have *always* entailed an element of racialised exclusion, violence, and dispossession, as well as been used more generally to justify policies of immigration restriction. Therefore, attempting to 'depoliticise' domicide through environmental arguments, and in particular with the discourse of cleaning, in fact reintroduces a racist politics at the very heart of the argument that more neutral discourses

of security and risk management obscure. Rather than viewing racist violence, environmentalism, and the domicide of racialised communities as somehow distinct or contradictory, Willie Wright's (2018) conceptualisation of environmental racism draws them together as coconstituve processes resulting from the dehumanisation of people racialised through their illicit mobilities, skin colour, and other linguistic or cultural markers.

In this context, although migrants' waste has been the focus of recent domicidal campaigns in Calais, they can better be understood as excluding migrants considered as waste themselves. Seen in Chapters 5 and 7, 'cleanings' have become the preferred nomenclature for violent police evictions, and the destruction of migrants belongings by city workers. By contrasting French police and citizens who clean to migrants who pollute France's natural/national environment, established racial, social, and political exclusions are reproduced in the figure of the environmental citizen. As environmental security becomes increasingly important in response to global climate-change, irregular migrants' presumed environmental irresponsibility (a result of enforced mobility, relegation to inhabit spaces outdoors, and the ways that state neglect ensures they continue producing unsightly waste) is an increasingly salient, although not necessarily new, axiom for political and spatial exclusion. The new securitised conservation projects at Fort Vert and Bois Chico Mendes exemplify many of the qualities of border/environmental security infrastructure. They make spaces uninhabitable for irregular migrants, reinforce the spatialisation of presumably native human and non-human species to their 'natural' environments, provide spaces for environmental citizens to actualise themselves through appreciating 'their' natural environment and perform stewardship tasks, and renew their connection to local/native natural ecologies; all of which reinforce the social, political, and spatial exclusion of racialised irregular migrants.

Notes

- i. Some of their efforts to recast the city's identity include purchasing a \in 30m mechanical dragon with money left over from the more than €100m in subsidies the city received from the national, regional, and departmental governments during the height of the 'migration crisis' and Jungle in 2015. This dragon is the contrivance of Mayor Bouchart, who hopes it will 'improve the image of her city', and was the second choice for a cosmetic attraction which would again make the city appealing for citizens and tourists after the €275m 'Heroic Land' theme park failed to attract enough investors (Railane and Escailliet, 2019). Also, In Summer 2017 two statues of Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle walking together towards a series of increasingly large maps of France that, at night, light-up in the blue, white, and red of the French tricolour were erected in Parc Richelieu. These statues are intended to promote Calais as an important node in the history of French and British cooperation, but given their roles as imperialists and colonizers, fighting wars against decolonial forces while ruthlessly suppressing resistance at home, Churchill and de Gaulle are more appropriate symbols of the state violence and racist apartheid that continues to define the city of Calais (CMS, 2017a). For the inauguration ceremony of these statues, bright red British phone boxes were placed all over town, a wooden replica of Tower Bridge was built on a roundabout across from the Mairie, and 1,000 British people were brought over to Calais on buses and given an all expenses paid tour of the city to the tune of £150,000 in the hopes that they would return (Chazan, 2017).
- ii. For discussion on the politics of security and mobility present in the export of fencing from the UK to Calais see Claudia Aradau (Aug. 7, 2016). 'Political Grammars of Mobility, Security and Subjectivity'. In: *Mobilities* 11.4, pp. 564–574, pp. 570–571.
- iii. Scholarly case studies of protected conservation areas at border-zones other than Mexico-US include Guatemala-Mexico (Ybarra, 2016), Mozambique-South Africa (Lunstrum, 2014; Massé and Lunstrum, 2016), Laos (Dwyer, Ingalls, and Baird, 2016), and the Galapagos (Valdivia, Wolford, and Lu, 2014).
- iv. Despite the typical referent for the discussion of race and racism in Europe being the Holocaust, and how internal racialisation was necessary to produce dehumanised populations of Jewish and Roma people who could be exterminated without protest by society, David Theo Goldberg (2006, pp. 336–337) argues that modern Europe, and particularly its notions of race, emerged from its colonial experiences. Among other examples illustrating this he points out 'how notions such as racial hygiene can be traced to racially predicated urban planning around sanitation syndromes by colonial regimes'.
- v. This is an argument he repeated in 2019 when blaming immigrants for perceived environmental damage to the Potomac River (Pilkington, 2019).
- vi. Although this was an autonomous occupation committed as an act of protest to previous domicidal interventions, it was nonetheless carried out in the context of a broader refusal by local authorities to allow migrants to inhabit other locations in the city. Therefore, although migrants and those in solidarity with them took Fort Galloo, what was previously a toxic metal recycling factory, for themselves, they were 'pushed' to do so due to the lack of alternatives.
- vii. There is also this (intentional?) ambiguity in Tucker Carlson's statement about hating illegal migrants because he hates litter which may perhaps reveal his more honest position on the matter.

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- viii. Wright offers the examples of lynchings from trees or murders of Black people in wooded forests, but the weaponisation of deserts and sea against racialised migrants are also relevant given the context of this research.
- ix. Just as Trump's border wall would spell environmental disaster for the ecosystems it would carve up (M. W. Wright, 2019), the ecological impact of Calais' own extensive series of border walls and fences not to mention the deforestation, flooding, and landscaping which took place to securitise the Eurotunnel (Malm, 2018)—cannot be ignored. Calais has yet to see thorough public research done on the environmental impact of these security infrastructures, which could be an interesting area for future research.
- x. There were also volunteer organised clean-ups of the Jungle which, while focused on improving the environmental and public health conditions of the Jungle, also produced similar boundaries between migrants and humanitarian/environmental citizen volunteers.
- xi. In a different but related example, Racleş and Ivasiuc (2019, pp. 29–30) explain that following an eviction of a Roma camp in Italy the land is subjected to operations of *'bonifica'* (reclaiming) as a ritual of purification.

Conclusions: Seeing through erasure

The most recent chapters focused on specific case studies from Calais' domicidal history and the equally specific forms of humanitarian and environmental citizenship they produced. Now it is time to zoom back out and combine these analyses with previous chapters to provide answers to the research questions, and see the overall counter-map of citizenship in/and Calais that has emerged.

The Introduction began by presenting many of the different walls I encountered in Calais which prompted me to think about the interconnections between citizenship, the city, and the exclusion of irregular migrants there. These first walls were; the one on which 'No one is illegal!' continues testifying to the existence of a constant struggle against the citizenship regime in Calais despite its erasure (Figure 1), the border fortifications preventing irregular migrants from travelling clandestinely to the UK (Figures 2 and 30), and the less conspicuous walls enclosing disused buildings and parcels of land which deny migrants spaces to inhabit in the city (Figures 3 and 21). The three 'walls' of citizenship were also introduced as being: (1) a form of status bureaucratically controlling migrants' mobilities, (2) an analytical framework limiting scholarly understanding of migrants' politics, and (3) an impediment to collectively imagining what a radical politics of free movement for all can look like. Chapters 7 and 8 also showed how 'nature' has been put to work as a 'wall' against migrants: both materially—e.g. adorning the 'Great Wall of Calais' (Figure 30) and or in the form of a securitised nature-reserve integrated into the border (Figure 28)—and in the sense identified by Hultgren (2015); a nominally depoliticised justification for anti-migrant domicide and policy which attempts to deflect from their racism.

These different walls threw up different questions. At first I was intrigued by how the struggles contesting citizenship's exclusions played out in the city, and how these struggles could still be read on the city's walls despite having been erased by them. This meant reading the city as a palimpsestic text to see the dynamic movements, ruptures, erasures, and reterritorialisations that have preceded the present. Rather than taking Calais' current configuration of walls for granted, I wanted to see the spaces and politics laying *behind* them. Others times I fretted whether underestimating the Hydra-like nature of citizenship's walls causes them to be re-erected in new places while letting us imagine they'd been broken through. I also doubted the walls that lay before me in conducting my research. What (invisible) barriers existed for my understanding of migrants' struggles and exclusion provided most of the walls existing for them in Calais include a door for me? Was I not also blinded by a fixation on citizenships' walls? Was I overestimating their solidity, and thus denying the everyday realities of those who overcome them? While these questions still linger, my ultimate objective became grasping how all the different walls in Calais mutually reinforce one another and together build a physical and socio-political terrain of exclusion for irregular migrants, while preventing coalitions against the border regime from forming across citizenship lines.

9.1 Answers to the research questions

To draw out the threads of Calais' exclusionary urban fabric, I settled on the three research questions listed on page 7. I also recognised the importance of looking beyond Calais' city walls to read the implications of these very local struggles for citizenship politics more generally, for which I needed a final, implications oriented, question; RQ4. The first two research questions combine to ask how citizenship's exclusions are produced and spatialised in Calais through exclusionary interventions against migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance. This is a divided question because it is first necessary to understand the ways migrants are spatially excluded (RQ1) before it's possible to understand how this produces citizenship (RQ2). However, before providing these answers, the meaning of 'citizenship' needs to be further clarified given that it is a highly contested term which remains ambiguous in these questions.

Because my research interest was piqued by the 'No one is illegal!' graffiti's provocation to the city of Calais—a city largely defined by its illegalised inhabitants—I have concentrated on the hegemonic state-based form of citizenship that produces certain people as illegal. Understanding how the normative spatial, social, and political divisions modern citizenship implies between citizens and non-citizens are reproduced in Calais to govern migrants' mobilities was the primary object of my research. This meant not limiting my area of investigation to non-citizenship as legal status, but seeing how this status consequentially entails social and political exclusion because of its presumed incompatibility with citizens' normative traits. In other words, I was less interested in migrants' lack of access to citizenships' institutions or rights after having entered France without authorisation than I was with seeing how their exclusion from citizenship was reproduced on personal, communal, and urban scales in ways that stemmed from, but were not strictly tied to, a lack of formal status. Much of Chapter 2 was spent understanding how this 'modern' citizenship (Tully, 2014) emerged through European colonialism and Enlightenment universalism, became formalised as a state regime of governance alongside the expansion of nationalism, and is essential to sustaining the racist global distribution of movement rights and wealth benefiting Europe and settler-colonial states.

Having begun my reflections with the '*No one is illegal!*' wall, moving through the city and encountering its other walls (like Figure 3) reoriented my interests to the ways migrants' take living spaces in the city, how these are taken away again by authorities, and the implications of this back and forth for what citizenship in Calais looks like. After accordingly narrowing *RQ1* to reflect this shift, I found domicide to be the primary exclusionary spatial intervention erasing migrants' autonomous spaces of inhabitance in Calais. Domicide was shown to be an exclusionary spatial technology of citizenship in three ways; (1) it segregates Calais' irregular migrants beyond the city and thus sustains it as a 'space of citizenship', (2) it enforces normative behaviours amongst citizens and non-citizens alike through which they come to be distinguished from one another, and (3) it eliminates the space for social and political solidarities between citizen and non-citizen groups to form and flourish (Section 4.4).

However, this thesis shows that there are in fact three different, but interrelated, kinds of domicidal intervention which each work differently to erase migrants' homes and concomitantly produce and spatialise citizenship. These are eviction, destruction, and securitisation. These three categories were used to separate the domicidal events gathered during data collection, organise my cartographic and narrative counter-maps, and to provide different angles of investigation into the production and spatialisation of citizenship through irregular migrants' exclusion. As will now be shown, the general ways domicide functions above are present in these three component parts to varying degrees and in different ways.

Evictions are forced expulsions entailing social and political consequences because of how they break apart the communities inhabiting Calais' squats and jungles (Chapter 3). Evictions work to produce and spatialise citizenship in Calais in three ways: (1) they physically remove irregular migrants from Calais so that the city remains a segregated space inhabited by citizens, (2) they re-enforce normative (non)citizenship identities and their corresponding ways of (not) being in the city by enacting performative violence towards irregular migrants who inhabit it despite authorities' prohibition, and (3) they eliminate the autonomous spaces of and for movement in which mobile commons and anti-citizen political solidarities are nurtured across citizenship statuses and privileges (Chapter 4).

Destructions, while also evicting inhabitants, additionally consist of an act of material erasure designed to deprive migrants of the infrastructure needed to continue living autonomously in Calais (Chapter 5). Destructions produce and spatialise citizenship in two main ways. They constantly deny irregular migrants even the most basic shelter to make their lives unlivable and deter them from coming to Calais or remaining there while attempting clandestine crossings to the UK. Yet, destructions do not just deter, they also dehumanise migrants and force them into relations of dependency with humanitarian actors in the city. They compel migrants to abandon their autonomous camps and take up residency in state managed temporary accommodations outside of Calais. These accommodation centres, which are the carrot to the stick of domicidal destructions (Section 5.4), are expressly designed to make irregular migrants submit to the securitising gaze of the citizenship regime in France which they largely remained isolated from in squats and jungles. Then, if found to not already have fingerprints in another EU country, they are given the option of either claiming asylum or facing deportation, but *not* of remaining in the irregular administrative situation necessary to autonomously move to, and hopefully then stay in, the UK.

Securitisations enclose or otherwise deny access to spaces in the city to prevent migrants from initially settling, or from re-occupying them following an eviction, and generally function by making the spatial consequences of evictions and destructions permanent (Section 7.1). They ensure that irregular migrants whose homes have been destroyed are unable to rebuild them or alternatively find another place in which to live autonomously in Calais. Securitisations strengthen spatial segregation, amplify deterrence, foreclose options for migrants to autonomously recover from and resist state domicide, aim to ensure a pure separation between 'spaces of citizenship' and those contaminated with the racialised bodies of 'non-citizens', and prevent autonomous spaces from being taken where communities of resistance to the border and citizenship regimes could develop.

Altogether these descriptions answer RQ1, and would also have answered RQ2 if my investigation of citizenship had been limited to its modern state-based form. However, while reviewing critical citizenship studies literature, I became aware of the disagreement over to what extent citizenship is actually determined by its relationship to the state, as well as ways that it can exist outside of its modern form. According to the CCS perspective, citizenship is a particularly potent 'way of being political' (Isin, 2002) which anyone can adopt and which has the power to lead to significant and substantive alterations in what citizenship means and to whom it extends. This perspective, when applied to Calais' migrants' struggles, would think of citizenship as a resource for 'non-citizen' migrants to take-up in their struggles against spatial, social, and political exclusion in the city, while pointing to how other citizenships forms could include them. While I disagreed with the CCS reading of migrants' struggles as examples of citizenship (see Section 2.4), the need to acknowledge other citizenship forms not exclusively defined in connection to the nation-state which might allow for migrants' inclusion in Calais was clear. Therefore, while not my original intention, this research also had to investigate what other 'diverse' citizenship forms (Tully, 2014) are produced through exclusionary spatial interventions in Calais, and how these relate to irregular migrants in the city to fully answer RQ2 and RQ3.

Remember that the securitisation case-studies in Chapter 7 of *Bois Chico Mendes* and the *Fort Vert* nature reserve not only represent a very specific type of securitisation that combines environmental and border security objectives, but also gave a more complex picture of how domicidal interventions produce other forms of citizenship. In addition to facilitating the segregation of the city, defending the UK's external border, and preventing irregular migrants from re-inhabiting spaces they were evicted from, these two conservation projects created spaces for *Calaisiens* to protect and connect to 'their' natural environments. The 'cleanings', both of migrants and 'their waste', which created these spaces were interventions premised upon excluding migrants while producing Calais' citizens as environmental citizens based upon stewardship of the local environment as a central tenet of their 'community of value' (Anderson, 2013, pp. 2–3).

Another type of citizenship domicide produced in Calais, this time during destructions, was 'humanitarian citizenship' (Chapter 6). In this case performing hospitality towards irregular migrants by distributing new shelters, clothes, and bedding to offset the state's daily domicidal destructions is a core quality of the 'community of value'. These interventions are not only made to differentiate the humanitarian citizen-volunteers from other citizens who insist on a blatantly nationalist definition of the citizen community, but also to demonstrate to them, and the state, the 'true' values of the French or European nation, reinforcing the regime of humanitarian migration governance.

However, domicide does not produce and spatialise environmental or humanitarian citizenship in exactly the same way it does for citizenship's modern state-based form. First, these two 'diverse' citizenships emerge more from citizens' secondary interventions in the spaces of erasure created by state evictions, destructions, and securitisations rather than through these exclusionary interventions themselves. These secondary interventions are not explicitly exclusionary to irregular migrants, and in fact, in the case of 'humanitarian citizenship', they can even perform migrants' inclusion. Another difference is that there is a much looser connection between the state and these diverse citizenship forms. They have not been codified in law, institutionalised in government, nor are they overtly linked with migration control (though they still implicitly are). The police and other state authorities are not enforcing the norms and boundaries of formally defined environmental or humanitarian citizen communities when they perform their domicidal operations, despite their frequent deployment of environmental and humanitarian justifications. These citizenship forms then represent more informal politically and socially defined 'communities of value' which should technically remain open to Calais' irregular migrants, and provide them a space of inclusion, as their non-citizen status is not an *a priori* disqualification.

Unfortunately, this research reveals that Calais' environmental and humanitarian citizenship forms, and potentially others I have not addressed, in fact do not provide a space of inclusion for migrants but instead produce and perpetuate their exclusion as 'non-citizens'. The answer, that kept reappearing, to exactly why this is the case was racism. Citizenship in Calais seems to be continually produced through distinguishing citizens against migrants who are dehumanised, unacknowledged as autonomous political agents, considered to fail in fulfilling substantive social and political requirements by displaying degenerative behaviours, or are otherwise made to endure exclusionary violence for the substantive acts that will define citizens to occur all because of how they have been racialised. With racism clearly being the mortar from which Calais' walls of citizenship are built, the blueprint for how they reinforce one another to construct a near total landscape of exclusion for irregular migrants, while obstructing their struggles for free movement, can still be further drawn out.

Citizenship, in the first instance, has been produced through a racist opposition

to non-European humanity since the Citizen grew out of the Enlightenment concept of Man. At first the national-citizen was defined against the racialised foreign other 'over there', while more recent post-colonial mobilities back to Europe from its former imperial extremities increasingly caused citizens to distinguish themselves from racialised 'migrants' present here. While cultural, linguistic, or religious traits increasingly stand-in for skin colour as racial markers, immigration policy continues reproducing migrants' ineligibility to readily receive European citizenship rights, and thus sustains an unequal distribution of global citizenship privileges, based on race.

In Calais, irregular migrants' skin colour and other less visible markers interlock with their illicit mobilities to produce them as non-citizens in multiple ways. Their lack of legal status resulting from unauthorised entry to Europe combines with their racialisation, a fact that predisposes them to be cast outside the European national community, to exclude them from citizenship on multiple levels. However, the perspective on citizenship and exclusion taken in this research does not accept that irregular migrant's banishment from citizenship is total, unchallengeable, and doomed to continue in perpetuity. Rather, what has been showed is that irregular migrants' exclusion remains the result of a constant series of spatial interventions which repress and re-territorialise their struggles *against* citizenship. While non-citizen status or racialisation make migrants seemingly legitimate targets for spatial exclusion, the moment they are excluded through an intervention is also the moment the citizen community is able to constitute itself and recognise common social and political traits within it. This transmutes spatial exclusion into a social and political exclusion, which then reciprocally reinforces spatial exclusion.

The contention of Chapters 6 and 8 is that Calais' humanitarian and environmental citizenships do not escape from this reciprocal cycle of spatial, social, and political exclusion. Also, because they are produced through (responses to) domicidal spatial exclusions, the qualities which define their 'communities of value' are defined against racialised migrants and end up reproducing many of modern citizenship's exclusionary norms. Even though these are examples of citizenship not explicitly defined through the exclusion of migrants as non-nationals, they accept continual racist domicidal violence against 'non-citizens' so long as they can intervene in its wake to perform their more sophisticated forms of citizenship. This provides racist anti-migrant domicide a latent, and sometimes explicit, endorsement, while offering already-citizens a chance to display the qualities of other substantive 'communities of value'. However, due to the consequences of spatial exclusion, migrants fail to live up to the qualities defining these alternative citizen communities and thus become further excluded socially and politically. Therefore, despite the racist politics of environmentalism and humanitarianism presupposing racialised migrants' dehumanisation, the main reason why environmental and humanitarian citizenship actually perpetuate racialised migrants' exclusion is because they fail to challenge both the racist domicidal violence through which they become produced and the foundational racism of citizenship.

Humanitarian citizenship reinforces rather than undoes racialised differences between citizens and non-citizens because the aid giving interventions constituting it reproduce paternalistic, victimising, and dehumanising distinctions between the citizengivers and non-citizen receivers, depoliticising rather than empowering them with autonomy. Furthermore, it is also deeply entangled with the perpetuation of dehumanising anti-migrant domicidal violence. While not straightforwardly defined against migrants, neither does humanitarian citizenship directly challenge their violent spatial exclusion. Rather it takes the destruction of homes as an occasion to perform the ideals of an appropriately liberal and sophisticated European citizenship in contrast to an overtly racist, nationalist, and xenophobic European one. However, here migrants, who undoubtedly do more to support one another than humanitarian citizens do to support them, remain victim-receivers rather than become recognised as citizen equals. Humanitarian citizenship, while being charitable towards migrants, maintains a political distance from them rather than tries to build coalitional solidarities across the citizenship divide and against the technologies that produce and sustain it.

Environmental citizenship, despite not being explicitly nationalist, also perpetuates racialised exclusion in a number of ways. First, in the broadest sense, the environmentalist politics laying at the heart of its ideology contain an implicit racial hierarchy based in the Western concept of nature which dehumanises racialised migrants and predisposes them to be considered an 'invasive species' threatening, not only the natural environment, but also the white nation, naturalised to inhabit Europe's national territories. Second, environmental citizens are produced within the context of 'environmental racism' (W. J. Wright, 2018) which sees irregular migrants forced to inhabit wastelands without proper sanitation or hygiene facilitates while enduring the daily domicidal violence which lays waste to their homes and belongings. Thus, the very 'cleaning' and stewardship practices producing environmental citizens only take place in opposition to the migrants who have been produced as environmentally destructive after being forced to live outdoors in ways that exacerbate their environmental impact. By treating stewardship of nature as a neutral and universal value to condemn migrants' polluting behaviours while lauding citizens care-taking of 'their' land, not only is anti-migrant environmental racism unacknowledged, but, like with humanitarianism, it becomes implicitly supported to create the contexts allowing environmental citizens to produce themselves. Here again migrants' violent spatial exclusion goes unchallenged. Calais' environmental citizens never condemned the border security infrastructure or domicidal state policy for creating environmental harms to begin with, but ignored them to instead celebrate nature's reclamation from the polluting and invasive migrants. In fact, this decontextualisation of the 'threat' migrants are presumed to pose to nature from the state policies which lay behind it further encourage domicide against them to ensure the environment stays 'clean'. Collective amnesia about how migrants are made to 'threaten nature' provides a selfevident justification for why migrants cannot be citizens since they fail to live up to the substantive qualities defining environmental citizens' 'community of value'.

Thus, to finish answering RQ3, this research shows the numerous intersections of racialised irregular migrants' social, political, and spatial exclusion in Calais reciprocally reinforce one another, and that even non-national and non-state citizenship forms configured at the preliminary scale of the city perpetuate them. However, this conclusion begs the final research question (RQ4) which aims to assess whether citizenship can actually encompass a politics of solidarity across citizenship lines which effectively challenges its formative exclusions. Since *all* the citizenship forms studied here are produced by and reproduce the constitutive exclusions of racialised irregular migrants in Calais, the empirical evidence suggests not. However, this is also a theoretical question that requires grappling with citizenship conceptually.

Section 2.2 established that citizenship requires constitutive exclusions whereby the community of citizens define themselves against an Other. These exclusions constantly re-emerge as citizenship reconfigures itself to maintain, while nominally adjusting, existing inequalities and normative characteristics. This makes citizenship, as Amy Brandzel (2016, p. 15) writes, an anti-intersectional and anti-coalitional concept not only because it requires a negative outside of non-citizens to define itself from, but because claims to citizenship fracture multifaceted and interlaced oppressions into discrete struggles around particular issues. Here aspiring citizens define themselves, not only against non-citizens completely cast out, but through competition with one-another to argue who should be seen as more worthy of inclusion. This not only means that modern citizenship is particularly unlikely to overcome the difference between European citizens and racialised irregular migrants which has defined it now for centuries, but that citizenship appears a particularly corrupt foundation for political solidarities across intersecting lines of race, gender, status, class, or privilege. However, the obvious rejoinder here seems to be: 'if not citizenship then what?!'

Indeed, for many scholars affiliated with critical citizenship studies, there is no concept that better encapsulates political subjectivity or is as effective in advancing material gains for marginalised communities (e.g. Nyers and Rygiel, 2012). For them, citizenship, when it is fought *for*, can accomplish significant and substantive alterations in what citizenship rights and privileges are and to whom they extend. These struggles for citizenship are also presumed to create new citizen coalitions between people who had, until that point, existed on opposite sides of the citizenship wall.

However, another contention of this thesis is that citizenship must be regarded as a wall in itself when it comes to imagining what a radically different world can look like—one in which all are able to move and stay freely where they choose—-and what political praxis is necessary to create that world. To avoid the tacit reproduction of the very exclusions migrant struggles are organising against, and also to avoid undermining their political strategies and subjectivities by misinterpreting and then translating them into the very language used to police their mobility, I've argued that the citizenship wall is one that must be fought *against*, across many scales, by taking up a politics of *anti-citizenship*.

With the conceptual metaphor of creating 'cracks' (Holloway, 2010) having already

been belaboured in radical political theory, anti-citizenship asks for more when confronting citizenship. It asks us to wield the sledgehammers, pick-mattocks, and wrecking balls against citizenship's walls whether they be imaginary, bureaucratic, material, or epistemic. Of course these are tools of destruction, but this a particularly *creative destruction*; one which, by refusing and dismantling citizenship, produces alternative political relations in the process (King, 2016, p. 28).

While stopping short of drawing-up a detailed agenda for how such a politics should unfold—this is not only impossible due to contextual differences in places of struggle and amongst their participants, but would also be counter to the prefigurative method at its heart—anti-citizenship, for now, remains a methodology of refusal that aims to constantly identify and attack citizenship's deferred exclusions and coalescing privileges. However, these will inevitably re-emerge elsewhere, Hydra-like, at which point the angle of attack must shift before being repeated. This is a methodology which, first and foremost, resoundingly asserts that citizenship, no matter how it has been reconfigured or reconsidered, not be part of the process or result of the journey to a different way of relating to one another across geographical, national, political, and personal borders. Even for those who may remain unconvinced about the need to do away with citizenship, an anti-citizen method of refusal can still be a powerful strategy. Rather than appealing directly to citizenship to be more inclusive, it recognises that the moment when autonomy is enacted on its own terms is also likely to be when offers to extend and expand citizenship are made in the hopes of re-territorialising its existential threats and sustaining its hegemony. While refusing and resisting citizenship is always easier theoretically than in daily life, one suggestion made here for how to begin enacting an anti-citizen politics is to create and sustain spaces where solidarities across and against citizenship can develop and be expressed in multiple ways.

There is an urgent need for creating more spaces from which to be able to think, share, and live together in ways that do not reinscribe difference based on parental lineage or location of birth as fact, and then distribute privilege and wealth unequally based on that difference. Following the examples of Calais' irregular migrants and solidarity activists struggling together, these spaces *will have to be taken*; they will not be given except as a ploy to further contain bodies and minds. Such spaces are necessary at all scales, beginning in the interpersonal and communal, through to the city and regional, and then reaching towards the global. However, these scales should not be separated and differentially valued against one-another, but instead must be understood as interrelated; the interventions made in one echo and amplify through the others. Therefore, while not wishing to *define* the politics of Calais' autonomous squats and jungles *as* anti-citizen—I acknowledge that inhabitants have a variety of political philosophies and personal motivations connected to their own experiences of post-colonial migration which should not be subsumed within this framework—these spaces should inspire us on our search for an anti-citizen praxis; particularly those of

us who may be in solidarity with, but not necessarily be, migrants themselves. Unfortunately, taking these spaces and nurturing the solidarities they engender is a task seemingly without end, not only because the primacy of citizenship as hegemonic state institution, conceptual analytical framework, and form of political subjectivity does not appear in decline, but especially because of the magnitude of resources and interventions determined to erase them.

9.2 Contributions

The main contribution of *Counter-mapping citizenship* has been to provide an in-depth understanding of the technologies and interventions that repress and reterritorialise the struggles against citizenship's many walls in Calais. To this end, my cartographic digital map and the text maps presented in the thesis together offer a coherent countermap of the spatial, theoretical, rhetorical, and epistemic interventions that (re)produce the city's exclusionary terrain of citizenship. This map is offered, in Edwards Said's (1995, p. 27) terms, as part of a counter-strategy and as a tool of resistance to help orient potential anti-citizen struggles. Having left open its form to be decided and altered through the *praxis* of those struggling together for free movement and against citizenship, counter-mapping the moves and spaces against them provides clues for how to break through citizenships' walls by identifying where they might be weakest.

Another objective of my research, as part of its 'militant-research' methodology, has been to contribute something tangible to the struggles migrants and solidarity activists are engaged in in Calais rather than extract from them, or explain them in a way that undermines them. This motivated me to collaborate closely with migrant solidarity groups, and this work has contributed to theirs in three main ways: (1) it produced an interactive digital map to make the evidence of state anti-migrant domicide accessible to the public; (2) it synthesised the data collected by the collaborating activist groups with secondary sources (the statements of state actors and critical scholarly research) to explain the developments in domicidal tactics, and how they correlated with shifts in governmental policy over the years; and (3) it mapped domicide on to the concept of citizenship to reveal how different forms of citizenship are produced through different interventions spatially excluding migrants in Calais. The first two interventions provide very practical contributions in explicating and denouncing the continued domicidal state violence which is a main bordering practice in the city. However, the thesis' third theoretical intervention is a more abstract, but equally necessary, contribution to freedom of movement struggles. By counter-mapping how citizenship is produced as a concept through the examples of its constitutive border violence, this research undermines the progressive conception one of the main ideological pillars undergirding migration governance and the reproduction of global inequalities. At the same time it demands a serious reconsideration of how citizenship should be thought of in relation to freedom of movement struggles, and treated in migrant solidarity work. The reflections developed throughout this thesis are offered in the hopes of weakening the concept's grip on how solidarity movements organise, the aims they strive for, and especially for how critical scholars make sense of them.

Furthermore, picking apart the (semi)coherent fabric of citizenship and/in the city shows how both have been produced through the constant repetition of exclusionary spatial interventions. These exclusions are then reciprocally re-enforced by Calais' spaces and the citizenship forms that have been produced. This is a self-reinforcing process that leads to the continual exclusion of migrants who are always Other and out-of-place; however, it is *not* totally successful nor incontestable. In fact, by displaying the numerous interventions re-establishing the normative geometry of citizenship and the city, this three-part counter-map proves just how contingent their effects are, not to mention the intensity of the struggle against segregation and apartheid that irregular migrants carry out everyday.

The domicidal interventions which have been mapped must then be understood not only as erasing the very spaces created by this resistance to re-inscribe citizenship distinctions, but as attempts to erase the very history of resistance. Erasing these histories promotes a collective social amnesia that makes imagining further resistance and alternative futures more difficult, while also obscuring how migrants' struggles themselves, and not just their erasure, are embedded in the city. Thus, the map-archive provides a template for looking past the givenness of the city-space produced through practices of bordering and erasure, and to read the struggles which came before and which will inevitably return as equally constitutive of its urban fabric. Taking such a critical gaze towards the city's walls in fact reveals how traces of those places where 'no one was illegal', even if in small and temporary ways, are still written all over them. Although now lying dormant, if the histories of those struggles can be reanimated, they may yet prove to be valuable accomplices in bursting through citizenship's walls again.

In addition to the counter-map's contributions to freedom of movement struggles, there have also been a number of contributions made to the critical scholarly literature on borders, migration, and citizenship in Calais. A main theoretical contribution of the study is on the spatial production of citizenship through domicide. This thesis defines domicide as a technology of citizenship (Section 4.4) which, through exclusionary spatial interventions, can produce citizenship forms connected to, but also distinct from, the nation-state. While drawing on theorisations of detention and deportation, the conceptualisation of domicide as a spatial technology of citizenship is a novel contribution to the literature on exclusionary citizenship in relation to migration.

'Spaces of anti-citizenship' (Section 4.3) also contributes to the literature by shifting the perspective on the relationship between citizenship and the often impermanent and insecure homes which migrants create during the stages of their irregular journeys. Most studies of citizenship and migrants' spatial struggles celebrate them, and the ruptures they produce, as examples of citizenship politics, while the perspective from the autonomy of migration literature emphasises how they go beyond citizenship. Anti-citizenship instead acknowledges how these spaces are entangled with citizenships' inequalities as they are often inhabited by many different types of people with gradations of (non)citizen status and their accompanying citizenship privileges. In fact, anti-citizenship draws attention specifically to how these groups develop solidarities through which to challenge citizenship's inequalities together despite the differences that exist among them. While different definitions of citizenship have proliferated in the literature, and there have been a number of qualifiers attached to it as a prefix (e.g. multicultural, spatial, urban, migrant, post-colonial etc.), the prefigurative politics of anti-citizenship I contribute here attempts to push beyond them and seriously grapple with the intractable and Hydra-like nature of citizenship's anti-coalitional exclusions.

Justifying the need for an anti-citizen politics also contributed to the critique of the 'conceptual imperialism' (Subsection 2.4.2) which exists within analyses of migrants' struggles coming from the CCS perspective. This built on existing critiques from scholars associated with the autonomy of migration perspective, but contributes to them through bringing reflections from decolonial scholarship to bear on questions of migrants' struggles and the epistemic violence of conceptual translation (Vázquez, 2011).

The thesis also contributed to understandings of environmental and humanitarian citizenship in the context of migration; showing not only how they are produced through spatial interventions, but in particular how they perpetuate racist exclusions against racialised 'non-citizen' irregular migrants. As Davies and Isakjee (2018) remark, race needs to be much more central to studies of the violence of the border and citizenship regime in Calais. This thesis has robustly responded to their call, showing not just how racism is foundational to irregular migrants' spatial exclusion in Calais, but how it remains at the heart of different types of 'modern' *and* 'diverse' citizenship (Tully, 2014, pp. 8–9) produced in the city.

The final area where this research contributed to existing scholarship is in the presentation of empirical material from the history of irregular migrants' spatial segregation in Calais. Much international academic attention has been paid to the border in Calais and the irregular migrants who are forced to remain there. However, there has yet to be a thorough overview of the erasure of irregular migrants' homes in the city as a bordering practice since the 1991 Sangatte Protocol. While not being able to provide a complete history in this thesis, the case studies and narrative accounts presented here are a significant step in that direction. Particularly considering that so much scholarship has focused on the time of the Jungle between 2015-16, highlighting the smaller scale and more frequent cycles of occupation and domicide which preceded and succeeded it offers a more complete picture. The thesis has also demonstrated how the events in this history and various strategies of migration control in the city are connected to one another; for example, the shift of the 48 hour window of flagrant delit from a tactic of resistance to a justification for hyper-cycles of destruction. Finally, although not part of the thesis itself, much of the archival material published in the digital map will be made public in that platform for the first time, and thus can provide data for others to analyse in future research into Calais' exclusionary geographies.

9.3 Limitations

Given that understanding how citizenship is produced and spatialised in Calais is such a broad topic, I have necessarily analysed it in a limited way by choosing to concentrate on domicide. This relatively narrow study has only been able to fleetingly address other exclusionary spatial interventions like abandonment, borders, detention, deterrence, or deportation that do not target living spaces but which also produce and spatialise citizenship in similar ways. Therefore, this study must be augmented with others on these interrelated exclusionary spatial technologies. This would provide a more complete illustration of how citizenship and the greater regime of mobility governance co-produce one the level of the city.

Other counter-maps are also urgently needed for other border geographies, and in particular for how these spaces are interconnected with one another. Expanding our understanding of the exclusionary geographies of Calais to include those of other spaces in the archipelago of Europe's borders, and how the very same European citizenship and border regimes extend further into other continents, is necessary to understand how nodal networks of exclusionary spaces coalesce to produce and spatialise citizenship at regional and global levels.

By counter-mapping citizenship this research has broken open the concept, to reveal the aggregated violence, social relations, and the spatial interventions which produce it, but there are also a number of other concepts that deserve to be similarly counter-mapped to improve the overall picture of how the border regime functions in Calais, and in other contexts. For example, similar work could be done to show how concepts like 'migrant' and 'migration', 'home', or even 'race' are produced through spatial interventions. This project also touched upon the importance of the 'hostile environment', considered as the social, political, and natural environment. Countermapping Calais' hostile environment could provide a better understanding of how the non-human world is increasingly weaponised to prevent unsanctioned mobilities while deferring border violence onto natural hazards that remain legally and politically immune from accountability. All of these maps (whether they come in the form of cartographies, narratives, theoretical deconstructions, or something else entirely) are necessary to achieve a coherent and detailed overview of the spatial, bureaucratic, and discursive terrain struggles for free movement have to navigate against so that they might better see where to intervene within them.

The main limitation of this project, however, is the lack of contributions from those who have directly experienced the events at the centre of this research—the irregular migrants targeted with domicide themselves—but whose stories have not found their way into the text. This decision, although justified in Section 1.2 as not contributing to research fatigue nor misrepresenting migrants' experience or politics of resistance, still remains problematic. My intention is that in ongoing collaboration with solidarity groups continuing to work on the ground in Calais everyday, and who have better and longer-term connections with people on the move, their voices can find a better forum than the one provided by this thesis (hopefully, at least in part, in the digital mapping platform which is the other output of this research project). Although I have tried to unpack the state strategies and tactics underlying these exclusions, as well as the consequences they have for citizenship politics, this picture is necessarily incomplete without the insights and testimonies of those enduring and resisting them daily.

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